# Amicus Curiae Brief — Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0422%3A06 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1934 - **Citation:** 290 U.S. 398 ## Text INDEX. ‘Preliminary Statement Summary of Argument " “I. The statute, because of the degree to which and the . Manner in which it subserves the general welfare in a , ' time of emergency, springs from a constitutional exer- cise of the: police power.........:...... ee aes II. Certain matters which the courts judicially notice, _ certain presumptions with which ‘they surround legis-‘= -. lation, and the general attitude which judicial tribunals take toward legisjation, all tend to support the act III. The statute is not repugnant to the contract clause of Section 10 of Article I of the: Constitution of the United, States .... ‘ IV. The statute is not repugnant to’ the due ‘process clause - of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con- stitution of the United States... . ' V. The statute is not-repugnant to the equal protection | ' clause of Section 1 of the. Fourteenth Amendment to the ‘Constitution of the United States eaieagen teal Argument ........... Sinn oennadied oeonsonamccsnelivinent . TABLE OF TEXTS AND DIGESTS. ; Burdjck, The Law of the American Constitution, Section 196........10, 41, 50 . Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution, Section 197........ 10,.41, 50 . Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), Vol. 2, p. 1231............ 22, .103 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), Vol. 2, p. 1232.........2.....7, 41 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), Vol. 2, p. 1234................ 8, 41 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), Vol. 2, p. 1237..16, 17, 76, 77 Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section, 221...................5.sceeeeeees 16, 58, 74 Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 222............ a w.--14, 59, 66 Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 22¢4..................... soak bb eansstabamaieledeccil 61. Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 226 ................ ves Cases Be eee 14, 66 ‘Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const: L., Section 226.............. sc icichiesheblestsisapanoaiied 5S Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 415. :.....................ceceeeeee .:.6, 35, 39 Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 430 ......................... Rae Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 608 .............. ceunuadihs ee Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 417 ........ CSET CETA Ae ED Oe a Corpus Juris, Vol. 12, Const. L., Section 894 .......................-+- icideamianadl 21, 96 Corpus Juris, Vol. 12. Con: . L., Section 962.......... RS Ie 19, 89, 91 ° Corpug Juris, Vol. 23, Evi«., Section 1810............. ica dlaalebseseiid hiuicemsiiapteread 10, 54- Corpus Juris, Vol. 23, Evid., Section 1900............:.......csccecleeeeeeeeeee hd, 55 Corpus Juris, Vol. 23, Evid., Section 1934.................. Ce EE eee 11,57 Corpus Juris, Vol. 23, Evid., Section 1947.........:....2.....cc--cceseseesseeeees -tekh, 56 Dec. Dig., (Third), Const. L., Section 48............. 11, 16, 68, 59, 74, 98 Dec. Dig., (Third), Const. L., Section 70 (8) ....0...0.........-.00 15, 61, 62, 70 Dec. Dig., (Third), Const. L., Section 212...............g.tineeeeeeeeeteeeeeeeee 21, 95 Dec. Dig., (Third), Const. L., Section 253... — 19, 89 New Standard Dictionary, p.1018......................... Sa ceheiinateaniabiaeitaghiaanunenill 4, 26 Ruling Case Law, Vol. 6, Const. L., Section 183. :..........2......-..-....::--1---+- 5, 34 Ruling Case Law, Vol. 6, Const.:L., Section 184................2..-..-.---.11-eee+ 6, 35. - Ruling Case Law, Vol. 6, Const. L., Section 185 ............2...-.-.-eeeeseeeseeees i _ Ruling Case Law, Vol: 6, Const L., Section 188..............4..-.-...-.:0-.--/.----8, 44 . Warren, The Supreme Court in. United States History, Vol. 2, . p. 735 ... OES ER Ce SE | Words & Phrases, Vol. 3, p. 2227.....................--.. cca eieammensiicionianensnonannnitil 94 Words & Phrases, Vol. 3, p, 2232 PRR. SEwenerca aihetilessiaiared 1.94 Words & Phrases, Vol. 3, p. 2243............-....--.---c-ocsesteeseesteceeeeeseeeeees jenni ~~ oe Words. & Phrases, Vol. 3, p.° 2253..........-.......--------cscseceeseeeeeneneneee eeeeees sitciaionne 19 © Words & Phrases (2d ser.), VOl. 2, p. 167...1..............::0c0seeeeeoe0 se 94 Words & Phrases (2d ser.), Voli 2, pe 170....\..........------.------2- sal aiashsalbhanatit 94 Words & Phrases (2d ser.), Val. 2, p. 175 ......2.--.-.-.----------cesescneeeesensenseneeneeeeees 94 Words & Phrases (3d ser.), Vol. 3, p. 68...........------------c-cessessescseseseesestenceneenens 94 Words & Phrases (3d ser.), Vol. 3, p. 67.....2..------.-------+-00--0010: 94 - Words & Phrases (4th ser.), Vol. 1, p: 813........ sieiecactesiialesiigahennabeiteacmenessee 94- . Words & Phrases (4th ser:), Vol. 1, p. 815............... SLE EE AR 94 - : TABLE OF STATUTES. ea Agricultural Adjustment Act; Preamble to Tit. I im a 11 Emergency Rd. Transportation Act, 1933 Sections 1 and 2...:......-.....11, 57 Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933; initial part of act................ 11, 56 -Federal Emergency Relief -Act-of 1933, Section 4 (a).....................--- 11, 56 - National Industrial Recovery Act, of June 16, 1933, Section 1............ 11, 57 - - & ° - : , 4 4 g ‘ 4 oe . ‘ # ii. o* TABLE OF CASES. Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.. S. 672.020.0020... ccccccccsececcececccictectecesececcesctecsect 103 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 S. E. 859............ piiciietiseaticaadll 12, 60 ‘American Coal Mining Co, v. Special Coal & Food Commission, RT Ae SR SEER aes Na a a a 84, 65, 74 w American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 w. YAR Ee aie TR ReMi! 48 Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 4 a. |e aa Gear 61 Arnold &-Murdock Co. v. Industrial Comm ssion, Ett Ti. a pouaate 92 Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. Ve. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548 . ae RE EE Oc... Tee EN, 13, 17, 19, 20, 62, 78, 90,91 Austin v. City of-New York, 258 NE Tie SI bk sidiniteis initiate sanessnlibaonensatienphisaa 46 Aymette v. State, 2 Hum h. (21 — [La a | = i. Bachtel v. Wilson; 204° U. S. 36.. bisa ee Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 312. c...0s.2.00.oci occ ccccccece Secteecleceoeeotes Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Russell — ) 249 N. W. 27. ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 2 icciiadisiibibendencengasisnasteire Barnitz v. Beverly,: 163 U. S. 118. : Barret. v. Rickard, 76 Neb. 769... LTE, i ata 6.3 Blanshard v. City ‘of New Yor | A PRR ANTM VER ce 61 Block. v. Hirsch, 256 2 10, ~18, 18, 18, 20, 43, 63, 85, 57, 62,.67, 71, 74, 88, 90, 91 _. Boston. Beer Co. v. "Massachusetts, 5 4 = See 7, 42, 71,75, 78° Bottdorf v. Lewis, 121 Iowa i’ MaRCeRE ane een ieiceaiiia ge "20, 93 Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16......02..0005...: SE ee eS HiT 48 Béyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 646. cane a isee aaaia alitiiae 71 a es Ta, BN inn neinc ens ncsnesnctensenaznnaneanscorennconsnnd 84 ae Bremen. Mining, etc., Co. v: a, 13 N. “Mex. M11... scutiinbinieeaadl 85 Brine v. Ins. Co., 96 U. | __ a e: E a ve Brinton v. Seevers, 12 fo "389 ssiiaunianaapct aoscdh v. Kinzie; 42 U. S. 311 esdlitdaniiiideinitbiniatactinniitia heshtmenieesionidinssition’ .18, 86 Br ooklyn Church Society v. Brooklyn Free Kindergarten Society, - 152 N. Y. Supp. 41..................... , 26 Brown v. Maryland, 12 ‘Wiest SNCS Re 1, 10, 41, 50, 51 Brushaber v. Union Pac, Rd. Co., ey RSet Rael) Burton v. Emerson, Shields & Co. (iewa),'4 G: Ge. 908.......:.................... 84 Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111.U. S. 746 icninencoatidietinimanate 71, 75 Cange: G. Frome & Mem Sep science Care WV. Welbomiborm, GB Gre. Git is cnc cecctc rected cree! 21, 95° Cawnee viseeeger, BOT Wee Oe 4, 25 Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S.°157............... 102 Chadwick v. Moore (Pa.), 8 Watts & RET EeE: 18, 83 Chamberlain v. City. of Burlington, 19 Iowa 395 4, 25 Chapman v: Boynton, 4 Fed. Supp. 43 19, 89 Charles River Bri v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet: REHAB Metis 5: Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. € 522..67 Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood (Miss.), 114 So. 781......................... , 60 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S: 543..10, 11, * 16, 55, 57, 68, 72, 73 Chicago & Alfon Rd. Co.-v. Tranbargar, 238 5? Tielantsdtealiaadiiiae 8 icago, Burlington & Quincy ‘Rd. v. Chicago, 166 U S 226 AC ne -..92 icago, rm & Quincy v. Drainage Commissioners, de mht Chicago, Ae het & Quincy Rd. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549... Chicago, — & St. Paul -Ry. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, a 0, Citizens’ Ins. Co. y. Hebert, 139 La. 708 2..6, 35 City of Aurora v. oo (Ill.), 149 N. E. 784........ ESE: 8, 15, 44, 71 City of Butte v. Roberts (Mont.), 23 Pac. (2d) 342... 17, 19, 77, 90 City of — Vv. a Home, 289. Til. 206................ 6, 15,36, 69 ‘ $ iv. City of Coral Gables ‘v. Certain Lands (Fla. ), 149 So, OI ois cidiiabircatecl 94 City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 96 hicsrsiioal 4, 9, 48 City of New Orleans v. oar 7 La. 113. ce en - City of Rochester v. West, 51 N. Y. Supp. 482 7, 10, 42,52 bn 4 of/Westport v. Mulhelland, 159 Mo. 86 nina ...17, 10, 42, 51 Collins v. Collins; 79 Ky. 88 oat 85. Commonweatth v. Algers (Mass), Cush. 53 saieeicue Commonwealth v. City of Newport News (Va., 1932), 164 S. E. 689...... 30. Soe veeneee v. Great American Indemnity Co. (Pa.), 167 a :12, 60 Conley v. Barton, 260 U.S. 677 4 eocesee 86 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gia, 108 U; _& eee 86° Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 324 5, 34 Correll v. Hull (Iowa), 4 G. Gr. 456....... ine ; 84 _. Cotter v. Stoeckel, 97 Conn. 244 71 . Crowley v. Christenson, 137'U. S. 86. : ‘ be Sangean Crump v. Guyer, 60 Okla. 222 ry 92 Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U, S. 526. Rivemoe Vaniels v. Teraney, 102 U. S. 415. : 84 .« Des: Moines v, Manhattan Oil Co:, 193 Iowa 1096 ‘onl Douglas v. K¢ nnedy, 168 U. S. “488 : 15 Eckerson v. ‘Moines, 137 Iowa 452 aise lg 11, 59 : Edgar A. Levy - Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 Edworthy v. Iowa Savings & Loan Assn., 114 Iowa 220 20, 93 _ Euclid y. Amblex © >, 272 U. S. 365...... ; ola ——— « and’ Merchan + Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. — Farmers: Go-operative Crean‘ery v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 112 lows 608. 84 Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. _—. 109 Wash. 680 21, 97 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 8 ; 67 Garrison v. City of NewYork, 21 Wall. 196.. 80 Gault’s Appeal, 33 Pa. 9 stesseieeeeedl; 88,84, 95. _ German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 288 U. 8: 380_— ' aa Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 _ ae ae = ilman v. Philadelphia, 3. Wail. 718......: OSE | te dney v. Sydnor, 172 Mo. 318 : aS Graham v. Kingwell.(Cal.) 24 Pac. and 488.. ...6, 19, 34, 89 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 é @.....85 ’’ Gunn v. Berry, 15 Wall. 610.... i anieiidesatiaia - Hadachek-v. Los Angeles, 239 .U..S. 394 ; 67 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., .251 we , 14 ....: 13, 16, 20, 48, ra 13, 92 Harmonson Vv. Wilson, Fed. Cas. No. 80 _ Henderson ge Co. v. Henderson City, 178 U. s. 92 99 . Hollister v. Deabhoe, 11 S. Dak. 197 ; sad Hooker v. Burr, 194 U.S. 415. aac rea Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U: S. 461: " ; acini” Hoyt Metal Co. v. “Atwood, 289 Fed. 453 : 92 Hubbell v. Herring (Iowa), 249 N. W. 430............. 60 Hubbell v. ‘Higgins, 148 Iowa 36 ine 19, 90 Hughes v. City of Detroit, 217 Mich. 567 a 22, 102 Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245 11, 59 Hutchens v. Jackson (N. Mex.), 383 Pac. (2d) 355 14, 60 - Jefferson County v. Busby (Ala), 148 So, s.. Sseianinids 12, 13, 16, 60, 62, 14 _ Kirkendall v. Omaha, 39 Neb. 1 » 24 ‘Koen v. State, 35. Neb. sired 7" 26 8, 17, 19, 20, 43, 77, 90, 92 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. Ss 595.. ee 5) Vv. Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 Fed. 434 cae Lake Shore & Mich. South. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 selected encase Leonard v. State, 100 Ohio St. 456 a | Leonhart v. Board of Education (Ww. Va.) 170 he . 418 . 2, 14, 15, 60,62, 66, 68 License Cases, 5 How. 504 36 Lindsley v. National Carbonic “Gas. Co., 220 U. S. 61 22, 28, 66, 99,102, 103 Littie v. American State Bank (idich 249 N. W. 23° Silacsaniel 13, 22, 62, 99 | Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285 Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203 Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 86 - Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co. v.. Mottley, 219 U. 8.4 Malone v. Roy, 134 Cal. 344. ae Maloney v. Fortune, 14 Iowa 417 Manigault v. Springs, 199. U. S. 473. 15, 17, 72, 75, 76, 77; _ Marcus Brown: Ho ding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 iaaianikced 17, 19, 78, Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286. 19, Martin v.. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304 ; Mason v. City of Seattle (Wash.), 24 Pac. (34) 91 ' ae 12. ‘McCabe v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 186 Fed. 966: : 11 ‘McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. "608 McCullough v. i Marvland, 4 Wheat. 316. McGuire v. ay & Quincy Rd. Co., 131 Iowa 340.......6, ‘MeKeen v. Neowe = cg New Haven & Hartford Ry. ‘Co., 75 Conn 347....6, .. McPherson v. Fisher (Ore. ds a8 Pac. (2d) 913. wesesiencn AB, 16, 62, Memphis v. U.'S., 97 U. S. 29 Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925), 196 Cal. 477 3,°5,.6, 8, 25, 34, 36, ‘44, Miller. v. City “of Niagara Falls, 202 N. Y. “Supp 594. 22,.1 Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 372. 103 Mississippi State Tax. Commission v. Flora Drug Go. (iiss), Ae 148 So. 373 13, 62 ' Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co: Vv. ey ~ U.S. 267 13, 64 Morley v. Lake’ Shore Ry. Co., 146 U. S. 1 os 80 Morrison v. State, 116 Tenn, 534 9, 47 Mt. Vernon- Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama: Interstate . ; Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 43 ‘Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623...:....... PK Y YS Ff Munn v: , 94 UL 8.113 i0, 51, 52, 53, 78, 99 Nati ine ns. Co. v. Warburg, 260 U. S. 71.. 18, 62 New. s Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 197 U. S. 453.......... 92 - New York, etc., Rd..Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. 4. 556 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 1 Nolen v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812 Norris v. Tripp, 111 Iowa 115...:..:...:.... saad 92 Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. s. 437 84 Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union Coun Bank, 297 U, S. 261 , sane 9D Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. —— Ss ’ Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 Us S. 39 7, 29, 4f . ‘ Pennsylvania’ Hospital v. og eg 245 u. = 20..: .....16; 76 People v, City Prison Warden, 139 N. Y¥ - Supp. 277 sag ....46, 74 People v. Coulides, 265.N. Y. Supp. 765. ‘ 14, 34, 65 People v. La Fetra, 280: N. Y. 429..............\ , 14, “5 4, 48,68, 89 People v. Nebbia, 262: N. Y. 259......... m 8,. io\ a2, 13, 45, 48, 63, 60, = Petley v. North Carolina, 249 U. PS as oe ist ees = Lethe” ma oS eee alg hen dR Pal HERR EE New Orleans Gus Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650..............71, 2 oe 5, 6, 7, 8 8, 88, 26, 39, a, a 11, 59 _ wi. ‘ Hettin & Alpha reson a LIB Nob, Ba ey tarts | AB... &, 9B, 94, 90, 44, 47 *hintiey ¥, Phinney, Al Me, 48 oer iil ate ‘Inktint a uf f rh ire, “Wi. bi TRL att. ¥.. Ohi 9, 28, BH, .108 pinout ral v Pee gag ti. 8. Ral ne 0 Pound + nity . . . ee, re vty dis, 98 Th A. 18 ‘ ee rt iretn’ Fratiaportation, Ce. ¥. Re. Gomi. a5 t. i) , ar Pupet Suund F Pik Titres Print @ Uo.,. 98 Wash OB1.....:'.....::4, 86° rity Extract iid snle Co. ¥, Ly teh, 26 U1. 8. 199 . 20, 70, 98 net ¥. Van Yeninan & Lewte Ov. vu, R. 49 6Y, 67 taytoned juniher ». Ni yea i a Light t, wtr., Co., 99 Wash. Ano AT, 19 reves ¢, pet 114 Av Reicha Liven 8 hag te v. City of Lynchburg (Va. a tay i adore ' Soma (Mont.), 88 Pac. (Bij 964 oars «aT ; iene v. Riek, 148 ARs, f6R ’ ey obard "yi Brown, ¥? ath, 499 8B: Hoche + Vater, t2 A pe | TT Teen iY Artec ec ei! Tork Bi Se Pee water vy, ! tale, 10 oye a as he ea Ac, «cahcet ceca taostlinbacdaiacbocilepaana e Rutt v.. Rtelt’ nh, 220 Mich, 94 a Ey eT at eee RA, OF Beligtt ¥. Lewis, 192 . buys cng EY A Sha Rolanider (lowe he tu. Gr, ‘BOT os 4 ‘Blaw itechowee Cases, 16 RT, “RBintth v. Katana Cit Tite & rast Oe, i | i | SP Rr. iaelaleds 61. Swnlth v. Gutllinan, 108 At oe WO aaer 86 - okatie ction Core. @ hath 42 Wash 506 ees * Standard Of Cw. vy. Clty of lige grees 244 Ry,” a 8, 24 Rtate ae sme oy 100 Re 490. A, @, 18, 16, dex ot 6, 6B, 10, mM, 8 State v. Brads ’ RH et 8 Rtate &. Dyer cl Be.) ‘. ee, ee ae | 49, 0, 62>--, Btate v.. Prevatt (Fla.), 148 8v. gre. ecsssececgghtg 105 GB, 74: Riate v. Dartivg (Towa), 240.N. apo di, 29, 97, 108 . ; State v. Hutehinavt Tee Cream Co, 168 Towa to 7) 14, 24, 48, 06 State v. Schlenker, 112 Towa 642. : niet . State ¥.- Witehtill @ Rosenthal, 147 La, jet 88, 102 State v. peat {Miae. .), 849 N. Ws ls ae a: TF State +. Louris, Mv, 307... ey Roe Lg Rtate v. Hall (Neb.), 249 N. W. SU ete ye oo Btate ¥. itzpatrick 198 1. B4 , hs cd Ab bicecok a la Btate v. Morrison (8. Dak.), oH N. W. Bod... APE BR State: +. Matriock, 88 Wash, 6:1. ; ‘Scaceareey 0, 47 | State ¥. Pitney, 70 Wash, 608 hy eee ai State. v. Superior Court, 24 Sa i ee 5.2/4 boas iidaan act aan ¢ State .v. Sponaugle, 46 W..V sastiist Gn sdicesaldaesl beeen een “State vy. Harper, 182 Wis. Hh ieisksptanassssiccsueasscicenstiy a, SE EN Be - State v. Redmon, 136 — AID SESS a Sree eee ae SCY Pan 15, 69 Steele Smith — ai Birmingham Ry. ‘Light & Power. * : Ce. 73 Sv 7 GRUSEWh Aba cbes Sh cdabadicdrocccccy te sikbgstbenbwwoscddesdsceccncgcodbecsscasséce oneses 3, 25 Stettér v. O'Hare, 69. Ore. ‘bie, CPt TRER OT, TE a, | a St: Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St.. Louis 249 U. re 200. Ferner Ree ey 90. « Stockton v. Williams (Mich. E Doug. esis utgiextionan. “toe ROE. ree 3, 24 ‘Stone v. Mississippi, 101 se, at A CNT GER A NRE 71, 76 Strafford v. Sharon, 61 we SE Re On eR oeK —F Stretch v. Board of Wavcation +" 8. Sere eeuaienccol 8, 46 epnires ad eo Fftighland Box’ Gold Mining on 00 U. 8. ba7 Rewer ccienastual 43, 90 x . . ° 7 : ' : r eee ee ee el a ee ee ee et a ee eae PG TPS , ° - : 4 -) 18 ‘Alien Bb. ; pom Se West v. City of Asbury Av N. Law ion a eT iC Whitey. Hart, 80 U. 8. 6 devia pashoiinn dehitnadet Sea Wilder v. Campbell, 4 lie, “Oo6.. VT SEE TMT NT, Williams v. Mayer, 69 8. Ct. ea a ae T) 16, 62, 74 Winter vi: Barret (Fla.}¢d86 N. fe iia. eng shies ssaeoul b stiladabinsnsagiadiael 94 wenn Kanne Cit . Andrew Society. v. Kansas City, - : oo a 8 F (2d) 698... sitdudie'ieessihdeks dae ean Wonder Bakeries Co., ine., v. v. Mhite, 9 F. Supp. ‘gif. SARE EI NAR OPS 18,62 Young v..Lemeux, 79 Cofin. 440.....:..... julia aetcaind Sa Rk AE ee: te gcuenet er '¥. aye 178 lowe 808 ‘im Csiecigenite Lis cuteaalgieenicicdocdl it > ahn v. Board o ublic Works, 21. 5 SR 2.14, Zucht v.. King, 260 U: 8. 174... 7 ceeadlilnbedconicane iadietheests pesnecenencedels 22, 103 — os a~ - >. . - « — Se | ° ~ @ ; 7.4 : *. . is ) - O ~ -. x 4 GS Sees ee i ¢ AD La of SS ee . “ - Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1933 No..370 HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION: Appellant, - VB. JOHN H. BLAISDELL, E‘?.AL., Respondents. @ a ‘ oi ON APPEAL TO THE. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES | BRIEF AND ARGUMENT OF VERNON A. VROOMAN AS AMICUS OURTAE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The undersigned, appearing as amicus curiae in this case, makes no attempt, in this brief, to argue in opposition to any particular brief heretofore filed in the case.” The funda- tnental question herein is, whether Chapter 339, , Laws of 1933 of the State of Minnesota, providing for an extension : Pa « ¢ ae a ee ~*~ C. Ona question of general welfare, the spirit rather than the letter of the constitution controls: Village of Carthage v. Frederick (1890), 127 N. Y. 268, 25 -N. E. 480, 481; | Packet Co: v. K eokuk (1877), 95 U, 8. 80, 87, 24 b. Ed. 377. . ; D. The police: power, like the constitution, has tur its ob- ject the general welfare. a Noble State: Bank v. Haskell (1910), 219 ‘U.-S-104, 1]1, 31S. Ct. 186, 55 L. Ed. ne R. A.N.S. . 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 487. All proper objects of the police power range under the one head, promotion of the general welfare, and numerous defi- _ nitions and characteristics of the power embrace the term _ “general welfare’’ in such manner as to make clear that the v. _ promotion of that’ welfare is the essential office of the power, and tlie foundation of every exercise thereof. 12 C. J., Constitutional Law, sec. 430. And see: ; - .Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925), 195 Cal. 477, . 234 Pac, 381, 383, 38 A. L. R. 1479; Pettis v. Alpha. Alpha Chapter (1927), 115 Neb. 525, 213 N. W. 835, 838; State v. Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 430, 123 Atl..842, ' 87 A. L. R. 131; (United States Supreme Court decisions cited) : Cook County v. Chicago = 311 Ill. 324, 142 N. E. 512, 516, 31 A. L..R. 44 Ne And the following recent cases: Graham v. Kingwell (Cal.), 24 Pac. (2d) 488; People v. Coulides, 265 N. Y. Supp. 765, citing "Baker vz Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 27S. Ct. 289, 51 L. Ed. | “499, . \E. Iti isa commoplace that ‘“nolice power’ i ig difficult of de nition. 0 6 R. C. iL. Constitutional Law, sec. 183. 2 ot . cov ce Broadly considered, “police — is synonymous with ; ‘“sovereign power.’’ : 6R. C. L.,, Constitutional’ ioc séc. (184; eee” 12 R: C. L. , Constitutional Law, sec. 415; ~ Citizens’ Ins. Co. v. Hebert (1916), 189 La. 708, ny, 71 So: 955, 958., a mee 8 5g Te a Ft, RAP, peepee! no-one 9 + oon If tion of sovereign power. y Chicago, Burlington & sis Ry. Co. v. Peo le (1905), 200 U. S. 561, 588, 26S. “Ct. 431, 56 L. Ed. 596 ; - - Maller a Sand of Public Works (1925), 195 Cal. 477, eke 234 Pac. 38", 3A. L. R. 1479; ier McKeon v. New Y ork, New Haven & Hartford Ry. para Ste - Co. (1902), 75 Conn. 347, 53 Atl. 656, 657, 61. p _R. A..730, quoting: from The License Cases," How: (46 U.S.) 504, 583, 12 L. Ed. 256; - State v. Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 420, 123° “Atl. 842, .. 43, A. L. R: 131; City of Chicago v. Washingtonian Home (1919), 289. Ill. 206, 124°N. E. 416, 419. ‘Less broadly a ee | police power is sovereign power as exercised to. meet some great public need. Nable State Bank v. Haskell (1910), 219 U. S. 104, 111, 31S. Ct. 186, 55 L. Ed. 112, 32 L. &. A. N. S. oe 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 487. ~Thus it is ‘‘society’s ; natural sae of self Mtiiais: sie McGuire v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. | 1208), 151 Iowa 340; 354, 108 N:. W. 902,: 907. And see: . ‘ss Be 2. iccdiaaitcnea Law, see. 415, and f. n. 13: Barret v. Rickard een. 76 Neb. 769, 124 N. W. "153, c 155-6; Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter (1927), 115 Neb. 529, - 213 N. W. 835, 838: = F. As to the relation between the police power ‘and the- ~ eA —wimerreR, Oke The exercise of the ‘police power is at least a manifesta- . Bie, noes letter of the constitution, a balanee-of- welfare theory seems - to be developing. The process of inclusion and exclusion i is gradually mak- ing out the boundaries of the power. ie , 6 R.C.L,, Constitutional Law, sec. 185; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra, (219 U.S. 104, | name ‘My. The saad whether Loitiidie contravening the letter of the constitution is unconstitutional involves, among other things, the degree to which the legislation promotes the gen- eral welfare. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, (260 U.S. 393, #16). ie G. The title may balance its police peer nidinat the let- __ ter of the federal constitution. The police power is inherently the state’ Ss. 12 C. J., Constitutional Law, sec. 447; , -2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ‘ed. )) Pp 1232, = \ Se a —— The federal constitution has not deprived the state ‘of the _ power. Brown v. Maryland (1827), 12 Wheat. (25 U.S. 4 419, 443 ; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (187 7), 97 U. 8. 25, 33, 24 L. Ed. 989; on v. Schlenker (1900), 112 Iowa 642, bot. 649, 84 .N: W. 698, 699, 51 L. R. A. 347, 84: Am. St. Rep. 360;. State v. ’Fitepatrick (1888), 16 RB. 1 54, 11° ‘Atl. 767, 769; | City of Rochester v.. West (1898), 29 App. Div. 125, _ ol N. Y. Supp. 482, 484; City of Westport v:.Mulholland G00), 159 “Mo. 86, 60'S. W. 77, 78, 53 L. R.A. 44 Re the contract clause of the federal eoiaotibution, a aaa ee = oe ig —"s The _— of the American Constitution, secs. * 196 and 197. : Re sg due pro¢ess and the equal protection clause. 2 Cooley, —— Limitations = ed. ), Pp 1234, f. n. HL Chanane’ in ‘conditions, whether gradual or siden, may render promotive of general’ welfare, and constitu- tional, measures. that formerly would. not have been so. Block v. Hirsch (1921), 256 U. S. 135, 155,41 S. Ct. /458, 65 L. Ed. 865, 16 A. L. R. 165; Edgar'A. Levy Leasing-Co. v. Siegel (1922), 258 U.S. 242, 246, 6 S. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed.595; - 6 R. C. | 2 Constitutional ‘Law, sec. 188; | Martin v. Hunter (1816), 1 Wheat. (14 U. Ss. ) 304, 326; . , Miler v. Board of Public Works (1925), 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381, 383; Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter (1927), 115 Neb. 545, : : 213 N. W. 835, 838; we City of Aurora v. Byrne 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784, 788; | 147 N. W. 779, 781, Ann. Cas. 1917 A. 760; — ~ People v. Seca (1933), 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N.E: 694, + 699. Stretch v. Board of Education (1914), 34 S. D. 169, \ \ | I. An- economic depression may conuttinige or comprise such an emergency as justifies an 1 unusual exercise of the police power. " General w elfare embraces economic _ State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. (1914), 168 Iowa 1, 10, 147 N. W. 195, 199, L..R. A. 1917 B. 1918; Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapte: (1927), 115 Neb. 525, - 213 N. W. 835,.838. Various definitions of police power refer to : ‘ prosperity,” “economic welfare,’’ ‘‘economic concern,’’ etc. | Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Russell (Mich.) 249 N. W. 27, "29 (United States Supreme Court ‘decisions cited.) : ‘ _ ~ Promotion of such objects is sities stated . to be -among the reasons for the exercise-of the power. --. - Chicago, ery gton & Quincy Ry. Co. v. ‘People, } supra, (200 U.S. 561, 592) ; ' Noble State Bank %. Haskell, supra, (219 U. S. 104, 111); _ . anes Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 318, ‘51-B/ Ba: 499, 27 3 t. 291; . > Bar bier v. Connolly ie 113 U. S. 27, 31, XS. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 92 Women’s Kansas City 8 St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City (1932), 58 en Bee 599 ; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co. (1922), 193 | = 1104, 184 N. W. 823, 23 A. L. R. 1 Pr v. Ce (1921), 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 1, O Stetter v are (1914), 69 Ores 519, 531, 139 Pac. . 743, 747, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 217, 222; State v. Pitney (1914), 79 Wash. 608, 140 Pac. 918, - 919, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 209; Ex parte Townsend (1911), 64 Tex. Cr. 350, 144 S. W. | ; 628, 631, 33 ‘Ann. Cas. 1914 C 814,817; State v. Mamlock (1910), 58 Wash. 631, 633, 109 Pac. _ 47, 137. Am. St. Rep. 1085; Morrison v. State (1500); 116 Tenn. 534, 543, 95 S.-W. _ 494,496; - - Village ‘of Carthage v. Frederick (1890), 122 N. y. * ~ 268, 25 N. E.. 480, 482; : Thorpe v. Rutland é Burlington Rd. Co. (1854), 27 . Vt. 140, 149, 62 Am. Doc. 625, 633. _ J. The statute is not, and does not profess: to be, a cure for the depression or any phase of the depression, but merely a means of ameliorating, during the economic emergency, a certain condition fraught with _puplic Getcinaget and dan- . ger. It is to be noted, bi that the statute is a legislative exer- cise of a legislative power, and not in any sense or degree an abdication of such pone: , 3 = natn SID cee K. The police power is older than any ‘constitution, and although it has never remained entirely unused in this coun- — try, the exercise of the power has’become more and ‘more. _ frequent and varjed during the past generation. : City of Rochester v. West kaoen es 51 N. Y. Supp. 482; 484; Brown v: Mar yland, 12 Wheat: (25 U. S.).419, 443 ; - 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States. His- ° . tory, p. 695, f. n. 2; Munn v. Timoke, 94 U.S. 113, 125, 24°L. Ed. 77; People v. Ne bia (1933), 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694, 698; : Leonard v. State (1919), 100 Ohio St. 456; 197 N. BE. : 464, 46); City of W stport U. Mulholland (1900), 159 Mo. 86, 60 S. W. 70, 78, 53 L. R. A. 542; Chicago, ilwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. w. City of Mil- —.° waukee (1897), 97 Wis. 422, 1 N. W. 1118, 1123;. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution, secs. 196. ‘and 197 ;- 2 Warren, The Supreme Court i in United States His- tory, B p. 735 et seq:, esp. 740-42. r be ‘a ot , IL. ; Pen ‘Certain matters which the courts judicially notice, certain presumptions. with which they surround legislation, and the general attitude which judicial tribunals take toward : legislation, all tend to support the act. ; : > See The court knows that a grave economic ompengency exists. ~~: «8% The courts judicially notice matters ‘of common knowledge. : 23 C. J.; ee sec. ». 1810. ' % .° ’ This court’ has heretofore judicially taken notice of an "emergency. Block.v. Hirsch, supra, (256 U.S. 135, 154) ; Chastleton Carp. v. Sinclair’ (1924) 264 U. S. 543, 547, 68 L, Ed. 841, 44 S. Ct. 405. yeaa —11— | This court kiiows that on ‘March 6,.1933 the President, - proclaimed the existence of an economic emergency..° / + 23 C. hy , Evidence, sec. 1900. -«. - Re . - The Federal on Relief Act; the Agricultural Ad. justment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Emergency Railroad ‘Transportation Act, have apprised 0, ‘ this court of the existence of ‘an emergency. a: 230.48., Evidence, sec. 1947. eel WAY _ - ‘Dhe. court must tikes judicial notice of statements in the Congressional Record concerning the economic depression. 23-0. J., Evidence, sec. 1934, and foot notes, particu- larly. fn. 95 -(a, 4). i This court knows of the ae of a public exigency in Minnesota in ‘connection with foreclosures of real estate mortgages. : fad ae * Block v. irish: supra, (256 U. S. 135, 154); : Chastleton Corp. v.. Sinclair, supra (264 U. S. 543, 547); Union ‘Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp. “ ; 248 U. 8. 372, 39 S. Ct. 117, 9 A. L. R. 1420; State v. Moeller, 249 N. We 330, B. There ‘i is an almost overwhelming presumption. that an act of Congress: or a State Legislature is constitutional. ‘Third Dee. Dig., Constitutional, Law, sec. 48; 12 C, J:, Constitutional Law, secs. 221 and 299 ; rer. McCabe. v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. (1911), 186 Fed.: : 966; affd. 235 U. Ss. 151, 59 L, Ed. 169, 35 S: Ct. 69; Eckerson v. Des Moines (1908), 137 | Towa 452, 115 '. OLN. W. 177; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. (1916), 175 Iowa ao 245, 154.N. W. 1037, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15, Ann. . Cas. 1917 E, 803 ; “ous Nolen v. Riechman (1915), 225 Fed. 812; g ounkot v. Susong (1916), 173 Iowa 663, 156 N. W. | Utah Mfrs. Ass’n ae eae - —12— - Waugh v. Shirer (Iowa), 249 N. W. 430, 435; Jefferson. County v. Busby (Ala.), 148 So. 411, _ State v. Dyer (Fla.), 143 So. 201, 203; - State v. Prevatt (Fla.), 148 So. 578, 579; - Wayne Township v. Brown (Ind.), 186 N. E. 841, 847; Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood (Miss.) ), 114 So. 781, 783; Rider v. Cooney (Mont. ), 23 Pac. (2d), 261; State v. Hall (Neb.), 249 N. W.-756, 758-9; People v. Nebbia,. 962 N. Y- 269, 186 N. E. 694, 699; Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co. (Pa.), 167 me wig 197-8; | Stewart (Utah), 23 Pac. (2d) 229, 232; . Richmond Tiinen Sepale Co. v. City of Leniiiiinre ' (Va.), 169 S. E. 554; | Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth (Va.), 169 S. E. 859, 864 ; Mason v. City of Seattle (Wash.), 24 Pac. (2a) 91, o;.- Leonhart v. Board of Education al Va. )s 170 s: E. +418, 421. e court is not concerned with the smetives of a State Legislature any more than with those of. Congress. United States v. Des Moines Navigation & Ry. Co. (1891)3142 U. S. 510, 544, 12 S. Ct. 308, 35 L. Ed. 1099 ; 12.C. J., Constitittional Law, sec. 204. Third Dee. Dig., Comstitutional Law, sec. 70 (3); Smith v. Kansas City & Trust Co. Soa 255 U.S. 180, 210, 41'S. Ct. 243, U.S. 146, 161, 40 8.-Ct. 106, 64 L. : hall | Appalachian Elec. Power Co. »% Smith = C., W. Va.) 4 Fed. Supp. 6, 22; Blanchard v. City of B New York, 262 N: Y. 5, 186 N. _E. 29,-32. . D. The court is not concerned with the eben or policy - of legislation. Third Dee. Dig. Constitutional Law, sec. .70 (3) ; t ‘ ‘ *. ote ‘ an National Union Fire. Ins. hie v. Warburg (1922), 260 U.S. 71 (segai7), 43 S. Ct. 32, 67 Ly Ed. 314; United States v: Lanza (1922), 260 U. S. 377. (see 385) . 43 8. Ct. 141, 67 L. Ed. 314; Hamilton v. “Kentucky Distilleries Co., ne (251 ; U.S. 146, 161) ; _ Block v. Hirsch, supra, (256 U. S. 135, 138) ; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Géorgia Public Service Corp. i supra, (248.U.S. 372, 374) ; Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Goldsboro, supra, (232 U. S. 548, ema | Recent cases: Williams v. Mayor, 53 S. Ct. 431, 433; Wonder Bakeries Co., Inc: v. White, 3 F. Supp. 311; Jefferson County v. Busby (Ala.), 148 So. 411, 413; State v. Dyer (Fla.), 143 So. 201, 203-4; Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Flora Drug Co. (Miss.), 148 So. 373, 377; Little v. American State ‘Bank (Mich.), 249 N. W. 22, 23; People. v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 269, 186 N- E. 694, 699: McPherson v. Fisher (Ore.), 23 Pac. (2d) 913, 914: ‘. State v. Morrison (S. Dak.), 249 N. W. 563, 565; Leonhart‘v. Board of Education a Va. ); 170 8. KE. 418, 421. ' E. The legislature's is the first judge of whit i is tal the - greatest good of the greatest number, and so for the true ultimate good of all. ' Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May (1904), 194 U. S. 267, 270, 24 S. Ct. 638, 48 L. Ed. 971; State v. Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 430, 123 Atl. 842, | 37 A. L. R. 131, F. peers the court can overtarn the act, the court must find that the legislature made a mistake as to whether there is any basis in fact for a finding that the public welfare is jeopardized, else a mistake as to whether there is any . t ali reasonable connection betes een the provisions of the act and the thing which jeopardizes that welfare. Americ an Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal & Food — Commission (1920), 268 Fed. 563; (1921) appeal ‘dismissed, 258 U.S. 632, 66 L. Kd. 801, 42 S. Ct. 278. war. And see's, State v. Harper (1923), 182 Wis. 148, 196.N. W. 451, =, 33 A. L. R. 269; ’ State v. Coulides, 265 N. Y. Supp. 765, 768, (recent case). A legislature is presumed to*have passed an act with full - _ knowledge of existing conditions and to have found the facts on which its power to. act must be predicated. . 12.C. J., Constitutional Law, ‘sees. 222 and 225; United States v. Des Moines Navigation € Ry. Co., = supra, (142 U.S. 510, 544) ; | State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. (1914), 168 Iowa 1, 147 N. W. 195, L. R. A..1917 B, 198; (1916) , alfa. 242 U.S. 153, 37S, Ct. 28, 61 ® Kd. 217; Hutchens v. Jackson (N. Mex. ), 23 Pae. (2d) 355, ‘(recent ease) ; Leonhart'v. Board of Education (W. Va.), 170 S. EK. 418, 421, (recent case). - 3 air It seems the presumption is fortified whibe a basis in fact for the legislation obviously exists, as where the existence of the basis is a matter of judicial knowledge, and that where there is reasonable doubt whether such basis exists the pre- sumption controls. Zahn v. Bd. Ly Public Works (1925),. 274 U. S. 325, ' 328,47 S. Ct. 594, 71 L. Ed. 1074; The Chastleton® Corp. v. Sinclair, supra, (264 U. S. 543, 547); People v. La Fetra (1981), 230 N. y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, .604; initia v. Board of Education va), 170 S. E. » 418, 421, (recent case). ‘ | Legislation ‘“necessary for the pute welfare”’ is legisla- tion tliat has such a basis. - State v. ‘Redmon (1907), 134 Wa’ 89, 114, N. Ww. 137, ~126 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 14 L. R. ‘A. N- S. 229, 15 Aun. Cas. 408, an And see: Chic ago v. Washingtonian Home (1919), 289 II]. 206, aoe ee K,. 416, 419, 15 Ann. Cas..408. : The only other requirement is that the legislation shall amount to some reasonable way of meeting the yee or danger which the situation unfolds. _. Third Dee. Dig., Constitutional Law, sec. 70 (3) lowe Die p. 557) ; Chicago, Burlington € Quincy Ry. Co. v. People, supra, (200 U. 8.561, 592) ; Block v. Hirsch, pee, (256° U.S. 135, 158) ; City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84,.149 N. E. 784, 787 ; State v. Bassett (1924). 100 Conn. 430, 1238 Atl. 842. 37 ALL. R. 134; State v. Harper (1923), 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451, 452-3, 33 A. L. ‘R. 269. G. Relative to matters of geniral welfare, a legislature . has a wide discrétion. Manigault v. Springs (1905), 199 U.S. 473, 480, 26. S. Ct. 127, 50 L. Ed. 274; State v. Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 430, 123 Atl. 842, 37 A. L. R. 134. = *4 limit i in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that t could not ‘be — asa permanent change.’’ Block v. Hirsch, supra, (256 U. S. 135, 157). = . And see: The Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, supra, (264 U. B. «548, 547). But emerggeney legislatiefi may oxtond>wifficiently beyond = eericste-eutird against its after effects. Panini v. Kéntucky Distilleries Co., supra, (251 UL 8.146, 161). I. It does not devolve upon appellees to show that the statute is constitutional, but upon — to show, if pos- gible, that it is not. 12 C. J., Constitutional ae sec. 221; Third Dee. Dig., Constitutional Law, sec. 48 (see p. | 473) ; People v. City: Prison Warden, 154 App. Div. 413, 7139 NW. Y. Supp. 277, 286. Recent cases in ‘point: Williams v. Mayor, 53 S. Ct. 431, 433; Jefferson County v. Busby (Alay., 148 So. 411, 413; State.v. Prevatt (Fla.), 148 So. 578, 579; McPherson v. Fisher (Ore.), 23 Pac. (2d) 913. Mm.. The statute is not repugnant to the contract clause of Section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States. A. The letter of the clause sometimes yields to consider- ations of general welfare. . Penns ylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia (1917), 245 4 S. 20, 23, 38 S. Ct. 35, 62 L. Ed. 124; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp., supra, (248 U. S. 372, 377) ; 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (sth ed. ), Pp 1237 ; | —17— Third Dee. Dig., Constitutional Law, See, 117. B, ‘Contracts are ——s subject to —— to ‘tee exercise of the police power. ~ Third Dee. Dig., Constitutional Law, sec. 417; ~ 12 C. J., Constitutional Law, sec. 603 ; 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (sth. ed. .), p 1237; Edgar A. Levy. Leasing Co. » Supra, (258 U. S.. 242, . 249) ; ~ Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. ‘Feldman (1921), 256 U. S. 170, 198, 41 S. Ct. 465, 65,L: Ed. 877 ; 1+ ° Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Goldsboro, supra, (232 ~ U.S. 548, 558); City of Butte v. Roberts (Mont. ), 23° Pace. (2d) 342, i} en case). MT f C. Otherwise, individualé could control thee police power . and defeat the general welfare. . - _ Manigalt v. Springs, supra, (199 U. s. 473, 480) ; 12.:C. J., Constitutional Law, sec. 603; Raymond Lumber Co. v. Ra ymond Light, etc., Co. (1916) ), 92 Wash. 330, 159 Pac. 133, 136, L. R. A. - 1917 C. 574. - D.. The viii of contracts does not protect them from the exercise of the power. The sacredness of contractual . obligations was not the reason for incorporating the clause into the constitution.. The reason probably was, to discour- age repudiation of debts by the states. E. Ifa sheriff’ 8 certificate of sale evidences a contract between him or, the state and a purchaser at an execution sale, the obligation of that contract, like the obligation of any -: other contract, is. Secondary to the matter of public welfare, which is the primary concern of all law. : F. Whether a legislative act validly impairs the obli- gation of-contract does not depend upon whether the act ey. | SHER ne AR | —18—, —— the = or were the acetal law pertaining to contract. Block v. Hirsch, supra, (256. U.S. 135, 158);. Chadwick v. Moore (Pa., 1844), 8 Watts & igen ™. G. If on the police power the legislature ean inter- fere with the remedy, the legislature can 80 interfere: at any stage of the remedy. It would be anomalous if general wel- fare were the paramount consideration at one. pom but not ~ at another. - H.. Cases like ree v. Kinzie (1843), 42 U. S. (1 low: ) 311, 11 L. Ed. 143; Barnitz 4. Beverly (1895), 163 U. 8. 118, 16 S. Ct. 1042, 41 L. Ed. 93; ete., ete.; containing hardly an intimation about police power or emergency legislation, are of no value on the question whether the adjective as well as ' the substantive law shall not yield to the police- power and the exigencies of public welfare. _ It is not’ without reason that in a recent case, Addis v. _ Selig, 264 N. Y. Supp. 816 (see top of 824), consideration of the police power is eliminated from. an opinion in which Bronzon v. Kinzie, supra, is discussed. If cases, state or federal, like Bronson v. Kinzie, and Barnitz v.. Beverly, may. by any remote possibility be re- garded as emergency or police-power cases, they must yield to principles announced in later decisions of this court. Iv. The statute is not repugnant to the due process clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution . of the United States. A. The letter of the due process jr yields to con- ' siderations of general welfare. ; —19— : | Third Dec. Dig., Constitutional Law, sec. 253; _ 12 C.J., Constitutional Law, sec. 962, citing numerous United: States Supreme Court and other deci-. sions; ie: 3 Words and Phrases, p. 2253; _ Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Stegel, supra, (258 U.S. 242, 247); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, supra, 256 ' U.S. 170; ae . Umon Dry Goods Co..v. Georgia P-blic Service Corp., : supra, (232 U. S. 548, 588) ; People v. La Fetra (1921), 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. EB, ’ 601, 605-6; | . Chapman v. Boynton,-4 Fed. Supp. 43, 46 (recent case), citing several United States Supreme Court decisions; Graham v. Kingwell (Cal.), 24 Pac. (2d) 488, 489, B. recent case). All property is held subject to the possibility that under the police power it may be taken notwithstanding the - due process clause. Every contract or property right, whether vested or not, is inherently subject to the possi- . Dility. 12 C. J., Constitutional Law, sec. 962; |. Ree we Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Goldsboro, -(232 U. S. 048) 5 : ae | Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. People, supra, (200 U. S. 561, 588) ; | Mugler v. Kansas (1887), 123 U. S- 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, . 81 L. Ed. 205; 3 | ao Hubbell. v. Higgins (1910), 148 Iowa 36, 126.N. ‘W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 822; ! : Martin v. Blatiner (1886), 68 Iowa 286, 289, 25 N. W. 131, 133, 135, 27 N. W. 244; | : | City of Butte v. Roberts (Mont.), 23 Pac. (2d) 349. C. So far-reaching is the police power in its relation ‘to the due process clause that notwithstanding this clause a ss, ; . process.” a | a ——- person may, under the igen be depiived of property with- out compensation. _ : Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. ‘Siegel, supra, (258 i U.S. 242, 247); . " Block v. Hirsch, supra, (256 U.S. 135, 156); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra, (251 U.S. 146); Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Goldsboro, supra, (232 U. S. - sai nThiy D. aie like Bottdorf v. Lewis (1903), 121 oe 27, 95 N. W. 26, and Edworthy v. Iowa Savings & Loan Assn. (1901), 114 Iowa 220, 86 N. W. 315, which are not: police- power or emergency-situation cases, are of no value on the question whether vested or property rights are not as sub-. ‘ject as any other rights to yield to the police power, in time of i slid upon considerations of ease welfare. -E. The statute must be. balanced, in point of general wel- fine, against the letter of the due process clause, and the ‘question answered whether the statute manifests a merely arbitrary attempt to supervene the letter. ’ Purit Extract and Tonic Co. v: ‘Lynch (1912), 226 . S. 192, 204, 33 S. Ct. 44, 57 L. Ed. 184; _ State v: Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 430, 123 Afl. 842, fs, ” & L. R. 131. : F. Although the legislatuse ‘could, under the police. power, for the public benefit, deprive appellant and others of property without due process of law, the legislature has not deprived — of — whatsoever without such > eo " Rvidently arpellcnt’t has had a hearing upon proper no- _ tice, with notice and hearing according to the laws ap- plicable to other like cases within the purview of the statute, a and with the same laws applied to the facts of tlie case as are applicable to the facts of all other like cases, and ‘with these laws applied in the same manner in which they are ap- plicable to all other cases like the case at bar. H. A Tedemption law i is ‘‘ rious to the rights of prop- _erty.’’ Gault’s A ppeal (1859), 33 Pa. 94, 98; Caro v. Wollenberg (1913), 68 Ore. 420, 136 Pac. 866, 869. ao ae The statute i is not repugnant to the equal protection ides of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu- tion of the United States. ‘A: The equal ae clause yields t to consider ations of general welfare. , | Third ‘Dec. Dig.; Constitutional Law, sees. 117 and a 212; 12 C. J. , Constitutional Law, sec: 894; Barbier v. Connolly, supra, 113 U. S. 27,31; Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Brown. (P24) 409 ae +680, 187 Pac. 399, 403. - | B. But the statute i is not yon legislation. a aa protection in a statute applicable to all alike who are _ in the same situation or the same natural.classification. Town of Green Riger v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F (2d) ~ 112, 114-5, ( nt case), citing several decisions ~ of the Supreme Court of the United States; State v. ~_ (Iowa), 246 N. W. 390 (recent case). Barbier v. on ie supra, (113 U. S. 27, 32); ' There.is neither unjust discrimination nor the denial of "Ee ie. * ~~ C. - Reasonable classification has never’ been: held un- constitutional. Third Dec. Dig., Constitutional Law, sec. 48 en P. 474); Little v. American State Bank Lam. ); 249 N. wW. 22, 23,. (recent case). ra) The legislature has wide Hindelion to make a classifica- . tion on any reasonable basis. The existence, at the time of a legislative enactment, of any conceivable reasonable basis for the classification must be assumed and the burden of - ‘showing that no such basis then, existed is upon whoever . assails the classification as arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911); 220 U. 8. 61, 78, 55 L. Ed. 369, 31S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 160; i Wayne Township v. Brown\(Ind.), 186 N. E. 841, 850, -. . (recent case); ~ 3 State v. Superior Court (Wasgh.), 24 Pac. (2a) 87, 88. D. If, in behalf of the general welfare, Lngisbition touches a certain field, the legislation need not cover the whole field in order not to:offend against the equa protection clause. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations’ (8th ed.), p. 1231; Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Federal Raaris | Bank (1923), 262 U.S. 649, 661, 43 S. Ct. 651, ‘67 L. Ed. 1157, 30 A. L. R. 635; : Zucht v. King (1922), 260 U.S: 174, 177, 43 S. Ct. o4, ~ 67 L. Ed. 194; . City of New Orleans v. LeBlanc (1920), 139 La. 113, \. 71 So. 248; ‘State. v. Winehill & Rosenthal (1920), 147 La. 781, | 86 So. 181; (1922), 258 U. S. 605, 66 L. Ed. 786, -42 8, Ct. 313, writ of error dismissed) ; :. West.v. City of Asbury, 89 N. J. Law 402; 99 Atl. 190; Hughes v. City of Detroit (1922), 217 Micb. 567, 187 N. W. 530; Miller v. City of Niagara Falls (1924), 202 N. Y. Stes 594, 207 —_ Div. 798. ee on -E. A faet that may not be without some significance is, that in many cases in which the constitutionality of legisla- tion similar to that here irivolved has been drawn into ques- tion, the claim that such legislation i impairs the obligation of contract has frequently been made, and likewise the claim that it denies due process of law, but seldom the claim that it denies the equal protection of the law. k . Cases like State v. Loomis (1893), 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. . 350, 21 L. R: A. 789,. and Vanzant v. Waddel (1829), 10 Tenn. (2 Yous: ) 259, in which emergency legislation is not ‘involved or in which the police power receives little or no’ consideration, have little force in connection with the ques- ‘ tion whether Chapter 389, Laws of 1933 of Minnesota, i is class legislation, denying to any person or persons the equal pro- | tection of the laws. F. The legislature is the first judge of whether a classi- fication is reasonable. The legislature has a wide diserétior in the matter of classification. | _Inndsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas. Co., supra, (220 U.S.-61, 78); Recent case: ‘State v. Darling (iowa), 246 N. W. 390. It would seem, also, that where the legislature i is striving to meet an émergency, the bounds of its discretion enlarge; the greater the emergency, the wider the discretion.: fe Ii has even been said that special legislation is permissible _ when ‘‘designed.to meet a temporary emergency in a par- | : * .ticular locality or in regard to a particular person, * #09 Platt v. Craig a 66 Ohio St. 75, 63 N. E. 594, 596. . cs ee te ° ' soe *\ - emergency, ‘Springs from a comainanel exercise of the - police power. tter which, with respect to any interest, whatever it may the Welfare of all who constitute a given community (e. g., a ‘city, a State, thé United States). ‘‘common welfare’’ are synonymous. Stockton v. Williams (Mich:, 1845), 1 ial 546, 570; _ Kirkendall v- Omaha (1894), 39 Neb. 1, 57 N. Ww. 152, : 794; 506, 85 Pac. 261, 264; , 198. - The term. “oeeeel welfare,”? with regard to the number - — broadest import. ne q _ 244 Ky. 362, 50 8. W. (2d) 960, 961. * : ~ i “The piiblic welfare embraces a variety of interests ‘calling for public care and control. ‘These are: ‘The fenegta, | Freund Police Power, secs. 9, 15%.” 1,10, 147 N. W. 195, 199, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1918. -/The statute, ‘because pf the degree to which and the man. - | ner in.which it subserves the general welfare in a time of A. General (public, . common) ‘welfare’ ‘embraces aia: be fe. g.,-any social, political or economic interest), involves ‘The terms ‘‘generak welfare,” "\publie welfare”? and ‘Bpokane Traction Co. ». Granath (1906) 42 Wash. - Aymette v. State e (1840), 2 ‘Humph. (a1 Tenn.) 154, | and diversity of the repre it may concern, is a } term of the ° Standard Oil Co. v, SW. ) Bowling si (1932), > primary social interests of safety, order and morals ; » ' economic interests; and ‘non-material and political in- State v. Hetchimoon Ice Cream Co. (1914), 168 lowa | 2 — “As ‘our civie life has developed, so has the definition of ‘public welfare,’ until it has been held to embrace: regulations to promote the economic welfare, public " convenience and general prosperity of the community. si Miller ». Board of Public Works (1925), 195 Cal.-477,+ - 234 Pac. 381, 38 A. L. R. 1479; - Pettis:v. Alpha Alpha Chapter (1927), 115. Neb. 925, 213 N. W..835, 838. . Not only is the term of: broad — with regard to the . number. and. diversity of the matters it may. concern, in- ‘eluding economic interest or welfare, but also with regard to the number of individuals and classes it concerns. It cor- ; notes the antithesis of the special or Private interest of an individual-or class. : . See Steele-Smith Dry Goods Co. v. Birmingham Ry., Light — : & Power Co. (1916), 15 Ala. App. 271, 7880. 215; 216. c . And see: Platt v. Craig (1902), 66 Ohio 75, 63 N. E. 594, 595. ; | 3 ; _ “Mr. Webster says that ‘in general, public expresses something common to mankind at large, to a nation, state, city or town, and is opposed to PRIVATE, which denotes what belongs to an individual, to a family, to a company, or a corporation’. “ Chamberlain v. City of Dortiigten (1865), 19 Towa 395, 403. ‘‘The Century Dictionary defines it. [publie} as: ‘Of | or belonging to the people at large; relating to or affect- ‘ing the whole people of a state, nation or community; not limited or restricted to any particular class of. the ‘eommunity.’ The New Internatiorial defines it as: “Of or pertaining to the people; relating to or affecting a pation, state or conimunity at large’.’”” Cawker v. Meyer (1911), 147 Wis. 320, “133 i. W: 157, | /159, 87 ER. ALN. 8. 510. — ™- At least in certain connections, a distinction has’ been - - taken between ‘‘géneral’’ and ‘‘universal.’’ Koen v. State (1892), 35 Neb. 676, 63 N. We: 595, 596, 17 L. R. A. 821; ‘ vA Puget Sound Pub.. Co. v. Times Printing Co. (1903), ~*~ 33 Wash. 551, 74 Pac. 802, 805; / a Brooklyn Church ‘Society v. Brooklyn Free Kinder- ~ garten Society, 152 N. Y. Supp. 41, 43; New Standard Dictionary, p. . 8, defining ‘* ven- eral’? as an pee. If the distinction between “ general’’ and ‘‘universal’’ be good in connection with the term ‘‘general welfare,’’ pos- _ sibly ‘the general welfare is less than the welfare of all the ' —. members of a community; possibly“such welfare is but that '. of many or thie greatest number—merely a welfare éxtensive or widespread. i In a sense; however, general (public, common) welfare is -in-any view of the matter the welfare of all.. That which ~ is directly for the welfare of many may bring welfare in- directly to all others, so that, in the ultimate, the welfare of _ all is promoted. Individuals and classes find their greatest ultimate welfare i in the welfare of all. ‘* Judge Dillon, i in his work on —- Corpora- tions, (volume 1, p.-212), says * * * ‘If one suffers - injury, -it is eithgr damnum absque injurta, or in the ° theory of the law, he is compensated fof it by sharing in the general benefits which the reguiations are in- tended and calculated to’ secure’.’’. ox of Carthage v. Frederick’ (1890), 122 N. ‘Y.-- 268, 25 N. E. 480, 481. And see e Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. People (1906), 200 U. S. 561, 593, 26 S. Ct. 341,56 L. Ed. 596. So, even if the recipients of the dived benefit of an act be _a class, if the object of the act is to benefit, not the class,-but —_ sa the public at baie (individuals and dita generally), the object is general welfare. If an act confers a direct benefit upon debtors as a class or upon a certain class of debtors, not for the sake of the debtors but for the sake of the public, the act is dn act to promote the general welfare. There isa decided difference between legisl@ion which has for its sole object the benefit of a class and legislation which bene- fits a class with a view to achieving the ultimate benefit of the public—between class benefit as an end in itself and class benefit as a means to a public end. B. The supreme aim of the federal constitution is the general welfare of the.people of the United States. It would seem that any politival aet, from the ordination of a constitution down to the enactment of a municipal ordinance, should have as its object the welfare of the com- munity to be affected by it—the general welfare of the na- _ tion, the general welfare of a State of the United States, the | general welfare of county or township, city or village. That.the general welfare of the people of the United States - is the object of the Constitution of the United States is at- _ tested by the constitution itself. The preamble to the con- stitution is as follows: ‘‘We the people of the United States, ‘in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, | promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of . Liberty to ourselves and ovr Posterity, do ordain and estab- lish this Constitution for the United States of America.”’ Promotion of the general welfare is the most general pur-- pose stated in thé preamble. Indeed, the purpose is so gen- eral that all the other.purposes stated in the preamble can be placed under the one head, promotion of the general wel- | _ fare. It is easy to see that the preamble would contain no more than it does, in substance and effect, if it were simply ~ this: “We the people of the eas States, in order to pro- ~~ — 28 — mote the general welfare, do ordain and establish this Con- stitution for the United States of America.’’ . The inciusion, in the preamble, of a general welfare clause, indicates that by and under the constitution the general welfare is to be promoted, not only in the several certain ways (instance establishirig justice and insuring domestic. tranquility) mentioned in the preamble, but i in. other ways © as well. pees It stands to reason that the general welfare is the primary “ object of the constitution,. because the general welfare is the primary object of all positive law. It is simply a matter of public policy that we have law. at all, and what reason . Of public policy there could be, for our having law, unless the reason be that the public welfare ;can be promoted through law, it is impossible to perceivé. Even the sunalind ‘‘private acts’’ of legislatures are not ‘without a measure of public importance, not without a rela- tion, however tenuous and remote, to the general welfare. Were it not so, what pessible excuse could there be for them, in a country whose government is supposed to proceed, in fact as well as theory, from. the people, and to be for the people. | » The difference between a private act saik a public act, in’ point of service to the general welfare, is one of degree, as is likwise the difference between one public act and another, and if a given public act be specifically denominated an act ‘for the public’ welfare, such act is so denominated merely because it is more obviously and immediately in the inter- est of that welfare than are most other public acts. | Even when on its face an act is in aid of an individual only, and is actually denominated a private act, it has—in order to be justified it must have—some certain, even though . relatively remote, public significance. Where, in point of public significance, is the dividing line between an act for : —39— ns the relief of John Doe and.an act' for the relief of a great mass of people? Perhaps no one can trace the line with precision. However, it suffices, for practical purposes, that - we can sense the difference betereen the private and the pub- -- lic act. The latter is certainly more for the public welfare than is the former. And just as there is a difference of de- gree between the private and the public act, so there is a _ difference of degree between one public act and another, in | point of the promotion of the public welfare. In the prevailing opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322, we .find the following passage: This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public interest even in this, as there is in‘every ' purchase and sale and in all that happens within the ' commonwealth. Some existing rights may be modified even in such a case. Rideout: v. Knox, 148 Mass; 368. But usually in ordinary affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference. A source of damage to such a house i is not a public nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in ~ifferent _ places. The damage is not-common.or public. Wesson | v.,Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95, 103.”? ze That “usually i in ovilinary affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference’’ can never. be gainsaid. In.Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the court divided over whether considerations of general welfare war- ranted the statute mvolved in that case.. The majority of the court did not think so; Mr. Justice: Brandeis did. He thought the ‘statute necessary to protect the public from . - detriment and danger—that is to say, to promote the gen- eral welfare. In view of the public detriment and danger _ involved 1 in the present real estate mortgage situation, the statute under consideration in tlre case at bar is not the out- growth ‘of any: of those ‘‘ordinary affairs’? alluded to in ~ —30— ‘Pennsylvania. Coal Co. v. Mahon. It is the outgrowth of affairs: warranting some of ‘‘this kind of interference.’’ It is not to be.numbered among ordinary public acts. It is in such degree in the interest of public welfare that, aithough all laws are in theory for that welfare, this particular - statute should be specifically denominated a public-welfare . statute. It is not only in theory for ” public welfare, but ° is especially so in fact. , ’ The preamble plays no part in the construction of the. framework -of the federal government, nor does the pre- amble play any part—at least, it plays no direct part—in endowing any branch of the federal government with any of the powers possessed by that particular branch. How- “ever, the preamble ean not be taken as an indulgence in beautiful but idle phraseology. It points to the purpose and object, basie and supreme, of the federal organic law—the . general welfare of the people of the United States. Of this: people the people of every State are a part; this welfare the welfare of the people of every State affects. And a con- stitution, as said in Commonwealth v. City of Newport News (Va., 1932), 164 S. E. 689, 696, must be construed ‘‘in the light of the purposes for which it was ordained ’”— the general, public, or common welfare. . “Cc. When by a legislative act which contravenes the let- * . ter of a constitution the general welfare can be better pro- moted than by a strict observance of: that letter, the act must prevail, else the constitution is a self-defeating instrument, and the organic law fails of the supreme object for which i it was ordained. . To concede that the statute impairs the obligation of con- tracts would not be to concede thatit violates Section 10 of Article T of thé Constitution of the United States: ‘‘N 0 state shall * * * pass any * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts * * * .”’ es om = To concede that the statute ealls for any procedure such as: does not constitute due process of law, would not be to con--. . cede that it violates Section I of the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States: ‘‘* * * nor shall any State deprive any person = edi, property, with- out due process of law * * *.’’ To concede that the statute withholds from any one the equal protection of the laws would not be to,coneede that it violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con- stitution of the United States: ‘‘nor-shall any State ** * deny. to any person: within its praioe the equal protec- tion of the laws.” It is erroneous to assume that any legislative act which impairs the obligation of contracts or trenches upon due a of class legislation is a violation of. the organic law. Whether such act is violative of ‘one or more of the clauses above quoted depends, fundamentally, upon how the clauses are to be regarded and applied. Shall they be interpreted strictly—interpreted according to their very -Jetter? Or shall they be construed liberally—construed in the light of the needs of society and the general purpose and object of a constitution? Shall they be strictly applied, without regard to whether adherence to their letter helps or hinders. general welfare? Or liberally, with an eye to pro- - moting that welfare? ‘Tf all the clauses of a constitution are always to be taken literally and applied strictly, no legislative act which is in literal conflict with any of them can by any ‘possibility be | constitutional. If, however, the clauses receive liberal con- struction and application, the question whether a given — legislative act contravenes one or more of. them must de- _ pend upon.the degree to which the act will serve the purpose and object of the constitution. ‘Ifthe clause is to be con- strued according to the spirit of the constitution as a whole, “ _— ‘and so applied as always to further, never defeat, the basic nigel ultimiate object of the organic law, certain legislative vets may impair the obligation of contracts or deprive ‘a person of property without due process of law-or deny to one the equal protection of the laws, and yet not contravene the - constitution. Ln other words, some impairments of the obli- zation of contracts may be. constitutional, others not. And’ sous to denials of due process or w ithholdings of equal pro- foe tion, . E Ps I this brief sueh expressions as ‘repugnant to,’? ‘ vio- lative of" ‘tin violation of,’* ‘Sin contravention to,’’ “ vio- lates)’ ‘Seontravenes,’’ and all similar expressions, with / reference to the relation between. a legislative act and the’ organie law or any particular provision thereof connotes more.than a mere literal conflict between them, and it is respectfully submitted that often in judicial opinions and the statements of textw riters such expressions are intended and should be taken fo mean a conflict between the legisla- tive act and the spirit and fundamental purpose of the con- “stitution or some one?or more. of its clauses. Whenever any clause of the constitution, taken literally, stands in the way of the general welfare, the general welfare must be deemed above, and constitutionally above, the letter of the clause. “A recent writer upon the Limitations of Police Power says that ‘where tlie-letter of the constitution. - would prohibit police regulations, which; by all. the prin- cipals of constitutional government, have been recog- nized as beneficent and permissible 1 restrictions upon the individual liberty of action, such regulations will be upheld by the courts, on the ground that the framers of the constitution could not possibly have intended to de- prive the government-of so salutary.a power; and hence the spirit of the constitution permits such legislation, although a strict construction of the letter may pro- hibit.’ Tid. Lim. 12.”’° aie —3— ‘ Village of Carthage v. Frederick (1890), 122 N. Y. 268, 25 N. 16, 480, 481. " a It may be said with regard to the contract clause, the due | process clause and the equal protection clause, as is said, with regard to a certain clause in-Packet Co. v. Keokuk (1877), 95 U.S. 80, 87, 24 L.. Wd. 377: ‘A mere adherence to the letter, without reference to the spirit and purpose, may in this ease mislead, as it has gnislead in other cases.’’ ID. | The police power, like the constitution, has for its object the promotion of general welfare.” ~~ @ “Tt may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. Canfield v. United. States, 167-U. 8. 518. It may be put forth in aid of |. - what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the. prevailing morality and preponderant opinion to be greatly and .- immediately necessary to the public welfare.” "Noble State Bank v2 Haskell (1910), 219 U. S. 104, ‘ 141, 31S. Ct. 186; 55 L. Ed. 112, 82 L. R.A. N.S. 1062, Ann. Cas, 1912. A, 487, regcrs ,. Mverything that has ever been stated as a proper object of the exercise of tle power.can be ranged under the head of general welfare. The public peace, the public arder, the. _ publie safety, the public health, the public morals, to men-_ tion only.a few but perhaps the most usual objects of the ex- ~~ ercise of the power—these all range under the head of gen- eral welfare. They range uhder it as certainly as, from the * national point of view, do the formation of a more perfect union; the establishment of justice, the insurance of domes- tie tranquility, the provision for the common (general, pub- | lic) defense, and the securing, to ourselves and ou terity, of the-blessings of liberty. Indeed, the object f\any law, organic or nonorganic, state or federal, must be something . that ranges under the general-welfare head. A + eR a ot ae Se emmerererenrnmreat as en) yen ee as —~%— The term ‘‘general welfare” or its equivalent occurs in numerous definitions and characterizations of the police : power, and in such manner as to make clear that the promo- tion of that welfare is the essential office of the pow, and the foundation of every. exercise thereof. Ss 12C. J. Constitutional Law, sec. 430. ie And see: — Board of Public Works , o>), 195 Cal. 471, \ ac. 381, 383, 38 A. L. R. 1479; - Pedtis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter (1927), 115 Neb. 525, * 213 N. W. 835, 838; State v. Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 430, 123-Atl. 842, 37 A. L. R. 131 (United States Supreme Court cases cited). . And the following recent cases : _ Graham v. Kingwell (Cal.), 24 Pac. (2a) 4 488; | People v. Coulides, 265 N. Y. Supp>765, citing Baker. v. Walker, 204 U. 8. 311, 27 iy Ct. 289, ‘ST L. Ed. 499. The police power has even. been said to be “the law: of overruling necessity, for the cuca of the wr welfare.’’ Cook County v. Chicens (1924), 311 Nl. 324, 142 N. B. 512, 516, 31 A. L. R. 442. : E. If the object of all law, organic or nonorganic, and the object of the police power, as exercised in the making of * law, be upon. ultimate analysis the general welfare, where within the bounds of law—where within the scdpe of ae . welfare—lie the boundaries of the police power? If the police power_ could -be defined with precision, the question could be readily answered. Definitions aes to } boundaries, boundaries point to definitions. - The difficulty of defining the police power or perceiving its boundaries has been frequently recognized. — 6 R. C..L., Constitutional Law, sec. 183. a“ 7 It is respectfully submitted that much of the difficulty” = in defining the police power lies in. the. fact that “‘nolice | power,’? like many other terms, has different itieiel in different connections. : nae . ; - In its broadest sense the term r means, perhaps, sovereign | power itself, the source of all: positive adie —— the organic. 6R. C.L., Constitutions Law, sec. 184; . 2 oe Constitutional Law, sec. 415; . | Citizens’ Ins. Co. v. Hebert (1916), 139 ‘La. 708, 717, 71 So. 955, 958. _ In a narrower sense, the police power seems to be the power to meet the great public needs, whether such needs as have been immemorially regarded as great (instance th relative to such matters as public health and public mora 5) or yet others, net immemorially regarded as great, but by. _ times and conditions, according to the.preponderant ‘opin- — ion of what.is required and the prevailing opinion of what is right, raised to the rank of those things ‘‘oreatly and immediately necessary to the public good.’’. ‘See Noble: State Bank v. Haskell, supra (219 U. 8. 104, 111). In the. narrower sense, police power is but sovereign power in a certain one of its aspects. We have already had occasi . (see I B, this Argument) to point out that private acts dif- fer from public acts in’ ‘degree only, in point of serving the public welfare, and that public acts differ from one another - in the same manner. Some serve that welfare in: much greater degree than do others. . . If certain characterizations of the police power dofnot serve to make it synonymous with sovereign power, théy at _ least go to the verge of doing so, and make out that the er- cise of the police power is 4 manifestation, at any rate, of - sovereign power. Thus, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy sind Co. v. People (1905), 200 U. S. 561, 588, 26 S. Ct. 341, 56 + 36 | ; L. Hd. 596, we.read that the police power is“‘ineident, to and. apart of government itself.’? In Miller v. Board of Public |. Works (1925), 195, Cal. 47% 234 Pac. 381, 3 A. L. R. 4479, we read that the police power is ‘‘an indispensable prerogative ee f soverguenty, and not lightly to be limited.’’. ‘The police astate *'* * ‘are nothing more or less than the ent inherent i in every sovereignty to the ‘extent of its dominions.” McKeon v. Railway Co. (1902), , 75 Conn..347, 53 Atl. 656, 657, 61: L.-R. A. 730, quoting from The License Cases, 5 How. (46 U.S. ) 504, 583, 12 L. ‘Ed. 256. pam wed orc LB a er State v. Bassett: (1924), 100 iGint. 430, 123 Atl. 842, * 843,37 A. L. R. 13h ; . City of Chicago v. yee Home —. 289 “Ti. 206, 124 N. E. 416, 419. ; _— Regarded as a power exercised for the gtent anil of gen--— ‘gapudies, the police power is hevertheless, of course, a ‘parts of sovereign power. Ita ds‘merely a nfatter of termi- — nology, whether we shall give the name ‘‘police power’’ to " sovereign power as a whole or to sovereign power as we see it manifest itself or capable of manifesting’ itself under cer- tain circumstance’ _and to certain ends. In strictness, the pelice power is no e to be separated from the one-and | only supreme Eek sia in a state than reason, will or emotion is to be separated from mind and made a mind unto - itself. - ‘‘ Police power,”’ then, in the narrow sense of the term (that is to say, the sense in which we usually employ the term) is a nante for sovereign power as it may or actu- . ally does manifest itself-iny behalf of great public needs; it “Is sovereign power. ina certain aspect of that power—sov- . .ereign power as capable. of acting or as act@ally acting for “certain highly important objeets of general welfare. It might seem as if, in a yet narrower sense, the police. + ep > , ° ‘ ‘ ‘ t ‘ 2 ° . ’ e ; -_ ; ‘ d , rs . ‘ ; ‘ ‘ . wun ee @. A state may balsizios its police power against the letter of the federa] constitution. The truth of the statement is so-implicit in so many of the _ decisions, state and\federal, cited in this brief, that it seems _ ‘ almost superfluous to fortify the proposition with particular & statements and citations. The contract clause of the federal constitution does not ‘ibhibit a state from i impairing: the obligation of contracts . ‘when exercising its police power with a view to esteemed a: i in and immediate good. TN ‘See Burdick, The Law‘of the. American Constitution, secs. 196 and 197. N or does ‘the Fourteenth Amendment place a wiiteltoa. upon the subjects over which a:state may exercise the power. >“ “See 2. Cooley; Constitutional. Limitations as ed. My | 1234, f. n._- a ene sgt ‘Police power belongs inherently to ent of the states. | 12 C. J., Constitutional Law, sec.. 417: \2 Cooley, Constitutional | Limitations (8th ed.), p 1232. Except posstity within a ‘field which the hitogile: of the ” _ United States, as distinguished from ‘the people of one of a] _the-stater-mlay oocu occupy exclusively, the federal constitution . has not deprived the states of their police power. —_— v. Maryland (1827), 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419, ; * aN AE PUL OE ener a. ee: : , Boston Beer Co. v . Massachusetts stn, 97 U.S. ° 25, 33, 24. L. Ed. 989; Reeves v. “Corning (1892), 51 Fed. 774, 785; | State v. Schlenker (1900), 112 Iowa 642, bot. 649, 84 | nae ath 698," 699, 51 L. R. A: 347, 84 Am. St. Rep.. ene ~ State w Fitepatrick. (1888), 16 R. I. 54, 11 Atl» 767, . City of Rochester v West (1898), 29 App. Div. 125, | 51 N. Y. Supp. 482, 484; City of Westport. v. Mulholland (1900), 159 Mo. 86, a OR. W. 1, 8, SSL. BR. B.408. . _ HL Whether given jogiilativin promotes the intwed wel-_ ee fare at all, nud if so, the degree to which the legislation ] pro- . motes the. general welfare, may depend upon times and con- ditions. As has in effect hetii pointed out, such matters as the pub- __lie peace, order, safety, health and morals .are ‘at all times _ to be. weighed against the letter of the constitution. Even — - with respect to these matters, undoubtedly certain measures _ which at, certain times and undér certain conditions are not: justified by considerations | of general welfare and-are uli- constitutional, may so far promote. that: welfare at certain . -other. times. and under certain. other conditions as to be con- ‘stitutional. The statute now under consideration is not un- ‘+ connected with’ certain of these matters, in. partjcular peace : : and order, because of conditions now obtaining. j - Such economic measures as the letter of the soantibaite, | wlll kill ‘at one time may. at another time kill the. letter . . _ of the constitution. - _ No one will. dispute that at most times vad iid most . conditions most measures in contravention of the letter of ' the contract. clause, the due process clause or the equal: pro-— tection clause are as contrary to the spirit of the constitu- - tion as to its letter. But conditions may so change, éven over night, 2 as to present an occasion on which measures de- —_ fen | signed to serve the general welfare fn the particular instance may serve it so well as to outweigh.all other considerations,- we _ and thus a measure that would have been contrary to the’ public intergst yesterday may today be imbued -with‘a public ” interest of the most vital sort. Such a measure is the.statute | . eonsidered in-the case at bar. ee ee ee as oO. a ‘ : 2 net ‘‘Plainly cireumstances may so change in time or so differ in-space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times. or in other places would be a matter of __.——~ ‘purely private concern. -It is: enough to refer to the decisions as to insurance, in German Alliance Insurance. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389; irrigation, in Clark v. Nash, 198 U.'S. 361; and mining, in Strickley.v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527. The sufficiently illus- trate‘what hardly would be denied. Th ‘that the use by the public generally of each specific thing affected cannot be made the test of public interest, - .. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama: ° Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S..30, 32;,'and that the pub- - lig interest may extend io the use ‘of land. They dispel the notion that what in its immediate aspect may be only a private transaction may not be raised by its class or character to a public affair. See.also Noble State Banh - Haskell, 219 U.S. 104,110,111. é es ~ Block v. Hirsch (1921), 256 U. 8. 135, 155, 41 8."Ct. 7 * . >" 458, 65 L:-Bad, 865,i6A.LB165.°- * _ A matter which in general is private may ina particdlar — _ situation become public. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel (1923), 258 U.S. 242, 246, 42 S. Ct. 289, 66 L. Bd. 595. - +: “*The police power of the state, never having been exactly defined or circumscribed by fixed limits, is con- ‘sidered:as being capable of development and modifica- . _ tion within certain limits, so that the powers of govern. ‘Mental control may be adequate to meet changing social, economic, and political conditions. It is very broad and comprehensive, and is liberally understood and applied. ee , Pia OKAY EN ¥ PN al aoe ey illustrate also . a . a ‘ 4 | ~~ The changing conditions of society may make it impera- _ tive for the state to exercise additional powers, and the - Welfare of society may’ demand that the state should . assume such power.’’ ’6R. C, L., Constitutional Law, sec. es, citing ample ° authority. Pa ae Se oP esac st * .*. *>- The instrument was not intended to pro- | vide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but: was _ to endure through a long lapse of ages; the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable. purposes of - , ' Providence... It could not be foreseen-what new changes and modifications of: power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of. the charter, and re- - strictions and specifications which at tlie present might seem salutary might in the end prove the overthrow of the system itself. Hence its powers are expressed in .. general terms, leaving to the legislature from time to time to adopt its-own means to effectuate legitimate _ objects and to mold and model the exercise of its pow- ers as its own wisdom and the public intérest should ___ See pts er ta , : _ “*The police power, as such, is not confined within 44% * __ the narrow circumscription of precedents, resting upon . _ past conditions which do not cover and control présent- day conditions obviously calling for revised regulations © ‘to promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare - of the public; that is to say, as‘a commonwealth devel- ops politicafly, economically. and socially, ‘the, police power likewise develops, within reason, to meet the changed and changing conditions. “What was at one- time regarded as an improper exercise of the police bgp may now, because of changed et recognized as a legitimate exercise of that power.”’ , ' > hm ' Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925), 195 Cal. 477,. + 234 Pac, 381, 383, 38 A. L.R.1479; -. Pettis vy. Alpha Alpha Chapter (1927), 115 Neb. 545, 213 N. W. 835, 838. aire Vue ier And seé'City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784, 788 Serge pawn — 45 — t ~ ‘*What was a reasonable-exercise in-the days of our fathers may toduy.seem so-utterly unreasonable as: to make it difficult for ns to comprehend the existence of ae conditions that would justify same; what would ir - fathers have been #ejected as unthinkable is today ac- _ -eepted-as\a most:proper and reasonable exercise there-. of.’ e. \,., a. & a " Streich v. Board of Education (1914), 34 S: D. 169, at a .147.N. W. 779, 781, Ann. Cas. 1917-A, 760; _ |... Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925), 195 Cal. 477, °°". 1934 Pao, 381, 383, 28 A.L.B.1479." © —.:. Doubtless the statute before us would be condemned. 2° least limitable of the powers of government and ‘that it extends to all the great public needs; that constitutional law is a progressive science; that’ statutes aiming to establish a standard of social justice, to conform the law to the accepted standards. of the community, to ing living standards ofMprice for the producer, are to be interpreted with that degree of. liberality which is essential -to the attainment of the.end in view (Austin stimulate the roductiggpot a vital food product by fix- ~ _. by an earlier generation temerarious interference. * ' “’ with the rights of property and contract * * *. But we must-nat fail to consider that the police power is.the. . v. City of New-York, supra, page 117 of 258 N. Y.,179 » . N: E. 313); and that mere novelty is no objection to in legislation (People exrel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La ' Petra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. EQget' 16 A. L. R. ¢152).”” | People v Nebbia (1933); 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694, os f ie 3 . , .. n . ° . ° *% 4 ¥ ° > ° _ I. An economic depression, as ‘well as a war, may consti- tute or comprise an emergency such as warrants ah unusual - exercise of the police power. In‘ne case so far decided’ has . it been said that'war provides the sole oceasion for such leg- islative overriding of the letter of the constitution as would not be periissible in ordinary times and under normal cir- - cumstances. On the contrary, the same reasoning that jus- — a ad oW a | . 6 ee : te - tifies certain legislation i in ‘onnthin, arid sera or ha the constitution certain exercises of the police powef inwar- ‘time emergency, justifies’ ‘certain. legislation in peacetime, | ; ° and harmonizes with the constitution certain exercises ae . the police power in peacetime emergency. In peacetime as in wartime, the point on which turns thé conflict between the police power and the letter-of the organic law, is the matter of general welfare. No better-evidence of this exists than the fact that public péace, order, safety, health and morals can always be furthered at thé expense of the letter of the constitution, But certain other things can be furthered at _that expense only when an emergency of some sort raises them, for the time being, to the plane that matters of public oa peace, order, safety, health and morals occupy. in peace or war, ‘and i in times of economic weniewunin as well as in times _ of prosperity. Various definitions of the sililees power embrace such terms as ‘‘ ‘prosperity,’ ‘economic welfare,’’ ‘‘economic concern,’ ” etc., ete thus evincing that the police power may be used | - to further the general welfare along economic lines, and in- dicating, also, that an economic eme rgency may be a proper occasion for exercising the power in ways in which it might _not, ordinarily, be constitutionally exercised. And see: *, Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Russell (Mich.), 249 N. W. 27, a -29 (United States Supreme Court decisions cited). We have already pointed out that numerous definitions of the police power embrace the term ‘‘general welfare’’: (I D, this Argument) and that general welfare, according to judicial definitions thereof, embraces the primary social interest of economic welfare (I A, this —* seed cases here again cited). . State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. (1914), 168 _— = 1, 10,147 N. W. 195, 199, L. R. A. 1917 B, 19185. —47 — oL, & | Pettis v. “Alpha Alpha Chapter (1927), 115 5 Neb. 525, : 212 N. W W. 835, 838. | ss | It has not bla been said by oe one.of the purposes - of the police power.is, ‘‘to insure in any respect such €c0-— nomic conditions as an advancing civilization of a highly complex charactér requires. ’’ Stetter v. O’Hare (1914), 69 Orl. 519, 531, 139 — ' 743, 747, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 217, 299. = Ex parte Townsend (1911), 64 Tex. Cr. 350, 1448. W. - 628, 631, 33 Amn. Cas. 19140, 814,-817; a . * State v. ’Mamlock (1910), 58 Wash. 631, 633, 109 Pace. iP i" .- 47,.137°Am. St. Rep. 1085; | Morrison v. State (1906), 116 Tenn. 534, 543, 95 - Ww. - 494, 496. - power that may be exercised to promote reer es may ‘certainly be exercised to deal with depression. . Therefore it is important to note that not infrequently the promotion of public poegeny has been said to be a function of the power. _ ‘*We hold that the police power r of | a ‘State embraces | regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations de- signed to promote the public health, the public morals - or the public safety. Lake Shore & Mich. South. Ry. - Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 292; Gilman v. Philadelphia, : _ 3 Wall 713, 729: Pound v. Turck, 95. U.S. 459, 464; Rail- road Co. v. Haven, 95 U.S. 470. » Chica. Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. People, supra (200 U. S. 561, 592). » It is a power under which ‘‘persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, ‘health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right i in the legislature to do which, no “question ever was, Or, upon. acknowledged © general principles, ever can be made, all vila . ; —48— Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Rd. Co. (1854), 27 : Vt. 140, 149, 62 Am. Dee. 625, 633; *- - Village of Carthage v. Frederick (1890), 122 N. Y. 268, 25 N. EK. 480, 482. ; ‘“Whatever may be the limits by which the earlier . decisions circumscribed the (police) power, it has in | -more recent decisions been defined to include all those . regulationgylesigned to promote the public convenience, the geieral welfare, the general prosperity, and extends to all great public needs, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, an public morals or the . - public safety.’’ State v. Pitney (1914), 79 Wash. 608, 140 Pac. as 919, Ann. Cas. 1916. A, 209. : “See also: Noble State Bank -v. Haskell, supra, (219 U. S. 104, © . iin : mes Wigite, 204 U.S. 311, 318, 51 L. Ed. 499, =... ~ §. Ct 3 Barbier v. Connolly (1885), 113 U. S. 27, 31,5 S. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923; Women’s Kansas City ’St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City (1932), 58 ¥ (2d) 593, 599; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co. (1922), 193 : Iowa 1096, bot. 1104, 184 N. W. 823, 23 A. L. R. 1322. © ‘*Kmergency laws i in time of peace are uncommon but not, unknown. Wholesale disaster, financial panic, the aftermath of war (Hamilton v. K entucky Distilleries W. Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161, 40 S. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. 194), earthquake, pestilence, famine, and fire, a combination of men 6r the force of circumstances may, as-the alterna- tive of confusion or chaos, demand the enactment of - laws that would be thought arbitrary under normal con- - ditions (Bowditch v. Boston, 101-U. S. 16, 18, 19, 25 L. Ed. 980; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. ‘41, 31 - _ S. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82).”” -Peopte v. La Fetra (1921), 230 N. y. 429, 130 N. E. . 601, 606. , — 49 - ahaa In no well considered modern case is it said, with reference ‘ to public (common, general) welfare, that the police power . is for exercise with respect to such welfare in.this connec:> tion but not in that, or that the letter of the constitution must yield to it in connection with this phase or aspect of such welfare but not in connection with that. Although the land involved in the case at bar is not farm . land, the importance of thé-sfatute to the people of the State . of Minnesota can not be. fully realized without: bearing in mind that agriculture is one of the important industries of | the state and that the prevailing economic distress involves — a multitude of farm mortgages. —«->-—s//. It can hardly be maintained that a power whieh j in ordi- - nary times and circumstances can be exercised in behalf of the health, morals, peace, order and safety of the people, — and otherwise for their welfare ‘i in general, can not be ex- erted by them for their economic welfare in tinies when con- ditions are such® ‘that they render families homeless, take . bread from the mouths of children, drive men, women and ° children. into breadlines and i in various ways throw large numbers of persons upon the bounty of public charity— times when conditions are-such that they even create ard fan the very sparks of insurrection itself. ; The Court of Appeals of the’State of New York, in People — v. Nebbia (1933), 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694, 698, noticed as a reason justifying a legislative enactment ‘‘scenes of vio- lence and disorder in the attempt. to organize so-called milk . , strikes asa protest against the low prices paid for milk.’’ It should hardly be: necessary to argue that in times like these the power can be used to keep families-in their homes, fariners on their farms. While farmers keep their land, they can at least keep themselves usefully employed and keep themselves and their.families from becoming public charges. Whether A or B, as an a individual, owns some Particular ‘ ° : : 5 F 2 . ‘ q " ‘ : . ‘ . . Sete = . . : . ‘ on a w -- Pen Neime eRe — . : = . ota - home or farm, i is wit the nitiint, but what matters is the detriment and danger to all the citizens of the state through _ what has happened or may happen to many of its citizens. «J. -'The statute is not, and does not profess to be,.a cure for the depression or any phase of the depression, but merely ‘a means of ameliorating, during the economic emergency, a certain conditidn fraught with public detriment and-danger. It is to. be noted, too, that the statute is a legislative exer- cise of a legislative. power, and not in any sense or degree “an abdication of such power. . 7 K.-: During the past generation, with the concept of the — .police powers. undergoing clarification, legislatures have ‘more and more weighed ‘this power against. the letter of the _ organic law. : It is an irrefutable fact that “during the last generation - the pendulum has swung.’’ ¢ : Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution, secs. 196 and 197: ae _ A detailed history of the swing of ¢he ‘iditien may be found in 2 Warren, The Supreme ‘Court in United States History, 735 et seq:, esp. 740-742. oa "Although the power must always have been as great as it - now is, the concept of the breadth | of the power has grown’ _as courts and legislatures have come to have a better under- standing of the relation ‘between the power and the organic — . Jaw. The police power can hardly be conceived of as ‘msthing more potent at one time than at another (see ‘Brown v. Mary- _ land, 12 Wheat., 25 U. S., 419, 439), but as a power the appli- cation: of which contracts or enlarges as the necessity for . “applying it grown or diminishes. " So, in the following -- tation, it would seem, the ‘‘growth of the police power’’ means merely the growth of the necessity for using the Ya FUCA LE TPR a Pht AE STE eA Tr ea SOE RT rae ene RE nag gee? dete 9 9 Ney a MRSA, am Sees rs = a iaiededaat tal a.’ power, and, consequently, of the bounds of the actual exer- ., eige or application of, the power. ap “*'* * the growth of the police power. must from ‘time ‘to time conform to the growth .of our social, in- - dustrial ant commeycial life. You cannot put a straight- jacket on justice alfy- more than you can put a straight- | jacket on business.’’ . Leonard v. State (1919), 100 Olio St. 456, 127 N. E. . 464, 465. We must without. hesitation or a : Mash of apology dismiss the view that those who framed our constitution and those i who voted to adopt it intended jit to be.a reer onetl on - progress or the. public welfare. . The tendency of modern development is is in the direc- tion of greater, rather than more restricted use of pélice power, and necessarily so in order to-meet the new dap- gers and increase of old dangers, constantly occurring _ as natural incidents of advancing civilization. en Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. City of _ « Milwaukee (1897), 97 Wis. 422, 72 N. W. 1118, ae. And see: . ater Cityof Wesi pot-o-Muthalisiad” (1900),.159 Mo. ae 60 S. W. 77, 78, 53 L. B. A. 442, - Although of late the use of the power has become more and more frequent and has extended over broader fields than it teuched in the early days of the republic, it must not be . ‘thought that the power has not always existed, any more than it must be ‘thought that the power itself has grown. Although the term ‘“police power’’ found its way into the decisions in 1827, via Brown v: Maryland, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.), 419, 443 (see 1 Warren, The Supreme Court i in United States History, 605, f. 1.2), the use of the power in this coun- try antedated the use of the term (see Mumn v. Ilinois, 94 U. S. 113, 125, 24 L. Ed. 77). Not only is it true that the yielding ’ OS LP SRR EL, IIE EDO SEDI OL OG! LCE A ELIE . ; sn of ‘the letter of the constitution to its spitit is po new thing, | but it is true, of a necessity, that the existence of the power aintedated the very organie law with whose letter it some-' times conflicts. As said in City of Rochester v. West (1898), 51. N.Y. Supp. 482, 484, the power, generally. speaking, ‘may - be characterized as.a power which.inheres in the state, and in each political subdivision thereof. * * * It constituted an - essential feature of some of. the enactments of the, Twelve - Fables, and it has for ages beon adopted and enforced by all civilized nations as a cardinal rule of the civil law.’’ The fact that the relation between the police power and the con- stitution was not at first thoroughly grasped, ‘and there- fore not cohsidered in. many cases in which it might have ~ been, is no argument against the existence and the scope of the power. oe 5 OE ae: a If the statutes involved ‘ini. certain cases: were the ont- Zz growths of previous depressions, and were emergeéney acts, notwithstanding the: fact that’ the decisions in question rv not allude to those statutes as emergency measures or, dis- cuss: the relation between the organic law and — ree two observations are in order: The force of those decisions ‘as standing for § a narrow namie of the constitution is weakened by their want of direct refereitce to! any emergency and their lack of allu- sion to thé police power. : - 2. Those decisions must yield to the authority of bober . Cases, in which emergency statutes are considered as such and the relation indicated which subsists and must always have subsisted oe the police power and the constitu- tion. oo As to Munn v. Illinois, supra, and saith cases :, + would stultify the principle enunciated therein to hold ‘that it is applicable only where the regulation of rates or prices is con- cerned. The principle is obviously applicable not only. ° opr inciple the ise of the police power in a large number __.-of-cises varying greatly from one. another in their facts. — ie: Ww hei rates.or prices are regulated 1 In con, aeetion with a busi- . ‘ ness affected with a public interest, but where for any rea- son’ anything whatsoever is so far affected with such an’ - interest as to'‘make it reasonably necessary that it be taken under legislative control. The difference between regulat- ~ Ing the use of property. ‘‘elothed with a public interest”? and extending for ‘the ‘publie benefit the ‘period in which re. _ . demptien of land may be effected is not a difference in prin- ciple. “It is not without reason if.in a recent: case, People — v. Ne bbia, 262.N, Y. 259, 186.N. EB. 694, 698, the Court-of -Ap- ’ peals of the State of New York, citing n us ‘decBions of the Supreme Court of. "the Unit d States, relates to a single - ee -From the time (1820) when Congress empowered. the city of. ' Washington “to regulate * * * the rates of wharfage at pri- vate wharves, * * * the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the rate of fees therefor, * * * and the weight and quality: of bread,’’ (see Munn v. Illinois, supra, 94 U.S. 113, 125) down to, through. and past the time (1921) when it was held that Congress could. regulate the amounts of rents and the tenures _ of lessees in that city (see Block v. Hirsch, supra, 256 U.S. . 135), the principle has always been applicable, that; given a. situation in which or occasion on which the public interest is so great as'to call for legislation contravening the letter & of the constitution, considerations of general welfare prevail ~ over that letter—the legislation i is constitutional. a II. ai? * Mertein maitre which the courts judicially notice, vertadn _ presumptions with which they surround legislation, and the: general attitude which judicial tribunals — = legis- ; lation, all tend to support the act. - ‘é eagle The relation between the grganic law and the’ police power involves the principle that whether the letter of that law or the police power shall prevail depends upon consid- erations.of general welfare. In the actual balancing of the letter against the power—the actual process ‘of balancing ‘considerations of public welfare—certain principles, pre- sumption, ete, apply. Tliey determine what part the agurt “and what part the legislature takes in the process, atid how each shall play its part. A.” The court i is bound to. ‘take judicial notice of the fact that a grave economic emergency“exists. ’ | ‘. The courts emerald notice matters of common knowl- edge. 7 — C. J., Evidence, sec. 1810. ‘The: best evidence that an emergency exists is public i *ognition of the fact. The courts can. not be without knowledge of that evidence. They know. that people in all walks of life are continually discussing, and have for years - bepi? continually discussing, the economic depression; that newspapers and magazines have teemed, and. teem now more than ever, with editorials aid‘other articles concerning it; that books, have been written about it; that sermons have zy been preached. about it, and that innumerable other dis- courses have been pronounced concerning it; that there has been discussion without end as to’ its cause or causes, its _ numberless ramifications and effects, its composite charac- ‘~ ter (its consisting of or producing countless emergencies that merge to make of it:one vast emergency), the time and man- ner of its beginning, ‘its probable duration and how it may end, as ‘well as what its after effects may be, and the possi- bilities of curing or ameliorating it as a whole or in some one’ \ or more of its innumerable particulars. _ That the e depression. has confronted the respective states * a ‘ ° i — . on e 2 \ PE POON TRE EGE REE SCAN LE EE LE LOOM SEES ELE ANG LLL EE AS ELIE ELEN ELLE BLP ION SLES OLS RESET DL = c om GR on ‘individually and the United States as whole with countless and various detriments and dangers, is also a matter of com- mon knowledge. ‘Tt is even such knowledge, that the whole - eivilized world faces an emergency. Recently representa- i ”* ,. torremove still beset the world—these facts are all mattersof ~~ tives of the principal nations assembled in Lénddn, to con- © sider the economic problems of the world. The fact.that there was such a conference, the fact that it found the prob- lems overwhelming, the fact that it adjourned, temporarily at least, without having solved the problems, and the fact . that most:if not all of the detriments and dangers it sought, the most common of common knowledge. It would seem. to require no specific, authority. for the . proposition that a court may*fudicially notice the existence of a public emergency. Yet such authority exists. Block v. Hirsch, supra, 256 U. S. 135, 154; Chastleton. Corporation v. Sinclair (1924), 264 U. S. ., 643, 547, 68 L. Ed. 841, 448. Ct. 405. - te the latter case this court said it could Jadicially. notice that an emergency has passed. It would be strange if a court | ould: notice, judicially, that an emergency has passed, but , ; 472). A recent pronouncement in ade is as follows: “Courts are reluctant to declare legislative enact- “ments unconstitutional, and will do.so only when the eo violation is clear, palpable, and practically free from a." ag : Wangh v. Shirer (lowa), 249 N. W. 246; | See also Hubbell v. Herring (Lowa), 249 N. W. 430, . ° 435. Among meet cases in point on the presumption of con- stitutionality and the duty of the courts to seek to sustain rather than defeat legislation, are the following: - Jefferson County v. Busby (Ala.), 148 So. 411, 413; State v. Dyer (Fla.), 143 So. 201, 203;. State v. Prevatt (Fla.), 148 So. 578, 579; Wayne Township v. Brows (Ind.), 136 N. E. 841, 847; ~ Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood (Miss.), 114 So. 781, 783; as _ Rider v. "Cooney (Mont.), 23 Pac. (2d) 261; ; State v. Hall (Neb.), 249 N. W. 756, 758-9; People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 269, 186 N. KE. 694, 699 ; Commonwealth v. Great American Indemuity Co. (Pa.), 167 Atl. 793, 797-8; _ Utah Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Stewart (Utah), 23 Pac. (2d) 229, 232; Richmond Linen Supply Co. v, City of Lynchburg (Va.), 169 _ K. 554; Aetna Ins. Co. . Commonwealth (Va. ), 169 S. E. : 859, 864; - Mason v. City of Seattle (Wash.), 24 Pac. (2d) 91, 92; Leonhart v. Board of Educatio (W. Va.), 170 S. EF. ° 418, 421. . . C. The courts are not concerned with legislative motives. If the good faith of the legislature could be impugned, we might make an argument like this:, If a statute is not enacted in good faith, but palpably involves a fraudulent ‘assumption of the exercise of the police power, the statute - being but a subterfuge whereby the gaining of ulterior ends © is sought—ends other than those of general welfare—the _ ‘statute itself breaks down the presumptions which clothe | / ee legislative acts. It is obvious that only in an unusual case —a clear case of legislative mala fides—can the statute itself defeat the presumption. Such a statute does not deserve to have the question asked concerning it, whether the gereral welfare is the more to be pregerved by the act or by adher- ence to the letter of the constitution. Such a statute should -without hesitation be declared unconstitutional. | Not only is there no apparent basis for such an argument, ' but if basis for it existed it could not be made, because bad faith can, never be imputed to a legislatyre. A proper mo- tive for every legislative enactment is conclusively pre- suined. Leuiee a Soe 12 C. J.; Constitutional Law, sec. 224;,: Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 4 Fed. Supp. - * Blanchard v. City of New York, 262 N. Y.5,186'N. E. 29, 32. P : = | : This court applies the presumption of proper motive to the acts of state’legislatures as well as to the acts of Congress. United States v. Des: Moines Navigation & Ry. Co. © (1891), 142 U.S. 510, 544, 12 S. Ct: 308, 35 L. Ed. 1099. .- : aoe “The motives of legislators in the enactment of a — | statute cannot be inquired into judicially in determin- ing the validity of the enactment.”’ ‘Third Dec. Dig., Constitutional Law, sec. 70 (3), eit- ing among other cases, Smith v. Kansas City ‘Title & Trust Co. (1921), 255 U. S. 180, 210, 41 _ §. Ct. 243,65 L. Ed. 577. — ; ‘‘No principle of our constitutional law is more firmly ~ established than that this court may not, in passi' g upon the validity of a statute, inquire into the motive of Con- gress. United States v. Des Moines Navigation Co., 142 U. S. 510, 544; McCrary v..United States, 195 U.S. see _e— 27, 53-59; Weber v. Fried, 239 U. 8. 325, 330; Dakota | Central Telephone Co. v. South ns 250 U. S. 163, © 184. * @ #9) | Hamilton v. clei Distilleriés Co.:, ‘supra, (251 _U. 8. 146, 161). —— = D. Legislative policy is nol matter for judicial re- view. . It is not: for the courts to say whetler legislation is - ‘ wise or unwise, whether it nianifests good policy or bad. “The question of the wisdom, justice, policy, or rex. ; pediency of a statute are for the Legislature alone.”’ =: Third Dee. Dig. ., Constitutional Law, sec. 70 (3),. cit. ing, among other cases: - National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Warburg (1922), 260 rr, U.S..71 (see 77), 43 S. Ct..32, 67 L. Sed. i; a ' U nited States v. Lanza (1922), 260 U. ” 377 — 385), = ; 43S. Ct. 141, 67 L. Ed. 314. “Nor may the court inquire into the wisdom of the _ legislation. McCullough v. Maryland,.4 Wheat. 316, © _ 421; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. ‘i 197; Brushaber -v. Union Pacific R.-R. Co., 240 U. 8. 1, 25; Rast v. Van Denman & — Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357.7 : ' Silane. Suibaiies Distilleries Co., supra, (251 U. "7 _* -, §. 146, 161). See dee ae: ee Block v. Hirsch, supra (256 U.S. 135, 138) ;. 3 ae Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service rakinies aie supra (248 U. §.-372, 374) ; Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Goldsboro, supra, Ce U.S. 548, 558). And the following recent decisions: _ Wiliams v. Mayor, 53 S. Ct: 431, 433; Wonder Bakeries Co., Inc.,.v. White, 3 F Supp. 311; Jefferson County v. Busby —_ ) 148 So. 411, 413; el oa | —-\ State v. Dyer (Fla.), 143 So..201, 208-4; _ Mississiggi State Tax Commission v. Flora Drug Co. | (Miss.), 148 So. 373, 377; = . Little v. American State Bank (Mich.), 249 N. W. 22, People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 269, 186 N. E. 694, 699; McPherson v. Fisher (Ore.), 23 Pac. (2d), 913, 914; State v. Morrison (S. Dak.),; 249 N. W. 563,560;.° a % r* Board of Education (W. Va.), 170 S. E. | 418, 421. ae : . - Therefore the court is not.concerned with whether eredi- 7 tors may also be debtors. If the legislature deems it more | important to the public: welfare to go to the aid of debtors ‘than to go to the aid of creditors, if the latter need aid, the matter lies in the realm of legislative wisdom and discretion. _ Legislative wisdom or lack thereof, in doing. nothing for creditors in the period 1912-1920, a: period of rising prices: and security-valuations, if indeed anything could or should have been done for creditors in that period, is not a proper matter for judicial inquiry, and is not a proper criterion by - ‘which to determine whether a present exercise of the police. power, for the relief of the public through the relief of mort- - gagors of real estate, is or is not a valid exercise of the . power. penn ee ak a - If it is the thought of the legislature that in view of the large areas of agricultural lands in the state and the great - ‘number of its citizens who are.engaged in agriculture, which js a paramount industry of the state, the vocation of the - farmer’ is. 80 fundamentally important that every effort - - should be made to help the farmer remain on his farm, the legislature is certainly entitled to the thought.. If itis the . thought of the legislature that homes and homeowners are of such fundamental importance to the state that every effort — should be made to, help the homeowner keep his home, the . - legislature is certainly entitled to the thought. If the legis- eens. i lature has the thought that although in these times most creditors are debtors, nevertheless there are more debtors than creditors, and that a‘man’s distress in the capacity . of debtor is greater than his distress in the capacity of creditor, and that the general welfare can be better promoted by a © _eoncession. to debtors.than b by. a concession to creditors, the legislature i is certainly entitled to the thought: “Tf the tegis=-—-— lature-has the thought that:although it can do something positive for the general welfare by aiding’ mortgagor-debt- ors, there is little or nothing positive it can do to aid mort- | gagee-creditors, and that to do nothing with regard to mort- gage debts is but to let a bad situation grow worse, alike for mortgagurs and mortgagees and the public in general, the legislature is certainly entitled to.the thought. EK. The legislature is the first judge of what-is for the - greatest good of the greatest number, and so for the true - ultimate good of all. “Great constitutional provisions must: be adminis- tered ‘with caution. Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine, and’it must be remembered that _ legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the ee in quite as great a degree as 8 the courts.’’ | a ‘iat, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. ». May (1904), 194 U. S. 267, 270, 24S. Ct. 638, 48 L. Ed. 971. | _ **The legislative department is the judge, within rea- _ sonable limits, to determine what public convenience and public welfare require, and the wisdom of its leg- _.islation is not the concern of the courts. It is our duty - to sustain an act, unless its invalidity is-in our judg- ment beyond a reasonable doubt. Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 82 Atl. 1030, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 946; State v. Lay, 86 Conn. 145, 84 Atl. 522; Cooper v.. Telfair, 4 * Dall. 14, 19, 1 L: Ed. 721. “The Legislature by the passage’ of this act has ; a inline judged that the public convenience and welfare would be substantially subserved by its enactment.”” , State v. Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 430, 123 Atl. 842," 37 A. L. BR. 131. ie | : . I. Before the court can overturn the act, the court must | - find that the legislature made a mistake as to whether there = \- any basis in fact for a finding that the public welfare is jeopardized, else a mistake as to whether there is any rea- | _ sonable connection between the provisions of the act and the | thing which jeopardizes that-welfare. | : : The police power is exercised. improperly if ‘‘there is no basis in fact on which to support the legislative finding of public welfare, or when the remedy prescribed has no possible connection with the evil to be cured.’’ American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal & Food Commission of Indiana (1920), 268 Fed. 563; (1921) appeal dismissed, 258 U. S. 632, 64 L. Ed. 801,428.Ct.273, ~ -. —. oe And see: _ State v.Harper1923), 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451, —~ 458, 33 A. L. R. 269; es ee ay People v. Coulides, 265 N. Y. Supp. 765, 768 (recent case). | sre ; The court is confronted by two questions: 1. Whether a basis in fact exists for the legislative judgment that a real estate mortgage situation of an emergency character exists, ‘ or whéther such judgment is unreasonable (arbitrary). 2. Whether the statute has ‘‘any possible connection with the evil to be cured.”’ | er ‘i A thing is. arbitrary which is without. basis in any fact other than the pleasure or caprice of the author of the thing, and therefore without a reasonable basis, or basis in reason; unreasonable. Baas | Ll -_ See ‘Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gine Cb. 220 U. S. 61, 78, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. -369, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 160. The court judicially notices the existing emergency—judi- cially knows that a ‘‘basis in fact’’ exists for-‘‘a finding ‘of © public welfare.’’ Consequently the legislative finding that } such an emergency exists ¢annot be unreasonable (arbi-. _ trary). However, were the court without knowledge of such oes ‘basis in fact, ”? the court would ‘be bound to oe its o- existence. \" Such facts and cireumstances as. must exist to render a legislative act constitutional are presumed to exist. 12 LC. J, Constitutional Law, 8 sec. 222. It WA even Deine ‘said that it is thé duty of the edurt to assume the existence of any conceivable facts and circum- stances the existence of which is — to the constitu- tionality of a legislative act; | State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. (1914), 168 Towa. - 1,147 N. W. 195, L. R.A. 1917 B, 198; (1916). affd. 242 U.S. 153, 37 S. Ct. 28, 61 L. Ed. 7. The legislature is presumed to have passed an act with full _ knowledge of existing conditions. . ; ‘12 C. J.,.Constitutional Law, sec. 225. ee And see U nited States v. Des Moines Navigation and . ; Ry Co., supra, (142 U. S. 510, 544). 4 hia are tecent cases in point 6n the proposition that — legislature is presumed to have found the facts on a which its power to act must be predicated. , Hutchens v. Jackson (N. Mex.), 23 Pac. (2d) 355; Leonhart v. Board of Education. i Va.), 170 8. E. 418, 421. ‘ said is that oe that deter- - Inination was an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable. In such circum- — . . >» a e ° ‘i . i . —_——— —_—_—_—_ * : stancés, the settled rule of.this court is that it will not \. substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body - -\eharged with the primary duty and responsibility ef ‘determining the question. _Euclid v.-Ambler Co., supra | Like U. S. 365), 388, 395; Radric v. New York, 264 U.S. © 99 \ | 294; Hadachek'v. Los Angeles, 239 U. S. 394,-408- 412, 413-413; Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. _ 526, 530-531; Rast v. Van Danman & Lewis, 240 U. S. | 342, 357; Price v. Illinois, 238-U. S. 446, 452.” - ‘Zahn v. Board of Public Works (1925), 274 U. S. 325, 328, 47 S. Ct. 594, 71 L. Ed. 1074. . It is submitted, therefore, that where reasonable minds . cagnot differ over whether there is an-emergency, it is as fully a matter of judicial as: of legislative finding that an. emergency does or that one does not exist, but that if rea- - sonable minds can differ in the matter, so that it is one of reasonable doubt, the finding of the legislature ‘should be deemed conclusive. Where the legislative finding is in rea- son indis utedly right, as where it is fortified by judicial mn 2 the presumption, in favor of the finding cannot by any possibility be overcome; where the finding is in rea- son indisputably wrong—clearly. unreasonable or arbitrary ‘the presumption: is. automatically overthrown. Wherein _ - reason there is doubt whether the finding is right or wrong, whether well or ill founded; the presumption controls. “The legislative finding that the real estate mortgage situation is an emergency situation is in reason indisputably right— " judicial knowledge fortifies the presumption in favor of the « » finding ; it is insuperable. ar ee ee Principle applicable where legislative judgment is obviously erronedas: ‘‘The-court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to-an obvious mistake, when.the validity of the law depends on the.truth of what is declared. Block. ‘y. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 154. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v.* Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 536.”’ \ \ \ ar The Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, supra, (264, U.S. 543, 547). The neiticinie ebhiailli wales the Mitadiatibe judgment _ is obviously’ correct, as where the legislative finding coin- cides with something that is a matter of judicial knowledge, ‘may be stated thus: The-court is not at liberty to shut its — eyes tova legislative declaration of what is a generally known fact, whether or not the validity of a law demands on the . truth of the declaration, but especially if the validity of a law so depends. If there were no emergency and. it ‘vere gener lly known that none existed, but the legislature should decla e the existence of one, the court would take notice of obvious legislative mistake. ‘Needless to say, the court may equally iiotice the truth of a legislative finding of the’. éxistence of an emergency when its existence is obvious. ” Somewhat in point is People v. ‘Le Fetra (1921), 230 N, Y. 429, 180,N. E. 601, 604. 4 Principle. angicable where there " doubt while the’ legislative judgment is correct: ‘‘In determining the . question as to the constitut tionality of an act of the Leg- islature, we must remember that the Legislature is an — independent part of our government. Itis presumed to . have had the Constitution in mind in passing thé act. It. is the exponent of the popular-will, and its acts must‘be treated with respect, reconciled, and sustained if possi- _ble. A-court is.never justified in setting at'‘naught the ~ will of the Legislature, ‘unless it is clearly repugnant to . °. the Constitution. The rule laid down in Fletcher v. Peck, ° ° _ 6 Cranch 87, 128, 3 L, Ed. 162, is sound and salutary: - ‘The question, whether a law be void for its repugnancy. ~ to the constitution, is, at all times, a question of much | delicacy, which ought seldom, if eyer, to bé decided 1 in. . the affirmative, in'a doubtful case.’ = Leonhart v. Board of Education (W. Va. dor 170 S. E. *-418, 421, — case). —69— 7 It i is submitted, moreover, that ‘‘necessary,”” in such an expression as ‘‘necessary for the public welfare,’’ has refer- . ence more to the situation or occasion from which the legis- ‘lation springs than to whether thé particular remedy is-the * only one of even the best one that could be supplied. Giyx the actual occasion or situation which reasonably, thoagh not absolutely, involves a necessity for action, because of some actually existing or actually threatened pubtic détri- ment or danger, any enactment, though the least reasonable’ or least desirable of a-number of possible. enactments that . could, within reas@n, be regarded as designed to terminate ‘or Obviate the particular detriment: or danger, is ‘within the _, meaning of ‘‘necessary for the public welfare’’—is legisla- tion for a public ‘‘need.’’ * “The dodtrine that the police power is a law of neces- sity may well be'said to furnish the key to what is within | and what ds without the boundaries of such power; not that a police regulation to be legitimate must be an abso- . Jute essential to the public welfare, but that the exigency ° to be met must so concern such welfare as to suggest, reasonably,. necessity for a legislative remedy.’’ “State v. Redmon.(1907), 134 Wis. 89, 114 N. W. 137, .126 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 14 L. R. A. N. 8. 229, 15 Ann Cas. 408. “And see: City of Chicago v. Weshinctboiin Home (1919), 289. . “Il. 206, 124.N. E. 416, a sees L. R. 1584. . In. most cases, the court j is more penne with the rea-| _ sonable relation of the.means to the end sought than with © the necessity of adopting a means, because the necessity is always factual, ‘but the means is always a law. Given the necessity, the law must be a reasonable means to the end, Can any one doubt that the statute involved in the.case at - ee bar is a sisnaiinailiter means ‘to an end penny sought by the cee 2 legislature? « Exercise of the power is primarily though int eon- clusively for the legislature and so long as its exercise of the power bears reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose, the courts may not interfere.’’ Third Dec. Dig. a Constitutional Law, sec. 70 (3) (see P. 597). And see State v. Marsex (1993), 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. Ww. 451; 452-3, 33 p Be L. R. 269. en _ ** *.\* the validity of a police regulation, whether established. directly by the State or by some public body acting under its sanction, must depend upon the circum- ec. stances of each case and the character of the regulation, — . whether arbitrary or reasonable and whether really de- a signed to accomplish a legitimate public. purpose. ’’ Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. People, sue N _ pra, (200 U. 8. 561, 592). : ™ “Tt was said in Purity Extract € Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226708, 102 204, 33 Sup. Ct. 44, 47, 57 L. Ed. 184, that, in examining a given statute relating to an appropriate — subject of “palice regulation to deterinine whether its provisions aré“reasonable— ‘The inquiry must-be whether, considering the et aa -view, the statute passes-the bounds of reason and as- sumes the character of a merély arbitrary fiat’.’” State v. Bassett (1924), 100 Conn. 430, 123 Atl. 842, 37 A. L. R. 134. ‘Even as. to the a whether the law, as a means, is | reasonable, it would seem that the lawmaking branch of the government and not the court is the first judge, and that -its judgment should not be’overruled unless plainly, clearly, x . =a palpably, wd beyond a reasonable doubt, ‘such judgment is wrong. — @ _ «¢* * * Tt is enough that we are not warranted in saying that legislation * * * has no reasonable relation to the relief sought. Chicago, Burlington & i R. R. Co. v, McGuire, 219 U: S. 549, 569... Block v. Hirsch, supra, (256 U. - 135, 158), And see: | City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Il. 84, 149 N. EK. 784, 787. G. ‘SA large discretion is necessarily uk i in the Legislature to determine, not only what the interests of public convenience and welfare require, but what measures are nece [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0422%3A06. 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