# Reply Brief — Harrisonville v. WS Dickey Clay Mfg. Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1933
- **Citation:** 289 U.S. 334

## Text

No. 559.

In the

October Term, 1932.

City or HarRIsONVILLE, Missouri, Petitioner,
vs.

W. 5. Dickey Clay MANuFACTURING CoMPANY.,
Respondent.

CERTIORARI.

SUPPLEMENTAL AND REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF
OF RESPONDENT.

” Maurice H. WINGER,
“ LELAND Hazarp,
1100 Waltower Building,
Kansas City, Missouri,
Attorneys for Respondent.

Offices Suprome Court,
FILE

FILE COPY MAR 20 13

GHARLES ELMORE

Supreme Court of the United States

SMITH-GRIEVES, LAW PRINTERS, KANSAS CITY, MO

PRE REE AP MA BION EE NG EIB GSPN NG I IE HST A SR

—

SUBJECT INDEX. a
PAGE i
Respondent's additional statement of the case........ 1 :
Summary of the argwmemt................22.0005- 3 4
Argument... 6. ee eee cece ete eee ee eee eee eee 6 &
The question of permanent or temporary nuisance. 6 é
The financial ability of the City to comply with a
is M.S is ened Re rawc eee « 28 &
IRIS ea cca encceceuskacecsune is 28
Goccel gable newer tan.........--5..5..... 30 ;
NY INE ne esec etre enicesccnss 33
EET EE ee ee 34
In any event the limitations upon financial powers
of the City probably do not apply............. 39
Cement TIE. 5 as oss nine reese 41
The injunction in question does not compel ex-
ercise of legislative power. .................. 43
The decisions of the courts below upon questions
of fact and matters of discretion will not be
Ce ee 46
i Beet a eka ea aneidku eee eae e wa ao 47
NE TEL i 5. ca x die eek mk on Sos wn wr eed 9
I a ea hawk ke wee ne eaten ew adiere se 51
SE si ar Ka W Grab ste Rake whe Ree owe cae

¥,

wee ROP ote vn. — is
= DESO EI REITER MOH RS apni

Table of Cases Cited.

PAGE
Attorney General ex rel. y. City of Grand Rapids,
175 Mich. 503, 141 N. W. 890.............. 18
Anderson y. Ripley County, 181 Mo. 46, 80 S. \,

saith RE a er ite ERIN ie Wes ep 35

Baltimore and Potomac R. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist
Church, 137 U. S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Eg.
784

ait Rude SECA Mah ay Aa uaa beat, AON 18, 41
Battle v. Willcox, 128 S, ¢ 500, 122 S. E. 516... 32
Blankenship vy. Kansas Explorations, 325 Mo. 998,

sf od. I a tt 20
Bloc. y. Baltimore, 149 Md. 39, 129 Atl. 887.... 26
Boehmer y. Pennsylvania R, Co., (N. Y.) 40 S.

Ct. 409, 252 U. S. 496. 64 L. a _ 46
Bollinger et al. y. American Asphalt Roof Corpora-

tion, 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S. W. (2d) 544..... 19
Chapman vy. City of Rochester, 110 N. Y. 273. 18

Ong TR Nee ait ins 17
Connor v. City of Nevada, 188 Mo. 148. 86 5. W.

sing A eT OIRO Sy ps 39

Donahoe y. Kansas City, 136 Mo. 657, 38S, \v. 57143

Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Hillcrest Realty

Co., 285 Mo. 552, 234 S. W. hice cp CET 34
Fireball Gas Tank & Ilinuminating Co., (Mo.)

36 S. Ct. 86, 239 U. S. 156, 60 L. Ed. 191... 47
Fisher v. American Reduction Co., 189 Pa. 419,

bialiind gee oe CGE Ie RR lees est 24

Hanlin v. Meat Co.. 174 Mo. App. 462, 160 S \v.
sR ee ey TS ee nal eet Sat 22

re a ; Nas Pe ~ wee 3 io? wa eee PUP Pet for LPI ee 1 TROL eed

TABLE OF CASES CITE D—Continued.

PAGE

Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 284 S. W. 521..22, 23

Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S. W. (2d) 571...... rig
Lamar Water and Electric Light Company vy. City

of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 26 S. W. 1025....... 35

McCarthy v. City of Kelso, 129 Wash. 121, 223
Pas Ro ees ace aan ed oy Ae Ce es 40)
Missouri v. Illinois and the Sanitary District of
Chicago, 180 U. S. 208, 21 S. Ct. 331, 45 L. Ed.

WO oes a ee ee tee 16, 18
Munk v. Columbus Sanitary Works, 7 Ohio N. P.

Sac, 5 (ile Ee Sy B.S aoe es een 25
Page vy. National Gas Corporation, 286 U. S. 269,

be 5, Ct Fe es, ss ee be a 13
Piney v. Berry, Gt Des Sorc rae 13, 22
Saleno v. The City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30

BW Ps cs ta ene eee cohen teal oe atie 36
Salton Sea Cases, 1/2 Fed. 792 (C. C. A.9)...... 45
Schoen v. Kansas City, 065 Mo. App. 134......... #3
Schueler v. City of Kirkwood, 191 Mo. App. 575,

Cee. Wis PR RG ee een eee ae 31
Simpson v. Dupont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 467, 85

Bi ee, cae h kad ane eee ae Pelee ee 25
Smith v. Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S. W. 597.... = 14
Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F. (2d) 736....... 47
State ex rel. Board of Health v. White, 90 N_ J.

ma Cee, Ee io sos as Faw als 26
State ex rel. v. Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254, 169

Pe WE es vo oo a ae ee ae ee 42
State ex rel. Pyle, Admr., v. City of University

City et al., 320 Mo. 451, 8S. W. (2d) 73...... 40
The Linseed King, (N. Y.) 52 S. Ct. 450, 285 U.

Ds Py. PO Bi, Se ore ee aay eerie 47

a

TABLE OF CASES C ITE D—Continued.

PAGE
Union Trust Co. v. Pagenstecher, 221 Mo.
121, 119 S. W. Ad teyee nen > cies sus Ok, Se
United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 45 S. Ct.
soc igi Ne ~ CeE 13

Constitution and Statutes Cited.

Ramet. Go, See. 08, Art. 00................ a
Const. Mo., Sec. 12, Art. 10 (Appendix C)..... .35-36
R. S. Mo. 1929, Secs. 860, 862 (Appendix A).... 7,50

or wee Oe, Oe OD .... 27
mo eo. 0909, See FOS1.................... 30
R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 7037 (Appendix B)......... 34
R. S. Mo. 1929,.Sec. 7038.............00000.,, 33
om oem Wee, Sec. FERS... kk... 34, 37

A EERE ae 39
ek Oc kw x's sk os cwakcconcac,, 43, 45
Dillon, Municipal Corporations.................. 36
Pomeroy, Specific Enforcement of Contracts (3d
ee en nwa nndax..c..., 7

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1932.

City oF HaArRISONVILLE, Missouri, Petitioner,
vs.

W. S. Dickey Clay MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Respondent.

No. 559.

CERTIORARI.

SUPPLEMENTAL AND REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF
OF RESPONDENT.

Respondent’s Additional Statement of the Case.

Respondent makes reference to the statement of the
case contained in respondent’s brief opposing petition
for writ of certiorari, and does not here repeat the state-
ment therein contained. It is admitted by petitioner that
a nuisance exists in the watercourse on respondent’s
land. The record indicates the extent of this nuisance,
and coritains the admission of respondent’s engineer that
a possible 40,000 gallons per day of raw, putrescible

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Rei Nee M MS SPE AYRE NI SONNEI OAT PE ORE TESTERS RR nanan

2

sewage matter may flow into Town Creek (R. 87). A
finding as to the existence of the nuisance and its char-
acter is contained in the decree of the trial court; also
that the nuisance is unnecessary and may be abated by
reasonable means available to the city (R. 15).

It appears from the record that the nuisance may be
due in part to defective operation of the existing sew-
age disposal plant, also to type of design which per-
mits the entire sewage of the City to be passed around
the existing disposal plant and discharged into the water-
course (R. 51). Petitioner admits that as to defective
operation of the existing plant petitioner should not. be
heard to complain of the decree,

Petitioner’s statement of the normal Operation of an
Imhoff tank should be supplemented by a statement con-
cerning complete sewage reduction. The following is a
paraphrase of the expert testimony on the point (R.
49-52).

The purification of sewage is simply a process of oxida-
tion. The organic matter in sewage consumes oxygen.
When the demand for oxygen existing in such organic
matter has been satisfied, the sewage is purified, i. e., it
is no longer putrescent. The Imhoff tank settles out
solids, leaving suspended in the liquid which flows out
of the tank forty to forty-five per cent of the organic
matter—more if the Imhoff tank is inefficiently built or
operated. Petitioner makes the statement in its supple-
mental and reply brief that the contents of the digestion
chamber of the Imhoff tank constitute the most noxious
part of the sewage. This is not the case. The organic
matter in suspension in the liquid part of the sewage
Which passes directly through the Imhoff tank is just
as putrescent, odorous and noxious as the solid matter

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which settles in the tank. The organic matter which
passes through the Imhoff tank must be further exposed
to oxidation by some process. It may be confined in
sand filters or confined in beds in which, by mechanical
agitation, the process of oxidation will be accelerated or,
if a body of running water is large enough, the oxidation
will occur there by the reason of the presence of dis-
solved oxygen in water. In the case at bar the stream
would have to be forty to fifty times larger than it is to
supply the oxygen necessary to purify the quantity of
sewage in question. [ffective sewage disposal simply
means complete oxidation. When that has been accom-
plished by any of the several available processes, then
the liquid r»sidue is harmless and inoffensive.

We proceed to a discussion of the issues which peti-
tioner says are of sufficient importance to warrant the
attention of this court. We discuss those issues in the
order contained in petitioner’s supplemental and_ reply
brief.

Summary of the Argument.
I.

The sewage plant in question discharges raw, untreated
sewage into the watercourse on respondent’s land, and
creates a condition of gross pollution, also contaminates
with foul odors and noxious gases the air on respond-
ent’s premises and about the dwelling house thereon. Re-
spondent’s land is improved with barns, silos and other
structures costing twenty-five or thirty thousand dol-
lars, and is maintained as a farm for registered Here-
ford cattle of the value of $20,000.00 or more. The
watercourse and one hundred acres or more of pasture
land through which it runs is the heart of this farm,

+

which consists, however, of a considerably larger tract
of land than the one hundred acres affected by the con-
taminated water supply. Petitioner admits the existence
of the nuisance, and admits ‘hat the sewage disposal
plant maintained by petitioner is incapable of reducing
the sewage sufficiently to eliminate the nuisance, Peti-
tioner also admits that improvements and additions to
the plant could be made which would eliminate the
nuisance, but contends that since the nuisance is caused
by a physical structure enduring in its nature, the re-
spondent has no cause of action except for damages.

Respondent contends, and the courts below found, that
the City is unreasonably maintaining an unnecessary
nuisance; that the existing plant can be easily improved,
and that the improvements required to eliminate the
nuisance will be such as are in general use in other mu-
nicipalities in the State of Missouri of about the same
size as the petitioner—some smaller, Respondent con-
tends that damages at law would not constitute an ade-
quate remedy, and that the City has no right to persist
in the maintenance of a sewage system which was neg-
ligently constructed in the first instance, and is being
negligently maintained. The courts below enjoined the
City from discharging putrescible sewage matter into
the watercourse, and allowed a_ reasonable time—six
months—in which to abate the nuisance,

II,

Petitioner contends that the injunction js improper be-
cause the City has no financial resources with which
to improve its sewage disposal plant. Respondent con-
tends that if this were true it would not constitute a
defense. If the City cannot maintain an adequate dis-

posal plant, meeting reasonable standards in general use
by other municipalities, then it has no right to gather
its sewage in mains and project it into the watercourse,
thus leaving the entire burden upon respondent. How-
ever, respondent does not accept petitioner’s position that
the City is without financial powers, and shows that
City has the following powers:

1. To issue bonds for at least one-half the cost of
one method of improving the existing plant.

2. To levy a special public sewer tax under Missouri
statutes to pay for the cost of such an improvement.

3. To levy special benefit assessments upon the land
in joint sewer districts to pay the cost of such an im-
provement.

4. To contract for the construction, lease or use of
adequate sewage disposal facilities, and pay under such
contract over a period of ten years; that the total con-
tract price will not be an indebtedness within consti-
tutional limitations, and that a general tax sufficient to
meet such contract payments will not fall within constitu-
tional limitations for general taxation purposes.

III.

Furthermore the respondent contends that limitations
upon the financial powers of the City are not applicable
to indebtedness or expenditures involved by reason of
a judgment, judicial decree, or other compulsion. Such
limitations are applicable only to the voluntary acts of the
City.

IV.

Petitioner asks this court to reverse the decisions be-
low upon the ground that the inconvenience to the City
will be great as compared with the injury to the respond-

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ent. The doctrine of balancin
not obtain in Missouri.
of judicial discretion whi
review on certiorari.

§ such considerations does
Furthermore, the matter is one
ch this court will not ordinarily

7:

The petitioner contends that the injunction encroaches
upon the legislative function. To make the point petitioner
assumes that the decree orders the City to perform positive
acts. The decree merely enjoins discharge of putrescible
sewage matter upon respondent's land. F urthermore, con-
struction and maintenance of sewers is a corporate and
not a governmental function.

ARGUMENT.
i

The Question of Permanent or Temporary Nuisance—The
Real Question Concerns Injunction of a Nuisance
Created by an Inadequate and Insufficient
Municipal Sewage Disposal Plant.

Petitioner urges this court to pass upon the question

of what constitutes a temporary as distinguished from a

permanent nuisance, asserting that that is a question of

sufficient importance to warrant the attention of the

Supreme Court of the United States. Petitioner in the

case at bar wishes to establish that the admitted nuisance

is permanent, not because the legal conception involved
in a permanent nuisance renders the nuisance any less
obnoxious, but rather because, according
permanent nuisance cannot be abated by an injunction
in equity The effect of applying petitioner’s position to
the facts in the case at bar would be to sanction perma-
nently the City’s act in constructing an inadequate sew-

to petitioner, a

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age system, and the consequent burden imposed thereby
upon respondent’s land.

Petitioner’s statement that respondent has an adequate
remedy at law for damages is insufficient. T rue, re-
spondent might have originally brought an action for
damages. The remedy, however, would not have been
adequate. The law throws every possible protection
around an owner of land. For example, a contract to
buy real estate is specifically enforceable, The purchaser
is not left to a remedy at law for damages. One reason,
among others, is that no two pieces of land are alike,
No landowner can be adequately compensated in money
for the loss of a particular parcel of land. Pomeroy,
Specific Enforcement of Contracts (3rd Fd.), Sec. 9.

The record in this case discloses, and the trial court
found that the tract of land in question is part of a farm
used for pasturage purposes; that the farm has been
improved by the construction of barns, silos and other
equipment at an expense of twenty-five to thirty thou-
sand dollars; that the land is used for pasturage of a
herd of Hereford cattle; that many of these cattle are
registered, and that the herd has a value of approxi-
mately twenty thousand dollars; that the contaminated
watercourse is the only effective water supply for the
entire farm (R. 177). It is impossible to compensate an
owner in money for the injury done to a stock farm of
such a character developed over a period of many years.

Furthermore, the statute of limitations has probably
run against a cause of action for damages. Actions for
trespass upon real estate are barred in five years in
Missouri. Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, Sec. 862
(see Appendix A). This period applies to actions at
law to recover for stream pollution. Kent. vy. City of
Trenton, 48 S. W. (2d) 571 (Mo. App., 1931) (not

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yet officially reported). Petitioner in its effort to defeat
the existing action urges that respondent has an ac-
tion at law for damages, but we are safe in saying that
limitations will be pleaded if that action should ever
arise. Respondent confidently brought this action in equity,
relying upon its right to enjoin an unnecessary nuisance.
If this action be now defeated, respondent probably will
be left with no remedy at all.

We repeat that the first object involved in petitioner's
effort to secure from this court a decision that the Har-
risonville disposal plant constitutes a permanent nuisance
is to compel the respondent land owners to submit per-
manently to the results of the nuisance and relieve the
City of whatever may be involved in the way of work
and labor, and the expenditure of money to abate the
nuisance. That such abatement is possible is admitted.

i)

~ RAT ee

ie can ints 8 Al nS eine Re i Ba

The second result of petitioner’s position would be far-
reaching. If the method of sewage disposal in the case
at bar constitutes a nuisance which the courts cannot
enjoin, then any less adequate method of disposal would
also be beyond the power of injunction. In other words, ,
despite the fact that standard methods for sewage dis-
posal are wholly effective, so that complete reduction
of the sewage may be accomplished, vet any city could
disregard such methods, and project its sewage wholly
untreated into any watercourse, leaving the landowner to
bear all of the consequences; that is the result that peti-
tioner asks this court to create by holding that the
nuisance which petitioner is now maintaining may not be
enjoined in equity.

We believe that the controlling principles in this field
are already established by this court. The important ques-
tion is not as to what constitutes a permanent nuisance,
and what constitutes a temporary nuisance. The im-

ALONE Lae

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9

portant question is: may the City exercise its function
of sewage disposal in such manner as to create an Unl-
necessary nuisance.

Petitioner’s argument seeks to make magic words out
of the phrases: permanent nuisance and temporary nui-
sance. If the nuisance is permanent, says the petitioner,
injunction will not lie; if temporary, injunction will lie.
These words should not be the basis for the decision.
The question is: May a municipality build any kind of
sewage disposal device, however crude or inadequate,
discharge the effluent into the watercourse of an adjoin-
ing land owner, pay him damages for the diminished
value of the land caused by the pollution and odors,
and then go its way in peace; or must a city in disposing
of its sewage have regard for standard methods of sew-
age disposal in general use by other cities of like size
methods which eliminate any need for pollution in the
adjoining landowner’s water course? In other words,
may the city be as negligent as it pleases in constructing
its sewage disposal plant or must it use reasonable stand-
ards of care: Upon this question the controlling factor
is not whether the nuisance be permanent. Let us illustrate
with the facts in the case at bar. Suppose the respondent
had brought a suit for damages against the city and had
recovered for diminished value of the land and for the
discomfort, inconvenience and other injuries caused by
the pollution, noxious odors, fumes and gases. Then
suppose respondent had brought a second action for dam-
ages. Now if the nuisance were permanent, i. e., if all
the damage which could occur were inherent in the
original situation then the first action would be a bar
to the second action. If, however, the nuisance were tem-
porary, i. e., if all possible damage were not inherent
in the original situation, then the first action would not

rect ree ——

be a bar to the second. In reaching the first result, the
courts speak of the nuisance as permanent, in reaching
the second result they speak of the nuisance as temporary.
Furthermore, limitations are always involved. If all pos-
sible damage were inherent in the original situation, limi-
tations run from the date the offending cause began to
operate; if not, then limitations do not apply.

10

Therefore, the words permanent and temporary are i
words which describe a legal result. If a first action for
damages operates as a bar to a second action for dam-
ages for the reason that a plaintiff has had a full and
complete recovery in the first action, then the nuisance
is called permanent. If the first action does not operate
as a bar to a second action for damages for the reason
that a plaintiff did not have a full and complete recovery
in the first action, then the nuisance is called temporary. :
Again, if all possible damage were inherent at the moment j
the offending cause began to operate then a right to dam-

ages will be barred by limitations unless asserted within

the statutory period; in such cases the nuisance is called
permanent. If, on the other hand, all possible damages

were not inherent at the moment the offending cause be-
gan to operate then a right to damages will not be barred

by limitations: in other words, limitations will not run

from that initial moment. In such cases the nuisance is

called temporary.

The correctness of this analysis will be disclosed by a
consideration of petitioner’s cases in which it will appear

that in no case has an injunction against the negligent
maintenance of a cause of nuisance been denied for the
reason that the nuisance was permanent rather than
temporary.

It may be considered that if the respondent in this case

had brought an action for damages and had recovered for

en Aes Ons CREPE BRE TE

11

diminished value of the land and other injuries, then if
all possible damage were inherent at the moment the City’s
sewage plant began to operate that action would have
been a bar to a second action for damages, and possibly
to a later action for injunction; but, because respondent
could have brought such an action does not mean that
respondent was confined to that action and no other. Re-
spondent’s position is that no action for damages or series
of actions for damages provide an adequate remedy;
that the City is negligently maintaining a nuisance which
proceeds from unnecessary causes; that the City is not
complying with standards of care, reasonable and usual
in the matter of sewage disposal; that therefore injunc-
tion will lie against such conduct.

Now let us examine the four cases upon which peti-
tioner relies.

In Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S. W. (2d) 571 (Mo.
App. 1931; not yet officially reported petition herein,
page 25), no question was raised as to negligent con-
struction or maintenance of the sewage structure. The
action was for damages; the structure was completed
and in operation in 1914; the action was brought in 1926.
It was held that the action was barred by the five-year
statute of limitations. It appeared also that the City had
acquired from a prior owner an easement for the sew-
age outfall in consideration of the agreement of the City
to waive taxes upon the property in question. It appeared
also that the cause of the injury was an increased flow
of sewage caused by the construction of a new sewage
district, but that plaintiff had failed to allege this cause
of action in the petition, and had set it up in a reply,
which, under the Missouri law, may contain rebuttal mat-
ter only and will not be taken to aid the petition in
stating a cause of action.

12

The case does not deal in any respect with negligent
maintenance of a sewage disposal plant and is disposed
of upon grounds entirely unconnected with that question.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the case,
and noted the fact that the decision rests upon points not
involved in the case at bar. That court said:

“Upon any one of two or more grounds specified in
the opinion that case was rightly decided.” (R. 193.)

In Hayes v. Railroad, 177 Mo. App. 201, 162 S. W.
266 (1914) (petition herein, p. 26), petitioner overlooks
the significance of the result. In that case a railroad
embankment was constructed without sufficient openings
to allow passage of water in times of high water. A
Missouri statute required such openings in all such em-
bankments. Suit was brought for damages from over-
flow which occurred more than five years after the em-
bankment was built. The court held that the action was
not barred by the five-year statute of limitations. The
court held the nuisance temporary because the embank-
ment without the openings, was not a legal structure.

The court said:

“This Act is a legislative declaration that railroad
embankments are not to be regarded as permanent
structures or nuisances to the extent of not requir-
ing adequate openings to be made to afford sufficient
drainage. An embankment without such opening is,
since said legislative enactment, however it may have
been before, an abatable nuisance to the extent of
remedying the defects, and the damages caused there-
by are to be sued for and recovered by successive
actions as and when they cecur within the statutory
period of limitation after the same actually accrues.
* * * In the case of Charles v. Railroad, 124 Mo.
App. 293, 301, 101 S. W. 680, the court held that

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13 e

because of a decree of court in a condemnation
proceeding providing for an opening through a rail-
road embankment which the railroad had failed to
make, the court would not regard the same as a
permanent structure, all damages arising from which
must be sued for in one action, as the railroad prob-
ably would, and if not, could be made to construct
the opening. The decree in that case was aot more
effectual in that respect than is the statute in this
case.”

The case is contrary to petitioner’s contention that
the nuisance is permanent because the structure is.
enduring. In the case at bar the structure, though en-
during, is inadequate—so inadequate as to make its
maintenance negligent. That this inadequacy is estab-
lished by court decree rather than by statute is im-
material, as the court pointed out in the passage just
quoted. The court in the Hays case quoted with ap-
proval the following passage from Pinney v. Berry, 61
Mo. 359 (1875):

“But it is obvious that this rule (recovering the
whole damage in one action) has no application to
such nuisances as may be removed the day after the
verdict, or for the continuance of which a second
or third may be maintained, or which may be abated
at the instance of the injured party, by the order
of a competent court.”

The trial court in the case at bar found, as a fact,
such inadequacy. The appellate court confirmed the
finding. This court will not disturb that finding upon
a review on certiorari. United States v. Johnston, 208
U. S. 220, 45 S. Ct. 496, 69 L. Ed. 925 (1925); Page
v. National Gas Corporation, 286 U. S. 269, 52 S. Ct.
507, 76 L. Ed. 1096 (1932).

14

In Smith v. Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S. W. 597
(1912) (petition herein, p. 27), a suit was brought for
damages and injunction against the City of Sedalia for
discharge of the effluent from its sewer plant onto plain-
tiff’s land. A prior suit had been instituted for damages
on account of the same facts (Smith v. Sedalia, 152 Mo.
283, 53 S. W. 907 (1899). This prior suit was. still
pending. The real holding of the case is that the prior
suit constituted a bar to the second suit. No question
was raised in either case as to the adequacy of the sewage
disposal plant or as to the negligent manner of its con-
struction or operation. The litigation occurred 20 years
ago, at which time methods of effective sewage disposal
were not in as general use as they are today.

The court in the second case held that the plaintiff had
elected, in his first suit, to confirm the right of the city
to the use of plaintiff’s land by bringing an action broad
enough to cover damages for the diminished value of
the land. The court held that a recovery of damages for
the appropriation of the stream had the effect of con-
firming the right of the city to sewer into the stream as
effectively as if that right had been obtained through
condemnation. The first suit was an election by the
plaintiff to adopt that form of relief. The court said:

“Both suits brought by plaintiff are, substantially,
actions for damages for injury to his land resulting
from a wrongtul appropriation by the defendant city.
He concedes the right of the city to condemn, and
complains because it has not done so, insisting in
effect that the city shall put him in the position to
claim permanent damages; but by his 1893 suit he
has put himself in position to claim the same measure
of damage in full compensation for the injury.

I]. Holding as we do that the injury is permanent,
and that damages in full compensation can be

7

awarded in the suit pending in Johnson County,
such damages to be measured by the decrease in
market value of the land caused by the sewer, it is
obvious that plaintiff cannot have such compensation
and also maintain a suit for injunction. A recovery
of damages as indicated would have the effect of
confirming the right of the city to sewer into the
stream as effectually as if the right had been obtained
through condemnation (Doyle v. Railroad, 113 Mo.
280).”

The decision is correct. Obviously a property owner
could not institute an action for the entire damage suf-
fered, including diminished value of the land, and then
afterwards seek an injunction. The case so holds; but
it does not hold that a property owner who elects in the
first instance to seek an injunction against a nuisance,
can not have that remedy. Petitioner misconstrues the
effect of the decisions allowing recovery in one action
for all damages. Petitioner apparently believes that be-
cause such a recovery may be had at law, that is the only
remedy available. None of the cases cited by petitioner
establish such a principle.

Likewise in Horine v. Peoples Sewer Company, 200
Mo. App. 233, 204 S. W. 735 (1918) (petition herein, p.
29), no issue was raised as to the adequacy of the sewage
disposal facilities or as to the management, construction
or maintenance thereof. Plaintiff simply sued to enjoin
the discharge of the sewage without any showing as to
whether the plant maintained by the city was as effective
as possible, and it does not appear whether the city had
done all that could be done to minimize the nuisance.
Furthermore, it appears in the case that the city had ac-
quired a prescriptive right over a long period of years,
and that as in the case of Smith v. Sedalia, supra, a prior

16

action at law for damages was pending. The court said
that it would not enjoin the further operation of the sew-
age plant “when it clearly appears that any injury caused
to plaintiff by the sewer can be fully compensated by a
pending action at law.” (Italics ours.)

Thus, upon examination, it appears that the four cases
relied upon by petitioner to defeat respondent’s action for
injunction do not establish the proposition that under no
circumstances will the Missouri courts enjoin the main-
tenance of a municipal sewage plant. In none of those
cases was the question of negligent construction or negli-
gent operation of a sewage plant involved. Those cases
hold that a property owner may have one action for
damages in which all damages past or future may be
recovered at law, but they do not hold that upon a show-
ing of insufficient or negligent construction or operation
injunction will not lie. Upon that point the cases cited
in respondent’s brief opposing petition for writ of certio-
rari are clear (pp. 5-11). In addition to those authorities,
respondent invites attention to the following cases:

In Missouri vy. Illinois and the Sanitary District of
Chicago, 180 U. S. 208, 21 S. Ct. 331, 45 L. Ed. 493
(1901), there was an original proceeding in this court
to enjoin the discharge of the sewage from the city of
Chicago through an artificial canal into the Mississippi
River. The decision of this court was rendered upon a
demurrer to plaintiff’s petition. This court said of the
petition:

“The object of the bill is to subject this public
work to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that
the method of its construction and maintenance will
create a continuing nuisance, dangerous to the health
of a neighboring state and its inhabitants.”

wae,
ert

i Pace aaa eee

The demurrer to the bill was overruled, and the de-
fendants given leave to file answers. Thus it is plain
that this court held that there is an inherent jurisdiction
in equity to pass upon the reasonableness of methods
adopted by a municipality to dispose of its sewage. In
the Illinois case, supra, this court cited with approval the
decision in Chapman vy. City of Rochester, 110 New York
273, 18 N. E. 88 (1888).

In the Chapman case plaintiff, living in the suburbs of
defendant city, collected the waters of a stream which arose
in the city and flowed across his property, in an artificial
basin for domestic uses. The city constructed sewers,
discharging surface water and sewage into the stream
above plaintiff, rendering its water unfit for use, etc.
In an action for damages and injunction against continu-
ance of the nuisance, plaintiff recovered $1200.00 present
damages and the injunction prayed, and judgment was
affirmed, the court saying:

“These and other facts well warranted the con-
clusion of the trial court that the act of the defend-
ant, in thus emptying its sewers, constituted an of-
fensive and dangerous nuisance. Moreover, the plain-
tiff is found to have sustained a special injury to
his health and property from the same cause; and
we find no reason to doubt that he is entitled, not
only to compensation for damages thereby occasioned,
but also to such a judgment as will prevent the
further perpetration of the wrong complained of.
Goldsmid v. Commissioners, L. R. I Eq. 161, L. R.
| Ch. 349. In view of the principle upon which these
and like decisions turn, the objections of the learned
counsel for the defendant, against the judgment ap-
pealed from, are quite unimportant. The filth of
the city does not flow naturally to the lands of the
plaintiff, as surface water finds its level, but is
carried thither by artificial arrangements prepared

18

by the city, and for which it is responsible. * * *
In fine, the case comes within the general rule which
gives to a person injured by the pollution of air
or water, to the use of which in its natural condi-
tion he is entitled, an action against the party,
whether it be a natural person or a corporation who
causes that pollution.”

The above language is quoted in part with approval by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Missouri vy.
Illinois, supra.

Missouri vy. Illinois is cited by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in Attorney General ex rel. vy. City of Grand
Rapids, 175 Michigan 503, 141 N. W. 890 (1913). In
that case an injunction was sustained against the city
to prevent the emptying of the city’s sewage into a
stream so as to constitute a nuisance to riparian own-
ers lower down the stream. The court expressly vepudi-
ated the doctrine that the necessity of the city excused
the nuisance, saying:

“The doctrine that necessity is no defense to an
unreasonable pollution of a watercourse is supported
by the following cases: Straight v. Hover, 79 Ohio
St. 263, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 276, 87 N. E. 174;
Hunter v. Taylor Coal Co., 16 Ky. L. Rep. 190;
Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N. J. Eq.
65, 33 Atl. 286; H. B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner,
117 Tenn. 180, 9 L. R. A. €N. S.) 923, 100 S. W.
116, 10 Ann. Cas. 581; Day v. Louisville Coal &
Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167,
as &. E. 776."

In Baltimore and Potomac R. R. Co. vy. Fifth Baptist
Church, 137 U. S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 784
(1891), the case of a nuisance caused by the proximity
of the railroad company’s shops to the church property

PN SNCS AIR

7

ROE

19

came before this court for a second time. The first case
under the same title is reported in 108 U. S. 317, 2 S.
Ct. 719, 27 L. Ed. 739 (1883) (respondent’s brief op-
posing petition for writ of certiorari, p. 9). The sec-
ond case adds nothing to the principle outlined in the
first case, viz., that the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unreasonably. The case is significant,
however, in showing that although the offending struc-
ture in that case was enduring (an engine house and
repair shop), yet this court did not treat the nuisance
as permanent in the sense that the first recovery of dam-
ages was a final recovery. This court permitted recov-
ery in two subsequent actions, both involved in the sec-
ond case, and it expressly held that the damages awarded
in the second case should not be minimized by the amount
of the initial recovery. That this court regarded the en-
gine house in that case as a continuing or temporary
nuisance in the sense that repeated recoveries could be
had is clear from the following quotation;

“The cases at bar afford a good illustration of
the rule of law, and of its application, as stated by
Blackstone: ‘Indeed every continuance of a nuisance
is held to be a fresh one; and therefore a fresh ac-
tion will lie, and very exemplary damages will prob-
ably be given, if, after one verdict against him, the
defendant has the hardiness to continue it.’ 3° BI.

Com. 220.”

In Bollinger et al. v. American Asphalt Roof Corpo-
rtion, 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S. W. (2d) 544 (1929),
plaintiffs maintained a home, and boating business, on the
Blue River near Kansas City, Mo. Defendant operated
a factory near by and discharged into the stream oil
and noxious fluids and odorous compounds and caused
soot, smoke, fumes and odors to be discharged into the

20

air, thus rendering the stream unfit for plaintiff’s busi-
ness and so contaminating the air as to render plain-
tiff’s home and place of business untenable and useless.
The factory had been built and put in operation by Oc-
tober 1, 1920. The suit was commenced September 30,
1926. Defendant contended that the injury was perma-
nent and had continued for more than five years and
hence that plaintiff’s suit for damages was barred by
limitations. The court held that the nuisance was not
permanei. because “‘abatable.” The court said on this
point :

“By their very nature the things involved in the
manner of use of the plant are abatable, and the
evidence shows that some of them in this case were,
in fact, abated in part, for example, by the erection
of a 60-foot condenser stack in 1923, for the dis-
position of fumes and smoke * * *.”

So in the case at bar all that is required is the addi-
tion of certain features to the existing sewage plant to
abate the nuisance (R. 51).

A nuisance is not permanent because the source is a
tangible structure rather than an intangible act, method
or use. A nuisance is permanent only when the cause,
whether a physical structure or not, is unchangeable or
unabatable.

In Blankenship v. Kansas Explorations, 325 Mo, 998,
30 S. W. (2) 471 (1930), plaintiff brought action
against defendant for the diminished value of plaintiff's
mill caused by the dumping of sludge and debris from
defendant’s mine into plaintifi’s mill pond. The Missouri
Supreme Court treated the nuisance created by the
accumulation of sludge and debris in the mill pond as
permanent, and allowed recovery of damages for the
diminished value of plaintiff's property, or the cost of

AYRE VERIO S A SEEN EN MAR OTT PRE

ues —

21

removing the debris from the mill pond, whichever sum
might be less. The following passage contains a good sur-
vey of the Missouri authorities.

“It (the deposit in the mill pond) is not a structure
upon defendant’s land or a process of operation go-
ing on upon defendant’s land, but a deposit upon
plaintiffs’ land, which plaintiffs cannot by judicial
process compel defendant to remove.

In Hanlin v. Meat Co., supra, the defendant,
operating a meat packing plant, emptied into a stream
running over plaintiff's land offensive substances and
fluids, which polluted the stream, and destroyed a
well adjacent thereto, It was held that pollution of
the stream could be abated by the defendant, and
was of a temporary nature, but also held that the
injury to the well was permanent because it had
\ been destroyed.

In Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, supra, the
plaintiff's complaint was the overflow of his prop-
erty by surface water from a sewer. He was per-
mitted to bring successive actions. The ground
upon which the injury was held temporary was, that
the cause of it was not permanent in a legal sense,
but could be abated by the city, by the enlargement
of drainage pipes or diversion of the water.

Nee +

Ivie vy. McMunigal was a case where the complaint
was of damage from smoke, cinders and dirt falling
- upon plaintiff’s dwelling house from defendant's
i foundry. Permanent damages were held to be not
recoverable on the ground that it was a nuisance
i such as could be removed the day after verdict, or
could be abated by the order of a competent court.
or, if continued, a second or third action for dam-
ages was maintainable.

In Schoen v. Kansas City, the injury complained of,
pollution of the water of a stream by emptying a
sewer therein, was the result of a temporary delay

a

in the construction of a sewer. The ruling proceeded
upon the theory that the cessation of the work was
not. permanent, and that when the work should be
continued the nuisance would cease.

In Pinney v. Berry, the plaintiff complained of the
erection and maintenance of a dam across a creek
which caused the water to flow up a branch on
plaintiff’s land, cutting off communication with a
part of his land, filling the branch with mud, leaves,
etc., and creating a nuisance which injured the health
of his family. The plaintiff was permitted to prove
that his property was rendered less valuable per
acre and that a spring was destroyed, and the value
of the spring. The petition contained no allegation
as to the destruction of a spring, and objection to
the evidence was made upon that ground. No in-
structions were asked or given by either party. It
was ruled that the trial court erred in allowing the
plaintiff to prove the value of his land before and
after the creation of the nuisance. After stating
what was said to be the rule of damages for neg-
ligent injury to real property the court said: ‘But
it is obvious that this rule has no application to
such nuisances as may be removed the day after the
verdict, or for the continuance of which a second
or third action may be maintained, or which may
be abated at the instance of the injured party by the
order of a competent court.’ ”

22

Citations of the cases digested in the foregoing passage 3
are:

Hanlin v. Meat Co., 174 Mo. App. 462, 160 S. W.
547 (1913).

Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 284 S. W. 321
(1926) (not officially reported).

Ivie v. McMunigal, 66 Mo. App. 437 (1896).

Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo. App. 134 (1896).

Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875).

tt S PY PERRO

Thus the distinction between a permanent nuisance
and a temporary nuisance turns upon whether or not
the abatement can be effected by acts to be done by de-
fendant, under judicial compulsion, if necessary, at the
source of the nuisance. In the Blankenship case, supra,
the court probably could not order by mandatory in-
junction that the defendant go upon plaintiff’s land and
remove the sludge and debris from the mill pond. On
the other hand, in the Kelly case and the Pinney case,
supra, as in the case at bar, the defendant can “the day
after verdict’? abate the nuisance by immediate action
lying within the power of the defendant. The nuisance
in the case at bar could be removed almost immediately
by cessation of the outflow from the sewer plant into the
watercourse. Therefore, it is a temporary nuisance.
The nuisance in the Blankenship case, consisting of a
permanent deposit in the mill pond on plaintiff’s land,
could not be immediately abated. In the case at bar an
injunction against the city will for all practical purposes
terminate the nuisance. In the Blankenship case an in-
junction against further discharge of slag and debris
from the mine would not have cured the permanent solid
deposits of such matter that had already accumulated
in plaintiff’s mill pond; therefore the nuisance was per-
manent.

In Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, supra, a second
action for damages caused by overflow from the city’s
storm sewer was instituted. The plaintiff had recovered
damages in a prior action and after that recovery an
improvement had been made in the drainage system.
In the second action plaintiff claimed further damages
from overflow despite the improvement. The court held
the nuisance temporary, and permitted the maintenance of
the second action. The court said:

24 |

“It appears that the cause of the overflow is not
permanent in a legal sense. It could be abated by the
enlargement of the discharge pipes or the diversion
of the water, and when this is true the wrong will be
treated as temporary in character. Carson v. City of
Springfield, 53 Mo. App. 289; Foncannon vy. City of
Kirksville, 88 Mo. App. 279; Schoen v. Kansas City,
65 Mo. App. 134; Scott v. City of Nevada, 56 Mo.
App. 189; Lewis v. City of Springfield, 142 Mo. App.
84, 125 S. W. 824; Howard County v. Railway, 130
Mo. 652, 32 S. W. 651; White v. City of Springfield.
189 Mo. App. 228, 173 S. W. 1090.

The first suit was filed within 5 years from the
date of the completion of the work of the street
which is charged to have caused this condition, and
the present suit was filed within 5 years of the date
of the first suit. If the conditions existing were
illegal and abatable—that is to say, if the nuisance
is subject to abatement by order of a competent
court—then the plaintiff has a right to successive
actions from damage resulting therefrom.”

It is apparent that the nuisance in the case at bar
is temporary. The real question is whether the plain-
tiff must be left to a series of actions at law or may have
injunctive relief. The record shows, and the courts
have found, that the city has not employed reasonable
and usual means to reduce its sewage. Under such
circumstances there is no doubt of the power of a court q
of equity to enjoin the nuisance.

In Fisher vy. American Reduction Co., 189 Pa. 419,
42 Atlantic 36 (1899), the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the operation of a reduction plant. The plant was con-
structed and operated under contract with the city of
Pittsburgh. The plant was located in the most unob-
jectionable place that could be found within the city limits,

25

and operated efficiently as possible with the type of equip-
ment available. It appeared, however, that noxious odors
could be reduced by additional equipment which would
make for a speedier reduction of the sewage. The court
entered a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant
to dispose of the garbage as fast as it was brought to
the spot, and take other practical steps which would ren-
der the operation of the plant less objectionable.

In Munk v. Columbus Sanitary Works, 7 Ohio N. P.
342, 5 Ohio D. E. C. 548 (1897), the court found that
the defendant in the operation of a garbage plant was
creating a nuisance, and a decree was entered restrain-
ing the defendant from so operating the plant as to cause
the injuries complained of. The operation of the order
was postponed until a fixed date in the future and the
defendant was directed in the meantime to make such
alterations in the plant that it could be operated without
creating the nuisance, with the further provision that
if the defendant did not at once, in good faith, take
steps to prevent the nuisance, the injunction would be-
come effective immediately.

In Simpson v. Dupont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 467, 85
S. E. 344 (1915), a municipal corporation was proceed-
ing under contract with a crematory company to erect
an incinerator for the consumption of the garbage of
the city. The erection of the crematory was in progress
when a suit was filed in which it was established that
the location of the incinerator at the point selected would
create a nuisance injuring residents in the community
by causing offensive odors, and the gathering of flies
in the vicinity. It was shown that other locations were
available for the incinerator in which injury would not
be done to property owners. The completion of the
crematory was enjoined.

carrey

26

In Block vy. Baltimore, 149 Maryland 39, 129 Atlantic
887 (1925), suit was brought by adjoining land owners
against the city and the owners of a garbage reduction
plant. The plaintiffs in their bill alleged that nearby
waters were so polluted as to be of no use for any pur-
pose, and that surrounding territory was rendered almost
uninhabitable by odors emitted from the plant. It was
held that since the plaintiffs suffered special damage and
there was no adequate remedy at law, they were entitled
to the injunction.

In State ex rel. Board of Health v. White, 90 N. J.
Eq. 621, 110 Atlantic 43 (1919), it appeared that the
defendant had contracted with the city of Asbury Park
to remove its garbage. He hauled the garbage to his
sixty-acre farm some distance from the populous section,
and there cooked or steamed the garbage and fed it to
his pigs. Plaintiff complained of the nauseating odors.
Injunction was granted.

In some of the cases injunction was granted against
disposal of municipal sewage or garbage regardless of
a showing as to whether the city was using every means
reasonably available to avoid a nuisance. We do not
seek to go that far in the case at bar. The whole bur-
den of plaintiff's testimony at the trial was to show that
there are effective means for the reduction of sewage
which leave the effluent clear, colorless, odorless, and non-
putrescent. The effluent from such a plant will not create
a nuisance, even in a very small watercourse. The
principle for which we contend and the one adopted
by the courts below is that a city must exercise its tunc-
tion of sewage disposal in a reasonable manner and if
it is creating an unnecessary nuisance by failure to
adopt reasonable means for disposal, injunction will lie.
Failure to apply this principle would leave with the city

ALLL SL on

St Seg eB i Be

27

the power of arbitrary and oppressive conduct toward
land owners in the environs. For example, the city
of Harrisonville in the case at bar might have constructed
a plain tank of concrete consisting of four walls and a bot-
tom. Sewage flowing into such a tank and out into the
watercourse would undergo but slight reduction. The Im-
hoff Tank in question is merely a modification of such a
structure so designed as to retard the flow of sewage for
a period during which a process of settling occurs. The
ease and efficiency with which sewage may be completely
reduced makes such a structure an unreasonable method
for the reduction of sewage. If the city had used avail-
able methods, methods which are in general use; methods
which can still be applied without abandoning the par-
tially effective structure now in existence, then there
might be a question concerning the right of the plain-
tiff to enjoin the trespass. The city has not used rea-
sonable means.

The principle for which we contend is not a limitation
upon the power of eminent domain. Any power is sub-
ject to such limitations as are involved in its reasonable
exercise. It is the function and the power of the courts
to determine those limitations. This would be true in
the case at bar if the city had exercised a power of
eminent domain to condemn the watercourse in ques-
tion. The fact is that the city did not proceed by con-
demnation (R., p. 7), although it could have done so
under Section 7023, R. S. Mo. 1929, which is as fol-
lows:

“The board of aldermen may make regulations
and pass ordinances for the prevention of the in-
troduction of contagious diseases in the city, and
for the abatement of the same, and may make quar-
antine laws and enforce the same within five miles

me |

28

of the city. They may purchase or condemn and
hold for the city, within or without the city limits,
within five miles therefrom, all necessary lands for
hospital purposes, waterworks, sewer carriage and
outfall, and erect, establish and regulate hospitals,
workhouses, poorhouses, and provide for the govern-
ment and support of the same, and make regulations
to secure the general health of the city, and to
prevent and remove nuisances: Provided, how-
ever, that the condemnation of any property out-
side of the city limits shall be regulated in all re-
spects as the condemnation of property for rail-
road purposes is regulated by law: and provided
further, that the police jurisdiction of the city shall
extend over such land and property to the same
extent as over public cemeteries, as provided in this
article.”

Even if the city had exercised this power, it would
have been subject to the limitation involved in reason-
able and adequate methods of sewage reduction. The
power of eminent domain is not the power to be arbi-
trary or negligent.

II.

The Financial Ability of the City to Comply with the Decree.
(A) Bonding Power.

Petitioner assumes that the cost of complying with
the injunction against “discharge of putrescible sewage
matter” into the watercourse will be $25,000.00 or $30,-
000.00. This assumption is based upon the estimated
cost of certain types of complete sewage disposal given
by respondent’s engineer in the course of his descrip-
tion of usual methods of complete sewage disposal (R.
51, 52). Petitioner introduced no evidence at the trial

a st 2s Si PRES 9 Ser ae aca

ncaa

29

as to cost of complete sewage disposal. Indeed the peti-
tioner at the trial was somewhat equivocal in tender-
ing a plea of municipal poverty as an excuse for main-
taining the nuisance. This colloquy occurred (R. 99,
100) :

“The Court: Let’s get at the point here. Are you
trying to show the City of Harrisonville is poor?

Mr. Barnett: Yes, sir, not only poor, but that it
may not, within the limits of the law, by the sale
of additional bonds get the money to build this sec-
ondary plant. Our purpose in this testimony is to
show the court what the financial condition is of
the City. Of course, whether or not the City can
or cannot create greater indebtedness after that is
a question of law, regulated by the Constitution and
the statutes, but this is to give the court the facts
about our present financial condition.

The Court: Now is it your statement that the City
could encroach unreasonably upon the land of a
property owner and then defend its conduct, justify
it, upon the ground that it was not financially able
to do a reasonable thing?

Judge Glenn: No, Your Honor, it is not.

The Court: In other words, that a poor town could
do an unreasonable thing and a rich town could not.

Judge Glenn: We do not take that position, but
this: If it is possible for this court to make an order
for us to put an additional plant in there, this court
would have to take into consideration the fact that
—whether we have exceeded our constitutional limit
of indebtedness before the court could force us to
do it; in other words, if the court could force us to
do something the Constitution said we couldn’t. But
as to the damage we have done, the party can sue
us and get a judgment and the court can cause a
levy in addition to a constitutional limit, but the
City can’t vote a bonded indebtedness.

The Court: I understand the theory that you can

ee
&

30

pay damages, but you can’t arrange to prevent dam-
ages, is that it?

Judge Glenn: This other way, we would have to
vote bonds to do this, and we have exceeded our
constitutional limit—that is, we haven’t exceeded it,
but we have already bonded the City to the maximum.

The Witness: Section 12 gives five per cent for
the building of sewers. We have now under that
five per cent some $42,500.00.”

Thus the petitioner at the trial disavowed an intent
to shield a wrong behind poverty, but urged that the
City was incapacitated by an exhausted bonding power.
It now appears by petitioner’s admission that the City
can raise at least half of the minimum estimated cost
of one of the suggested methods of abating the nuisance
by use of bonding power (petitioner’s brief, p. 51).

Let us examine other methods available to the City.

(B) Special Public Sewer Tax.

One of the several methods of paying for the con-
struction of a disposal plant is provided by Section 7031,
Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, which is as follows:

“The board of aldermen shall have power to cause
a general sewer system to be established, which shall
be composed of three classes of sewers, to-wit: Pub-
lic, district and private sewers. Public sewers. shall
be established along the principal courses of drain-
age, at such points, to such extent, of such dimen-
sions and under such regulations as may be pro-
vided by ordinance, and these may be extensions
or branches of sewers already constructed, or entirely
new throughout, as may be deemed expedient. The
board of aldermen may levy a tax on all property
made taxable for state purposes over the whole city,
to pay for the constructing. reconstructing and_re-

31

pairing of such work, which tax shall be called ‘spe-
cial public sewer tax,’ and shall be such amount as
may be required for the sewer provided by ordinance
to be built; and the fund arising from said tax shall
be appropriated solely to the constructing, recon-
structing and repairing of said sewer.”

It is expressly held that this statute applies to a plant
for the disposal of sewage as well as to lines and mains
for the collection of sewage. Schueler v. City of Kirk-
wood, 191 Mo. App. 575, 177 S. W. 760 (1915).

The comprehensive nature of the statutory power will
be noted; especially the power to levy the tax for recon-
struction or repair of an existing general sewer system.
The statute is clearly applicable to the case at bar.

( insel for petitioner erroneously state that the fore-
© vig statute has been held unconstitutional (petitioner’s
brief, p. 52). The case of Union Trust Co. v. Pagen-
stecher, 221 Mo. 121, 119 S. W. 1103 (1909), does not
hold the statute unconstitutional; it holds that a tax of
$2.50 per $100 levied in that case was invalid because
not submitted to vote of the people under Sec. 11, Art.
10 of the Constitution of Missouri. The court holds the
special public sewer tax to be a general municipal tax.
Therefore the provision of the constitution above cited
was applicable. Under that constitutional provision, no
tax in excess of fifty cents on the hundred dollars valua-
tion can be levied in a city of the class in question unless
such excess be authorized by two-thirds of the qualified
voters. In the Union Trust Co. case the matter of the
tax had never been submitted to the voters at all. Hence,
the tax, but not the statute, was invalid.

This point must be well noted, otherwise petitioner’s
erroneous statement that the statute is unconstitutional
will be confusing.

ne gee —

32

The City of Harrisonville is at perfect liberty today
to submit to the voters of the City of Harrisonville a
proposition to reconstruct or repair the City’s disposal
plant, and two-thirds of the qualified voters may authorize
the board of alderman to levy whatever tax may be sub-
mitted for that purpose.

The following quotation from the Union Trust Co. case,
supra, gives the pertinent provisions of the Missouri Con-
stitution and the holding of the court:

“The section (Sec. 11, Art. 10, Mo. Const.) so far
as applicable, reads: ‘In cities and towns having
less than ten thousand and more than one thousand
inhabitants, said rate shall not exceed fifty cents on
the hundred dollars valuation; * * * provided, * * *
for the purposes of erecting public buildings in * * *
cities * * * the rates of taxes herein limited may
be increased when the rate of such increase and the
purpose for which it is intended shall have been sub-
mitted to a vote of the people, and two-thirds of the
qualified voters of such * * * city * * * voting at
such election, shall vote therefor.’ ”

The court then concluded that “before a legal tax in
excess of fifty cents on the hundred dollars can be levied
the question must receive the approval of two-thirds of
the qualified voters who vote at an election held for that
purpose.” The court construes the phrase “public build-
ings” to mean “public works.” See Battle v. Willcox, 128
S. C. 500, 122 S. FE. 516 (1924).

Petitioner speaks as if the Missouri Constitution im-
posed an absolute limitation upon the City in the matter
of raising funds. Such is not the case. The constitution
simply prohibits a tax rate in towns of petitioner’s class
of more than fifty cents per hundred dollars of valuation

NS SRE I eR PI ea ta he : WERE

33

unless two-thirds of the voters approve for specified pur-
poses.

The existing litigation is controlled, of course, by
the city officials and their counsel. They have elected not
to submit to the voters of the City a proposal to abate
the unnecessary nuisance. Until they do that, the petitioner
cannot urge in this court or any other court a matter
of financial inability. The City officials should not assume
that the voters wish to perpetuate the stench and pollution
in the watercourse. They should assume that the voters
would take seriously the trial court’s statement that (R.
182):

“The City in the exercise of its function should
be anxious to avoid disposing of its sewage in such

way as to occasion needless harm and injury to the
people who hold property in its environs.”

(C) Special Assessments.

Petitioner confuses this method with the special pub-
lic sewer tax discussed in (B) just above.

Sec. 7038, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, is as
follows:

“Whenever the city shall deem it necessary, it may,
by ordinance, provide for the construction of a septic
tank or other sewage reduction device for the pur-
pose of purifying the discharge from any district or
joint district sewer. In such case the cost thereof
shall be assessed against the lands in the district or
joint district for which the same is provided in the
same manner as is provided for the assessing of
the cost of district sewers.”

This statute provides a third method. A disposal plant
may be constructed and paid for by special assessments
levied upon a benefit district. The benefit district may

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34

comprise several district sewers; indeed, all the dis-
trict sewers in “the natural drainage area.”’ (See Sec.
7037, R. S. Mo. 1929, Appendix B.) See also Farmers
& Merchants Trust Co. v. Hillcrest Realty Co., 285 Mo.
552, 234 S. W. 1023 (1920).

Counsel for petitioner stated in oral argument in the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that the sewer system
of Harrisonville is a public sewer system. However that
may be, the statute in question clearly gives the power to
the City to lay out the City into districts or joint dis-
tricts for the purpose of collecting the sewage into a
disposal plant, and to levy benefit assessments against
those districts or joint districts to pay for the improve-
ment. The fact that the original sewer mains may have
been laid as a public sewer system would not preclude
dividing the city into districts for disposal purposes.

(D) General Revenue.

By authority of Sec. 7276, Revised Statutes of Mis-
souri 1929 (quoted in petitioner’s brief, p. 13), the City
may acquire a sewage disposal plant and pay therefor
out of general revenue over a ten-year period. Petitioner
contends that the general revenue of the City is insuf-
ficient for that purpose. Petitioner states that the City’s
general revenue is only $6,000.00 per annum (petitioner's
brief, p. 50). We find no support in the record for this
statement. The record (pp. 102-107) contains statement
of certain accounts, but a careful examination fails to
disclose any showing as to amount of general revenue for
any period whatever.

Petitioner argues that the general revenue must be
first applied to paying the City’s “general operating ex-
pense” (petitioner’s brief, p. 51). There is, however,
no showing in the record of the amount of fixed operat-

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abe Gi AECL oN NS HATH A oP NE SSH SS) eet 1 AC SAN A RTT
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35

ing expenses of the City. Petitioner cites Anderson Vv.
Ripley County, 181 Mo. 46, 80 S. W. 263 (1904) (peti-
tioner’s brief, p. 51). That case dealt with a statute pre-
scribing the purposes for which the revenues of a county
should be applied. Petitioner cites no authority controlling
disposition of funds of the City in this case.

There is nothing in the record to show that the City
may not manage its finances in such manner as to pro-
vide the funds for this method. Of course it is easy for
the City officials to believe the task impossible because,
evidently, they have no will for the job. On the other
hand they did not hesitate recently to spend $100,000.00
for a water plant (R. 102, 108).

Furthermore, with respect to raising funds to make
payments under the contract authorized by Section 7276,
supra, the City is not limited to its constitutional power
to levy taxes at the rate of 50c per hundred; neither
would the total sum that might fall due within the period
of that contract constitute an indebtedness within the
meaning of Article 10, Section 12, of the Constitution
of Missouri. Lamar Water and Electric Light Com-
pany v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 26 S. W. 1025
(1894).

In that case a city of the fourth class entered into a
contract with respect to a water works. The contract
called for 20 annual payments of $3,000.00. For the
purposes of meeting the annual payments, the City levied
a tax “not exceeding 40c¢ on the $100.00 valuation on
all taxable property in the City, * * *.” This tax of 40c
per hundred dollars valuation was in addition to a gen-
eral tax of 50c per hundred dollars of valuation. The
case is a landmark in Missouri, and establishes two
propositions :

1. That an annual tax authorized by Section 12, Ar-

36

ticle 10, of the Missouri Constitution (Appendix C) to
retire indebtedness is not within the limitations of Sec-
tion 11 of Article 10 of the Missouri Constitution limit-
ing the general tax levy to 50c¢ on the $100.00 valuation
for cities of the fourth class.

2. That the total sum of a contract indebtedness pay-
able in installments over a period of years is not an
indebtedness within the limitation of Article 10, Sec-
tion 12, of the Missouri Constitution.

In establishing the second point, the court quoted the
following passage from Dillon on Municipal Corpora-
tions:

“Under the constitutional provisions in Iowa, Il-
linois, Indiana and Pennsylvania, referred to, it is
held that a corporation may make a contract (at
least for necessaries) covering a series Of years,
upon which an obligation to pay may arise from
year to year as the thing contracted for is furnished,
and in such case, the whole amount which may ulti-
mately become due does not constitute a debt within
the constitutional prohibition. But in order to ascer-
tain whether the corporation by such contract is
transgressing the limit, regard is had only to the
amount which may fall due within a certain year
or other period; and if the revenues for that year
or other period are sufficient, over and above the
payment of the other expenses, to pay such amount,
there is no debt incurred within the constitutional
prohibition.” 1 Dillon’s Municipal Corporations (4
Ed.), 1890, Sec. 136a.”

In Saleno v. The City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30 S.
W. 190 (1895), a contract by a city to pay a fixed price
annually for 20 years for water was held not to create
an indebtedness for the total sum of the 20 annual pay-

Paik tea nerroscats Mand BW Fac MS Se

ments within the limitations of Section 12, Article 10,
of the Missouri Constitution.

It may be argued by petitioner that in both of the
cases supra the contracts with respect to water were con-
tracts for services rather than for the acquisition of
properties. We need not consider whether that would
be a sound distinction for the reason that the contract
which the City is authorized to make under Section 7276,
Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929 (quoted in full in
petitioner's brief, p. 13), empowers the City to “provide
for the gathering, handling and disposition, either by it-
self or by contract with others for the gathering, han-
dling and disposition of * * * refuse matter and mu-
nicipal waste * * *; to acquire by purchase, construc-
tion, lease, gift or otherwise within or without the cor-
porate limits of such cities an incinerator or incinerators
for the destruction of such * * * refuse matter and
municipal waste; to acquire by any of such means a
purification plant or plants or sewage disposal plant for
the purification of all sewage accumulating in such
cities.” (Italics ours. )

Thus within the exact terms of the statute, the City in
the case at bar may lease rather than acquire ownership
of the necessary sewage disposal facilities and in that
manner bring itself within the exact facts which were
involved in the Lamar case and the Neosho case, supra.

If we were advising the City of Harrisonville, we
would advise the City that it could contract for the
construction of necessary sewage disposal facilities to
be paid for in ten annual installments, or it could con-
tract by lease or otherwise for a service of sewage dis-
posal to be provided by private enterprise.

The function of sewage disposal is frequently per-
formed by private enterprise for compensation. One rea-

38

son, among others, for such enterprise is the well known
fact that the residue from sewage disposal furnishes a
by-product which has commercial value as fertilizer.
The contract price, either for acquisition of the plant or
to cover lease, rental or service over a period of years
(in the latter case the statute does not limit the period
to ten years) can be provided by the levy of a tax suf-
ficient to pay the annual installment in each year; and
for that purpose the City is not limited to a tax of 50c
per $100.00 of valuation.

Let us summarize the powers of the City applicable to
a reconstruction or repair of its sewage disposal plant:
(1) The City has by its own admission an available
bonding power of $12,583.00, plus the increase in that
figure due to retirement of bonds which may have oc-
curred since June 17, 1930, the date of the trial and
the date on which petitioner computes the above figure
(R. 34, 102; petitioner’s brief, p. 51).

(2) The City may submit to the voters a proposal to
reconstruct or repair the sewage disposal plant and the
voters may authorize whatever general tax is necessary
for that purpose.

(3) The City may tax the cost of such improvement
as special benefit assessments to the land in joint sewer
districts created for that purpose.

(4) The City may contract for the improvement and
pay the contract price from general revenues.

Finally there appears to be no reason why a combina-
tion of these methods may not be used.

Even if there were doubt concerning the City’s powers,
the officials should not at this stage resolve such doubt
against the trial court’s decree. They should first make the
attempt to comply, and if blocked by some legal barrier

39

present that matter to the trial court where jurisdiction
for such purposes was expressly reserved (R. 15, 16).

Ill.

In Any Event the Limitations Upon Financial Powers of the
City Probably Do Not Apply to Matters Affecting
Compliance with the Decree.

Limitations of the amount of municipal indebtedness
apply only to debts created by voluntary act or contract,
and not to obligations or liabilities imposed upon the cor-
poration by law or against its will; 44 C. J. 1127.

It is well established in Missouri that a judgment
against a municipality for a tort liability can not be de-
feated by pleading that the city has exhausted its debt
making power.

In Connor vy. City of Nevada, 188 Mo. 148, 86 S. W.
256 (1905), a judgment was rendered against the city
for personal injuries occasioned by failure of the city
to properly maintain a public street. The city pleaded
that under the terms of Sections 11 and 12 of Article 10
of the Constitution of Missouri the debt making and tax-
ing power of the city had been exhausted, and therefore
the city could not be made liable for additional indebted-
ness. The court in rejecting the contention said:

“The clause of the constitution in question deals
with the subject of incurring indebtedness which
arises ex coutractu and which is very different in its
nature from suffering liability for a tort. The lan-
guage of Section 12 is that the city shall not be
allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any
purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year without
the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof vot-
ing at an election to be held for that purpose. This

Lge dae epee

Se Re es

40

language shows that it is indebtedness incurred by
assent, agreement or contract. The word debt has a
well recognized meaning in law distinguished from
liability for damages. After a claim for damages is
reduced to a judgment it becomes, in a_ technical
sense, a debt, but it is a debt imposed by law, not
one assumed by contract.”

In State ex rel. Pyle, Administrator, v. City of Uni-

versity City et al., 320 Mo. 451, 8S. W. (2) 73 (1928),
the city sought to defeat a similar liability upon the same
grounds. The contention was again rejected. The court
said:

“Suits against municipalities, based on negligence,
involve wrongful acts, whether of omission or com-
mission. It was said in Conner v. Nevada, supra:
‘A city cannot scape liability from an obligation
arising ex delicto on the ground that its indebtedness
has already reached the constitutional limit.’ Again
it was there said: ‘Then when we turn again to the
clause in our constitution on which appellant. relies,
we see that it refers only to the contracting of debts,
and makes no reference to liability for torts; it leaves
that matter as the common law left it.’ To what then
has the statute reference? It speaks of constitutional
limits, but it is evident from the cases in this and
other states that the constitution does not limit the
rate of taxation where a tort is involved. Moreover,
municipalities should not escape responsibility for
their wrongful acts. Any other construction of the
statute might permit them to so escape, and would,
if collection of taxes for that purpose was thwarted.
The constitutional limitation, as we have held, refers
only to debts arising out of contractual relations,
leaving the matter as it was at common law.”

In McCarthy yv. City of Kelso, 129 Wash. 121, 223

Pac. 151 (1924), it is held that a constitutional limitation

41

upon debt making power would not apply to excuse the
city for failure to comply with an order of the state board
of health requiring the construction of a water filtration
plant, there being no other method whereby wholesome
water could be supplied to the city. The court said:

“Having held that the constitutional limitation does
not apply to an indebtedness for the maintenance of
a jail, a quarantine, a fire department, and impound-
ing stock because such indebtedness is necessary for
the preservation of property and the safety of the
inhabitants, we see no reason why the constitutional
limitation should prevent the city from incurring an
indebtedness for the construction of a water filtration
plant for the preservation of the health and lives of
its citizens.”

IV.
Comparative Injuries.

Petitioner contends that the alleged cost of improving
the Harrisonville sewage plant should be offset against
the amount of damages awarded respondent for loss of
rents. This argument assumes that the only damage re-
spondent has suffered is the difference between rent ac-
tually received for the premises and the theoretical rental
value if the water in the stream were unpolluted. The
decisions cited in this brief make frequent reference
to the impossibility of determining accurately the injury
suffered by a landowner from pollution in a stream and
from noxious odors, gases and fumes. Damages caused
by such nuisances include such intangible factors as dis-
comfort, inconvenience and annoyance, Baltimore and Po-
tomac Railroad Company v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137
U. S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 784 (1891). Indeed
it is the very impossibility of adequately fixing compen-

42

sation in money for the injuries received from such
sources which furnishes one ground for equitable juris-
diction.

The real measure of respondent’s damage is the sub-
stantial destruction of a fine stock farm so long as the
watercourse remains contaminated and polluted.

Furthermore, the doctrine of comparative injuries or
balanced equities does not obtain in Missouri. In the
case of State ex rel. v. Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254,
169 S. W. 267 (1914), a suit to abate a nuisance, the
Missouri Supreme Court disposed of the doctrine in the
following language:

“Counsel for respondents say that we should con-
sider the ‘relative advantages and disadvantages to
the parties concerned.’ If it is meant by that assertion
that substantial, certain and irreparable damages to
the plaintiff which might be prevented by injunction
are to be left without remedy because of the fact that
greater damages and disadvantages would result to
the defendant, a wrongdoer, by the issuing of the in-
junction, we are driven to emphatically say no. * * *

‘But we have nothing to do with this question as
to the comparative importance of the conflicting in-
terests, or the inconvenience to the defendants by the
stoppage of their works, if they infringe the material,
substantial rights of others. It is the province and
imperative duty of the court to ascertain and enforce
the legal rights of the complainant, no matter what
the consequence to defendants may be. This duty no
court could evade if it would.’”

eens eB an aS

43

\ ] ee
. rs)

The Injunction in Question Does not Compel Exercise of
Legislative Power.

Petitioner makes the point that “the judiciary may not
properly compel exercise of legislative power.” Petition-
er’s argument consists of two false premises. The first
erroneous premise is stated as follows: “It must be con-
ceded, therefore, that the decision to build a secondary
plant is the exercise of a legislative function” (Petition-
er’s Brief in support of petition, p. 46). It is far from
clear why the above statement should be conceded when
the authorities cited by petitioner establish the exact
opposite of its statement.

The first authority cited by petitioner in support of its
contention that the decision to build a sewage disposal
plant is a legislative function, is 44 C. J. 1084, Sec.
4002 (p. 44 of Petitioner’s Brief). The passage quoted
by petitioner states that some courts have held that the
construction of municipal drains and sewers is a corpo-
rate or municipal as distinguished from a governmental
function, while other courts have held that it is a govern-
mental or legislative function. But the only Missouri
case cited by the authors is Donahoe v. Kansas City, 136
Mo. 657, 38 S. W. 571 (1897), and it is cited in sup-
port of the following:

“Some authorities hold that the construction and
maintenance of municipal drains and sewers is a cor-
porate or municipal, as distinguished from a govern-
mental function.”

In the Donahoe case a workman brought action against
the city to recover damages for injuries received while
digging a trench for a sewer. The court held for the

44

plaintiff on the ground that the maintenance of sewers
is a corporate rather than a governmental function. The
court said:

“But as soon as the corporation has determined
to construct a public work, it enters upon an under-
taking which, in all its details, should be subordi-
nated to the rule requiring the use of care, for the
work is then ministerial. (/b., Sec. 141, p. 267.)

In Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U. S. 21,
it is said: ‘But the construction and repair of sewers,
according to the general plan so adopted, are simply
ministerial duties; and for any negligence in so con-
structing a sewer, or keeping it in repair, the mu-
nicipality which has constructed and owns the sewer
may be sued by a person whose property is there-
by injured.’

‘The work of constructing gutters, drains, and
sewers is ministerial, and when, as is usually the
case, the undertaking is a corporate one, the cor-
poration is responsible in a civil action for damages
caused by the careless or unskillful manner of per-
forming the work.’ 2 Dillon’s Municipal Corporations
(4 Ed.), Sec. 1049.

The same rule was announced by this court in
Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510, and seems to be
the general if not uniform doctrine upon this subject.

The sewers of the city are its private property;
the citizens are alone interested in them; the general
public of the state at large has no interest in them,
any more than they have in waterworks when owned
by a city, by which its citizens are supplied with
water, and in this very important particular differ
from the streets of the city, which are for the benefit
of the public generally.”

= — —— . FRAP RTI FOP
alee _

It is interesting to note that although petitioner cites
a part of Sec. 4002 of 44 C. J. 1084, it omits the part
of the same section which reads:

“Authority to construct and maintain drains and
sewers gives no right to create a nuisance, or to
construct drains or sewers or discharge sewage upon
private lands without permission, or without ac-
quiring the right to do so by lawful means and mak-
ing due compensation to the landowner for the in-
juries sustained.”” (See cases cited in notes 37 and

38.)

The second false premise of petitioner’s argument is
that the court has ordered the City to erect a new dis-
posal system. From time immemorial it has been the cus-
tom of courts of equity to enjoin a result, and to leave
it up to the wrongdoing defendant to choose the method
of stopping the enjoined result. This was the holding of
the Salton Sea cases, 172 Fed. 792 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909),
in which the court enjoined the flooding of lands in the
United States caused by floodgates maintained by defend-
ants in Mexico. It was conceded that the court had no
authority to order the doing of acts in Mexico, but the
court stated:

“\Vhy may not a court restrain a party over whom
it has jurisdiction from injuring property within
its jurisdiction? How does it affect the question of
jurisdiction or venue to say that the party on whom
the court must act may find it necessary to do things
outside the jurisdiction of the court in order to com-
ply with the order of the court? May this not often
happen, and would it not happen oftener, if it were
determined that such an excuse was sufficient to de-
feat the jurisdiction of the court.”

‘
=
z
e

DEAR OL PSE AANA MM OR

46

Finally, respondent returns in all seriousness to the
statement that the petitioner is not required by the
decree to do anything except cease the discharge of
putrescible sewage matter into the watercourse. Petitioner
is offended by the suggestion that the people of Har-
risonville may return to private disposal if they do not
wish to maintain a general disposal plant complying
with standard specifications. Petitioner says that this
thought is “so abhorrent to one’s sense of the requirements
of social and community life that it scarcely requires
further comment.” We wonder if the thought of human
excreta, visible in the stream, toul odors and noxious
gases, constantly offensive, is at all abhorrent to
the petitioner. There is great force in the statement of
the trial judge (Albert L. Reeves) that the City of Har-
risonville should not wish to dispose of its sewage in
such a way as to do harm and injury to persons living
in the environs. We submit that this court will take
cognizance of the fact that the trial judge, in all prob-
ability, is quite familiar with local situations in Missouri,
and that he knew full well that the City of Harrisonville
was trying to do a thing which other similar cities have
avoided doing. The City is trying to make respondent's
pasture land a part of its sewage disposal plant.

VI.

The decisions of the courts below upon questions of fact
and matters of discretion will not be disturbed on certiorari.

The courts below have found the existence of the
nuisance, and that by means, reasonably available, it may
be abated. Such findings of fact will not ordinarily be
disturbed on review in this court. Boehmer v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., (N. Y. 1920) 40 S. Ct. 409, 252 U. S. 496,

ee SOMES ow

wt

LE NaS AEA OR TID

47

64 L. Ed, 680; Fireball Gas Tank & Illuminating Co.,
(Mo. 1915) 36 S. Ct. 86, 239 U. S. 156, 60 L. Ed. 191;
The Linseed King, (N. Y. 1932) 52 S. Ct. 450, 285 U.
S, 5QR,; FO fa. Be. cc on

Likewise the determination of the courts below upon
any pertinent question of comparative injury will not
ordinarily be disturbed by this court. Such determination
is a matter of discretion. Smith v. Staso Milling Co.,
18 F. (2d) 730.

Conclusion.

Petitioner admits the existence of the auisance. The
admission involves all that the record shows as to a con-
dition of gross pollution in the watercourse on respond-
ent’s land. Petitioner admits that reasonable means in
general use are available for abating the nuisance.
Petitioner’s chief defense is that the City has no financial
power to raise the funds involved in remodeling the sew-
age system. The ground for review upon certiorari
under this head is an alleged conflict between the decision
of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and a decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri
(Union Trust Co. v. Pagenstecher, 221 Mo. 121, 119 5.
\W. 1103 [1909]).

\We have shown that that case did not hold the statute
authorizing a Special Public Sewer Tax unconstitutional,
but simply held a tax levied under that statute in that case
invalid because the matter had not been submitted to a
vote, as required by Section 11, Article 10 of the Con-
stitution of Missouri. The trial court and the appellate
court did not even mention the Special Public Sewer Tax
in rendering the decision, but if that method of raising

48

revenue had been expressly relied upon there would have
been no conflict. Furthermore, we have shown three other
financial methods by which funds could be raised for
sewage disposal purposes. Therefore that ground for
certiorari must fall.

The petitioner states that the question of what con-
stitutes a permanent as distinguished from a temporary
nuisance is of such great importance that this court should
pass upon it. We have shown that the real question is
whether a city may maintain a method of sewage disposal,
however inadequate, and however injurious to adjoining
property owners, and escape all supervision by courts
of equity on the theory that the injured property
owner may have an action at law for damages. We
have shown that in the case at bar such a cause of
action is now barred by the five-year statute of limitations
in Missouri. However, this unfortunate result to the
respondent in this case would probably not be a con-
trolling factor. If the question proposed by petitioner is
one of great importance, then the factor which we believe
will control this court is the following:

If an equity court has no supervisory power, then any
municipality may create any kind of unnecessary nuisance
in the way of sewage disposal, taking the chance that a
jury in a suit for damages would be lenient so that the
cost of the inadequate and improper disposal method plus
the damages to be paid for projecting raw sewage onto
private property, would amount in the aggregate to less
than a sufficient and proper disposal plant would cost.
We do not believe that this court will announce a rule
which will make that the controlling factor in determing
what type of sewage disposal plants municipalities shall
construct. If the question is important enough to be
settled by this court, then the equitable jurisdiction which

ah ge eae a |
bs
&

i 49

the trial court and the appellate court have exercised
should be confirmed. The results of such a rule will be
salutary and will look solely toward the construction of
sewage disposal facilities which will not unnecessarily
injure private property owners and will tend to clean,
wholesome, sanitary conditions in the environs of
municipalities.

Petitioner urges that the decree encroaches upon the
legislative function. We have shown that the municipal
function of sewage disposal is not legislative. But even
if it were, it cannot be exercised so as to create a
nuisance. A judicial decree finding the existence of such
a nuisance and enjoining it does not encroach upon the
legislative function.

Petitioner urges that the courts below should have
balanced inconvenience to the municipality against the
damage to the respondent. We have shown that the
Missouri courts do not subscribe to such a doctrine. Even
if the doctrine obtained in Missouri, review of such a
matter of discretion is not the purpose of a writ of
certiorari.

+ a Rp

Respectfully submitted,

Maurice H. WINGER,
LELAND Hazarp,
1100 Waltower Building,
Kansas City, Missouri,
Attorneys for Respondent.
Josern T. OWENs,
WINGER, REEDER, BARKER,
GuMBINER & Hazarp,
1100 Waltower Building,
Kansas City, Missouri,
Of Counsel.

net A RE

50

APPENDIX A.

“Sec. 860. Period of Limitation Prescribed —Civil
actions, other than those for the recovery of real property,
can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in
the following sections, after the causes of action shall
have accrued: * * *

Sec. 862. What Within Five Years—Within five
years: First, all actions upon contracts, obligations or
liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in
Section 861, and except upon judgments or decrees of a
court of record, and except where a different time is
herein limited; second, an action upon a liability created
by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture; third, an
action for trespass on real estate; fourth, an action for
taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, in-
cluding actions for the recovery of specific personal
property, or for any other injury to the person or rights
of another, not arising on contract and not herein other-
wise enumerated; fifth, an action for relief on the ground
of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed
not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved
party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constitut-
ing the fraud.” (Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929.)

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APPENDIX B.

“Sec. 7037. Joint District Sewers. Whenever the city
may deem it necessary that a sewer should be constructed
or reconstructed in any part of the city containing two or
more sewer districts, it may, by ordinance, unite such
sewer districts into a joint sewer district and cause a
sewer to be constructed therein in like manner in all
respects as is provided in Section 7032, in case of district
sewers, and should the board of aldermen, by ordinance,
unite two or more sewer districts into a joint sewer dis-
trict for the purpose of constructing a joint district sewer
therein, the action of the board of aldermen shall be
conclusive for all purposes, and no special tax-bill shall
be held invalid or be affected on account of the included
drainage area thereof, or the size, character or purpose
of such sewer: Provided, however, that no sewer district
shall be included in such joint district which is not con-
tained in the natural drainage area of the valley or
watercourse in which joint district sewer is proposed to
be constructed.” (Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929.)

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APPENDIX C.

“No county, city, town, township, school district or
other political corporation or subdivision of the State
shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or
for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year, without the
consent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting on
such proposition, at an election to be held for that pur-
pose; nor in cases requiring such assent shall any in-
debtedness be allowed to be incurred to an amount in-
cluding existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceed-
ing five per centum on the value of the taxable property
therein, to be ascertained by the assessment next before
the last assessment for State and county purposes, pre-
vious to the incurring of such indebtedness, * * * and
provided further, that any county, city, town, township,
school district or other political corporation or subdivision
of the State, incurring any indebtedness requiring the
assent of the voters as aforesaid, shall before or at the
time of doing so, provide for the collection of an annual
tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness
as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for
the payment of the principal thereof, within twenty
years from the time of contracting the same: * * *.”
(Sec. 12, Art. 10, Missouri Constitution. )

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0355%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
