# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hoeings v. Adams County

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 525 U.S. 931

## Text

veproms VeUurTt, Vea
FILED

\) 98 267 NAY 281%

OFFICE CF FE CLERK

NO.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
October Term, 1997

DANIEL HOEINGS, a/k/a DANIEL HOINS, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated, and
BYRON BUZEK, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated

Petitioners,

COUNTY OF ADAMS, et. al.,

DANIEL HOEINGS, a/k/a DANIEL HOINS, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated, and
BYRON BUZEK, on behalf of himself and ail other
persons similarly situated

Petitioners

| eS
COUNTY OF ADAMS, et. al.,

CORRECTED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT

MARY C. WICKENKAMP, NSBA NO. 16396
COUNSEL OF RECORD
4831 S. 58TH ST.
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68515-1412
(402) 488-1921

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. WHETHER THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT
ERRED IN RELYING, IN PART, ON A
SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED STATUTE IN
CONSTRUING NEBRASKA LAW TO HOLD THAT NO
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT VESTED TO EMPLOYER
GENERATED PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER
NEB.REV.STAT.§23-2310 IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE,ARTICLE I, SECTION 10,
CLAUSE 1, AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. OF
THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners

Daniel Hoins and Byron Buzek are residents of Cass
County and Saline County, Nebraska, respectively, and
bring this action on behalf of themselves and approximately
6,000 other persons who are similarly situated and reside
in the state of Nebraska, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
Section 25-319. The Class consists of all past and current
employees of the Defendant Class of Nebraska Counties,
who have participated in the Retirement System for
Nebraska Counties since January 1, 1983, or are currently
participating in said system.

Defendants

The Defendants include ninety one Nebraska
Counties which participate in the Retirement System for
Nebraska Counties established by Neb. Rev. Stat. Section
23-2301 et. seq. and specifically include the following
Nebraska Counties:

Adams, Antelope, Arthur, Banner, Blaine, Boone, Box
Butte, Boyd, Brown, Buffalo, Burt, Butler, Cass, Cedar,
Chase, Cherry, Cheyenne, Clay, Colfax, Cuming, Custer,
Dakota, Dawes, Dawson, Deuel, Dixon, Dodge, Dundy,
Fillmore, Franklin, Frontier, Furnas, Gage, Garden,
Garfield, Gosper, Grant, Greeley, Hall, Hamilton, Harlan,
Hayes, Hitchcock, Holt, Hooker, Howard, Jefferson,
Johnson, Kearney, Keith, Keya Paha, Kimball, Knox,
Lincoln, Logan, Loup, Madison, McPherson, Merrick,
Morrill, Nance, Nemaha, Nuckolls, Otoe, Pawnee,
Perkins, Phelps, Pierce, Platte, Polk, Red Willow,
Richardson, Rock, Saline, Sarpy, Saunders, Scottsbluff,
Seward, Sheridan, Sherman, Sioux, Stanton, Thayer,
Thomas, Thurston, Valley, Washington, Wayne, Webster,

ii

Wheeler, and York.

THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR
NEBRASKA COUNTIES, an Agency
of the State of Nebraska, and

THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
RETIREMENT BOARD, an Agency of the
State of Nebraska; and Harry A.
Spencer, in his capacity as a

member of the Public Employees
Retirement Board; Robert Corner,

in his capacity925Xasember of the
Public Employees Retirement Board:
Robert Giese, in his capacity as a
member of the Public Employees
Retirement Board; Al Curtis
Robinson, in his capacity

as a member of the Public
Employees Retirement Board:
William Lindsay, Jr.,in his

Capacity as a member of the Public
Employees Retirement Board:

James D. Murphy, in his Capacity as
a member of the Public Employees
Retirement Board; and Connie Witt,
in her capacity as a member of the
Public Employees Retirement

Board. and E. Benjamin Nelson, Governor
of the State of Nebraska.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW i
PARTIES TO PROCEEDING ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v
OPINIONS BELOW 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 :
4 ‘
6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
v. :

438 U.S. 234 (1978) 12

: v. Milwauk unty,
544 N.W. 2d 888 (Wis. 1996) 11
Baker v. Sommerville, 138 Neb. 466,(1940) 11
Bohmont v. Moore, 141 Neb. 91,(1942) .

City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895(1949). 11
Dadisman v. Moore, 181 W. Va. 779, 384 S.E.2d 816

(1989) 12

Hoadley’s Admrs. v. San Francisco, 124 U.S. 639 (1888).
13
Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d

223 (1994). 1,2,7,8,11,
Home Buildings & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.398
(1934); 12

In Re: Interest of Jaycox, 250 Neb. 67 (1996). 9

Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly. 66 U.S. 436 (1861)13
Karrer v. Karrer, 190 ry 610 (1973). 11
v.I , 250 ae
789 (1996).
hMonahan Cattle Co... Goodwin, 201 Neb. 845 (1987 11
_V. Villa

910 F.2d 1474 Cth. Cir. 1990) 11

v. l .. Inc. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223
(9th Cir. 1990). 12
Nobel v. City of Lincoln, 158 Neb. 457, 63 N. “6 2d 475

(1953)

Ritter_v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Oe and_ohson
Counties, 137 Neb. 866 (1940).
v. Ne Fi Fund,
204 Neb. 445 (1979). 11
ilt Truck Line, Inc. v. Je Ned

Neb. 591 (1984).

State Teacher’s Retirement t Board v. Giessel, a

N.W.2d 301 (1960). 12

State v. Thayer, 235 Neb. 70 (1990). sy)
Summerville v. North Platte Valley Weather
Control Dist., 170 Neb. 46 (1960). 8
Swink v. Smith, 173 Neb. 423 (1962). 8
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
(1977); 12
Vogel v. Bartels, 1 Neb. App. 1113,
510 N.W.2d (1993). 13
Wi in Retired Teachers Assn’n v Trust
Funds Board.,, 537 N.W.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1995),

12
Yazoo & M.V.R.Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 1, reh.den.
181 U.S.580 (1850). 13

vi

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a, a ie a

eT a ee ee ek ts Bee eee eee eee meee

NE are en SS ae ee oe ae

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court is
published at Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 254 Neb.
64,574 N.W.2d 498 (1998) and is reprinted in the
Appendix herein. The 1994 opinion of the Nebraska
Supreme Court in this case is published at Hoiengs v.
Cour.ty of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994)
and is reprinted in the Appendix herein. Relevant portions
of the Nebraska County Employees Retirement Act are also
reprinted in the Appendix hereto.

p628X
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioners assert that this Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §1751 to review a February 27, 1998
decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court. This is a case
wherein the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to rule upon
the issue of whether a district court decision violated the
Due Process Clause and the Contract Clause in giving a
later enacted statute retrospective effect to reduce the
previously vested rights of county employees to employer
generated pension contributions. Instead, the Nebraska
Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional issue was moot
because Neb.Rev.Stat.§23-2310 ,the statute setting the
amount of the employee contribution setting the employer
contribution at 250 percent of the amount contributed by an
employee was ambiguous in light of Neb.Rev. Stat. §23-
2308 and that therefore, §23-2310 must be construed as
meaning 150 percent despite the express language of §23-
2310 setting the amount at 250 percent. In doing so the
Nebraska Supreme Court relied, in part, upon the language
of a subsequently enacted statute, LB1057, as evidence of
legislative intent supporting its holding that 150 percent

was the proper pension contribution.

Petitioners argue that this court has jurisdiction to
review a decision wherein a state determines that a
subsequently enacted statute impairs or negates the
obligations of a contract to which the state or its agents is

a party.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The first of these two consolidated cases, Hoieings
v. County of Adams, et. al., Lancaster County District
Court Docket 472, Page 146 (hereinafter referred to as
Hoieings I) was filed in 1991 as a class action under the
Declaratory Judgment Act in Lancaster County District
Court. The Plaintiff was initially William Fairbanks, but
Plaintiff Daniel Hoins, aka Hoiengs was later substituted as
Plaintiff. Named as Defendants were 91 Nebraska Counties
and the Retirement System for Nebraska Counties. This
matter was previously before the Nebraska Supreme Court.
See, Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516
N.W.2d 223 (1994).

On April 15, 1992, after the filing of the first case
but before trial, the Nebraska Legislature passed LB1057
which changed the language of §23-2310 and actually
reduced the amount of the employer funded contribution
from 250% to 150% for all previous years. On Aug™st 18,
1992 the Lancaster County District Court granted a
demurrer dismissing the first action for failure to state a
cause of action. The first case was appealed to the
Nebraska Supreme Court. The Nebraska Supreme Court
on May 12, 1994 reversed and remanded, finding that the
Plaintiff had stated a cause of action in contract. LB1057
and the issue of retrospective application thereof was not
discussed in the Nebraska Supreme Court’s 1994 opinion.
On May 2, 1995, while the first suit was pending on

Ee kee ee, SN Oe ee eT ee ee Seen ee ee

5 er

remand in Lancaster County District Court the second of
these two consolidated actions was filed. That second suit
involved the same parties and requested a determination
that LB1057 was unconstitutional. The Lancaster County
District Court consolidated the two cases in December,
1996.

The second case, Hoiengs v. County of Adams, et.
al, Lancaster County District Court Docket 527, Page 114
(hereinafter referred to as Hoiengs II) was filed May 2,
1995. Like Hoiengs I, it involved a class action, and
related to provisions of the County Retirement Act.
Hoiengs II sought a declaratory ruling that a 1992
Amendment to the Act,LB1057, was unconstitutional in
that it violated the due process and contract clauses of the
U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions.

Both cases were brought under the Nebraska
Declaratory Judgments Act. 25-21,145 et. seq. The cases
were consolidated for trial over objection of the Plaintiffs.
On December 20, 1995 the Court heard reciprocal motions
for Summary Judgment on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Defendants.

On March 28, 1996 the Lancaster County District
Court granted Summary Judgement for Defendant Counties
Cass and Saline and against Plaintiffs Buzek and Hoins.
That Court specifically held: 1) that the County Retirement
Act from 1983 to 1992 required an employer contribution
of 150% because, although the express language of
Neb.Rev.Stat. §23-2310(1) clearly specified an employer
contribution of 250% that because §23-2308 "refers to a
requirement that the County Clerk pay the 100% of the
employee’s contribution and the 150% of the employer
contribution, totalling 250%" 2) that LB1057 was a
"curative" act that applied retrospectively to the County

Retirement Act; and 3) that because of the retrospective
effect of LB1057 the Plaintiffs’ rights to an employer
contribution under the County Retirement Act only vested
in an employer contribution of 150% instead of the 250%
specified in §23-2310(1).

In the decision at issue here the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that the express language of Neb.Rev.Stat. §23-
2310 in setting the pension contribution of a public
employer at 250% of the amount contributed by the
employee was ambiguous and made in error by the
Nebraska Legislature. The Nebraska Supreme Court in
doing so refused to rule on the constitutionality of the later
enacted LB1057 but went on to cite LB1057 in its opinion
as evidence of legislative intent that the contribution
requirement of 250% contained in §23-2310 must be read
as 150%.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Contract Clause, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, United
States Constitution
"No State shall . . . pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or
grant any Title of Nobility."

Due Process Clause, Amendment 5, United States
Constitution.
"No person shall. . .be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law..."

Amendment 14, Section 1, United States Constitution
". . .No State shall make or enforce any law

me

which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States:
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . ."

Neb. Rev. Stat.(Reissue 1991).23-2301. See Appendix.
Neb.Rev. Stat. (Reissue _1991).23-2302. See Appendix.
Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1991).23-2305. See Appendix.
Neb.Rev.Stat.(Reissue_ 1991).23-2306. See Appendix.
Neb. Rev. Stat.(Reissue 1991).23-2307. See Appendix.
Neb. Rev. Stat.(Reissue 1991).23-2308. See Appendix.
Neb. Rev. Stat.(Reissue 1991).23-2309. See Appendix.
Neb. Rev. Stat.(Reissue 1991).23-2310. See Appendix.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

I. WHETHER THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT
ERRED IN RELYING,IN PART, ON A
SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED STATUTE IN
CONSTRUING NEBRASKA LAW TO HOLD THAT NO
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT VESTED TO EMPLOYER
GENERATED PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER
NEB.REV.STAT.§23-2310 IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE,ARTICLE I, SECTION 10,
CLAUSE 1, AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. OF
THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Petitioners urge this court to grant certiorari to
determine whether the Nebraska Supreme Court is
construing Nebraska law in derogation of the Contract
Clause, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, and the Fifth and
Fourteend Amendments to the United States Constitution.
This question is posed in the context of whether Petitioners
have a right to an employer generated pension contribution
of 250% of the amount contributed by the employee as
stated in Neb.Rev.Stat.§23-2310,,enacted in 1983.

The question before the Nebraska Supreme Court on
appeal here was whether the District Court erred in finding
that LB1057, a statute enacted subsequently to §23-2310,
should be given retrospective effect to reduce the 259
percent contribution required of ninety one Nebraska
Counties under §23-2310 to 159 percent.

The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the issue of
the constitutionality of LB1057 was moot because the
Petitioners had no vested contractual right to an employer

contribution of 250 percent, notwithstanding the language
of §23-2310.. In so holding, the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the express language of §23-2310 which required
a contribution of 250 percent was in conflict with the
language of §23-2308 which states:

"The County clerk shall pay to the primary carrier
an amount equal to two hundred fifty percent of the
amount deducted from the compensation of the
employee in accordance with §23-2307."

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that because of
the language of §23-2308 that §23-2310 was ambiguous and
therefore each reference to 250 percent contained within
§23-2310 must be read as meaning 150 percent. In
reaching this conclusion the Nebraska Supreme Court relied
upon the legislative history of previous legislation and in

e 7 as evidence of the intent
of the Nebraska Legislature that the amount of the
employer contribution be 150 percent instead of 250
percent.

The Nebraska Supreme Court earlier ruled in this
case that the Petitioners had, in asserting a right to an
employer contribution of 250% under §23-2310 stated facts
constituting a cause of action which, if proven, would give

rise to a legal liability under the law. Hoeings v. County of
Adams, 245 Neb. 877 (1994).

The Nebraska Supreme Court first dealt with this
case in 1992 on appeal from the District Court’s order
sustaining Defendants’ demurrers to Plaintiff’s Petition.
Plaintiff sought a declaratory ruling that the amount of the
employer requirement required by the County Retirement

Act, codified at Neb.Rev.Stat. §23-2301 et.seqg., (Reissue
1991) was 250% and not the 150% that the Defendant

Counties were actually paying.

The Nebraska Supreme Court issued its opinion in
that case, Hoeings v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877
(1994), holding as follows: 1) that the District Court did
have jurisdiction of this matter and the parties, 2) that
substitution of Plaintiffs Hoeings for Fairbanks was proper,
3) that Plaintiff did state a cause of action on behalf of
himself and the class, 4) that Neb.Rev.Stat. §23-135 did
not apply, 5) that the Administrative Procedures Act did
not apply, 6) that there was no misjoinder of parties or
causes of action, 7) that Plaintiff could maintain an action
for declaratory judgment, 8) that sovereign immunity had
been waived for both the Retirement System and the
Counties by the terms of the County Retirement Act; and
9)that the PERB was not an administrative agency for
purposes of the County Retirement Act.

In reaching its 1994 decision in this case the
Nebraska Supreme Court necessarily had to determine what
amount of employer contribution the County Retirement
Act requires in order to determine whether Plaintiff had
stated, or could state, any cause of action. Nebraska law
requires that when considering whether a District Court’s
order sustaining a demurrer should be affirmed or reversed
the Court must consider whether a Plaintiff can ultimately
recover. A case will not be reversed where the
complaining party will not be entitled to a judgment in any
event. Swink v. Smith, 173 Neb. 423 (1962); Bohmont v.
Moore, 141 Neb. 91, (1942). Appellant submits that this
Court, in deciding Hoeings, logically had to consider all
aspects of the law to determine if there was any way in
which Hoeings could ultimately recover under the
allegations in his petition. This court was required to
consider the case on the law as it existed on the date of

judgment. Summerville v. North Platte Valley Weather

beaieoemenieceeeaeialic

Control Dist., 170 Neb. 46 (1960). State v. Thayer, 235

Neb. 70 (1990).

In reaching its holding the Hoeings Court noted that
the employer contribution under the act was set by Neb.

Rev. Stat. §23-2310 (Reissue 1991). Hoeings at 883-

884,896. A matter controlled by statute presents a question
of law. In Re: Interest of Jaycox, 250 Neb. 67 (1996).
A determination that the employer contribution is
250% is a necessary and integral part of the Court’s ruling
in Hoeings and, as such, is the law of the case. State ex
a , 218 Neb. 591 (1984).
In +S , 250 Neb.
789 (1996), the Court reiterated the basic premise of the
doctrine of the law of the case, which states that the
holding of an Appellate Court on questions presented to it
in reviewing proceedings of a Trial Court become the law
of the case, and those holdings conclusively settle, for
purposes of that litigation, all matters ruled upon either
expressly or by necessary implication. Latenser held that,
under this doctrine, matters previously addressed in the
Appellate Court are not reconsidered unless the party
seeking such reconsideration presents materially and
substantially different facts. Nobel v. City of Lincoln, 158
Neb. 457, 63 N.W.2d 475 (1953). Noble made it clear
that when an Appellate Court rules on whether factual
allegations in a petition state a cause of action such that a
demurrer will not lie, that ruling establishes the law of the
caseé and where those same facts are later proven on
remand the law of the case as established by the Appellate
Court controls.

As the Nebraska Court has previously stated, in a
‘cause of action’ is a judicial protection of one’s recognized
right or interest, when another, Owing a corresponding duty
not to invade or violate such right or interest, has breached

that duty. In determining whether a demurrer should lie,
the Court must also decide whether there is any way
Plaintiff can recover. If there is no way in which a
plaintiff can recover an order sustaining, a demurrer will
be affirmed, even if the District Court sustained the
demurrer for the wrong reason.

The Nebraska Court in 1994 concluded very clearly
that a cause of action was stated, that if proven, would
entitle the petitioners to a judgment.

A reading of this Court’s decision in Hoeings
clearly demonstrates that this Court considered the question
of the amounts of the employer contribution in considerable
detail and found that the Petitioners had a viable cause of
action.

The 1998 decision of the Court in effect took away
the Petitioners constitutionally vested cause of action, and
went on to rule that Petitioners had never had a right to the
pension contribution of 250%. The Nebraska Court did so
in partial reliance on the language of LB1057 as evidence
of the intent of the Nebraska Legislature.

Petitioners urge in support of a grant of certiorari
that there exist no independent and adequate state grounds
for the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in this case
which do not involve issues of constitutional magnitude.

The Nebraska Supreme Court in its 1998 decision
simply held that Petitioners had no right to a pension
contribution of 250% because the statute setting the 250%
requirement when read in light of earlier legislation had to
be regarded as absurd. The Court did so in complete
disregard for its earlier 1994 decision finding Petitioners
had a cause of action which under Nebraska law is defined
as a set of facts which, if proven, give rise to a legal

10

—$—— eee”
————————————————————

liability (Hoieings v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877

(1994). However, in doing so, the Nebraska Supreme
Court also cited the subsequently enacted statute.

Before a party may assert due process argument it
must establish that it has legitimate claim of entitlement to
right being asserted. New Burnham Prairie Homes. In - 2
Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474 (7th Cir. 1990).
Petitioners have such a claim by virtue of the language of
§23-2310 and the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court

in Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877 (1994).

Where contractual and vested rights are created
pursuant to statute, they cannot be destroyed by subsequent

act of the legislature. Ritter v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of
Otoe and Johnson Counties, 137 Neb. 866 (1940). Statute

may not operate retroactively where it would impair
obligation of contract or interfere with vested right. State

ex re Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, 204
Neb. 445 (1979). Monahan Cattle Co., v. Goodwin, 201
Neb. 845 (1987). Karrer v. Karrer, 190 Neb. 610 (1973).

retroactively to deprive property owner of his previously
vested rights. City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895
(1949).A municipal ordinance cannot operate retroactively
to deprive a property owner of previously vested property

rights. Baker v. Sommerville, 138 Neb. 466

(1940).

Due process clauses’ procedural protection of
property is a safeguard of security of interest that a person
has already acquired in specific benefits. Assoc. of State
P tors v. Milwauk unty, 544 N.W. 2d 888 (Wis.
1996). Each listed member and retiree of county retirement
plan had a property interest in retirement system protected
by due process clause. The gravity of a property
deprivation is irrelevant to the question of whether such

11

—— EEE

rights are violated without due process. Dadisman v.
Moore, 181 W. Va. 779, 384 S.E.2d 816 (1989). A West
Virginia court has recognized that pension plan participants
had contractually vested property rights created by pension
statutes and that such rights were enforceable and could not
be impaired or diminished by the state. A Wisconsin Court
has held that the right created by the pension statues vest
in a constitutional sense even though the right created by
the statute may be inconsistent with the prior expressed
intent of the legislature as demonstrated by the legislative
history. Wisconsin Retired Teachers Assn’n v. Employee
Trust Funds Board,537 N.W.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1995).
There the court relied on Giessel and held that the
annuitants of the Wisconsin Retirement System had a
property interest in the earnings of their trust fund. State

Teacher’s Retirement Board v. Giessel, 106 N.W.2d 301
(1960).

The Nebraska Supreme Court decided this case in
a way which directly contradicts the legal principles laid
down by this Court in Home Buildings & Loan Assn. v
Blaisdell, 290 U.S.398 (1934);(Obligations of a contract
are impaired by a law which renders them invalid or
releases or extinguishes them. . .and impairment. . .has
been predicated upon laws which without destroying
contracts derogate from substantial contractual rights.)

United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,

(1977); Alli ctural Steel Co. v. s, 438 U.S.
234 (1978). See also, Nev. Employees Assoc., Inc. v.

Keating, 903 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1990).

While it is also recognized that generally the
construction given by state courts to State laws and State
constitutions are binding and conclusive upon the Federal
Courts, the rule does not extend to cases in which this
Court is called upon to interpret the contracts of the States.

12

i aaeeniaineiiaiiaiteiiiiiiilaaiaialiial

n_ Branch Bank v. Skelly.. 66 U.S. 436 (1861).
Petitioners submit that this is a case where the Nebraska
Supreme Court construed the terms of a contract between
petitioners and political subdivisions of the State of
Nebraskan, namely, the ninety one counties of the State
that participate in the County Employees Retirement
System. Vogel v. Bartels, 1 Neb. App. 1113, 510 N.W.2d
(1993). Petitioners argue that because of the State’s direct
involvement in this contract via the ninety-one counties,
that the construction of the Nebraska Supreme Court in this
case not be regarded as binding and conclusive and that this
court has and should take jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C.§1751. Yazoo & M.V.R.Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S.

1, reh.den. 181 U.S.580 (1850). Hoadley’s Admrs. v. San
Francisco, 124 U.S. 639 (1888).

In conclusion Petitioners submit that there exist no
independent and adequate grounds which justify the
decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court and which do not
involve issues of constitutional magnitude.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_1420%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.