# Petitioners Brief — Reed v. Allen > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0183%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petitioners Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1932 - **Citation:** 286 U.S. 191 ## Text Y a | a3 rls. | FILE FILE COPY’ ies QHARLES. LLMs ‘ . - SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. OCTOBER TERM, 1931 ~ PT ' : ‘“KEZIAH REED, GEORGIANA’ R. SIMPSON, LIL- LIAN: M. H. REDDING, Iwnrant, sy Her Next _ Frmnp, LEWIS H.. REDDING; MARGARET M. REDDING, Inrant, By Her Next Frienp, LEWIS H.' REDDING, ET AL., PETITIONERS, 7 ° ! vs.’ ‘ “LORENZO ALLEN. a _. , BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS. _ ; { ° 1 23 _ J. WILMER LATIMER, Guardian ad Litem for. Infant . / |. Petitioners, in Propria Persona, { | WALTER C, CLEPHANE, | GILBERT L. HALL, - ‘Counsel for Adult Pesliionore. 7. “eens: — “he a ok bn ai Dh Bity neon Wr De Yor gyedery Bere Og co akaerig y © OTE ea ey Tae RS eV re 4 oe Rr ee aad e 4 . INDEX, ' Sussect. INDEX. r Ae . ; Page ia EN on 4-cUNines4460 000d bib bap ¥dveabweten beds bacsune 1 TN se seedshenkehtaxddcandenned oa fut 4b0o6+éb0 cgnews 2 I NIN awd. ocnd'n.s 049. dab enonueec in one dncs er 2 Statute involved.......... OVS cvecceeensbenecoccvesceseesenes 2 ; , Statement of the case.......0.....cceecceeesces vcbsccccccece 3 g Grounds of decision below............. jeacusuvasdrecdcuentas 5 . OE WON ws ved eengsedanenccchacsdeeicecssacs 6 STE? Py — , pee cepares ee PN LEA TN DOE RO EYL LI ME ROMO ARMIES, C8 EN AME RELL LOM REL IALP MOD ARIEL ARLD GOSS Oly 4 “ every case where one voluntarily appears, pre- _* sents his case and. is fully heard, and why he should ‘not, in the absence of fraud, be there- after concluded by the judgment of the tribunal a7 which he has submitted his cause.” (pp. 525, 526) | The appellate court’s interpretation of the Silas Holmes will, in the interpleader suit (R. 15), was not handed down for many months after the first ejectment judgment had been entered and petitioners put in pos- session (R. 1g). The present decision of the Court of Appeals is that, notwithstanding the acquiescence of re- - spondent in the judgment in the first ejectment suit, he is nevertheless not bound by it, but may maintain this second ‘ejectment suit because of that intervening rul- ing of the Court of Appeals in the interpleader suit. In‘other words, when (through the appellate court’s subsequent ruling in a wholly collateral suit) it appears that a final judgment in ejeetment, unappealed from and acquiesced in, had been erroneous, the losing party “may again litigate the same issue with the same parties ‘in a secotd ejectment action. Tested by this later ‘interpretation it may be ad-. -mittéd that the ejectment judgment was erroneous. But that doesnot at all affect its finality and coriclusive- ness. As this Court said in State of Oklahoma Vv. - State ‘of pia 256 U.S. ‘70: : ; “The matter being res judicata, as the result of the decree in the former suit, it is of no con- ‘sequence whether it was correctly decided or not.’’ (p. 93) 11 J It is not necessary to cite decisions of other courts to the effect that the failure to assert rights in a suit in which a judgment. is obtained, either through igno- rance of law or of facts, or through negligence or mis- conduct of counsel, does not affect the estoppel, and that, so long as the judgment remains unappealed from ~ and in full force, the fact that it may have been erro- neous doés not detract from its effect ag a bar to fur- - ther suits upon the same cause of action. The opinion in Oklahoma v. Texas, supra, and the following quotations from other cases in this Court make the above principles clear. _ In Wilson’s Executor v. Deen, 121 U. S. 525, which is quite in point on the facts, the Court said: ‘Fraud in procuring the lease, upon which this ‘action is brought, was the point in issue in the action in the Marine Court between the same ; parties, and it having been found by the verdict of the jury against the plaintiff, and judgment _ having been rendered upon that finding, the fact _ ¢ thus established must necessarily defeat any subsequent action upon the ante instrument be- tween those parties. The effect of the yudgment is not at all dependent upon the correctness of the verdict or finding upon ‘which tt was ren- dered. It not being set aside by subsequent pro- ceedings, by appeal or otherwise, tt was equally ‘effective as an estoppel upon the point decided, Fs hether the decision was right or wrong aii i (p. 534). (Italics supplied.) In Cromwell v.County of Sac, 94 U: S. 351, fre- quently cited in later decisions of this Court, the opin- ion, after stating’ the rule that.a judgment rendered ’ . a GREET AON R Aas BIO NTA RENT ON RO ar I MIO EEEY SO ZEEE PLETE IP LENT 12 upon the merits constitutes an absolute bar toa subse- ‘quent action, continues : * ‘It is a finality as to the claim or demand in . controversy, concluding parties and those in. privity with them, nat only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or de- ~ feat the claim or demand, but as to any other ad- missible matter which might have been offered - for that purposé. Thus, for example, a judgment rendered upon a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and of the ~. ’ amount due upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that perfect ‘defenses actually existed, of — which no proof. was offered, such: as forgery, ‘want of consideration, or payment. If, such de- fensés were not presented in the action, and es- tablished by competent evidence, the subsequent. _ allegation of their existence is of no legal conse- quences The judgment is as conclusive, so far as future proceedings. at law are concerned, as though the defenses never existed’’ (pp. 252, 253). (Italics supplied.) ™ U... 8. v. Moser, 266 U. S. 236, the Court said: “But a fact, question or right distinctly ad- : judged i in. the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the deter- mination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law’ (p. 242). (Italics the Court?s.) y To same effect: §\ \ ¢ , Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, Sas a9 Chicago, R: 1. & P. R. Co. v. Schendel, S. 611, at p. 617. a bemane ‘ . « 9 : ’ : ‘ ; 4 ‘ , y . % :, te _— At € Nae PM) ow MUO AY ORM LOB NLT EMS IO ISNA IE PRI AIPA F CGH TT \ setae aie oe PLE EES, . , ° ‘ . ~ ee g So important is the maintenance of the doctrine of res judicata that this Court has declared that. it must - be enforced even when no-review of the judgment by appeal was available, because of the small amount in- — - volved (Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252). ' Brief references will be made now to the grounds © stated in the opinion of the Court of “err for its ruling in the present case. 1, Stringely, the appellate court treats the appeal from the decree in the collateral (interpleader) suit as if it had been’an appeal from the judgment in the first action of ejectment, and bases its conclusion upon — this supposed fact. It alia i in its opinion, after quot- ing the Code se@tion in question (supra, p. 6): . - It will be observed that this relates to final judgments. A judgment appealed from is not a final judgment. It is merely an adjudication of the inferior court, the finality of which depends upon the action of the superior court”’ (R. 24). | *. (Italics ours.) Any reader of the opinion (R. 22-25) would almost certainly infer from this that there had been an ap- peal from the first ejectment judgment. But it has already been shown by the record that there was no appeal taken (R. 6, 23). 2. The appellate court falls into the further error of treating the decree in the interpleader suit as a decree vesting title to the real estate. : That the interpleader decree did not create or ‘vest title to the real estate is obvious. The only possible 14 ‘authority of the court in the interpleader suit was to determine who was entitled to the money in Walker’s hands. This involved the interpretation of Silas. _ . Holmes’ will for the purpose-of ascertaining in whom was the title in remainder, for such remainderman was - ‘clearly entitled to rent-money collected by Walker’after — -* the life tenant’s death. The trial court’s construction | of the will gave the v3 oney to petitioners as devisees . under the will (R. 9,10). The appellate court’s con- struction gave it to respondent Aller «s heir-at-law’ (R. - 15), In either view the title to the las must have vested ‘at the testator’ s death (which occurréd about 30 years ° before—Rp 12) or as sbon after his-death: as the claim- ants came’into being. Therefore the equity court could nat have vested title to the land by its decree in the interpleader syit, and the fact is that neither the first _ decree (R. 9, 10) nor the decree upon mandate * 15, . . 16) attempted to do.so. ‘ It is thus made evident ‘that the appellate court: w as entirely in error in declaring the fact tobe that “The judgment in the first ejectment proceed- . ing was dependent entirely upon the title ac- utved through the decree of the Supreme Vourt mat the: District of Columbia”? (R. 24). (Ifalies . ours, ) cs 3. The- third fundamental error of the appellate '} court is closely related to the second. } It j is that the appellate ‘court predicated its decision. upon the un: justified premise ‘tliat petitioners had based their eject- ‘ment action upon the trial court’s decree i in the inter- pleader suit. The opirtion, in stating the case, says . '(R. 23) that petitioners-‘‘instituted an action in eject- . Ment against the appellant wholly based on the decree then on appeal.’’ (Italics ours,)° Throughout the opinion are other frequent. references to the same sup- - _. posed fact, and it is plain, from the court’s language‘ that it: regarded such supposed fact, as a controlling oo N e : hae at iy But the record shows that Petitioners’ ejectment ac- tion was based, ay of course it must have been, upon _ the title which the had | Tong asfiWed as devisees under the Silas Holmes will (R- ‘8, 9). Manifestly the judg- - ment therein could not have been based, nor in any way dependent, upon a deéree which vested no title to the _ veal estate nm them. Respondent’s replication in the _ present action (upon which he elected .to stand after — demurrer was sustained) ‘avers that in the former eject- ment action, petitioners’ ‘as their source of titlé and right to possession relied solely’? upen Silas Holmes’ ‘will, and upon the trial court’s decree in the inter-— pleader suit (R. 8, 9). tae is the only statement in the record upon thissubjéct, and it shows that the pres- ". ent petitioners there asserted and relied ‘upon a title derived from the wul and very properly availed them- ‘ selves of the interpretation given the same will by a *, justice of the same court in a collateral proceeding in |. which the will had also been involved. But even if peti-: _ tioners in that action had erroneously relied upon the trial court’s decree in the collateral suit, as their source of title, respondent could not by a secdnd action in ejectment attack the./erroneous an from which he omitted to oppes. A. * - 4 The a eourt further, in its opinion, says. | that: ri ail Aare ae . ° “The first ejectment. oil was 3 merely: im aid of the — decree”’ (R. 24, 25): - (Italies ours.) @. and. aw * 4% Had a - i “When: that decree was ; reversed,” ‘vacated, set aside, and for nothing held,’ the jlidgnots,” _ for possession shared the fate of the decree upon _» Which relianc® was — for title” (R. Be). “Iti is impossible to find any justification either in the - record or in-the law for declaring, that.{his common law getien of ejectmerit was or could ‘hav. been i in aid of the decree for the payment of ey in, the inter- - » pleader suit. _ * 5, The appellate court's Citi concludes thus: ‘‘It was within the power of the equity court upon the mandate. ofthis. court, to have ordered restitution of posséssion in its ‘decree. Possess- _. -ing this power, it would-be trifling with justice ~*~ to hol& that.the court was without power to “gre restitution in ejectment’’ - 25). . But, it may be —— what possible — or jur is- diction liad the, equity court, in the collateral: inter- pleader suit over money, to- enter any. order or decree which could disturb the final. idgment, ‘entered long . before by the law court in ejectment, or the possession ‘of the real estate which had been secured by that judg- ment? Of course, - upon the reversal of the equity. | decree, the trial vourt could and would have required paren | sik cp Y - o, 7 vA (ae 16° f rd 7“ #he prevailing parties below to surrender the money, | which -alone was the: subject of that suit, had such ‘money been paid to them pending the appeal. - ms The . Court of. Appeals in its opinion cites, as - authorities, for its conclusion, ‘the. following ue ‘cases only: Golde Clothes Shop v. Loews Buffalo - . Theater, 236 N.Y. 465, 470; Ure v. Ure, 223 Ill. 454; Dodson v: Butler, 101 Ark. 416, 420;'U. S. (mean- * ing Bank of U.S.) v. Bank of Washington, 6 Pet. 8, 17. ‘Counsel deem it urinecessary to protract this brief by -referring to the facts and conclusions i in! ‘those cases, because’ a cusory examination will disclose that none ~ of hem is at all i in Soint upon the facts or the sy of the present case. ee As paicates by the foregoin's quotations from the opinign of the Court of Appgals, it wholly ignored the ~ - distinct nature of the remedies invoked. in the eject- . ment action and the interpleader proceeding, -respéc- — _ tively, and the exclusive character ‘of the jurisdiction in sneh-cases. Because ini both it happened that the thterpretation of ‘the same will wag: involved, the ap- pellate court fell into the fundamental error of treat- . -. ing the judgment in thé one cdse as dependent upon the decree in the other. The following apt language ‘of this Court in Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, which N was directly called to -the appellate court’s attention . In petitioners’ brief ies should kave. prevented my such: — : ety ar “Tt j is not tine that a eouré. having edtained jurisdiction of a subject matter of a suit, and ' .of. parties before-it, thereby excludes all other courts from the right to adjudicate upon other fii 8 -.. matters having a very close connection with those before the firsti‘court, and, in some ‘in- stances, ig the decision of the same ques- . tions exactly, ‘Ine pining into the exclusive character of ~ the jurisdiction of such cases, we must have re- gard to the nature of the remedies, the character ‘" ’° of the relief sought, arid the identity of the parties in the different suits: & “For example, a party having notes sevured: - by a mortgage on real estate, may, unless re- strained by statute, sue in‘a court of chancery to foreclose his mortgage, and in a court of law . to recover a judgment on his notes, and in an: « other court of law in an action of ejectment to - get possession of the land. Here in,all the suits the only question at issue may be the existence’ . of the debt mentioned in .the notes. and mort- gage; but as the relief sought is different, and the mode of proceéding is different, the juris- diction of neither court is affected by the pro- . ceeding in the other’’: (pp. 345, 346). (Italics ° supplied. ) $ See also Wafson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, at page 716. + The only ground upon which respondent sen to avoid the bar of the fokmer judgment was that he ad i acquired a new title since the first ejéctment judgment. by virtue of the-decree upon mandate of the appellate owrt in the interpleader suit. (See Op. Ct,. of Ap., R. 23.) The learned trial justice in his memorandum ~ opinion. rejected this contention, saying: 7 “‘Tdo not think that the plaintiff sets up any =| J, ' title in the present suit acquired since the former , | s@it. * * * He failed to appeal fyom the former / — oe ae _ judgment and cannot now set up any title which -he had at that time’’ (R. 18). | With that conclusion the popelinie court disagreed, ‘holding that the decree upon its mandate in the inter- > pleader suit over the rent money constituted a new title to the real estate in Allen. It has’already been shown ° _ that-such could not have been the effect.of said decree, ‘-and reference to its terms (R. 15, 16) will show clearly | that it did not eiitidl to vest or create title to the land - in anyone. es, . To further test the main question here ‘aeuived, sup- pose Petitioners’ ejectinent action had been instituted after (instead of long before) the ruling by the Court of Appeals in the interpleader suit, and that: the trial © court had erroneously given jud ent. for petitioners notwithstanding that ruling, what would have been respondent’s remedy? Obviously his. only remedy - would have been an appeal from|that judgment. - He could not acquiesce therein and latér on institute a sec- ond ejectment suit because of the error i in entering the - prior judgment. _ The case made by the record comes “simply to ‘hie: Respondent had his day in cuurt in the first ejectment ‘action. He had a plain legal remedy by appeal from — the adverse final judgment therein and omitted to avail himself of it. By the present decision the Court of Ap- peals has given him a remedy which is opposed to set- tled principles repeatedly declared by this Court, as well as.té the terms of an unambiguous statute. 2 we are not mistaken in our view that the decision ~ ) is wrong, that it contradicts the plainest decisions of >? ® bi 20 = . v. iy \ ‘this Court, and that it tends to weaken if not to destroy ~ - one of the fundamentals of the law, then the fact that—- the decision was by a unanimous court only makes the situation the more serious. - Conclusion. It is respectfully submitted that the decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. J. WILMER LATIMER, Guardian ad Liten for Infant Petitioners, in Propria Persona. WALTER C. CLEPHANE, GILBERT L.: HALL, Counsel for Adult Pelitigters. (1679) --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0183%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.