# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Minnifield v. Louisiana Department of Education (No. 06-1512)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2007

## Text

oO Suprere Court U.d.
061512 APR6 - 2007

NO. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
OCTOBER TERM 2006

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD
PETITIONER

V.
LOUISIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, et al
| RESPONDENTS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE 5™ CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD, PRO SE
302 TANGLEWOOD DRIVE

MONROE, LOUISIANA 71202

(318) 330-9119

“J
°

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Can the State of Louisiana and any of it’
parishes use federal, state, or local provisions to
“ultimately” allow Racial Discrimination in it’s
Public Education System?

2. Can the State of Louisiana and any of it’s
parishes use fraud to “ultimately” allow Racial
Discrimination in Public Education?

LIST OF PARTIES

The petitioner in this case is Ricky Eugene
Minnifield, pro se.

The respondents in this case are:
1. Louisiana State Department of Education.
2. Ouachita Parish School Board

3. West Monroe High School

The respondents were represented by:
1. Louisiana Department of Justice
2. Louisiana Attorney General’s Office

3. Noah, Smith & Johnson, L.L.P.

i}

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....................
INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH..............

Sogo | Se Ae Tere

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONG.................0065 1-2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................
Ultimate Racial Discrimination
in Louisiana
PRINS I cae nin scitecasvaess

Fraud to allow Ultimate
Racial Discrimination in

Louisiana Public Education................ 7-8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......

The decisions below conflicts

with decisions of this Court

allowing Racial Discrimination

in Pablic Education.......................

The importance of the
elimination of Ultimate Racial
Discrimination in Public Education....

ST ss iaieconvawens tecxaSicrnswaleeess
APPENDIX with-

ee Oe I on iain cas widacdbecccveccdscces

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Anderson v. Martin,

cs his ceensesy Wedsstvbenwes 5,12
Brown v. Board of Educ.
Of Topeka Kan,
EE EO crecckcsekiasccsivesonvcnesd 6, 12-13
Coddington v. Pensacola
& G. R. Co.
Ee EE I suc ck avs caccarnecesneunes 7, 13-14
Hanger v. Abbott,
MNES bai chsh exci seicdccsnasdennbenn $43
Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
I aii ca cass sands ves eoasbe hanes ye
McLaughlin v. State of Fla.,
BP IR a icin gk kk os 0 0aGessicatenviues 8, 12
Monroe v. Board of Com’ers
of City of Jackson, Tenn.
EN gcc ak ieauusssanchassaduaine 3,12
Norwood v. Harrison,
WE NN Shak i sekcdcciswersctesaitess 3-4, 12

Order of Railroad Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency,

UE Sai si ha i seks cave su evncdevactes 5,13
Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co.
v. Howard,
a sh aise Cannnaasdeandvet<aisens 7,8, 13

Regents of University
of California v. Bakke,

Se Rr ere pee Neb
Rindge Co. v.
Los Angles County,

BN A PIs hs cnknkeeiksdndasahackaseaae 4,13
U.S. v. State of La,
PN Bs os ibits cays kscealiivasssetaaieeue 6, 12

Federal Statues
Pe ies WE EES o kv bins ccessscaccastarsbeensac 1
United States Constitution

Thirteenth Amendment .....................0c000: 1,2
Fourteenth Amendment .......................006. 1,2

INTRODUCTION

This petition for a writ of certiorari seeks this -
Court’s review of the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The issue, a
nationally important matter, relates to racial
discrimination in public education and constitutional
limitations on the power of the states that
“ultimately” allow Racial Discrimination in Public
Education.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and judgment of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
district court appears in the appendix pages 15-16,
but it was not published. The judgment of the district
court appears in the appendix page 17-18. The issue
of racial discrimination in public education was never
addressed by the court below. The courts below
affirms provisions such as lack of standing, mooted
upon graduation and time barred, that are invalid and
unconstitutional. They allow ultimate racial
discrimination in public education. This is an
injustice to this Court’s authority and African
Americans, indeed.

JURISDICTION

This case was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana December 5,
2005. The judgment of the District Court was
entered on June 23, 2006. The judgment of the 5™
Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on February 15,
2007. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS

The judgment of the United States Courts of
Appeals was entered on February 15, 2007. All
provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or
permitting racial discrimination in public education
must yield to principle that such discrimination is
unconstitutional; also, no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws; see U.S.C.A. Const.

Amend 14. One purpose of the 13" amendment to
the Federal Constitution was to raise the colored race
from the conditions of inferiority and servitude into
perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons
within the jurisdiction of the states. Louisiana denies
petitioner’s rights to individual dignity and freedom
from racial discrimination in public education. “No
law shall discriminate against a person because of
race...”; see Article I Section 3 Constitution of the
State of Louisiana. “In access to public areas,
accommodations, and facilities, every person shall be
free from discrimination based on race,.., or national
ancestry”; see Article I Section 12 Constitution of the
State of Louisiana. Louisiana has provisions for
equal protection and against racial discrimination, but
they remain dormant as they are not enforced in this
case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
violations of the 13" and 14" amendments to the U.S.
Constitution and 28 U.S.C. sec. 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.
CAN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND ANY OF
ITS PARISHES USE FEDERAL, STATE, OR
LOCAL PROVISIONS TO ULTIMATELY
ALLOW RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION?

This case seeks the removal of the
confederate rebels and battle flag from West Monroe
High School as mascot. What valid reason does
public education have for honoring the confederacy?
They made slaves of African Americans! The
confederacy has a long undeniable history of racial
discrimination toward African Americans due to their
slavery ancestry. “School board has affirmative duty

to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert
to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch”; see Monroe v.
Board of Com’rs of City of Jackson, Tenn., 88 S.CT
1700, 391 U.S. 450, 20 L.Ed.2d 733, conformed to
427 F.2d 1005. As an African American, nothing is
more “root” to racial discrimination than the
confederacy imposing slavery on my ancestors.
Likewise, nothing is more “branch” to racial
discrimination than the continued perpetuation of
confederate principles, and the likes of Jim Crow and
the Klu Klux Klan. Still, Louisiana allows it parishes
and cities to honor the confederacy in public
education. In turn, this waters and fertilizes racial
discrimination assuring its growth. It appears
Louisiana thinks the confederacy has a good name to
be cherished and uses public education to help
preserve it. Or maybe Louisiana thinks it’s
affirmative duty is to take whatever steps necessary
to preserve the perpetuation and emulation of
confederate principles in public education? “Racial
discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by
the Constitution, and a state may not induce,
encourage or promote private persons to accomplish
what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish”;
see Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 413 U.S.
455, 37 L.Ed2d 723, on remand 382 F.Supp. 921,
opinion supplemented 410 F.Supp. 133, appeal
dismissed 563 F.2d 722. Respondents counsel claim
West Monroe High School has had no official
connection with the confederacy or its symbols since
1990. However, every year they continue to allow its
use even during the 2006-2007 school year, some 16
or 17 years later. The rebel as mascot, the onfederate
rebel head on the school hallway floor, and West
Monroe High Schoo!l’s confederate history continue
to induce, encourage, and promote the confederate

rebel. This is nothing more than systematic racial
discrimination ultimately. “Preferring members of
any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic
origin is discrimination for its own sake and is
forbidden by the Constitution.(Per Mr. Justice Powell
with the Chief Justice and three Justices concurring
in the judgment in part; see Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 438 U.S. 265, 57
L.Ed.2d 750. The preference of the confederacy is
white racist only. This insures continued racial
discrimination against African Americans because of
slave ancestry. The confederacy has a long
undeniable history of racial violence and
discrimination toward African Americans. The
honoring of the confederacy only undermines and
stifles the removal of racial discrimination from
public education. Provisions such as lack of
standing, mootness upon graduation, and time barred
which permit the honoring of the confederacy in
public education are invalid and unconstitutional.

Lack of standing and Mootness

“A litigant can question a statue’s validity
only when so far as it is being or about to be applied
to his disadvantage”; see Rindge Co. v. Los Angles
County, 43 S.Ct. 689, 262 U.S. 700, 67 L.Ed. 1186.
Lack of standing and mootness upon graduation are
statues being applied to petitioner’s disadvantage.
These statues allow racial discrimination in public
education. This causes chronic real, absolute, private
and public injury to my person and personal rights
and those of other African Americans. These injuries
can be redressed by the removal of the confederate
rebel mascot at West Monroe High School. A more
appropriate mascot would not be connected to a hate
group like the confederacy that perpetuates racial

discrimination. This would help heal injuries to my
honor and dignity caused by the confederacy. Injury
to my civil and private rights and rights for being a
member of society can begin the healing process.
The confederacy in public education causes breeches
and violations of established rights for African
Americans against racial discrimination.

Time Barred

“A state statue of limitations cannot destroy a
claim because the period of actual contest over it in a
federal tribunal extends beyond the limitation
period”; see Order of Railroad Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, 64 S.Ct. 582, 321 U.S.
342, 88 L.Ed 788. If this Court and the courts below
are federal tribunals, then time barred should not
be allowed to deny this case. This case is about the
elimination of racial discrimination in public
education which has no limitation period that expires.
“Exceptions in statues of limitations are framed to
prevent injustice ...”; see Hangar v. Abbott, 73 U.S.
532, 6 Wall. 532, L.Ed 788. Louisiana alleges
making an exception to time barred provisions to
eliminate the confederacy in public education is
inappropriate and invalid reasoning. It must be an
injustice to the state of Louisiana to eliminate the
confederacy from public education? U.S. Rep. Steve
Cohen is urging House members to vote for a bill he
introduced to apologize for slavery and Jim Crow
discrimination.

Lack of Standing, Mootness, and Time Barred

“That statue promotes ultimate racial discrimination
is sufficient to make it invalid”; see Anderson v.
Martin, 84 S.Ct. 454, 375 U.S. 399, 11 L.Ed.2d 430.

Louisiana permits the use of lack of standing,
mootness on graduation and time barred to allow the
confederacy in public education. Given the
undeniable history of the confederacy for racial
discrimination, these provisions are nothing but
systematic ultimate racial discrimination. “All
provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or
permitting racial discrimination in public education
must yield to principle that such discrimination is
unconstitutional”; see U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14
and Brown v. Board of Educ. Of Topeka, Kan., 75
S.Ct. 753, 349 U.S. 294, 57 0.0. 253, 71 Ohio Law
Abs. 584, 99 L.Ed. 1083, on remand 139 F.Supp.
468. Louisiana statues and provisions permit the
confederacy in public education instead of allowing
them to yield and eliminating racial discrimination.
This is ultimate racial discrimination and
unconstitutional. ‘Louisiana interposition statues
which asserted that Supreme Court decisions in
school segregation cases was usurpation of state
power, and which purported to interpose state
sovereignty were invalid”; see U.S. v. State of La., 81
S.Ct. 260, 364 U.S. 500, 5 .Ed.2d 245. Louisiana
interposes state provisions over Supreme Court
decisions and this permits racial discrimination in
public education which is unconstitutional. Jf
petitioner were a student at West Monroe High
School during a current school year, ‘lack of
standing, mootness upon graduation, and time barred
would not apply. Would honoring the confederacy as

mascots and school names be racial discrimination in
public education then? If yes, then respondents are
guilty of ultimate racial discrimination in public
education which make Louisiana provisions invalid
and unconstitutional.

2.
CAN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND ANY OF
ITS PARISHES USE FRAUD TO ULTIMATELY
ALLOW RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION?

Louisiana wants this Court to believe the
petitioner and other African Americans have always
known the confederacy could be removed from
public education. This is a misrepresentation by the
state of Louisiana. Also, this is an attempt to mislead
African Americans to rely on false statues and false
provisions that consent to the confederacy in public
education which is nothing but fraud! Petitioner
never knew a claim could be filed to eliminate the
racially discriminatory confederacy while attending
West Monroe High School as the Mag. Judge Hayes
alleges. Petitioner first learned that racial
discrimination in public education was
unconstitutional when he purchased the Supreme
Court Digest in 2005! U.S.N.Y. 1946, “Where a
plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in
ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence
or care on his part, the bar of statue of limitations
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered,
though there may be no special circumstances or
efforts on part of party committing fraud to conceal it
from other party”; see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392. U.S.Fla. 1880, “In action for relief on
ground of fraud, the cause of action is not deemed to
have accrued until the discovery by the aggneved
party of the facts constituting the fraud’’; see
Coddington v. Pensacola & G. R. Co., 103 U.S. 409.
‘“‘Where party asserts what he knows is false or does
not no to be true to another’s loss and his own gain,
he is guilty of fraud”; see Philadelphia, W. & B.R.
Co. v. Howard, 54 U.S. 307, 13 How. 307, 14 L.Ed.

157. When African Americans rely on false state
provisions, this permits racial discrimination in
public education. The state and confederacy make a
gain while the African Americans take a loss, again
fraud!

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

l.
THE DECISIONS BELOW CONFLICTS WITH
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT BY ALLOWING
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION.

This Court’s opinions and the U.S.
Constitution are the law of the land. Louisiana
denies obligations to this Court and the U.S.
Constitution and permits ultimate racial
discrimination in public education. This Court
should give notice to Louisiana and other states, this
Court and the U.S. Constitution are to be respected
and obeyed, and that racial discrimination in public
education is unconstitutional. These are appropriate
reasons to grant this wnt and reverse the decisions
below. What valid interest does the confederacy
in public education as mascots and school names
have in relation to the elimination of racial
discrimination in public education? No state should
have the power to allow the honoring of the
confederacy in public education as mascots or school
name. This fosters ultimate racial discrimination and
is very inappropriate. U.S. Fla. 1964, “Central
purpose of equal protection clause was to eliminate
racial discriminating emanating from official sources
in the States”, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; see
McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184.

2.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ELIMINATION OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION.

The elimination of the honoring of the
confederacy as school names and mascots in public
education benefits society as a whole. Its elimination
decreases areas that promote racial discrimination
and moves forward the goal of public education
without racial discrimination. Furthermore, the
confederacy’s elimination decreases the amount of
people exposed to the ideology of a confederate good
name, with confederate principles that are to be
cherished and perpetuated. Additionally, it would
decrease racial discrimination overall. This gives
children, parents and alumni a better foundation for
racial respect and equality inside and outside of
classrooms. These are valid and appropriate reasons
to grant this writ and reverse the decisions below.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted and resolved by a summarily reversal of the
opinions below. This would send a stern message to
Louisiana and other southern states that ultimate
racial discrimination will no longer be tolerated in
public education. The elimination of the honoring of
the confederacy as school names and mascots from
public education will send this message. It will also
honor the “Union Soldiers” correcting that injustice
and restoring them as the true heroes of the Civil
War. West Monroe High School should not be
allowed to honor the Confederate Rebels and their
confederate flag. No public school should be allowed
to honor the confederacy as school mascots and

names, as there is no valid reason. To honor the
confederacy in public education is the same as
honoring the Klu klux Klan and Jim Crow. Itis a
designed, systematic practice in “ultimate racial
discrimination”. This injures constitutional nghts
guaranteed to the individual and established as
personal rights. Has the elimination of ultimate racial
discrimination in public education, as well as society,
become a frivolous, unreasonable, groundless issue in
the federal court sysitem?

Respectfully submitted,

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD
Pro Se

302 Tanglewood Drive

Monroe, Louisiana 71202

(318) 330-9119

10

APPENDIX: TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUPREME COURT DIGEST

EAA 10 A SEBD GADRIICE vncsnssvsanisnsoncess 12-14
DU ESV Ee CADRERING PARC UTRGEIES since ccvsisscvnsweciespans 14
APPEALS COURT OPINION
FINED Taga Eo sSieiass cba cacesssaccnens iin 15-16
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT .............. 17-18

MAGISTRATE JUDGE R@&R .................. 19-30

1]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DIGEST: VERBATIM QUOTES ©

Preferring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic origin is
discrimination for its own sake and is forbidden by
the Constitution. (Per Mr. Justice Powell with the
Chief Justice and three Justices concurring in the
judgment in part.) Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.

U.S. Miss. 1973. Racial discrimination in
state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution,
and a state may not induce, encourage, or promote
private persons to accomplish what it is
constitutionally forbidden to accomplish. Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455.

U.S. La. 1960. Louisiana interposition statues
which asserted that Supreme Court decisions in
school segregation cases was usurpation of state
power, and which purported to interpose state
sovereignty were invalid. U.S. v. State of La. 364
U.S. 500.

U.S.Fla. 1964. Central purpose of equal
protection clause was to eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources in the
States. Mclaughlin v. State of Fla. 379 U.S. 184.

U.S.La. 1964. That statue promotes ultimate
racial discrimination is sufficient to make it invalid.
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399.

School Board has affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would
be eliminated root and branch. Monroe v. Board of
Com’rs of City of Jackson, Tenn., 391 U.S. 450.

U.S. Dist.Col. 1955. All provisions of
federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting
racial discrimination in public education must yield

12

to principle that such discrimination is
unconstitutional. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S.
294,

U.S.La. 1939. Equal protection to all is basic
principle upon which rests justice under the law.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend 14. Pierre v. State of La.,
306 U.S. 354.

U.S.Md. 1851. Where party asserts what he
knows is false or does not know to be true, to
another’s loss and his own gain, he is guilty of fraud.
Philadelphia, W & B.R. Co. v. Howard, 54 U.S. 307.

U.S. Cal. 1923. A litigant can question a
statue’s validity only when and so far as it is being or
is about to be applied to his disadvantage. Rindge v.
Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700.

U.S.Ga. 1944. A state statue of limitations
cannot destroy a claim because the period of actual
contest over it in a federal tribunal extends beyond
the limitation period. Order of Railroad Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342.

U.S.N.Y. 1946. Where a plaintiff has been
injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his
own part, the bar of statue of limitations does not
begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though
there may be no special circumstances or efforts on
part of party committing fraud to conceal from other
party”, see Holmberg v. Armbreecht, 327 U.S. 392.

U.SArk. 1867. Exceptions in statues of
limitations are framed to prevent injustice and never
to encourage laches or to promote negligence.
Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S 532.

U.S.Fla. 1880. In an action for relief on
ground of fraud, the cause of action is not deemed to
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved

13

party of the facts constituting the fraud, see
Coddington v. Pensacola & G. R. Co., 103 U.S. 409.

U.S.Va. 1879. One purpose of the 13™ and
14" amendments to the federal constitution,
U.S.C.A., was io raise the colored race from the
condition of inferiority and servitude into perfect
equality of civil rights with all other persons within
the jurisdiction of the states. Ex parte Common
wealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339.

U.S.lowa 1969. Right to recover damages
sustained through breach of duty sprang from
principle of common law and was left to be enforced
accordingly. Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I. C. Ry. Co.,
395 US. 164.

STEVE COHEN ARTICLE
White congressman urges slavery apology:
Memphis, Tenn—U.S. Rep. Steve Cohen is urging
House members to vote for a bill he has introduced to
apologize for slavery and Jim Crow discrimination.
Cohen commended the Virginia General Assembly
which voted unanimously on Saturday to express
“profound regret” for the state’s role in slavery.
Sponsors of the Virginia resolution say they know of
no other state that has apologized for slavery.(2007).

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30738
Summary Calendar

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;

SCHOOL BOARD OF OUACHITA PARISH;

WEST MONROE HIGH SCHOOL,
Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:05-CV-02074

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Pro se Plaintiff Ricky Minnifield alleges that
the West Monroe High School mascot, a confederate
rebel, manifests state-sponsored discrimination in
violation of both the Louisiana and United States
Constitution. Citing these same constitutional
provisions, Minnifield also complains that during his
years at West Monroe High, the school used the
confederate battle flag on its yearbook, on its
cheerleader uniforms, and on the school building
itself. In the early 1990s, the school stopped all
officially sanctioned use of the flag, though the rebel

15

mascot remains. The plaintiff seeks compensatory
and punitive damages totaling $22 million and
injunctive relief.

Plaintiff graduated from West Monroe High
in 1975, and he has no children attending the school.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of
standing his claim for injunctive relief. That claim
was mooted upon graduation. See Doe v. Marshall
622 F.2d 118, 119 (5" Cir. 1980) ; Newdow v.
United States Congress, Elk Grove Unified Schoo!
District, et al, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). Likewise, the
district court properly dismissed as time-barred
plaintiff's claim for damages under section 1983.
See Jacobsen v. Osbome, 133 F.3d 315 , 319 (5 Cir
1998); Peter Henderson v. City of Port Arthur, 806
F.2d 1273, 1275 (5" Cir. 1987). Such claims accrue
when the plaintiff has reason to know of the
actionable injury. See Kline v. North Texas State
University, 782 F.2d 1229 (5" Cir. 1986).

AFFIRMED

Pursuant to 5" Cir. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5" Cir. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD
CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2074

VS.
JUDGE JAMES

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

EDUCATION, ET AL
JUDGMENT

The Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge [Doc. No. 30] having been
considered, together with the written objections
thereto filed with this Court, and, after a de novo
review of the record, finding that the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation is correct and
that judgment as recommended therein is warranted,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that School Board’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. #24) be GRANTED, and his matter
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the School
Board for mootness, lack of standing, and for failure
to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED, taking cognizance of this court’s
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining
claims, that the remaining claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety for lack of
standing.

17

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the School
Board be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this _23_ day
of __ June _, 2006, in Monroe, Louisiana.

/s/

ROBERT G. JAMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |

18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

RICKY EUGENE MINNIFIELD
CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2074
VS
JUDGE JAMES

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, ET AL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on
reference from the District Court, is a Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. #24) filed by defendant,
School Board of Ouachita Parish (“School Board’’).
Pro se plaintiff, Ricky Eugene Minnifield
(“Minnifield”’) has not filed an opposition to the
motion. For the reasons stated below, it is
recommended that the School Board’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. # 24) be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against the Louisiana
Department of Education, Ouachita Parish School
Board and West Monroe High School alleging that
the Defendants’ use of the confederate rebels mascot
is racial discrimination and unconstitutional in public
education and state-operated schools. Plaintiff claims
that Defendants’ “have and continue to induce,
encourage, and promote racial discrimination by
allowing West Monroe High School to have the

19

Confederate rebels mascot”. Plaintiff claims that he
has experienced humiliation, emotional distress, and
mental anguish as well as “continued feelings of
disappointment, emotional deterioration and rupture”
“due to public education’s promotion of the
glorification of slavery”. Minnifield seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
$22,000,000.00 in compensatory and punitive
damages.

The School Board has filed the current
Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The School Board also
seeks recovery of attorney fees and costs.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)

‘A case is properly dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case”. Home builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of
Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5" Cir. 1998 (quoting
Nowak v. Ironworkers local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d
1182, 1187 (2™ Cir. 1996). The party seeking to
invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
demonstrating its existence. See Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5" Cir.2001), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 960 (2002); Howery v. Allstate ins. Co.,
243 F.3d 912, 916 (5" Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 993 (2001). In fact, “there is a presumption
against subject matter jurisdiction that must be
rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal
court”. Coury v. Prot., 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5" Cir.

20

1996) (citing Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742
F.2d 888, 889 (5" Cir. 1984)).

“Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under
Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1) come in two forms: ‘facial
attacks’ and ‘factual attacks’”. Garcia v.
Copenhaver, Bell & Assics., M.D.’s P.A., 104 F.3d
1256, 1260-1 (11" Cir. 1997) (citing Lawerence v.
Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-9 (11"™ Cir. 1990); see
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5" Cir.
1981). Facial attacks on the complaint “require the
court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged a basis of subject mater
jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are
taken as true for purposes of the motion”.
Lawenence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (5" Cir.
1990) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,
613 F.2d 507, 511(5™ Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3™ Cir. 1977).
“Factual attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge ‘the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact,
irrespective of the pleading, and matters outside the
pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are
considered”. Id.

Mootness

The School Board first argues that the claims
against it are moot because Minnifield graduated
from West Monroe High School in 1975 and has no
children attending West Monroe High School.
““Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, ... our impotence to review
moot cases derives from the requirement of Article
III of the Constitution under which the exercises of
judicial power depends upon the existence of a case

21

or controversy”. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.
244, 246, (U.S. 1971) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

The School Board argues that a case is moot
when a plaintiff complains of certain activities at a
school and subsequently graduates from that school.
However, the cases presented by the School Board in
support of this contention sought only injunctive
relief, not damages. See Doe v. Madison School
District No 321, 177 F.3d 789, 797 (9" Cir. 1999)
(“the student-plaintiff graduated. ... Because we
cannot remedy the student plaintiff's injury with
injunctive or declaratory relief, the student-plaintiff’s
claim for those forms of relief are moot”’.)

Minnifield is seeking declaratory or injunctive
relief. The School Board correctly argues that since
Minnifield graduated from West Monroe High
School over thirty years ago, and has no children
attending West Monroe High School, his claims for
declaratory or injunctive relief are moot. However,
Minnifield is also seeking compensatory and punitive
damages; therefore, the mootness doctrine does not
apply to those claims, and further analysis is
required.

Standing

The School Board also argues that
Minnifield’s claims should be dismissed because he
lacks standing. “The doctrine of standing is
distinguishable from that of mootness. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged mootness as the doctrine of
standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal
interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation (standing) must continue throughout its
existence (mootness)”. Pederson v. Louisiana State

22

University, 213 F.3d 858, 869 (5"" Cir.2000).
(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Article III of the United States Constitution
requires that a litigant have standing to invoke the
power of a federal court. “To demonstrate standing,
the plaintiff must show an injury in fact, a
requirement assuring that the court will not pass upon
... abstract, intellectual problems, but will adjudicate
concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries. The
injury alleged must be actual or imminent and not
abstract, conjectural, or hypothetical”. Dov v.
Beaumont Independent School Dist., 240 F.3d 462,
466 (5"" Cir. 2001) quoting Federal Election Com’n
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141
L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, “[tjo have standing a plaintiff must
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to
be redressed by the requested relief”. (emphasis
added) National Park Hospitality Ass’n v.
Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 815, 123 S.Ct.
2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556
(1984). Finally, the United States Supreme Court has
developed prudential limitations on standing,
including a requirement that a litigant generally must
assert his or her own legal nights and interest and
cannot rest a claim to relief in the legal nghts or
interest of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
Ward v. Santa Fe Independent School Dist., 393 F.3d
599, 606 (5" Cir. 2004).

To have standing, Minnifield must first show

that he suffered a injury in fact. There must be a
‘personal stake in the outcome’ such as to ‘assure that

23

i rt eS | gt

concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions’. ...
Abstract injury is not enough. Jt must be alleged that
the plaintiff ‘has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result
of the challenged statue or official conduct. The
injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and
immediate’, ‘not conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’.
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-494 (U.S.
1974).

Minnifield alleges that he continues to
experience humiliation, emotional distress, and
mental anguish due to public education’s promotion
of the glorification of slavery. The defendants
continue to act in a conscious disregard for [his]
rights. ... The Confederate Rebels continue to
oppress [his] rights. ... defendants ... attempt to
induce [him] to give up his legal rights to be free
from discrimination ... {and he] has suffered
continued feelings of disappointment and emotional
deterioration and rupture due to public education’s
promotion of the glorification of slavery. Complaint
(Doc. # 1 pg. 4 — para. 6).

Minnifield’s claims of injury are conjectural
statements unsupported by any factual allegations.
Minnifield argues that the rebel mascot offends him;
however, in order to have standing, Minnifield must
present some factual basis, not just conclusory
statements, to support a claim that he has actually
been injured by West Monroe High School’s use of
the rebel mascot. Indeed, it appears unlikely
that any individual could present facts to support a
claim of actual injury as the result of a school’s
choice of mascot.

24

Plaintiff has failed to show that he has
suffered an injury in fact and he therefore lacks
standing to bring these claims. Since Minnifield
lacks standing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the
School Board’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 24) be
GRANTED, and the matter DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE as to the School Board. Furthermore,
in as much as this court has the duty to raise the
question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte
under Rule 12(b)(1). See Bndgmon v. Array
Systems Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 575 (5"" Cir. 2003). IT
IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Minnifield’s
claims be dismissed as to All defendants because
Minnifield lacks standing and consequently, this
court has no subject matter jurisdiction.

Prescription

In the alternative, the School Board contends
that Minnifield’s complaint fails to state a claim and
must be dismissed because it is time-barred. The
School Board has filed this argument as a Motion to
Dismiss; however, since the School Board is relying
on documentation outside the pleadings, the Court
will construe the motion as a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary Judgment is appropriate when the
evidence before the Court shows that no genuine
issue as to any material fact exists and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. F.R.C.P. Rule 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine”
under this standard if the non-moving party has
presented sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury

a

could return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)

The moving party bears the initial burden in
summary judgment and must demonstrate through
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, and/or affidavits that no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has
successfully demonstrated the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to show the opposite. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). In doing so, the non-moving party may not
merely rely on the allegations, and conclusions
contained within the pleadings; rather, he “must go
beyond the pleading and designate specific facts in
the record showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial”. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042,
1047 (5™ Cir. 1996). Furthermore, these specific
facts must be shown through something more than
“some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by
conclusory unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere
scintilla of evidence”. Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5 Cir. 1994). Ultimately,
however, the court must resolve all doubts against the
moving party and draw any reasonable inferences
raised by the evidence in favor of the non-moving
party. See Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys.,
321 F.3d 503, 507 (5 Cir. 1999).

Minnifield contends that the “defendants have
and continue to induce, encourage, and promote
Racial Discnmination by allowing West Monroe
High School to have the Confederate rebels mascot”.
Complaint (Doc. #1 pg. 2-para. 2). In addition to
monetary damages, Minnifield requests that West
Monroe High School change its mascot prior to the

26

2006-2007 school year ,and to “remove any
Confederate connected mascots or school named for
the confederacy from the Louisiana public education
system prior to the 2006-2007 school year”.
Complaint (Doc. #1 pg. 5-para. 8).

Minnifield’s Complaint alleges that this Court
has jurisdiction over this action “pursuant to the 14"
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which prohibits Racial Discrimination in Public
Education as a fundamental right”. Complaint (Doc.
#1 pg.l-para. 1). Pro se complaints are to be liberally
construed. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5"
Cir. 1993). Therefore, it is assumed that Minnifield
intended to pursue is claims under 42 U.S.C.A. sec.
1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: Every
person who, under color of any statue, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceedings for redress. 42 U.S.C.A.
sec. 1983.

The statue of limitations to be applied in sec.
1983 cases is the state statue of limitations governing
actions for personal injury in the forum state. Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-280 (1985). Therefore,
pursuant to Louisiana’s law governing personal
injury actions, a one-year statue of limitations
governs sec. 1983 claims. Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133
F.3d 315, 319 (5" Cir. 1998). Section 1983 actions
accrue when the injured party knows or has reason to
know of the injury which forms the basis for the

27

action”. Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port
Arthur, Tex., 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5" Cir. 1987).

Minnifield testified in his deposition that he
was born on January 17, 1957 (Depo. pg. 11) and that
he attended West Monroe High School from 1972-
1975 (Depo. pg. 22). Minnifield stated that he
graduated from West Monroe High School on his 18"
birthday January 17, 1975. (Depo. pg. 52 and 104).
Throughout his deposition, Minnifield discussed the
disdain he felt as a student for the rebel mascot and
what he perceived to be offensive symbolism. (Depo.
pg. 79-83). Minnifield did not file a formal
complaint about the school’s mascot while he was a
student, (Depo. pg. 92) and did not complain to the
school superintendent or a school board member until
recently. ( Depo. pg. 93-102).

Minnifield graduated from West Monroe
High School more than 31 years ago, and according
to his own testimony, knew or had reason to know of
his claims well before his graduation. Since the one-
year statue of limitations to bring sec. 1983 claims
has clearly passed, IT IS RECOMMENDED IN THE
ALTERNATIVE that the School Board’s Motion for
Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Minnifield’s
complaint be dismissed as time-barred.

Attorney’s Fees

The School Board has requested attorney’s
fees. Under 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 1983, the district court
may, in its discretion, award attomey’s and costs to
the prevailing party in sec. 1983 litigation. See 42
U.S.C.A. sec. 1983. While such relief is typically
awarded to prevailing plaintiffs, a prevailing
defendant may recover attorney’s fees ‘when a

28

plaintiff's underlying is frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless”. United States v. State of Mississippi,
921 F.2d 604, 609 (5 Cir. 1991), citing
Christiansburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC 434 U.S. 412,
(1978). Not only does Minnifield lack standing and
any factual basis for a claim of injury resulting from
the school’s mascot choice, but the statue of
limitations over any possible claim has long since
expired. Minnifield’s complaint is clearly frivolous.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the
School Board’s Motion for Attorney’s fees be
GRANTED and that it be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. sec.
636(b)(1)(C) and FRCP Rule 72(b), the parties have
ten (10) business days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file specific, written objections
with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to
another party’s objection within ten (10) business
days after being served with a copy thereof. A
courtesy copy of any objection or response or request
for extension of time shall be furnished to the District
Judge at the time of filing. Timely objections will be
considered by the District Judge before he makes a
final ruling.

A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WITHIN TEN
(10) BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS
SERVICE SHALL BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY,
EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR,
FROM ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE
UNOBJECTED — TO PROPOSED FACTUAL

29

am

FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Monroe
Louisiana, this 30™ day of May 2006.

KAREN L. HAYES
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

30

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0467%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.