# Opposition Brief — Wood v. City Council of Manassas

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_1214%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 525 U.S. 869

## Text

No. 98-47 * Se ee
In The ———__
Suprene Court of the United States
~

October 1997 Term
WILLIAM DOYLE WOOD,
Petitioner,
VS.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANASSAS, VIRGINIA; BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY and THE
MANASSAS REGIONAL AIRPORT ADMINISTRATION
BOARD,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Virginia

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

SHARON E. PANDAK
Prince William County Attorney
ROBERT B. DICKERSON
Assistant County Attorney
GIFFORD R. HAMPSHIRE*
Assistant County Attorney
One County Complex Court
Prince William, Virginia 22192
(703) 792-6620

Attorneys for Respondent
Board of Supervisors of
Prince William County

* Counsel of Record

147712 (800) 274-3321 * (800) 359-6859 AP tlate
ervices, inc.

A DIVISION OF COUNSEL PRESS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Should this Court exercise its discretion to grant a Writ
of Certiorari when the decisions of the Virginia courts rest on
adequate nonfederal grounds and Wood presents no argument
that the decisions of the Virginia courts conflict with the
decisions of this Court, another state court of last resort or a
United States court of appeals?

2. Should this Court exercise its discretion to grant a Writ
of Certiorari concerning Wood’s claim against Prince William
County when his claim was dismissed consistent with the
precedents of this Court?

3. Should this Court exercise its discretion to grant a Writ
of Certiorari when the allegations of Wood’s Complaint
constituted merely preliminary activities that did not amount to
a taking of the property?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
(Questions Prenenwnd 5 i065 is oo sie ee i
Sate OF COMMON Bio ii ae ee ii
‘aes Of Cines oii eh ie ill
POSS OF PRINCE oe isc pod ee I
wien Of ie Cage. a cae Mee ee |
Reasons for Denying the Writ .................... 4
I. Wood's Claim Against The County Was Dismissed
On Independent And Adequate State Grounds.
Ee es Cee ee ey eo ne te 4
II. Wood's Petition Fails To Establish A Basis For
The Exercise Of This Court’s Discretionary
Jurisdiction Pursuant To Rule 10. .......... 4
III. Wood’s Taking Claim Is Premature Because He
Has Not Used Available State Inverse
Condemnation Procedures Nor Sought A Final
Decision Concerning The Applicability Of Local
Ordinances As Required By Williamson Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank. ........ 7
A. Wood Did Not Use Available Inverse
Condemnation Procedures. ............ 7
B. Virginia’s Inverse Condemnation Procedures
Were Adequate And Available To Wood. . 8

aaa ec aeeerrecaae

iii
Contents

Page

C. Wood Did Not Obtain A Final Decision On

The Applicability Of Ordinances To His
NS ei he ca che hbov'ey kaw a ¥ ha tee 8
CN EERE RSID Oe ae aT Oe NISS EE 9

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Cited:

Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ............. 5, 6
Allen .. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) ............. 8
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) ...... 4

County of Chesterfield v. Town & Country Apartments &

Townhouses, 214 Va. 587, 203 S.E. 2d 117 (1974)
eR wae es Le ak wl 6 w cee Ge web Cel dacs ay
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939) ..... 5, 6

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church vy. Los
ee, SU Std ee CAD ED cae 5 av cee sia'e ccs 5

_ Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
SNS ah abe ea cy he ct as ce b'e eee 68 6

Northern Va. Law Sch. v. City of Alexandria, 680 F. Supp.
WU OD 6 oe yack ves'd ck ns vee cues 8

Ee

Contents

Page

Nuckols v. Moore, 234 Va. 478. 362 S.E. 2d 715 (1987)
CY EONAR CE Ln pop 4 hk pele CRMC aCS Lt ee Ce 7

Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n y,
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) ............ 7,8

Statutes Cited:

ee ge Bs Sepupeinrtieg mame uit ye AR Oe
VA Code Ann. Section 8.01-187 .................. 7,8
VA Code Ann. Sections 15.1-550 through 554 ..... 1&4, 8
VA Code Ann. Sections 15.2-1245 through 1248 .... 4

Rule Cited:

Supreme Court Rule 10

l

BASIS OF JURISDICTION

This Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to Section
28 U.S.C. § 1257 because Wood’s failure to present a claim to
the Board was a jurisdictional matter that he has steadfastly
refused to comply with, thereby denying the courts jurisdiction
of his claim pursuant to state law.!

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

William Doyle Wood (“Wood”) filed his Motion for
Judgment, Petition in Inverse Condemnation and for Declaratory
Judgment (“Motion for Judgment’) on approximately June 19,
1997. The Motion for Judgment asserted a monetary claim
against the County. On July 17, 1997 the County mailed a
copy of its Demurrer and Plea in Bar (“Demurrer”) to Wood.
The Demurrer asked the court to dismiss Wood’s suit because
of Wood’s failure to follow the requisite Statutory jurisdictional
procedures for bringing a monetary claim against the Board of
County Supervisors of Prince William County (“County”).

Section 15.1-554 VA Code Ann. provides that no action
Shall be maintained by any person against a county upon any
claim or demand until such person shall have first presented his
claim to the board of supervisors of such county. Moreover,
Virginia case law provides that the claims procedure is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing any monetary claim against
the County in court.”

Instead of complying with those jurisdictional procedures,
Wood brought his case directly to the circuit court which

1. VA Code Ann. Section 15.1-554.

2. County of Chesterfield v. Town & Country Apartments &
Townhouses, 214 Va. 587, 203 S.E. 2d 117 (1974).

2

properly dismissed his Motion for Judgment because the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter pursuant to well established
Virginia law. The Supreme Court of Virginia found no error in
the circuit court’s interpretation of the Virginia statutory and
case law on that issue.

Contrary to Wood’s Statement of the Case, Wood did not
allege takings by conspiracy and physical invasion of his
property. Wood’s Motion for Judgment contained three counts;
specifically inverse condemnation, nuisance and trespass. The
Motion for Judgment did not contain counts for conspiracy
and physical invasion. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia, Wood again asserted that his claim was only in the
three counts of nuisance, trespass and taking by inverse
condemnation.

The Court also should note that the “low level overflights
of [Wood's] abutting property” referenced in Wood’s Statement
of the Case were not alleged in his Motion for Judgment.
Consequently, the circuit court had no such allegations before
it when rendering its decision.

The circuit court dismissed the case against the City of
Manassas (“City”) and the Manassas Regional Airport
Administration Board (“Airport Board”) because the Motion
for Judgment only alleged preliminary activities by the City
and Airport Board that did not constitute a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted The circuit court made no findings
of fact, and considered only those allegations set forth in the
documents before the court.

Although this matter was correctly dismissed as it pertains
to the County because of Wood’s refusal to comply with
Virginia's established procedures for seeking compensation from
counties, the Court also should note that the County’s Demurrer

Sr ae ee

asked that Wood’s Motion for Judgment be dismissed on several
other grounds. The circuit court did not rule expressly on those
arguments, presumably because of Wood’s failure to take the
steps necessary to provide the court with jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, even if the circuit court had not granted the
County’s jurisdictional demurrer, the record clearly indicates
that Wood’s suit would have been dismissed as it pertained to
the County for the same reason that the matter was dismissed as
it concerned the City. Additional factors set forth in the County’s
Demurrer also would have required the circuit court to dismiss
this frivolous suit. Specifically, the County does not own or
control the airport which is the center of this suit’, Wood lacks
standing*, the County has sovereign immunity, and Wood’s suit
is SO vague that it is impossible to comprehend what County
actions allegedly harmed him.

The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that there was
no reversible error by the circuit court after reviewing the record
of the case and considering all arguments concerning the appeal
petition.

3. As acknowledged in Wood’s Motion for Judgment, the City owns
and operates the airport. Further, the undisputed affidavit of the Mayor of
the City of Manassas, which was admitted into evidence by the circuit court,
provides that the County does not own or operate the airport. Rather, through
its ownership of the Airport and its appointment of Airport Board members,
the City controls the operations of the airport. The Airport Board was created
by the City of Manassas as an advisory body, and the members of the Airport
Board are appointed by the City.

4. The property formerly owned by Wood now belongs to another
private property owner, just as it did when Wood filed this suit.

4

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I.

WOOD’S CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY WAS
DISMISSED ON INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE
STATE GROUNDS.

As set forth in Appendix A- 2 of Wood’s Petition, the circuit
court dismissed Wood’s suit against the County for his failure
to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of VA Code Ann.
Sections 15.1-550 through 554.5 This independent and
adequate state law ground for dismissing Wood’s suit against
the County should prevent this Court from disturbing the
judgment of the circuit court. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211
U.S. 45, 53 (1908).

Il.

WOOD’S PETITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH A BASIS
FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS COURT'S
DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO
RULE 10. .

Rule 10 provides that the Court may exercise its discretion
to grant a petition for writ of certiorari if a state court of last
resort has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with another state court of last resort or of a United
States court of appeals. Importantly, Wood cites no authority
that challenges, or conflicts with, the authority of Virginia courts
to dismiss matters when a party refuses to follow jurisdictional
requirements. However, Wood appears to contend that the state

5. Effective October 1, 1997, Sections 15.-550 through 554 were
recodified without substantive change as VA Code Ann. Sections 15.2-1245
through 1248.

MEN aS ae lt AE Bal

court decisions in this case are in conflict with this Court’s
decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). His assertion is without merit.

In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 312, n.6 and 313 (1987), the Court
did not decide the issue of whether any alleged actions would
deny the property owner all use of its property. Instead, the
Court accented the state court assumption that a taking had
occurred a * ocused on the issue of whether compensation
was required for a temporary taking.

Moreover, contrary to the assertions of Wood, neither
Danfor:h v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939) nor Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) were eroded or overruled by
First Lutheran. Instead, while discussing Danforth and Agins,
the Court confirmed that the preliminary activities in each case
did not work a taking even though such activities may have
depreciated the value of property. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987).

In Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939), the
Court found that legislation authorizing the Secretary of War to
initiate condemnation actions was a preliminary act. The Court
found it inappropriate to sanction a taking based on preliminary
activities because until an actual taking occurs, the condemnor
can discontinue or abandon his efforts. Jd. at 284. For example,
the Court also noted that legislation may be modified, or
appropriations may fail. /d. at 286. Moreover, the Court held
that a reduction or increase in the value of the property by
reason of legislation for, or the beginning or completion of, a
project are incidentals of ownership. /d. at 285. Wood has alleged
only similar preliminary activities in his Motion for Judgment
and the Virginia courts properly found that such preliminary
activities do not constitute a taking.

6

In Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Court
confirmed a state court decision sustaining a locality’s demurrer
to a taking claim based upon preliminary activities of the locality.
The Court reaffirmed Danforth and rejected the property
owner's contention that a municipality’s good faith planning
activities, which do not result in successful prosecution of an
eminent domain claim, do not burden property so as to constitute
a taking. /d. 263, n.9. In the pending matter, Wood has merely
alleged preliminary activities undertaken by the City as it studied
various possibilities for the future of the airport. As correctly
determined by the Virginia courts, these preliminary activities
do not constitute a taking. As acknowledged by the Court in
Danforth and Agins, governmental bodies may choose not to
proceed with condemnations and do not have to compensate
landowners just because the government may have contemplated
taking such property.

Finally, this Court’s rulings in Danforth and Agins,
concerning preliminary activities, was not eviscerated by its
ruling in Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 |
(1992). The offending statute in Lucas, on its face, clearly
prohibited virtually all use of the subject property. In contrast,
the actions alleged by Wood are of a preliminary nature that
manifest the City’s careful review of its options.

>

Il.

WOOD’S TAKING CLAIM IS PREMATURE
BECAUSE HE HAS NOT USED AVAILABLE STATE
INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES NOR
SOUGHT A FINAL DECISION CONCERNING THE
APPLICABILITY OF LOCAL ORDINANCES AS
REQUIRED BY WILLIAMSON REGIONAL PLANNING
COMM’N v. HAMILTON BANK.

A. Wood Did Not Use Available Inverse Condemnation
Procedures.

Any taking claim is premature until the claimant shows
that the applicable inverse condemnation procedure is
unavailable or inadequate, and until the claimant has utilized
that procedure. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985). Virginia’s inverse
condemnation procedures were available to Wood as set forth
in VA Code Ann. Section 8.01-187. A jurisdictional prerequisite
to those procedures is contained in VA Code Ann. Sections
15.-550 through 554. These statutes on their face, and as further
confirmed by Virginia case law®, require all claimants to formally
present their monetary claims to the governing body of a county
before granting the courts jurisdiction over such claims. Wood
chose not to comply with that jurisdictional requirement, even
after the County’s Demurrer highlighted the requirement that
he ignored when filing his suit against the County.

6. Nuckols v. Moore, 234 Va. 478, 481-82, 362 S.E. 2d 715, 717 (1987)
(“the language and context of [Sections 15.1-550 through 554] as well as
their arrangement and sequence demonstrates a legislative intent to provide
a comprehensive procedure for the presentation, auditing, challenge, defense,
and judicial review of monetary claims asserted against a county.”); and
County of Chesterfield v. Town & Country Apartments & Townhouses, 214
Va. 587 at 590-591, 203 S.E. 2d 117 at 120 (1974).

8

Wood refused to use the established procedures available
to assert his claim against the County. That refusal does not
open the door to the federal courts, and Wood cannot create a
federal claim by ignoring the available state process. Wood did
not use the available inverse condemnation procedures and,
consequently, his taking claim against the County is premature.

B. Virginia’s Inverse Condemnation Procedures Were
Adequate And Available To Wood.

Assuming arguendo that Wood actually used the available
inverse condemnation procedures, his claim would still be
premature because of an inability to show that Virginia’s inverse
condemnation procedures are inadequate.’ Whether or not a state
inverse condemnation remedy is “adequate” under Williamson
is not determined by whether the landowner ultimately prevails
or even by whether the state court judgment is sound. All that
is required is that the party be afforded the opportunity for a
full and fair hearing in state court. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 101 (1980). The procedures under Sections 15.1-550 ef
seq. and 8.01-187 afforded Wood the opportunity for a full
and fair hearing in state court, but he elected not to follow
those procedures. His refusal to follow those procedures does
not show that those procedures are inadequate.

C. Wood Did Not Obtain A Final Decision On The
Applicability Of Ordinances To His Property.

Until a property owner obtains a final decision regarding
the application of contested ordinances to his property, its claim
is not ripe. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n yv.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). Wood nakedly

7. VA Code Ann. Section 8.01-187 has been held to constitute the
available state remedy for regulatory inverse condemnation claims. Northern
Va. Law Sch. v. City of Alexandria, 680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

9

alleges that he had plans for a mixed-use planned unit
development. However, Wood has not alleged that he was denied
permission to undertake such uses. In his Motion for Judgment,
Wood cryptically stated that the County “incorporated certain
derived information into the County’s policies and land use,
building and zoning of the County”. Wood’s pleadings are not
clear, but if he is alleging that some of these specific land use
and zoning policies of the County are restricting the use of his
property then it is incumbent upon him, or his successor, to
seek a final decision regarding the application of such regulations
to his use of his property. Having failed to seek such a decision,
a claim by him or his successor is not ripe.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

SHARON E. PANDAK

Prince William County Attorney
ROBERT B. DICKERSON
Assistant County Attorney
GIFFORD R. HAMPSHIRE*
Assistant County Attorney

One County Complex Court
Prince William, Virginia 22192
(703) 792-6620

Attorneys for Respondent
Board of Supervisors of
Prince William County

* Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_1214%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.