# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1936
- **Citation:** 297 U.S. 110

## Text

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FILE COPY | :

Supreme Court of the United States
OcroBER TERM, 1935

NOBLE-TROTTER RICK MILLING 'CO., INC.,
PETITIONER,
V.
RUFUS W. FONTENOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND:
AS ACTING UNITED STATES COLLECTOR

OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE DIS-
TRICT OF LOUISIANA,

RESPONDENT.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, AND
SUPPORTING BRIEF THEREON.

C. A. McCoy,
Attommey for Petitioner.
McCoy, Kiva & Jones, ¢
Lake Charles, La..,
Of Counsel.

o

SUBJECT INDEX |

PAGE
Petition for writ of certiorari: .
Questions presented sath aot elpiihcses ielianss Weiasiiesmanieakieiauibicn 2
Summary statement of: matters involved ........ .... 26
Reasons relied upon for the allowance of the
Ws co atca caso ccatsctadeanacaarascas use aetna 5 Seacwewncee 6-8
Reasons relied upon for the allowance of the
writ before action on the merits by the Circuit
Re te cca esarreteeneccin acumen 8-10
Prayer for writ ......... CASI Te
Brief in support of petition: .
The opinions of the courts below ....................2... 15.
IS pi a nai ean segetoicuaandeas a a
Statement of the case (see summary statement |
of the matters involved) ...........<....0....-...0..<....- 17
ee 17-19
pS EAS ne ar De Cn RAND Oe TNE HSE Ie 19-46
summery of arqgunett ................................... 19-20 |

Point A. Inapplicability of R. S. 43224 and
Section 21(a) of the Agricultural Ad-
I I iia scsoncteemsnacinisee dh oieciaiaices 20-23

~ Point B. Section 21(d) of the Agricultural
- Adjustment Act deprives petitioner of its
I aires ctecee 23-31

Point C. Unconstitutionality of R. S. §3224
and Section 21(a) of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act under the circumstances

Oe Tee CD saiiinsaseanctdlitanbiaa state eess 31-36

Point D. Unconstitutionality of summary
proceedings for collection of the tax .:.... 36-37

Point E. The Agricultural Adjustment Act,
as amended, is unconstitutional ................ 38-43

Point F. Certiorari should be granted at the
IID I sevetetentaiicsssiccndteniines seuiaiemeeiaaaaiile 43-46
I At SRNR Te Mehran 46-47
eee svdvemmemdoaaaal . 49-55
RT a a er 56-61
RANGER Ice rien earn ‘cciipavatnlisciadasssanaiaaieiiiiaediaaas 62-64

Appendix D. CN DT Pe, LO Re 65-72

TABLE OF CASES CITED

PAGE

American’ Construction Co. v. Jacksonville Rail-

wap, 268 TU. 2 Sea, 208 ....-..........-..-... 16, 45
Armour & Co. v. Harrison (not yet reported) ........ 22
Atlantic Coast Line v..Daughton, 262 U.S. 413... 30
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281

aici alaesiouns 82
Butler v. United States of poeneniny 78 Fed. (2d) 1 39
Carpenter v: Shaw, 280 U. S. 368, 369 -..::............. 37
In Re Chetwood, 165 U.S. 443, 462. ......................- 16, 45
Child Labor Tax: i, aoe oS. OP .................,-..- 39, 40
_Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123, 133. 16,46
Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 121 ..........-.......... 21
DuPont Powder Co. v. Mastland, 244 U.S. 100... 46
‘Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, Nt a ek 31
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426... 88
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506, 518 ~............... 16
ee ee een ° 216
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 ...................--... 40
Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409, 430,

Ti as catenins 33

Hamilton v. Kentucky Dist. Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 32
Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251, —

SESS AMR, SS Uae OREN RS SS A 28
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. een 39
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S.

a RES AR Se eR 16
Harriman v. Northern Securities: Co., 197 U.S.

BE, TD waecricinccewerevsessecsnevenecesenssennsencewoseanzenvetovoeer ves 16, 45

Heisler v.'Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 259 40

Hill v. Wallace, 259'U. S. 44, 62 ........:....!..21, 31, 39,40.

‘ Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., 283, 570, 574, 581..24, 29
_ Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U. S.

I ici a ocean aio daiemnansnnsmebnerecaeniaueshaeounereees 40
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S

ce anuaerndatinanepemaediieviens 25
ee i I, BID Ti, Be By BE ncccencececcecccvessersssoes 40
Lash’s Products Co. v. U. S., 278 U. S. 175, ‘176... 24

Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. “eee 37

Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 Wall. 655, 668 .....:..........41, 42
Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce “4
Commission, 246 U. S. 638, 644 _.00000...... ee. y 22
Michaelson v. U. S., 266 U. S. 42, 64, 65, 66 ......,.22, 34
Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. _.
_ 498, 509 ..... Ricca seieisdasnislian asta amrasabcconiatadalasieesbltwriee eave 21, 31
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 277................ 16
Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 —.....0..00000.... 30.
Panama Refining Co. v: Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 ........ 43
Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 374 ........ - 22
Penn v. Glenn, 10 Fed. Supp. 483, 484 -00..2.......... ae
’ Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596 ........ 37
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,
SRE EO RO oe ae aOR ae ene 40

Raymond v. Chicago Union Tr. Co., 207 U.S. 20.... 30
Schechteg Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 -
2 y ee Feria OR, SON ...89, 40, 48
Spiller v. A. T. & S. F. R’y Co., 253 U.S..117, 120 . 46
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 287 U.S. 9...:.... 30
The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 49 -......-....:2::0-000--- 16, 46

Union Pac. R. R. v. Weld County, 247 U. S. 282... 30
United States v. Jefferson El. Mfg. Co., 291 U: S.¥

green SEY en ne 28
-F. G. Vogt & Sons, Inc. v. Rothensies, 11 Fed.
STE ee ee ee ee eT 22
’ Wallace vy. Hines, 263 U. S. 66 .........................20..-.- 22, $1
Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 ................1......-+- ,
Wilson y. Illjnois Southern Railroad, 263 U.S.574 30

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE

Agricultural Adjustment Act, P. L. No. 10, May
I aces acai etal ence eaacadncisaigtpbiaiiaianinmeailacen reviews
BR. © ORD ceprecnevontvcceriovesinncnnncntsapticonnemevcoioscenapente
Os iaidieeaiainieneainininmadipeiniie

eee ee eee nat I

| PAGE «
OE, RD avevsstiernessievens hectheenianicaiel 17, 18, 20, 22, 81, 37
Ns i ace ella laa as 19, 23
Constitution of the United States, Article I, Sec. 1 43
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 -.....0............-..220--- 41°
Article III, Sec. 1 ...... easialapaelesiaiaiatiaiiiadetiie nesiner 84
SD is Tle TE sichsinvacoaswsindsrcnscuiecenstivcdtnieenenienl 34, 36
-Amendment V ....... SEM I AO SOD FCP Lee 18, 34
caveman iiaiicsaiaete 18,
_ Judicial Code, Sec. 240,'as amended .................... aac 4 a
. RB. S.. 8808 ............ ee .17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 31, 37
United States Code, Title 26, Secs. 115-131......18, 19, 36 ee
United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 347 ..............0..... ' 16

Supreme Court of the United States

NOBLE-TROTTER RICE MILLING CO., INC.,
. PETITIONER,

We

RUFUS W. FONTENOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS ACTING UNITED STATES COLLECTOR
OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE DIS-

7 TRICT OF on er RESPONDENT.

PETITION OF NOBLE- TROTTER RICE MILL.
ING CO., INC., FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

. TO THE ‘UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

May IT PLEASE THE Court:

The petitioner, Noble-Trotter Rice Milling Co.,
Inc., respectfully prays for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit at New Orleans, Louisiana, to hear this cause
prior to its decision by the Circuit Court of
Appeals and to review the decision of the District
Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Louisiana, New Orleans Division, entered in this. _
cause on October 28, 1935, and further to review the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in denying .

20 Qe igi ene neti

2

the application of petitioner for a preliminary in-
junction pending the appeal of said cause in said
Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner respectfully
shows this Honorable Court: |

i.

Questions Presented. |

(a) Is the so-called Agricultural Adjustment

Act, as amended on August 24, 1935, constitutional ?

(b) Does Section 21(d) of said Act deprive peti-
tioner of an adequate remedy at law?

(c) Does Article 3224 R. S. or Section 21(a) of
said Act forbid the granting of an injunction when
petitioner has no adequate remedy at law?

(d) If Section 21(a) of said Act forbids an in-
junction in a case where petitioner has no adequate
remedy at law, is said Section 21(a) constitutional ?

(e) If Congress may constitutionally deprive the.

“Courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of

illegal-taxes and at the same time deprive the tax-
payer of any legal remedy to recover such illegal
taxes, may the summary proceedings provided in
Sections 115 to 131, Title 26, U. S. C., as amended,
be constitutionally employed for ie collection of

such illegal taxes? iPiee

2.

Summary Statement of the Matter Involved.

a

Petitioner owns and operates a rice mill at Lake
Charles, Louisiana. Under the Act of the 73rd

_—_—_—a ;

3

Congress, P. L. No. 10, approved on May 12, 1933,

as amended, known as the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, there is imposed a processing tax of 1c per
pound upon the first processing or milling of rough
rice. The amount of tax shown to be due by peti-
tioner in its return filed for the month of September,
1935, was $17,331.90. This tax was due and payable
to respondent on October 30, 1935. October 28,
1935, petitioner filed its bill in the District Court
to restrain the collection of this tax and any tax
which might become due in subsequent months on the
ground that said tax-was.unconstitutional, that peti-
tioner was without adequate remedy at law, and that
without such injunction it would be irreparably
damaged. (R. 2.) Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the Court had been de-
prived of jurisdiction by Art. 3224, U.S. R. S., and
Section 21(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
(R. 54.) Seven similar suits were consolidated
with this by Court order (R. 58) and the Court
heard at the same time petitioner’s motion for a
preliminary injunction and respondent’s motion to
dismiss for want of jurisdiction. At the. hearing
petitioner introduced two affidavits in support of its —
allegation that, due to the peculiar nature of the ‘rice
business, it was impossible to accurately determine
the profit or loss resulting from the processing and
sale of any given lot of rice. (R. 60,65.) The affi-
davits further showed that it is impossible to prove
what part, if any, of the processing tax is passed
forward to the consumer or back to. the producer or
what part is borne by the miller. Respondent intro-

ED ae ie NT OS ae las
6 ong Aer AR eens sano

DCRR Micki SRA A SS eb Nh ins er cit oR Sct oS CN ar age Lee Nie Ree ee Ral LOE

4
duced the joint affidavit of three deputy Internal

_ Revenue Collectors which affidavit was inconsistent .

with the affidavits of petitioner in only one respeq.
(R. 75.) At the conclusion of the hearing the Court
denied petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion and granted respondent’s motion to, dismiss
upon the ground that the Court was deprived of .
jurisdiction by Article 3224, U.S. R.S., and Section .

21(a) of said Act. (R.79.). Said Article 3224* and

Section 21(a)* forbid the, granting of an injunction
_to restrain the collection of any tax, and of the

processing tax here involved, respectively. Under
Section 21(d)* of said. Agricultural Adjustment
Act it is provided that no tax collected under the
Act may be recovered except upon proof satisfactory
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the
payer of the tax had not, directly or indirectly, in-
cluded such amount in the price of the commodity
with respect to which it was imposed, or passed on
any part of such amount to the vendee of the com-
modity, and that the price paid: by the taxpayer for
the unprocessed commodity was not reduced by any .

_ part of such amount. The bill below, and support-

ing affidavits, show the manner in which rough rice
is milled and the manner in which it is sold, and that
from any’ given lot of rough rice many different
grades and qualities of clean rice are produced. The
usual and customary method of selling rice is to sell
it on samples made up of mixtures of different lots
of clean rice which in turn are derived from differ-

*

*Set out in Appendix to Brief.

5

ent lots of rough rice purchased from different par-
ties; and when an order for clean rice is received,
based on any particular sample, the miller fills the
order of clean rice from a mixture from various lots
of clean rice. Many sales are made during a given
season made up of various mixtures of, clean rice,
and there is practically an unlimited combination of
lots of clean rice that go into the various sales.
There is no way of accurately allocating to ‘the va-.
rious lots of rice going into any given mix any
definite part of the price received for the entire mix.
(R. 16-21.) Petitioner’s sworn bill and affidavits
showed that for these reasons it is impossible for
petitioner or any other rice miller to make the proof
required for recovery of the tax paid, if the law be
held unconstitutional, even if it were otherwise pos-
sible to make such proof. Petitioner’s sworn bill
_ alleged that unless the injunction prayed for was
‘granted: (1) It-would be without adequate remedy
at law to recover the taxes paid in the event they be
held unconstitutional; (2) if any legal remedy exist-
ed, it would entail a multiplicity-of suits; (3) it
‘would become subject to heavy civil and criminal
penalties and (4) it would suffer great and irrepar-
able damages for specific reasons set out. (R. 15,
16, 23.) Respondent filed no answer denying any
of these allegations. Petitioner alleged below that
the said Section 21(d) did not apply to its suit be-
cause petitioner: had no adequate remedy at law.
It alleged further that, if said section be interpreted.
a8 prohibiting the injunction prayed for, the said

The RE Oy INS DA PLES. hi, Site

6
section, together -with the other provisions of the
Act, violated the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion in that’said unconstitutional taxes would be col-
lected from petitioner and ‘petitioner would have no
remedy by which it could recover said taxes, if they
were unlawful, and thereby petitioner would be de-
prived of the right to test the constitutionality of
the taxes. (R. 23.) Petitioner offered to give such.
security as the Court might require if the injunction
were granted. (R. 24.) There was neither pleading
nor proof that the granting of the injunction would
in any wise injure respondent if the tax were vulti-
mately held constitutional. | 7
On October 29, 1935, petitioner was ian an

appeal. (R: 81.) On the same day petitioner ap-
plied for, and was denied, an injunction pending
appeal. (R. 80.) The record was duly filed in the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit at New Orleans, Louisiana, on November 4,

1935, being Cause No. 7951 on the docket of that
Court. On November 4, 1935, petitioner applied to
said Circuit. Court of Appeals for an injunction
against the respondent pending the hearing of its
appeal (R. 87), but the Circuit Court of Appeals
on November 5, 1935, denied the application. (R. 98.)

3.
Reasons Relied Upon for the Allowance of the Writ.

This case, with its companion cases, presents an
entirely unprecedented situation. It presents ques-
tions of gravity and importance. It involves the

7

constitutionality of an important Federal statute
and the rulings of the Court below, insofar as they
may be taken to have held the statute constitutional,

are probably in conflict with the decisions of this

Court in Loan Association v.* Topeka (1874), 20
Wall. 655; Child Labor Tax Case (1922), 259 U.®.
20; Hill v. Wallace (1922), 259 U. S. 44; Hammer

4, Semon (1918), 247 U. S. 254; and Schechter

Poultry Corporation v. United States (1935), 295
U. 8. 495; and contrary to the decision of the United
States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in Butler et al. v. United States (1935), 78 Fed.
(2nd) 1. The District Court and the Circuit Court
of Appeals in holding that Congress may constitu-

tionally forbid the granting of an injunction against _

summary collection of taxes, while at the same-time
depriving the taxpayer of any adequate remedy at
law, presents a constitutional question of great im-
portance never decided by this Court and a question

which should be definitely decided. “Though this

question has never been directly decided by: this
Court, the decisions of the Courts below probably
conflict with the decisions of this Honorable Court

in Truaz v. Corrigan (1921), 257 U. 8. 312; Brink-

erhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Company v. Hill
(1930), 281 U. S. 673, and inferentially Graham &
Foster v. Goodcell (1931), 282 U. S. 409, 430, 431;
Michaelson v. United States (1924), 266 U. S. 42,
64, 65, 66, and Phillips v. Commissioner (1931), 283
U. S. 589, 596. This holding was particularly er-
roneous when the respondent was, at the same time,

Bie...

Re OS en Or Bee Me SE ree TEE Re OE RE EN

- 8
authorized to collect the tax by summary pro-
ceedings under Sections ,115 to 131, Title 26, U.S.
ais as amended.

.In holding that Article 3224, U. Ss. RK. S., and Sec-
tion 21(a) of said Act deprive the courts of jurisdic-
tion to grant an injunction under the unusual and
extraordinary circumstances of this case, the courts
below decided an important question of Federal
law in a way probably in conflict with the decisions
of this Honorable Court in Hill v. Wallace (1922), .
259 U.S. 44, and Miller, Collector, v. Standard Nut
Margarine Company (1932), 284 U. S. 498, and in
conflict, with the unreported decisions of the Second,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, which granted injunctions pending appeal
in cases similar to the’ present case.

The District Court, in refusing to grant petition- —
er’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and in re-
fusing to grant petitioner’s motion for an injunction

pending appeal, and the Circuit Court of Appeals

in refusing to grant petitioner’s motion for an in-
junction pending appeal, have so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-

’ ings as to call for an exercise of this Honorable

Court’s power of supervision and this action of the
courts below is probably in conflict with the de-
cision of this Honorable Court in Ohio Oil Company

~ y. Conway (1929), 279 U. S.-813, ‘and is in conflict |

with the holdings of every other Circuit Court of
Appeals which has passed upon this question, to
wit, the Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.

9
4,

Reasons Relied Upon for the Allowance of Writ Before
Action on the Merits by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

This case, with its companion cases, presents a
situation unparalleled in American history. Under
the provisions of Sections 115 to 131, Title 26, U.S.
C., as amended, the respondent is armed: with
weapons for the immediate forcible collection of the
tax from petitioner, and those similarly situated,
which they are powerless to resist. The District
Court and Circuit Court of Appeals below have, con-
trary to the decisions of all other Circuit Courts of
Appeals passing upon the question, held themselves
deprived of any jurisdiction whatsoever to grant
petitioner any relief. In the ordinary course of
events it will be six or seven months before petition-
er’s appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals will be
heard on the merits. Meanwhile, through collection
of the tax the subject-matter of the appeal may be
_ destroyed, and the case become moot before a hear-
ing may be had in the Cireuit Court of Appeals.
In addition, the order of the court below, though
apparently an interlocutory order, has the effect
of finally disposing of the appeal on the merits.
The. questions involved are of great national im-
portance, and deserve the prompt consideration of
this Honorable Court. This petition raisés im-
portant questions of constitutional law not raised
by any other petition now before this Court, and
particularly it raises the question whether the pro-
visions of Sections 115 to 131, Title 26, U.S. C., as

10

amended, are constitutional, if it be held that Con-
gress may constitutionally deprive a taxpayer of
all adequate remedy at law to recover taxes illegally
collected while at the same time forbidding the.
' granting of an injunction to restrain their collection.
Hundreds of similar suits throughout the country
involve this question, as well as the others herein
raised, and the situation thus presented is so un-
usual and unprecedented as to justify this Honor-—
able Court in requiring the record: below to be certi-
fied to it forthwith for decision.

WHEREFORE, ‘your petitioner respectfully
prays that a writ of certiorari may issue out of
and under the seal of this Honorable Court directed
to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit commanding said court to certify
and send to this Court, on a day certain, to be there-

in designated, a full and ‘complete Transcript of ~

the Record and all of the proceedings in the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals im said cause entitled Noble-
Trotter Rice Milling Co., Inc., Appellant; v. Rufus W.
Fontenot, Indiyidually and as Acting United States °
Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Lou-
isijana, Appellee, No. 7951 on its docket, to the end
that said cause may be reviewed and determined by
this Court as provided by Section 240 of the Judi- —
cial Code, as amended, and that your petitioner
may have such other and further relief or rem-
edy in the premises as this Court may deem ap- —
propriate and in conformity with said provisions
of the. Judicial Code, and that said judgment of the

11

| ‘District Court be reversed by this Honorable Court
and such relief granted a8 is appropriate to the
cause.

NosiE-TrorTer Rick Mire Oo., Inc.,

af

By: C. A. McCoy,
| Attorney for Petitioner.

Of Counsel,
McOoy, Kina & JongEs, :
Lake Charles, La.

INTHE |
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1935 |

.NOBLE-TROTTER RICE MILLING CO,, INC,
SP ETITIONER,

V.

RUFUS W. FONTENOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS ACTING UNITED STATES COLLECTOR
OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE DIS-
TRICT OF LOUISIANA,
RESPONDENT.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR

The District Court wrote no opinion and the Cir-.
cuit Court of Appeals has not yet rendered any de-
cision on the merits of the appeal. The per curiam
opinion of the Court denying the’ injunction pend-
ing appeal is found on page 98 of the record.

16
- PS
Jurisdiction.

(1) Jurisdiction of this cause is-conferred upon
this Honorable Court by Judicial Code, Section 240,
as amended; United States Code, Title 28, Section
347. | , | |

(2) The date of the judgment of the Tria! Court
to be reviewed is October 28, 1935 (R. 79), the date
of the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals deny-
ing the injunction pending appeal sought to be re-
viewed is November 5, 1935. (R. 98.)

(3) The power of this Honorable Court to review
the case prior to a disposition of it by the Circuit
Court. of Appeals and to review the action of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in refusing to grant an
interlocutory order to preserve the status quo is sus-
tained by the following, among other, cases:

The Three Friends (1897), 166 U.S. 1, 49. |

Denver v. New York Trust Company. (1913),
229 U.S. 123, 133.

Harriman v. Northern Securities Company
(1905), 197 U. S. 244, 286. -

American Construction Company v. Jackson-
ville Railway (1893), 148 U. 8S. 372, 384.

Forsyth v. Hammon (1897), 166 U. 8S. 506, 513.
In re Chetwood (1897), 165 U.S. 443, 462.
McClellan v. Carland (1910), 217 U. S. 268, 277.

Hanover Star Milling Company v. Metcalf
(1916), 240 U. S. 403, 408. |

Gay v. Ruff (1934), 292 U. 8. 25, 30. °

17
IT. .
Statement of the Case.

A full statement of the case has been given under
heading 2 in the petition and in the interest of brev-
ity the statement is not repeated at this point.

- IV.
Specification of Errors.

(1) The District Court erred in holding that it
was without jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s cause
because of the provisions of R. S. Sec. 3224, and See.
21(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as
amended. |

(2) The . District, Court erred in refusing to
grant petitioner a preliminary injunction pending ©
a hearing on the merits.

_ (3) The District Court and Circuit. Court of
Appeals erred in holding that said Sec. 21(a) did
not deprive petitioner of its property without due
process of law contrary to the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, in view of the
allegations in the bill, admitted by the motion to dis-
miss, that petitioner was without remedy at law to
recover the taxes paid if they were held to be illegal.

(4) The District Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals erred in holding that if said Sec. 21(a)
forbade the ‘granting of an injunction restraining
the collection of the tax, and if petitioner had no
remedy at law to recover the same, if it be held they
were illegally collected, respondent could neverthe- -

18
less employ the summary proceedings for immediate
collection of the tax provided in Sections 115 to
131, Title 26, U. S. C., as amended, without depriv-
ing petitioner of its property without due process
of law contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

(5) The District Court and the Circuit Court
erred in holding that either or both R. S. §3224, and
Sec. 21(a) of said Act prevented the granting of an ©
injunction under the special and extraordinary cir-
cumstances presented by this case.

(6) The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in hold-
ing that petitioner had ‘‘a remedy at law to recover
back any taxes illegally exacted.”’ |

(7) The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in re-
fusing to grant petitioner an injunction to preserve
the status quo pending its appeal from the order dis-
missing the bill.

(8) The Circuit Court of.-Appeals erred in re-
_ fusing to grant petitioner an injunction pending

the appeal for the purpose of preserving the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of that Court.

(9) The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in hold-
ing either or both R. 8S. §3224, and Sec. 21(a) of
said Act ‘‘deprived the Court of jurisdiction to
grant injunctive relief.’’

(10) The District Court ond Circuit Court of

_ Appeals erred in not holding the Agricultural Ad-

justment Act, as amended, to be violative of Art. 1,
Sec. 1, Amendments Five and Ten of - Consti-
tution of the United States.

eee ) : : .

19

Petitioner expects to rely on all of the foregoing
specifications of error.

Ws
ARGUMENT
Summary of the Argument.
J Point A

Neither R. S. §3224, nor Sec. 21(a) of the nk
cultural Adjustment Act, properly interpreted, bars
injunctive relief in this case. ;

Pa

Pornt B

See. 21(d) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
deprives petitioner of any adequate remedy at law.

Port C -°

If R. S. §3224, and Seé. 21(a) of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act forbid the granting of an injunction
_ in this case, then they are unconstitutional.

Pornt D

The summary proceedings provided in Sections
115 to 131, Title 26, U.S. C., as amended, are uncon-
stitutional when applied to a taxpayer who has been
deprived of both legal and equitable remedies to test
the constitutionality of the ie thus sought to be
collected.

» -.
Port E

The Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, is
unconstitutional. _

Port FEF.

This is a case where certiorari should be granted
prior to the final decree by the Circuit Court of
meee. -

Port A.

Inapplicability of R. 8. §3224 and Section 21(a) of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

_. In wording and in effect R. S. §3224 and Sec.
21(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as
. amended, are for all practical purposes identical.
For the convenience of the Court the two acts are
‘here set out side by side: |

R. 8. §3224, ALA. Al Sec. 21 (a).

No suit No suit, action or pro-.

| ceeding (including pro-
bate, administration, re- °
ceivership, and bank-
ruptcy proceedings)

shall be maintained in shall be brought or main-
any court — tained in any ¢ourt

for the purpose of re- if such suit, action or
straining the assessment proceeding is ’for the pur-
or collection of any tax. pose or has the effect (1)
of preventing or restrain-
ing the assessment or

2 ee

collection of any tax im-

posed or the amount of
' any penalty or interest

aecrued under this title

on or after the date of

the adoption of this
- amendment * * *,

“

This Court has consistently held that despite the
apparently unconditional terms of R. S. §3224, in-
junctions against the collection of a tax may issue in
proper cases. The latest expression of the Court
on the point is found in Miller v. Standard Nut Mar-

garine Company (1932), 284 U. S. 498, 509, where
the Court said:

‘The section does not refer specifically to the
rule applicable to cases involving exceptional
circumstances. The general words employed
are not sufficient, and it would require specific
language undoubtedly disclosing that purpose,
to warrant the inference that Congress intended
to abrogate that salutary and well. established
rule. * * * It has never held the rule to be

~ absolute, but has repeatedly indicated that ex-
traordinary and exceptional circumstances ren-
der its provisions inapplicable. * * *

“ * * * Tt requires no elaboration of the
facts found to show that the enforcement of the
Act against respondent-would be arbitrary and
oppressive, would destroy its’ business, ruin it
financially and inflict loss for which it would
have no remedy at law. It is clear that, by rea-
son of the special and extraordinary facts and
circumstances, Sec. 3224 does not apply.”

See also Hill v. Wallace (1922), 259 U. S. 44, 62;
Dodge v. Osborn, (1916), 240 U. S. 118, 121.

Section 21(a) was included in the amendment to
the Act of August 24, 1935, after numerous suits to
restrain the collection of the tax had. been filed
throughout the country.in which the contention was
made that the supposed tax was in fact no tax at all |
but a penalty. e.g., Penn v. Glenn, 10 Fed. Supp.
483, 484 (April 13, 1935) ; F. G.-Vogt & Sons, Inc. v.
Rothensies, 11 Fed: Supp. 225, 230 (July 17, 1935) ;
Armour & Company v. Harrison (not yet reported,
District Court, Northern District of Illinois), in
which the Court said in connection with R. S. §3224:

‘*Merely to call this exaction a tax does not

_make it a tax. It is not levied for governmental

purposes; therefore, it is not a tax. | Therefore,
the statute has no application to it.

The obvious purpose of Congress in inehuding
this section in the amendment was to make certain
its intention that the principle of R. S. §3224 should
apply to suits brought to restrain collection of these
particular taxes. Having expressed its intention in
words practically identical with those used in R. S.
§3224, the amendment must be interpreted in the
light of the well settled rule that, when a statute is _,
reenacted in the same words as a previous statute
which has received a judicial interpretation, the
re-enacted statute includes the previous judicial
interpretation. Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission (1918), 246 U. S. 638, 644.

Further it must be interpreted in the light of the

23

rule that a statute, susceptible of two constructions,
should be construed in such a way as not to raise
doubts as to its constitutionality. Panama R. R. Co.
v. Johnson (1924), 264 U. S. 375; Michaelson v.
United States (1924),'266 U. 8. 42. As will be
pointed out hereafter, to interpret this statute in the
manner in which it has been interpreted below would
raise grave doubts as to its constitutionality.

_ Interpreting these statutes as not forbidding in-
junctive relief in all cases we may pass to a discus-
sion of whether extraordinary and exceptional cir-
cumstances exist in this case such as would render
them inapplicable.

Pot: B |
Section 21(d) of the Agricutural Adjustment Act
Deprives Petitioner of Its Remedy at Law.

Section 21(d)* forbids the return of any taxes
illegally collected under the Act unless the taxpayer
proves, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, that
neither the taxpayer nor any person directly or in-
directly under his control has, directly or indirectly,
included the amount of the tax or any part thereof
in the price of the commodity with respect to which
it was imposed, or of any article processed from
the commodity with respect to: which it was im-
posed, or passed on any part of such amount to the
vendee or to any other person in any manner or in-
_¢luded any part of such amount in the charge or fee

*Printed in the appendix.

24

for processing, and that the price paid by the tax-
- payer for the commodity was not reduced by any
part of the tax paid. This, obviously, was an at-.
tempt to enact into law the economic theory that the
burden of any tax imposed upon.a manufacturer
or processor is ultimately passed on to others. In
speaking of a sales tax, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Indian Motorcycle
Company v. U. S. (1931), 283 U. S. 570, 581, said:

“‘In the Panhandle Oil Case, it was held that .
this shifting of the burden of a State tax from
the seller to the buyer was sufficient to render
the tax invalid where the buyer was an agency
of the United States, and it was assumed that
the burden of the sales tax involved was so in-
evitably passed on to the buyer as to require
this result. With this assumption economists
would not, I believe, generally agree. Many
hold that whether the burden of any tax paid by °
the seller is actually passed-.on to the buyer
depends upon--considerations so various and
complex as to preclude the assumption a priori
that any particular tax at any particular time
is passed on. In some conditions of the market, |
the burden remains with the seller, or even may
be shifted back from the seller to the producer
by the reduction of the producer’s price, rather
than forward to the consumer by an increase of
the sellex’s price.”’

Likewise Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the full
Court in Lash’s Products Company v. U. S. (1929)
278 U.S. 175, 176, said:

‘‘The phrase ‘passed the tax on’ is inaccurate,
as obviously the tax is laid and remains on the

'__—aa "

25

.manufacturer and on him alone. Heckman &
Co. v. I. 8. Dawes & Son Co., 12 F. (2d) 154.
The purchaser does not pay the tax. He pays
or may pay ‘the seller more for the goods be-
cause of the seller’s obligation, but that is all:.”’

A sales tax is of course easily identifiable, or
capable of identification, because levied on the sale
of a given identifiable object and based: upon the
price at which the object is sold. If the question of
whether such a tax has been ‘‘passed on’’ is so de-
batable, how much more so must be the case of a
tax, such as a processing tax, which is carried as a
part of the processor’s expenses of operation? Even
more. complicated is the situation when, as here, the
price paid to the producer and by the consumer
fluctuates from day to day on competitive markets
influenced by complex and manifold economic. fac-
tors. However, whatever the merits of the theory
qua theory, there can be no question that in order to
. make factual proof as to whether a processing’ tax
has been “‘passed on’’ it must be shown that the
price to the vendee has been increased because of the
tax, or that the price paid to the producer has been
reduced becavise of the tax. When a commodity,
such as rice, is bought and sold on competitive mar-
_ kets such proof can be made only by proving what
the market would have been had there been no tax.

This Court held in International Harvester Come.
pany v. Kentucky (1914), 234 U. S. 216, 223, that
the determination of what the market price of a
given article would have been under different. cir-

cumstances ‘is a problem that no human ingenuity
could solve,’’ and that:

* “The reason is not the general uncertainties
of a jury trial but that the elements necessary
to determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain

_ both in nature and degree of effect to the acutest
commercial mind. The very community, the
intensity of whose wish relatively to its other
competing desires determines the price that it
would give, has to be supposed differently or-
ganized and subject to other influences than
those under which it acts. * * *

_, #* * * To compel ‘them to guess on
peril of indictment what the community would
have given for them if the continually changing
conditions were other than they are, to an un- .
certain extent; to divine prophetically what the
reaction of only partially determinate facts
would be upon the imaginations and desires of
purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does
not possess.”’

The situs*ion involved in this is many times
more complex than that in the case just referred to.

_° The manner in which the rice milling business is

conducted is too complicated to set out in the con-
fines of this brief but is fully set out in the petition
and affidavits in support thereof. (R. 16-21, 60-75.)
Because of the manner m which the rice milling
business is, and must be, conducted it is impossible
for a miller to tell accurately whether he has made a
profit or loss with respect to ‘the purchase, milling,
and sale of a given lot of rough rice. (R. 62.) He
can make a book figure with regard to any such lot.

f

27

of rice by the use of averages, estimates, and arbi-

on the season’s operations. (R. 62.) The process-
ing tax is levied upon each lot of rice based upon its
weight at the time it reaches the mill and in order to
’ recover the tax paid on such rice, under the pro-
visions of Sec. 21(d), the miller must prove that he
did not ‘‘pass on’’ the tax with respect to that par-
ticular lot of rice. Since he cannot even de’ »rmine
whether he made a profit or a loss on the particular
transaction, it is manifestly impossible for him to
know, much less prove, whether he has passed the
tax on. However, even if he were able to prove
exactly the amount of profit he made on each trans-
action, he would still have proved nothing but that.

have been able to sell the particular lot of rice for
exactly the same price even if there had been no tax
and he might have been able to purchase it for
exactly the same price had there been no tax. On

or even a sound guess. The miller cannot control
the market on which he buys nor that on which he
sells but he is compelled to buy and sell on those
markets if he is to stay in thé rice milling business.
This lack of control of the markets by the miller is
illustrated by the fact that the present cost of rough

rice, plus operatings costs, including tax, is more
than the miller can reasonably expect to get out of
the products processed from it on the present market

traries but that is all. He can only tell, at the end ~
of the season, whether he has made a gain or loss

For all that he, or anyone else, could know he might

the face of it such matters are incapable of proof

28 .

for clean rice and rice products. (R. 62.) Mani-
festly under such circumstances no one can know,
much less prove, whether the ultimate burden of the
tax has fallen on the producer, the miller, or the
purchaser. An analogous situation arises-where a
trademark has been infringed and the question aris-
es as to how much of the sales price received by the
infringer is attributable to the use of the trademark.
and how much to the intrinsic value of the object
sold. In Hamilton Shoe Company v. Wolf Bros.
~ (1916), 240 U. S. 251, 260, this Court held that in
such a case it would, in the very nature of things, be -
impossible to ascertain to what extent the infringer .
could. have effected sales and at what prices except
for the use of the trademark. The same principle
_is applicable here—it is inherently impossible, in
the circumstances of this case, for petitioner, or
any other rice miller, to ascertain or prove to what
_extent he could have ‘‘effected sales and_ at what
prices’’ except for the existence of the’ processing
tax.

More than a thousand suits to enjoin the collection
of these taxes have been filed throughout the United
States. .Insofar as petitioner knows the government
has never yet been able to suggest how the proof
required by the statute can be made. The govern-
ment has satisfied itself with the simple .assertion
that proof can be made and with citing the opinion .
of this Court in Umited States v. Jefferson Electric
Manufacturing Company (1934), 291 U.S. 386, 402,

where the Court said;

29
“Tf the taxpayer has borne the burden of the
_ tax, he can readily show it.”’ *

The tax involvéd in that case was a tax upon the
sale of a definite determinable object and amounted

_ to 5% of the price for which the object was sold.
. The tax was not upon the manufacture, or. the manu--

facture and sale. Indian Motor Cycle Company v.
United States (1931), 283 U. S. 570, 574. In deter-
mining whether the payer of the tax ‘collected it
from the vendeé or paid it himself there were no
such complications as here exist. Indeed it was not
suggested by anyone that the required proof could
not be made; only that the taxpayer should not have
to make it because the tax involved in the suit had

- been paid. prior to the passage of the Act and at a

time when it would not have been necessary for the
payer to make such proof to procure refund. (P.
401.) The present case came before the Circuit
Court of Appeals on a final judgment dismissing the
bill on motion of the respondent which admitted the

allegation that the proof required by the Act was im-_

possible of being made. Nevertheless, and in the
face of this, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
petitioner had ‘‘a’”’ remedy at law (nothing being
said as to the adequacy of it). Petitioner asserts

, that on the face of the Act, considering the kind of

tax involved, an impossible burden of proof is placed
upon petitioner. Petitioner further asserts that
even if this were not true the Courts below should
have enjoined the collection of the tax until such
time as the courts could make a finding upon the

30

fact question of whether, under the peculiar condi-
tions of the rice milling industry, the proof could

be made. Respondent has not denied the allegations .°

of petitioner’s bill in this respect and under the cir-
cumstances the Court should not have dismissed the
bill but was under the plain duty of preserving the
status quo until such time as the facts upon which
petitioner’s constitutional rights depended could be
fully determined. cf Ohio Oil Company v. —"
(1929), 279 U. S. 813.

Besides the lack of any adequate remedy at law
this case presents several other grounds for equitable
relief which have been held sufficient by this Court
for the enjoining of the collection of a tax: _

1. Multiplicity of suits (R. 23). Wilson v.
Illinois Southern Railroad (1924), 263 U. 8.
574; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Com-
pany (1907), 207 U. S. 20.

. 2. Congress has made no appropriation to
repay any of these taxes if illegally collected,
even if an adequate remedy at law were avail-
able, and in view of the tremendous amount in-
volved it is improbable that any such appropria-
tion will be made. (R. 24.) Stewart Dry
Goods Company v. Lewis (1932), 287 U. S. 9.

3. The statute purporting to give the legal
remedy has never been interpreted by the
Courts and for this reason, if no other, peti-
tioner’s remedy at law. cannot be said to be
adequate. Atlantic Coast Line v. Daughton
(1923), 262 U. S. 413. ef Union Pacific Rail-
‘ road v. Weld County (1917), 247 U.S. 282.

' 4. The existence of the heavy civil and crim-
inal penalties provided by Section 19(b) of the

Betineyy,

31

Act*..(R. 15.) Ex Parte Young (1908), 209

U.S. 123, 146; Wallace vy. Hines (1920), 253 -

U. S. 66.

Point C

Unconstitutionality of R. S. §3224 and Sec. 21(a) of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act Under the
Circumstances of This Case.

The argument is made that the District Courts
_ and Circuit Courts of Appeals, not being eonstitu-
tional courts, may be completely abolished by Con-
gress and therefore Congress may place any desired
restriction their jurisdiction. The answer to
this is that/Congress has not abolished the District
Courts nor the Circuit Courts of Appeals and not
having abolished them the Congress may not consti-
tutionally deprive one class. of citizens of the right

to equitable relief therein while at the same time -

and under similar circumstances other taxpayers
are permitted to obtain such relief. Persons other
_ than those subject to the processing tax from whom
illegal taxes are sought to be collected may enjoin
their collection under special and extraordinary cir-
cumstances. Hill v. Wallace, supra; Miller v. Stand-
ard Nut Margarine Company, supra. The right to
protect one’s property by invoking the aid of courts
_ is as much a property right as the property itself,
and to deny one class of citizens this right while
granting it to others under similar circumstances

*The applicable penalty provisions are copied in
Appendix C hereto. —

be Eee APTI
FS eee a,

Se ae ac ood

RTT ol comets

32

is to deprive the class so denied of its property
without due process of law. In Truaz v. Corrigan
(1921), 257 U. S. 312, which involved an Arizona
statute which forbade the issuance of injunctions
_ to protect property rights in cases of labor disputes
the contention was made in support of the validity
of the statute that the State could have completely
abolished the lower courts and therefore the State
eould put suck limitations as it desired upon their
jurisdiction. This court nevertheless held the stat-
ute violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since
_ the validity of exertions by the Federal Government
of any of its delegated powers under the Fifth |
Amendment are to be measured by the same stand-
ards by which exertions of State power are meas-
ured under the Fourteenth Amendment, Hamilton
v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. (1919), 251 U. 8. 146,
156, it would seem clear that R. S. §3224 and See.
21(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act are un-
constitutional if they be construed as depriving
courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions to pro-
tect property rights in tax cases where the taxpayer
is without remedy, or at least adequate remedy, at
law. |

In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Company
v. Hill (1930), 281 U. S. 673, the Supreme Court
of Missouri held that the trial court properly dis-
missed a bill seeking to enjoin the illegal assess: ~
ment and collection of taxes on the ground that the
taxpayer should first have pursued remedies before
the State Board of Equalization. That court had >

33
’ previously held that the State Board of Equalization
was without jurisdiction to hear such complaints. |
The efiect of the second decision was to deprive the
petitioner of all right to test the validity of the tax.
- This court held that this amounted to a deprivation

of petitioner’s property - without due process of
law, Mr. Justice Brandeis saying: |

‘Whether acting through its judiciary or -
through its legislature, a State may not deprive
a person of all existing remedies for the enforce-
ment of a right, which the State has no power
to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to
him some real opportunity to protect it.’’

This language is exactly applicable. to the instant
case and seems conclusive that if R. S. §3224 and
Sec. 21(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. be
construed as forbidding injunctive relief in this
case they are unconstitutional. See also Graham &:
Foster v. Goodcell (1931), 282 U.S. 409, 430, 431.

However absolute the power -of Congress to de-
stroy the jurisdiction of the inferior Federal Gourts
May seem, it is no more absolute than the apparent
power of the State to arbitrarily exclude a foreign
corporation from doing business within its borders.
Nevertheless, this court has held, Fidelity Deposit
Company y. Tafoya (1926), 270 U. §. 426, that this
‘most absolute seeming”’ right was qualified and
in some circumstances could become wrong, and
that despite this apparently unqualified right the
State could not impose an unconstitutional condi-
tion upon the foreign corporation coming into the

State. The exercise of Congress’s right to limit the
equity jurisdiction of the lower Federal Courts in
the granting of injunctions in tax cases such as ~
the present would be, as in the case just cited, for
the purpose of securing a result forbidden by the
Fifth Amendment, i. e., the deprivation of petition-
er’s property without due process of law, and may
‘not stand.

There is still on reason why these statutes,
if.construed to absolutely and in all cases forbid
injunctions, are unconstitutional. The Constitu-

- tion, Article III, Section 1, vests the judicial power
of the United States in one Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. By Section 2 of
Article ITI this judicial power extends to all cases
in law and equity arising under the‘ Constitution
and laws. of of the United States. Congress‘having .
established the District: Courts and the Circuit
Courts of Appeals, they, by virtue of the Constitu-
tion, at once become vested with judicial power in
all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of
the United States. These inferior courts derive their —
judicial power from the Constitution and not from
any act of Congress. Congress may well have the —
power to regulate the procedure in these courts and
to define their jurisdiction but Congress may not,
it is submitted, deprive the courts of their inherent
judicial powers which naturally follow from the
Constitutional grant of those powers. This was
expressly held in Michaelson v. United States

’
,
il

35 ee
(1924), 266 U. S. 42, 64, 65, 66, where the court said:

“If the statute now under review encroaches
upon the equity jurisdiction intended by the
Constitution, a grave constitutional question in
respect of its validity would be presented; and

it, therefore, becomes-our duty, as this Court
has’ frequently said, to construe it ‘if fairly
possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion
that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts
upon that score.’ Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson,
264 U. S. 375. | .

* * *

‘But it is contended that the statute mate-
rially interferes with the inherent power of the
courts and is therefore invalid. That the power
to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts,
has been many times decided and may be re-
garded as settled law. It is essential to the ad-
ministration of justice. The courts of the
United States, when called into existence and
vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at
once become possessed of the power. So far as
the inferior Federal Courts are concerned, how-
ever, it is not beyond the authority of Congress
(Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510-511;
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. 8S. 324,
326); but the attributes which inhere in that
power and are inseparable from it can neither -
be: abrogated nor rendered practically inoper-
ative. That it may be regulated within limits
not precisely defined’ may not-be doubted. The
— now under review is of the latter char-
acter.’ |

The power of courts of equity to issue injunctions
to protect property rights, which could not other-
Wise be protected, is quite as inherent as the power

36

to punish for contempt. Conceding the authority of
Congress to regulate or limit the use of the power,
to an undefined extent, the case here presents no
such situation, for to interpret the acts as depriving
the courts of the power to issue injunctions in
-every case involving the collection of the tax, would
be to completely destroy one of the inherent powers
of the court which it possesses by virtue of Section
2 of Article IIT of the Constitution. For these rea-
sons ‘petitioner submits that R. 8. §3224 and See.
21(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, so con-
strued, are unconstitutional.

eon D

- Unconstitutionality of Summary Proceedings for
Collection of the Tax.

Soin Sections 115 to 131, Title 26, U. 8. C., as
amended,* which are incorporated. into the present —
Act, the Commissioner is authorized to collect the
taxes, upon non-payment, by the fixing of liens on
all of petitioner’s property or by the levying of dis-
traints, against petitioner’s propergy, including
bank accounts, etc. The procedure igssummary and
under the distraint proceedings it would be entire- _
ly possible for the Commissioner to collect the full

_ tax alleged to be owed by petitioner before petitioner
could even know any proceedings had been started
to collect the tax. All that: would be necessary
would be for the Commissioner or a deputy to walk ©

*Printed in Appendix B.

37

to petitioner’s bank with the proper papers and
distrain petitioner’s money there deposited. The
constitutionality of this summary procedure was up-
held in Phillips v. Commissioner (1931), .283 U. 8.
589, 596, upon the express ground that under exist-
ing statutes the taxpayer was given ample oppor-
tunity to ultimately test the liability for the tax in
a court of law, the court saying:

‘‘Where only property rights are involved,
mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is
not a denial of due process, if the opportunity
gwen for the ultimate judicial determination of
the liability is adequate. Springer v. United
States, 102 U. S. 586, 593; Scottish Union &

National Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. 8. 611,
631.”’ . |

Under the facts of this case plaintiff is deprived of
all legal remedy to recover thé tax collected, if it be
held illegal, because of the impossible burden of
proof petitioner would have to meet in such a suit
and, if R. S. §3224 and-Sec. 21(a) be'so construed,
petitioner is deprived of the right to test the valid-
_ ity of the tax by a suit for an injunction. To permit
the government to summarily seize petitioner’s prop-
erty under these circumstances would be to deprive
petitioner of his property. without due process of law
and to.argue this further would be to argue the ob-
vious. See, in addition to the case cited, Lipke v.
Lederer (1922), 259 U. 8. 557, 562; Carpenter v.
Shaw (1930), 280 U. S. 363, 369; Ward v: Love
County (1920), 253 U. 8. 17. i

38
Port E

The Agricultural Adjustment Act, as ‘Amended, Is
Unconstitutional. :

Petitioner asserts that the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, as amended, is unconstitutional for the.
following reasons: .

*.

1. The Act, though in form a revenue mea-
sure, is in fact an attempt to regulate the price’
at which petitioner buys and sells rice in intra-
state commerce.

2. The Aét is an attempt to aie the pro-
duction of agricultural commodities within the
several States.

_ 8. The taxes are not levied for the general
welfare ‘or for a public purpose. .

4. The Act, as amended, contains an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power to
the Secretary of Agriculture.

Section 2(1) of the Act declares the policy of the
Act to be ‘‘to establish an@ maintain such balance
between the production and consumption of agri-
cultural commodities, and such marketing condi-
tions therefor, as will reestablish prices to farmers
at a level that will give agricultural commodities a
purchasing power with respect to articles that farm-
ers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of ag-
ricultural commodities ip the base period. * * *”
The rice miller is still compelled to pay the market
‘price for all rice bought from farmers, and ‘in addi-
tion thereto he is compelled to pay $1.62 per barrel

39

on the rice so purchased, which $1.62 in turn is given
to. the farmer under the guise of benefit payments.
The object is to raise the price to the farmer and
that object is obtained in part, at least, by com-
pelling petitioner. to pay at least $1.62 per barrel.
more for his rice than he would otherwise have to
pay. Since the purchase is wholly within intra-
state commerce, it is unquestionably beyond the
power of the Federal Government to control. Hill
v. Wallace (1922), 259 U. 8. 44; Schechter Poultry
Corporation v. United States (1935), 295 U. S. 495;
Butler v. United States of America (C. C. A., First,
1935), 78 Fed. (2nd) 1. Congress being without
power by direct regulation to fix or control these
* prices, it cannot achieve the same result by casting
~ a law having that purpose into the form of a revenue
measure. Child Labor Tax Case (1922), 259 U. S.
20; Hill v. Wallace, supra; Hammer v. Dagenhart
(1918), 247 U. 8. 251. bey . ¢

Secondly, the Act attempts to control and reduce
the production of agricultural commodities by farm-
ers within the several States. In Section 8(1) the
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized

‘“‘to provide for reduction in the acreage or re-
duction in the production for market, or both,
of any basic agricultural commodity, through
agreements with producers or by other volun-
tary methods, and to provide for rental or bene-
fit payments in connection therewith or upon
that part of the production of any basic agricul-
tural commodity required for domestic con-
sumption, such amounts as the Secretary deems
fair and reasonable.’ * * *

Of all indust~ies, iastabiies is the most essential- |
ly intrastate, and this has long been recognized by
this Court. Kidd v. Pearson (1888), 128 U.8. 1, 21; .
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Company (1922), 260
U. S. 245, 259; Industrial Association v. United

States (1925), 268 U. S. 64, 82. Since the Act has’
for its purpose-the regulation of this purely intra-
_ state matter, Schecter Pow vry Corporation v. U. S.,

supra; Hill v. Wallace, supra, the tax levied. to
effectuate this purpose must fall. Child Labor Tas
Case, supra; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton .
Railroad Company (1935), 295 U. S. 330; Gibbons —

v. Ogden (1824), 9 Wheat. 1,199. ¢

The fact that the arrangements between the Sec-
retary of Agriculture and the individual farmers .

by which the latter reduce their acreage and the

former mates) henefit payments to them therefor

out of the taxes collected from processors does not

| make the Act in purpose and effect any the less a -
regulation of agriculture within . the State. cf.

Schecter Poultry Corporation v. U. S., supra, p. 529.

~ The arrangements are made by virtue of, and under

authority of, the law, and it is idle to say that the
act of the farmer in reducing his acreage pursuant
to the contract with the Secretary of Agriculture is

- voluntary when the farmer ‘knows that if he does

not execute such agreement he is subjected to the

penalty of having to sell his commodity .at the

same price at which other farmers sell it minus the
substantial amount received by, the other farmers
by way Of benefit. payments. (R. 41.) Further-

:
eric her BO ta $

..
RAPES ar tre pes rh yanytepr eens
. a

4]

more, without the ‘tax provisions in the Act (which
are certainly not voluntary) the enormous benefit
funds with which to coerce the farmers into making
‘the “voluntary” agreements would not be available
_and the result sought to be achieved by Congress, to
‘wit, the regulation of agriculture within the several
States, could not be accomplished. |

_ Third,’it seems plain that these taxes are not
levied for the general welfare or a public purpose,
as required by Article I, Section 8, Clause 1; of the
Constitution. It is plain from the face of the Act
that it is an attempt to redistribute purchasing pow-
_ erand the taxes provided by the Act are to be used
solely for that purpose. Under Section’ 12(b) of the
Act it is provided that ‘“‘* * * for the purpose of
effectuating the declared policy of this title, a sum
equal to the proceeds derived from all taxes imposed
under ihis iiiie is uerevy appropriated io be avail-
able to the Secretary of Agriculture. * * *.’’ That
a tax’ cannot be lévied on A for the purpose of pay-
ing a bounty to B was long ago held by this court
in Loan Association v. Topeka, (1874), 87 Wall. 655,

s

- 663, where Mr. Justice Miller said:

“The power to tax is, therefore, tlie strong-
est, the most pervading of all the powers of -

_ the, government, reaching directly or indirectly
to all classes Of the people. It was said by
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCui-
lough v. The State of Maryland, that the power
to tax is the power to destroy. A striking in-
stanee_of the truth of the proposition is seen in

the factthat the existing tax of ten per cent
imposed by the United States on the circula-

* 420

tion of all other banks than the National banks,

drove out of existence every State bank of cir-
_ culation within a year or two after its passage.

This power can as readily be employed against
. one class of individuals and in favor of. an-

other, so as to ruin the one class and give un-

limited wealth and prosperity to the other, if

there i8 ‘ho implied limitation of the uses for
_ which the power may be exercised.’’

It has been urged that the tax is constitutional -
- because, a favorable readjustment of the farmers’
econonfic condition will ultimatély redound to the
general public good. The same sort of an argument
was: made to the court in Loan Association v. To-

' peka, supra, but the court rejected it, mene at
page 665: :

“If it be said that a benefit results to the
local public of a town by establishing manu-
factures, the same may be said of any other
business of pursuit which employs capital or

- labor. The merchant, the mechanic, theinn-
keeper, the banker, the buildér, the steamboat —
owner are equally promoters of the public good,
and equally deserving the aid of the citizens
by forced: contributions.”? *

While many assert that our. economic difficulties 4
are attributable to the condition of the farmer, there ,
are still others who attribute it to the condition of
the manufacturers or the condition of our export
trade. If a tax can be levied to pay a bounty to
farmers no reason is perceived why a tax may not
be constitutionally levied to pay bounties to manu-

: e
FR eR ER ARAM Ne ity ees Oe. ar «rene 4 "
s RT neater AES EDA I SONS se
Ps : :

—

. | ae 43 - .
facturers or to those engaged in export trade or ©
those engaged in any of our basic industries. |
Finaky, the processing tax provisions (Sec. 9),*
even as altered by the. amendment of August 24,
“=> ~—-1935, violate Article I, Section 1, of the Constitu-
a tion in making an unlawful delegation of —
power to the Secretary of Agriculture. Vhile the
amendment provides for an initial processing tax
on rice of le per pound (or $1.62 per barrel), never- °
_ theless, under Sec: 9 the Secrefary is given full
power at any time to reduce, Apcrease, modify or
aad eliminate the tax, not by an¥ ctical standard, —
_ but largely’ by his opinion or prophecy of future
prices and conditions, Where all such questions
~ as to the duration of the tax and its increase of de-
| crease or elimination are thus left to be resolved by
the Secretary of Agriculture alone, it is clear that
the Act still rtins counter to ‘Article I, Section i
and is therefore unconstitutional. Schechter Poul- *
try Corporation, supra; Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan (1934), 293 U.S. 388. | |

Port F
_ Certiorari Should Be Granted-at-the Present Time.

_ The opinion and order of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, while interlocutory in form, in truth and in

_ fact, finally disposed of the case upon the merits.’
When it held that petitioner had a remedy at law .
and that the Courts below were without jurisdiction _
to grant the injunction ‘prayed for (R. 98) the result -

- *Set out in Appendix D.

,
+N RAL RCC rue etna ped

was a denial of all the relief sought by petitioner.

- %

44.
Since the case will not come-up for a hearing on its
merits m the ordinary course of events until after

the lapse of six or seven months the subject of the
suit will be destroyed, the case become moot, and

petitioner deprived of all right to have its case

heard on the merits by any court unless this Court ~

_ grants certiorari. If the order of the Circuit Court

of Appeals is allowed to stand all the trial courts

” ° in the Cireuit will feel bound thereby and will of

necessity dismiss all bills filed in the Circuit for
the purpose of testing the constitutionality of
the taxes levied by the Agricultural Adjustment -Act,
as amended, with the result that not only your peti-

' tioner, but all other citizens living within the States

of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia
and Florida be effectrvely deprived of any oppor-

. tunity of testing the validity oi this statute. There

can be no questior but that the constitutional ques-
ions. raised in this case are grave_and of national
importance and this case involves an unprecedented
situation. That the action of the Circuit Court of —
Appeals in denying the motion for an injunction
to preserve the status quo pending appeal was
wrong is plainly indicated by the fact that its action
is contrary to the action of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits, in granting injunctions in similar

eases. It stands alone, unsupported by the decision

of any other circuit. Its error can be corrected only
by this Court now granting certiorari since there is

45.

now before this Honorable Court a cause involving
the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment

-» Act, which said cause is set for oral argument on

December 9, 1935, and which will in the ordinary

course of events be decided long prior to the time °

when this case would come up for hearing in.the
Circuit’ Court of ‘Appeals. Without q writ of cer-
tiorari from this Honorable Court petitioner will
have been conipelled. meanwhile to pay the’ taxes

and if the Act bé held’ unconstitutional its case

«

would become moot and the taxes paid by it prob-
ably forever:lost. | :

While the power to bring up a case pending in the
Circuit Court of Appeals prior to final action in that
Court is one to be sparingly exercised, the power

nevertheless exists. American Construction °Com--

pany v, Jacksonville Railway (1893), 148-U. 8. 372.

This Court said in In Re Chetwood (1897), 165 ee

S. 443, 462: ,

‘And although, as observed in that case, this
writ has not been issued ‘as freely by this court
as by the Court of Queen’s Bench in England,
and, prior to the Act of March 3, 1891, C. 517,
26 Stat. 826, had been ordinarily used as an
auxiliary process: merely, yet, whenever the cir-

. cumstances imperatively demand that form of —
_interposition the writ may be allowed, as at com-.
mon law, to correct excesses of jurisdiction and.

im furtherance of justice.’

- Likewise in Harriman v. Northern Securities
Company (1905), 197 U. S. 244, 286, where the de-
cree of the Circuit Court of Appeals actually dis-

“

>

46

. posed of the entire case, although interlocutory'in' ~
form, this Court granted certiorari, Other, cases’
in which this Court has granted certiorari prior to'a-
final decree 'in the Circuit Court of Appeals are
Denver v. New York Trust’ Company (1913), 229 .
U.S. 123, 133; Spiller v. Atchison, T. & 8S. F. Rail-
way Company (1920), 253 U. S. 117, 120; and Du-
pont Powder Company v. Mastland (1917), 244
U. S..100. And in The ‘Three Friends (1897), 166
U. 8.,1, 49, this Court reviewed a decision of the
District Court prior to action by the Circuit Court:
_ of Appeals on the agpeal pending therein.

CON CLUSION

| It is therefore respectfully cubenitiinl that this
case is such as to call for the exercise by this Court
of its supervisory powers. If the decisions of the
District Court and the Circuit Court of, Appeals
‘stand, the result will be that petitioner will be de-
prived of its property without due process of law, .

-and will be so deprived without any opportunity to
_test in the Courts the constitutional rights asserted
in its bill of complaint. Unless this ‘Honorable
Court exercises: such supervisory powers prior to.
the entry of a final decree inthe Circuit Court of ~
Appeals the subject matter of the suit will be de-
_ stroyed, the suit become moot, and petitioner forever.
deprived of its constitutional rights. This Court —
should, therefore, review forthwith the decision of —

47
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and the decision of the District Court’
of the United States: for the wae District of

Louisiana.
Respectfully submitted,

By C. A. McCoy,

| * Attorney for Petitioner.
McCoy, ING & Jones, 3
OF ounsel,

49

APPENDIX A
R. 8: Arr. 3224

No suit for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any tax shall te maintained in —
any court. |

. D>

SECTION 21 oF AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT

Sec. 21 (@) No suit, action, or proceedings (in-
- eluding probate, administration, receivership, and
’ bankruptcy proceedings) shall be brought or main-
tained in any court if such suit, action, or proceed-
ing is for the purpose or has the effect (1) of pre-
venting or restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax imposed or the amount of any penalty’ or
interest, accrued under this title on or after the date
of the adoption of this amendment, or (2) of obtain- .
ing a déclaratory judgment under the Fedéral Dec-
laratory Judgments Act in connection with any such
tax'or such amount of any such interest or penalty.
In probate, administration, receivership, bankrupt-
cy, or other similar proceedings, the claim: of the
United States for any such tax or such amount of
any such interest or penalty; in the amount assessed
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, shall be
allowed and ordered to be paid, but.the right to
Claim the refund or credit thereof and to maintain
such claim pursuant to the applicable provisions of
law, including subsection (d) of this section, may be
reserved in the court’s order.

{b) The taxes imposed under this title, as deter-
mined, prescribed, proclaimed: and made effective by
the proclamations and certificates,of the Secretary .
of Agriculture or of the President and by the regu-

_ a . Te gt em Hee 8 A CE ™
4 TERROR pe Pet ss ee ; 5 ELA CN IHG me ete Y

oe: :

50

lations of the Secretary with the approval of the
President prior to the date of the adoption of this
amendment, are hereby legalized and ratified, and

- the. assessment, levy, collection, and accrual of all
: guch taxes (together with penalties and interest with

respect thereto) prior. towsaid date are hereby legal-

- ized and ratified and confirmed as fully to all intents
‘and purposes as if each.such tax had been made ef.-

fective and.the rate thereof fixed specifically by
prior Act of Congress. All such taxes which have ©
accrued and remain unpaid on the date of the adop-
tion of this amendment shall be assessed and col-

‘lected pursuant to Section 19, and to the provisions

of law made applicable thereby. Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to import«illegality to any
act, determination, proclamation, certificate, or regu-
iation of the Sec: etary of ‘Agriculture or of the
President done or made prior to the date of the

adoption of this amendment. .

(c) 'The making of rental and benefit payments

‘ under this title, prior to the date of the adoption of
_ this amendment, as determined, prescribed, pro-

claimed and made effective _by the proclamations of
the Secretary of Agriculture or of the President or
by regulations of the Secretary, and the initiation, —
if formally approved by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture prior to such date of adjustment programs un-
der Section 8 (1) of this title, and the making of
agreements with producers prior to such date, and
the adoption of other voluntary methods prior to -
such date, by the Secretary of Agficulture under
this title, and rental and benefit payments made pur- ©
suant thereto, are hereby legalized and ratified, and

the making of all such a greements and payments,

the initiation of such programs, and the adoption of
all such methods prior to such date are hereby legal-
ized, ratified, and confirmed as fully to all intents
and purposes as if each such agreement, program, ©
method, and payment had been specifically author-

~ 51.

| ae . °

ized and made effective and the rate and amount
thereof fixed specifically ‘by prior Act of Congress. -
(d) <(1) No recovery, recoupment, set-off, re- |
_fund, or credit shal! be made or allowed of, nor shall
any counter claim be allowed for, any amount of any
tax, penalty, or interest which accrued before, on, or -
after the date of the adoption of this amendment un-
der this title (including any overpayment of such
tax),unhless, after a claim has been duly filed, it shall
be established, in addition to all other facts required
to be established, to the satisfaction of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, and the Commis-
. sioner shall find and: declare of record, after due
notice by the Commissioner to such claimant and op-
portunity for hearing, that neither the claimant nor
any person directiy or indirectly under his control
or having control over him, has, directly or indi-
rectly, included-such amount in the price of the ar-
ticle with respect to which it was imposed or of any
_ article processed from the commodity with respect
to,which-it was imposed, or passed on any part of
such amount to the vendee or to any_other person in
any manner, or included any ont of such amount
in the charge or fee for pro¢essing, and that the
price paid by the claimant or sych person was not
reduced by any part of such amount. In any judi-
‘cial proceeding relating to such claim, 4 transcript
of the hearing before the Commissioner/shall be duly
-certified and filed as the record in the case and shall
be so considerd by the court. The provisions of this °
subsection shall not apply to any refund or credit
authorized by subsection (a)’or (c) of Section 15,
Section 16, & Section 17 of this title, or to any re- |
fund or credit to the processor of any tax paid by
him with respect\to the provisions of Section 317 of
the Tariff Act of 1930.

(2) In the event that any tax imposed by this
title is finally held invalid by reason of any provision
of, the Constitution, or is finally held invalid by rea- -

52

son of the Secretary of Agriculture’s exercise or
failure to exercise any power conferred on him un-
der this title, there shall be refunded or credited to
any person (not a processor or other person who
paid the tax) who would have been entitled to a re-
fund or credit pursuant to the provisions of subsec- ._
tions (a) and (b) of Section 16, had the tax ter-.
minated by proclamation pursuant to the provisions
of Section 18, and in lieu thereof, a sum in an
amount equivalent to the amount to which such per-
son would have been entitled had the Act been valid
and had the tax with respect to the particular com-
modity terminated immediately prior to the effective
date- of such holding of invalidity, subject, however,
to the following condition: Such claimant shall es-
tablish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, and
the Commissioner shall find and declare of record,
after due notice by the Commissioner to the claim-
ant and opportunity for hearing, that the amount of
the tax paid upon the processing of the commodity
used in the floor stocks with respect to which the
claim is made was included by the processor or
other person who paid the tax in the price of such
stocks (or of the material from which such stocks
were made). In any judicial proceeding relating to
such claim, a transcript of the hearing before the
Commissioner shall be duly certified and filed as the
record in thé case and shall be so considered by the
court. Notwithstanding any other provision of law:
(1) no suit or proceeding for the recovery, recoup-
ment, set-off, refund or credit of any tax imposed by
this title, or of any penalty or interest, which is |
based upon thé invalidity of such tax by reason of |
any provision of the Constitution or by reason of the
Secretary of Agriculture’s exercise or failure to
exercise any power conferred on him under this title,
shall be maintained in any court, unless prior to the
expiration of six months after the date on which
-such tax imposed by this title has been finally held |

;

MIRON SS tt me sees cnc ctenn teen ee tye sae .
Peeters. POR OE PRESSES pias Shaman ba, te kere “ ets . —_ eee ee . + ONE :
we er

” 53

invalid a claim therefor (conforming to such regula-
- tions as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may
prescribe) is filed by the person entitled thereto;
(2) no such suit or proceeding sha!l be begun before
the expiration of one year from the date of filing
such claim unless the Commissioner renders a deci-
sion thereon within that time, nor after the expira-
tion of five years from the date of the payment of
such tax, penalty, or sum, unless suit or proceeding |
is begun Within two years after the disallowance
of the part of such claim to which such suit or pro-
ceeding relates. The Commissioner shall within 90
days after such disallowance notify the taxpayer
. thereof by mail. |

(3) . The District Courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of cases to which this subsec-
tion applies, regardless of the amount in contro- |
versy, if such courts would have had jurisdiction of
‘such cases but for limitations under the Judicial
Code, as amended, or jurisdiction of such courts
based upon the amount in controversy.

(€) In connection with the establishment, by any
claimant, of the facts required to be established in
subsection (d) of this section, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is- hereby authorized, by any offi-.
cer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
including the field service, designated by him for
that purpose, to examine any books, papers, records,
or memoranda, relative to any matter affecting the
findings to be made by the Commissioner pursuant
to subsection (d) of this section, to require the at-
tendance of the claimant or of any officer or em-
- ployee of the claimant, or the attendance of any
other person having knowledge in the premises, and
to take, or cause to be taken, his testimony with ref-
erence to any such matter, with power to adminis-
ter oaths to such person or persons. It-shall be law-
ful for the Commissioner, or any collector designated

-at a time and place named in the summons, and to”

‘answer interrogatories, under oath, relating to any

ten request therefor. Such information shall be

- made or allowed. of the amount of any tax, under

54

by him, to summon witnesses on behalf of the United
States or of any claimant to appear before the Com-
missioner, or before any person designated by him,

produce such books,: papers, correspondence, memo-:
randa, or other records as the Commissioner may -
deem relevant or material, and to give testimony or. -

matter affecting the findings to be made by the Com-
missioner pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
The provisions of Revised Statutes 3174 and of Re-
vised Statutes 3175 shall be applicable with respect
to any summons issued pursuant to the provisions |
of this subsection. Any witness summoned under
this subsection shall be paid, by the party on whose
behalf such witness was summoned, the same fees
and mileage as are paid. witnessés in the courts of
the United States. All information obtained by the
Commissioner pursuant to this subsection shall be
available to the Secretary of Agriculture upon writ-

kept confidential by all officers and employees of
the Department of Agriculture, and any such officer
or employee who violates this requirement/ shall, _
upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not: more>
than $1,000 or to’ imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both, and shall be removed from office.
(f) No, refund, eredit, or abatement shall be

Section 15, or Section 17, unless, within one year
after the right to such refund, credit, or abatement
has accrued, a claim for such refund, credit, or
abatement (conforming to such regulations as the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may pre-
seribe) is filed by the person entitled to such refund,
credit, or abatement, except that if the right to any
such refund, credit, or abatement accrued prior to
the date of the adoption of this amendment, then

55

such one-year period shall be computed from the
date of this amendment. No interest shall be al-
lowed or paid, or included in any judgment, with
‘respect to any such claim for refund or credit. :

(g) The provisions of Section 3226, Revised —
' Statutes, as amended, are hereby extended to apply

to any suit for the recovery of any amount of any
tax, penalty, or interest, which accrued, before, on,
or after the date of the adoption of this amendment
under this title (whether an overpayment or other-
wise), and to any suit for the recovery of any
amount of tax which results from an error in the
computation of the tax or from duplicate payments
of any tax, or any refund or credit authorized by-
subsection (a) or (c) of Section 15, Section 16, or
Section 17 of this title or any refund or credit to the
processor of any tax paid by him with respect to
articles exported pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tion 317 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

«

56

APPENDIX B

PROVISIONS oF TITLE 26, U.S. C. DEALING WIitTH
Cae CoLLECTION or Taxes By DistRaInt

SEc. 115. Inen for Taxes. (a) If any person
liable%o pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand, the amount (including any in-’
terest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to
such tax, .together with any costs that may accrue in:
addition thereto) shall be a lien’in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to prop-
erty, whether real or personal, belonging to such —
person. Unless another date is specifically fixed
by law, the lien shall arise at the time the assessment
list was received by the collector and shall continue -
until the liability for such amount is satisfied or be-
comes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
(Balance of Section deals with recording of lien and
giving of releases.) (R. S. Sec. 3186; Mar: 4, 1879,
_ C. 125, See. 3, 20 Stat. 331; Mar. 4, 1913, C. 166, 37
Stat. 1016; Feb. 26, 1925, C. 344, 43 Stat. 994 ; May |
29, 1928, 8 am., C. 852, Title IV. See. 613, 45 Stat)

116. Distraint for Taxes. If any person liable
to pay any taxes neglects or refuses to pay the same
within ten days after notice and demand, it shall be
lawful for the collector or his deputy to collect the
said taxes, with 5 per centum additional thereto, and
interest as aforesaid, by distraint and sale, in the
manner hereafter provided, of the goods, chattels, or
effects, including stocks, securities, bank accounts,
_and evidences of debt, of the person. delinquent ‘as
aforesaid. (Balance of Section déals with exempt
property.) (R.S. Sec. 3187; June 2, 1924, 4:01 p.m,
C. 234, Sec. 1016, 43 Stat. 343.)

117. Same; Levy. In such case of neglect or re-
fusal, the collector may levy, or by warrant may au-
thorize a deputy collector to levy, upon all property

: G ane omen
ER SH sia TRAY ahr nme (8 te: CMLL SH ERM ERR EMT a2 PMO!

87

and rights to property, except such as are exempt by
Section 116 of this title, belonging to such person, or
on which the said lien exists, fur the payment of the .
sum due as aforesaid, with interest and penalty for
nonpayment, and also of such further sum as shall
be sufficient for the fees, costs, and expenses of such
levy. (R. 8S. Sec. 3188.) ie
118. Same; Exhibit of Evidences Relating to
Property. All persons, and officers of companies or
corporations, are required, on demand of a collector
or deputy collector. about to distrain or having dis-
trained on any property, or rights of property; to
exhibit all books containing evidence or statements
relating to the subject of distraint, or the property
or rights of property liable to distraint for the tax
due as aforesaid. (R. S. Sec. 3189.)
119. Same; Proceedings On. When distraint is
made, as aforesaid, the officer charged with the col-
: lectid shall make or cause to be made an account of
the goods or effects distrained, a copy of which,
signed by the officer making such distraint, shall be
left with the owner or possessor or such goods or
effects, or at his dwelling or usual place of business, -
with some person of suitable age and discretion, if
any such can -be-found, with a note of the gum de-
_Inanded, and the time and place of sale; and the
said officer shall forthwith cause a notification to be
published in some newspaper within the county
wherein said distraint is made, if a newspaper is
published in said county, or to be publicly posted at
the post office, if there be one within. five miles near-
‘est to the residence of the person whose property
shall be distrained, and in not les§ than two other
public places. Such notice shall specify the articles
distrained, and the time and place for the sale
thereof. Such time shall not be less than ten nor
more than twenty days from the date of such notifi-
cation to the owner or possessor of the property and |
the publication or -posting of such notice as herein

_—_—_ LPL OAL NG OMNIA Ce NMOS OPEL ILI it sotiey Dane sop aan paininilbat ts Sib bleed Edie
aa = es

a ee ae ee ee See ee

58 «

provided, and the place proposed for the sale shall .
not be more than five miles distant from the place
of making such distraint. Said sale may be ‘ad-
journed from time to time by said officer, if he
deems it advisable, but not for a time to exceed in

all thirty.days. . (R..S. Sec. 3190.)

120. Same; Sale of Property Subject to Taz.

‘When property subject to tax, but upon which the

tax has not been paid, is seized upon distraint and

- sold, the amount of such tax shall, after deducting |

the expenses of spich sale, be first appropriated, out

-of the proceeds thereof to the payment of the tax.

And if no assessment of. such tax has been made
upon such property, the collector shall make a returf?
thereof in the form required by law, and the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue shall assess the tax
thereon. (R.S. Sec. 3191.) |
121. Same; Sale of Property; Purchase for
Umited States.. When any personal property is ad- |
vertised for sale under distraint as aforesaid, the
officer making the seizure shall proceed to sell such
property at a public auction, offering the same at a
minimum price, including the expenses of making
the levy. and of advertising the sale, and if the.
amount bid for such property at the sale is not equal
to the minimum price so fixed, the officer conducting
the sale may declare the same to be purchased by

him for the United States. The property so pur-

chased may be sold by the collector within whose dis-
trict the sale was made under such regulations as -
may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal

- Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the

Treasury. The collector shall render to the Commis-
sioner a distinct account of all charges incurred in

such sales and; in case of resale, shall pay into the

Treasury the proceeds as provided in Section 3210
of the Revised Statutes, as amended (R. S. 3192, as
amended May 10, 1934, 11:40 a.m., C. 277, Sec. 508,
48 Stat.) , i

LLL EINE ONE ON EN A 2

59
122. Same; Restoration of Property on Payment
Before Sale. (This merely provides for return of
property distrained upon if tax is paid prior to
sale.) (R. 8S. 3193.) | s q
123. Same; Effect of Certificate of Sale. In all.
eases Of sale, as aforesaid, the certificate of such sale
shall be prima-facie evidence of the right of the offi-
cer to make such sale, and conclusive evidence of the
regularity-of his proceedings in making the sale, and
- shall:transfer to the purchaser all right, title, and
interest of such delinquent in and to the property
sold; and where such property consists of stocks,
said certificate shall be ‘notice, when received, to any
corporation, company, or association of said trans-
fer, and shall be atfthority to such corporation, com-
. pany, or association to record the same -on their
_ books and records in the same manner as if trans- ©
’ ferred or assigned by the party holding the same, in
lieu of any original or prior certificates, which shall
be void, whether canceled or not. And said certifi-
cates, where the subject of sale is securities or other
evidences of debt, shall be good and valid receipts to
the person holding the same, as against any person
’ holding, or claiming to hold, possession of such se-
04) or. other evidences of debt. (R. 8. See.
(124. Same; When Property Not Divisible. (This
deals with special case of indivisible property and
allows sale of the whole even though its value ex-
ceeds amount of the tax. (R. S. Sec. 3195; June 2,
1924, 4:01 p.m., C. 234, Sec. 1031 (a), 43 Stat. 351; -
re-enacted Jan. 26, 1926, 10:25 a:m:, C. 27, Title XT,
Sec. 1128(a), 144 Stat. 124.) ap
125. Real Estate; Sale to Satisfy Taxes. When
goods, chattels, or effects sufficient to satisfy the
taxes imposed upon any person are not found by the
collector or deputy collector, he is authorized to col-

lect the same by seizure and sale of real estate. -(R.
_ 8B. See. 3196.)

- . '60

126. Same; Proceedings. The officer making the

_ seizure mentioned in Section 125 of this title shall
give notice to the person whose estate it is proposed.
to sell by, giving: him in hand, or leaving at his last
or usual place of abode, if he has any such within,
the collection district where said estate is situated,
a notice, in writing, stating what particular estate
is to be sold, describing the same with ‘reasonable
certainty, and the time when and place where said
officer proposes to sell the same; which time shall,
not be less than.twenty nor more than forty days :
from the time of giving said notice. ‘The said officer
shall also cause a notification to the same effect to be
published in some newspaper within the county
where such seizure is made, if any such there be,
. and shall also cause a like notice to be posted at the
' postoffice nearest to the estate seized, and in two
other public places within the county; and the place
of said sale shall not be more than five miles distant
from the estate seized, except by special order of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. At the time and
place appointed, the offieer making such seizure shall |
proceed to sell the ‘said estate at public auction, of-
fering the same at a minimum price, including the
- expense of making such levy, and all charges for
advertising and an officer’s fee of $10. (Balance of
section deals with details of conducting sale.) (R.
'§. See. 3197; Feb. 27, 1877, C. 69, Sec. 1, 19 Stat.
248; Mar. 1, 1879," C. 125, See. 3, 20 Stat. 331; May
28, 1896, C. ‘252, 39 Stat. 179; Mar. 3, 1905, C. "1483,
Sec. 1, 33 Stat. 1207 ; July 19, 1919, C. 24, Sec. 1, 41
Stat. 209.)

127. Same; Certificate of Purchase; Deed. (This
provides for execution of deed by the collector to the
' purchaser.) (R. 8S. Sec. 3198.) .

- 3196. Same ; Deed Prima-Facie Evidence. The
deed of sale given in pursuance of Section 127 of this
title shall be prima-facie evidence of the facts there-
in stated ; and if the proceedings of the officer as set

61

forth have been substantially in accordance with the
provisions of law, shall be considered and operate as
a conveyance of all the right, title, and interest the
- -party delinquent had in and to the real estate thus .
gold at the time the lien of the United States at-
tached thereto. (R.S. Seg. 3199.)

129. Same; Place of Seizure (and Sale). Any
collector or deputy collector may, for the collection ..
of taxes imposed upon any person, and committed
to him for collection, seize and sell any of the prop-
erty, real or personal (except property. exempt from
distraint and sale, under Section 3187 of the Revised
‘Statutes, or any right or interest therein, of such
person situated in any other collection district withs -
in the State in which such officer resides, notwith- :
standing the provisions of Section 3209 of the Re-

- vised Statutes; and his proceedings in relation there-
to shall have the same effect as if the same were had
in his proper collection district. ‘(R. S. See. 3200;
amended Jan. 26, 1926, 11:25:a.m., Title XI, Sec.

~~ 1129, 44 Stat. 125.) ?

130. Same; Redemption Prior to Sale. (This
provides for return of property seized on payment
of tax.) (R.S. See. 3201.) - |

131. Same; Redemption After Sale. (This pro-

» vides for redemption after sale by payment to pur-
chaser, within one year after the sale, of the pur-
chase price with interest at 20% per annum. ) (R.

8. 5202, )

FAG NR OE EHS | AR RA LTUOTEET TROT RST Oi
‘ Al . Sb at Nt 2 ee

62

APPENDIX C
PENALTY PROVISIONS

SECTION 19(b) of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act: iy

“Sec 19. * * * (6) All provisions of
law, including penalties, applicable with respect .
to the taxes imposed by Section 600 of the Reve-
nue Act of 1926, and the provisions of Section |
626 of the Revenue Act of 1932, shall, insofar
as applicable and not inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this title, be applicable in respect of
taxes imposed by'this title: * $§ * .”

Section 1114 of 1926 Revenue Act, applicable
with reSpect to taxes imposed by Section 600 of
’ that Act: 7

“Sec. 1114. (a) Any person required un-
der this Act to pay any tax, or required by law
or regulations made under authority thereof to
make a return, keep any records, or supply any
information, for the purposes of the computa-
tion, assessment, or collection of any tax im- -
posed by this Act, who wilfully fails to pay such
tax, make such return, keep such records, or

- Supply such information, at the time or times
required by law or regulations, shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of —
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof,
be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisioned |
for not more than one year, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution. . a

‘‘(b) Any person required under this Act to
collect, account for and pay over any tax im-
posed by this Act, who. willfully fails to collect
or truthfully account for and pay over-such tax,

63

and any person who willfully attempts in any |
manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by
this Act or the payment thereof, shall, in addi-
tion to other penalties provided by law, be guilty
of a felony and, upon. conviction thereof, be
fined not more than $10,000,. or imprisohed for
not more than five years, or "poth, together with
the costs of prosecution.

‘‘(c) Any person who willfully aids or as-
sists in, or procures, counsels, or advises, the
preparation or presentation under, or in connec-
tion with any matter arising under, the internal-
revenue laws, of a false or fraudulent return,
affidavit, claim, or document, shall (whether or
not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge
or consent of the person authorized. or required
to present such r return, affidavit, claim, or docu- .
ment) be guilty’of a felony and, upon convic-
tion thereof, be fined not more than $10, 000, or
imprisoned ‘for not more than five ycars, or
both, together with the costs of prosecvtion.

— (d) Any person who willfully fails to pay,
collect, or truthfully account fdr and pay over,
any tax imposed by Titles IV, V, VI, VU, VIII,
and-IX, or willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any such tax or the payment
thereof, shall, in addition to other penaities
provided by law, be liable to a penalty of the
amount of the tax evaded, or not paid, collected
or accounted for and paid over, to be assessed
and collected in the same manner as taxes are
_assessed and collected. No penalty shall be as-
sessed under this subdivision for any offerise
for which a penalty may bé assessed’ under au-
thority of Section 3176 of the Revised Statutes, |
as amended, or for any offense for which a pen-
alty has been recovered under Section 3256 of
as Revised Statutes.

64

‘*(e) “Any person in possession of property,
or rights to property, subject to distraint, upon -
which a levy has been made, shall, upon demand
by the collector or deputy collector making such
levy, surrender such property or rights to such
collector or deputy, unless such property or
right is, at the time of such demand, swbject
to an attachment or execution under any judicial
process. Any person who fails or refuses to so
surrender any of such property or rights shall
be liable in his own person and e&ate to the
United States in a sum equal to the value of the’
property or rights not so surrendered, but not
exceeding the amount of the taxes (including
penalties .and interest) for the collection of
which such levy has been made, together with
costs and interest from the date of such levy.

‘‘(f) The term ‘person’ as used in this sec-
tion includes an. officer or employee of a cor-
poration or a member or employee of a partner-
ship, who as such officer, employee, or member
is under a duty to perform the act in respect
of which the violation occurs.”’’

65

APPENDIX D

Processinc Tax PROVISIONS oF AGRICULTURAL AD-«
JUSTMENT ACT, AS AMENDED, AS APPLIED TO RICE‘

Sec. 9. (a) To obtain revenue for extraor-
dinary expenses incurred by reason of the national
- economic emergency, there shall be levied processing |
taxes as hereinafter provided. When the Secretary |
of Agriculture determines that any one or more pay- |
ments authorized to be made under Section 8 are to |
be made with respect to any basic agricultural com- |
modity, he shall proclaim such determination, and a |
processing tax shall be in effect with respect to such |
commodity from the beginning of the marketing
year therefor next following the date of such procla-
mation; except that * * * (2) in the case of:
rice, the Secretary of Agriculture shall, before April
1, 1935, proclaim that rental or benefit payments are —
to be made with respect thereto, and the processing —_
tax shall be in effect on and after April 1, 1935.
* * * In the case of rice, the period from August
1 to July 31, both inclusive, shall be considered to
be the marketing year. The processing tax shall be
levied, assessed, and collected upon the first domestic -
. processing of the commodity, whether of. domestic
production or imported, and shall be paid by the
processor. The rate of tax shall conform to the re-
quirements of subsection (b). Such rate shall be de-
termined by the Secretary of Agriculture as of the
. date the tax first takes effect, and the rate so deter-
mined shall, at such intervals as the Secretary finds
necessary to effectuate*the declared policy, be ad-
justed by him to conform to such requirements.
The processing tax shall terminate at the end of the
marketing: year current at the time the Secretary
proclaims that all payments authorized under Sec-
tion 8 which are in effect are to be discontinued with

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WMT A ieee Ry Bt ee A hee abe Rc a OPES Re taeest
‘ P

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7

66

respect to such commodity. The marketing year for
each commodity shall be ascertained and prescribed
by regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture: * * *

(b) (1) The processing tax shall be at such
rate as equals the difference between the current
average farm price for the commodity and the fair
exchange value of the commodity, plus such per-
centage of such difference, not to exceed 20 per .
centum, as the Secretary of Agriculture may deter-
mine will result in the collection, in any marketing
year with respect to which such rate of tax may be
in effect pursuant to the provisions of this title, of
an amount of tax equal to (A) the amount of credits
or refunds which he estimates will be allowed or
made during such period pursuant to section 15(c)
with respect to the commodity (B) the amount of

‘tax which he estimates would have been collected

during such period upon all processing of such com-
modity which are exempt from tax by reason of the
fact that such processings are done by or for a
State, or a political subdivision or an institution
thereof, had such processings been subject to tax.
If, prior to the time the tax takes effect, or at any.
time thereafter, the Secretary has reason to believe _
that the tax at such rate, or at the then existing

rate, on the processing of the commodity generally .

or for any designated use or uses, or on the process-
ing of the commodity in the production of any desig-
nated product or products thereof for any desig-
nated use or uses, will cause or is causing such re-
duction in the quantity of the commodity or products
thereof ‘domestically consumed as to result in the
accumulation of surplus stocks of the commodity or
products thereof or in the depression of the farm
price of the commodity, then the Secretary shall
cause an appropriate investigation to be made, and
afford due notice and opportunity for hearing to
interested parties. If thereupon the Secretary de-
termines and proclaims that any such result will oc- .

67

cur or is occurring, then the processing tax on the
/processing of the: commodity generally or for any
designated use or uses, or on the processing of the
commodity in the production of any designated
product or products thereof for any designated use
or uses, Shall be at such lower rate or rates as he
determines and proclaims will »revent such accumu-
lation of surplus stocks and depression of the farm
price of the commodity, and, the tax shall remain
during its effective period at such lower rate until
the Secretary, after due notice and opportunity for
hearing to interested parties, determines and pro- |
claims that an increase in the rate of such tax will.
not cause such accumulation of surplus stocks or
depression of the farm price of the commodity.
Thereafter the processing tax shall be at the highest
rate which the Secretary determines will not cause
such accumulation of surplus stocks or depression
_of the farm price of the commodity, but it shall not
be higher than the rate provided in the first sentence
of this paragraph. * * * : |

Speciric Tax RatE—RICE |

(3) For the period from April 1, 1935, to July

. 81, 1936, both inclusive, the processing tax with re-

spect to rice shall be levied, assessed, collected, and

paid at the rate of 1 cent per pound,of rough rice.
* : : 3 ;

(6) (A) Any rate of tax which is prescribed in
paragraph (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this subsection
or which is established pursuant to this ‘paragraph
_ (6) on the processing of any commodity generally
or for any designated use or uses, or on the process-
ing of the commodity in the production of any des-
ignated product or products thereof for any desig-
nated use or uses, shall be decreased (including a
.. decrease to zero) in accordance with the formulae,
Standards, and requirements of paragraph (1) of

68

this subsection, in order to prevent such reduction
in the quantity of such commodity or the products
thereof domestically consumed as will result in the
accumulation of surplus stocks of such commodity
or the, products thereof or in the depression of the
farm price of the commodity, and shall thereafter

- be increased in accordance with the provisions of

paragraph (1) of this subsection but subject to the

‘ provisions of subdivision (B) of this paragraph

(6). 7

(B) If the average farm price of any commod-
ity, the rate of tax on the processing of which is
prescribed in paragraph (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this
subsection or is established pursuant to this para-
graph (6), during any period of twelve successive

‘months ending after July 1, 1935, consisting of the

first ten months of any marketing year and the last
two months of the preceding marketing year—

(7) is equal to, or exceeds by 10 per centum
or less, the fair exchange value thereof, or, in
the case of tobacco, is less than the fair ex-
change value by not more than 10 per centum,
the rate of such tax shall (subject to the provi-
sions of subdivision (A) of this paragraph (6)
be adjusted, at the beginning of the next suc-
ceeding marketing year, to such rate as equals
20 per centum of the fair exchange value.
thereof.

(it) exceeds by more than 10 per centum,
but not more than 20 per centum, the fair ex-
change value thereof, the rate of such tax shall

subject to the provisions of subdivision (A) of
this paragraph (6) be adjusted, at the begin-
ning of the next succeeding marketing year,
to such rate as equals 15 per centum of the fair
_ exchange value thereof. .

(iii) exceeds by more than 20 per centum

the fair exchange value thereof, the rate of such

69

tax shall (subject to the provisions of subdi-
vision (A) of this paragraph (6) be’ adjusted,
at the beginning of the next succeeding market-
ing year, to such rate as equals 10 per centum
of the fair exchange value thereof.

(C) Any rate of tax which has been adjusted
pursuant to this paragraph (6) shall remain at: such
adjusted rate unless further adjusted or terminated
pursuant to this paragraph (6), until December 31,
1937, or until July 31, 1936, in the case of rice.

(D) In accordance with the formulae, standards,
and requirements prescribed in this title, any rate
of tax prescribed in paragraph (2). (3), (4) or (5)
of this subsection or which is established pursuant
to this paragraph (6) shall be increased. .

(EK) Any tax, the rate of which is prescribed in |
paragraph (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this subsection or -
which is established pursuant to this paragraph
(6), shall terminate pursuant to proclamation as
provided in section 9 (a) of this title or pursuant to
section 13 of this title. Any such tax with respect to
any basic commodity which terminates pursuant -to
proclamation as provided in section 9 (a) of this
title shall again become effective at the rate pre-
scribed in paragraph (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this

gubsection, subject however, to the provisions of sub-
divisions (A) and (B) of this paragraph (6), from
the beginning of the marketing year for such com-
modity next following the date of a new proclama-
tion by the Secretary as provided in section 9 (a)
of this title, if such marketing year begins prior to
December 31, 1937, or ptior to J uly 31, 1936, in the
' case of rice, and shall remain at such rate until al-
tered or terminated pursuant to the provisions of
ial or terminated pursuant to section 13 of this
a =

(G) If the applicability to any person or circum-
stances of any tax, the rate of which is fixed in pur-
suance of this paragraph (6), is finally held invalid
by reason of any provision of the Constitution, or is
finally held invalid by reason of the Secretary of
Agriculture’s exercise or failure to exercise any. »
power conferred on him under this title, there shall

_be levied, assessed, collected, and paid (in lieu of

all rates of tax fixed i in pursuance of this paragraph
(6) with respect to-all tax liabilities incurred under.
this title on or after the effective date of each of the

. rates of tax fixed in. pursuance of this paragraph
'.(6)), ‘rates of tax fixed under paragraph (2), (3),

(4) or (5), and such rates shall be in effect (unless

_the particular tax is terminated ‘pursuant to procla- —

mation, as provided in section 9 (a) or pursuant to
section (13) until altered by Act of Congress; except —
that, for any period prior ‘to the effective date of
such holding of invalidity, the amount of tax
which represents the difference between the tax
at the rate fixed in pursuance of this paragraph
(6) and the tax at.the rate fixed under paragraphs
(2), (3), (4) and (5). shall not be levied, assessed,
collected, or paid. .

RiIcE—SPEcIAL RULE

(7) In the case of rice, the weight to which the:
rate of tax shall be applied shall be the weight of
rough rice when delivered to a processor, except
that, where ‘the producer processes his own rice, the
weight to which the rate of tax shall be applied
shall be the weight of rough 1 rice when delivered to

the place of processing. * 6

(c) For the purposes of part 2 of this title, the
fair exchange value of a commodity shall be the
price therefor that will give the commodity the same
purchasing power, with respect to articles farmers
buy, as such commodity had during the base period

71

specified in section 2; and, in the case of all com-
modities where the base period is the pre-war period,
August 1909 to July 1914, will also reflect interest
- payments per acre on farm indebtedness secured by
real estate and tax payments per acre on farm real
estate, as contrasted with such interest payments
and tax payments during said base period; and the
current average farm price and the fair exchange
_ yalue shall be ascertained by the Secretary of Agri-
y culture from available statistics of the Department

' of Agriculture. The rate of tax upon the processing
of any commodity, in effect on the date on. which this
amendment is adopted, shall not be affected by the
adoption of this amendment and shall not be re-.
quired to be adjusted or altered, unless the Secre-
tary of Agriculture finds that it is necessary to ad-
just or alter any such rate pursuant to section 9: (a)
of this title.

(d) As used in part 2 of this title— ** *
(7) In the case of rice—

(A) The term ‘‘rough rice” means rice in that
condition .which is usual and customary when deliv-
_ ered by the producer to a processor.

(B) The term ‘‘processing’’ means the cleaning,
shelling, milling (including custom milling for toll
as well as commercial milling), grinding, rolling, or
other processing (except grinding or cracking by or
for the producer thereof for feed for his own live-
stock, cleaning by or directly for ‘a producer for
seed purposes, and drying) of rough rice; and in
the case of rough rice with respect to which a tax-
payment warrant has been previously issued or ap-
plied for by application then pending, the term .
‘“processing’’ means any one of the above mentioned
processings or any preparation or handling in con-
nection with the sale or other disposition thereof. .

(C) The term ‘‘co-operating producer’? means

ARR ain ete HATE Nee tepey etna Se MG NE PRS ee PSA EY LN LIN INE eae STEN NN

72

any person (includipg any share-tenant or share.
cropper) whom the Secretary of Agriculture finds '
to be willing to participate in the 1935 production-
_ adjustment. program for rice. ,

(D) The term ‘‘processor,’’ as used in subsection
(b-1) of section 15 of this title, means any person
(including a co-operative association of producers)
‘ engaged in the processing of rice on: a commercial '
basis (including eustom milling ‘for toll as well as’
commercial 7

pe

ra

7

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1935

RICKERT RICE MILLS, INC.,
PETITIONER,
. . Vv.
“RUFUS W. FONTENOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS ACTING UNITED STATES‘COLLECTOR
OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE DIS-
TRICT OF LOUISIANA,
RESPONDENT.

MOTION FOR INJUNCTION TO PRESERVE -
' SFATUS QUO |

Hower L. Bruce,
JoHN P. BULLINGTON,
Attorucys for Petitioner.
Houston, Texas.
Baker, Borrs, ANDREWS & WHARTON,
Of Counsel.
Houston, Texas.

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1935

RICKERT RICE MILLS, INC.,
PETITIONER,

V.

RUFUS W. FONTENOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS ACTING UNITED STATES COLLECTOR
OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE DIS-
TRICT OF LOUISIANA,

RESPONDENT.

MOTION FOR INJUNCTION TO PRESERVE
STATUS QUO

To THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN N. Carpozo, Associate
Justice of the Su seal Court of the United
States: —

- Comes now Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., by its counsel,
Homer L. Bruce and John P. Bullington, and re-

- spectfully states that petitioner on October 25, 1935,

brought a bill in equity in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New

Orleans Division, entitled Rickert Rice Mills, Inc.,

Plaintiff, v. Rufus W. Fontenot, Individually and as

2

Acting United States Collector of Internal Revenue
for the District of Louisiana, Defendant, and num-
bered 321 in Equity in the New Orleans Division of -
said court. In its bill of complaint in said cause pe-
titioner prayed for a temporary restraining order
to be issued immediately, and for a preliminary in-
junction after notice to the respondent, and for a
permanent injunction on the final hearing of. said
cause, enjoining the respondent from assessing. or
_eollecting or attempting to assess or collect from the
petitioner in any manner whatsoever, whether by
lien or jeopardy or distraint proceedings, in court
or otherwise, any processing taxes levied under and
pursuant to the Act of the Congress of the United
States known as the Agricultural Adjustment Act, -
and amendments thereto, or purported to be levied
by said Act, upon the petitioner for the processing
of rice during the month of September, 1935, and
for subsequent months, and any interest or pen-
alty on account of petitioner’s failure to pay said
processing tax, and from imposing.or giving notice
of intention to impose any lien for said taxes upon
the property, real or personal, of petitioner. Said
application for preliminary injunction was set down
for hearing before the judge of said District Court
at New Orleans on Monday, October 28, 1935.
Notice thereof was duly waived by réspondent. Prior
to said hearing respondent, filed his motion to dismiss
said bill, copies of which motion and also of peti-
tioner’s bill of complaint are contained in the record
in this cause now cia to this Court on petition
. for certiorari.

3

After a hearing on petitioner’s motion for pre-
liminary injunction and on respondent’s motion to
dismiss, the Honorable John McDuffie, acting judge
of said District Court, on October 28, 1935, refused
petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction,
granted the motion of respondent to dismiss the said
bill of complaint, and dismissed the said bill of com- ©

_plaint, to which petitioner herein duly excepted.
Thereafter on the 29th day of October, 1935, the
petitioner herein in open court and in the presence

- of counsel for respondent filed its petition for an

.. appeal, which was duly allowed by the said judge
of the United States District Court who tried said —
cause, and filed at the same time its assignments of —
error, and also a cost bond was duly filed and ap-
proved by the said judge of said District Court. At
the time petitioner presented its said petition for ap- -
peal, it also petitioned said judge of the District
Court to grant it am injunction enjoining the re-
spondent in the manner set out in ‘its request for a
preliminary injunction in its bill of complaint, pend-
ing the appeal of petitioner to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at New Orleans,
Louisiana, but the said judge of said District Court
refused petitioner’s said petition and refused to
grant petitioner said injunction pending said ap-
‘peal. |

Petitioner perfected its appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, making said
cause returnable at New Orleans, Louisiana, as pro-
vided by law, and duly caused to be prepared a

| transcript of the record in said cause and filed the

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4

same, in accordance with law and within the time
allowed by law, in the office of the clerk of said
Circuit Court of Appeals at New Orleans, Louisi-. |
ana, and said cause was duly docketed in that Court
as ‘‘Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., Appellant, v. Rufus W.
Fontenot, Individually and as Acting United States
Collector’ of Internal Revenue for the District of
Louisiana, No. 7937.”’ .
- On November 4, 1935, after notice to respondent,
petitioner filed in said Circuit Court of Appeals its
motion for a preliminary injunction pending the
hearing of its appeal enjoining respondent from as-
sessing or collecting from petitioner said taxes. The
Circuit Court of Appeals on November 5, 19335,
denied petitioner’s said motion, stating in its opinion
that

‘‘the taxpayer has a remedy at law to. recover
back any taxes illegally exacted, and, further
that the provisions of the Act as amended de-
prive the Court of jurisdiction to iesaaa injunc-
tive relief.’ si ; a

Both in ds. District Court and in the Circuit
Court of Appeals petitioner offered to give such -
security as the court might require in the event the
court should ultimately decide the cause against
petitioner.

Petitioner has filed in the Supreme Court of the
United States its petition for a writ of certiorari in
this cause and the record therein.

In said bill of complaint petitioner alleged that
the amount of processing taxes on account of the

?.

5

rice processed by the petitioner during the month -
of September, 1935, was $57,275.42, and that under
said Agricultural Adjustment Act petitioner was
required to pay said amount to respondent. on or
before October 30, 1935, and that respondent was
charged with the duty of collecting said tax, and if
said tax were not paid on or before October 30, 1935,
respondent would assess said tax against the peti-
tioner and serve-upon petitioner ‘notice and demand
for the payment thereof and would allow petitioner
ten days from receipt of such notice within which
to pay the same; that in the event said tax should
not be paid within said time, respondent would as- -_
sess against petitioner a penalty equal to 5 per cent
of the amount of the tax and interest on the tax at
the rate of 1 per cent per month from the due. date
of the tax until paid; that if the petitioner failed
to pay the tax within said ten days, respondent
- would proceed to collect the tax, penalty and interest |
by filing a notice of lien on all of petitioner’s prop-
erty and by distraining upon and selling such of
petitioner’s property as might bé necessary to real-
ize the amount of said tax, penalties and interest;
and that additional processing taxes for months
subsequent to September, 1935, will accrue and be
assessed against and collected from the petitioner in
the same manner as the tax for the month of Sep-
tember. °

Petitioner alleged that the said processing tax was
illegal and unconstitutional, and violated various
provisions of the Constitution of the United States
in many particulars, more fully set forth in peti-

ERI AOS LAK PGR ION STREAM BO cm

6

tioner’s bill of complaint. The petitioner also al-
' leged that under an amendment to said Agricultural
Adjustment. Act approved on August 24, 1935, a
_ Section 21(d) was added to said Act, which section
provides in substances that petitioner should be al-
lowed no. recovery of any of said taxes paid, if the
same should be illegal or unconstitutional, unless
- petitioner established to the satisfaction of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, and the Commission-
er should so find, that.neither petitioner nor any per-
son directly or indirectly under petitioner’s control
or having control over petitioner, has, directly or
indirectly, included such amount in the price of the
rice with respect to which.it was imposed or of any
: article processed from the rice with respect to which
it was imposed, or passed on any part of such
amount to the vendee or to any other person in any
manner, or included any part of such amount in the
charge or fee for’ processing rice, and that the price
paid by the petitioner or such person for said rice
was not reduced by any part of such amount. Peti-
tioner in said bill of complaint, alleged, as more
fully se’ ut therein, that under said Section 21 (d)
it had no adequate remedy at law by which it could
recover any part of said taxes if same were uncon-
stitutional and illegal, and that it was impossible,
owing to the peculiar conditions existing in the rice
milling industry and in the purchase, milling and
sale of rice, for petitioner to discharge the burden
placed upon it by said Section 21 (d), all as more
fully set out in petitioner’s bill of complaint.

7

Petitioner further alleged that in said amendment
of August 24, 1935, a new section known as Section
21 (a) was added to said Agricultural Adjustment
Act, which in substance provided that no suit to
enjoin the collection of said processing taxes should
‘be maintained in any court. Peti

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_0294%3A16. Public record. Not legal advice.
