# Opinion — Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0181%3A08 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opinion - **Published:** January 1, 1932 - **Citation:** 286 U.S. 145 ## Text “5 5 ¢ 1 . ww : Fi . ’ : : Bebe Ww Yow kM r -SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. No, 423.—Ocroszr Trem, 1931. — Bradford Electric Light Company, Inc., Appellant and .Petitioner, vs. o* | “: Jennie M. Clapper, Administratrix. 1 ~ > Pefition for writ. of cer- Appeal from the United States Cirerit. Court of Appeals for thd First Circuit. | tiorari to the ~ United States Circuit Court of. .. Appeals’ for the First Circhit. - Q . [December 7, 1931] Mr. Chief Justice Huaugs delivered the opinion of the Court. This fection was brought in thé. Superior Court of New Hamp- shire bythe respondent, a citizen of that State, to recover dam- ages for injuries resulting in the death of the respondent’s irites. _ tate, upon -the ground of the negligence of his employer, the de- — fendant (appellant and@: petitioner here). The case was removed | to the District Court of the United States for. the District :of - ‘rent in both Vermont and New | : . : e . - . - . e 2 . ae ° - ‘ EDEL IMO LE) SP PNAS at EI AE NT rar rece siemiastiomail.a SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. No. 423.—Octoprr TERM, 1931. Bradford Electric Light Co., Ine, ) On Certiorari to the Petitioner, United States Circuit | Court of Appeals for the Jennie M. Clapper, Administratrix. | First Circuit. + - | [May 16, 1932.) Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. - This action for damages was brought in a court of New Hamp- shire under the employers’ liability provisions of the Employers’ Liability and Workmen’s Compensation Act of that State, N. H. Public Laws, 1926, ce. 302, to recover for the death of Leon J. Clap-, . per, which the plaintiff claimed was due to his employer’s negli- - gence.. The case was removed to the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship; the defendant, Bradford Electric Light . Co., Inc., being a citizen and resident of Vermont and the plaintiff, - “Jennie M. Clapper, administratrix, being a citizen and resident of — New Hampshire. It appeared that the Company had its principal place of business in Vermont i ing i - ont, was employed’by _ it there as a lineman for emergency sé in either State; and that — in the course of his duties, he was sent.to restore some burned-out - fuses at a substation in New Hampshire and while doing so was Killed. The Company, invoking the full faith and credit | clause’ of the Federal Constitution, set up as a special defense that ‘the action was barred by provisions of the Vermont Compensation Act; that the contract of employment had been entered into in Vermont, where both parties te it then, and at all times thereafter resided; and that the Vermont Act had been accepted by both - employer and employee as a term of the contract. The District Court ruled that the action was properly brought ‘ under the’ laws of the State of New Hampshire; that the action was based on a tort occurring in that State; and that the Ver- over Ps ae RE ee 2 Bradford Electric Inght Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. mont Workmen’s Compensation Act had no extra-territorial effect. Accordingly, that court rejected the special defense and denied a motion to dismiss. The case was tried three times before a jury, the third trial resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $4,000. The judgment entered thereon was first reversed by * the Cireuit Court of Appeals. But upon a rehearing, the judg- ‘ment of the trial court was affirmed, one judge dissenting. 51 F. (2d) 992, 999. The Company filed in this Court both an appeal and a petition for writ of certiorari. The appeal was denied, and ‘eertiorari granted. 284 U. S. 221. . The Vermont Workmen’s Compensation Act provides that a workman hired within the State shall be entitled to compensation even though the injury was received outside the State, Vermont’*~ General Laws, c. 241, Sec. 5770; that ‘‘employers who hire work- men within this state to work outside of the state, may agree with such workmen that the remedies under the provisions of this chapter shall be exclusive as regards injuries received outside this state by accident arising out of and in the course of such employ- ment, and all contracts of hiring in this state shall be presumied to include such an agreement,’’ Sec. 5774; that every contract of ‘ employment made within the State shall be presumed to have been made subject to its provisions, unless prior to the accident an express statement to the contrary shall have been made, in writing, by one of the parties, Sec. 5765; and ‘that acceptance of the Act is ‘‘a surrender by the parties . . . of their rights to any . Other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof’’, Sec. 5763. Neither the Company nor Leon Clapper filed a stetensens declining to accept any provision of the Vermont Act. The New Hampshire Employers’ Liability and Workmen’s Com- pensation Act provides that the employer shall become subject to . the workmen’s compensation provisions of the Act only by filing a. declaration to that effect, N. H. Public Laws, c. 178, § 4; and that even if the declaration is filed, the employee may, subsequent to the injury, still elect either to claizn compensation, Sec. 11,. or to sue for damages at common law. as modified by the employers’ liability provisions of ‘the Act. Failure to file such a declaration exposés the employer to a common law action of tiegligence in - which the defenses of assumption of risk and -injury by a fellow servant may not be interposed. Sees. 2, 8. The Company filed_ o . >— _ Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. ‘Clapper. — - in New Hampshire the declaration provided for by its statute. Thus, each State has a ‘workmen’s compensation law of the elec- tive type; but their provisions differ sharply. The New Hampshire statute, unlike that of Vermont, permits the employee or ‘his rep- resentative to elect, after the injury, to sue for. damages as at com-. mon law; and it was as a result of such-an election made by the ad- ministratrix that the case at bar arose. The main question for de- cision is whether the existence of a right of action for Leon Clap- per’s death should be determined by the laws of Vermont, where both parties to the, contract of employment resided and where the contract. was made, or by the laws of New Hampshire, where the employee was killed. | . | First. It clearly was the purpose of the Vermont Act to pre- clude any recovery by proceedings brought in another State for injuries received in the course of a Vermont employment. The provisions of the Act leave no room for construction.: ‘The statute declares in terms that when a workman -is Lao are the State, he’ shall be entitled to compensation thereunden for in- _ juries received outside, as well as inside, the State, unless one of the parties elects to reject the provisions of the Act. And it declares ‘further that for injuries wherever received the remedy under the statute shall exclude all other rights and remediesbof the employee or his personal representative. If the accident had happened . in Vermont, the statute plainly would have precluded the bringing of an action for.damages in New Hampshire under ‘its employers’ liability act.? For such action is predicated on a tort; and in Vermont an injury resulting from the employer’s negligence is 1°‘ Right to Compensation Exclusive : The rights and remedies granted by the provisions of this chapter to an employee on account of a personal injury for which he is entitled >to compensation under the provisions of this chapter, shall exclude all other rights and~remedies of such employee, his personal -Tepresentatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise on account of such injury. Employers who hire workmen within this state to work outside of the state, may agree with such workmen that’ the remedies under the provisions of this chapter shall be exclusive as regards injuries re- ceived outside this state by accident arising out of and in the course of such -¢mployment, and all contracts. of hiring in this state shall be presumed to — include such an agreement.’’ Vt. Gen. Laws, c. 241, § 5774. . *Compare Homes Insurance Co. 'v. Dick, 281 U. 8. 397. .No question is here raised of the character of that considered jn Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55; and Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, 4 Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. not a tort, if the provisions of the Compensation Act have beep ac- cepted. The question is whether the face that the inj curred in New Hampshire leaves its courts free to subject eis em- _ ployer to liability as for a tort. That is, may the New Hampshire courts disregard the relative rights of the parties as- determined by the laws of Vermont where they resided and made the contract ~ of employment; ot must they give effect to the Vermont Act, and to the agreement implied therefrom, that the only right of the employee against thg employer, in case of injury, shall be the , claim for compensatién provided by the statute? ' Second. If the conflict presented were between the laws of a ' foreign country and those of New Hampshire, its courts would be free, so far as the restrictions~of federal law are ‘con- sp cerned, to attach legal consequences to acts done within the State, without referenee to the undertaking of the parties, entered into ‘at their common résidence abroad, that such consequences should not be enforced between them.. But the conflict here i# between thé laws of two States; and the Company in setting up as a defense a right arising under the Vermont statute, invokes. Art. IV, §1, of the Federal Constitution, which declares that ‘‘full faith and . eredit shall be given in each State to the public acts .°. . of : every other Sjate.’’ That a statute is a ‘‘public act’’ within the - meaning of that clause is settled. Modern Woodmen of America y. Mixer, 267 U. 8, 544, 550, 551; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dun ken, 266 U. S.- 389, 393. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. . George, 233 U. 8. 354, 360; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U. 8. 615, 622.2 A federal court sitting in New Hampshire is bound equally with courts of the State to observe _ 233 U. 8. 354, of the-validity of an attempt to create a statutory cause of | — and confine it to the courts of the enacting State. ° also saa v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U. 8. 274, 279; Pennsylvania mice Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 248 U. S. 93, 96; * . Western Life Indemnity Co: v. Rupp, 235 U. 8. 261, 274, 275; Texas & New Orleans BR. Co. v: Miller, 221 U. 8. 408, 416; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. ». - Melton, 218 U.\8. 36, 50-52; El Paso & Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, — - 215 U. 8. 87, 92, 983; Smithsonian Institute v. St. John, 214 U. 8. 19, 28; . ‘Allen v. Alleghany/Co., 196 U. 8. 458, 464, 465; Finney v. Guy, 189 U. 8. - 335, 340; Johnson v, New. York Jpife Insurance ‘Co., 187 U. 8. 491,, 496; Eastern Building & Loan Association v. Ebaugh, 185 U. 8. 114,.121; Ban- ~*~ ; ai bean ste towne ee te one . « i : . * -,* could have enjoined Leon Clapper from ‘suing the Company in - New Hampshire, to recover damages for an injury suffered there, - just as it would have denied him the right to recover such damages | ~ + in Vermont. ’ Compare Cole v. Cunningham, 138 U, S. 107; Rey } nolds v. Alden, 136 U. S. 348, 353. The rights created by the Vér. mont Act are entitled to like protection when set up in New Hamp. . shire by way of defense to the actiéh brought there.’ Ifthis were ' > _ not so, and the émployee ar hig, representative were free to disre- gard the law of Vermont and his'contract, the effectiveness of the. Vermont Act would be gravely impaired. ‘For the purpose of that -*.. Aet, as of the worlfmen’s compensation laws’ of most other States, is to provide, in’ respect to persons residirig and businesses lochted in the State,-not only for employees, a remedy which is both ex- peditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for em- ployers 4 liability which is limited and determinate.. Compare “New York Central B. COV. White, 248 U. 8.188; Hawkins y. » Bleakly,-243 U.S. 210; Mowntain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243-- U.S, 219. ea ee ee Fourth. It is urged that the provision of. the Vermont statute which forbids resort to‘common law remedies for injuries incurred - . in the course of employment is contrary ‘to the public poliey of ».- New Hampshire; that the full faith and credit clause does not re- s _ quire New Hampshire to enforce an act of another-State which is obnoxious to.its public policy; and that a federal court sitting in 1 that State may, therefore, decline to do so. : Compare Union Trust — ®~ Co. v. Grosman, 245°U. $412. It is true that. the full faith and - :@redit clause does not require the enforcement of every right con- % ferred by a statute of another State: There is rom for some play oo | - of confli¢ting policies, Thus, a plaintiff suing in New Hampshire on @ statutory cause of action arising in Vermont might be denied -,, Relief because the forum fails to provide a court’ with. jurisdiction "of the egritroversy; see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, - 207 U, 8. 142, 148, 149; compare Douglas v. Yew York, New Haven. & Hartford BR, Co., 279 U. 8. 877; or because it fails to provide. - "procedure appropriate to its determination, see Yonnessez Coal, a ; Iron & RB. Co. v. George, 283 U. 8.854, 359; compare Slater ¥, 4° 1 Mewvicon, National B. Co., 194 U. 8. 120, 128,°129; oF Yeec vase the « .'. @nforeement of the right conferred would be obnoxious to the pub- “| <4 Tie policy of the forum, compare Bothwell v. Buckbée, Mears 00.) : 6 | Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. - a ee 915 U. S. 274, 277-279; Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. 8. ‘ '. 412; Bond:v. Hume, 243 U.'S. 15, 25; Converse v.-Hamilton, 224° U. S.. 248, 260, 261; or because the liability imposed is deemed a _ penal one, see Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co..v. . Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 490, compare Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio - Re R., 168 U. 8. 445, 448. But the Company is in & position differ- - ent from that of a ‘plaintiff who seeks to enforce a cause of action conferred by the laws of another State. The right which it claims should be given effect is set up by way of defense to art asserted liability; and to a defense different considerations apply. Com- pare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. 8. 397, 407, 408. A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. . ‘ In so doing, it merely denies: a remedy, leaving unimpaired the _. plaintiff’s substantive right, so that he is free to ‘enforce it —~ elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect. to a substantive defense ' under the applicable law of another State, as under the cireum- "stances here presented, subjects the defendant to irremediable — liability. -This.may not be done.’ Compare Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 550, ‘551; Aetna Life Insurance -Co. v. Dunken, 266 U: 8. 389; Royal Arcanum, v. Green, 237 U. 8. _ 581 See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U. & 542; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. 8. ~~65,_69. Ra . ; : oo '_ ‘Moreover, there is no #dequate basis for the lower’ court’s con- - elysion that to deny recovery would be obnoxious to the public policy of New Hampshire. No decision of the state court has béen - cited indicating that recognition of the Vermont-statute would be regarded iri New Hampshire as prejudicial to the interests of its itizgns.? In support of the eontentiqn that the ‘provision of the. Vermont ‘Act is contrary to the New Hampshire policy, it is urged be | . that New Hamipshire?s compensation law is unique among work- men’s. compengation acts in that it permits the injured employee to elect, subsequent to injury, whether to bring a suit based upon ‘Compare Saloshin v. Houle, 155 Atl.:47, an’ action of negligence ‘by. the widow of a New York ‘resident killed in. New Hampshire while working for . ° ® New York firm, brought the Supreme 10 Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. negligence 2 to avail himself ft the remedy ‘provided by the.. it Act; and the legislature of New Hampshire has steadily” v x refused to withdraw this privilege,*° But the mere fact that the . Vermont legislation does not conform to that of New Hampshire does not establish that it would be obnoxious to the latter’s public policy to give effect'to the Vermont statute in cases involving only the rights of residents of that State incident to the relation of em- ployer and employee created there. Northern Pacific -R. Co.-y. ' Babcock, 154 U. 8. 190, 198. Nor does sufficient reason appear why it should be so regarded. The interest of New Hampshire was _ Only casual. Leon Clapper -was not a resident there. He was not. continuously employed there. So far as appears, he had no de- . pendent there. It is‘ difficult to see how the State’s interest would . be subserved, under such circumstances, by burdening its. courts _ with this litigation. Sizth. The administratrix urges that the Company had in fact — accepted the provision of the New Hampshire Compensation Act, which reserves to the employee the right to elect to sue for dam- ages as at common law. It.was upon this ground, priniarily, that the Circuit Court of Appeals based, upon the rehearing, the affirm- ance of the judgment of the District Court: The circumstances under which the acceptance,of the New Hampshire Act was filed show that the: Company did not intend thereby to abandon its rights under the Vermont law in réspect to Leon Clapper or other , employees similarly situated. It had had occasion. to hire in New _ Hampshire residents of that State for employment there in con- nection with the operation of ts lines in that State.. In case of '- injury of. such employees, failuké to accept the New Hampshire * Act would have made the petitioner liable to an action for negli-* _ gence,in which it would have been denied the defenses of assump- | tion of risk and injury by a fellow servant. Jutras v. Amoskéag . Manufacturing Co,, 84 N. H. 171, 173; Leve@ue v. American Bow © . 1Attention is ealled to the following rejected compensation bills abolishing the rightpof election after accident: 1915 Session, House Bills No. 206, 302,. . Journal, pp. 720, 1021; 1917; Session, House Bills No. 81 485, Journal, pp. 567, ; 1919 Session, House Bill No. 184, Journal, p. 437; 1927 Session, ‘How ill No. 212, Journal, p. 752; 1980 Session, House Bill No. 292, | Journal, p. 752.- In 1928-the statute was amended to increase the compen- sation, N. H. Laws, 1923, ¢. 91; and in 1925, as amended, it was reénacted without change, N. H. Publie Laws, e. 178. 2 sa ° M as j a) 4 oe Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Clapper. u & Lumber Co., 84 N: H. 543. Its acceptance is to. be construed as referable only to such New Hampshire employees, and not as bring- ing under the New ames Act employees not otherwise sub- ject to it. We are of opinion that the rights AS ieleinn us Company and Leon Clapper or his representative are to be determined according to the Vermont Act. The judgment of the. Circuit Court ‘of Ap- ' peals must accordingly be reversed. We sa occasion to.con- | sider whether if, the injured employee had been a resident of New Hampshire, or had been continuously employed there, or had left dependents there, recovery might validly ‘have ‘been permitted under New Hampshire law. . ‘Devevesd, ‘4 : ’ ; ° Mr. Justice Carpox tot no part in the consideration or decision of this case. .: er: | A true copy. * Test: : , , Hu , - ge e t : Clerk, Supreme Court; U. 8. . » 2 e SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: No. 423.—Ocrosus Taam, 1931. ; ' Bradford Blectrie Light Co., Inc, ) On Certiorari to the | Petitioner, | United - States Circuit v8. ‘Court of Appeals for the Jennie M. Clapper, Administratrix. | First Circuit. . [May 16, 1932.] Mr. Justice Sronz, concurring. ‘TL agree that in the circumstances of the present case, the courts - of New Hampshire, in giving effect ‘to- the public policy of that — "state, would be at liberty to apply the Vermont statute and thus, by comity, make it the applicable law of New Hampshire. In the absence of any controlling decision of the New Hampshire courts, _ T assume, a8 does the opinion of the Court, that they would do so and that what they would do we should do. Hence,: it seems unnecessary to decide whether that result could be compelled, . against the will of New Hampshire, by the superior force of the . full faith and credit clause. =o i eae ON: _ . If decision of that question could not be avoided; I should hesi- tate to say that the Constitution projects the authority of ‘the Vérmont statute across state lines into New Hampshire, so that the ‘New. Hampshire cOurts, in fixing: the liability of: the employer for a tortious act committed within the state, are compelled te . apply Vermont law {nstead of their own. The full faith and _._ edit clause has not hitherto been thought to do more than com- "Pel recognition, outside the state, of ‘the operation and effect of ' its lows upon persons and events within it.’ Bonaparte v. Taz: " . Court, 104. U: 8.592; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. " ¥. Bowers, 213 U. S..55; Olmsted v.- Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386; Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. RB. Co. v. George, 233. U. 8. 354; Hood ~Y., McGehee, 237 U. 8, 611; see Union Trust Co. Vv. Grosman,.245 ~—U~.S. 412, 415, 416; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 "es U. 8. 542, 547, aN ee “bk: ; “, - i rc . “ Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. vB, Clapper. ° It is true’ that in this case the status of eniployer and employ terminable at will, was created by Vermont laws operating them while they were within that ‘state. I.assume that the # of its creation there,must.be recognized elsewhere, whenever 4 terial. But I am-not prepared to say that that status, volunta . continued bY employer and employe arid given a locus in N Hampshiré by their presence within the state, may not be re lated there according to New Hampshire law, or that the 1 consequences of acts of the employer or employe there, which g - oat of or affect the status in New Hampshire, must, by man " of the Constitution, be either defined\or ‘controlled, in the Hampshire courts, nil the alee of Vermont — than of Ni Hampshire. % 4 The interest, which New amualiine has, in arcing q trol, derived from the presence of employer and employe witf -its borders, and the commission of the tortious act titre, ia) *. least ag valid as that of Vermont, derived from “the fast hat | status is that of its citizens, and originated when they(Were in. Vj ‘mont, before going to New Hampshire. I can find nothing in, a - history of the full faith and credit clause, or the decisions um “ it, which lends support to the view that it compels any state, subordinate its domestic policy, with respect: to persons and th _ acts within its borders, to the laws of any other. On the contrél I think it should: be interpreted as leaving the courts of New | Hag -. shire free, in the circumstances now presented, either to apy tS refuse to apply the law of Vermont, in accordance with their 1 0 — of New —_—e atten and law. - 3 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386008_0181%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.