# Opinion — City of Marion v. Sneeden > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_0059%3A7 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opinion - **Published:** January 1, 1934 - **Citation:** 291 U.S. 262 ## Text ‘ , ‘SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. ; No. 565. —Ocrotr TERM, 1933. ‘% . ri ° @ Ruth Loughran, Petitioner, ‘) On Certiorari to the Court Us. . ‘ *l of Appeals of the Dis- John Loughran, et al., Trustees. trict of Columbia. ad _—_ | [April 30, 1934.] Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. . This. ease is here on eevtlevent (290 U. S. ome) to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. It is a suit in-equity brought , in the Supreme Court of the District In 1932, by Ruth Loughran, then resident there. The defendants are John Loughran and - others, trustees of real estate there located. The estate of Daniel Loughran Jr., deceased is a beneficiary. The plaintiff alleges that she is Daniel ’s widow; and she seeks to enforce as such-rights in the nature of dower and to recover unpaid alimony. She. alleges that.in 1926 she mmfrried Daniel in Florida after living there more. than fwo years; that in 1927 she and her said husband established their domicile in Virginia; that in 1929, while they were residing in Virigina, she obtained there a deeree of divorcee from him a mensa et toro, with an award of alimony payable monthly ; and ‘that in 1931, while she remained Daniel’s wife, he died, leaving a part of the alimony unpaid. The trustees defend on the ground. that before her marriage , to Daniel, the’ plaintiff had been married to Henry Daye: that in 1924, while, she. and Daye were domiciled in‘ the District, he had secured there an absolute divorce for her adultery with Daniel ; that being fhe guilty party, she was by § 966 of the.Code of the District’ prohibited from remarrying; and that, having. married in violation of the. statute, she is not in a position to enforce .im a court of the District the alleged. rights in’ the estate of the de- ceased. A copy of thé record of *the Daye divoree, proceeding is annexed to the answer. Section 966 provides: — = ‘ ‘‘A divorce from the bond of marriage may be granted only ‘where one of the parties has committed adultery during the mar- C oo: . 2 | ‘Loughran vs. Loughran et al. riage: Provided, That in such case the innocent par ty ‘only may remarry, but nothing herein® contained shall prevent the remar-: riage of the divorced parties to each other: . . ...’’+~ On motion of the plaintiff, the case was hee on bill and answer. The trial COW aeptered a decree for the plaintiff in respect to the claim inthe nature of dower. That decree was. reversed ‘by ‘the Court of Appeals of the District. . It ordered that the cause be re- manded to the lower court for further proceedings not. inconsistent with the. opinion, 66 F. (2d) 567; »~969, saying: ‘‘It is unnecessary for us to concern ourselves with the legality ef the Florida marriage in that State, or with the subsequent di- voree proceedings in the State of Virginia, since the disposition of the case is dependent entirely upon the law of the District of Columbia. Insofar as the law of the District is concerned, the marriage between plaintiff and Daniel Loughran, Jr., in Florida, if performed in the District’of Columbia, would be absolutely void, and the plaintiff, being the offending party against the law of the District, is in no position to enforce.any claim against the estate of Daniel Loughran, Jr., growing out of the marriage in Florida.’’ Dtselaiming consideration of the’ doctrine of clean hands, the court added : , , : “Plaintiff, by. her own unlawful condinet: has placed herself €ith- ‘out the pale of the law, and cannot be heard in a court of equity to take advantage of her own wrong.”’ ~ ee o The trustees insist that. ‘the bill was properly dismissed because — the plaintiff, retaining her domicile in the District, went to Florida and married. there in order ‘to evade the prohibition of § 966. The plaintiff contends thatthe admitted facts constitute no de- fénee; that because the marriage was legal in- Florida,, its legality . should; under the established doctrines governing conflict of laws, have been recognized by the courts of the District : ‘ ‘and, moreover, that this Was ‘required by the full faith and credit clause, since the validity of the Florida marriage had been adjudicated by the Vir- vinia decree of divorce a mensa et thoro. ¢ First. Marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute,’ will, tf valid by the law of the State where entered into; be recognized as’ valid in every oth jurisdic- ction. Meister v, Moore, 9% U.S. 76;‘Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 1For cédlleetion of statutes sce: ‘Vernjer, American Famidy Laws, $$ 32, 45, 92. Compare The American Law: Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Proposed Final Draft No. 4, March 22, 1934, pp. 88-95. - ° 2 “. ° ade Loughran vs. Loughran et al. , 3 U. 8. 423, 440. The mere statutory prohibition by the State of the domicile either generally of the remarriage of a divorced person, dr of rem marriage within a préscribed period after the entry of the decree, is given, only t territarial effect. Such a statute does not in- validate a marriage solemnized in another State in conformity with thé laws thereo?.? ~~~ 2 w8 ee Necond. We have no occasion ‘to ‘decide what the rights of-the parties would be ?f- it appeared that. the plaintiff and her pararhour, retaining at all times their domicile in the District, had gone to ‘Florida for the purpose of evading § 966 by a marriage there; and - had then returned ‘to the District to live as tnan and wife.*.. It is argued that marriage within the District would have been illegal because prohibited by § 966; and that a marriage which would be illegal if entered into within the District must .be treated ynder § 1287 as void, even if valid under the law of the State in which it was solemnized. But § 1287° has no application to marriages in violation of the prohibition of § 966. Section 1287 provides: ‘Tf any marriage declared illegal by the aforegoing sections shall be entered into in another jurisdiction by persons. having and retaining: their domicile in the District of Columbia. sueh marriage shall be deemed illegal, and may be decreed to be void in said District in the same manner as if it) had been celebrated therein.”’ ’ : The seetions bieceding §$ 1287 relate solely to marfiages void, because incestuous or polygamous, and to those which are voidable, because entered into by a personawho was a lunatie, under the age jof consent, or impotent, and those which are voidable because pro- cured by force or fraud. In the ease at bar, there is no suggestion ofany such @bstacle to ,the validity of the marriage. The only objection urged is that by marrying in Flerida the plaintiff vio- lated § 966. But the preceding sections do not refer to § 966; and they contain no reference to remarriage of divorced persons. Their “only reference to divorcee is in Paragraph Third of § 12833 which. de- > elar eS void: . -° “A “giNee Commonwealth v. Lane,-113 Mass.'458; Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Towa 142; In re Miller’s Estate, .239 Mich. 455, : : | sBy the widely prevailing view, the marriage would, even under such cir- cumstances, be held valid by the courts of the domicile in the absence of ex- press provision to the contrary. For tases see Joseph H. Beale, et al., Mar- riage and Domicile, 44 Harv. L, Rev. 501, 514-517. ‘ : 6 4 . ‘Loughran ‘vs. Loughran et al. ‘‘The marriage of any persons either of whom, has been pre- viously married and whose previous marriage has not ‘been ter- minated by death or a UYoeree of divorce.’’ ° Since the plaintiff had been légally divorced from Dayé in the District while the parties | were ddmiciled there, and the decree be- tame effective under ‘§ 983a unconditionally and irrevoeably, she was thereafter an unmarried woman; and if she had cohabited with Daniel in the District after the Florida marriage she would not have been guilty of polygamy. ‘ommonwealth v..Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 460, 462. , pe ae Moreover, it does not appear that the plaintiff and Daniel did retain their domiciles in the District after her divdree? or that after the Florida, marriage they ever lived in the District as man and wife. The trustees argue that it must be assumed on the plead- ings that plaintiff’s residence in Florida and the marriage, there were not in good faith.* But the bill alleged the* good faith of the residence and marriage in Florida: and the answer contains no specifie denial: of that allegation. Nor does: it contain ariy averment that the residence in Florida and. marriage there were with the intent of evading the prohibition against remarriage.® Fhe Court of Appeals did not pass upon the issue sought to be- raised. It expressly disclaimed deciding whether the Florida mar- riage was valid or wltat the effect of the Virginia decree was. And the question whether the marriage in Florida should be ‘deemed void within the District because the parties went to Florida to evade the prohibition of § 966 was not presented by we petition for a writ of certiorari. . Third. The Court of Ronee stated that ‘‘the single question for Getermination here js, whether or,not plaintiff is entitled to her dower interest;’’ and it held that the bill should be dismissed, re- gardless of whether the marriage’was valid under the law of Florida. The requisites of dower are a valid marriage; seizin of #The argument rests upon the phraseology ‘of the answer and the equity rules of the Supreme Court of the -District. 5The aNegation is “‘‘that having openly and in utter disregard of the pro- "hibition contained in said statute violated the terms thereof, she cannot’ now return to this jurisdiction and this Honorable Court and herein make appli- cation for relief with respect to the very situation and réfationship which she could and did create only. in direct violation of the prohibitory mandate of the statute’’. ; creas or ; ‘Loughran vs. Eoughran et al. . 5 - the husband ; and ‘his. death. It may be assumed that the law of. the situs of real estate determines whether a widow a entitled te ~ dower. Compare De Vaughan v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 556, 570. But, if the marriage was valid under the laws of Florida, the plain- ' * tiff was, under established-doctrines of the conflict of laws, Daniel’s widow. As such she was entitled, as an incident of the marriage, to dower in the property within the District. For, while a statute of the District provides for forfeiture of dower in case of the wife’s adultery during marriage ;° none denies dower to a widow because * she had been guilty of adultery prior- te the marriage with her late husband. : , e Section 966 is not extra-territoriel in its aia It does not > purport to prohibit remarriage oufside the District; and no other statute denies dower to a widow because by remarrying elsewhere she had disregarded the prohibition contained in § 966. It does not make remarriage a crime, or in-terms impose any: penalty, even if contracted within the District and obviously it could not make criminal remarriage’ elsewhere. ‘Nor does gt in -terms declare the | remarriage void. Apparently, it is the law of the District that a remarriage elsewhere ix disregard of the prohibition of, § 966, even where beth parties remained domiciled .in the District ,¢is not void ahi initio, but, at most, voidable; and that a voidable marriaze can- not be annulled after the death of either spouse.’ No ease has been found in which, independently of statutory di- rection, a widow has been denied dowér'on the ground “that a re- ‘marriage, legal by the law of the place where celebrated, had been “entered into in violation of some prqhibition imposed by the law of the State in which the divorce was granted and the property was | situated.* -Ordinarily the operation of a statute of descent’and dis- , _ —— : ‘The Code of the District 1929, Title 14, § 30, ‘declares: ‘‘If ‘a wife will- ingly leave her husband, and go away, and continue. with her advouterer, sho shall be barted forever of action to dnnend her dower, that she ought ‘to have not her husband’s lafds, if she be convict thereupon, except that hier husband? ° ‘ “willingly, and without coercion reconcile her, and suffer her to cool with -him ; in which case she shall be restored to her action.’’ 7Sammons v. Sammons (S. C. D. C.), 46 W. L. R, 39, 41. See Tyler, v. Andrews, 40 App. D. C. 100, 104; Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App. D. C. 216.4 218-219; 19 F., (2d) 690, 692:3; Abramson v. Abramson, 60 App. D. C. 119, 121, 122; 49 F. (2d) 501, 503, 504. Compare Diinpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329; Bonham v. Badgley, 7 Ill. 622. oi , sCompare Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433; Dickson v. Dickson’s Heirs, «i Yerg. 110. See 18¢C. J., p. 859,§102. 6 , : ” we 6 . : Loughran vs. Loughran et al. ° tribution i is held not affected even by the fact that the death of the decedent was caused by a crime of the heir ;° and by the common “law, dower is not barred evtn by misconduct during marriage. Since, as matter of substantive law, the plaintiff i 1s entitled to dower in property within the District, if the marriage in Florida was valid, and its yalidity was assumed by the Court of Appeals, we have no oceasion to consider whether the decree’ in the Virginia divoree proeeedings made that matter .res judicata. Fourth. The relief sought by the bill includes, besides dower rights, a claim undeg the Virginia decree for the alimony whieh had acerued and rinea unpaid .at the time of Daniel’ s death. The right to reeover the alimony is independent of the right to dower, It rests upon a judgment to which, so far as appears, full faith and credit must be given by the courts of the District. It is true that, under rales. of law generally applicable, these: courts may refuse to enforce a mere right of contract if. it provides for doing within the District things prohibited by its laws. Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co.,°275 U. 8. 274, 278. It may, in the exercise of the police power, orohibit the enjoyment by persons within its ¢ borders of many rights acquired elsewhere-and refuse to lend the ‘aid of its courts to enforce them. Home Insurance Cggy. Dick, 281 USS. 397, 410. But when rights, however arising, ha Ipened into a judgment of a court of another’ State, the full fh and eredit clause applies. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 0. 8. 230; Converse V. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260.; Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411,415. And courts of the District are baund, equally with courts of the States, to observe the command of the full faith and credit elause, wherever applicable. Bradford Electric Light Co, ,. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 155. - Thus, the tacts Stated afford no ua in the substantive law for dismissal of the bill so far as it ‘seeks to recover unpaid alimony. Whether the fact that this claim has been presented: also in the probate court constitutes a reason for denying relief here, was not discussed below, and on this mat- ter we expfess no opinion. — ; . . Fifth. tt remains to consider -whether the denial of -rélief can be justified on some principle.of adjective law. The Court of Ap- 9) cAllister v. Fair, -72 Kans. 533; Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793; Goll- nick v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349; Holloway v..MeCormick, 41 Okl, 1; Johnson’s Estate; 29 Pa. Sup. Ct. 255. to wll) It rts for ell ‘ise ifs the ich, ved ind rse 252 ‘ith ind Co. no s it aim soir iat- ean \p- aa Loughran vs. Loughran et al. Ras &7 peals holds that the ‘‘plaintiff by her own unlawful conduct has placed herself without the pale of the law;’’ but ‘it does not state specifically the ground for that conclusion. The bar applied is not the plea of jllegality commonly interposed in suits brought to enforee contracts tainted by illegality. In those suits the illegality . relied on is inherent in the cause of action; is directly connected with the relief sought ;.and constitutes a swbstantive defence. Here, the relation of the illegality to the relief sought is indirect and re- mote. The wrong done is a thing of the past and is collateral. By the long line of cases following Connolly v. Union Sewer P.se Co., 184. U. 8." 540, it is settled that illegality constitates no de- ti wher merely collateral-to the cause .of action sued on. A ‘‘pegson does not become an outlaw and lose all rights by doing an illegal act.’’ National Bank & Loan‘ Co. v. Petrie,.189 UV. 8 423, 425.- Courts grant relief against present ‘wrongs and to en- force an. existing right, although the property involved was ae- quired by some past illegal act. Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70, 79, 80; Planters’ Bank v. Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483, 499, 500. The Court of Appeals, while it dintalned acting on the doctrine of clean hands,'® declared that Olverson v. Olverson, 293 Fed. 1015 (decided by it in 1923) is decisive of the case at bar. But both’ the facts and the relief sought are different in the &wo cases. In the first place, the parties.in the Olverson case were at the .time of ° the marriage domiciled in 'the@)istrict ; remained so when they . went to Baltimore for the marriage ceremony with the purpose of evading the prohibition of § 966; returned immediately ‘thereafter to the District; and then lived in the District as man and wifey On thé other hand, in the case at. bar it does not appear that the plaintiff and Daniel wete domiciled in the District at the time of -the marriage; or that they went to Florida in order to evade the “prohibition of § 966; or that during their marriage they lived in , the District; or that they ever cohabited there as man and wife. ¢ the second place, the Olverson suit was brought by a wife for a e cree of divorce a mensa et thoro with a mgtion for alimony; and was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff could not ‘‘ask- the courts of this jurisdiction to relieve her of the obligations of a re- lation which she willfully and .wrongfully assumed.’’ 10Tt had stated in Simmons vr. Simmons, -57 App. PD, C, 216, 218, 19 F. (2d) 690, 693, that the Olverson case rested on the doctrine of clean hands, ; : : ¢ | ai se sa ° . * Ba oe P e 8 Loughran vs. Loughran et al.. The suit at bar was brought after termination of the marriage by death to enforce existing property rights growing out of the marriage in Florida and the decree entered in Virginia. It was ‘fot brought to enforce any ,transaction had within the Distriet; nor was it brought to enforce an illegal contract; or to further an _ illegal relation.'' Equity does not-demand that its suitors shall “have led blameless lives. | Neither the doctrine of clean hands, nor any kindred principle on which éoufts refuse relief, is applicable here. The deé¢ree of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause remanded to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. + . Reversed. A true copy. ‘ H é Test: ‘ « ~ al : Clerk, Supreme Court, U. 8., . ‘ \ 2 . j “ ‘ ‘., a . ‘ f ; ‘ ¢ : & - % bd . ‘ | “™~ e , a. me £7 i a ; "Compare Western Union Telegraph Co. v..Union Paeifie Ry. Co., 3’ Fed. | 423, 427-8; Bateman rv. Fargason; 4 Fed, 32. © ‘ --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_0059%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.