# Opposition Brief — Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0866%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 543 U.S. 942

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

TR ie SEP 15 2004

LERK

Inu The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

4

AGNES BERNARDO, PAMELA COLIP and
SAUNDRA DUFFY-HAWKINS,

Petitioners,

Vv.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SAN DIEGO
AND RIVERSIDE COUNTIES,

Respondents.

®

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Court Of Appeal Of California,
Fourth Appellate District, Division One

¢

RESPONSE TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+

DARA KLASSEL
Counsel of Record
JAMES E. MCELROY
SHANNON R. NUGENT
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. MCELROY
625 Broadway, Suite 1400
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 232-6686

Counsel for Respondents

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules, Rule 29(6), Re-
spondent Planned Parenthood of San Diego and Riverside
Counties is a not-for-profit corporation that does not have
a parent corporation and is not owned in any part by a
publicly held company. Respondent Planned Parenthood
Federation of America is a not-for-profit corporation that
does not have a parent corporation and is not owned in
any part by a publicly held company.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACK-
CARI FITAD »i:susniecnsninensiolnasianiiceabentensicibenanieries Sete 1
II. BERNARDO FAILS TO STATE ANY COM-
PELLING REASON FOR REVIEW................ 2

A. REVIEW OF THE COURTS’ APPLICA-
TION OF EVIDENCE TO CALIFORNIA
SUBSTANTIVE LAW DOES NOT IM-
PLICATE A FEDERAL QUESTION AND
IS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVIEW.......... 2

B. THERE IS NO IMPORTANT QUESTION
OF FEDERAL LAW THAT NEEDS TO
BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT.............. 3

BER. COCTIWR TEATRO i cess cdeneeniacevinneen eamionaanaawed 9

ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S.
BO, OO BEX, IGIR, 44 1.16. BG TAL ....0.00550050000000005050000 4,7
BE& K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516
eo al antin nialemapihcannsicraeatnesins 4
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.
ee oe dar iheuaeieensanaevantsaieaninnae 5
Bovin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2000).............. eee 7
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)................ 6, 8, 9
Equilon Enterprises LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc.,
29 Cal.4th 53, 52 P.3d 685, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507
os ass pa ccenbenaeintian 4, 5, 6, 7,9
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) ............... 6
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787,
86 L.Bid.2d 384 (1985) ..............scscccsscsresssenresecseeessesesseees 6
Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick, ” F.3d
EI ss ic ai cn china sansliekeatanievusnabanenane 7
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
SRE ay ea AS Ea A eo he Cn ne Oe I 6
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84
AR; FAD, 1 TT Be GS (2G) oacscccesssccccnsssersosccccrescseens 6
Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard,
Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 1157 (1986).................. 5

Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
I so. ss ccachuneinbarecadnnanoccapacassssdsnssnenanaasets 5

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued
Page

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92
ea I IIE sinhe sat enalecieeasinnnlainanioarictincitaedakiehilbanhicienins 4

Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National
Electrical Contractors Assoc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th
_: BRERA RRA Ae CPi ated Ore Rae Suit AONE Nee 5,6

Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 113 S.Ct.

RE Rare ee HE CD iinnnncrcissaniststiasictctninveiesnansavene 5
Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2002)... 7
The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)................. 6
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793. (1987) ......cccccccccccccconscccccscsscsees 7
Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 33

EEA RIED sesinsisasisicaadnstheeindstainientienstewbinbidsnninss 7
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal.4th

Be IE siscinwicsnshadisissonstinsintdiudoansctipieldiitaiabaideiamnbiladiaiakiiassuiletans 5
OTHER AUTHORITIES
California Business and Professions Code section

ERIN Ra ON A REO R CO TN DLE The Oe 1
California Business and Professions Code section

Fe RE nsitsasihizeakasihsihsaisesipninhitiecnatcelelliadibtapleninlsauibeaianaeabiaiilaaiien 1
California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.....passim

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner (Bernardo) brought an action in the Supe-
rior Court of California, in the County of San Diego alleg-
ing violations of California Business and Professions Code
(B & P Code) sections 17200 and 17500 (California’s unfair
competition and false advertising laws) and seeking to
restrain Respondents Planned Parenthood Federation of
America and Planned Parenthood of San Diego and
Riverside Counties (Planned Parenthood) from publishing
their opinion that the credible scientific evidence does not
establish a link between induced abortion and breast
cancer. Bernardo iurther sought an order requiring
Planned Parenthood to communicate Bernardo’s view on
the issue — that the scientific evidence does establish such
a link — to all former and prospective abortion patients.

Planned Parenthood brought a Motion to Strike
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)
under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16
(‘anti-SLAPP statute’). This statute provides in pertinent
part:

A cause of action against a person arising from
any act of that person in furtherance of the per-
son’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution shall be
subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
court determines that the plaintiff has estab-
lished that there is a probability that the plain-
tiff will prevail on the claim. (App. 105a-108a)

The Superior Court granted Planned Parenthood’s
motion dismissing the Bernardo’s Complaint. (App. 84a-
104a) The trial court found that the lawsuit arose from
Planned Parenthood’s exercise of the right to free speech
on a public issue (this was not an issue in dispute) and that
Bernardo failed to present evidence to establish a probability

2

of prevailing on the merits. Pursuant to the anti-SLAPP
statute, Planned Parenthood was awarded its attorneys’
fees and costs.

Bernardo appealed both the order striking her com-
plaint and the order awarding attorneys’ fees. The appel-
late court affirmed the lower court’s orders. Pursuant to
the anti-SLAPP statute, Planned Parenthood was awarded
its fees and costs on appeal. (App. 2a-66a) Bernardo was
denied review by the California Supreme Court. (App. 1a)

II. BERNARDO FAILS TO STATE ANY COMPEL-
LING REASON FOR REVIEW

A. REVIEW OF THE COURTS’ APPLICATION OF
EVIDENCE TO CALIFORNIA SUBSTANTIVE
LAW DOES NOT IMPLICATE A FEDERAL
QUESTION AND IS NOT GROUNDS FOR
REVIEW

Bernardo claims that grounds for review exist because
application of California Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16 to strike her complaint and to award fees and costs
to Planned Parenthood violated her right to petition, Due
Process, and Equal Protection under the U.S. Constitution
and that, as a result, important questions of federal law
were raised which must now be decided by this Court.

However, as is readily apparent in reading the Peti-
tion, her entire argument hinges on the underlying factual
findings by the state courts and their determination that
the evidence, viewed most favorable to her, could not
sustain her claims under California’s substantive law
governing unfair competition and false advertising. In
fact, she devoted much of her petition for review to setting
forth the evidence she contends was improperly interpreted

3

and improperly applied to her claims by the lower courts.
She is in effect arguing that the courts made erroneous
factual findings with regard to the evidence she submitted
in support of her state law claims and that the courts
misapplied section 425.16 to her evidence. However, “a
petition for writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” (Supreme
Court Rules, Rule 10.) Moreover, the criticisms Bernardo
has concerning whether or not the evidence she presented
could support her claims involves no question of federal
law, rather it involves only whether she stated a claim
under California law.

B. THERE IS NO IMPORTANT QUESTION OF
FEDERAL LAW THAT NEEDS TO BE SET-
TLED BY THIS COURT

California’s anti-SLAPP statute is a fee-shifting
statute that provides an automatic award of attorneys’ fees
to a prevailing defendant. The fee award provision does
not come into play until it has already been established
that (1) plaintiff’s complaint arises out of defendant’s
exercise of First Amendment rights, and (2) plaintiff
cannot state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.
(CCP § 425.16(b).)

Bernardo challenges California’s anti-SLAPP statute
on federal constitutional grounds including the right to
petition, the right to Due Process, and the right to Equal
Protection. Her “right to petition” claim asserts that by
imposing a mandatory award of fees on the losing plaintiff,
the anti-SLAPP statute operates to deprive her of her
First Amendment right to petition the court. Her “Due
Process” and “Equal Protection” claims are grounded in

4

her assertion that there is “no meaningful standard for
liability” under the statute, that there is no subjective
intent requirement under the statute, and that the stan-
dard is different for successful plaintiffs and successful
defendants. The same claims have been summarily denied
by the California Supreme Court in Equilon Enterprises
LiC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 52 P.3d 685,
124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 (2002).

The right to petition is not absolute and provides little
or no protection baseless litigation. Equilon, at 64. “Sec-
tion 425.16 does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an
action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or
petitioning.” Id. at 63. “It subjects to potential dismissal
only those causes of action as to which the plaintiff is
unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.”
Id. “It provides an efficient means of dispatching, early on
in a lawsuit, and discouraging, insofar as fees may be
shifted, a plaintiff’s meritless claims.” (citations omitted)
Id. This fulfills the legislative intent behind the statute of
“encouraging continued participation in matters of public
significance” (§ 425.16(a)). (See generally, Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 262, 95 S.Ct. 1612,
1624, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 [explaining that the “circumstances
under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the
range of discretion of the courts in making those awards
are matters for Congress to determine”].)

Moreover, there are numerous federal statutes which
contain similar fee-shifting provisions. See, e.g., Pennsyl-
vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,
478 U.S. 546, 562, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986)
(noting that more than 100 federal statutes provide for
attorneys’ fees. As one federal appelHtate court so aptly
posited, “fee-shifting statutes have become common.”

5

Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National Electrical
Contractors Assoc., 814 F.2d 358, 373 (7th Cir. 1987).
“They require the loser to pay the winner’s fees. Loser-
pays-winner statutes discourage litigation with a low
chance of success.” Jd. “[T]he proposition that the first
amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, prohib-
its or even has anything to say about fee-shifting statutes
in litigation seems too farfetched to require extended
analysis. Fee-shifting requires the party that creates the
costs to bear them.” (citations omitted) Id.

Bernardo relies on several cases to support her asser-
tion that a showing of “frivolousness” is necessary in order
to effect the attorneys’ fees provision of section 425.16
including, BE& K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516
(2002); Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993); Bill Johnson’s
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); Wilson v.
Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal.4th 811 (2002); Oren
Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss &
Karma, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 1157 (1986); and Pacific Gas and
Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal.3d 1118 (1990).
Bernardo confuses the issue. Each of the cases she relies
on involves the imposition of liability (in the form of
asserting a cause of action for damages) against a litigant
who was unsuccessful in a prior proceeding. In contrast,
the fee-shifting provision of section 425.16 does not make a
party “liable” for filing a lawsuit. Equilon, supra, at 62,
citing and distinguishing, Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S.
49, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993). As noted by the
California Supreme Court in Equilon, this Court has held
that a defendant may obtain an attorneys’ fee award where
the plaintiff’s suit is objectively “without foundation,” noting
that a finding of subjective bad faith is not a prerequisite.

6

Id., citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). Again,
fee-shifting statutes simply require the party that creates
the costs to bear them. Premier Electrical Construction
Co., supra, 814 F.2d at 373. None of the cases cited by
Bernardo purport to apply the reasoning therein to the
context of fee-shifting statutes.

Equally without merit is Bernardo’s inappropriate
reliance on cases requiring a plaintiff to meet a higher
evidentiary burden before imposing tort liability against a
defendant for actions involving First Amendment activi-
ties, including free speech (New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964);
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); The
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)), the right to
petition (McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787,
86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985)), and freedom of association
(NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
Bernardo’s flawed analysis ignores the fact that in the
case at bar, she brought a claim against Planned Parent-
hood arising out of Planned Parenthood’s First Amend-
ment activity. Section 425.16 was designed to curtail
baseless litigation that arises out of a defendant’s exercise
of First Amendment activities. In enacting section 425.16,
the California Legislature sought to prevent the use of
meritless litigation as a means to encroach upon or chill a
person’s exercise of First Amendment rights. This is
precisely the evil the above cases sought to address by
imposing a higher evidentiary standard on the plaintiff
whose claim, like Bernardo’s, arises out of defendant’s
exercise of First Amendment rights.

Finally, Bernardo’s Due Process and Equal Protection
claims do not raise any novel federal questions. Once it is

Me

7

determined that an act is in furtherance of protected
expression, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a
“reasonable probability of prevailing” in those claims to
survive dismissal. Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wor-
nick, 263 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Wilcox v.
Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446,
455 (1994). The standard is much like that used to deter-
mine a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, which
mandates dismissal when “no reasonable jury” could find
for the plaintiff. Jd. The standard requires a plaintiff to
present a sufficient legal basis for the claims and to set
forth evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a
claim. Jd.

The fact that recovery of fees is different for plaintiffs
and defendants under the statute does not raise Equal
Protection concerns. Typically, a law will withstand an
equal protection challenge if it bears a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental end. Bovin v. Black, 225
F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2000), citing, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793, 799 (1997). Bernardo as a party-litigant subject to
section 425.16 is not a “suspect class” for purposes of equal
protection. Nor does this fee-shifting statute impermissi-
bly burden the fundamental right of access to the courts.
Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 64; and see, Alyeska Pipeline
Co., supra, 421 U.S. at 262. Federal statutes which cap
prisoner-litigants’ attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases have
similarly been upheld. Bovin, supra, at 42. The Bovin
court noted that prisoners are not a suspect class for
purposes of Equal Protection and determined that the fee
cap on a prisoner’s recovery of attorneys’ fees was ration-
ally related to the legitimate government interests of
discouraging frivolous suits, protecting the public fisc, and
bringing prisoner incentives to litigate more in line with
non-prisoner incentives. Jd. (See also, Riley v. Kurtz, 361

8

F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2002), finding that capping pris-
oner’s recovery of fees is rationally related to reducing the

number of frivolous suits.) Similarly here, section 425.16 is |

designed to discourage unsubstantiated lawsuits that
arise out of a defendant’s exercise of First Amendment
rights of free speech and petition. This purpose provides a
rational basis for the disparity of treatment between the
parties.

Moreover, this Court has already approved the use of
differing standards for recovery of attorneys’ fees in the
context of Title VII cases depending on whether the
prevailing party is a plaintiff or defendant. Christians-
burg, supra, 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. Under
§ 706(k) of Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff will ordinarily
be awarded attorneys’ fees barring special circumstances
justifying an exception. In Christiansburg, this Court held
that prevailing defendants however, would only be entitled
to fees where it can be shown that plaintiff’s action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith. Jd. Differing
standards were found to be justified where the “equitable
considerations” bear differently depending on which party
prevails. Id. 434 U.S. at 419, 98 S.Ct. at 699. Similar to
the Title VII provision at issue in Christiansburg, the
attorneys’ fees provision of section 425.16(c), provides for
mandatory fees to a prevailing defendant, but only allows
fees for a prevailing plaintiff where it is shown that the
defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous or brought
for purposes of delay. (CCP § 425.16(c).) In this way it
shifts to plaintiff the costs defendant incurred having to
extricate himself from a meritless lawsuit adversely
affecting his right to engage in First Amendment activity.
This serves the Legislature’s declared purpose in enacting
the statute to “encourage continued participation in
matters of public significance” and to deter lawsuits which

A eter oe sleainer en ener

9

encroach on a person’s “right of petition or free speech in
connection with a public issue.” This concern is “wholly
absent” in the case of a plaintiff who successfully opposes
an anti-SLAPP motion. Thus, under Christiansburg, there
is no Equal Protection concern.

III. CONCLUSION

There are no compelling reasons which would justify
review of this matter. Bernardo simply disagrees with the
manner in which the state courts interpreted and applied
her evidence to the substantive law in the case. Because
her claims arose out of Planned Parenthood’s protected
First Amendment activity and she was unable to state and
substantiate a legally sufficient claim, she was subject to
the fee-shifting provisions of California Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16(c). The statute has been upheld
as constitutional by the California Supreme Court.
Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 64. Moreover, there is a
plethora of analogous federal fee-shifting statutes which
have similarly passed constitutional muster.

Respondent Planned Parenthood respectfully requests
that this Court deny Bernardo’s Petition for Review.

Respectfully submitted,

DARA KLASSEL
Counsel of Record
JAMES E. MCELROY
SHANNON R. NUGENT
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. MCELROY
625 Broadway, Suite 1400
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 232-6686

Counsel for Respondents

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0866%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
