# Brief for the United States — Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 1932
- **Citation:** 286 U.S. 427

## Text

AmLaNTic. ‘Cizaiens Ann” DYERs, INo.; ‘Gtons Dry.
OLEANERS, AND Dyas, ‘Ancape-Suw-Sinxe Co., Er

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:- Argument:

A price-fixing agreement by persons engaged in the business
of cleaning and dyeing clothes in the District of Columbia” _
is in restraint of trade or commerce within the meaning of

De ia canunthisndenbeanamonsy 6
PRs ec ccanddnweangeend nen eabekenandnaneene 17
CITATIONS

. .° American Bénd & Mortgage Co. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 318-- 7
American Laundry Co. v. E. & W. Dry-cleaning Co., 199 Ala. 154- 8
Buckele.a v. Martens, 156 Atl. 436_ 4 ---..------------- eacedtid 9
Campbell y. Motion Picture Machine Operators’ Unior, 151 Minn. .

| BBD pw ccccccc cece cccwcccc ccc cen conn qecqecenqeccese Sonn 12
Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U. 8. 200:...__-- 10
General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 31 F. (2d).630_ . 7
Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 12 F. (2d) 341---..-------- 11
Kansas City v. Seaman, 99 Kans. 143__.-22--.-----1-------- 9, 12
ae. Pepe, 190 U, §..1....5....-.-....---5,-22----- 00 “13
.-Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181-_-.-- amas wmae ae SOON 16
nk y, Damien, 108 Tenn. 678..............-.,........... 11, 19
' Stangard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1------- ected Er 7
‘ State of California v. ‘Tagami, 195 Cal. 522__.__- Si ti et Ceres 10.
‘State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. a 11,12
State v. Frank, 114 Ark. 47.-.--.--------- a en a 11
ES 11
. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311--------- Be eis 2
The Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke’s Rep. 53a----- mae 15
United States‘v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 86 Fed. 271.------ 15
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 26 U. 8.-371__:---- 14
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. —
Ce ae le neat dh ate AND Lage Sle a Sag a Snapp Sk a ubevetenio-an ee
United States v. Union Pacifig R. R. Co., 226 U. ies ~ 3.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. 8. 347.-_--- 7
Year Bgok, 2 Hen. V, fol. 5,.pl. 26....---------------------- 15
Modern Methods in Drycleaning......-.-------------+---- 6
Act.of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, Sees. 3 and 4 WU. Ss. C.,

Zuo 16, Sees. 3 and’€) .c.....-cn none lencccccnnelecccccee 2
* 114226¢—32——1 (1) at | |

Jufisdiction......-.---- ciapeansinen CE tenaddewenuinaiemenn . -
Question presented. -.......-.- [idnbéhbebsehenaensedncesdne
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: Inthe Supréme Gourt of the Wnited States

‘ Ocroser Term, 1931

No. 667. | oo

ATLANTIC CLEANERS 4ND Dyers, Inc. GLope Dry

Cleaxiers and Dyers, hae —_ et fs

L,, appellants ee ‘
wu '
THE UnirTep States OF AMERICA

5 7.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF

+ COLUMBIA | sis : :
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STAT] az,

OPINION BELOW

, The memorandum opinion of the Supreme Court |
- of the Distriét/of Columbia (R. 11), entered upon - |
the motion to dismiss the petition, is unreported. ”

ay ‘JURISDICTION

The -decree of the court below was entered No-
vember. 5, 1931. (R. 23.) Petition for: appeal was
filed December 29, 1931, and was allowed oe anuary

2,.1932. . a 25, 26.)

,

(1) =e

3 : ;

cy ee 2 ) . . ’ ae :
is J urisdietion of this Gourt is conferred by Section
2 of the Act of February 11, 1903, ¢. 544) 32 Stat.
823 (U.S. C., Title 15, Sec. 29), and by Section 238
. of the J udicial Code as amended by the Act: of Feb-

—Tuary 13, 1925, ¢. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 938 (U. ‘S. C.,

‘Title 28, S&. 345). Swift & Co. V.. United States,

" 276 U. RS 311.

igus QUESTION PRESENTED °
e

Whether price-fixing agreement by persons en-
gaged i in the busmess of. cleaning and dyeing. clothes *
in the District of Columbia is in restraint of trade’
or commerce ‘within the meaning of the Sherpa
- Act. on a | .

‘STATUTE INVOLVED

ae The Act of July 2, 1890,¢. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (U.S.
C., Title 15, Sec, 3 and 4), com as the Sherman

Antitrust tract, provides i in part as follows:

‘Sno, *3., Every contract, _¢ombination in

~ form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in

restraint*of trade or commerce in any Ter-

ritory of the United States or.of the District

aa Sa olumbia, % * * is hereby declared

ir Fh

Src. 4. The: several circuit courts of the

nited $tates are hereby invested with juris- .

‘diction to prevent and restrain violations of

- this” Att; and it shal] be the duty of the sev- -

eral district attorneys of the United States,

: in their respebtive districts, under the direc-

tion of.-the Attornéy-General,. to institute. .

- proceedings in equity to prevent: and restrain
s > guch viglations.: . * hae

+ °
3° a
sTkrEMEnt

This is:a suit in equity under: Section 4 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act to enjoin appellants: from
further engaging in a eombination and conspiracy
in restraint of.trade and commerce in thé District .
of Columbia ‘inzleaning, dyeing, and otherwise ren-
ovating clothes, in violation of Section 8 of that Act.
(Rie.

Thezgourt below ovetreled: ee to dismiss ©
the petition and appellanis filed amended answers.
(R. 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20.) . The answers did ndt
deny, and hence admitted (Equity Rule 30), all .
_ the material allegations of fact contained in the .

- petition.’ The sole defense set- up was that = a
lants’ business, of dry cleaning and dyeing ‘‘e =
sists solely of the performance of labor and oa
rendering of a gervice in cleaning, dyeing, and/or
‘Yenovating wearing apparel and other articles
which have passed into the hands of the ultimate
consumer thereof,’and ‘is not trade or ‘commerce
7 the Imeaning of” ‘the Sherman Ant titrust
| - CR. 13, 15, 17, 19, 21:) Upon motion by the
| An States, the -court ordered - these answers -

_ stricken from the files upon the ground that they o

1The petition alleged | that defendants ain did sub-
stantially all of the business of cleaning, dyeing, and reno- = -

vating clothing in the District of Columbia. ” *(R. 3.) The
_ ansWérs stated, on information and belief, that persons other

than the defendaats did at least one-half_of this business.
(R.-13, 15, 17, 19, vm) Si ) ‘ .

4

did not state a valid defense. (R. 22,23.) After
appellants had advised the court that they elected
to stand upon their answers, a.decree was entered °
enjoining the combination and — ne ..
in the petition. (R. 23-24. )

Upon the pleadings, the following fadin stand |
admitted. Appellants are engaged in the business
of cleaning, dyeing, and otherwise renovating
clothing at plants located in the District of Co-
lungbia. - (R. 2-3.) Their business is in part, and
in some cases principally, at wholesale, pursuant
to contracts or engagements with so- -called retail
dyers and cleaners who maintain shops in the Dis-
trict and receive from: the public clothing to be-
' cleaned, dyed,’ or ‘ otherwise renovated. (R. %,.
13-21.) In August, 1928, appellants agreed to
. raise the pricg@ then being charged for cleaning,

dyeing, and otherwise renovating clothing and
| agreed upon certain minimum and uniform prices,
terms, and conditions as those which they would |
thereafter charge for performing such service.
.(R. 3.) They also agreed to assign and allot the
retail dyers and cleaners ampng themselves, and
. each agreed to trade only with-the retailers assigned
_tohim. (R:4.) Appellants subsequently put into
effect antl carried out their agreement to maintain
minimum and uniform prices and to allot cus- _

tomers. (RB. = | aan

4)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT -

Appellants are carrying on the business of clean- —

ing and dyeing clothes for the purpose-of making
a profit from the sale of a standardized, nonpersonal .
service. Their business is ‘‘trade or commerce”’
within the meaning of the Sherman Act even if
those words are used ‘in the limited sense of barter .
and exchange. Appellants barter the standardized
service which they perform for what it will bring
from those desiring the service. The exchange of
a given unit of service for a price has been held to
be trade or commerce. Fransportation is the ren-
dering of a service, and transportation itself is com- .
‘merce. . Transmission of intelligence by telegraph
or radio, where a service only is performed, is also
commerce. An agreement ‘not to compete in the
business of cleantThg clothes has’ been held within
the common law doctrine of ‘restraint of frade. _

If the meaning of the statute is doubtful, the in-
tention. of Congress may be considered. | Appel- —
_lants’ agreement to fix prices and allot ct ustomers
- in the cleaning and dyeing business engen ers. the
evils against which the statute ‘was directed and

therefore may be presumed to be within the scope ra
of the Act. In addition, the history of the common

lagdoctrine of restraint of trade leads to the same _
conclusion. Not only was trade which consists in
performing a service not outside the common law
doctrine, but the doctrine was first applied to pro-
tect such trade. eer .

6
ARGUMENT
A PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENT: BY PERSONS ENGAGED IN
TH BUSINESS OF CLEANING AND DYEING CLOTHES IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
_ OR COMMERCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SHER-
MAN ACT -

Appellants contend that the words ‘trade. or
- commerce,’”’ as used in the Sherman Act, do not
apply to any business which consists in supplying
a service, evén though the business has all the ear-
marks of an ordinary commercial undertaking.
Appellants are engaged in cleaning and dyeing
clothes. The service they perform is standardized,
as evidenced by their agreement to charge uniform
prices. The so-called service performed is also
wholly nonpersonal. Appellants are not, like, the .
owner of a baseball-club ora theatre, engaged in
marketing of#/exploiting the skill of particular indi-
viduals. To the extent that appellants operate at
wholesale, the customer whose clothes are serviced
may not even know the name of the company which
did the work. And the court, we assume, may take
judicial notice that’ appropriate machinery and
equipment are used in the business.” It is our con-’
tention that the business of purveying a standard-
ized, nonpersonal service, where there is, as here,
eompetition upon a price hasis, is trade or’ com-
merce within the meaning of the Sherman Act.:

- . See “ Modern Methods in Dry cleaning,” by George G.
Gaubatz, jr., published by National Association of Dyers
and Cleaners, 1931, pp. 8, 17, 19, 25, 115.

-

We abies that this view is supported by the deci- -
sions, by a consideration of the purposes of the
Sherman Act, and by the history of the common- ~
law doctrine of restraint of trade.

Railroads, whose business consists in furnishing
a service, the service of transportation, have long | |
been recognized as subject to the limitations of the
Sherman Act. . This.avas held in one of the first.
Sherman ‘Act cases to come before this Court
(United States v. Trans-Mi issourt Freight Associa-
tion, 166 U. 8. 290), where the Court rejected. (p.
312) the contention that the Act was intended to
reach only those engaged in the manufacture and
sale of articles of commerce, and said, “Railroad
companies are instruments of commerce, and their.
business is commerce itself... bs
* The business of a-telegraph company is furnish-
ing the service communication, but this business _
has been held to be commerce. Western Union °
‘Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. 8. 347. Fur-
nishing a broadcasting service by radio is within |
the regulatory power of Congress under the com-
merce clause of the Constitution. American Bond
& Mortgage Co. v. United States, 52 ¥® (2d) 318,
322 (CO, C. A., 7th), certiorari denied FebMary 23,
1932 ; Sverd Electric Co. v. Federal R io-Com- .
mission, 31 F. (2d) 630, 633 (Ct. App., ‘D. 6. Ds. cer-
tiorari dismissed, 281 U. 8. 464.

In Standard Oil Company v. United States, 221
U. 8. 1, this Court said (P. 51) that the terms of

114226—82——-2

. _

‘
the Shérman Act, “‘at least in their rudimentary
meaning, took their origin in the common law’’ and

- (p. 60}.that the scope of the Act is to be measured

by “the standard of reason which had been applied

"at the common law and in this country in dealing

with subjects of the character embraced by the
statute.’’ It is therefore significant that the com-
mon law doctrine of restraint of trade has been
applied to the business of dry Seening as well as
to the laundry business.

In American Laundry Co. v. E.& W. Dry-clean-
ing Co., 199 Ala. 154, the plaintiff sued to enjoin
violation of a contract entered, into between it and
five laundry companies. The contract provid ed
that the plaintiff was to establish a dry-cledging
plant in Birmingham, Ala.; that for a period of
ten years it would nal engage in the laundry busi-

~ ness and for the same period the five laundry com-

panies would not engage in the dry-cleaning busi-
ness; that all dry-cleaning work collected by the
laundry companies from their customers should be
done: by the plaintiff, the laundry companies re-—
ceiving 25% of the price paid by the customer. —
The bill alleged that the plaintiff, relying upon this .
contract, had invested $10,000 in dry-cleaning ma-

_ chinery and equipment and had erected a modern .

dry-cleaning: plant. The defendant laundry com-

_ pany was charged with having refused to deliver

to the plaintiff dry-cleaning work collected from

the defendant’s customers. The court held that

the contract, by reason of its tendency to stifle com- —

Stim J

9°. |
petition, was in restraint of trade and therefore
unenforceable in equity. a

A.recent decision by the New Jersey Court of

Errors and Appeals is similar. In Buckelew'v. - 7
‘Martens, 156 “Atl. 436, suit was brought on a de-—
mand note given to secure payment of liquidated

damages for the breach of an agreement between

certain laundry companies. The laundry- compa-

nies agreed to charge their custoy a minimum
price, to require solicitors of (laundry work to _
charge the same minimum rate, and $0 employ as .

solicitors only those with whom they previously
' dealt. The court affirmed judgment: for the de-
- fendant upon the ground ‘that the contract was in

restraint of trdde and illegal at common law. The
’ The public are entitled to have competi-
tion, in order that they may buy at the .
—Jowest price, and it makes ng difference
whether the price-fixing agreements are rea-
sonable or unreasonable or tend to monopoly

- or not. ie
Kafttsas City v: Seaman, 99 Kans. 148, held that
an employee of a laundry company located in Mis-
souri who collected in Kansas City, Kans., articles to

be laundered and who returned the same aftet they °
- had been laundered was engaged in interstate com- —

merce’ and therefore not subject'to a license fee im-

posed on every person carrying on the laundry busi-
“ness in Kansas City, Kans. The court rejected (pp.

144-145) ‘the contention made by the city that no.

_

J 4 | - 10 s”
commerce was invelved because the transaction was
afor a .personal service with reference to property
~owned by customers and because the latindry com-
pany was selling, not goods, but service. It held’
that the barter and sale of certain services, like the
barter and sale of commodities, may be commerce.

_ - State of California y. Tagami, 195 Cal. 522, held
that leasing land for the purpose of conducting 2
sanitariuin was within the scope of a treaty guar-
anteeing to the:citizens of each contracting party
the right ‘‘to carry on trade’’ and to lease land for

‘commercial purposes.’’ The court said (pp. 528-
529):
The words ‘‘trade’’ afid ‘‘eonimeree”? are @
frequently found in conjunction or Juxta-
position gn treaties between nations and in
those constitutions and laws which define
and regulate the scope and purposes of such
international engagements. They are also
often employed by lexicographers in defin- —
ing each other. When so employed, and |
particularly when so used in the conjunc-
tive, they are held to impart to each other
an enlarged signification which would in-
clude practically every business occupation
#£ carried on for the purpose of procuring sub-. :
sistence pr profit and into which, or any
material part of which, the elements of bar-
gain and sale, barter, exchange, or - traiie
enter.

3 —
Appellants rely upon Federal Baseball Club v.
N atvonal League, 259 U. 8, 200, holding that

~ jeagues of professional baseball clubs promoting
: . ra ae bn, ‘

11

competitive games between clubs in different States

are not subject to the provisions of the Sherman

Act. The Court said (pp. 208-209) that the busi-

ness was giving exhibitions of baseball, which are

purely State affairs, and that ‘the interstate trans-

_ portation attendant upon such exhibitions ‘“‘is a

mere incident, not the essential thing.’’ It said

further (p, 209) : , { :
That to which it is incident, ia “exhibi-

tion, although made for. money would not

be called trade or commerce in the commOn-

_ ly accepted use of those words. © As it is put

- by the defendants, personal effort, not re-

* ated to production, is not a subject of com-

merce. |

Each member of a.baseball team is employed be-

cause of his individual, personal skill. There is

no sale of a standardized service, but rather a hir-

ing of the peculiar skill and ability of particular

individuals. _The service, contracted for ‘is purely -°

- personal and hence not a subject of commerce. The
cage is like Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange 12.
F, (2d) 341 (C. ©. A. 2d), certiorari denied 273
U.S. 703, which held that a combination to monopo-—
lize the giving of vaudeville exhibitions was not a
violation of the Sherman Act. }
Appellants also” rely upon State. v. Frank, 114
Ark, 47; State v. McClellan, 155 La. 37; Smith v.
Jackson, 103 Tenn. 678; and State v. Duluth Boord
of Trade, 107 Minn. 506. The first two eases held
that the respective State antitrust acts did ‘not ap- ’
. ply to the laundry business. In State v. Frank, ,

1

supra, the law merely. prohibited fixing the price
of any ‘‘commodity.’’ In State v. McClellan,
supra, the section of the act upon. whith the indict-
méht was based prohibited attempts to monopolize ~
“trade or commerce,’’ but the court held (p. 43)
that it wa8 necessary ic-tarn to another section. 6f
the act for.a definition of these words and that, so
cousirued, only those who sold, leased, or dealt in
commodities were within the act. * .

Smith v. J ackson, supra, held that the Commerce -
Clause of the Federal Constitution did not bar a
Tennessee occupational tax upon a resident of that
State acting as agent for a Kentucky laundry in
the collection and délivePy of clothes. The deci-
g ioh i is in direct conflict with Kansas. City. v. Sea- |

. man, 99 Kan. 143, supra." .

State v. Duluth Board of Trade, supra, held that

_ the rule of a grain excang? revuirizg its members
* to charge uniform commissions did not viglate the
State antitrust law. The court (pp. 546) 551) re- .
‘garded the tomiission men as.competing with each —
. other on the basis of individual skill and therefore —
performing a personal service. The court. also
4 held (pp. 550-551) that the rule under attack did
not’ restrain trade, because it promoted, rather
than stifled, competition. The case was qualified
in Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operatars’
Union, 151 Minn. 220, 230-231, where the court
adopted | the broad view that the exchange of per-.
sonal service for a money consideration is“‘trade’’
. within the meaning of the State antitrust law. In

e@ 4,

a

ee ot - CY
‘ . {nat case the court, referring to the contention that
the business of exhibiting motion pictures is not
trade, said (p. 232) > ; ee
It seems clear to us that thie “ logical

conclusion is that the ‘word has been used
in its broadest sense’ and includes business
of any kind in which a person engages for
profit.
Appellants -also rely upon. cases holding that
_ manufacturing is not commerce, But appellants
are not: manufacturers ; as this Court said in Kidd
v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20, ‘Manufacture is trans-
formation—the fashioning of raw materials into a-
change of form-for use.”” The question here ‘is
whether the provisions of the Sherman Act declar-
ing unlawful every agreement in restraint of trade
and commerce withigp the District of Columbia
‘apply.’to 4 business where ‘a standardized service
is exchanged for cash or whether these’ provisions
apply only to those engaged in the sale id exchange
of commodities.

If there'is doubt as to the wie of the statute,
it is proper to consider the intention of Congress.
Referring to the Sherman Act, the Court said, in’
United States v. Union Pacific’R. R. Co., 226 U. S/ 7
61, 87:

. To preserve from undue restraint the,free
action of competition in interstate commerce
. was the purpose which controlled Congress
in enacting this statute, and the courts
should construe the law with a view to effect-
ing the object of its enactment.

?

ae

- Tn United. States v. Pree Linseed Oil Co., |
262 U. S. 371, 388, the’ Court said: ee |
—— The Sherman Act was intended to secure ,
equality of opportunity and to protect the
public against evils commonly incident ,to
- monopolies and:‘those abnormal contracts |
éd and combinations which tend directly to”
suppress the conflict for advantage called
_ competition—the play of the contending
forces ordinarily engendered by an honest
desire for gain. a.

Under the circumstances here presented there
may be competition among those engaged in the
- business of selling a service or there may be, by rea- |
‘ son of an agreement, fixing prices and allotting cus-
tomers, suppression of all cotapetition. A statute
¢ enacted to’ protect against ‘‘evils commonly inci-
“dent to monopolies” will fail of its full purpose if ©
ee such a business. is beyond the reach of the statuté.
‘The consequences of an agreement to maintain
“prices. in such trade may be as serious as those of.
alr agreement to fix the price of. a commodity. The
price: paid for cleaning clothes may be of as much
concern to the publie as the price. of an article of
~ food or clothings. Appellants’ agreement. restrains -
- the trade of retail shops which receive clothes from
the public and have them cleaned or dyed by whole-
. salers in, the same way. that a price agreement |
“among wholesalers of shoes would restrain. the

+ . tfade of rétail shoe stores.
Not only does consideration of the purposes of
the Sherman Act lead to the conclusion that it.

‘ ~~
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applies to appellants’ business, but the history i

the common-law doctrine of restraint of trade leads
to the same conclusion.

‘The ‘contract in restraint of ene which origi- :
“ie fell under the condemnation of the common
law was one whereby a-party bound himself not

to follow some particular occupation, trade, or call-

ing. From early times it was the policy of ‘the
English law to discourage such restraints. - They

were condemned because they tended to deprive

the community of the services of ‘one of its mem-
bers and frequently. ' tended to create a monopoly

and thus destroy the freedom of trade. See United -
a States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Ce., 85 Fed. 271,

279,

_/. “The law of restraint of trade thus’ gre rem up to-
"protect the ‘trade of-the handicraftsman, who per-
forms a service. Curiously, the earliest. recorded ° -

ease {1415) of restraint of trade is that of a dyer.
The defendant had bound himself not to exercise
his art in the same town. as the plaintiff. Justice

Hull, after holding the contract void, indignantly

exclaimed, “ner Dieu, if plaintiff’ were here, le

should go to prison until he paid a fine to the King.”

_ Year Book, 2-Hen. V, fol. 5, pl. 26.

The Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke’s.
Rep. 53a, was an action of debt against a tailor for —

exercising his trade without having complied with
an ordinante of the corporation: of the tailors of
Ipswich which prohibited any one from exercising

that trade in the town of Ipswich until he had .

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served at least seven years as an apprentice and

had been admitted re te be a sufficient. work- ;
man. -It was arguél—
That at the common law, no. man could be °*
prohibited from working in any lawful trade, |
for the law abhors idleness,.the mother of all
evil,“otium omnium vitiorum mater, and es-
‘pecially in young men, who ought in their
_ youth, (which is their seéd time) to learn
-.. lawful sciences and trades, which are profit-
able to the commonwealth, and whereof they
might reap the fruit in their old age, for idle
_ in youth, poor in age; and therefore the com-
mon abhors all monopolies, which pro-
ent any from working in any lawful
tra a, * bd : ;
The court gave judgment for the defendants hold-
ing that at common law no man could be prohibited
from ‘working at any lawful trade. .
The early doctrine that all restraints were bad,

without exception, gave way (1717) to the view that

partial restraints, reasonably adapted to-serve the .

‘interests of the contracting parties and not injuri-
~ ous to the public, were valid. Mitchel v. Reynolds,

1 P. Wms. 181. But. it was never suggested that
the doctrimé of restraint of trade did not apply
where: the trade was carrying on, furnishing, or

: performing a service.

In prohibiting agreements in restraint of trade

_ or commerce among the States, Congres neces-
. sarily acted within the limits of its regulatory

power over interstate commerce. In legislating.

17

‘
5

for the Distriet of Columbia, Congress was not sub- _
ject to this limitation, and it may have intended to «

embrace .the whole domain of the common law.

But for the purposes of the present case it is not

necessary to adopt this construction.

Appellants’ agreement to fix the prices to be -

charged for the service of cleaning or dyeing
clothes is within the purposes of the Sherman Act

é because it engenders the evils: against which the
statute was directed. From the standpoint of legal

. history, restraint of trade-includes a business which

consists in performing a service, and. Congress

adopted the terminology of the common law. It —

_ would be a strange reversal, after five centuries,
to hold that tlfe business of dyeing, which called

forth the first announcement of the doctrine of re- _

straint of trade, is not within a statute the terms.
of which “‘at least in their rudimentary meaning,

4

- took their ie the common law.”’

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the decree be-—

low’ should be affirmed. :
THomas D. THACHER,
| Solicitor General.
_ JouN Lorp O’Brian,*
The Assistams to the Attorney y General.
a. / | CHartes H. Weston,
. - | | REssEit Harpy,
‘ GrorGE:P. ALT,
Spectat Assistants to the Attorney General.

. APRIL, 1932. __ e saan

, ‘
"U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1932

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0205%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
