# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Parish v. Virginia

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1746%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2011
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1220

## Text

——

Supreme Coun, U.S.
FILED

MAR 15 2011

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Wnited States

69

No. 10-817

Anne Boston Parish,
Petitioner,

Commonwealth of Virginia,
Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court of Virginia

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Anne Boston Parish

208 West Walnut Street
Alexandria, Virginia 2230]
abparish@msn.com
703-299-1795

Pro Sé

March 15th, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.. 1
INTRODUCTION ...........
LAW AND ARGUMENT i
CONCLUSION. 8

CERTIFICATION .... | 1]

i]

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES Page
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1967)....................... 6, 7
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3rd 972,988 (9th Cir. 2005)......... 6
Hulvey v. Roberts, 106 Va. 189.55 S.E. 585 (1906)........... D
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 1038, 115 (1935) ........ 7
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-216 (1942) ..000. 7,9
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 666 (1984) ....... 5
U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25 (1983)... 6

COURT RULES

Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15 (Motion to Strike)........... l.2, 2, 4,6
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1 (Finality of Judgment)................ Loo
BN We SM gots sxe vuswadsnadiveeaneinurarica abies turonndenetehiaaes 4,11
The Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct...............0.0......00264- >)
Standards of the American Bar Association..................... 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Oo ie eI o.oo cso Cascthas ca cuusuecsatacaccatcacohevesains 1, 5, 7,8
Fifth Amendment............... Seek cane ren mate eS Ee ear ee l
Sixth Amendment...................... ecghe dea tecie ea cactaaeaeas 5, 6, 7
PURER TIRED FARIUPTICRIIIOIE,. a... nc sccccces cas cncccccssnnescnsssononoseen: ]
SN Te I cn ens eigenen reser pan cyehnsentucentanecenansemcaast ae

OE ae ee SS Re one RAE ene TR AP re |

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution states only one command twice.
The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government
that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.” The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, states the same eleven
words to describe the legal obligation of all states. It
was Thomas Jefferson’s fervent belief that anything is
possible. It is possible and vital this conviction is
reversed, dismissed or remanded to the lower Court.

The Virginia Supreme Court erred when it ruled in
finding the evidence sufficient, as a matter of law, to
support Petitioner's conviction. The opinion of the Court
of Appeals of Virginia was presumed “to be correct and
would be reversed only upon a showing that it is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.”

A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered
evidence “is a matter submitted to the sound discretion
of the lower Court and will be granted only under
unusual circumstances after particular care and caution
has been given to the evidence presented.” This period
is referred to as the time for which the case is “in the
breast of the court”, and during this time the court has
complete discretion to suspend, vacate, or amend its
judgment or decree. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A: 15; 1:1: Motion
to Strike or to Set Aside Verdict; Judgment of Acquittal
or New Trial must satisfy a four prong after-discovered
test to suspend, vacate, or amend its judgment or decree.
This Petition of Rehearing satisfies the four prong
after-discovered test (that fell within the legal
obligation of the lower Court) to grant a new trial
due to its unusual circumstances.

oD

The United States Supreme Court has an
obligation to reverse, dismiss or remand to the
lower Court.

1. The Evidence was discovered after the
trial:

A. Defense counsel directed key witness, Mr.
Akbar, not to come to Court. Petitioner
was told after the trial, (Appendix E).

B. Mr. Roger Owens the USPS Manager,
called Petitioner. Miss Roth was
modifying the charges; after the trial,
(July 3, 2009).

C. Defense counsel did not assist Petitioner
within the “21 day rule” of judgment (June
22, 2009) Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15; 1:1
requesting a motion for a new trial that
was within the twenty-one-days-from-
conviction limitation on presentation of
newly discovered evidence of innocence,
after the trial.

D. An electronic mail from Mr. Greenspun
states his withdrawal from the case,
within the 21 days from judgment was
sent to Petitioner after the trial.

pdg@mail.greenspunlaw.com
To Anne Parish, James Abrenio
Ed 7/08/09 1:58

Anne:

Given the letter to Judge Brown, I will not
take any other actions on your behalf. I have never
received information that Ms. Roth wants to drop
the charge since the trial result. We knew, as did you,
that she was not pushing the charges vigorously,
but the prosecutor insisted on proceeding despite
Ms. Roth’s attitude. That was his decision.

(Abbreviated )
Peter [s]

~

wy

3
The Evidence could not have _ been

discovered, through the exercise of due
diligence, prior to the trial:

A.

B.

Defense counsel did not display due
diligence in ethical and moral, conduct
or competence set forth by the American
Bar Association within the 21 days to
defend Petitioner after the trial.

Defense counsel’s intentional wrong, and
refusal to defend Petitioner, was viewed
as bad faith and grounds for reversing
a conviction on appeal after the trial.

The Evidence is not merely cumulative,

corroborative, or collateral:

A.

Defense counsel refused to defend the
Petitioner, when advised that Miss Roth
had come forward to modify her charge
is grounds for reversing a conviction on
appeal after the trial.

Defense Counsel, a scholar of the law,
withheld legal procedural or protocol/
technicality for a Judgment Motion.
A letter written within the 21 days of

judgment needed, to be in front of a

Judge in Court, not merely written to a
Judge after the trial (Appendix H).

The evidence is material to the extent that
it_is likely to produce different results

from a new trial:

A.

The Virginia Courts erred, with prejudice,
not to enforce the Commonwealth rule
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15; 1:1.

The dismal of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15; 1.1
is an improvident exercise of misconduct;
an_error of law and grounds for
reversing a decision on appeal. The

4

right to a new trial was not granted
as due process would allow when the
Honorable Judge Brown denied a new
trial dismissing a letter dated July 6th,
2009 (Appendix H) in accordance to Va.
Sup. Ct. R. 3A: 15 was within the 21
days of judgment and met all criteria
for granting a motion for a new trial.

If this conviction is affirmed, it will set a precedent
that any two persons can make up a tale and for any
reason have an innocent person wrongfully arrested.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has opened the “flood
gates” for innocent people to be wrongfully arrested and
maliciously prosecuted. With lack of any fact and without
any evidence a person may now be wrongfully arrested
and convicted solely on the “unfounded information” of
two people making up a tale out of prejudice, hate or
mean spirited and nothing more.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Rule 44, a petition for rehearing is
limited to intervening circumstances of a substantial
or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds
not previously presents (Rule 44). On February 22,
2011, this Court issued an Order denying the Petitioner,
Anne Boston Parish, (“Petitioner”), Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari. The Petitioner now timely seeks this Petition
for Rehearing.

The Petitioner's Petition for A Wnt of Certiorari
was mailed to this Court on December 17, 2010. On
September 24, 2010 the Supreme Court of Virginia issued
their decision to deny Petitioner a rehearing to set aside
judgment rendered on July 22, 2010. The Commonwealth
of Virginia did not follow its governance, yet their
prosecutorial misconduct and demonstrated overt

2

constitutional prejudice that further gives confidence
in the erosion of the Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.

Under the standards, set forth by the American Bar
Association, the United States Constitution, and Bill of
Rights the insubordination of the lower Court evokes
contempt. This case is an egregious departure
from constitutional law and grounds for reversal,
dismissal or remanded to the lower Court. The
Virginia Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s rehearing
is a failure to consider the facts and law relating to a
particular matter; an arbitrary or unreasonable departure
from constitutional precedents and settled judicial
custom. The Commonwealth’s judicial performance
was paradoxical and highly arrogant with counsel’s
conduct not functioning as ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.

The lower Court of Virginia dismissal of the
“Fundamental of Fairness” standards shall, by virtue of
this United States Constitution, have original jurisdiction
in cases of Writ of Certiorari, and shall compel a lower
court to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties
correctly. The question of jurisdiction is dependent upon
the decision of a constitutional question in the lower
court. Jurisdiction may be conferred upon the United
States Supreme Court by virtue of the constitutional that
the constitutionality of the law was called in question
and decided in the lower Court, Hulvey v. Roberts 106
Va. 189. 55 S.E. 585 (1906).

In a retrospective analyzes of ineffective assistance
of counsel, after the trial and within the “21 days
of judgment” counsel’s conduct so undermined the
functioning of the adversary process that this trial
could not be relied upon as having produced a just
result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
666 (1984). The ineffective assistance of counsel was

o

pretentious and a violation of Petitioner's Constitutional
Sixth Amendment. Mr. Greenspun’s lack of assistance for
a new trial calls into question his obligation to perform
at a level of competence and consequently Compromised
the outcome. Mr. Greenspun’s failure to defend Petitioner
was fundamentally wrong. He ostentatiously sent an
electromic mail to Petitioner, stating, “He would not
assist. Petitioner within the critical 21 days of judgment
to secure a new trial.” In Cronic, the Court described
this type of a situation an unreasonable departure from
constitutional law from which prejudice is presumed.
When counsel does not assist the accused, at a critical
stage of the proceeding, or when counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial
testing, courts will presume prejudice U.S. vo. Cronic,
466 U.S. at 659 & n.25. (1983).

There are numerous cases that will be cited to
support the departure of constitutional law inherent
in this case. It is equally significant to note that the
Virginia Court of Appeals erred when liberally dismissing
a letter to Judge Brown dated July 6, 2009, (Appendix
Hf). This error went to the heart of the case and was
within the draconian twenty-one days-from-conviction
limitation on presentation of newly discovered evidence
of innocence Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15 that was a violation
of the Petitioner's constitutional rights for a new trial.

The Prosecutor's actions in Hayes v. Brown
illustrates how a prosecutor's unethical conduct resulted
in a tainted and unjust trial. Hayes v. Brown, 399
F.3rd 972,988 (9th Cir. 2005). Further in Alcorta
v. Texas, 355 U.S, 28, 31 (1957) the United States
Supreme Court announced that prosecutors have an
independent duty to correct information they know to be
false Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957).

ry

/

Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court
established that a prosecutor's failure to correct false
testimony was unconstitutional Alcorta. vo. Texas, 355
U.S. 28, 31 (1957). This departure from constitutional
law is not only significant but salient, and corroborates
Mr. Greenspun’s and the Commonwealth’s pompous
departure from reporting new evidence, after the trial
and within the 2] days from Judgment, as acts so
unconstitutional it led to an unfavorable outcome and
conviction for this Petitioner, an innocent person. ‘The
United States Supreme Court in an effort to determine
whether trial testimony was correct first granted relief in
Mooney v. Holohan, for the use of false testimony by a
prosecutor to seek aconviction Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103, 115 (1935). In Mooney v. Holohan, it was
alleged the prosecutor withheld evidence that would have
exposed perjury Id. at 110. The United States Supreme
Court. held the State knowing use of false testimony was
“inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice,”
and hence, unconstitutional Id. at 112.

Seven years later, in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213,
215-216 (1942) the United States Supreme Court held
that suppression of evidence favorable to the accused
was sufficient to create constitutional error. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that’ these
allegations indicated that defendant’s constitutional
rights had been violated Id at 216.

Qn appeal, the lower Court and Mr. Greenspun’s
decision not to seek a continuance was unconstitutional.
Similarly to Pyle v. Kansas, Mr. Akbar was the one
person who could exonerate the Petitioner. (Appendix
kK). Mr. Greenspun had a moral and ethical obligation
to uphold the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to defend Petitioner. It was Mr. Greenspun’s
responsibility to ensure the key witness be present in

$

court or request a continuance of trial. Neither of these
two options was executed. When this was brought
to the Courts attention, after the trial, it was the
lower Court obligation to grant a new trial.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s published opinion
affects every citizen in the United States. This conviction
will sanction and gives great preeminence to State and
Federal government agencies to convict an innocent
person without evidence or fact. This wrongful conviction
will promote and tolerate the proliferation of bias,
prejudice, ignorance and hate. To ignore this wrongful
conviction is to affirm and establish a precedent
that is a violation of the Petitioner’s constitutional
rights of the United States Constitution.

Mr. Greenspun’s electronic message affirms _ the
Commonwealth’s desire to prosecute the Petitioner.
The arrogance and lack of discipline that is inherent
within the Commonwealth of Virginia’s failed justice
system is unconstitutional. The lower Court just got
it wrong.

° There is or never was any evidence to
substantiate the conviction more so this case
began with a heinous made up offense and
pitted an unpopular minority female, assisted
by an inadequate defense, against a determined
prosecutor zealously seeking a conviction.

° In this “low profile” case, the pressure to
convict involved standard cases to which no
one pays close attention. Conduct explained
in this way may include disregard for due
process safeguards, to overt pressure on
witnesses to give evidence that) will support
the conviction of the selected suspect, to

‘)

falsification of evidence, all in the name of
securing. a conviction of someone the police
have decided ts guilty.

° A marginalized female who can be made to
bear public fear, embarrassment, humiliation
and the loathing is the necessary clement of a
wrongtul conviction. “The ends may justify the
means” rests on the assumption that the police
have found, and the state is prosecuting, the
right person

° The challenge is to be morally ethical and
intellectually honest during an investigation,
fair during trial, and above all, humble enough
to admit error. Anyone can make a mistake;
the evil lies in refusing to admit it

° The role of the police to generate the evidence
is only half of the equation. The other half
rests on the role of the police and their high
status within the administration of justice

Without the intervention ofthe United States Supreme
Court, a ruling to affirm this case will bless lawyers,
judges and courtrooms akin to cite this particular case
that will sanction any two persons, without an iota of
evidence or fact to accuse one person of a false charge,
to be wrongfully arrested and maliciously prosecuted. It
is Incumbent upon all those who evaluate the causation
of this wrongful conviction to consider the internal
prejudice within the parameters of this case

In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-216 (1942)
the United States Supreme Court held that suppression
of evidence favorable to the accused was sufficient
to create constitutional error. Any misuse of public
authority threatens the equilibrium of a system resting
so fundamentally on the consent of the governed, but

the threat is most acute when the misconduct injuries

10

a citizen directly-especially if it denies the Petitioner
a constitutionally protected nght. This) conviction
Hluminates the importance of the United States Supreme
Court. Justices to grant instant Petition for Writ) of
Certiorari. It is possible and vital this conviction
is reversed, dismissed or remanded to the lower
Court.

lor the reasons stated above, the Petitioner respectfully
requests that this United States Supreme Court Grant the
Petition for Rehearing and grant Petitioner its previously
submitted Petition for Writ of Certioran

Respectfully submitted,

ANNE BOSTON PARISH
Pro se

208 West Walnut Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22301
703-299-1795

abparish@msn.com

1]
CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 44

Anne Boston Parish certifies that pursuant to Rule 44, the
grounds for this Petition for Rehearing are restricted to
intervening circumstances of a substantial or controlling
effect or to other substantial grounds not) previously
presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and that
this Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and
not for delay

Respectfully submitted

Anne Boston Parish
ANNE BOSTON PARISH
Pro se

208 West Walnut Street
Alexandria, Virginia, 22301

(103-299-1795

abparish@msn.com

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1746%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.