# Brief Amicus Curiae — United States v. Butler > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_0300%3A12 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief Amicus Curiae - **Published:** January 1, 1936 - **Citation:** 297 U.S. 1 ## Text FILE COPY No. 401 din the Supreme Court of the United States 2 OCTOBER TERM, 1935. THE UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, PETITIONER Vv. | WILLIAM M. BUTLER, ET AL, RECEIVERS OF Hoosac MILs CORPORATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT AMICUS CURIAE ARGUMENT BY TEXAS AGRICUL- TURAL ASSOCIATION IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER. = vii. INDEX’ | PAGE The tax imposed by the Act is an excise tax........ 2 The, provisions for floor-stock taxes are valid...... 5 The Act does not involve an improper delegation oe PABIBIMEIVG POWET. cece os iv.. The Act does not contravene the Fifth Amendment. . 26 . ' The Act does not contravene the Tenth Amendment.. 28 Respondents have no right to question the validity of the tax because of ‘the appropriation made of i ED a ees dw ea ee 31 Any question as to the validity of the Act has been | sy ts by the validating amendment.......... 32 A \ AUTHORITIES. - Alcolea Vv. Smith, 150 La. 482; 90 So. 769; 24 A.L.R. 815.. 6 _ Arizona Vv. California, 283 U.S. 428................... > § llings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261................ 27 Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 240 U.S.1..:....... 4, 27 Butler v. United States, 78 Fed. (2d) ree a yu tae 8, 28 Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210......... 16 . Charlotte Harbor Ry. Co. v. Welles, 260 U.S.8.......... 33 Dorchy V. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286............ Crerercs . . 33 Eisner Vv. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189.......... Sayan Lee ia 4 Field v. Clark, 148 U. S. 649. 7.0... eee, 17, 25 First Savings Bank of Ogden v..Burnet, 53 Fed. (2d) 919. 6 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107..>............ 4, 26 Georgia Warehouse V. Jolley, 172 Ga. 172, 157 S. E. 276. 5 Hampton & Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 394..... 17, 18, 24: Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312.............. wie we eee Heiner Vv. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U. S. 502............ 18 Modpee VW. Demer, Bet U. BD. GOO. oo ecw sccees $3 _Hoeper V. Commissioner, 284 U. 8. 206................. 28 Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 8 | A Car ee 16 Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Road Imp. Dist., 266 U.S. 379: . 33 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41........... Soe 9, 10 Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40°.......... atea aie ee 27 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. occurred”.on the date the tax first takes effect and for adjustments of such fax. ‘ , ". 16 These are the provisions of the ‘Act involved in - this. case. { - The suit originated by the United States. filing a claim with the Receivers for processing and floor . taxes levied against Hgosac Mills Corporation under Section 9 and Section 16 of the Act. It is not a suit to restrain the levy of a tax or. the disbursement of, - funds under-the appropriation mz by the Act, but, in so far as Respondents are ‘eonesenall, it. is an attempt to defeat the payment of the. taxes levied. . The issue involved-is the validity of what has been done under the Act, and not the validity of a threat- ened action. This distinction is important.. Whéiher the adjustment or reduction authorized © by Section 9 (a) and 9 (b) amount to an improper delegation of power is not involved because the taxes in-issue were not levied in connection with any such _. adjustihent or reduction-and in the administration of _., the Act there has not ben any attempt to adjust the’ rate under either of these provisions. Mountain Tim- _ber Co. Vv. Washington, 243 U. S. 219; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. V. Blagg, 225 U. S. 571 (576); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfgst, cos U. S. 165 (186) ; Champlin Rig. Co. V. Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (235).. These - ’ provisions of the Act appear to be separable, and even § if they were determined to be improper delegations of legislative power, nevertheless the provisions on which rest the tax involved in this case would remain ‘in force. Instead of appearing evident that the Con- gress would not have enacted the provisions imposing the tax, independently. of those which allow the ad- justment, the wording of the Act indicates that ‘the Congress would -have enacted the provisions imposing the tax, independént of those provisions which permit | the adjustment. > , 17 : But, even if it be considered that the. Congress would not have: énacted the provisions imposing the tax, independently of the provisions authorizing the -adjustment,: these latter provisions are sustainable _. under the decisions of this Court. The authorized adjustment of -the rate is to prevert surpluses ‘and the depression of farm. prices, clearly indicating that these provisions do not contemplate an increase in the base rate provided for by Section 9 (a), (b) and- (c), but a reduction, when necessary, to prevent the conditions described in the Act. In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (680-697), the Court sustained a statute conferring upon The Pres- _ ident authority to suspend, by proclamation, the free - introduction of certain commodities when he was sat- isfied that any country proaacing such, articles im- posed duties or other taxes upon. products. of the United States, which he determined to be reciprocally unequal or unreasonable. In Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (404-412), the Court sustained an Act empowering The President to increase or decrease duties to equal- ize differences ascertained by him between domestic production and the cost of producing like articles ‘in competing foreign countries. The Act ‘involved pro- . vided that in ascertaining the differences in cost of — production The President -should, in so far as he found it practical, take into consideration: .f ** * (1) the differences in conditions im pro- duction, including wages, costs of material, and other items in costs of production of. such 9r sim- _ va te: in wn hag Ray + com- peting foreign countries; e differences in — _ the’ wholesale selling prices of doukstic and for- eign articles in the principal markets of the. United States; (3) slit granted to a for- 18 ; eigtr iain _ a fineigin government, or by a person, partnership, poco or association i in a foreign country; and (4). any other advantages or disadvantages in competition.” Speaking of this Act the Court said: Ce oe “What The President was required to do was > merely an execution of the-Act of Congress, . It: ~ was not the making of law. He was the mere agent of the law making department to ascertain . and declare the event upon Which its expressed. _. will_was to take effect.” It is not conceivable that there would be ‘any greater difficulty to determine that a tax was causing the accumulation. of surpluses and depression of farm prices, than it would be to determine the cost of pro- duction, including wages, materials and other items entering into such cost of similar articles in the United States and in competing foreign countries, and the advantage granted to foreigh producers by - foreign . governments and any other advantages ad disadvantages in. foreign competition. ‘If the Act involved in Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, prescribes a certain and definite criteria to be taken into consideration i in ascertaining the differences, assuredly, the Act involved in this | case speaks . with equal certainty. . The authority granted the Secretary to make adjustments is analo- gous to the power upheld in Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U. S. 502 (504-507).: The issue of unauthorized delegation of legiglative power is then, so far as this case is concerned, re- duced to the question, “Does the Act delegate to the ‘Secretary. the legislative authority to determine a tax rate, and, the time when it shall take effect and end; or does the Act prescribe the formula for computing the rate of tax, and the time when it shall. begin and ~ 19 end, depending upon the existence of facts to be ascer- tained by the. Secretary?” ee ve ee The Act provides that “the processing tax shall be _ at such rate as equals the differencé between the cur-* rent average farm price for the commodity and the fair exchange yalue of the commodity” * * * “the fair exchange value of a commodity. shall be the price therefor that will give the commodity the same pur- chasing power, with respect to articlés farmers buy, os as such commodity had during the base period (Aug- _ ust 1909 to July 1914) * * * and the current average farm price and the fair exchange value shall be ascer- tained by the Secretary of Agriculture from available statistics of the Department of Agriculture.” | This is the formula for computing the rate of tax. ‘Does it fix a certain criteria to be used in computing the rate? " “ ee | The practice of the Department of Agriculture to collect and publish statistical facts concerning agri- cultural productions and markets has been in exis- tence for a long period of years. Congress was evi- dently familiar with this practice and in general with the statistical information available in the ‘Depart- ment because. it provided that the “current ‘available farm price and the fair exchange values” should be ascertained by the Secretary from such statistics. The facts were so ascertained.” (R.11)/) °° Determination of the “current average farm price and the fair exchange value” involved the application _ of elementary principles of mathematics to the “avail- able statistics of the Department of Agriculture.” The determination of the tax from “the current aver- age’ farm price-and the fair exchange value” at such rate as equals the difference’ between the current... . avérage farm price for the commodity and the fair 20 exchange value of the commodity involved no more . than the application of principles of mathematics to the figures previously determined. (R. 11). The Congress prescribed the rule by which the rate should be figured and empowered the Secretary: to do no more than determine the facts, and apply the facts to the rule and figure the rate from the facts by the rule. There is no more delegation of legisla- tive power here than where a state prescribed by law that a State Tax Board shall ascertain the intangible values of property for purposes of taxation or that such Board shall compute an ad valorem tax rate by . dividing the total of all ad valorem taxes collected during the previous year by the quotient of the total valuation of all property within the state divided by 100. The formula is prescribed by legislative enact- ment, and the administrative officer is directed to ascertain the facts and by applying them to the fgr- mula to figure the. rate of tax. ! In Michigan Central Railway Company'v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 297, the Court said: ' “It may be laid down as a general preposition that where a legislature enacts a‘ specific rule for fixing a rate of taxatjon, ty which rule the ‘rate, is mathematically d rom facts and events occurring. within the el and created without reference to the matter of that rate, there is no abdication of the legislative ‘function, but, on the — a direct legislative determination of the The Secretary is not empowered by these pro- visions.of the Act to fix the rate; he-is directed to compute the rate by a formula prescfibed by Con- gress. The provision of the Act directing the Secre- tary to.compute the rate does not grant to him author- ity or discretion to determine what the rate shall be, — a ‘ but imposes upon him a-duty to determine existing, ., controlling facts, and figure the rate on these facts by #he formula prescribed by Congress. . | . The Act provides that a fax “shall be in effect: with respect to. such commodity from the beginning of the inarket year” and that “the market year for each commodity’ shall be ascertained and prescribed by regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture.” 7 ' Cotton matures, is harvested and sold during par- ticular seasons of theyear. The same is true of grain crops, such as-wheat and corn., In deteymining: the carry-over from year to year 1 Tt has long. been the . _ custom to treat a certain date as the end of one mar- ket year and*the beginning of another. These dates‘ are well known and understood, not only by experts: in the Department of Agriculture, but by the people who are’ engaged in the planting and production of _ these commodities and in their marketing and manu- facture. The language directing the Secretary to, ascertain “the market year” may well be construed as’ meaning that the market year for each commodity . , is as has been previously ascertained by the Secretary under departmental rules because it is well: known that:long prior to the enactment of this statute the Department of Agriculture had recognized certain dates as the beginning of market years for certain commodities. If the language of the Act be construed to mean that the marketing year is as has hereto- fore been determined by the Secretary under the regulations prescribed in the Department of Agri- _. culture, then the Congress has definitely fixed the . period by referente ;'to an existing determination. . Such: would be a re ndeh construction of the lan-* guage and would not do violence to the apparent legislative intent. . So construed, the provision would appear to be entirely valid, and if under some other * 22 construction the provision might be invalid, then that construction. should be adopted which sea give the - Act validity. - On the other hand, if the Congress intended that the tax should take effect from the beginning of the market year, the date to be determined in the future by the Secretary of Agriculture, it is not to be pre- ~ sumed that the Congress intended to delegate to the © Secretary an arbitrary discretion to determine, the market year. This is because legislative bodies are presumed to act within, and not beyond, their consti- tutional authority. If the language’ is construed to mean that the Secretary shali, in the future, ascertain the market years for the commodity then clearly it must be held to mean that he shall ascertain the facts as to what eri _ of time constitutes the market year for the part commodities involved in the Act. This would leeks the finding of an existing fact upon which the tax ‘should operate. Suppose the Congress had provided for a tax based upon reasonable market value, such market value to be ascertained by the Secretary of Agriculture. The language would not have been indefinite, it would not delegate a power to determine what the rate of tax should be, but would have directed an administrative officer to determine the facts upon which the tax should operate. Throughout this country Boards of Equalization, Tax Assessors and Tax Collectors are daily ascertaining the value of property for purposes of taxation. There is no more difficulty in finding the facts as to “the market year” of a commodity than in determining the market value of a commodity _or other article of property subject to taxation. Sections 2, 8, and 9 should be read together in determining whether there has been an unauthorized delegation of the power to determine when the tax . _ shall become effective. ee . . Section 2 declares it to be the policy at Congress | ” to establish and maintain an equality between pro-- duction and consumption of agricultural commodities that will re-establish to farmers prices which will give _agricultural commodities a purchasing power, as related to articles consumed by. farmers, equivalent to the purchasing power of such commodities during “\ the base period. In enacting the law and declaring’ this policy, the Congress found, in effect, that such “equality did not at the tim@ exist. , | Section 8 empowers the Secretary, in order“to ef- fectuate the policy of Congress, to provide-for a re- . duction. in acreage and production for marketing “through agreements with producers or other volun- °: tary methods” and to make provision for rehtal or benefit payments in connection with such reduction or upon that part of the production required for do- -Mestic consumption. | Section 9 provides that when the Secretary deter- mines “that rental or benefit payments are to be made with respect to any’ basic agricultural commodity, he shall proclaim: such determination and -a. processing * tax shall be in effect with respect to such commodity.” The voluntary reductions and the rental and bene- fiPpayments ate to be made, if at all, for the purpose of attaining the policy of the Act. Current consump- tion in domestic,and foreign markets is to be con-. sidered as well as the cost of agricultural commodities to the consumer. The Secretary, is to determine, . through the agencies available to him, when a suf- ficient number of producers are willing to enter into - a voluntary reduction program to effectuate the de- clared poliey Of the Act. The Congress has deter-— =a v _ 24 mined that there is an inequality between production and consumption; that to establish the desired prices, reduction in acreage and rental and benefit payments - should be made. The time when the reduction will ac- complish the desired is a fact to be found. The practi- ' eability of effectuating the policy depends upon the willingness of a sufficient number of producers to ‘enter into voluntary agreements for a reduction of acreage and production with which may be associated rental and benefit payments, and effectiveness of such -in accomplishing the desired equality in prices. The Congress has established the. standards and has directed the Secretary to find the existence of certain facts. The Secretary is not empowered to prescribe a tax or the date that a tax shall become effective, but Congress has prescribed a tax, and pro- vided that it shall become eff@ctive upon the existence of certain facts, to be determined by an administra- tive officer. ~ : As was said in Samsitein & Co. V. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (407): “Congress may feel itself unable siceiaiaibeiil to determine exactly when its exercise of the leg- islative power should become effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the decision of -an Executive, or, as often happens in matters of state legislation, ‘it: may be left to a opular vote of the residents of a district to be affected by. the legislation.” "* * * “‘The- true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discre- tion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first- cannot be made to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ ” 25 The statute involved in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (680), provided that “so often as the President shall be satisfied that the government of any eountry. producing and exporting” certain commodities *im- posed duties upon agricultural products of the United States which “he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable,’ he shall havé the power and it shall be his duty to suspend” * * * “the provisions of this Act relating to the free introduction of sugar” and other named commodities, “for such time as he ' shall deem just.” Speaking of this statute, the Court said: : * * * “But when he ascertained the fact that - duties and exactions, reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, were imposed upon the agricultural or other products of the United States by a coun- | try producing and exporting sugar, molasses, . coffee, tea or hides, it became his/duty to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension, as to that country, which Congress had determined should occur. He had no discretion in the premises ex- cept in respect to the duration of the suspension so ordered. But that related only to the enforce- ment of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a particu- lar fact, it cannot be'said that in ascertaining that fact and in issuing his proclamation in obe- - dience to the legislative will, he exercised the © function of making laws. Legislative power was exercised when Congress declared that the sus- pension should take .effect upon a named contin- gency. What the President was required to do was simply in execution.of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law. He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.” (Italics ours) 26 \ ; | vlt was impossible for the Congress to ascertain in advance the facts which the Secretary is directed to determine. ' What he was to do in this relation was not a matter of making law or prescribing a. tax, but the determination of facts upon which the Act of Congress should operate. When the policy of Congress has been attained or . the facts upon which the reduction program is to be begun and rental and benefit payments’ made no long- er exist, there will be a termination of the tax. A finding that the- conditions upon which the operations of the law originally depended no longer exist does not involve any: more exercise of legislative discretion than the original finding of the existence of such con- ditions. | It is submitted that the rate a the tax is to be | determined upon readily ascertainable facts; that the determination of “the marketing year” does not in- _ volve the exercise of legislative discretion; that defi- nite standards are prescribed as to the time when the tax shall become effective and as to the time when. it shall end. . iv. | The right to select objects and prescribe rates of taxation is reposed in the Congress. It is not for the Courts to weigh the reasonableness of the tax, either as to rate or objects upon which it is imposed. Pat- ‘ ton V.:.'Brady, 184 U. 8S. 608; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (58); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (167). “The power to tax involves the power to destroy.” McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. *" 27 In Billings v. United States, 939 U. S. 261 (282), it is said: aes “lt ig also settled: beyond dispute that the Constitution is not ‘self-destructive. In other words, that the powers which it confers: on the one hand it does not immediately take away on | the other; that °is to say, that the authority to tax which is given in express terms is not limited or restricted by the subsequent provisions of the Constitution or the amendments thereto, especial- ly by the due process clause of: the Fifth ——— - ment.” In Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Go. 240 U.. S. 1 (24), the Court said: . “So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is no pasis for such reliance since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limi- tation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the Constitution does not confliet with itself by conferring-upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the limitations of the due process clause.” Magnano v: Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (44), cites Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, and makes the following statement: ide “Except i in rare and special instances the due process of law clause contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation _ the taxing Potion.” conferred upon Congress by the Consti- ution.” The “rare and special instances” are illustrated by cases like Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. 8S. 531; 28 _ Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230; Heiner v. ~ Donnan, 285:U. S. 312; and —— V. Commissioner, 284 U. S.. 206. | ; The tax imposed by this Act is not’ like the taxes ' . considered in the cases cited as illustrating the in- stances referred to in the quotation from Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40. _ The assessment of the tax imposed by t the Act in . question ‘is upon the cotton processed and the amount of the tax is determined by the quantity of cotton processed. The power of the Congress to classify, for _ purposes of taxation, where thé cldssification bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law, can- not be questioned. The-processing of agricultural - commodities has\been classified for purposes of tax- ation. The classification appears to have a reason- able relation to the purpose of the Act. It cannot be contended either that the Congress cannot classify for the purposes of taxation, or that if this be a classification, that it is an unreasonable and arbi- trary classification. V. _. The assignments of error.in the Circuit Court of Appeals and the opinion of the Circuit Court of Ap- peals in this case raise the question as to whether the Act is an attempt upon the part of the Congress to regulate activities solely within the control of the State. Butler v. United States, 78 Fed. (2d) 1. The question raised is whether the Act violates the Tenth Amendment. It seems tHat this question is ruled by Massachu- ' setts v..Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (478-488), and not by Schechter Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. _ ©. are ie 495. The Massachusetts case involved the validity of an Act. of Congress appropriating money to be appoytioned ainong such of the several states ag might ~ accept and comply with its provisions,-for the purpose of cooperating to reduce maternal and infant mor- tality and protect health. A bureau was provided to administer the Act in cooperation with state officers. ° ' The Act did not require the states to accept its bene- fits or undertake- to enforce upon the states or the people of the states obedience to any requirement of law, but left it optional with the states whether they accepted or rejected its benefits. The)contention ‘was — made that the Act constituted an attempt upon the - part of the general government to induce the states. _ to yield a portion of their sovereign rights. The Court said: , . lel ee enacted it with the iherior . purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose. may be effectively frustrateél by the — ex- pedient of not yielding.” ._ In the Schechter Corporation case it was said that the codes involved did not merely give voluntary trade or industrial associations privileges or immunities, ‘ but involved “the coercive exercise of the law-making power,” and that “The codes of fair competition which the stat- ute attempts to authorize are codes of laws. If valid, they place all persons within their reach under the obligation of positive law, binding equally those who assent and those who do not . assent. Violations of the provisions of the codes: . are punishable as crimes.” (I(glics ours) The distinction between the statute invelved in the Massachusetts case and the code and statute 30 : ‘involved in the Schechter case is that the one in- volved in the former made acceptance of its benefits - optional, while the one involved in the latter made . obedience to its terms obligatory. ~ — }. . “The*same distinction exists between the Act in-. © volved in this case and the statute and code involved in the Schechter Corporation case. There ig no pro- vision in the statute to compel any farmer to enter into an agreement to reduce the acreage planted to cotton or any other commodity mentioned in the stat- ute. There is no provision requiring any farmer to accept any rental or benefit payments. The language of the Act is that the Secretary shall have ,power to provide for reduction in acreage “through agreements with producers, or by other voluntary methods, and to -. provide for rental or benefit payments in connection | therewith.” There is no semblance of a requirement or an attempt’ to require that any farmer enter into a reduction agreement; the acceptance of the benefits of the Act is entirely optional.. The Secretary may — enter into contracts with such farmers as wish to contract with him, but there is no provision requiring any farmer to so contract or to reduce his acreage. ‘When @ voluntary contract is made between the Sec- retary and a farmer, the Secretary may pay rental or benefit payments to him from money appropriated for that purpose. The right of the State, if any exists, to control commodities to which its land may be planted remains unimpaired by the provisions of - this Act. What Congress may have’ hoped would be the result upon prices and production by the expen- diture of money appropriated is one thing; and an attempt upon the part of Congress to control a matter of purely State concern would be an entirely differ- ent thing. ) “ - vi. . The power of Congress to impose a tax is one’ thing; its. power to make an appropriation is another > thing. There is a wealth of instances in which — Congress has made appropriations similar to the appropriations made in this Act. One purpose for . which the. money is appropriated is “the removal of. surplus agricultural products.” In recent years Fed- eral agencies have-been authorized to buy. agricul- tural commodities and to lend public money on agri- cultural commodities. Governmental agencies have been authorized to lend money to banks and trust , companies, to irrigation districts, to cities and towns, ~ and to invest public money in the stocks of state and national banks. Public. money has been appropriated to promote the public health in the several states; to advance education; for social welfare work; in py, 3 viding food for needy and distressed people ; for mak- ing loans to agricultural and livestock raisers in drought stricken areas. Many instances might. be furnished where Federal agencies over a long period of years have been authorized to spend Federal money in the relief of physical.and economieal dis- tresses. There is nothing novel about the appropria- tion made by this Act. A citizen might as well be heard to contest the val- iuity of an inceme or inheritance tax imposed against him on the claim that a part of the tax paid may later - be appropriated to some Federal agency to lend to . some bank, or to some poverty stricken person in some tenement section of a great city, or to some drought stricken ranchman in the arid part of West Téxas, as for Respondents to question the validity of the tax because of the appropriation of the proceeds. - ~ e.. ae: Vii. In the ‘Act approved Augugf 24, 1935 (Public No. _ 820, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.), amending the Agricul- P tural’ Adjustment Act, it is provided: — oe “The taxes imposed under this title, as deter- ‘mined, prescribed, proclaimed and made effective. by the proclamations and certificates of the Sec- retary of Agriculture or of the President and by the regulations. of the Secretary with the ap- proval of the President prior to the date of the . a ion of this amendment, are hereby .legal- ‘ized and ratified, and the assessment, -levy, col-— lection, and accrual of all such taxes” * * * “prior to said date are hereby legalized and rati- .. fied and confirmed as fully to all intents and purposes as’ if each such tax had been made effective ‘and the rate thereof fixed: ss by prior. Act of Congress.” * * * “Nothing in thie section shall be construed to import illegality. ~ to.any act, determination, proclamation, certifi- cate, or regulation of ‘the Secretary of Agricul- ture or of the President: done or made prior to the date of the adoption of this amendment. . “ * * * “The making of ‘rental and benefit pay- ments under this title, prior to the date of the adéption of this amendment, as determined, pre- sc , proclaimed and made effective by the proclamations of the Secretary of Agriculture or of the President, or by regulations of the Secre- tary” *.* *, “and the adoption of other voluntary methods prior to such date” * * * “are hereb legalized and ratified,-and the making of all suc agreements bee YP ig the initiation of éuch programs, and the ae ee of all such methods prior to such date are hereby legalized, ratified, * and confirmed” * * *, ' The power of the Congress to ratify an illegal assessment of taxes which was made under the . 1] , , A eae re eee ee 33 ~. faith of congressionsil enactment, and which taxes the Congress had the power to impose, cannot be questioned. It is within the pqwer of Congress to so ratify an illegal assessment of taxes, even after the commencement of. suit for restitution.. ‘It has been held that in dedling with the Philippine Islands Con- . ‘gress may delegate legislative authority to agencies . selected by it and may ratify the acts 6f such agents, the same as if the acts had been /Specifically author- . ized by prior Act. United States v.. Heinszen; 206 U. S. 370; Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. | . 226; Dorchy v. Kansas, 264-0. 8. 286; Charlotte Her- bor Ry. Co. Vv. Welles, 260 UV. S. 8; Kansas City So.— Ry. Co. v. Road Improvement. Dist., 266 U.S. 379; Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S..600. ° | ‘The ratification of the taxes involved in this suit. being valid, aif questions of improper delegation of © legislative power are answered by the ratifying Act. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the . processing tax and floor-stocks. taxes are valid ex- cises; that there has been no improper delegation of legislative power by the Act involved, and if there . ever were such, it has been cured by the validating Act; that the statute does not contravene either the Fifth or Tenth Amendment; that the Respondents have no right to question either the’ validity of the Act or the validity of the assessment and collection of the taxes involved in this case because of the exer- cise by Congress’ of its fiscal power to appropriate = _— of the tax, and that the Act en be upheld. Respectfully submitted, fp GREENWOOD, MoopY AND ROBERTSON, Attorneys for Texas Agricultural Association, Amseys Curiae. / * cal --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_0300%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.