# Amicus Curiae Brief — Wyoming v. Houghton > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_1342%3A09 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1999 - **Citation:** 526 U.S. 295 ## Text SEL Supreme Court, U.S. , Dp CLERK NOV 10 1998 No. 98-184 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1998 THE STATE OF WYOMING, Petitioner, vs. SANDRA HOUGHTON, Respondent. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court for the State of Wyoming BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER CHARLES L. HOBSON* Criminal Justice Legal Fdn. 2131 L Street Sacramento, CA 95816 Telephone: (916) 446-0345 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation * Attorney of Record QUESTION PRESENTED Does the bright-line of Acevedo v. California permitting containers to be opened during warrantless automobile searches have limits based on the ownership of the containers? (i) AIEEE ALLS C8 COIL a moet ee ee eee TABLE OF CONTENTS Question presented ........ 6. cece eee eee e teen eens i Table of authorities 2.0.65. cect e nessa cr eeses iV Interest of amicus CUTIGE «1.6.6.6. eee eee l Summary of facts and case .......- esse eee reece ees 2 Summary of argument .........-- +e eee eee eee 3 Argument ........ cece cece eect erect eeeeereerene 4 I The decision below did not account for the exigencies of automobile searches .........--seeeeceeeecereeees 4 II The rule of California v. Acevedo should not be complicated by the impractical “notice test” ....---. 660s eee ees 14 A. The policy problem ...........22++seeeeeee 14 ee Raa Pere rr a eer eee, 17 1. Drawing the proper line ......--..-++++55 17 BG RR aan Seer ewok ee eo ew ee 21 Ee POPC OE CELE ETS ae Ree. 24 (iii) iV TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, Pe NA SOMOLIETEE v5 co cee a oe 10, 15 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, Le Me Spon 8 eS” Ff 5 * RUM Giger ON sepals sib GE 14 California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) ...... 3, 1, 12, 14, 15, 21, 23,24 California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, SOS Di AA: SOOO LIOR? 5 oa Sas kb oc ELE Le 14,15 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, MIC 2S ee 5,9 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925) ...... Vewea te snkvesus 5, 7, 14, 15 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, Pe thd SRO AIP, voneks hea ee 8, 16 Commonwealth v. Reese, 549 A. 2d 909 (Pa. 1998) ..... 23 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 24 564, 91S. Ce 2022-4971). 05005 ee 4 Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, se GE Eee Ce oc oo ks Sa ee eee 17 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, ER CASO oo 15 | Houghton y. State, 956 P. 2d 363 | CWFMG. THOMA cia va ors eh ae kak tees he Dy Bs Oy hy oy AO | Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, a6 2 i CR RC as se 6, 7, 17, 20 ee ee Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, BGi BS. CRs BIRT LISS ooo ike skteat coe 7, 8, 16 New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 501 SCR SRG LISSL) Co kc eae 17, 18, 20 New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81, BUD. S. CL SOU Cie ics ca sca ic bea ee 5 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, SE 7 Bs CRORES VASP v6 cas Steen neeoeekeenn 17, 18, 19 Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938, 135 L. Ed 2d 1031, RIGS. GR COGS Clot ka sas ive hee eee 14, 15 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, Fe D.C Sa Ear iia osha eh es 6 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, SETS. Ck FSGS aos HA ee 19, 20 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, DS SOS; BSE Aa od os Sos oes ed en ee 19 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) ...... 6, 14, 15 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, Be Os Cty OTTO cnc bv oceans eas 13,17 Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209, Pr es A NR io oo has Eee eH we 16 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, PFT th Ak tO 1B PEED cis oak kc eo 4 Sao a eek oe 10 United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 92 L. Ed. 210, Oe ee Sots ee EE oo ok a he 12, 13 United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890, Re A SOk CAD EE Ie ee rin 15 vi United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, BOS Gh IO E LEME) baicwietcccbirews Orbbe dS OFeas 6 United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, Ue A BAe CAEN n'c sc eee cnaeds 8,9, 10, 11, 15, 16 Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, Sah as RT EEE hr aso a ee eee ok 17 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, id oe SR ROTO ak cv ka kv a annetes 8, 9, 12, 13, 22 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525, Pe Rs SPREE TT oo vik han Se RON eee ree 8 Treatises W. LaFave, Search and Seizure RS TOME ee i oe Ak Ge ee 8, 9, 13, 15, 21 Miscellaneous Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ............... 15 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1996 EEE) hoy 2a wees VER COVE LE EE Oe 15 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1998 THE STATE OF WYOMING, Petitioner, vs. SANDRA HOUGHTON, Respondent. BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF)' is a non- profit California corporation organized to participate in litiga- tion relating to the criminal justice system as it affects the public interest. CJLF seeks to bring the due process protection of the accused into balance with the rights of the victim and of society. The automobile’s mobility and pervasiveness makes it an ideal tool for transporting contraband, particularly illegal drugs. The ability of police to conduct warrantless searches of automo- biles whenever they possess probabie cause that the vehicle Rule 37.6 Statement: This brief was written entirely by counsel for amicus, as listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions were made to the preparation or submission of this brief. Both parties have given written consent to the filing of this brief. contains contraband is thus an essential tool for combatting such crime. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s “notice test” for opening closed containers suspected of carrying contraband needlessly complicates automobile searches while providing little protection for any legitimate expectation of privacy. The threat posed by this decision to this very important law enforce- ment mechanism is contrary to the interests CJLF was formed to protect. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE On July 23, 1995, in the early morning, a “Wyoming Highway Patrol Officer stopped an automobile for speeding and a faulty break light.” Houghton v. State, 956 P. 2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1998). The vehicle contained three occupants: the driver, David Young; his girlfriend; and the defendant. /bid. The officer, who was soon joined by two other officers, started questioning Young. During the questioning, the officer noticed a syringe in Young’s shirt pocket. The officer then went to his patrol car in order to get gloves. Upon his returning to Young’s vehicle, he ordered Young out of the car and to place the syringe on the hood. When asked what the syringe was for, Young replied that it was for personal use. Jbid. The passengers were then ordered out of the vehicle and asked for identification. /bid. Defendant identified herself as Sandra Jones and claimed that she had no identification. The passengers were then patted down, which produced no weapons or drugs. The officer then searched the automobile for drugs. Ibid. The officer discovered “a closed ‘cloth lady’s purse’ ” while searching behind the area where the two female passengers sat. Ibid. He opened the purse and took out a wallet. Inside the wallet he discovered defendant’s driver’s license which identified her as Sandra Houghton. Defendant then acknowl- edged that the purse was hers. The officer then continued the search, finding “a brown “wallet bag’ containing drug parapher- nalia, a syringe containing an estimated 60 cc’s of liquid, a black wallet containing drug paraphernalia, a vial, and a syringe with approximately 10 cc’s of liquid.” Jbid. A field test of the liquid from the syringe in the brown bag tested positive for methamphetamine. Defendant was arrested, while Young and his girlfriend were released. /bid. The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion, relying on California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991). Houghton, 956 P. 2d, at 365. A jury convicted defendant of one count of felony possession of a controlled substance. She was sentenced to two to three years in prison. /bid. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer knew or should have known that the purse did not belong to Young. /d., at 372. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The decision below failed to appreciate the special status of the automobile under the Fourth Amendment. Beginning with Carroll v. United States, this Court has treated automobiles differently in its Fourth Amendment cases due to their mobility, the diminished expectations of privacy surrounding automo- biles, and the inherent dangers of automobile stops. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s reliance on Ybarra v. Illinois is a product of its failure to appreciate this key distinc- tion. Occupants of an automobile are more closely associated with the premises being searched and have less of an expecta- tion of privacy than the tavern patrons in Ybarra. As both automobiles and their passengers are treated differently under the Fourth Amendment, Ybarra is inapplicable. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement is a creature of Fourth Amendment policy. In addition to the mobility and diminished privacy of the automobile, another consideration should influence this Court’s analysis of automo- bile searches. Because the automobile exception is limited to searches for contraband, and since most contraband searches are for illegal drugs, most searches under this exception will be for drugs. Therefore, the dangers often associated with such searches should inform this Court’s analysis of the automobile exception where relevant. The present case is best served by the formulation of a single, clear-cut rule by this Court. Although this Court has shied away from bright lines upon occasion, it has done so where the rule would be impractical or provide little benefit. This Court can and has established bright-lines where there is a need for clear authority in a carefully defined aspect of Fourth Amendment law. This Court’s cases demonstrate that automo- tive searches are ideally suited to such rules. The “notice test” invoked by the Wyoming Supreme Court tails to satisfy this requirement. Tying the authority to open a container to the apparent ownership of it needlessly complicates automobile searches, while providing a potential windfall for perpetrators. Any attempt to deal with concealed contraband under this test will either create an exception that will swallow the test or create an exceptionally complicated rule. The better rule is derived from Acevedo. Allowing all containers to be opened, regardless of their ownership, is clear, simple, and consistent with the spirit of Acevedo. So long as a container is capable of holding the suspected contraband, officers should be able to open it during an automobile search. ARGUMENT I. The decision below did not account for the exigencies of automobile searches. The automobile occupies an important niche in Fourth Amendment law. Driving or riding in an automobile signifi- cantly changes an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not, of course, disappear inside the car. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 461- 462 (1971) (plurality). It is no less true, however, that one’s expectation of privacy diminishes upon entering an automobile. The reasons for treating automobile searches differently form the foundation for any analysis of a search or seizure involving an automobile. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s failure to appreciate this difference taints its analysis. The first case from this Court to uphold a warrantless search of an automobile, Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), centered on the difficulty of searching an automobile or other vehicles under the traditional warrant process. “(T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Jd., at 153. As the automobile exception was expanded and refined, another justification developed, namely, the lesser expectation of privacy associated with automobiles. “The Court has recognized that the physical characteris- tics of an automobile and its use result in a lessened expec- tation of privacy therein: “ “One has a lesser expeciation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scru- tiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occu- pants and its contents are in plain view.’ ” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-113 (1986) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality)). tet The diminished sense of privacy inherent in automobiles is reinforced by the “pervasive and continuing governmental regulation” of them. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976). The limited privacy of the automobile has consequences beyond warrantless searches. In United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983), federal agents placed a beeper inside a container of chloroform to be sold to an individual suspected of using stolen chemicals to manufacture illicit drugs. See id., at 277-278. Relying on a signal from the beeper, agents traced the chloroform on its journey to its final resting point, a cabin in Wisconsin. /d., at 278. Using the location of the chloroform and additional information obtained through visual surveillance, officers obtained and executed a search warrant. /d., at 279. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the monitoring of the beeper violated defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, suppressing all information found after the cabin was located as being the fruit of the illegal monitoring. /bid. This Court noted that it had “commented more than once on the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile.” /d., at 281. The situation in Knotts was no different since “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” Jbid. The surveillance did not constitute a search or seizure, and therefore could not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 285. The exigencies surrounding the automobile extend beyond the Warrant Clause as well. In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. _ 408, 410 (1997), this Court extended the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (ordering the driver to exit the vehicle during a lawful stop) to automobile passengers. Since traffic stops pose a real threat of danger to officers, see Wilson, 519 U. S., at 413, the balance of interest tipped in favor of the reasonableness of ordering passengers out of vehicles during traffic stops. Even though the passenger did nothing to justify the initial stop, the “danger to an officer from a traffic stop,” id., at 414, from the presence of passengers, justified this additional intrusion. /d., at 415. Wilson drew from the rule of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), which allowed police officers to detain occupants during the execution of a search warrant for contra- band on a residence. See id., at 704-705. While Summers gave officers substantial authority, the grant of authority to detain was carefully controlled. The existence of a warrant was “[o]f prime importance” in supporting the constitutionality of the detention. See id., at 701. Furthermore, Summers was applied only to searches for illegal drugs because of the special risk such searches carried. “[T]he execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evi- dence.” J/d., at 702. Allowing officers to control the search through temporary detention minimizes this risk. /d., at 702- 703. Wilson extended Summers’ limited rule by recognizing the automobile’s special place in the Fourth Amendment. Instead of a magistrate’s finding of probable cause of the existence of contraband, the Wilson detention can be supported by a simple warrantless traffic stop. See Wilson, supra, 519 U. S., at 415. The lack of a warrant is inevitable when a traveling automobile is involved; it is impractical to obtain a warrant on a moving vehicle. See Carroll, supra, 267 U. S., at 153. As noted earlier, the inherent danger of automobile stops played a major role in the Wilson decision, thus making the automotive stop analogous to executing a search warrant for narcotics. See 519 U.S., at 414 (analogizing Summers). Finally, the realities of automobile stops lessens the intrusiveness of the detention. Because “as a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle,” id., at 413-414, the extra intrusion of ordering them out of the car is minimal. /d., at 415. Even though the passengers did not commit the “minor vehicular offense,” which justified the stop and detention, the realities of the possible dangers at a traffic stop help justify the extra intrusion. See id., at 413-414. Summers created a special exemption for certain search warrants. Although it took no formal position on whether its - rule applied to ordinary searches for evidence, see 452 U. S., at 705, n. 20, a careful reading of that footnote casts substantial doubt over any attempt to expand Summers beyond warrants for contraband. Footnote 20’s disclaimer concerning evidentiary searches is followed by a citation to Justice Steven’s dissent in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547 (1978), where he stated “the persons who possess evidence that may help to identify an offender, or explain an aspect of a criminal transac- tion, far outnumber those who have custody of weapons or plunder,” and that “[c]ountless law-abiding citizens . . . may have documents in their possession that relate to an ongoing criminal investigation.” /d., at 579. If accepted, this view casts grave doubt over extending Summers beyond contraband. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(e), pp. 651-652, n. 123 (3d ed. 1996). By contrast Wilson applies to al/ passengers in all validly stopped automobiles, vividly illustrating the differ- ences between automobile searches and most other searches. As this Court has noted, “for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970) (emphasis added). The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision did not appreciate this essential distinction. Relying on the statement in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982), equating the scope of a warrantless automobile search with that of a search pursuant to a warrant,’ see Houghton v. State, 956 P. 2d 363, 366 (Wyo. 1998), the Wyoming high court analyzes the search in the present case as if it were the product of an ordinary search warrant. See id., at 367. This problem with approach is revealed by its reliance on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979). Ybarra struck down a 2. “The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower-—and no broader—than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.” /bid. patdown search of a customer who was in a bar during the execution of a search warrant for drugs against the premises of the tavern and the person of a bartender. See id., at 88, 96. In reaching that conclusion, this Court noted that probable cause must extend to each individual being searched or seized pursuant to the warrant, as the mere coincidence of visiting a place during the execution of a search warrant against it did not justify an invasion of the visitor’s privacy. See id., at 91. The Wyoming Supreme Court extended this “persons not places” reasoning, ibid., to protect containers in automobiles such as the defendant’s purse. See Houghton, supra, 956 P. 2d, at 367-369. This conclusion fails to place Ybarra in its proper context. Ybarra protected visitors to a public place, and is therefore distinguishable from Summers, which dealt with a private dwelling. See 2 LaFave, supra, at 650-651. Wilson demon- strates that the passengers of an automobile are analogous to the occupants in Summers under the Fourth Amendment. One does not normally share an automobile with complete strangers, as one often does with a public place like a bar. Furthermore, the occupants of a vehicle have a diminished privacy expectation compared to Ybarra’s bar patrons. The difference is more pronounced when comparing the containers in the present case to the Ybarra patrons. “ ‘The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one’s person or of a building.’ ” Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality) (quoting Almeida- Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). Ybarra’s protection of the stranger does not apply to the context of the automobile search. The fact that the Wyoming Supreme Court invoked Ross, an automobile case, to support its use of Ybarra does not bring Ybarra into the context of automobile searches. In Ross, officers stopped defendant’s car after an informant had provided them with probable cause that Ross was dealing drugs from his car. See 456 U. S., at 800-801. A search of the passenger compartment found a bullet on the front seat, and a gun in the glove compartment. /d., at 801. The police then searched 10 Ross’ trunk where they found a closed paper bag which they opened, finding glassine bags of what proved to be heroin. Jbid. A more thorough search at the police station found in the trunk a zippered leather pouch containing $3,200 in cash. Jbid. Citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the opening of the leather pouch because Ross had a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. See Ross, 456 U. S., at 801-802. Sanders was based on United States v. Chadwick, 433 VU. S. 1 (1977). See 442 U. S., at 762-763. In Chadwick, federal agents had probable cause to believe that a 200-pound, double- locked footlocker contained marijuana. 433 U. S., at 3-5. The agents tracked the locker as defendants removed it from a train and carried it through the station to a waiting automobile. /d., at 3-4. As defendants lifted the locker to the car, the agents arrested them, seized the locker, and opened it one and one-half hours later. See id., at 4. The United States did not claim that the trunk’s brief contact with the car made Carroll applicable. It instead analogized the movable luggage to an automobile. Id., at 12. The Chadwick Court rejected this argument, finding that a person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than in his car. /d., at 13. Sanders extended Chadwick to a suitcase stored in the trunk of a vehicle. See Sanders, supra, 442 U.S., at 762-765. These cases provided a confusing, ill-considered standard that impeded effective law enforcement while doing little to protect privacy, and eventually would be abandoned for automobiles. See post, at 11. The Ross Court avoided the Chadwick-Sanders rule by distinguishing between it and the original automobile search case, Carroll. See 456 U. S., at 817. When it equated the scope of the automobile search with that of a warrant-based search, the Ross Court was distinguishing the Chadwick-Sanders rule so that officers could open containers found during the search under the authority of Carroll. “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of the container in which 1] the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is proba- ble cause to believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” Ross, supra, 456 U. S., at 824. This is the only limit that Ross adds to automobile searches. Ross did not import all of the law of search warrants into the automobile search. Where appropriate to the context of the automobile search, principles could be borrowed from this Court’s interpretation of the Warrant Clause. As California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991) demonstrates, where the automobile demanded different treatment, automobile searches would still be treated differently. Acevedo’s car was stopped on probable cause that it contained drugs. See /d., at 567. A search of the trunk found a paper bag which, when opened without a warrant, was found to contain marijuana. /bid A California Court of Appeal suppressed the search of the bag under Chadwick while noting tension between that decision and Ross. /d., at 568. This Court found that the Chadwick-Sanders line provided little protection of privacy, see id., at 575-576, and established a confusing standard. See id., at 576-577. The Chadwick-Sanders line was abandoned for automobile searches because automobiles were different under the Fourth Amendment. “Thus, this Court in Ross took the critical step of saying that closed containers in cars could be searched without a warrant because of their presence within the automobile. Despite the protection that Sanders purported to extend to closed containers, the privacy interest in those closed 12 containers yielded to the broad scope of an automobile search.” Id., at 572 (emphasis added). Attempts to apply stricter, non-automobile standards to automobile searches are usually fruitless. In Acevedo, the dissent supported its argument that Chadwick-Sanders had not impeded law enforcement by noting that since Ross, this Court had decided 27 cases in favor of the government. See id., at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Acevedo majority dismissed this with a forceful argument against applying alien concepts to automotive searches. “Most important, with the exception of United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985) and Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the Fourth Amendment cases cited by the dissent do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception. From Carroll and Ross, this Court has explained that automobile searches differ from other searches. The dissent fails to acknowledge this basic principle and so misconstrues and misapplies our Fourth Amendment case law.” Jd., at 578 (emphasis added). Accepting the Wyoming Supreme Court’s rule would amount to jamming Ybarra’s square peg into the round hole of automo- bile searches. Ybarra’s reliance on United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), see 444 U. S., at 94-95, does not justify applying Ybarra to automobile searches. In Di Re an informer told an Office of the Price Administration investigator that he was going to purchase counterfeit gasoline ration coupons from a person named Buttitta in a certain place in Buffalo, New York. The investigator and a Buffalo police detective trailed Buttitta’s car until it parked at the appointed place. They went to the car and found the informer in the rear seat holding two coupons which were later found to be counterfeit. The informant stated that he obtained the coupons from Buttitta who was sitting in front along with Di Re. All three were taken into custody, frisked for weapons, and taken to the station. At the station, two searches of Di Re turned up numerous counterfeit gas and oil coupons. 13 See 332 U. S., at 583. This Court struck down the search, finding that probable cause to search a car does not support the search of an occupant of that car absent probable cause to arrest him. See id., at 586-587. Di Re was invoked by the Ybarra Court to reject an argu- ment that had little to do with the present case. Illinois had argued that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968) should be extended to the execution of drug warrants against “ ‘compact’ premises.” See Ybarra, supra, 444 U. S., at 94. Di Re itself does not govern the present case because it only prevented searches of the occupants themselves; Di Re did not address searches of containers. This Court was only “not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses inumunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled.” Di Re, supra, 332 U. S., at 587 (emphasis added). Both Ross and Acevedo demonstrate that as far as containers are concerned, their presence in an automobile diminishes the expectation of privacy in them. Di Re has been criticized for allowing occupants of an automobile to “ ‘take the narcotics out of the glove compartment and stuff them in their pockets, and drive happily away after the vehicle has been fruitlessly searched.’ ” 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(e), p. 508 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 552 (1975)). It should not be allowed to create a new windfall with respect to containers in vehicles. The legality of the search in the present case can only be decided on its own terms, as an automobile search. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s reliance on Ybarra was misplaced, thus confusing the analysis and leading it to reach the wrong result. 14 II. The rule of California v. Acevedo should not be complicated by the impractical “notice test.” A. The Policy Problem. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement based upon Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925) and its successors is a creature of Fourth Amendment policy. The automobile exception and its subsequent application by the Court have involved a careful analysis of the competing interests of the individual’s privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement. See, e.g., id., at 153-154; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1973); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367-369 (1976); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985); California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 576-577 (1991). The automobile exception to the warrant requirement is justified on the policy grounds that it is impractical to obtain a warrant to search something as mobile as an automobile, and that cars carry a diminished expectation of privacy. See Carney, supra, 471 U.S., at 391; supra, at 5-6. As noted in part I, supra, these are not the only reasons for treating automobiles differently under the Fourth Amendment. See supra, at 6-8. Amicus submits that an automobile search should be analyzed under all of the relevant policy reasons that make automobiles special under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, an additional aspect of automobile searches, the risks associated with searches for drugs, deserves particular attention when consider- ing what standards should govern the conduct of automobile searches. While important for traffic stops generally, the need to think clearly and control the situation is even more important for a traffic stop that escalates to a warrantless search under the automobile exception. So far this Court has only allowed these types of searches when there is probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 15 U. S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam).? The extra dangers associated with the typical contraband search reinforces the officer’s need for clear instructions from this Court. Although the term “contraband” covers any goods which are deemed “unlawful to produce or possess,” see Black’s Law Dictionary 322 (6th ed. 1990), automobile searches will most often involve illegal drugs. The threat posed to society by drugs is considerable. “Possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.’ ” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 668 (1989)). Given the threat posed from the pervasive scourge of illegal drugs, much effort is expended by law enforcement to combat this threat. Preliminary statistics show that drug offenses constituted 36.4% of all felony convictions in U. S. District Courts in 1994 and 22.9% of all state felony convictions in 1994. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1996, pp. 440, 471 (1997). A problem this pervasive stands to be a very common target of automobile searches. Thus the bulk of this Court’s recent automobile search cases have involved drug searches or seizures. See, e.g., Labron, 518 U. S., at 939 (per curiam); Acevedo, 500 U. S., at 567; United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478, 480-481 (1985); Carney, 471 U. S., at 388; United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 800-801 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 755 (1979); Opperman, 428 U. S., at 365-366. 3. The contraband requirement started in Carrolil, which addressed a prohibition- era search for alcohol. See 267 U. S., at 153-154. Although there are sound reasons for having particular concerns about contraband, the impracticality of obtaining a warrant would be similar for other items in an automobile such as a murder weapon. Since this case involves a search for contraband it is unnecessary to determine whether the automobile exception applies to searches supported by probable cause that other evidence of a crime is in the vehicle. However, Carroll’s contraband limitation should not be controlling if such a case ever comes before this Court. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(a), pp. 459-460 (3d ed. 1996). 16 While some searches will turn up items associated with more mundane crimes, see Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 67-68 (1975) (per curiam) (fraudulent checks), other dangerous items can be found during automobile searches. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 44 (1970) (instruments and fruits of armed robbery, namely guns and money). Like automobiles, drugs do sometimes change the calcula- tion of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In upholding the authority of policy to detain an individual leaving a house during the execution of a search warrant for drugs, this Court said: | “Although no special danger is suggested by the evi- dence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-703 (1981). The need for clarity is made even stronger by a real threat of lost evidence. The mobility that justifies suspending the warrant requirement greatly aids in the destruction of success- fully hidden contraband; if an officer fails to open a container out of fear derived from an unclear understanding of the Fourth Amendment law,’ then the lucky perpetrators can easily dispose of the pctentially incriminating contraband far away from the suspecting police. “In short, ‘[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.’ ” 4. Since automobile searches are warrantless, “police officers of course lose the protection that a warrant would provide to them in an action for damages brought by an individual claiming that the search was unconstitutional.” United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 823, n. 32 (1982). Fear of litigation can thus make the threat of deterred searches all too real. nr aren 17 New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 (1979)). B. The Solution. 1. Drawing the proper line. The Fourth Amendment is a particularly fruitful source of interpretive problems. Any legal standard that turns on a concept as liquid as “reasonableness,” see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996), is bound to create a complex body of rules. Since the Fourth Amendment regulates much police conduct, see Belton, supra, 453 U. S., at 458, its scope is necessarily broad, multiplying its many judicial interpretations. Implementing such an important complex legal standard will never be easy. One of the more difficult problems posed by the Fourth Amendment’s interpretative difficulties is determining the proper level of specificity for Fourth Amendment rules. The reasonableness standard at the heart of every Fourth Amend- ment case often argues for a case-by-case approach so that the factual peculiarities of each case may be appreciated. See, ¢.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 506-507 (1983) (plurality). This Court has, however, also understood that some cases call for clear rules that wiil govern a variety of situations. “Respondent argues that, because we have generally eschewed bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context, see, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, [519 U. S. 33 (1996)], we should not here conclude that passengers may constitu- tionally be ordered out of lawfully stopped vehicles. But, that we typically avoid per se rules concerning searches and seizures does not mean that we have always done so; [Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)] itself drew a bright line, and we believe the principles that underlay that decision apply to passengers as well.” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413, n. 1 (1997). 18 This dilemma is not solved by throwing the labels “case-by- case approach” or “bright-line rules” at particular Fourth Amendment issues, but by a careful analysis of what level of specificity will best solve the Fourth Amendment problem brought before the Court. This Court will promulgate clear rules to govern Fourth Amendment question when there is a need to simplify. “Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’ LaFave, ‘Case-By-Case Adjudication’ versus ‘Standardized Procedures’: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142. This is because “ «Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regu- late the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applica- ble by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be “literally impossi- ble of application by the officer in the field.”’ ” Jd. at 141.” Belton, supra, 453 U. S., at 458. The proposed rule rejected by the Robinette Court was the near-antithesis of a proper Fourth Amendment rule. Robinette dealt with a consent search conducted after a valid traffic stop. See 519 U. S., at 35-36. The Ohio Supreme Court struck down the search by establishing “a bright-line prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these circumstances: 19 “*The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Consti- tutions, to be secure in one’s person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase “At this time you legally are free to go” or by words of similar import.’ ” /d. at 36. The impracticality of this standard virtually forced its rejection. This Court had earlier rejected the argument that consent to search was invalid unless the defendant understood his right to decline consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Robinette understood the practicality of that decision. “And just as it ‘would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed require- ment of an effective warning,’ id., at 231, so too would it be unrealistic to police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.” Robinette, supra, 519 U. S., at 39-40 (citation omitted) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at 231). The rule struck down by Robinette did not make an officer’s task simpler. Since it was only a prerequisite to a valid consent, satisfying the proposed rule would not end the inquiry. Instead, a court would still have to determine the voluntariness of the consent “ ‘from all the circumstances... .’” J/d., at 40 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S., at 248-249). This rule thus only served to further complicate the officer’s job, contrary to the purpose behind such rules. Since officers will not ask for consent in a uniform manner, and citizens will not respond with any greater consistency, a fact-specific inquiry is the only reasonable solution. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385 (1997) provides another example of an inappropriate Fourth Amendment rule. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the “knock-and-announce” rule for the execution of all drug-related 20 search warrants created an exception that was both too broad and too difficult to contain. See id., at 392-394. This was due in part to the control the police had over the execution of a search warrant. Officers could at times substantially reduce the physical risk or the risk of the destruction of evidence through proper timing or investigation. See id., at 393. This differs from automobile searches, in which police have little control over when and where the search takes place, and where destruc- tion of evidence poses a constant threat. The Richards Court’s second reason for dismissing the rule, that “the reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others,” see id., at 393-394, does not apply to the present case. Automobiles are clearly treated distinctly under the Fourth Amendment. See Part I, supra. Acevedo demon- strates that containers within them are also to be treated specially. See supra, at 11-12. This different treatment has not and will not bleed into other similar categories. Under the Fourth Amendment, the vehicle stands alone. The rule of Richards is thus inapplicable to the present case. Automobile stops and searches provide several examples of appropriate Fourth Amendment rulemaking. Two of these examples, Belton, supra, and Wilson, supra, have already been discussed in this brief. Belton dealt with a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a vehicle. 453 U. S., at 455. Searches incident to custodial arrests were particularly important because of the need to find any weapons the arrestee may have access to, and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Id., at 457. It was therefore important to this Court to formulate a “workable rule” to govern this situation. See id., at 460. From this followed the rule that all containers in the passenger compartment may be searched pursuant to a valid arrest. Jbid. As noted earlier, Wilson was based on the inherent danger of vehicle stops. See supra, at 6-7. The Wilson Court thus understood that officers must be allowed to control the situa- tion. See 519 U. S., at 414. Extending the bright line of Mimms, supra, see id., at 413, n. 1, allowed officers to preserve that control by freeing them from having to make unnecessarily 21 complex legal calculations concerning their control over the passengers. A particularly important rule for the present case was announced in California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991). Acevedo abandoned the Chadwick-Sanders line of cases for a rule generally allowing containers to be searched inside a car under the automobile exception to the Warrant Clause. See supra, at 11. A major problem with the Chadwick-Sanders rule was its conflict with the Carroil doctrine governing automobile searches. See Acevedo, 500 U. S., at 576. This “discrepancy between the two rules has led to confusion for law enforcement officers.” Jbid. Acevedo recognized “the virtue of providing * “ ‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines ....”° ” /d., at 577 (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146, 151 (1990) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 682 (1988))). When confronted by the confusion wrought by Chadwick and Sanders, the Acevedo Court “conclude[d] that it is better to adopt one clear cut rule to govern automobile searches . . . .” Id., at 579. Carroll searches of containers within automobiles thus are already governed by a bright-line rule. Any rule that governs the present case should preserve Acevedo’s essential clarity. 2. The Rule. Before finding the