# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 534 U.S. 1084

## Text

® Supreme , (Cour, US.

Not 2 4830 MAY 12 2001
OFFIGE OF THE CLERK —

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

JAY NOLAN RENOBATO,

Petitioner

versus

BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT
Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION(APPEAL) FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI,

Jay Nolan Renobato
Arbitrageur, Contractor, and Proprietor of Record
Post Office Box 9771
The Woodlands, Texas. 77387
(213)364-8250
Natural Person Pro Se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Certified Federal Questions. Commonly described as a federal
question in equity, the Renobato contest against Bureau of the
Public Debt arises under dual federal treatise including the
Constitution, and Acts of Congress, and involves their appropriate
application to the property and contracts at issue, and of which
jurisdiction is given to federal courts at all levels. (See U.S. CONST.
art. III, sec. 2, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1292, 1331.)

(a) Constitutio Reconstitution and the Bill of Rights. In
general terms, does the Constitution of the United States of America
vest Petitioner with certain fundamental and inalienable civil rights,
powers, and privileges in redressing grievances via recourse in the
federal court system to recoup remuneration? And further, does the
Bill of Rights draw provisions the Claimant is entitled, empowered,
and warranted to use in seeking damage in a court of last resort?

(b) United States Code, and Code of Federal Regulations.
In particular terms, is Respondent liable in various United States
capital market venues for its omissions and/or commissions of acts
in violation of certain definitive trade customs, duties, and
obligations promulgated under federal code appurtenant to
Commerce and Trade and Money and Finance? (15 U.S.C., 31
US.C., 31 C.F.R., & Reg T) ;

PARTICIPANTS TO THE PROCEEDING
2. Natural Person Claimant v. Artificial Person Respondent. The
only real entities (‘parties’[sic]) in interest concerning Renobato v.
Bureau of the Public Debt now pending before the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the 5 Circuit are listed in the caption. The petitioner is
Jay Nolan Renobato, a sole proprietor and arbitrageur who
advances pro se. The respondent is Bureau of the Public Debt (in
the Bureau of Printing and Engraving in the Department of the
Treasury), a fiscal service factor. In the courts below, Renobato is
called Plaintiff, Claimant, and Appellant, whereas the Bureau is
customarily referred to as the Defendant, Respondent, and
Appellee. The interstate commerce controversy originates between
Texas and the District of Columbia where the participants reside. In
addition to those listed on the face of the cover, defense attorneys
incorrectly purport that the United States, an intervenor, is the
actual defendant named in the case. Real Defendant Bureau,
however, is in fact a subsidiary! inter-governmental organization
(‘IGO’). Also, the Government is a participant in a high proportion
of litigation in the Supreme Court.?

1 The United States is the parent of Bureau of the Public Debt.
2 The statistics for any Term[sic] can be found in the Annual Report of the Solicitor
General, which is printed as a part of the Annual Report of the Attorney General.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Capital Case Terms Page:
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ....---:sssesrrrrresrrrrene i.
PARTICIPANTS TO THE PROCEEDING «...------sssseeeresrrrre i.
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....--++ssesesessesrrensesenser tener iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......---+0sssererersseereee eer Vv
OPINIONS BELOW .......:-csecsesrsessorenenenesrerenenenenensen ener 1

EPA CHUM ..00 ABDOREEK ..cvcccccsecvssevecrsossessosveseess (28 U.S.C.- Appendix)
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule of the Supreme Court of the United States of America

Title 31 United States Code- Money and Finance ...(31 U.S.C. et seq.)
Subtitle III- Financial Management
Chapter 31- Public Debt
Subchapter I- Borrowing Authority
Chapter 310i- Public Debt Limit
Chapter 3104-Certificates of Indebtedness/Treasury bills
Chapter 33- Depositing, Keeping, and Paying Money
Subtitle IV- Money
Chapter 51- Coins and Currency
Chapter 53- Monetary Transactions

Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations- Money and Finance: Treasury
ocvcacencuesedeevacedsveesecosentetnesecdaudnsseenseibadtnesdinene (31 C.F.R. et seq.)
Subtitle B- Regulations Relating to Money and Finance
Chapter II- Fiscal Service
Subchapter B- Bureau of the Public Debt
Part 306-General Regulations Governing U.S. Securities
Part 309- Issue and Sale of Treasury Bills
Part 356- Sale and Issue of Marketable Book-Entry
Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds ;
Part 357- Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury
Bonds, Notes, and Bills

Title 17 Code of Federal Regulations Chapter II Part 240 Section
153-1 Securities Mairead ......ccesscvsesecseess (17 C.F.R. § 240.15¢3-1)

Secondary Sources:

General Accounting Office; Payments, Clearance, and Settlement: A
Guide to the System, Risks, and Issues, GAO-GGD-97-73....... 10

S.Cottle, R. Murray, and F. Block; “Graham and Dodd’s Security

Analysis,” Fifth Ed. (1988).............cscccseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenees 16
B. Bailyn, “The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution” 55,

ea FI Ca ia ectik sibs adacaicetnntenssncepeseeerncncecseverveonn 18
G. Wood, “Creation of the American Republic” (1969)................. 18

Westen, “The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math and
Morals: A Reply,” 81 Mich.L.Rev. 604 (1983); Westen, “The
Empty Idea of Equality,” 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982) ......... 20

xi

xii

CERTIORARI
ONE SOLE PROPRIETOR Jay Nolan Renobato a basis trader
proceeding pro se, comes forward to request, appropriately appeal,
and firmly call for a rightful Writ of Certiorari to issue from the
United States Supreme Court in reviewing opinions of various
federal Judges in territorial and local venues constituted within the
United States of America in conjunction with commerce and trade.

OPINIONS BELOW

I. Fifth Circuit. On 13 February 2001 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit filed, docketed, and entered into the
record a two-part ‘MEMORANDUM’ and “Conference Calendar”
combination representing apparent actions that confirm printing
and other errors and also proffers misjudged opinions about
Plaintiff's motives in the controversy on trade and competition. (See
St Circuit’s ‘MEMORANDUM‘- (Appendix A); and “Conference
Calendar” of 13 February 2001.) The overlying paper credit confirms
typographical and printing errors on the face of such underlying
instrument, whereas the actual underlying decision is unsigned by
any judge and therefore rendered invalid under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (See FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 11) In the lower case
numbered 00-20555 at the intermediate level, the government has
requested the so-called “Conference Calendar” document not be re-
published and in honoring such request, Claimant will not reprint
such document in any appendix hereto. (See 5 Cir. “Conference
Calendar” of 13 February 2001.) Note also that the 5 Circuit Court
did not affirm the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas ruling and did not contain particular findings of
fact, draw lines of reasoning, make conclusions of law, or grant
evidentiary concessions; whereas no valid ORDER has been
rendered by any United States court appertaining to any oral
argument hearing, trial contest, or final judgement. Further, on
Appellant's Application for Hearing(Re)? and Motion for En Banc
Determination originally stamped 27 February 2001, and later re-
entered on 14 March 2001, the said court filed a document titled “On
Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc” [sic] of 18
April 2001 ratifying stay of the mandate under Rule 41, where no
per curiam certification on the en banc authority were given. (See 5

3 Appellant is of the position that no formal hearing[sic], argument, or trial has
transpired as purported in such referenced 13 February screening process, and
subsequent 18 April DENIAL; and that the minority Smith, Barksdale, and Garza of
the full Circuit have not auditorily participated in any conference scheduled or
argument contest. (5% Cir. Rule 33)

l

Circuit’s 18 April 2001 Ruling ‘Note’.) Appellant's timely petition
for hearing, and request to poll the individual judge’s positions,
opinions, and standing was entered on 13 March 2001. (See FED. R.
APP. P. Rule 35) In addition, on 8 November 2000 the Fifth Circuit
denied Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record, an Emergency Writ
of Habeas Corpus Cum Onre, and from the onset has neglected to
execute a Monetary Product and Electronic Credit Currency Attachment.
(See 8 November 2000 Court filing; & Appellant's Brief Attachment.)
II. Southern District of Texas. As a result of an original United
States District Court antitrust proceeding commenced under seal on
9 February 2000 and numbered H-00-0425 in the Southern District of
Texas, Bureau of the Public Debt (Defendant, Respondent, and
Appellee below) an inter-governmental quasi-corporation within
the Bureau of Printing and Engraving in the Department of the
Treasury of the United States Executive Branch, obtained an
internally biased and unwarranted verbal opinion on 19 May, and
an insequens void written order of 23 May 2000 from a United States
District Court Judge situated on the same Judiciary Branch side of
government. (See 19 May 2000 “Transcript of Rule 16[sic]
Conference” Before the Honorable Vanessa D. Gilmore docket entry
#26, and such 23 May 2000 Court ORDER{sic] constituting docket
entry #27.) Now since the Money credit and Commerce clause in
Article I Section 8, and since the Full Faith and Credit obligation
issue declared under Article IV Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States have both been completely obliterated by the acts in
legislation promulgated in paper form by such justice, the operation
of the law has inappropriately precluded Renobato (Plaintiff,
Claimant, or Appellant) from obtaining relief in the form of
consideration on good forward derivative government securities
contracts, and must be adjusted and changed. (See U.S. CONST.)
This stands to reason as the 5 Circuit neither affirmed nor
concurred such acts of the Houston Division. The opinions and
order(s) of the courts entered in the case are unreported. The 19 May
statements and trailing decree of the U.S. District Court granting a
preliminary injunction filed 23 May 2000 are reproduced in
Appendix B and Appendix C to this petition.

THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI (JURISDICTIONAL

GROUNDS)

Ill. Affirmative Jurisdiction on Appeal. To frankly acknowledge
and freely lay before the court body the sundry constitutional,
statutory, and codified in personam and in rem ways on which
jurisdiction positively rests is plain, simple, and straightforward.

2

(See U.S.CONST,., 15 U.S.C. Ch. 1 §§ 4, 9 et. seq., 28 U.S.C. Ch. 81 et.
seq., 31 U.S.C. Ch. 35 et. seq.) In truth, beginning with the Judiciary
Act of 1925, Congress by successive enactments greatly increased
the extent of discretionary control lodged in the Supreme Court to
determine for itself the kinds of appellate litigation which would be
decided by the Court on the merits. (See Ex parte Republic of Peru,
La.1943, 63 S.Ct. 793, 798; and see also “The Supreme Court under the
Judiciary Act of 1925,” (1928) 42 Harvard L.Rev. 1.) However, before
that act, the First and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States had guaranteed the inalienable right of citizens to
equal litigation opportunity. (See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).) In addition, the declaration of a mere notice of
appeal has been characterized as being jurisdictional, and
accordingly the ability to come to the Court by the appeal route
remains a right of noteworthy value to the litigant. (See e.g. Holley v.
Capps, 468 F.2d 1366 (C.A. 5, 1972).) In fact, the Supreme Court's
treatment of such right of access to meaningful civil adjudication of
disputes illustrates the principle that decision-making processes,
made essential by the government, must not be simultaneously
denied because of economics to those who are obliged to rely upon
such processes. (See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).) Otherwise
the government is free to ignore its trial hearing duties with
impunity, leaving our heritage of procedural safeguards to be “only
a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like
a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will.” (See Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 401
U.S. 371, 377 (1971).) Although the original jurisdiction conferred
upon the Supreme Court by Article 3 Section 2 of the Constitution is
not exclusive by virtue of that provision alone, the State may not
deprive someone of that access, and must give litigants a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in court. (See Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. at 77; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Long v.
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969).) Moreover, this action covers jurisdiction of
numerous specific federal questions involving a natural person in
the Republic of Texas and an artificial person contemporaneously
situated in both the territories of the District of Columbia and
Parkersburg, West Virginia. Thus, interpreting an action between an
entity in one State against another entity in another part of the
United States to enforce penalties for violations of federal statutes

3

against a State-owned utility qualifies and confers express exclusive
jurisdiction. (See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1251; and Louisiana v. Texas, 1899, 20
S.Ct. 251, 176 U.S. 1, 44 L.Ed. 442; United States v. State of Utah, 1931,
51 S.Ct. 438, 283 U.S. 64, 75 L.Ed. 844; United States v. 4,450.72 Acres
of Land, Clearwater County, State of Minnesota, D.C.Minn. 1939, 27
F.Supp. 167, affirmed 125 F.2d 636; United States v. California, 1936,
56 S.Ct. 421, 297 U.S. 175, 80 L.Ed. 567.) Now without question in
establishing the remainder of positive jurisdiction in this particular
matter, the codified boundaries putting forward such affirmative
jurisdiction for plenary consideration on appeal will be reinforced
by numerous legislative means within certain United States Code
titles involving but not limited to; (1) decisions of three judge
federal courts, and (2) as of right directly to the Supreme Court
under occasional special statutes which may be used to create
jurisdiction in any particular situation. (See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1254)
In judicial terms, this Court's jurisdiction stands perfectly in pleas to
the court of last resort concerning ‘Direct appeals from decisions of
three-judge courts’ wherefore- “any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and
hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding required by an Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” (28 U.S.C.
§ 1253) In fact, historically the instant provision consolidates Section
28 of title 15 U.S.C., 1940 ed. Commerce and Trade, and section 44 of
title 49 U.S.C., 1940 ed. Transportation, are identical and provide for
convening three-judge panels to try and determine cases arising
under the Sherman anti-trust law and the Interstate Commerce Act,
respectively, or any decisions holding Federal laws repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States. A three-judge panel headed the
unsigned 13 February 2001 decision of the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals that is sought to be reviewed. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. §
1254 ‘Court of appeals; certiorari; certified question’ facilitates
jurisdiction enabling that- “Cases in the courts of appeals may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: (1) By
Writ of Certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil
or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgement or decree; (2)
By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of
law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired,
and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding
instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of
the entire matter in controversy.” (28 U.S.C. § 1254) Moreover, a
redesignated way of invoking jurisdiction that is par for the course

4

and that is to be followed in the same manner and with like effect of
the antecedent statutes are found under 15 U.S.C. § 4- Jurisdiction of
Courts, 15 U.S.C. § 9- Jurisdiction of Courts, and 15 U.S.C. § 29-
Appeals. At this point, it should be added that certiorari review was
expressly provided for in cases coming from certain special
economic controversies. (See Fry v. United States, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 1972,
421 US. 542, 44 L.Ed.2d 363; Colgate v. United States, Ct.C1.1929, 50
S.Ct. 22, 280 U.S. 43, 74 L.Ed. 157; United States v. Shearer, Ct.Cl.1944,
65 S.Ct. 187, 189, 323 U.S. 676, 89 L.Ed. 549.) Drawing from defense
testimony, in papers filed on 15 September 2000, attorneys for
Defendant conceded the allegation of jurisdiction as such record
clearly states in respect of such territorial courts jurisdiction to hear
claims that Plaintiff's notice of appeal was timely filed “thereby
vesting this Court with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”
(See 15 Sep. 2000 Brief of Appellee p.2, par.1, sen.2) Recently,
Petitioner’s timely Application for Hearing, and Motion for En Banc
Determination (incorporated as Appendix D) was denied on 18 April
2001, which directly sanctions this court with statutory jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). Overall, the overriding premise and
larger point taken is that the referenced statutory class shall not be
construed to be in derogation of any right in Appellant for direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States under existing
provisions of federal law. Additionally, this petition is filed
according to Rule 11. (See Rules of the Supreme Court.) Thus in
sum, it is easy to see, in respect of cases coming from the United
States courts, that the statutory authorization for review on
certiorari is extremely comprehensive and guaranteed under federal
law. The notification required by Rule 29 has been made, whereas
28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) may be applicable. (See Rules of the Supreme
Court Rule 29) This favors safety of the people’s rights.

LAWS, STATUTES, AND RULES INVOLVED
IV. Regulatory Codification. Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt
involves pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, United States Code, Code of Federal Regulations, Regulation
T of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, and Federal Rules of
Evidence. Originally the matter primarily used 15 United States
Code Chapter 1- Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of
Trade (15 U.S.C.) (Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Wilson Tariff Act,
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, Expediting Act, and
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act); 31 United States Code Chapter 31- Money
and Finance (31 U.S.C.), 31 Code of Federal Regulations- Money and

5

Finance: Treasury (31 C.F.R.), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations-
(12 C.F.R.) (‘Reg T’ Section 220.7- “Arbitrage”). Similarly, the
Constitution as well as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure are applicable and relevant. Recent
developments have invoked the Texas Business and Commerce
Code § 17.41- § 17.63 (Deceptive Trade Practices- Consumer
Protection Act) Certain of the laws, statutes, and rules involved are
cited and put forward at Appendix E to this petition.

BASIS AND CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE

WITH MATERIAL FACTS

V. Legal Statements and Factual Data. Renobato v. Bureau of the
Public Debt is a large and complex case. Originally at the United
States District Court level, the indictment numbered H-00-0425
included a total of twenty-six counts of complaint of which nine
were common law pleadings, seven causes of complaint were
statutory infringements, and the remaining ten were regulatory
breaches. (See Plaintiff's Original Complaint and Statement of Claim of 9
February 2000) Moreover, prosecution’s Bill of Exchange filed
concurrently derives $1,337,962,000 in gross mense profits on such
zero coupons, and is supported in case law. (See Brown Shoe
Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1524,
(1962); Grumman Corp., v. LTV Corp., 527 F.Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.)
affirmed, 665 F.2d 10(2"4 Cir. 1981); SuperTurf v. Monsanto Co., 660
F.2d 1275 (8 Cir.1981).) Neither of said Original Complaint and
Statement of Claim (on a point by point basis), or such Bill of Exchange
(on an accounting basis), have ever been denied by the Defendant
Bureau of the Public Debt or any United States attorney to date. (See
Defendant United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) and, alternatively, Motion
for Summary Judgement [sic] filed 10 April 2000.) Obviously, if the
weight of import of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are equal, then

in balance the parallel Rules 7 and 8 would strike out the Defense’s
pleas on the grounds that their motion (1) was not denominated as a
third-party ‘answer’ as stipulated under Rule 7(a), (2) is essentially
an abolished demurrer (according to Rule 7(c)) titled under the
guise of a secondary Motion for Summary Judgement sans ce que
minimum scintilla of evidence rule (See Chiniche v. Smith, Ala. 374
So.2d 872, 873; Wilson v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., Ala., 331 So.2d 617,
619), (3) admits the twenty-six counts of complaint for failure to -
deny pursuant to Rule 8(d), and (4) is not constructed under to Rule
8(f) to the specifications of Rule 8(c). (See FED. R. CIV. P. generally.)
Notwithstanding, technically the subject matter involves patent

6

Oe ee ee ee ee eS ae eee lee

eee SS ee oe ee

settlements in issues appurtenant to an antitrust lawsuit
encompassing over one billion dollars in surety claims underlying
the notion of relevant national securities issues. (See CIVIL COVER
SHEET (Form JS 44) of 8 February 2000; see 31 C.F.R. Part 309; and
see also e.g. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F.Supp.
295, 340, 341 (D.Mass.1953), affirmed per curiam, 347 U.S. 521, 74
S.Ct. 699 (1954); Valmont Industries Inc., v. Yuma Mfg. Co., D.C.Colo.,
296 F.Supp. 1291, 1294).) In the most basic sense, the particular
derivative action commenced by financier Plaintiff seeks nothing
more than timely execution of instructions and transactions after
issue culminating in rightful due pecuniary payments, appropriate
‘E-Z CLEAR’ relations with the Fed corresponding to an
Administrative Bank Account (‘ABA’) routing number or
‘Participant’s Securities Account’, and established customer status
with the Department. (See 31 C.F.R. Subchapter B; 31 C.F.R. § 321.14;
31 C.F.R. 357.2, Federal Reserve Operating Circular No. 1)
Nonetheless, although it is incontrovertible that the Bureau is the
correct entity to be “charged with matters relating to transactions in
securities” (31 C.F.R. 306.1(b)) in competing claims regarding
securities held in TREASURY DIRECT , the matter has been totally
mischaracterized by the lower tier United States District Court as
being suit against the United States (who is not a real party in
interest or named in the caption) and therefore barred by the notion
of sovereign immunity; whereas the sovereign immunity exception
would only be applicable to judicial proceedings versus the
Treasury Department or a Federal Reserve Bank. (See 31 C.F.R. §
357.23 Judicial proceedings- sovereign immunity.) It is redundant to
note and point out that the Department, the Fed, and the United
States are not parties to the antitrust suit coined and entitled
Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt. On top of that, the Fifth
Circuit (who abandoned and did not affirm the Houston Division
judgment) also inaccurately purported that the case was
commenced solely to embarrass the opposing Respondent and thus
would not hear oral argument. (See 5% Cir. “Conference Calendar”
of 13 February 2001.) Now what is left, insofar as factual data is
concerned, is that it seems clear that the local and territorial courts
have arbitrated a hypothetical trial that has never occurred or been
heard -and not the legitimate arbitrage cause of action actually
before it. The invalid court orders have nullified rightful payments
in the denominated currency futures injuring credit Claimant's
economic standing and disparaging his commercial operations,
holding that the suit was tried and dismissed as if United States

7

Code, Federal Regulations, and Federal Rules did not exist in
ordinary calculations.

VI. Account. TREASURY DIRECT® account 4000-012-0872 is owned
by and registered under Plaintiff Appellant Renobato’s single
ownership name in the so-called TREASURY DIRECT” / TRADES
programs of participation. (See Appellant’s TREASURY DIRECT”
Account 4000-012-0872; 31 C.F.R. Part 357 Subpart B-

Treasury /Reserve Automated Debt Entry System (TRADES), and 31
C.F.R. Part 357 Subpart C- TREASURY DIRECT® Book-Entry
Securities System.) This account rendering is a common form of
action at law against any entity, who by reason of some fiduciary
relation (as factor, safe-keeper, etc.) was bound to render an account
to another on the basis of federal law, but has refused to do so. (See
Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal.App.2d 729,
137 P.2d 729, 731; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).) It should be
restated that Plaintiff has properly attempted to enjoin his due
rights and property interests through the legal process of
attachment, however, United States employees who act as judges in
the judicial branch have refused to grant access to such appropriate
securities account of Claimant within the executive branch. (31
C.F.R. § 357.44) This exclusion of investment banker Renobato from
the electronic payments system is wholly unwarranted, as even non-
bank entities are entitled to participate in the bidding process for
contracts to deliver federal benefits payments through electronic
terminals. (See Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232 (D.C.Cir.
1996).) Conspicuously, TREASURY DIRECT” is a registered monetary
product “trade-mark” of the instant fiscal service program in the
Department of the Treasury which positively confirms a direct
account relationship between the beneficial owner of Treasury
securities and the Department of the Treasury. (31 C.F.R. Part 357
App. B) Now, the high Court acting as a responsible organ of
government, is called on in good faith to represent the best values of
the judiciary in independently sorting out each and every count,
and to secure the widely circulated and explicit underlying issues of
restructuring the spread of stock options across a straddled
digitization gap of rightful asset ownership in such account
statement of Appellant. (See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1(1974); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 265 (1971).)

VII. Debt. In this case, the fundamental debt articles heretofore
neglected to be executed and enforced lie principally with the
Article I Section 8 commerce clause; the Fourteenth amendment

Section 4 where the validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, shall not be questioned; and the forgotten
Fifteenth amendment in the Bill of Rights vesting voting rights
protection. (See U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
sec. 4, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) A posteriori the referenced
legislation transmuted the nation-state’s operation of the public
commodity property use into a constructive “waiver” of immunity,
and is plenary, and brooks no restraint by the state on its exercise.
(See Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).) Technically, at
the same time, Title 31 United States Code Subtitle III- Financial
Management Chapter 31 Public Debt; and parallel Title 31 Code of
Federal Regulations Subtitle B Regulations Relating to Money and
Finance, Chapter II- Fiscal Service, Subchapter B Bureau of the
Public Debt make statutory provisions for commerce, securities
regulations, exchanges, trades, transfers, limit orders, borrowing
authority, privileges, options, markets, prices, etc.. A fortiori this
debt action is commonly for a sum of money owing to one person
from another entity in the form of electronic zeros; including not
only obligations of debtor to transact redemption, but also rights of
a public customer creditor to receive and enforce payment. (See State
v. Ducey, 25 Ohio App.2d 50, 266 N.E.2d 233, 235.) Clearly,
Appellant's current claims before the high court are within the
collar or cap enumerated according to the bottom line of Title 31
U.S.C. 31 § 3101 Public debt limit wherefore “the face amount of
obligations issued under this chapter and the face amount of
obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the
United States Government (except guaranteed obligations held by
the Secretary of the Treasury) may not be more than
$4,900,000,000,000, outstanding at any one time, subject to changes
periodically made in that amount” (See 31 U.S.C. 31 § 3101(b).)
Furthermore, 31 U.S.C. 31 § 3123- Payment of obligations and
interest on the public debt states that (a) “The faith of the United
States Government is pledged to pay, in legal tender, principal and
interest on the obligations of the Government issued under this
chapter,” and authorizes (b) “The Secretary of the Treasury shall
pay interest due or accrued on the public debt.” Certainly then, the
debt liability on this credit claim, TRADES duty, and open market
obligation in certificates of indebtedness including bills and hybrid
federal reserve notes securing collateral payments constitute
government derivatives under banking rules and are enforceable by
law. (Bankruptcy Code § 101)

VIII. Electronic Case. It seems to reason that one must inspect the
overlying prima facie contractual evidence and investigate the
underlying cost of bills before framing an opinion or rendering a
decision about this commerce lawsuit brought under the law of
competition. (See State ex rel. Herbert v. Whims, 68 Ohio App. 39, 38
N.E.2d 596, 599, 22 O.O. 110; State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Rickhoff, Mo.App., 509 S.W.2d 485, 487; and see also FED. R. CIV. P.
Rule 26 and Rule 34.) Certainly, the appropriate form of action
commonly adapted for the recovery of damages for some economic
injury resulting to the Appellant from the wrongful commission or
omission of the Appellee is ‘trespass on the case’ and comprehends
any misfeasance, transgression or offense which damages Plaintiff's
property or reputation. (See e.g. Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis.2d 171, 313
N.W.2d 790, 794; King v. Citizens Bank of DeKalb, 88 Ga.App. 40, 76
S.E.2d 86, 91) However, zeroing in on exactly what acts constitute
the assertion of electronic trespass on the case is not so readily
apparent on the face of the litigation and pleadings because the
Bureau of the Public Debt facility front is housed in the Bureau of
Printing and Engraving in the Department of the Treasury, whereas
it maintains back office operations in Parkersburg, West Virginia.
Comprehending the key issue of the electronic case connects the
Departments intranet software transferring the specific keyed
amount or denomination of monetary value through the
intermediary ‘E=Z CLEAR’ primary bank reserve system into the
designated depository account at such secondary retail banking
institution.* However, only United States coin and currency,
including Federal Reserve notes, (and not electronic money) are
legal tender by law and is the form of currency to be accepted by
creditors legally discharging debts. (31 U.S.C. § 5103) Finally insofar
as the scope of electronic case is concerned 15 U.S.C. Chapter 41
Subchapter VI is relevant. (15 U.S.C. §1693 et seq.)

IX. Standing in the Zone of Interest and Passing the Zone of
Interest Trial. Plaintiff's claim and complaint fall within the
prudential zone of interests protected by the federal commerce and
trade law invoked, and is built on the separation of powers and
recognizes “the proper- and properly limited —role of the courts in a
democratic society.” (See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751(1984).) In

4 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; Payments, Clearance, and Settlement: A Guide
to the System, Risks, and Issues, GAOQ-GGD-97-73

10

recess

particular terms relating to access and review combined, Article III,
§ 1 makes it apparent that, while the constitution itself provides for
a Supreme Court, it does not similarly mandate lower federal
courts: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court...” Moreover Article III, § 2 provides that “the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to both Law and
as to Fact.” (See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330-
31 (1816).) These notions are important in screening and
determining that the competitor Appellant’s cause qualifies for
review by the Supreme Court as one aggrieved by court “action
within the meaning of a relevant statute” when “the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question.” (See Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); Clarke v.
Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757 (1987).) In contrast, what
has transpired below is that the district court improperly looked
beyond the zone of antitrust statutes under which the Plaintiff
originally brought suit and imported such ideas of “waiver of
sovereign immunity”, the over-broad “Federal Tort Claims Act”,
and the “Tucker Act”, to find inapplicable, irrelevant, and repealed
laws upon which to summarily dismiss the action and pass the zone
of interest trial to the Circuit Court for discovery. (See Defendant
United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
FED.R.CIV.P. Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) and, alternatively, Motion for
Summary Judgement [sic] filed 10 April 2000.) Factually, there was
no need for the court to look beyond the concrete evidence of
contracts (Form PD 3905) in discerning its zone of interest (See Form
3905 for issue instructions on CUSIP(s) 912795- BNO, BL4, CF6, CJ8,
and FG1), because the United States court agencies decisions have
“by its own force, raise(d) separation of powers problems” by
illustrating coordination between branches of government,
inasmuch as such problems arose “from the substantive issues the
individual seeks to have adjudicated.” (See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 99 (1968).) Likewise, there is simply no “interplay” between the
laws the action was commenced under and what rules the courts
have relied on, that are relevant to shedding light on the law of
competition, in order to avoid regulation of an ‘IGO’ Bureau in the
executive branch. Overall, the recurring and overriding fact is that
Appellant had established standing in the court of first instance
commonly and statutorily on 15 U.S.C. 1, 31 U.S.C. Subtitle III, 31
C.F.R. Subtitle B, and Reg T, whereas there should be no question as

to whether the Bureau of the Public Debt has the capacity to be sued
in a court of law.

X. Indispensability of the structure of the United States
Government outside the scope of Real Parties in Interest. In —
validating the necessity of governmental institutions, the American
“people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest
it (i.e. ‘government’) with requisite powers” conducive to the
interest of the people. (The Federalist Papers No. 2 (J. Jay).) In other
words, the federal court system structure identified pursuant to
Article III of the Constitution is essential in providing a way, means,
and venues for the people to redress their grievances according to
Article I of the Bill of Rights. (See U.S.CONST. art. III; and Bill of
Rights art. I) This axiom is undeniable, however, “among the most
formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to
encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a
certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may
hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequences of
the office they hold under the State establishments.” (The Federalist
No. 1 (A. Hamilton).) To the danger that the judges themselves
might stray beyond their constitutionally delegated sphere of
authority and thereby serve personal impulse to shield and protect
another Bureau of their employer, rather than the Constitution,
leaders of post-Revolutionary opinion replied by arguing that the
judiciary would “be bound down by strict rules and precedents.”
(The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton).) The founders added that,
lacking ultimate “influence over either the sword or the purse,” the
federal judiciary “may truly be said to have neither force nor will
but merely judgement” and may thus be expected to remain “the
least dangerous” branch. (The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton).) For
this very reason the court is trusted to serve as “an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature” but is not expected to
allow government intrusion of Appellant’s preferred rights, or
intervene as the United States appurtenant to the presentation of
security interest evidence in lawsuits in equity. (See Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); and compare 28 U.S.C. § 2403.)
Albeit now, it is up to the Supreme Court to execute the
implementation of such rules and precedents. Consequently in
Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt, the Supreme Court has the
delicate job of differentiating the overlap of branches, commingling
of real parties in interest, and separating undue influence and
internal bias from judgements which fail to restrain the impairment
of the obligation of contracts. (See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)

12

87 (1810); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984);
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).)

XI. Key Control Issues and Public Interest Satisfaction. The
development of electronic banking and commerce technologies has
strained traditional regulatory concepts and raised questions as to
when and how the government should regulate various products
and services that have emerged in today’s markets, although the
important legal right of Petitioner to go forward in front of a court
at every level of government remains long standing. (See King v.
Idaho Funeral Services Ass'n, 862 F.2d 744 (9t Cir.1988); Forro Precision
Inc., v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9t Cir.1982), appeal after remand,
745 F.2d 1283 (9% Cir.1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1130, 105 S.Ct. 2664
(1985); ESI Montgomery County Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899
F.Supp. 1061, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).) Factually, on 8 February, 1
March, 3 May, and 14 August 2000, purchases / sales were
transacted via non-competitive tenders for investment grade bills
directly between registered owner Plaintiff and the Department of
the Treasury. The indexed bills were issued 11 February, 4 March, 8
April, 6 May, and 17 August 2000. Stripped discount refunds (IO
tint component) were cleared and deposited 10 February, 3 March, 7
April, 5 May, and 16 August 2000. Claimant's reverse repurchase
instruction orders were drawn on Form PD 3905 for all issues, and
the noncertificated principal government warrants (PO corpus
component) were surrendered and presented for denominational
exchange in a timely manner in each instance. Nonredemption
electronic funds transfers occurred 13 May, 3 June, 8 July, 5 August,
and 16 November 2000 in the incorrect amount. The overlying
financials are T-bills and have resembling Fed Note physicals
underlying the currency options. The United States Court for the
Southern District has confirmed, verified, and admitted the true
ownership of securities entitlements saying that Renobato’s claims
“concern his Treasury bills”, whereas the opinion of the three-judge
panel for the Fifth Circuit, which abandoned Judge Gilmore’s
position, throws the law governing arbitrage, commerce and trade,
money and finance, and settlement payment into complete disarray
because of the split in vague judgements. (See 23 May 2000 Court
‘ORDER’ [sic], and compare 5% Circuit 13 February 2001 ‘Conference
Calendar’.) This square conflict and change in rules among
commercial enterprise and judiciary legislation means that, until the
Supreme Court of the United States resolves the issues, courts

13

aici

reviewing simple purchases and sales of securities will not be sure
what criteria to apply in deciding federal questions according to the
vagueness doctrine. (See McCrary v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 429 So.2d
1121, 1123; Porta v. Mayor City of Omaha, Neb., D.C.Neb., 593 F.Supp.
963, 865.) As it stands under the lower Court's rule, bona fide 15
U.S.C. 1 class cases are re-stated and erroneously classified under 28
U.S.C. 171 tort actions essentially putting the action in a place where
it cannot be settled but must go through years of grinding litigation.
Therefore, if the Fifth Circuit opinion is wrong but ruling remains
unreviewed, the decision will unjustifiably deter parties from
settling and force them unnecessarily to litigate this cause of action
on the property, contract, and evidentiary merits. If the Fifth Circuit
is right and access to the judicial system and the United States
capital marketplaces are closed, then parties that choose to enter
into common reverse repurchase agreements cannot rely on justice
of federal courts and should eventually see those rulings
overturned. This court must reverse the stance of the circuit court
panel and should grant review to clarify the governments exchange
and trade standards and prevent the enormous waste of both
judicial and personal resources that are the inevitable real-world
result of the conflicting rulings. Note that the whole public has some
common interest in this cause because the preservation and use of
property held for the benefit of people, and devoted to public use
and interest, and may be regulated and protected so that future
generations shall not be deprived of the general benefit of such
resources. (See Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43, 46.) The
circumstances which clothe this particular kind of business with the
requisite “public interest” is the close relationship between the
public and those engaged in the business world, and raises
implications of affirmative obligation on part of the judiciary to be
reasonable in dealing with the public. (15 U.S.C. § 16(e)) Plaintiff
does not have to dedicate his property or business solely to public
use, or cover it with a public interest, merely because he co-makes
commodities for, and trades with the public in common callings.
(See Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of State of
Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630, 633, 67 L.Ed. 1103.) Here,
Appellant's business presses and bears upon meeting the public
interest standard because it is large, because the public has a
concern in respect of its maintenance, and derives benefit,
accommodation, ease, and enjoyment from it. (See Tyson & Bro.
United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 271 U.S. 418, 47 S.Ct. 426, 71
L.Ed. 718.) The fact is that in addition to the former positive reasons,

14

the competitive impact and impact of entry is in the public interest
for any potential would-be participant. (See Chevron USA Inc. v.
Natural Defense Resources Council, 467 U.S. 837(1984).) Even so, be
reminded that all Judges on the bench are employees of the United
States and therefore subject to recusal, and that for many years it
has been the Court's invariable practice to grant certiorari when
four of the nine justices affirmatively press and vote for a grant of
certiorari. (See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., Mo.1957, 77 S.Ct. 443,
450, 532 U.S. 500, 509, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, 517.)

XII. Program Schedule and Leverage Tool Use. Arbitrage and
leveraged buyout transactions are perfectly legal and regular
practice in the equity, commodity, and treasury markets
respectively. (Reg T _ 220.7) Basically, leverage or capitalization can
be defined as the use of a smaller investment to generate a larger
rate of return through debt usage. (See e.g. Community Bank v. Jones,
278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470, 475.) This efficient use of leverage is
critical to any arbitrageur’s scheduled rate of return or animus
lucrandi. Records will show that Plaintiff Renobato is well versed in
the positive effect of gearing long positions and unwinding or
matching a corresponding short position in order to complete such
permissible arbitrage transactions. (See Renobato v. Merrill Lynch et.
al., NYSE Inc., Arbitration #1997-006649, and see also Renobato v.
Merrill Lynch et. al., U.S.D.C. case H-98-0360 now pending in the
SDoT.) In this particular cause of action styled Renobato v. Bureau
of the Public Debt, the lawful and proper program schedule or
leverage tool to use in procuring transfers and exchanges in
government securities is Form PD 1827 or Form PD 3905 as
appropriate. (31 C.F.R. § 306.15) ‘Minimum to hold’ means the
smallest amount of a security that will be issued to a bidder and
may be held in any book-entry account, and is equivalent to
securities haircuts. (See 31 C.F.R. § 356.2, and compare 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-1.) The reverse repurchase deficit represented as the
differential between the market value of securities subject to the
contract price for the repurchase of the securities at appropriate
market values has lead to charging the Bureau with conspiring to
eliminate the competition for product versions, and by tying up the
supply of key trigger mechanisms (i.e. transactions after issue) used to
create them. (31 C.F.R. § 306.1(b).) The investor Claimant's
relationship with the Bureau’s back office operations, that supplies
the key electronic credit entries and is responsible for servicing this
function, has lead up to the commencement of action. The most
common element and ground on the Bureau’s antitrust violations

15

involve vertical mergers that restrain lawful arbitrage trade and
commerce, and lessen free competition. (15 U.S.C. § 7) From a
historical view, the Cellar-Kefauver Act is of significance since it
expanded the scope of Section 7 in a number of ways, including
bringing asset acquisitions within its scope. Thus, when the change
in capitalization results from a sale of additional stock at a
comparatively low price (through the exercise of subscription
rights/warrants) or to the convertibility of senior equities,
adjustments are usually made in rights> and this must be enforced.
DIRECT REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT
There are numbers of affirmative reasons why the Supreme Court
should grant this Petition for Certiorari that have traditionally
deemed to warrant plenary review, not the least of which are
conflicting judgments and inferences drawn against articles of the
Constitution, 15 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 31 C.F.R.. Generally, this
volume presents major issues of commerce, exchange and arbitrage.
Next, the renditions of lower court decrees create restraint problems
in the securities industry and are contrary to the language of the
open market system. (12 U.S.C. § 263(c)) Also, the opinions below
question nationwide issues concerning the enforcement of contracts
and property rights under statutory federal law. Particularly, the
differing legal standards split between the district and circuit courts,
if permitted to stand, cause confusion regarding the proper rule,
makes settlements chancy propositions, violates the rule of
evidence, and will strongly discourage business investment within
U.S. capital markets at large. Last, this cause is of public importance
to society as a whole because of the economic expansion created, the
monetary stimulus provided, and the commerce/trade benefits
directly bearing on the area’s credit status and should be reviewed. _
XIII. (A.) CONSTITUTIONAL PORTFOLIO- Fundamental property
and contract examinations. The total range of legal issues
heretofore put forward and explored in Renobato v. Bureau of the
Public Debt are numerous and many fold. (See generally Plaintiff's
Original Complaint and Statement of Claim, Creditor’s Bill of Exchange
filed 9 February 2000; and Appellants Brief of 16 August 2000.)
Concurrent listing of each and every particular encroachment and
breach claimed committed or omitted by Defendant Appellee
perpetrator is such that investigation of each in turn herein would
exceed the page limitation set for this economic treatise
denominated as certiorari in the appeals process. (See Rules of the

> COTTLE, MURRAY, BLOCK; Graham & Dodd's Security Analysis, 5% Ed. (1988)
16

Ee eee e Tn Te CMe Re ae RE eae EN NN

S.Ct. Rule 33.3) Notwithstanding, an intermediate three-judge court
arbitrarily writes an unsigned and vague opinion apparently setting
aside the claims of Claimant merchant at the appellate level (See 5'
Circuit Conference Calendar of 13 February 2000), whereas a lower
level federal district court enters an injunction appurtenant to a
subsidiary Defendant Bureau exactly coinciding with the point and
time scheduled for discovery (See U.S.D.C. ORDER filed 23 May
2000), and each referenced and identified act constitute the official
U.S. employees renditions upon which the following great
exceptions and weighty legal issues are based, founded, raised and
are matched to the notion that property can be attacked without any
enforcement.

1. Separation of Powers Restructured. Generally, on one
hand in guaranteeing certain civil and political rights under Article
I, Article II, and Article III the Magna Carta’s doctrine of separation
of powers is enacted as; “We the people of the United States”
provide for the severability of authority among the legislative
(writes and passes bills), executive (carries out acts), and judicial
(adjudicate disputes under laws) branches inside government. (See
U.S. CONST.) Particularly, on the other hand in terms of the
national security, Title 31 Money and Finance Code of Federal
Regulations Section 356.2; and 31 C.F.R. § 356 Subpart D legally
defines and makes provisions for the Separate Trading of Registered
Interest and Principal Securities which actually multiplies the
distribution of powers for the corpus and/or tint entitlement holder.
(See 31 C.F.R. § 356 generally.) Analogous, arranged in terms the
Supreme Court has promulgated and will understand, the executing
or reconstitution of such system of checks and balances will dictate
that an extreme branch “be limited to the exercise of the powers
appropriate to its own department and no other” (See Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881); Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838)), thus, the judicial branch in
fulfilling its mission to arrest the other branches so as to preserve
settled expectations that the body of federal legal principles has set,
the Court will exercise its judicial power pursuant to Article III, and
this is just. However, the foregoing coined postulate that flows from
the obligations of good faith stands to be affirmed or denied in
whole or in part because:

(a) if the current political system in place actually works,
operates, and produces results as a tried and true democratic
republic in checking one another to shield the individual from
governmental oppression and discrimination in a framework

17

ultimately supervised by disinterested judiciary, then the said legal
outcomes on this subject must be reversed, changed, or adjusted to
reflect a more appropriate model of settled government regularity
in separating the hegemonic monopolistic powers that be; and

(b) if the degree to which various governmental
arrangements comport with or threaten to undermine the
independence and integrity of one of the Plaintiff's species of
property rights, or if the extent of government trust combinations
manipulates determinations in subsidiary levels of government,
then the resulting conclusion drawn about the ability of the actions
at any one level renders another incapable of reaching the actual
goal of the constitutional design forming a well-balanced
government; or then the degree to which complicity between and
among levels of government yields damaging opinions in which no
one has to be adequately answerable, is righteous. (See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); State v. Scheuering, 226 La. 660, 76
So.2d 921, 924.)

2. Fundamental Property Rights and Preferred Liberty of
Contract. The general notion that governmental authority has limits
which preserve subjects autonomy predates the establishment of the
American republic.* Without question, Article I, § 10 commands
that, “No State shall...pass any...Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts...” (Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330,
353-54 (1935).) Likewise, rights of property ownership emerged as
an interpretation of, and are insured under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, virtually guaranteeing that
“no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections
of the Bill of Rights” safeguards. (Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
74-75 (1947).) In fact, Supreme Court justice Frankfurter believed
that he could identify “those liberties of the individual which
history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as
against a closed society” (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949).) by
a “disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit cf science, on a
balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached
consideration of conflicting claims...on a judgement not ad hoc and
episodic, or arbitrary but duly mindful of reconciling the needs of
both continuity and of change in a progressive society.” (Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).) Here, in particular, if

© See B. BAILYN, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 55-93, 175-98
(1967); G. WOOD, Creation of the American Republic (1969).

18

oe a a a RE |

each level and branch of government is bound to be confined to a
sphere of authority defined by the nature of the function of that
level or branch and by the inherent rights of citizens, pertinent
questions are:

(a) ultimately, whether justice protects little beyond the
entitlements that government chooses to confer, or unless
government operations were not infused with substantive values
beyond those of assuring the implementation of the state’s own
dispositive decisions, whether subjects property improvement
transactions are warranted and protected from improvident
impairment at law, or not? (See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213 (1827); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 (1985); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).)

(b) whether the basic relation between federal judges and
political bodies has continued, without real interruption, to be one
in which general constitutional principles are regularly invoked to
strike down sub-optimal governmental choices in the industrial
digital age, or will a last resort judicial intervention protect subject
property and contract liberties? (See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517
(1961); cf. Moore v. West Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).); and/or

(c) whether an affirmative Defense restatement followed in
combination with judicial non-intervention in respect of matter
protecting subject’s property rights and contractual liberties will
end without hearing by jury, or rather how the nation-state will
cover, propagandize, or justify their abridgement of the individual
natural person’s business, prosperity, welfare, property and
contracts leaving a wholesale abandonment in the authorities of
record? (See e.g. East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S-230, 232
(1945); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).)

3. Indentured Servitude. Involuntary servitude can be said
to be the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he
is paid or not, ipso facto. (Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 935,
29 L.Ed. 89; In re Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 69, 21 L.Ed.
394; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41 L.Ed. 715.)
Ipso jure, the Thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits slavery peonage or compulsion labor for all debts. (U.S.
CONST. amend. XIIl). Also in context, debt service (i.e. fiscal
service; see 31 U.S.C. 3 § 306) can be defined as the interest and
charges currently payable on a debt, including principle payments,
or a sum of money due by certain and express agreement including

19

not only obligation of debtor to pay, but right of creditor to receive
and enforce payment. (State v. Ducey, 25 Ohio App.2d 50, 266 N.E.2d
233, 235; see also Black’s Law Dictionary) Inasmuch as judicial
review is concerned on this particular question, remote levels of
relations with distant federal bureaucracies and institutions seem to
be the antithesis of respect for personal integrity and autonomy.
Hence, prosecution will emphasize its rightful place to stand in the
persistent war waged against capricious subjugation at the whim of
the sovereign. (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).)
Definitively, “the very idea that one may be compelled to hold his
means of living, or of any other material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another” has been ruled
“intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself.” (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).) Now, the wholesale questions positioned in remainder are:

(a) whether gridlock in governments and the sum total of
global judicial errors blocking grants, issues under the guise of court
conferences, mandate reversal to secure and enforce prohibition of
involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment.

(b) whether admitted printing errors will face the necessary
corrections as identified in such MEMORANDUM of 13 February
2001 thus implementing, executing, and perfecting appropriate, and
transparent fiscal debt service operations pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3 §
306, and the Fourteenth Amendment Section 4 where the validity of
the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, shall not be
questioned. (31 U.S.C. § 306; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV sec. 4)

4. Direct Equal Access Protection. The Supreme Court's
reservations about the efficacy and legitimacy of intrusive federal
injunctive remedies may have first surfaced in the school
desegregation context. (Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).)
Obviously, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the United States...” (See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV sec. 1, and see also Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 428
(1935).) Regardless, the central concept of the clause, equality,
requires the specification of substantive values before it has full
meaning.” Here, the opacity of the clause as applied in this case,

7 See WESTEN, “The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math and Morals: A
Reply,” 81 Mich.L.Rev. 604 (1983); WESTEN, “The Empty Idea of Equality,” 95
Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982).

20

cries out for a mediating principle and for supplying some variety
of anti-discrimination policy relevant to equal access protection.
Thus, Plaintiff requests resolution as to: when mediated by an anti-
discrimination principle, will the Fourteenth Amendment (or the
Fifteenth, and perhaps the Thirteenth) become a tool for
overturning: (1) injurious judicial decisions that deny equal
protection of the laws like Article I Section 8: (2) legislative acts that
are based on invidious rather than rational grounds, and (3)
executive or administrative opinions that are motivated by
unacceptable types of internal bias, or not? (See e.g. City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100
(1981); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).)

XIV. (B.) COMMERCE AND TRADE, MONEY AND FINANCE,
AND RULE OF PROCEDURE PORTFOLIO- Technical Antitrust,
Rule of Law, and Valid Debt Claims. More interest should be paid
to the following group of legal prescripts, supervisory schemes, and
regulatory channels named or used hereafter that are to be »
scientifically tested for validity, integrity, and reliability in terms of
applying the referenced statutory legislation, cannon, or rule to acts
of BPD, embedded in the disparity of demand outstripping supply.

1. Permissible Reverse Repurchase Contracts, Presentment,
and Trade Acceptance. Assuming the production of a negotiable
Bill of Exchange instrument to the drawee (i.e. Defendant Respondent
Appellee) on acceptance, or of a promissory note to the said party
liable for payment of the same, is presentment in this sentence (See
People v. Norwood, 26 Cal.App.3d 148, 103 Cal.Rptr. 7, 11; Allmon v.
Allmon, Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 651, 655.); whether a district judge is
correct in giving a public interest determination favoring a Bureau
in a separate branch of her employer's (i.e. United States)
organization before the prosecution (i.e. Plaintiff Claimant
Appellant) had put in any of ‘ITS’ contractual evidence in
admittance, is valid, because of the ensuing contrary reasons: (Note,
see NYSE Rule 15- definition of ‘its’- Intermarket Trading System.)

(a) the commercial property ownership and contractual
rights transgressions commissioned by Defendant Bureau warrant
presentment (See e.g. U.S. v. Briggs, C.A.Fla., 514 F.2d 794, 804; State
v. Hudson, Tenn.Cr.Ap., 487 S.W.2d 672, 674) against the same on
such personal chattel forward contract breaches at issue as clear
restraint of commerce (15 U.S.C. § 1), monopolizing trades (15
U.S.C. § 2), and discrimination in price, services, and facilities (15
U.S.C. § 13); whereas the un-heard, but related and admissible
contractual evidence filed as proof (See Appellant's Restraint of

21

Trade/Monopolization Proofs, Clear Demonstration of Forced Wash Sales
or more commonly Price, Services, and Facilities Discrimination Proofs
filed 28 February 2001) is another simultaneous demand for
“electronic funds transfer” (‘EFT’) redemption and payment made
upon the drawee, acceptor, or maker Appellee by or on behalf of the
entitlement holder or payee Appellant (U.C.C. § 3-104; § 3-504(1))
and can not be merely voided, annulled, or improperly restated by
the governments own justice as pay back for the remedy on such an
anti-trust violations.

(b) the hypothetical (31 C.F.R. § 357 App. B- J. Hypotheticals)
case that has not been heard (15 U.S.C. § 18(f) hearings) to this point
is whether the courts acts (intermediate and below) constitute errors
in legislating and fixing trial results pendente lite by holding,
through one statutory. employee and also via a territorial three-
judge panel, that Claimant Appellant could be precluded from
recovery (15 U.S.C. § 15), injunctive relief (15 U.S.C. § 26), or
obtaining distribution (15 U.S.C. § 15e) of civil pecuniary
consideration legally measured (15 U.S.C. § 15d) on the basis that
such order ticket (Form PD F 3905) elections clearly establish
empirical evidence in the public interest (15 U.S.C. § 16e) relating to
obligations drawn on the face of the Full Faith and Credit clause in
United States derivative Treasury bills.

(c) and whether the completion of the transaction in
permissible bona fide arbitrage (12 C.F.R. § 220.7) transaction
settlements are subsequently enforceable ex post facto through the
court system’s application of federal laws to wit: U.S. CONST., 15
U.S.C. 1, 31 U.S.C. 31, and Regulation T, or not?

2. Securities entitlements in STRIPS TRADES valuation.
Assuming free trade and open market conditions, whether the
rights and property interest of an Entitlement Holder with respect
to a Book-entry Security are of any value an a relevant sub-market?
(See 31 C.F.R. Subpart A § 357.2; 31 C.F.R. Subpart B § 357.11) And
more fundamentally, whether the provisions endowing Congress
with the power to pay the domestic Debts of the United States, to
borrow money on the credit of the United States, to regulate
Commerce among the several States, to coin Money and regulate the
value thereof, is obsolete as Defense attorneys’ claim, or not? (See
e.g. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, and compare 31 U.S.C. 31 et seq.)

8 The Electronic Funds Transfer Act, was enacted in 1978, its primary objective is
the provision of individual consumer rights. (See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 et.seq.)

22

3. Rule of Evidence. One part of positive lawmaking is the
bearing that clear proof and physical evidence have on the outcome
of legal situations, and candor will oblige us to admit that Federal
Rules of Evidence is a significant component of adjudicating any
controversy. (See FED. RK. EVID. generally.) In the course of
preceding observations written in Federalist Papers, all American
citizens (including judges and attorneys) are warned to “guard
against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your
decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any
impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of
truth.” (The Federalist Papers, No. 1 Hamilton) The res ipsa loquitur
evidence doctrine is summed up as requiring the best available
evidence be presented and is properly admissible. (See Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); People v. Banks,
Colo.App., 655 P.2d 1384, 1387; State v. Stephens, Mo.App., 556
S.W.2d 72, 723; and FED. R. EVID. Rule 1002.) Be advised that the
United States District Court transcript of the Rule 16 Discovery
Conference confirms that the sole judge only “looked at the
government's motion to dismiss” and not any of the prosecutions
litigation, or even one piece of evidence; whereas on another level in
a letter document to the Appellant, the local circuit court declared
that they were “unable to take any action on (Plaintiff's) ‘Restraint
of Trade /Monopolization Proofs, etc.’” that was submitted as part
of prosecutorial litigation EXHIBITS in order to make a clear cut
route to executing Claimants legal collection rights, powers, and
privileges. (See 5‘ Circuit’s March 5, 2001 generic letter.) Questions
remaining in principle part before the Supreme Court are:

(a) whether statutory government employee's opinions, who
only look at inter-governmental parties pleadings and do not take
evidence in making public interest determinations as to remedy, are
to be treated as questions of interpretation and application of the
proffered statements, or rather as questions of law to be decided in
entirety by the Supreme Court of the United States?

(b) whether after a nation-state court has suppressed
evidence, and has enjoined the arbitrage firms officials from
testifying concerning such evidence, and inappropriately applied
the Federal Tort Claims Act to an Anti-trust lawsuit; if a federal
conviction may thereupon be had and stand when not affirmed at
the local level, and correctly involves application of the Federal
Rules of Evidence; Commerce and Trade Code, and Money and
Finance Code rather than a sole generic hybrid tort count against

23

the United States (who is not named as a party in the action) and are
remedial, or not?

(c) whether the differential zone between scientific analysis
and discovery processes will eventually recognize the force in the
underlying principle message that the prosecution satisfied the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof insofar as clear and
convincing evidence is concerned, and as a result to what extent will
the deduction be drawn from established Acts of Congress in the
particular Commerce and Trade field of controversy and contest?

4. Triers of Fact. Commonly triers of fact include the jury,
and the court when the court is trying an issue of fact other than one
relating to the admissibility of evidence. (See e.g. Calif.Evid.Code.)
In this cause of action, Claimant’s Original Complaint and Statement of
Claim dated 8 February 2000 was covered by Form JS 44 which
clearly established the following facts: (1) the only Defendant
Bureau of the Public Debt resides in the District of Columbia, (2) the
basis of jurisdiction is diversity and amount, (3) that the nature of
suit is Antitrust and not Torts, (4) that the cause of action is
pursuant to 15 United States Code for denominational exchange
gains under 31 Code of Federal Regulations, and (5) that demands
were made for $1,337,962,000 in legal tender and also for a jury trial.
The question is: after the Respondent's counsel concede the
allegation of jurisdiction at both lower levels’, whether in a
continuing federal appellate court suit brought by Petitioner against
Defendant Bureau, and after courts have unilaterally held via
partisan United States employees who hold offices as Judges, that
no Defense attorney in government would compete with Appellant
Plaintiff who opposes a subsidiary intergovernmental quasi-
corporation in a positive contest for monetary reparations before a
jury, is a perfectly competitive market, equally efficient, and
facilitating consumer benefits?

5. Want of Assignments. First and foremost, Title 31 C.F.R. §
357.22 empowers rightful transfers whereby: “A security may be
transferred only as authorized by this part. A security may be
transferred from an account in TREASURY DIRECT® to an account in
TRADES. A coat ge be transferred between accounts in
TREASURY DIRECT , or from an account in TRADES to an account
in TREASURY DIRECT®.” More, Title 31 C.F.R. § 306.15 mandates

9 “Notice of Appeal” was timely filed on June 19-22, 2000 (30-32 DOC), thereby
vesting this Court with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (See Brief of
Appellee, p.2 par. 1 sen. 2)

24

Perera

that “the transfer of registered securities should be made by
assignment in accordance of subpart F of this part. Transferable
registered securities are eligible for denominational exchange and
exchange for bearer securities. Bearer securities are eligible for
denominational exchange, and when so provided in the offering
circular, or eligible for exchange for registered securities. Specific
instructions for issuance and delivery of the new securities, signed
by the owner must accompany the securities presented. (Form PD
3905 or PD 1827, as appropriate may be used.)” The truth is that
each and every one of the foregoing criteria was followed to the
letter and complied with in all respect by the public customer
Appellant. However, at the same time, written assignments have
not existed on the face of the governments papers according to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11- Signing of Pleadings,
Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to the Court; Sanctions
where “Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual
name, or, if the party is not represented by a attorney, shall be
signed by the party...An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless
omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to
the attention of the attorney or party.” (See FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 11)
Undeniably, the fact is that the lack of signatures invalidates, voids,
and nullifies the written opinion of such three-judge panel. (See
Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087,
1092; Klugh v. United States, D.C.S.C., 620 F.Supp. 892, 901; Easterline
v. Bean, 121 Tex. 327, 49 S.W.2d 427, 429.) This assertion will stands
firm as “there are few, if any, situations in our system of justice in
which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters
concerning a person’s liberty or property.” (Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 751 (1983).)

6. Conflict Among Circuits Message. Neither the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas nor the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the
principal underlying issues put before them for resolution and clear
determination. At the same time, Plaintiff's rights, powers, and
privileges, and corresponding customs, duties, and obligations of
the Defendant have been marred, debased, and impaired by the
messages implied by such judicial actions[sic]. Moreover, both the
void order of the Houston Division, and the unsigned opinion of the
appellate level institution stand at odds with practically every
antitrust case dealing with the basic economics of competition,
monopoly, market power, concerted refusals to deal, exclusionary

25

practices, vertical integration, tie-ins, and evidence of distribution
restraints. (See Balmoral Cinema v. United Artists Pictures Corp., 885
F.2d 313 (6% Cir.1989); Standard Oil Co. v United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31
S.Ct. 502 (1911); United States v. E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586, 77 S.Ct. 872 (1957); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911); Interstate Circuit v. United States; 306
U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct.467 (1939).) The Congress that enacted the Sherman
Act saw it as a way of protecting consumers against market entry
prices that were too high, not too low. (See Kartell v. Blue Shield
(Mass.), 749 F.2d 922 (1s Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029, 105
S.Ct. 2040 (1985).) Analogous, the Supreme Court has often relied on
mere circumstantial evidence in ascertaining behaviors that were
inconsistent with profit-maximization adding “While the District
Court's finding of an agreement of the distributors among
themselves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the
circumstances of this case such agreement * * * was not a
prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was enough that, knowing
that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors
gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.” (See
Interstate Circuit v. United States; 306 U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct. 467 (1939).)
Notwithstanding the convictions in those listed cases, the Clayton
Act has expanded and increased the scope of anti-trust regulation
by explicitly condemned anti-competitive price discrimination,
tying, exclusive dealing, and injury to business or property, as well
as preferring the position of consumers and competitors. (See
Yentsch v. Texaco Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2°4 Cir.1980); Bob Maxfield
Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5 Cir.1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 315 (1981); Siegel v. Chicken Delight
Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9% Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955, 92 S.Ct.
1172 (1971); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 99 S.Ct. 2326
(1979), on remand, 602 F.2d 179 (8 Cir.1979).) There is no doubt
that consumers have always been antitrust’s preferred plaintiffs,
and even critics whose notions of appropriate enforcement are most
restrictive recognize the value of consumer suits in correlation to a
main goal of antitrust policy that is low entry prices and high
quality output for customers. It is apparent that the recent
developments in Renobato v. Bureau of the Public Debt reveal
disagreement among the circuits surrounding the substance of
competition and trust, which only the Supreme Court can finally
resolve. Certiorari should be granted for this purpose as well as to
establish that uniformity of procedure for contesting commercial
arbitrage transactions that are the clear intent of the underlying

26

federal claims currently at issue before the honorable court, for if the
decisions are unreviewed it will discredit the cited authorities, and
other pro se litigants will be faced with the impossible burden of
settling lawsuits that protect property and business within the
nation-state’s federal court system.

[The foregoing basis, authorities, and choices are rightfully

presented in this instrument denominated as Appeal /

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, in Renobato v. Bureau of the

Public Debt No.H-00-0425/No: 00-20555. Claimant hereby

adopts each of the gross reasons by incorporation. ]

DRAWN CONCLUSION

XV. Harnessing the Right Powers and Privileges of Passing Bills
in Governments. Without immediate review by the Supreme Court,
Appellant's legal rights to the most effective forms of antitrust relief
will be stripped and foreclosed while simultaneously forcing a sole
proprietor to give up his professional trade, vocation, skill, and
commercial calling. In the matter of Renobato v. Bureau of the
Public Debt, even if the federal judicial business consisted of
nothing more than statutory interpretation and interstitial common
lawmaking appurtenant to this suit, then Plaintiff would prevail on
the contractual evidence alone, not to mention property ownership
rights or Defendant's encroachment of legislative grounds. Beyond
dispute, Title 31 C.F.R. § 321.6 preserves Renobato rights under law
wherefore; “Nothing contained in this part shall limit or restrict any
existing rights which holders of securities may have acquired under
the offering circulars or the applicable regulations” whereas Title 31
C.F.R. § 321.15 fixes Bureau of the Public Debt’s liability for losses;
“Under the governing statute, as amended (31 U.S.C. 3126(a)), an
agent cannot be relieved of liability for a loss resulting from an
erroneous payment...” As the cause of action stands today, the
opinions of the court agencies concerning Title 15 U.S.C. § 26, which
clearly states that “Any person, firm, corporation, or association

shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of
__ the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws,
including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the
same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and
upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an
_ injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of
irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction

27

shall issue...” has been completely plundered, destroyed, mutilated,
and overturned. As previously demonstrated, this matter is one
where certiorari ought to be granted because; (1) the United States
Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision
of another United States Court of Appeals, (2) the lower venues
have so far departed from the accepted and customary course of
judicial proceedings in the capital markets as to call for an exercise
of this court’s supervisory power, and (3) the 5» Circuit has failed to
affirm important questions arising under federal law that have not
been but should be settled in this court, or rather has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts and deviates with
relevant decisions of this court. Positively in terms this court will
comprehend “nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant
spirit which has at all times characterized political parties” and
therefore any denial of certiorari does not import any expression of
views by the Court concerning the merits of the case or whether the
case was correctly decided below. (See e.g. United States v, Carver,
N.Y. 1923, 43 S.Ct. 181, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 67 L.Ed. 361, 364; Sunal v.
Large, Conn.1947, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 1592, 332 U.S. 174, 181, 91 L.Ed.
1982, 1988; State of Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, Ohio 1959, 79 S.Ct. 978,
979 note 1, 360 U.S. 246, 247 note 1, 3 L.Ed.2d 1200, 1202 note 1;
Hughes Tool Co.v. Trans World Airlines Inc., N.Y.1973, 93 S.Ct. 647
note 1, 409 U.S. 363 note 1, 34 L.Ed.2d 577 note 1; Hopfman v. ~
Connolly, Mass.1985, 105 S.Ct. 2106, 2107, 471 U.S. 459, 461, 85
L.Ed.2d 469, 471; Teague v. Lane, I11.1989, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1069, 489
U.S. 288, 296, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 349; Hambsch v. United States,
Cl.Ct.1989, 109 S.Ct. 1969, 490 U.S. 1054, 104 L.Ed.2d 437; Wisconsin
Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley Jr. Co., Wis.1992, 112 S.Ct.
2447, 2452, 505 U.S. 214, 219, 120 L.Ed.2d 174, 184; Brown v. Texas.
Tex.1997, 118 S.Ct. 355, __ U.S. __, 139 L.Ed.2d 276; see also
memorandum of Chief Justice Warren in Martin v. Texas, 1965, 86 S.Ct.
307, 382 U.S. 928, 15 L.Ed. 2d 340.) Notwithstanding, ultimately in
the Supreme Court cause, one choice will stand out above all others,
and that is to grant certiorari, vacate judgements rendered, and
reverse the principles in appropriate fashion, thus giving binding
instructions or require that the entire record be sent up for decision
of the aggregate bill matter in controversy. (28 U.S.C. § 1254)
PRAYER
Ora pro nobis. With due solemn respect, Appellant honestly prays
(1) for affirmative relief, (2) that four Justices vote for a grant of
certiorari, (3) for plenary consideration in review (May v. Henderson,
268 U.S. 111, 45 S.Ct. 456, 69 L.Ed. 870; Mashunkashey v.

28

Mashunkashey, 191 Okla. 501 134 P.2d 976, 979), (4) for reversal of
lower court choices, (5) for “GVR” where this Court grant certiorari,
vacate the judgements, and remand the case to a lower court for
further consideration in light of potentially pertinent factors that
were not considered below (See Stutson v. United States, Ala.1996,
116 S.Ct. 600, 516 U.S. 193, 133 L.Ed.2d 571; Lawrence v. Chater,
N.C.1996, 116 S.Ct. 604, 516 U.S. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 545; Lords Landing
Village v. Continental Ins. Co., Md.1997, 117 S.Ct. 1731, 520 U.S. 893,
138 L.Ed.2d 91), (6) for determination of the net long and short
positions if contrary to the Bill of Exchange accrued through the
rollout date of 21 March 2001 (31 C.F.R. 356.13), as for even
numerous Hail Mary’s can’t bring back what has been taken for
Appellant Plaintiff by the illegal omissions or commissions of the
Appellee Defendant. This sum total of the arguments, from an
ideological basis, appeals to the conservative republican justices on
business, quality maintenance, and highly structured platforms, and
to the liberal democrat justices on the notions of change,
government serving man, and such great capacity of human nature.
Plaintiff calls for the issuance of a reversal implementing sweeping
changes thus concurrently vacating such arbitrary judgements
surrounding Appellant's actual trade positions. A revolving
recurrence to the principles heretofore embodied will satisfy that
there is no color to pretend that the nation-state, by the adoption of
the business plan, be divested of its privilege of paying down the
national debt, free from constraint, best answering the ends of
public justice and security.

Respectfully Submitted,
Jay Nolan Renobato
Natural Person Pro Se
JNR
Arbitrage Firm of Record
Jay Nolan Renobato, Proprietor
Post Office Box 9771
The Woodlands, Texas. 77387

(213)364-8250 tel
INDUSTRIAL MARK:

On the spot.
Investment Banker, and Financier
Petitioner(Appellant).
Dated, 11 July 2001

29

APPENDICES

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
CHARLES R. FULBRUGE III TEL. 594-589-6514
CLERK 600 CAMP STREET

-February 13,2001 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW
Regarding: Fifth Circuit Statement on Petitions for Rehearing or
Rehearing En Banc

No. 00-20555 Renobato v. Bur of the Pub Debt
USDC No. H-00-CV-0425

Enclosed is a copy of the court’s decision. The court has entered
judgment under FED. R. APP. P. 36. (However, the opinion may yet
contain typographival or printing errors which are subject to
correction.)

FED. R. APP. P.’s 39 through 41, and 5™ CIR. RULES 35, 39, and 41
govern costs, rehearings, and mandates. 5™4 CIR. RULES 35 and 40
require you to attach to your petition for panel rehearing or
rehearing en banc an unmarked copy of the court’s opinion or
order. Please read carefully the Internal Operating Procedures
(IOP’s) following FED. R. APP. P. 40 and 5T CIR. R. 35 for a
discussion of when a rehearing may be appropriate, the legal
standards applied and sanctions which may be imposed if you
make a nonmeritorious petition for rehearing en banc.

Direct Criminal Appeals. 5™ CIR. R. 41 provides that a motion for a
stay of the mandate under FED. R. APP. P. 41 will not be granted
simply upon request. The petition must set forth good cause for a
stay or clearly demonstrate that a substantial question will be
presented to the Supreme Court. Otherwise, this court may deny the
motion and issue the mandate immediately.

Pro Se Cases. If you were unsuccessful in the district court and/or
on appeal, and are considering filing a petition for certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court, you do not need to file a motion for
stay of the mandate under FED. R. APP. P. 41. The issuance of the

mandate does not affect the time, or your right, to file with the
Supreme Court.

The judgement entered provides that the plaintiff-appellant pay to
the defendant- appellee the costs on appeal.

Sincerely,
CHARLES R. FULBRUGE III, Clerk

By: “s/ Joseph Armato “
Joseph Armato, Deputy Clerk
Enclosure
Mr Jay Nolan Renobato
Ms Nancy A Cross
Mr Keith Orlando Edward Wyatt

2a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION
JAY NOLAN RENOBATO 7 C.A. NO. H-00-0425
V. . HOUSTON, TEXAS
: MAY 19, 2000
BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT*
AH bbb bbb ttt bbe t + 12:45 P.M.

TRANSCRIPT OF RULE 16 CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE HONORABLE VANESSA D. GILMORE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Mr. Jay Nolan Renobato
(Pro Se)
P.O. Box 9771

The Woodlands, Texas. 77387

FOR THE DEFENDANT: Ms. Nancy Cross Graham
Assistant U.S. Attorney
P.O. Box 61129
Houston, Texas. 77208

COURT REPORTER: Kathy L. Metzger
U.S. Courthouse
515 Rusk
Room 8016
Houston, Texas. 77002
713-250-5208

Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
produced by computer-aided transcription.

3a

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Renobato versus Bureau of the Public

Debt.

MS. GRAHAM: Nancy Graham for the government,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: Come on up, please.

MS. GRAHAM: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: You are, sir?

MR. RENOBATO: Plaintiff Jay Nolan Renobato, pro se,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I've had a chance to look
at the government's motion to dismiss this case, and the Court
finds that the Federal Tort Claim Applies to this case and the
government has not waived sovereign immunity in this case.

Moreover, that the Bureau of the Public Debt would not
even be the correct defendant in a case like this. The correct
defendant would have to be the United States. An agency of
the United States can’t be sued the way that this case has been

brought.

4a

ET eS ON ee Ne Te eR ee ee Te CRT ee

In any event, the Court finds that the claims that you
filed, Mr. Renobato, in this case are barred by the United
States’ sovereign immunity in this case; and the government's
motion to dismiss has been granted.

All right. The Court has just signed an order today on
the government's motion to dismiss. So the Court finds that no
further orders be entered in this case.

All right?

Okay. Thank you then. You all are excused.

MS. GRAHAM: Thank you, your honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I certify that the foregoing in a correct transcript from the
record of proceedings in the above entitled cause.

“s/__ Kathy L. Metzger “ 5-20-00

Kathy L. Metzger Date
Official Court Reporter

Sa

6a

United States Courts
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
MAY 23 2000
Michael N. Milby, Clerk of Court
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION
JAY NOLAN RENOBATO §
§
versus § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-0425
§

BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT §

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
or Alternatively, Notion for Summary Judgement (Instrument No.
10). Plaintiff Jay Nolan Renobato (“Renobato”) has alleged, inter alia,
various torts as well as breach of contract by the Bureau of the
Public Debt related to the purchase of Treasury bills. The Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides a limited waiver of the
sovereign immunity of the United States government. The FTCA is
also a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in those cases where the
government has waived sovereign immunity and has consented to
be sued in certain situations. 28 U.S.C. § 1376(b)(1).

First, in this case the Bureau of the Public Debt is not the
proper party. A federal agency may not be sued for claims
cognizable under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). Because the United
States is the proper party in this case, not the Bureau of the Public
Debt, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case. See Galvin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5 Cir. 1988).

Furthermore, a specific exemption to the FTCA’s waiver of
sovereign immunity covers Renobato’s claims. The FTCA provides
that its provisions “shall not apply to...[a]ny claim for damages
caused by the fiscal operations of Treasury of by regulation of the
monetary system.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(i). The Bureau of the Public
Debt is an agency within the Department of the Treasury that
borrows money needed to operate the federal government, and
issues and accounts for all United States Treasury securities issued

7a

ns nsmeneernssrineeesiilnepsmsingselniasdip-cibeejpeepmsian sraasscaiatin dlaste coot nE tina s ntihet
a

pursuant to the authority of Title 31 United States Code.
(Instrument No. 10, Exh. A, Affidavit of McCoy). Accordingly,
Renobato’s claims, which concerned his Treasury bills, are barred
by the United States’ sovereign immunity.

Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
| The Clerk shall enter this Order and provide a copy to

all parties.
| SIGNED on the “s/ 19” day of May, 2000, at Houston,
Texas.

sé

“s/ Vanessa D. Gilmore
| VANESSA . GILMORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
No. 00-20555 APR 18 2001

CHARLES R. FULBRUGE III CLERK

JAY NOLAN RENOBATO Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT _ Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-00-CV-425
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA Circuit
Judges.

(Vv) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this
panel nor Judge in regular service on the Court having requested
that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (FRAP and Local
Rule 35) the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court having
been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and
majority of the Judges who are in regular active service not having
voted in favor, (FRAP and Local Rule 35) the Petition for Rehearing
En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of this Court in active service having requested a poll
on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the
judges in active service not having vote in favor, rehearing in banc is
DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
CLERK’S NOTE:
“s/_ Emilio M. Garza “ SEE FRAP AND LOCAL
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE RULE 41 FOR STAY
OF THE MANDATE

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Texas Business and Commerce Code § 17.41-— § 17.63

§ 17.41 Short Title
This subchapter may be cited as the Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act.

§ 17.44 Construction and Application

(a) This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect
consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business
practices, and unconscionable actions, and breaches of
warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures
to secure such protection. ;

(b) Chapter 27, Property Code, prevails over this subchapter to
the extent of any conflict.

§ 17.45 Definitions

As used in this subchapter:

(1) “Goods” means tangible chattels or real property
purchased or leased for use.

(2) “Services” means work, labor, or service purchased or
leased for use, including services furnished in connection with
the sale or repair of goods.

(3) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other, group, however organized.

(4) “Consumer” means an individual, partnership,
corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state
who seeks to acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or
services, except that the term does not include a business
consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or that is
controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million
or more.

(5) “Unconscionable action or course of action” means an act
or practice which to a consumer's detriment, takes advantage
of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the
consumer to a grossly unfair degree.

lla

Ee

(6) “Trade” and “commerce” means the advertising, offering
for sale, sale, lease, or distribution of any good or service, of
any property, tangible or intangible, real personal or mixed,
and any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever
situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or
indirectly affecting the people of this state
(7) “Documentary material” includes the original or a copy of
any book, record, report, memorandum, paper,
communication, tabulation, map, chart, photograph,
mechanical transcription, or other tangible document or
recording, wherever situated.
(8) “Consumer protection division” means the antitrust and
consumer protection division of the Attorney General's Office.
(9) “Knowingly” means actual awareness, at the time of the act
or practice complained of, of the falsity, deceptive, or
unfairness, of the act or practice giving rise to the consumer's
claim, or, in an action brought under Subdivision (2) of
Subsection (a) of Section 17.50, actual awareness of the act,
practice, condition, defect, or failure constituting the breach of
warranty, but actual awareness may be inferred where
objective manifestations indicate that a person acted with
actual awareness.
(10) “Business consumer” means an individual, partnership or
corporation who seeks or acquires by the purchase or lease,
any goods or services for commercial or business use. This
term does not include this state or a subdivision or agency of
this state.
(11) “Economic damages” means compensatory damages for
pecuniary loss, including costs of repair and replacement. This
term does not include exemplary damages or damages for
physical pain and mental anguish, loss of consortium,
disfigurement, physical impairment, or loss of companionship
and society.
(12) “Residence” means a building:

(A) that is a single-family house, duplex, triplex, or

quadruplex or a unit in a multi-unit residential
structure in which the title to the individual units is

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transferred to the owners under a condominium or
cooperative system; and
(B) that is occupied or to be occupied as the consumer’s

residence.
(13) “Intentionally” means actual awareness of the falsity,
deception, or unfairness of the act or practice, or the condition,
defect or failure constituting the breach of warranty giving
rise to the consumer’s claim, coupled with the specific intent
that the consumer act in detrimental reliance on the falsity or
deception or in detrimental ignorance of the unfairness.
Intention may be inferred from objective manifestations that
indicate that the person acted intentionally or from acts
showing that a defendant acted with flagrant disregard of
prudent and fair business practices to the extent that the
defendant should be treated as having acted intentionally.

§ 17.46 Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful

(a) False misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful and are subject to action be the consumer protection
division under Sections 17.47, 17.58, 17.60, and 17.61 of this
code.

(b) Except as provided in Subsection (d) of the section, the
term false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts.

(1) passing off goods or services to be those of another

(2) causing the confusion or misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval, or certifications, of the goods
or services

(3) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection, or association, with, or certification by another
(4) using deceptive representations or designations of
geographic origin in connection with goods or services

(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship,
approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or
quantities which they do not have or that a person has a

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sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which
he does not

(6) representing that goods are original or new if they are

’ deteriorated reconditioned reclaimed used or secondhand

(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular
standard quality or grade or that the goods are of a particular
style or model, if they are of another

(8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by
false or misleading representation of the facts

(9) advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised

(10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply a
reasonable expectable public demand, unless the
advertisements disclosed a limitation of quantity

(11) making false or misleading statements of fact concerning
the reasons for, existence of, or amount of price reductions
(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights,
remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or
which are prohibited by law

(13) knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact
concerning the need for pats, replacement, or repair service
(14) misrepresenting the authority of a salesman,
representative, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a
consumer transaction

(15) basing a charge for the repair of any item in whole or in
part on a guaranty or warranty instead of on the value of the .
actual repairs made or work to be performed on the item
without stating separately the charges for the work and the
charge for the warranty or guaranty, if any

(16) disconnecting, turning back, or resetting the odometer of
any motor vehicle so as to reduce the number of miles
indicated on the odometer gauge

(17) advertising of any sale by fraudulently representing that a
person is going out of business

(18) using or employing a chain referral sales plan in
connection with the sale or offer to sale goods, merchandise,
or anything of value, which uses the sales technique, plan,

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arrangement, or agreement in which the buyer or prospective
buyer is offered the opportunity to purchase merchandise or
goods and in connection with the purchase receives the seller’s
promise or representation that the buyer shall have the right
to receive compensation or consideration in any form of
furnishing to the seller the names of other prospective buyers
if receipt of the compensation or consideration is contingent
upon the occurrence of an event subsequent to the time the
buyer purchases the merchandise or goods

(19) representing that a guaranty or warranty confers or
involves rights or remedies which it does not have or involve,
provided, however, that nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to expand the implied warranty or merchantability
as defined in sections 2.314 through 2.318 and Sections 2A.212
through 2A.216 of the Business & Commerce Code to involve
obligations in excess of those which are appropriate to the
goods.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_0854%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.