# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Acton v. City of Eaton

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1671%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 546 U.S. 872

## Text

LIST OF PARTIES

The Petitioner, Stephanie S. Acton, appears as Pro Se,
3045 US 35 West, Eaton, Ohio 45320, (937)-456-3731.

The Respondents City of Eaton; Leslie Renner, City
Clerk; Dave Daily, City Manager; Police Chief Phillip
Romeo; John Petry, City Attorney; Pat Taylor, Mayor and
Treasurer of PC Youth Foundation, appears by Erin B.
Moore of Green & Green, 800 Performance Place, 109 North
Main Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402-1290, (937)-224-3333.

The Respondents, Preble County; Christopfer B.
Washington, PC Clerk; Rebecca Ferguson, PC Prosecutor;
and PC Sheriff Tom Hayes, appears by Christopher W.
Carrigg, Charity S. Rob, Neil F. Freund, and Daniel F. Getty
of Freund, Freeze & Amald, 1800 One Dayton Centre, 1
South Main Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402-2017, (937)-222-
2424.

The Respondent, Honorable Wilfred Dues, Judge of
PC Court of Common Pleas and Founder of PC Youth
Foundation, appears by Ralph E. Burnham and Hope A.
Smith of Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, 36 East Seventh
Street, Suite 2100, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, (513)-241-4722.

The Respondent. Parker-Hannifin Corporation:
Wayne Pinkstaff, Human Resource Manager; and Jenny
Haddux, Insurance Specialist, appears by Bruce G. Hearey
and Allison McCallum of Spieth, Bell, McCurdy & Newell
Co., L.P.A., 927 Euclid Avenue, Suite 2000, Cleveland, Ohio
44115, (216)-696-4700.

Condolences to the family of PC Sheriff Tom Hayes as he has
deceased since Petitioner’s filing of her complaint on April 4,
2003, in The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio Western Division. PC Prosecutor, Rebecca
Ferguson has recently retired. Eaton City Attorney, John Petry
has also retired. Pat Taylor no longer functions as mayor, nor sits
on city council.

Xil

LIST OF PARTIES CONTINUED \

The Respondents, Samaritan Behavioral Health, Inc.
and Lori Marcellino, Psy D., appears by John F. Haviland of
Bieser, Greer & Landis LLP, 400 National City Center, 6
North Main Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402, (937)-223-3277.

The Respondents, Preble County Youth Foundation;
Founder, Wilfred Dues; Treasurer, Pat Taylor, appears by
Grey W. Bennett, Bennett Law Building, 200 West Main
Street, Eaton, 0hi045320, (937)-456-4100.

The Respondents, Harold Allen Ferguson, DO. And
Mark Steven Vosler, DO., appears by Mark L. Schumacher
and Vaseem S. Hadi of Freund, Freeze & Arnold, One
Dayton Centre, Suite 1800, Dayton, Ohio 45402-2017, (937)-
222-2424.

The Respondent, Preble County Medical Center,
appears by Robert F. Cowdrey of Statman, Harris, Siegel &
Eyrich, LLC, 110 North Main Street, Suite 1520, Dayton,
~ Ohio 45402, (937)- 222-1090.

xiii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
COVER PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
LIST OF PARTIES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINION BELOW
JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A: Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,

At Cincinnati, Ohio; Honorable
Martha Craig Daughtrey, Honorable

Deborah Cook, Honorable Jerome Farris;

Case No. 04-3095; Denial of Rehearing;
Entered December 7, 2004

APPENDIX B: Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
At Cincinnati, Ohio; Honorable
Deborah Cook, Honorable Jerome Farris;
Case No. 04-3095; Denial of Rehearing;
Filed February 4, 2005

XIV

(i)

(ii - xi)

(xii, xiii)

(Xiv-xv1)

31-36

37-40

APPENDIX C: US District Court the Southern
District Western Division at Dayton, Ohio;
Honorable Michael R. Merz;
Case No. 3-03-0116; Docket 87,
- Dismissal and Summary Judgment,
Entered on November 28, 2003 41-58

APPENDIX D: US District Court the Southern District
Western Division at Dayton, Ohio;
Honorable Michael R. Merz; 3-03-0116;
Grant Extension of Time entered
October 9, 2003, docket 81 59-61

APPENDIX E: American Bar Association’s
Modei Code of Judicial Conduct
(in part) 62-65

APPENDIX F: American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(in part) 66

APPENDIX G: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
V. Depositions and discovery> Rule 34
Production of Documents and Things and
Entry Upon Land for Inspection
and Other Purposes (in part) 67-68

APPENDIX H: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
V. Depositions and discovery> Rule 37
Failure to make or Co-operate in
Discovery; Sanctions (in part) 69-70

APPENDIX I: Ohio Revised Code:
Section 5122:
Hospitalization of Mentally Il! (in part) 71-76

XV

APPENDIX J: Ohio Revised Code
Section 4113.
Miscellaneous Labor Provisions (in part) 77-79

XV1

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STEPHANIE S. ACTON,
*Petitioner
vs. -

CITY OF EATON: LESLIE RENNER, DAVE DAILY,
PHILLIP ROMEO, JOHN PETRY; PAT TAYLOR, City Mayor
and Treasurer of P.C. Youth Foundation;

PREBLE COUNTY: CHRISTOPHER B. WASHINGTON;
PC. Prosecutor, REBECCA FERGUSON; P.C. Sheriff TOM
HAYES;

HONORABLE WILFRED G. DUES,

Judge of P.C. Court of Common Pleas and
Founder of P.C. Youth Foundation;
PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION: WAYNE PINKSTAFF,
JENNY HADDUX; SAMARITAN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH,
INC., LORI MARCELLINO, Psy;

PREBLE COUNTY YOUTH FOUNDATION;
PREBLE COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER:

HAROLD ALLEN FERGUSON, DO.,

MARK STEVEN VOSLER, DO. and P.C. Health Commissioner.

; Respondents,

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Stephanie S. Acton, Pro Se, Petitioner herein, prays
that a Writ of Certiorari be granted by this esteemed court, as
Ms. Acton presents issues for reviewing the order of denial
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, wherein that court

]

upheld the Dismissal and Summary Judgment ordered on
November 28, 2004 by Honorable Michael R. Merz of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
Western Division, as it pertains to case number 03-00116
styled Stephanie S. Acton vs. City of Eaton, et al.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order entered December 7, 2004, in the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Cincinnati, Ohio, in the case styled
Stephanie S. Acton v. City of Eaton, et al., case number 04-
3095, may be found in the Appendix to this Petition,
Appendix A, at pages 31-36.

The opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Cincinnati, Ohio, filed February 4, 2005, in the case styled
Stephanie S. Acton v. City of Eaton, et al., case number 04-
3095, may be found in the Appendix to this Petition,
Appendix B, at pages 37-40.

The Dismissal and Summary Judgment ordered by
Honorable Michael R:--Merz of the United States District
Court for the Southern District Western Division, filed as
docket 87 on November 28, 2003, may be found in the
Appendix to this Petition, Appendix C, at pages 41-58.

The granted extension of time so ordered by
Honorable Michael Merz of the United States District Court
for the Southern District Western Division, filed as docket 81
on October 9, 2003, may be found in the Appendix to this
Petition, Appendix D, at pages 59-61.

JURISDICTION

Stephanie S. Acton, Petitioner, Pro Se, commenced a
civil action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio Western Division. Case number
03-00116 was filed on April 4, 2003. Ms. Acton is
proceeding with this lawsuit under Title 42 of the United
States Codes, section 1983 and related sections there to, and
Ms. Acton alleges a violation of rights under the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and
Ohio state claims. Further, Ms. Acton is seeking damages
and equitable relief under Title 42 U.S.C., section 1983 and
Ohio state law. On November 28, 2003, Judge Michael R.
Merz entered decision and order granting Summary
Judgment and Dismissal of Ms. Acton’s case. Ms Acton
timely filed a Petition for Rehearing in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on December 21,
2003, case number 04-3095. An Order to deny Petitioner a
rehearing was filed on February 4, 2005. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the highest U.S. Court in
which a decision could be had in this case. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under Title 28, Part IV, Chapter 81,
Section 1254.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the following provisions of the
Constitution of the United States: the First Amendment,
which provides:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances”;
and the Fourth Amendment, which provides, in pertinent
part:

“The right of people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, = no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
and the Fifth Amendment, which provides, in pertinent pert:

“ |. . mor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; .. .”; 7
and the Sixth Amendment, which provides, in pertinent part:

“ ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense”;
and the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, which provides,
in pertinent part:
“ ... mor shall any State deprive any person of life
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”;
and the following provision of the United States Code: 42
U.S.C. 1983, which provides, in pertinent part:

“Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
4

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable”;

and the following portions of Canon 3 of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct as sanctified by the American Bar
Association: 3A, 3B, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(5), 3B(6), 3B(7), 3D,
3D(1), 3D(2), 3E, 3E(1), 3E(1)(a), set out in the Appendix to
this Petition as Appendix E, pages 62-65;

and the following portions of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Rule 3.6(a) and Rule 3.8(f), set out in
the Appendix to this Petition as Appendix F, page 66;

and the following portions of Ohio Revised Code Section
4113.52: (A); (B); (C); (D), set out in the Appendix to this
Petition as Appendix J, pages 77-79 (in part);

and the following portions of Ohio Revised Code Section
5122.11: set out in the Appendix to this petition as Appendix
I, pages 71-76 (in part);

and the following portions of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 34; set out in the Appendix to this petition as
Appendix G, pages 67-68 (in part);

and the following portions of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 37; set out in the Appendix to this petition as
Appendix H, pages 69-70 (in part).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Stephanie S. Acton lives in mostly rural Preble
County, Ohio, population around 43,000, about two miles
west of the county seat, Eaton. In the mid 1990’s, Ms. Acton
was employed in Eaton at Defendant Parker-Hannifin
Corporation. She was employed by Defendant City of Eaton
as a volunteer certified Emergency Medical Technician. Ms.
Acton has a genuine desire to help people in need.

Unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, also in the mid 1990's,
Wilfred Dues was also a resident of Preble County and
functioned as a judge. Unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, Dues had
established a foundation that he named Defendant Preble
County Youth Foundation, Inc., a foundation wherein he
functions as president. Presumably one would believe that he
has a genuine heart for the youth of this community.

In 1997, while operating industrial machinery known
as “chuckers” at the Eaton Parker-Hannifin, Ms. Acton was
subjected to breathing in contaminated expelled compressed
air (industrial violations covered in Ohio Revised Code,
Section 3704, refer to Appendix J page 78).

Ms. Acton became sick and sought treatment from
Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler for her first and only time in her
life. Her regular physician was out of town. Ms. Acton’s
symptoms apparently stemmed from an industrial air quality
issue addressed in ORC 3704, regulated by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Ms. Acton
documented about her injury on a Defendant Parker-Hannifin
Corporation insurance form specifically used to reimburse
Ms. Acton for missed wages. Then Ms. Acton submitted it to
Dr. Mark Vosler’s nursing assistant/receptionist for
processing.

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, Defendant

Judge “Bill” Dues had been meeting with officials of

Defendant City of Eaton, including Defendant Dave Daily
6

and Rick Daily, both formally of Daily and Hake Realtor,
Inc., as well as officials of Defendant Preble County,
including the Board of Commissioners. Defendant Wilfred
Dues would occasionally give report at public meetings.

Unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, Defendant Judge “Bill”
Dues was putting forth extensive effort to pull together a
multi-million-dollar-long-term-local-tax-revenue-increasing-
money-making-business-plan/deal that also included
Defendant Preble County; Defendant City of Eaton;
Defendant real estate business, Preble County Medical
Center; Defendant Dr. Allen Ferguson; and Dr. Mark Vosler,
as well as the Dayton, Ohio, Chapter of the Y.M.C.A.; land
contributor, John and Eleanor Hake, formally of Daily and
Hake Realters, Inc.; Kettering Medical Center Network, and
Defendant Parker-Hannifin Corporation among others.

Meanwhile on July 19,1997, after only signing and
dating the physician’s portion of the insurance form, rather
than completing the documentation and properly processing
that insurance form, Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler chose to
give it back to representatives of self insured Defendant
Parker-Hannifin Corporation.

Having served over 20 years as Preble County
Medical Commissioner, surely Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler
would be in the know of OSHA regulations and state laws
related to OSHA regulations. Dr. Mark Vosler made a
calculated choice to conspire with Parker-Hannifin
Corporation, entered into complicity with Parker, and
committed insurance fraud by not involving himself with
OSHA violations that could be detrimental to his/their
personal financial future as it related to Defendant Judge
“Bill” Dues multi-million-dollar-long-term-local-tax-
revenue-increasing-business-plan/deal.

Subsequently, on July 25, 1997, Defendant Jenny
Haddux, Parker-Hannifin Insurance Specialist, and Bill
Fackson, department manager, allowed Ms. Acton to view

7

that particular form dated July 19, 1997 and proceeded to |
threaten Ms. Acton, insisting that she submit yet another
form to Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler, one that would not
potentially prompt an O.S.H.A. investigation.

Ms. Acton was extremely intimidated, so she
complied with their illegal demand.

Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler not only signed and dated
the fraudulent form as July 28, 2001, but he also completed
the physician’s portion of the form before resubmitting it to
- Defendant Parker-Hannifin’s Insurance Specialist, Defendant
Jenny Haddux who then processed the fraudulent form.

If not for the illegal actions of insurance fraud,
conspiracy to commit insurance fraud, complicity and
conspiracy to cover-up the insurance fraud, both
* independently and jointly with other defendants, by
Defendant Jenny Haddux an agent of Defendant Parker-
Hannifin Corporation, Ms. Acton would not have suffered
injury provable and commencing on or about March 8, 2001,
and continuing to this day because of her/Parker’s illegal
actions.

But for the illegal action of choosing to participate in
industrial-insurance fraud, conspiring to commit insurance
fraud, complicity and conspiring to cover-up insurance fraud,
rendering void Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler’s claim of
immunity as an official of the county, thereby rendering him
accountable for any civil complaints and subsequent financial
responsibility for Ms. Acton’s suffered injury, provable and
commencing on or about March 8, 2001, and continuing to
this day because of his illegal actions.

Further, unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, Defendant Dr.

Mark Vosler not only had a vested interest in real estate

business, Defendant Preble County Medical Center, but for

20 years he has functioned as Preble County Health

Commissioner, he would clearly have been involved with the
8

business meetings of the county. Clearly, he would have
known about the stipulations contained within the Enterprise
Zone tax shelter contracted by Defendant Parker-Hannifin
Corporation, wherein Parker agrees to be “a good citizen”
while residing in Defendant Preble County. Self-insured
industries that intentionally violate OSHA regulations and
submit fraudulent insurance forms to themselves by way of
threatening extortion are not very good community citizens,

now are they? :

Further, Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler became married
to Peggy Hake, thereby marrying into the family of John and
Eleanor Hake who were previous commissioners for
Defendant Preble County, who were formally of Daily and
Hake Realtor, Inc., but they also provided the initial 3 acres
of land for Defendant Judge “Bill” Dues multi-million-
dollar-business plan/deal, a plan of which Defendant Dr.
Mark Vosler and his wife are also a party.

About a month later, Ms. Acton was horrified to hear
that a young man had received mutilating injury to his head
as it was smashed by a hydraulic press at another Defendant
Parker-Hannifin Corporation shop in Defendant Preble
County. The hearsay was that there was no safety stops on
the machine, a violation regulated by OSHA. Not using
safety precautions and safety equipment was a common
Defendant Parker-Hannifin practice that saved operating
time, thus increasing the numbers as it pertained to
production efficacy. This method of crunching numbers,
although unsafe for employees, looks good on paper for the
stockholders and benefits management and _ blue-collar
workers wherein bonuses and profit sharing are concerned.

OSHA has it on record where Defendant Parker-
Hannifin has been fined for this type of dangerous machining
practice, the lack of safety stops and “lock-out-tag-out”.

Because Ms. Acton was distraught, having
participated in something illegal, Ms. Acton reported the
9 a

fraud to O.S.H.A. They said that she would-need to report it
to the prosecuting attorney; Ms. Acton reported the fraud to
the Department of Insurance for the State of Ohio. They said
that she would have to report it to the local prosecuting
attorney; Ms. Acton spoke to a representative of Workers’
Compensation. They told her to report it to the local
prosecutor; Ms. Acton talked to a few union representatives.
They told her that she would need to report it to the local
prosecuting attorney. (Here’s a hoot! By phone conversation,
Ms. Acton reported it to former Ohio Representative Gene
Krebs, formally a Defendant Preble County commissioner.
He said to report it to state agencies). Refer to Appendix_J,
page 77-78.

Because Ms. Acton had always been totally
uninterested in politics, Ms. Acton had to inquire as to
exactly who was the Preble County Prosecutor and the City
of Eaton Attorney. Further, she spent some time in the local
library reviewing through some of the Ohio Revised Code.

Ms. Acton discovered ORC Section 4113.52
pertaining to employees reporting violations of state and
federal law; refer to Appendix J, pages 77-79.

Ms. Acton not only reported the circumstances of the
insurance fraud to Defendant Jeff Beier, Plant Manager of
Defendant Parker-Hannifin and Vicki Volkerding, secretary
to Defendant Wayne Pinkstaff, but Ms. Acton also reported
the fraud to Defendant Preble County Prosecutor Rebecca
Ferguson, as well as, Defendant Eaton City Attorney, John
Petry, just as written in ORC.

Unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, Defendant Judge “Bill”
Dues’ multi-million-dollar-long-term-local-tax-revenue-
increasing-money-making-business-planning/dealing was
coming along marvelously. Defendant Jeff Beier of
Defendant Parker-Hannifin would become vice-president of
Defendant “Bill” Dues’ Defendant Preble County Youth
Foundation.

10

Quite some time had elapsed and Ms. Acton received
no written communications, hence if not for the action of
calculated disinterest, conspiracy to act disinterested,
complicity and conspiracy to cover-up insurance fraud,
independently and jointly, by Defendant Parker-Hannifin
Corporation, Defendant Jeff Beier, Defendant Wayne
Pinkstaff, Defendant Rebecca Ferguson and Defendant John
Petry, and conspiring to be disinterested in violations of ORC
4113.52(A){1)(b) and (A)(2) and (A)(3), as it appears in
Appendix J, on pages 77-79, Ms. Acton would not have
suffered injury, provable and commencing on or about March
8, 2001.

However, in the meantime, Ms. Acton went out of her
way to discover and talk to other employees of Defendant
Parker-Hannifin who were also instructed as to how to fill
out insurance forms with respect to avoiding Workers’ Comp
claims and/or OSHA involvement. Ms. Acton went as far as
to submit advertisement on the local cable t.v. network. Ms.
Acton did receive response, but they “don’t want to get
involved” voluntarily. They fear harassment from
management and losing their job, their very livelihood.

In 1998, during an OSHA investigation requested by
Ms. Acton, at the Eaton shop, Ms. Acton was transferred
from Defendant Parker-Hannifin’s Eaton shop to their
Lewisburg shop, also in Defendant Preble County. Refer to
Appendix J, page 79.

- In 1999, yet another industrial maiming resulted from
an incident at Defendant Parker-Hannifin Corporation. A
man was required by management to clean plating tanks
using the unsafe production increasing, number crunching
method. He slipped into a drum of nasty corrosive plating
chemicals that resulted in the cooking of his flesh to the point
of it “pooling around his ankles”, a quote from Caro] Mann, a
fellow Eaton EMT who was a member of the crew that
responded to that 911 call.

1]

Ms. Acton became overwhelmed with grief and
feelings of guilt. “My God,” she thought, “I have a heart to
help people, yet in some indirect way, I had contributed to
Parker-Hannifin avoiding O.S.H.A.”. The irony was that Ms
Acton, volunteering as an EMT for Eaton, responded to the
911 call for help from Parker employees, yet submitted a
fraudulent insurance form, indirectly giving rise for the
potential of them getting hurt in the first place!

By this time, Ms. Acton’s “nerves” were worn very
thin, hence she was-then-treated by her family physician,
Defendant “Doc” Allen Ferguson. After Ms. Acton confided
in detail to him about the fraudulent insurance form and how
it involved Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler and Defendant
Parker-Hannifin. Ms. Acton told him that the Defendants
Preble County Prosecutor Rebecca Ferguson, the City
Attorney John Petry, and Parker-Hannifin management did
absolutely nothing about it following Ms. Acton’s
submission of her complaint. Ms. Acton told “Doc” about the
one too many preventable “accidents” at Parker.

Defendant Dr. Allen Ferguson prescribed medication
to treat depression and anxiety and ordered that she not work
for a period of time as written on a slip of paper and given to
Defendant Jenny MHaddux, Parker-Hannifin Insurance
Specialist. Defendant Parker-Hannifin fired Ms. Acton for
the reason of “no call, no show”, while on “Doc’s” medical
leave of work duties in September 1999. (ORC 4113.52 in
Appendix J, page 79.

Ms. Acton was totally oblivious of Defendant Judge
“Bill” Dues’ continuing multi-million-dollar-long-term-local-
tax-revenue-increasing-money-making-business-
planning/dealings as the founder of Defendant Preble County
Youth Foundation, moreover, Ms. Acton was completely
unaware of who this “Bill” Dues was in the first place! Her
only knowledge of the business politics of Eaton or Preble
County was that she volunteered as an EMT

12

Ms. Acton worked as a crewmember for the 2000
Census. It was then when Ms. Acton shared her story with
another census crewmember, Betty Shelton, a life long
resident of Preble County. Betty said, “Stephanie, don’t you
know that your former doctor, old man Harold Ferguson and
Preble County Prosecutor “Becky” Ferguson are brother and
sister? That makes your current “Doc” Allen her nephew.”

After the census job ran out, Ms Acton was hired by
D & D Driving School, owned by Sharon R. Postigo, 3125
Wilmington Pike, Kettering, Ohio, 45421, 937-294-7206.
Ms. Acton was trained and became certified by the State of
Ohio as a driving instructor in August 2000.

Moreover, now that Ms. Acton was aware that her:
long time family physician Defendant “Doc” Allen Ferguson
was intertwined in this mess to a degree, Ms. Acton got back
to her desire of trying to “right a wrong”. Her greatest fear
and concern was that some one would eventually die at
Parker-Hannifin simply because there was clearly an agenda,
one that was well hidden, that one too many local officials
and their relatives appear to be a part of!

Ms. Acton spent some time at the courthouse pulling
records, asking questions, and requesting copies of records.
Ms. Acton noted eyebrows raising, whispering, and heads
shaking. Apparently, to request copies of and to review
public documents, especially when “officials” are zeroed in
on, is not the norm and is not appreciated in Preble County.

Once again, Ms. Acton contacted Defendant City
Attorney, John Petry, and Defendant Preble County
Prosecutor, Rebecca Ferguson, this time by certified written
correspondence so as to document her efforts. At this point,
Ms. Acton knew that the chances of them doing the right
thing were slim to none. However, giving them yet another
opportunity to do the right thing seemed to Ms. Acton to
somehow have merit.

13

Ms. Acton received no response, hence, Ms, Acton
suffered injury, provable and commencing on or about March
8, 2001, due to the act of disinterest and the illegal acts of
conspiracy and complicity to cover-up insurance fraud, by
Defendant Preble County, agent Defendant PC Prosecutor
Rebecca Ferguson, Defendant City of Eaton, and agent
“Defendant City Attorney John Petry, imate ¢ and
jointly with other defendants.

By late 2000 and early 2001, Ms. Acton contacted
Ohio Workers’ Compensation and reminded a representative
of her past conversations with them. The representative did,
indeed recall the circumstances and suggested, “Since you
have not submitted a claim to Workers’ Comp for the
incident in July 1997, why not submit one now?” Ms. Acton
was no longer employed with Defendant Parker-Hannifin,
however the representative said that it wouldn’t matter.
“Workers Comp will probably deny your claim, but it will
give you opportunity to get it on record. You can appeal to
the Ohio Industrial Commission.”

By this time Ms. Acton was fed up with living in this
community, not because the community isn’t a great place to
live and raise kids, but because of the apparent corrupt
business practices of the officials who seemingly control
Defendant Preble County rather than serve Preble County
residents.

In December 2000, on the weekends, Ms. Acton
began attending Southern State Community College, 1850
Davids Drive, Wilmington, Ohio, 45177, 937-382-6645, to
acquire the training and experience of driving “big rigs”. This
would give Ms. Acton an outlet to leave the area, yet come
back intermittently to be with her family, friends, and attend
her home church.

Ms. Acton’s main instructor was Ed Mullins, who
now functions as Training Manager. He formerly worked for

14

‘Schneider Truck Leasing as a training specialist who assisted
in the design of Schneider’s safety protocols.

Meanwhile, also occurring in early 2001,
unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, Defendant Judge “Bull” Dues’
multi-million-dollar-long-term-local-tax-revenue-increasing-
money-making-business-planning/dealings were getting
closer to becoming reality.

In February 2001, Ms. Acton filed her claim with
Workers’ Comp as it pertained to her injury in July of 1997.
By the end of February, Workers’ Comp sided with Parker
and her claim was denied, of course. However, Ms. Acton’s
intent was the appeal for a hearing before the Ohio Industrial
Commission, which she immediately filed, once again
putting the Defendant Parker-Hannifin issue on yet another
public record.

The Industrial Commission sent notice to Ms. Acton
and Defendant Parker-Hannifin announcing the hearing that
would be at the beginning of April 2001.

Defendant City of Eaton hired a new police chief
named Defendant Phillip Romeo at the beginning of 2001.
Ms. Acton thought that she would give this new police chief
an opportunity to do the right thing and truly investigate. Ms.
Acton went to the police station and admitted to her part in
insurance fraud of a federal degree; she even submitted
proof. Ms. Acton desired to be charged in some way, not
because she was “crazy”, but because Ms. Acton wanted to
get this illegal mess documented in a courtroom. Ms. Acton
not only admitted to taking part in insurance fraud, but she
had documents that verified the existence of two insurance
forms, thus proving the fraud that transpired involving
Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler, Defendant Parker-Hannifin, and
victim, Ms. Acton.

Ms Acton had the proof in the form of copies of the
two insurance forms because she had previously gone to
15

\

Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler’s office and requested copies of
her entire file. Having been treated by him only once, there
wouldn’t be much in it, but thank God, the file also contained
copies of both insurance forms.

Violating what are now known as HIPPA regulations,
Dr. Vosler’s medical receptionist did not check Ms. Acton’s
ID, nor did she have Ms. Acton sign an authorization to
release the record. However, Ms. Acton walked out of his
office with a copy of that record in hand. Ms. Acton began to
wonder if anyone in Preble County or Eaton respects state
and federal laws!

In February 2001, Ms. Acton was a student on the
weekends and a driving instructor through the week, giving
little time for her volunteer EMT position. Ms. Acton
informed Eaton Emergency Squad Captain Marsha
Stonecash, that she would have to be taken off of scheduling
for a period of time.

Defendant Police Chief Romeo’s response to Ms.
~ Acton’s complaint/admission to guilt was to get into Ms.
Acton’s personal face/space and smugly inform Ms. Acton
that he “personally investigated and there was nothing to it”.
Ms. Acton became instantly angry and said something like,
“How did you pull that off without a court order to release
my medical file to you? I sure as hell didn’t sign an
authorization to release it! I guess I°ll have to file a complaint
about that too. Should I file it with you or “Aunt Becky”?
Defendant Chief Phillip Romeo got red faced and obviously
very angry. Evidently Ms. Acton knew more about the Ohio
laws than he had anticipated. He threateningly requested that
Ms. Acton leave the City Building, so she promptly walked
out.

Ms. Acton then realized that she was employed by the
City of Eaton, which by definition is a business. So, Ms.
Acton once again followed ORC. 4113.52 (Refer to
Appendix J, pages 77-79).

16

Ms. Acton personally filed a complaint to the City
Manager, Defendant Dave Daily, and the Mayor, Defendant
Pat Taylor. Ms. Acton informed them that Chief Romeo
claims to have seen Ms. Acton’s medical file without a legal
authorization. Furthermore, Ms. Acton presumed a degree of
corruption within the city and county that she verbalized to
both Daily and Taylor.

Unfortunately, unbeknownst to Ms. Acton, Eaton
City Manager, Defendant Dave Daily, formerly of Daily and
Hake Realtors, Inc. and City Mayor Defendant Pat Taylor,
treasurer of Defendant Judge “Bill” Dues’ Defendant Preble
County Youth Foundation, both were very much in the loop
with the Defendant Judge “Bill” Dues multi-million-dollar-
long-term-local-tax-revenue-increasing-money-making-
business-plans/deals.

Because of the act of disinterest, the act of conspiracy
and complicity to cover-up insurance fraud, the act of
conspiracy and complicity to cover-up corruption within both
Preble County and the City of Eaton, the act of participating
in the cover-up of insurance fraud and corruption,
independently and jointly with other defendants by
Defendant Dave Daily, Ms. Acton ‘suffered injury, provable
and commencing on or about March 8, 2001, and continuing
to this date because of Dave Daily’s illegal actions.

Because Defendant Pat Taylor threatened Ms. Acton
to keep her mouth shut, or else he would “personally see to it
that the city take [you} through that courthouse that-[you’re]
so worried about”, Ms. Acton followed formal procedures for
speaking at a public city council meeting.

Because of the illegal act of threatening Ms. Acton to
keep her mouth shut, thereby inducing fear to deny Ms.
Acton’s right to the first amendment, because of the act of
disinterest, because of participating in the act to cover-up
insurance fraud, because of participating in the act to cover-
up corruption within the business of both Preble County and

17

City of Eaton, because of the act of conspiracy and
complicity to cover-up both insurance fraud and corruption,
by Defendant Pat Taylor, both independently and jointly with
other defendants, Ms. Acton suffered injury, provable and
commencing on or about March 8, 2001, continuing to this
day because of Pat Taylor’s illegal actions.

Once again following ORC. 4113.52, Ms. Acton then
went to her immediate Eaton EMS supervisor, Marsha
Stonecash, and told her the whole story. Ms. Acton further
informed Chief Marsha Stonecash that she intended to
officially resign on February 20th, 2001, during the monthly
public meeting of Eaton City Council.

Defendant Mayor Pat Taylor allowed only 5 minutes
for Ms. Acton to speak, Ms. Acton complied and condensed
the story. Ms. Acton publicly announced that she was
threatened and that she would submit a complaint with
Defendant Preble County Sheriff fom Hayes, which she did.
Ms. Acton truly expected Dr. Mark Vosler or Parker-
Hannifin or someone to file a complaint of slander or libel as
a result of Ms. Acton vocalizing that she had documents, but
that ramification is not what happened.

What did happen completely blindsided Ms. Acton,
as well as the numerous pertinent persons in Ms. Acton’s
life, all of whom, if given the opportunity by this court, will
by subpoena or willful testimony, testify as to the sound and
stable mental stability of Ms. Acton as they each one
witnessed at that time in February-March of 2001.

As an employee of D & D Driving School, Ms. Acton
was responsible for the lives of many youth of Preble and
Montgomery County’s, hence owner, Sharon Postigo had a
vested interest in being constantly aware of the mental status
of Ms. Acton. Sharon Postigo was never given opportunity to
testify on Ms. Acton’s behalf because Defendant Judge
“Bill” with-a-multi-million-dollar-plan Dues, never afforded

18

Ms. Acton the due process of ORC 5122.12 as it appears in
Appendix I, on pages 74-75.

As a commercial driving student of Southern State
~ Community College, who not only drove a training semi with
cargo weighing thousands of pounds, but she drove it over
Ohio highways where other motorists could have potentially
been hurt or killed, if indeed, Ms. Acton was truly
“homicidal, suicidal, or delusional”. Training Manager, Ed
Mullins, had a vested interest in being constantly aware of

the mental status of Ms. Acton, yet he was never afforded the ©
opportunity to testify on Ms. Acton’s behalf because
Defendant Judge “Bill” with-a-multi-million-dollar-plan
Dues never allowed Ms. Acton the liberty of due process
contained in ORC 5122.12. Refer to Appendix I,pages 74-75.

Ms. Acton has attended Christ Cathedral of 51 Best
Street, Dayton, Ohio 45401, 937-223-8505, for several years.
Dr. Leon Stutzman is Ms. Acton’s pastor. He has a vested
interest in Ms. Acton’s mental status, yet he was never given
opportunity to testify on Ms. Acton’s behalf because
Defendant Judge “Bill” with-a-multi-million-dollar-plan
Dues never afforded Ms. Acton the due process of ORC
5122.12. Refer to Appendix I, pages 74-75.

As an EMT employed by the City of Eaton, Captain
Marsha Stonecash had a vested interest in Ms. Acton’s
mental status, yet Mrs. Stonecash was never given
opportunity to testify on Ms. Acton’s behalf because
Defendant Judge “Bill” with-a-multi-million-dollar-plan
Dues never afforded Ms. Acton the due process of ORC
5122.12. Refer to Appendix I, pages 74-75.

Ms. Acton’s family physician, Defendant “Doc”
Ferguson professionally, ethically, and morally had a vested
interest in Ms. Acton’s mental status, and according to his
lawyer, he “didn’t want to get involved”, especially during
Ms. Acton’s illegal detention. (No wonder! Gee, I’d hate to
have to be honest and testify for the benefit of Ms. Acton

19

when she unknowingly is in pursuit of keeping me(“Doc”)
from my millions that “Bill” Dues will make for me and my
associates!)

If not for the act of blatant disinterest, the act of
conspiring and complicity to cover-up the mental stableness
of Ms. Acton, participating in the act of covering-up Ms.
Acton’s mental stableness, by Defendant Dr. Allen Ferguson,
independently and jointly with other defendants, Ms. Acton
suffered injury, provable and commencing on or about March
8, 2001, and continuing to this day due to his illegal actions.

Ms. Acton’s close friends and family had/has a vested
interest in Ms. Acton’s mental status, yet they were never
given opportunity to testify on Ms. Acton’s behalf because
Judge “Bill” with-a-multi-million-dollar-plan Dues never
afforded Ms. Acton the due process of ORC 5122.12. Refer
to Appendix I, pages 74-75.

Apparently Defendant Eaton’s new Defendant Police
Chief Phillip Romeo, who Ms. Acton publicly announced
was corrupt and violated ORC and Federal confidentiality
laws, went to Defendant Judge “Bill” with-a-big-plan Dues,
or maybe Dues went to the chief, regardless, Defendant
Romeo submitted an affidavit of mostly lies, falsely alleging
that Ms. Acton was “homicidal, suicidal, delusional, and
possessed strong religious beliefs”, and therefore a danger to
herself and the community. Ms. Acton had/has a strong
relationship with God of the Bible, however, Ms. Acton was
not homicidal, suicidal, or delusional.

As previously mentioned, Defendant Romeo’s choice
to conspire with all other Defendants, to enter into complicity
and to submit a false affidavit to protect Defendant Judge
“Bill” with-a-big-million-dollar-plan Dues, effectively
forfeited his immunity as a police officer and disgraced his
military uniform as well, thereby forfeiting his/their claim to
protection by the Soldier’s and Sailor’s Act.

20

Actually, Ms. Acton believes that Defendant Judge
“Bill” with-a-multi-million-do!lar-plan Dues called a meeting
of all the other Defendants, in one form or another, and they
all entered into complicity and contributed to his new
emergency plan of shutting Ms. Acton’s mouth, and
defaming her for the purpose of discrediting her testimony as
it pertains to the now needed protection of Defendant Judge
“Bill” and-all-others-with-the-multi-million-dollar Dues’
plan.

Further, Defendant Judge “Bill’ with-a-new-
emergency-plan Dues has many years of expertise in the
legal system as it pertains to forensic hospitals for the
criminally insane. Defendant Judge “Bill” with-a-plan Dues
presumed that Ms. Acton would suffer a degree of mental
and emotional stress. Moreover, he was fully aware that the
odds of Ms. Acton being physically assaulted, raped, or
killed were greatly increased while detained at TVPS’
Forensic Hospital on co-ed ward 53 wherein housed the
criminally insane.

The main assault is that to secure his huge multi-
million-dollar-long-term-local-tax-revenue-increasing-
money-making-business-plan/deal, and to protect his fellow
Defendant business associates from Ms. Acton’s truthful
allegations, Defendant Judge “Bill” now-I-got-a-new-
emergency-plan Dues made a calculated decision to illegally
manipulate ORC and abused the power and authority of his
judicial robe, thereby forfeiting his immunity as a judge.
After all, who would dare to question his authority or
integrity, he wears a judicial robe! (Refer to parts of Canon 3,
Appendix E, pages 62-65.)

As previously noted, neither Ms. Acton nor her
immediate family, friends, pastor, instructor, or bosses, nor
Ms. Acton’s choice of legal representative were given notice
of any hearings pertaining to Ms. Acton, a direct and
calculated denial of due process by Defendant Judge Dues,
notice that is provided under ORC 5112.12.

21

Why did Dues skip this part of the ORC? He
intentionally skipped that part of Ms. Acton’s due process
because he knew Ms. Acton was not “crazy” and would, no
doubt prove it. Besides, he didn’t want any court records
containing the truth of the matter at hand now. He has money
to make: he can’t risk doing things legally at this point!

To create a basis to attack Ms. Acton, Defendant |
Judge “Bill” Dues and other Defendants arranged for
documentation from Defendant Parker-Hannifin and all of
the top officials of Defendant Eaton and Defendant Preble
County, including a fax that amounted to a contribution of
hearsay from Defendant Preble County Prosecutor Rebecca
Ferguson.

As. previously mentioned, Defendant Ms. Ferguson
made a calculated choice to conspire with the cover-up of
Defendant Judge Dues’ plan, Defendant Rebecca Ferguson
made a calculated choice to conspire with Defendant Parker-
Hannifin to keep Ms. Acton from attending fhe scheduled
hearing before the Ohio Industrial Commission. Defendant
Ms. Ferguson conspired with Defendant members of
Defendant Preble County Medical Center to aid in the
protection of her family’s future multi-million dollar
investment.

To further assault and cause injury to Ms. Acton,
Defendant Rebecca Ferguson’s long history of expertise with
issues of mental illnesses, forensic hospitals, and the legal
system, all afforded Ms. Ferguson the knowledge that to
illegally detain Ms. Acton, with a sound mind, and to
illegally lock Ms. Acton behind secured doors with the
criminally insane, would potentially cause Ms. Acton much
emotional distress and could very well induce serious mental
disorder. Further, Defendant Rebecca Ferguson’s experiences
as an expert also gave her the knowledge that Ms. Acton
~ could very well have been physically assaulted, raped, or
even killed.

22

If employees of hers, or anyone else in the courthouse
truly had cause to believe Ms. Acton to be “crazy” as “Aunt
Becky” claimed in her memorandum, why did they not
personally give affidavit or deposition? Answer: Because no
one had reason to believe Ms. Acton to be of unsound mind,
after all, because they worked in the courthouse they more _
than chance, knew about the big Dues’ plan and “didn’t want
to get involved”.

Ms. Acton would like to point out at this time that
Honorable Ferris of the Sixth Circuit Court in Cincinnati,
Ohio, made comment pertaining to Defendant Rebecca
Ferguson’s memorandum, wherein he states that Ms. Acton
displayed “ABERRANT BEHAVIOR”. (Refer to Appendix
A, pages 31-36. He apparently came to that false conclusion
while making his decision based upon the clearly undeserved
merit that Ms. Ferguson is/was a prosecutor, combined with
his obvious preconceived notion that Ms. Acton -is/was
“crazy”, just as Defendant Rebecca Ferguson alleges within
her hearsay memorandum. Ms. Acton strongly objects to
Honorable Ferris’ presumption.

Defendant City Attorney John Petry, also a member
of this elaborate conspiracy, actually entered into complicity
and held a meeting in his office wherein Defendant Dave
Daily and Defendant Police Chief Romeo were in attendance.
Further, Defendant Wayne Pinkstaff clearly requested to
keep abreast of the results of that particular meeting,
wherein, the subject matter was pertaining to Defendant
Parker-Hannifin Corporation and Ms. Acton’s apparent
agenda.

Defendant Judge “Bill” with-an-emergency-plan
Dues included proof of this meeting among the other
documents he used to put Ms. Acton away, on ward 53 of
TVPS wherein the criminally insane are housed!

Furthermore, to add more insult to injury, Defendant
Judge “Bill” Dues involved Defendant Preble County’s
23

Board of Mental Health and arranged for a psychologist,
Deiendant Lori Marcellino, who had never even so much as
met Ms. Acton, let alone personally evaluate Ms. Acton, to
give false affidavit including sworn testimony wherein she
echoed Defendant Police Chief Romeo’s lies and
fabrications, requesting Ms. Acton to be hospitalized at
Defendant Twin Valley Psychiatric Systems at Dayton in
Defendant Montgomery County.

Further, Defendant Judge “Bill” with-an-emergency-
plan-to-protect-his/our-multi-million-dollar-money-making-
tax-revenue-increasing-business-plan/deal Dues only
considered testimony from psychologist, Lori Marcellino,
when ORC 5122.11 on page 73 of Appendix I also requires a
Medical Doctor opinion to legally hospitalize someone for
involuntary evaluation.

Because she is expert, Defendant Lori Marcellino was
fully aware of the potential for mental suffering, emotional
stress, the inducing of Adjustment Disorder, not to mention
the increased possibility of physical injury, rape, or even
potential death, that Ms. Acton could receive resulting from
this malicious fabrication to iivoluntarily hospitalize Ms.
Acton in a state forensic hospital for the criminally insane.

If not for the acts of conspiracy and complicity to
cover-up insurance fraud, the acts of conspiracy and
complicity to cover-up corruption within Preble County and
the City of Eaton, the acts of covering-up insurance fraud and
corruption, the act to maliciously support the untruths that
Ms. Acton was criminally insane, the acts of conspiracy and
complicity to support the malicious untruth that Ms. Acton
was criminally insane, the conspiracy, the act of entering into
complicity, and the act to prevent Ms. Acton from appearing
at the hearing before the Ohio Industrial Commission in
April 2001, the conspiracy and: the act of entering into
complicity to illegally hospitalize Ms. Acton within a
forensic hospital for the criminally insane, to act in such a
way as to illegally hospitalize Ms. Acton in a forensic

24

hospital for the criminally insane, the conspiracy and the act
of entering into complicity to illegally place Ms. Acton in
physical and mental harm’s way, the act to place Ms. Acton
in physical and mental harm’s way, Ms. Acton did indeed
suffer injury, provable and commencing on or about March
8, 2001, by acts both independent and jointly with other
defendants, acts committed by Defendant Chief Phillip
Romeo, Defendant Dave Daily, Defendant John Petry,
Defendant City of Eaton, Defendant Preble County,
Defendant Sheriff Tom Hayes, Defendant Prosecutor
Rebecca Ferguson, Defendant Parker-Hannifin Corporation,
Defendant Wayne Pinkstaff, Defendant Jenny Haddux,
Defendant Samaritan Behavioral Health, Defendant Dr. Lori
Marcellino, and last be not least Defendant Judge Wilfred
Dues with a huge plan to protect.

Ms. Acton was illegally detained on March 13, 2001.
Ms. Acton had to reschedule her March 14th nieeting in
Columbus with a representative of the Ohio Ethics
Commission, as well as her hearing before the Industrial
Commission against Defendant Parker-Hannifin Corporation
at the beginning of April, both while detained in a state
hospital for the criminally insane.

To add further assault and injury, while detained
within the jurisdiction of Defendant Montgomery County,
Ms. Acton did not receive completed hearing from her date
of detention, March 13, 2001, until April 5, 2001. Ms. Acton
was effectively illegally incarcerated for three and a half
weeks, because of the untrue and illegally documented
witness testimony of fictitious symptoms, as well as expert
diagnosis stemming from those illegal and untrue
documented fictitiously witnessed symptoms, symptoms that
would make it appear that Ms. Acton was criminally insane.

For Ms. Acton to be detained for three and a half
weeks without a completed hearing by Defendant
Montgomery County’s Defendant Judge George Gounaris, is

25

yet another denial of legitimate due processes of ORC
5122.14] on pages 76-77 of Appendix I.

Are these denials of legitimate due process, by both
Preble County jurisdiction and Montgomery County
Jurisdiction, mentioned thus far, used to deny only Ms.
Acton her Constitutional rights, or are these denials of
Constitutional rights the norm for those who are allegedly
criminally insane and in presumed need of involuntary
hospitalization for evaluation?

If not for the blatant acts and conspiracies of those
Defendants residing in Preble County as mentioned thus far,
conspired and entered into complicity to independently and
- jointly, illegally act in such a way by each one of the Preble
County residing defendants addressed thus far, Ms. Acton
would not have been injured and therefore would not have
suffered, provable and commencing on or about March 8,
2001, and continuing to this day.

With no assistance from any agent of Defendant
Montgomery County; without any assistance from any agent
of Defendant Twin Valley Psychiatric System of Dayton,
Ohio, in Montgomery County, Ms. Acton was finally able to
secure professional legal representation, on or about April 2,
2001, who requested the immediate completion of Ms.
Acton’s hearing, further threatening Judge Gounaris with the
filing of a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal Court.

Ms. Acton’s hearing was then immediately
completed. With no substantial proof of mental disorder
warranting hospitalization, Judge Gounaris dismissed the
case and then he expunged the case.

Now fearing to stay in the community of Preble
County, Ms. Acton completed her driving training, obtained
a Commercial Driver’s License, secured a job with Schneider
National Trucking, and effectively hid for nearly two years
on the highways of this great country in an 80,000 pound

| 26

bright orange semi, occasionally hauling freight through
Eaton, stopping to see her family, friends, and attend her
home church.

Ms. Acton and Parker-Hannifin did have a hearing
before the Industrial Commission. The claim was denied,
However, Ms. Acton could then request an appeal hearing in
the Court of Common Pleas in Preble County. Oh, what a
hoot that would have been. No thanks! Ms. Acton was truly
afraid to act on her right to appeal, afraid of what else Prebie
County would put her or her family through.

This Court has access to the complaint that Ms. Acton
filed April 4, 2003. But what this court needs to be aware of
is that Defendant Judge “Bill” Dues’ long-term-money
making-business-dream is now a thriving reality. As a matter
of fact, in the recent March 22, 2005, issue of the Palladium-
Item newspaper, Eaton City Manager, and former agent for
Daily and Hake Realtors, Inc., Dave Daily, gave comments
concerning the business of Eaton.

Apparently, Eaton plans to annex 54 more acres of
Eleanor Hake owned land from Preble County into the City
of Eaton. Real estate business, Preble County Medical
Center, and others of course, are planning to build a hospital
at the site of the newly built, Judge Dues’ planned Y.M.C.A.
Dave Daily further stated, “But that’s a lot of land to not put
much on. Their long term plan is to do something bigger!”

Ms. Acton is presently employed at Trinity Missions
of New Paris, Ohio, 7739 West U.S. 40, 937-437-2311.
Administrator, Randy Blough, personally knows Eaton EMS
Captain Marsha Stonecash, hence, he spoke with her
pertaining to the potential hiring of Ms. Acton. Captain
Stonecash gave a positive referral concerning Ms. Acton,
who was then fingerprinted and employed on March 8, 2004.

And what about Parker-Hannifin? On November 3,
2004, the morning after the elections, a Greenville, Ohio
27

resident, Steve Nisonger, age 41, was smashed, severed in
half, and dead at Defendant Eaton Parker-Hannifin
Corporation. He was a solo truck driver and was smashed at
the back of his own trailer. He was between it and the
shipping/receiving docks. Possessing a commercial driver’s
license, Ms. Acton presumes the only way he could be
smashed behind his own tractor-trailer is with some human
OSHA violating help, because he surely couldn’t have
smashed himself, given the mechanics of hydraulic and air
brakes.

According to the local paper Defendant Chief Phillip
Romeo and Defendant Prosecutor Rebecca Ferguson secured
the scene at Defendant Eaton’s Parker-Hannifin until OSHA
investigators came to the scene and began their investigation.
(The Honor of this court may contact OSHA at 513-841-
4132, 800-454-0404, or www.osha.gov, and enquire as to the
case number 308367713 pertaining to this death.)

Ms. Acton’s current physician is Dr Shafik Ahmad,
MD. of Family Physicians of Huber Heights, Ohio, 5212
Brandt Pike, Suite C, 937-235-6331. He has been treating
with Ms. Acton since April 2001 soon after Ms. Acton’s
release from TVPS in Dayton. Her current diagnosis is
hypothyroidism; Adult ADD (314.00); Bi-Polar, Type 2,
Hypo-manic-depressive (296.42); and Adjustment Disorder
(309.9), some of which are influenced by both environmental
stressors as well as genetics.

However, Adjustment Disorder (309.9) is the
development of clinically significant emotional or behavioral
symptoms in response to an identifiable psychosocial stressor
or stressors.

Hence, Ms. Acton clearly had these diagnosis to one
degree or another, provable and commencing on or March 8,
2001, however not “homicidal, suicidal, or delusional”. Ms.
Acton did absolutely possess a strong relationship with God

28

at that time, however, “strong religious beliefs” are not
considered a legitimate symptom of mental disorder.

Dr. Shafik Ahmad prescribes 112 meg. Synthroid,
150 mg. Wellbutrin XL, 80 mg. Strattera, 400 mg. Seroquel
and a low dosage of Lovastatin for cholesterol. Ms. Acton
consults with Dr. Ahmad on a regular basis and stays current
with blood analysis.

_ Ms. Acton is not currently homicidal, suicidal, and is
not currently delusional. Ms. Acton does currently have a
strong relationship with God of the Bible.

Ms. Acton can prove that she was not homicid,
suicidal, and was not delusional on or about March 8, 2001.
Ms. Acton did possess a strong relationship with God, both
then and now.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In conclusion, Ms. Acton was clearly the victim of
several conspiracies that were intertwined and acted out by
involved Defendants, both independent and jointly with one
another. All designed and carried out to- protect Defendant
Judge Dues’ money-making plan, in which all Defendants
would prosper, either monetarily, or by public recognition, or
by promotion, or a combination there of, by the blatant
intentional demise of Ms. Acton; financially, emotionally,
physically, and geographically.

Ms. Acton clearly suffered as a result of an
outrageously manipulated legal system as it pertains to the
alleged mentally ill. The Constitution, ordaining due process,
was designed to prevent what happened to Ms. Acton, yet in
Preble County, and continuing in Montgomery County Ms.
Acton’s rights were blatantly denied.

The Constitutional provision of due process was
completely ignored by Judge Dues because it interfered with
: 29

“their long term plan”, as well as by Judge Gounaris who
clearly, because of obvious habit, and because he presumed
Ms. Acton to be criminally insane and presumably not
knowing or caring or even being aware of her rights.

Clearly Ms. Acton still has a heart to help people in
general, but specifically the alleged mentally ill, but more
clear is that Judge Dues’ presumed heart for the youth of this
community is over-shadowed by his/their greed for power,
prestige and his/their long-time, long-term planrod
“paycheck”.

(Aren’t officials held to a longer statute of limitations
when they intentionally conduct themselves illegally?)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Writ for
Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

tad

(‘bh L Pro Se

Goes

Stephanie S. Acton
3045 US. 35 West

Eaton, Ohio 45320
937-456-3731

30 =

APPENDIX A -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE S. ACTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ORDER

CITY OF EATON; PREBLE COUNTY;
REBECCA FERGUSON, Preble County
Prosecutor, TOM HAYES, Director;
WILFRED G. DUES, Preble County Court ‘:
of Common Pleas; PREBLE COUNTY
MEDICAL CENTER; MARK VOSLER;
ALLEN FERGUSON; PARKER-HANNIFIN
CORPORATION; WAYNE PINKSTAFF,
Human Resources Manager; JENNY
HADDUxX, Insurance Specialist;
SAMARITAN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
INC., LORI L. MARCELLINO; PREBLE
COUNTY YOUTH FOUNDATION INC.;
CHRISTOPHER B. WASHINGTON; TOM
HAYES; LESLIE RENNER; PHILLIP ~
ROMEO; DAVE DAILY; JOHN PETRY;
PAT TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellees.

Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and FARRIS,
Circuit Judges.

Stephanie Acton, an Ohio citizen proceeding pro se,
appeals a district court judgment dismissing her civil rights
complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Her appeal has

31

No. 04-3095

been referred to a panel of this court pursuant to Rule
34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, the
panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed.
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

Seeking monetary relief, Acton filed a complaint
against twenty-two defendants raising claims under 1983 and
_ asserting supplemental claims under Ohio law, each related
to her involuntary detention and subsequent psychological
evaluation. In response to the defendants’ various motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment, the district court
dismissed each of Acton’s federal claims against all of the
defendants. The district court dismissed with prejudice the
claims against Judge Wilfred Dues, Preble County Clerk of
Courts Christopher Washington, and Preble County
Prosecutor Rebecca Ferguson on the basis of absolute
immunity. The district court dismissed with prejudice the
claims against Tom Hayes, Leslie Renner, Phillip Romeo,
Dave Daily, John Petry, Pat Taylor, Samaritan Behavioral
Health, Lori Marcellino, Mark Vosler, (Harold) Allen
Ferguson, and Preble County Youth Foundation on the
grounds that Acton’s claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. The district court_dismissed without prejudice
Acton’s claims against Parker-Hannifin Corporation (PHC),
Wayne Pinkstaff, and Jenny Haddux for failing to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court
granted Preble County Medical Center’s unopposed motion
for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice the
claim against the City of Eaton. Acton filed a timely appeal.

Whether a district court properly dismissed a suit
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law
subject to de novo review. Gahafer v. Ford Motor Co., 328
F.3d 859,861 (6 Cir. 2003). The court must construe the _

“complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept
all the factual allegations as true, and determine whether the
plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of

32

No. 04-3095

her claims that would entitle her to relief. Powell v. Jacor
Communications Corporate, 320 F.3d 599, 601-02 (6" Cir.
2003). This court reviews an order granting summary
judgment de novo. Toms v. Taft, 338 F.3d 519, 524 (6" Cir.
2003). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).

Initially, we note that Acton does not argue that the
district court erred by dismissing her claims against PHC,
Wayne Pinkstaff, Jenny Haddux, and Preble County Medical
Center, where the district court’s judgment was not based
upon the grounds of either immunity or the statute of
limitations. Likewise, Acton does not argue that the district
court erred when it dismissed Acton’s claim against
Christopher Washington on the basis of absolute immunity.
Finally, Acton does not argue that the district court abused its
discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims. Issues raised in the district court
but not on appeal are considered abandoned and not
reviewable on appeal. Enertech Elec.m Inc. V. Mahoning
County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 257, 259 (6" Cir. 1996).

On appeal, Acton argues: (1) that Tom Hayes,
Rebecca Ferguson, Phillip Romeo, and Judge Dues were not
entitled to immunity; (2) that her claims were not barred by
the statute of limitations; (3) that the district_court cut short
the sixty days she had been granted to ask for records from
the defendants by dismissing her case, and (4) that the district
court should not have dismissed the claims against the City
of Eaton and the related defendants on the basis of the
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act.

33

No. 04-3095

Because the district court did not rely upon immunity
grounds in dismissing Acton’s claims against Hayes and
Romeo, this court need only address the district court’s
holding on immunity in relation to Judge Dues and Rebecca
Ferguson. The district court properly concluded that Judge
Dues is entitled to judicial immunity. A judge performing
judicial functions is absolutely immune from suit seeking
monetary damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 US. 9, 9-10
(1991). A judge will not be immune from suit where: (1) the
judge acts in a non-judicial capacity; or (2) the judge acts in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. At 11-12. A
judge acts.in the complete absence of all jurisdiction only if a
matter was clearly outside the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6" Cir. 1985).
All of the alleged acts by Judge Dues are judicial functions
exercised under proper jurisdictional authority, and thus,
judge dues is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

The district court also properly concluded that
Rebecca Ferguson is entitled to absolute immunity to the
extent that Acton bases her claim upon Ferguson’s refusal to
prosecute the alleged instance of fraud. A prosecutor is
afforded absolute immunity for the decision not to prosecute.
Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37,41 (1" Cir. 1992).

Acton argues that Ferguson is not entitled to imminity
for the memorandum that she wrote to Chief Romeo
describing Acton’s aberrant behavior. Rather, the court
determined that Acton had failed to produce any evidence
contradicting Ferguson’s affidavit, which stated that she took
no part in the decision to seek Acton’s detainment. The
district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
Rebecca Ferguson on this issue because Ferguson’s
memorandum, by itself, could not establish liability under
1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976).

34

No. 04-3095

The district court did not err in determining that a number of
Acton’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. State
statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to
determine the timeliness of claims asserted under

1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 47] U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). For
civil rights suits filed in Ohio under 1983, the statute of
limitations is two years. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2305.10;
Browning v. Pendleton, 869,F.2d 989, 992 (6" Cir. 1989) (en
banc). Acton’s claims accrued, at the very latest, on March
13, 2001, the date on which she was detained by court order.
See Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6° Cir. 1996).
Acton did not file her complaint until April 4, 2003, twenty-
two days after the two-year statute of limitations had expired.

Acton argues that the statute of limitations should be
tolled pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2305.16. Because
Acton argues only that she was confined, not that she was of
unsound mind, the tolling provision is inapposite. See Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. 2305.16; Fisher v. Ohio Univ., 589 N.E.2d
13, 16 (Ohio 1992). Therefore, the district court properly
determined that Acton’s claims were barred by the statute of
limitations.

For her third issue, Acton argues that the district court
cut short her opportunity for discovery. We review a district
court’s decisions concerning discovery matters for abuse of
discretion. Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6 Cir.
2003). Acton has not demonstrated that the district court’s
actions deprived her of information that would disclose
material facts. See id. (“Nebulous assertions that more
discovery time would have produced evidence to defeat
summary judgment will be unavailing.”). Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.

Finally, Acton argues that the district court
improperly dismissed the claims against the City of Eaton
and related defendants under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil

35

No. 04-3095
Relief Act in dismissing these claims. Instead the court found

the request for this alternative basis for relief moot. This
argument lacks merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
Rule 34(j)(2)( C ), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Clerk

36

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[Filed February 4, 2005]
LEONARD GREEN,
Clerk

Circuit Court No. 04-3095

STEPHANIE S. ACTON, PRO SE
Plaintiff-Appellant

VS.

CITY OF EATON; PREBLE COUNTY;
REBECCA FERGUSON, Preble County
Prosecutor; TOM HAYES, Director;
WILFRED G. DUES, Preble County Court of
Common Pleas; PREBLE COUNTY
MEDICAL CENTER; MARK VOSLER;
ALLEN FERGSON; PARKER-HANNIFIN
CORPORATION; WAYNE PINKSTAFF,
Human Resources Manager; JENNY HADDUX,
Insurance Specialist;
SAMARITAN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC.
LORI L. MARCELLINO; PREBLE COUNTY
YOUTH FOUNDATION, INC.;

: CHRISTOPHER B. WASHINGTON; TOM
HAYES; LESLIE RENNER; PHILLIP ROMEO;
DAVE DAILY; JOHN PETRY; PAT TAYLOR
Defendarits-Appellees.

37

No. 04-3095
ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant, Stephanie Acton, has filed a
petition for rehearing of his court’s order of December 7,
2004, affirming the district court’s judgment dismissing her
civil rights suit.

Upon careful consideration, this panel concludes that
it did not misapprehend or overlook any point of law or fact
when it issued its order. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a).

The petition for rehearing is thus DENIED.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Leonard Green, Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 East Fifth Street, Room 532
Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3988

Stephanie S. Acton, Pro Se
3045 US Route 35, West
Eaton, Ohio 45320

Erin B. Moore

Green & Green

110 N. Main Street

Suite 950 Fifth Third Center
Dayton, Ohio 45402-1769

38

No. 04-3095

Attorneys Continued

Neil F. Freund, Freeze & Arnold
1 S. Main Street |

Suite 1800 One Dayton Centre
Dayton, Ohio 45402-2017

Christopher W. Carrigg
Freund, Freeze & Arnold

1 S. Main Street

Suite 1800 One Dayton Centre
Dayton, Ohio 45402-2017

Ralph E. Burnham
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson
36 E. Seventh Street

Suite 2100 Society Center
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Robert F Cowdery

Statman, Harris, Siegel & Eyrich
110 N. Main Street |

Suite 1520 Fifth Third Center
Dayton, Ohio 45402

Mark L. Schumacher

Freund, Freeze & Amold

65 E. State Street

Suite 800 Columbus, Ohio 43215

39

No. 04-3095
Attorneys Continued

Allison McCallum

Spieth, Bell, McCurdy, & Newell

925 Euclid Avenue

Suite 2000 Huntington Building —-
Cleveland, Ohio 44115

John F. Haviland

Bieser, Greer & Landis

6 N. Main Street

Suite 400 National City Center
Dayton, Ohio 45402-1908:

Grey Bennett
200 W. Main Street
Eaton, Ohio 45320

RE: 04-3095
Acton vs. Eaton
District Court No. 03-00116

Enclosed is a copy of an order which was entered

today in the above styled case.

Leonard Green, Clerk

Ms.) Michelle M. Davis
Case Manager

APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

Case No. C-3- 03-116
STEPHANIE S. ACTON

Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge
VS. Michael R. Merz

THE CITY OF EATON, OHIO, et al

DECISION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on the following
Motions:

1. Motion of Defendants Parker-Hannifin Corp., Wayne
Pinkstaff, and Jenny Haddux to dismiss or for a more
definite statement (Doc. No. 51);

2. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 60);

Defendant Rebecca Ferguson’s Motions for Summary

Judgment (Doc. Nos. 61 & 63);

4. Defendant Preble County Medical Center’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 64);

5. Defendant City of Eaton’s Motion for a Final
Appealable Order (Doc. No. 73);

6. Defendant Preble County Clerk of Court Christopher

~ Washington’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 72);

7. Defendant Preble County Sheriff Tom Hayes’ Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. No. 73);

G2

4]

Case No. C-3-03-116.

8. Defendants Samaritan Behavioral Health, Inc, and
Lori Marcellino’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 73); and

9. Defendants Mark Vosler and Harold Ferguson’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 76).

Despite notice of the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
and of her obligation to respond to these Motions, Plaintiff
has only responded to the Parker-Hannifin Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. No. 59) and Defendant Rebecca Ferguson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 71).

The parties have unanimously consented to plenary
magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and the
case has been referred on that basis (Doc. No. 52).

Motion to Dismiss Standard

The Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 51, 72, and 73)
were made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) whose purpose is
to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in
the complaint is true. Mayor v. Mylod, 988 F. 2d 635, 638
(6" Cir. 1993), citing, Nishiyama v. Dickson County
Tennessee, 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6" Cir. 1987). Put another
way, “The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test
the formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief;
it is not procedure for resolving a contest about the facts or
merits of the case.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2d 1356 at 294 (1990).

The test for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
is a Stringent one:

42

Case No. C-3-03-116

[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co v. California, 509 US 764, 811, 113 S.
Ct. 2891, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1993), quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 US 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80
(1957); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 US 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827,
104 L. Ed 338 (1989); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 US
69, 104 S. Ct. 229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59(1984); Monette v.
Electronic Data Systems, Inc., 90 F. 3d 1173, 1189 (6 cir.
(1996). For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint
must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and its allegations taken as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US.
232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974); Westlake v.
Lucas, 537 F. 2d 857 (6" Cir. (1976); Craighead v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 899 F. 2d 485 (6" Cir. (1990). To survive a
motion to dusmiss under Fed, R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a...
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery
under some viable legal theory.” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F. 2d 434 (6" Cir (1988); followed
Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F. 2d
1236 (6" Cir 1990); Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v.
Tatum, 58 F. 3d 1101 (6™ Cir 1995). The Court “need not
accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences.” Morgan vy. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F. 2d
10, 12 (6 Cir. 1987). Bare assertions of legal conclusions
are not sufficient. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. Of Educ., 76
F. 3d 716, 6" Cir. 1996); Sogevalor S. A. v. Penn Central
_Corp., 771 F. Supp. 890, 893 (S.D. Ohio 1991). It is only
well-pleaded facts which are construed liberally in favor of
the party opposing the motion to dismiss. Id., citing Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 US. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90
(1974); see also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice And
Procedure: Civil 2d 1357 at 311-318 (1990).

43

ae SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Other Defendants have filed motions for summary
judgment. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and-admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
— entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
On a motion for summary Judgment, the movant has the
burden of showing that there exists no genuine issue of
material fact, and the evidence, together with all inferences
that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion..
Adickes v.\S. H. Kress & Co., 398 US. 144, 157-59 (1970).
Nevertheless, “the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US 242, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part
of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to
“secure the just, speedy aid inexpensive determination of
every action.” Celotex Carp. v. Catrett, 477 US. 317, 327
(1986). - v3

Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for
the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment
asserting that the opposing party will not be able to produce
sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict
motion (now known as a motion for judgment as a matter of

Case No. C-3-03-116

law. Fed R. Civ. P. 50). Street v. Bradford & Co., 886 F. 2d
1472, 1478 (6™ Cir. 1989). If, after sufficient time for
discovery, the opposing party is unable to demonstrate that
he or she can do so under the Liberty Lobby criteria,
summary judgment is appropriate. Id. The opposing party
must “do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US.
574, 586 (1986).. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 US. At 249-50, 106 S. Ct. at
2510-11 (citations omitted). “The mere possibility of a
factual dispute is not enough.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964
F. 2d 577, 582 (6" Cir. 1992)(quoting Gregg v. Allen-
Bradley Co., 801 F. 2d 859, 863 (6° Cir. 1986). Therefore a
court must make a preliminary assessment of the evidence, in
order to decide whether the plaintiff's evidence concerns a
material issue and is more than de minimis. Hartsel v. Keys,
87 F. 3d 795(6" Cir. 1996). “On summary judgment,”
moreover, “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts... must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 US. 654,655,82 S. Ct. 993, 994, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962).
Thus, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial,” Liberty Lobby, 477
US at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.

(The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.)

45

Case No. C-3-03-116

Celotex, 477 US at 323; see also, Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.
2d 1150,1156 (6" Cir. 1991) (citation omitted): If the moving
party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must go
beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Matsushita, 475 US at 587; Martin v. Ohio Turnpike
Comm’n., 968 F. 2d 606, (6™ Cir.,1992), cert. Denied, 506
US.1054,113 S. Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed. 2d 133 (1993).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (in other
words, determining whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact), “[a] district court is not . . . obligated to wade
through and search the entire record for some specific facts
that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.” Jnterroyal
Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F. 2d 108,111 (6" Cir. 1989), cert.
Denied, 494 US 1091 (1990). Thus, in determining whether a
genuine issue of material facts exists on a particular issue, a
court is entitled to rely only upon those portions of the
verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with any affidavits |
submitted, specifically called to is attention by the parties.

The facts set forth in this Decision are admitted or
established by eviderice competent under Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e) and not controverted by opposing competent evidence.

Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff brought this action pro se against twenty-two
Defendants (Complaint, Doc. No.1). She purports to bring
the claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and. to assert supplemental
claims under Ohio law (Complaint, 1). She claims that
Defendants acted intentionally, maliciously, or with
deliberate indifference to her rights (Id., 4) and that they
acted under color of state law (Id., 8).

= 46 ‘

Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on February 7, 2001, she met
with Eaton City Manager Dave Daily to inform him of
corruption in a particular (unnamed) department of the City
(Id., 9). Later that day she went to the private photography
business of Eaton Mayor Pat Taylor both to get a photograph
restored and to inform him of the same things (Id.). Although
Mayor Taylor said he could not get his own personal issues
dealt with by the Preble County Court system, he threatened
to have the City take Ms. Acton through the same system
(Id., 14).

At a public meeting of the Preble City Council on
February 20, 2001, she made a statement admitting to her
own participation in an alleged insurance fraud involving
Defendant Parker-Hannifin and Preble County Health
Commissioner Mark Vosler (Id., 17) and other public
officials who allegedly failed to investigate the fraud.

On March 8,- 2001, two employees of Samaritan
Counseling Alternatives appeared at her home and advised
her that Sheriff Tom Hayes, Eaton Police Chief Romeo, and
Wilfred Dues were concerned about her mental health. She
alleges that the three of them conspired “for the purpose of
creating the perception that I was ill with mental disorder, or
combination there of [sic] to the degree of being homicidal,
suicidal, delusional, and possessing strong religious beliefs.”
(Id.,27). Instead of accepting a counseling appointment at
Samaritan Counseling Alternatives, she made an appointment
at a Christian mental health agency, Christos Counseling, in
Vandalia, Ohio (in Montgomery as opposed to Preble
County).

47

Allegations of the Complaint

On March 13, 2001, Judge Dues, the Probate Judge of
Preble County, issued an order for Plaintiff's detention at
Twin Valley Psychiatric in Dayton (Id. 30). She was taken
into custody with Chief Romeo personally participating (Id.
39). At an on-site hearing with Montgomery County Probate
Judge George Gounaris, she requested to have that evaluation
done on referral by Defendant Dr. Allen Ferguson, but he
declined to become involved (Id. 57-60. Dr. Lori Marcellino,
a psychiatrist with Samaritan Counseling Services, is accused
of rendering an opinion on Plaintiff's mental health of which
Judge Dues used to justify the confinement, but without Dr.
Marcellino ever evaluating Plaintiff. (Id. 63). At the second
hearing on April 5, 2001, Judge Gounaris ordered the case
dismissed (Id. 82).

The complaint questions at length the documents
assertedly reviewed by Judge Dues before issuing the
temporary detention order (Id., 95-113). She then quotes at
length from a newspaper article in the Register-Herald of
March 19, 2003, about the new Preble County Medical
Center (Id.,114-119). In 120 through 128, she alleges that
two different forms signed by Defendant Dr. Mark Vosler
were submitted by Parker-Hannifin with respect to a
Workers’ Compensation claim.

Having set forth the factual basis of her claims,
Plaintiff proceeds to plead three separate causes of action.
The first is a 1983 claim solely against Judge Dues (Id.,129-
1340. The second solely against Dr. Lori Marcellino, also
under 1983, for making the allegedly false affidavit on the
basis of which Judge Dues detained Ms. Acton. In the third
cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants
conspired to deprive Plaintiff of her due process rights and to
cause her to suffer cruel and unusual punishment (Id., 140).
She alleges this claim seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for
violations of the First and Fourth Amendments (Id. 141). In
143-145, the Defendants defamed her. She seeks $12 million

48

Allegations of the Complaint

in compensatory damages and another $12 million in
punitive damages (Id., 147).

The Pending Motions
1:Parker-Hannifin Corp. Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 51).

Parker-Hannifin, Wayne Pinkstaff, and Jenny Haddux
move to dismiss on the grounds that they are not state actors.
Only persons acting under the color of state law can be liable
under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

However, Plaintiff does allege that these three
Defendants conspired with state actors to deprive her of her
constitutional rights. A civil conspiracy is a combination of
two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful
act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the
principal element of which is agreement among the parties.
Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F. 2d 600, 620-21 97" Cir.
1979). rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 US. 754, 100 S.
Ct. 1987, 64 L. Ed.2d 670 (1980). Liability attaches for a
civil conspiracy when a plaintiff can prove that two or more—
defendants agreed to injure another by unlawful action and
committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Michigan Paytel Joint Venture v. City of Detroit, 287 F. 3d
527,541 (6" Cir. 2002). :

The difficulty with Plaintiff's Complaint is that it
makes very general conspiracy allegation: all the Defendants
are alleged to have conspired together to deprive her of her
rights. Conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of
specificity; vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by
material facts will not be sufficient to state a claim under 42
U. S. C. 1983. Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F. 2d 1534, 1538 (6"
Cir. 1987), citing Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F. 2d 239, 245 (6"
Cir. 1984); Polur v. Raffe, 912 F. 2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1990);

49

The Pending Motions

Applegate V. Top Associates, Inc., 425 F. 2d 92 (2d Cir.
1970). The only connection alleged between these three
Defendants is that the certificates of which Plaintiff
complains were both signed by Dr. Mark Vosler as a
physician and he is alleged to have various connections with
the other Defendants who are alleged to be “connected” with
one another.

In response to this Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff does
not provide any specific allegations of conspiracy by any of
these Defendants with any of the state actors. Instead, she
refers to various pages from hundreds of pages of documents
she submitted to the Court on July 29, 2003. The pages she
references do not show anything about a conspiracy among
the Defendants.

As to these three Defendants, the Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and will be
dismissed without prejudice on that basis. The alternative
motion for definite statement is denied.

2.Rebecca Ferguson’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. Nos. 61 and 63).

Because Defendant Ferguson’s Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 63), replaces her original Motion
(Doc. No. 61). The original Motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

Defendant Ferguson seeks summary judgment on two
basis: that she did not conspire with anyone to have Plaintiff
detained for mental status evaluation and that she is entitled
to immunity for her decision not to prosecute Parker-
_ Hannifin for what Plaintiff alleges is insurance fraud.

With respect to Ms. Ferguson’s reporting to Chief
Romeo facts observed by her staff which might lead a
50

The Pending Motions —

reasonable person to question Plaintiff's mental stability,
this reporting of observations does not give rise to any
liability. Ms. Ferguson avers by Affidavit that she took no
part in the decision to seek detainment and Plaintiff has
produced no contrary testimony. The sole basis for finding
her liable, then, would be reporting the observed facts. Such
reports do not give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in
the absence of some proof that they are part of an unlawful
conspiracy. Paul v. Davis, 424 US. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47
L. Ed.2d 405 (1976). ~

Acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which
occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State,
are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. /mbler
v. Pachtman, 424 US. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128
(1976); Burns v. Reed, 500 US. 478,111 S. Ct 1934, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 547 (1991); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 US. 259,
113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed. 2d 209 (1993). This absolute
immunity does not extend to investigatory activity, advising
police, or personnel matters. Burns. It does apply to
presenting allegedly false or defamatory testimony or
making false or defamatory statements in judicial
proceedings. Burns. Absolute immunity applies to
professional evaluation of evidence assembled by the
police. Buckley.

In this case, Plaintiff appears to allege Ms. Ferguson
violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights by not prosecuting
Parker-Hannifin. If the decision to prosecute someone is
protected by absolute immunity, a fortiori the decision not to
bring criminal charges is likewise protected.

Therefore, Defendant Ferguson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED.

51

The Pending Motions

3.Preble County Medical Center’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 64).

Preble County Medical Center’s Motion for Summary
Judgment establishes that it is a real estate partnership
which, until 1998, owned a building in which several of the
indivisual Defendants practiced medicine, but that it never
employed any of them. Plaintiff offers no contrary evidence.

Upon that state of facts, Preble County Medical
Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

4.Christopher Washington’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
No. 72).

Defendant Christopher Washington is the Preble
County Clerk of Courts. Although he is a named Defendant,
there are no allegations against Mr. Washington in the
Complaint and Plaintiff has not responed to the Motion.
Presumably he was sued because it was his duty to
journalize whatever orders Judge Dues may have entered in
this matter. As such, he is absolutely immune from any
liability, Foster v. Walsh, 864 F. 2d 416 (6 nCir 1988);
Denman v. Leedy, 479 2d 1097 (6™ Cir. 1973). Defendant
Washington’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Because
the basis is his immunity, the dismissal will be with
prejudice.

5.Sheriff Tom Hayes’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 73).

Preble County Sheriff Hayes moves to dismiss on
grounds the Complaint does not state a claim for relief
against him. As noted above, the only claim which involves
all the Defendants is the third cause of action for
conspiracy. The allegations are as general and conclusory as

52

The Pending Motions

to Sheriff Hayes as they are as to the three Parker-Hannifin
Defendants.

Sheriff Hayes also seeks dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds since the Complaint in this case was not
filed for more than two years after it accrued. The ststute of
limitations under Ohio law fir actions brought puruant to 42
U.S.C. 1983 is two years. Ohio Revised Code 2305.10.
Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F. 2d 989 (6 Cir. 1989)(en
banc).

Plaintiff claims the statute was toiled during the
period she was confined at Twin Valley, March 13-Apmil5,
2001. This Court believes she misinterpreted Ohio Revised
Code 2305.16. She was confined there for an evaluation of
her mental status and never found to have been of unsound
mind. In fact, as one of the Defendants pointed out, if
Plaintiff could obtain the benefit of 2305.16 by claiming to
have been of unsound mind, she would thereby be admitting
that there was some basis for having her detained for
evaluation, whereas her theory throughout seems to be that
the mental illness claims were trumped up in retaliation for
her whistle-blowing activities.

Sheriff Hayes’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Because the 1983 claim is barred by the statute of limitations,
the, the Complaint will be dismissed as to Sheriff Hayes with
prejudice

6.Defendants Samaritan Behavioral Health and Lori
Marcellino’s Motion for Sum:aary Judgment (Doc. No.
75).

Defendants Samaritan Behavioral Health., and Dr.
Lori Marcellino seek summary judgment on the basis of the

statute of limitations. Since any causes of actions against
53

The Pending Motions

them accrued at the same time as the claims against Sheriff
Hayes, they are entitled to judgment on the same basis.

7.Defendants Mark Vosler and Harold Ferguson’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 76).

Defendants Mark Vosler and Harold Ferguson also
seek dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations.
Since any causes of action against them accrued at the same
time as the claims against Sheriff Hayes, they are entitled to
judgment on the same basis.

8.Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 60).

Plaintiff has moved to amend the Complaint, but the
proposed amended complaint merely adds dozens of new
Defendants without adding any allegations against the
existing Defendants which would permit the case to survive
a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The Motion
to Amend is DENIED.

Defendant Preble County Youth Foundation, Inc., has
filed answer) Doc. No. 25) raising, interalia, the defenses that
the Complaint does not state a claim against it and that any
1983 claims would be barred by the statute of limitations.
While this Defendant has not moved to dismiss of for
summary judgment, it is entitled to summary judgment on
the basis of the statute of limitations which the Court hereby
GRANTS, sue sponte.

Because this Decision and Order will result in a final

judgment, the City of Eaton’s Motion under Rule 54 (Doc.
No. 69) is MOOT.

54

_ The Pending Motions

All three causes of action pled by Plaintiff
purportedly under 42 U.S.C.1983 and all such claims are
being dismissed with prejudice. However, Plaintiff did advert
to supplemental jurisdiction and has claimed defamation,
albeit not in a separate claim for relief. Generally, if federal
claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be
dismissed as well. Landefeld v. Marion General Hospital,
Inc., 994 F. 2d 1178, 1182 (6" Cir. 1993); Taylor v. First of
America Bank-Wayne, 973 F. 2d 1284 (6" Cir. 1992);
Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F. 2d 1331, 1338 (6™ Cir. 1992). Any
state law claims made by Plaintiff shall be dismissed without
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. 1367.

Conclusion

The Clerk shall enter judgment against the Plaintiff
and in favor of the Defendants, dismissing the Complaint
without prejudice as to Defendants Twin Valley
Psychiatric/Behavioral Healthcare, Parker-Hannifin, Wayne
Pinkstaff, and Jenny Haddux and with prejudice as to
Defendants Wilfred Dues, George Gounaris, Dan Foley,
Michael Holz, City of Eaton, Leslie Renner, Phillip Romeo,
Dave Daily, John Petry, Pat Talor, Rebecca Ferguson, Preble
County Medical Center, Christopher Washington, Tom
Hayes, Samaritan Behavioral Health, Inc., Lori Marcellino,
Mark Vosler, Harold Allen Ferguson, and Preble County
Youth Foundation, Inc.

November 28, 2003.

S/Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

55

ORDERS ON MOTIONS

U.S. DISTRICT COURT [Live]
LIVE- U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio

Notice of Electronic Filing
The following transactions was received: from mm1l, on

11/28/2003 at 1:41 PM ES; from ghl, entered at 2:49 PM
EST and filed on 11/28/2003

Case Name: Acton v. City of Eaton, Ohio et al
Case Number: 3:03-cv-116
Filer:

Document Number: 87

Docket Text:

Notation ORDER finding as moot [86] Motion for Judgment
as a Matter of Law, by Judge Michael R. Merz on
11/28/2003. (mm1); ORDER granting [51] Motion to
Dismiss, denying [51] Motion for More Definite Statement,
denying [60} Motion to Amend/Correct, denying as moot
- [61] Motion for Summary Judgment, denying as moot [63]
Motion for Summary Judgment, granting [64] Motion for
Summary Judgment, finding as moot [69] Motion for Order
to, granting [72] Motion to Dismiss, granting [73] Motion to
Dismiss, granting [75] Motion for Summary Judgment,
granting [76] Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by
Judge Michael R. Merz on 11/28/2003. (gh1,)

The following document(s) are associated with this
transaction:

Document description: Main Document
Original filename: n/a

56

ORDERS ON MOTIONS

Electronic document Stamp:
{STAMPdcecfStamp_ID1040326259[Date=1 1/28/2003][File
Number=859350][1£823c28361a9792 1 cdfd2c985ac67f7bf8c
dc743c480bcb3f5 144984 fc57adSafbl8b1 832833 lcace8d947e
34d4c4£3 db6ef5£6c87744625324acc7£84051]]

3:03-cv-116 Notice will be electronically mailed to:

Gray W Bennett graybennett@wol.rr.com,

Christopher William Carrigg ccarrigg@ffalaw.com

Mark Robert Chilson mchilson@yandalaw.com

Karen Morrison Clark kemclark@infinet.com,

Robert Forrest Cowdrey rfcowdrey@shsedayton.com,

Neil Frank Freund adetmer@ffalaw.com

Daniel F Getty dgetty@ffalaw.com,

Vaseen S Hadi vhadi@ffalaw.com

John Francis Haviland
jfh@bgllaw.com,DAL@BGLLAW.COM,

Sruce G. Hearey _ bhearey@spiethbel!.com
John Fredrick Krumholtz krumholtzj@mcohio.org

Allison McCallum
amccallum@spiethbell.com,: mstaton@spiethbell.com

Mark L. Schumacher mschumac@ffalaw.com

57

ORDERS ON MOTIONS
3:03-cv-116 Notice will not be electronically mailed to:
Stephanie S. Acton

3045 US Route 35 West
Eaton, Ohio 45320

58

APPENDIX D
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
STEPHANIE S.ACTON Case No. C-3-03-116
Plaintiff Magistrate Judge
Michael R. Merz
Vs.
THE CITY OF EATON, OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME 7

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Request of
Extension of Time (Doc. No. 80) which appears to seek
additional time for Defendants to produce medical or other
records to Mark Schumacher in response to his requests for
those documents under authorizations for release signed by
Plaintiff. Assuming that is indeed the relief requested by
Plaintiff, it is GRANTED. This extension does not affect any
of the pending motions to dismiss or for summary judgment
as Plaintiff has not requested additional time to respond to
those motions.

October 9, 2003

S/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

59

ORDERS ON MOTIONS

U. S. District Court [Live]
LIVE- U. S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was received from ghl, entered on
10/9/2003 at 5:00 PM EDT and filed on 10/9/2003

Case Name: Acton v. City of Eaton. Ohio. Et al
Case Number: 3:03-cv-116
Filer:

Document Number: 81

Docket Text: ORDER granting [80] Motion for Extension of
Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge Michael R.
Merz on 10/09/03. (gh1)

The following document(s) are associated with this
transaction:

_ Document description: Main Document
Original filename: n/a
Electronic document Stamp:
[STAMP dcecfStamp_ ID=1040326259[Date=10/9/2003]
[FileNumber=3963 1-0]
[066b88dbbb589 1 dS2cbcS0663 88 fcabl899a84c694ebcb3e65
£429 1488673999 1821 44afc89e62afS5ED5S8425BD86229E777
1478BBC66F9FDA14493E3A774EBS5]]

3:03-CV-116 Notice will be electronically mailed to:
Christopher William Carrigg ccarrigg@ffalaw.com

Mark Robert Chilson mchilson@yandalaw.com

60

ORDERS ON MOTIONS CONTINUED

Karen Morrison Clark kemclark@infinet.com

Robert Forrest Cowdrey rfcowdrey@shsedayton.com

Neil Frank Freund - adetmer@ffalaw.com

Daniel F Getty dgetty@ffalaw.com

Vaseen S Hadi vhadi@ffalaw.com

John Francis Haviland jfh@Begllaw.com

Bruce G Heary bhearey@spiethbell.com

John Frederick Krumholtz krumholtzji@mcohio.org

Allison McCallum amccallum@spiethbell.com,
mstaton@spiethbell.com

Mark L. Schumacher mschumac@ ffalaw.com

3:03-cv-116 Notice will not be electronically mailed to:

Stephanie Acton
3045 US Route 35 West
Eaton, Ohio 45320 *

Gray W Bennett
Bennett & Bennett
200 West Main Street
Eaton, Ohio 45320

APPENDIX E
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
MOLEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 3
(in part )

A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF
JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY

A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a
judge take precedence over all the judge’s other
activities, The judge’s judicial duties include all the
duties of the judge’s office prescribed by law. In the
performance of these duties, the following standards

apply.
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters
assigned to the judge except those in which
disqualification is required.

(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence in it.A
judge shall not be swayed by partisan
interests, public clamor or fear of criticism.

62

Canon 3 Continued
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities

(5) A judge shall perform judicial
duties without bias or prejudice. A
judge shall not, in the performance of
judicial duties, by words or conduct
manifest bias or prejudice, including
but not limited to bias or prejudice
based upon race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation or socioeconomic status,
and shall not permit staff, court
officials and others subject to the
judge’s direction and control to do so.

Commentary: “. .. A judge must be alert to avoid behavior
that may be perceived as prejudicial.”

(6) A judge shall require lawyers in
proceedings before the judge to refrain
from manifesting, by words or
conduci, bias or prejudice based upon
race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or
socio-economic status, against parties,
witnesses, counsel or others. This
Section 3B(6) goes not preclude
legitimate advocacy when race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability,
age, sexual orientation socioeconomic
status, or other similar factors, are
issues in the proceeding.

63

Canon 3 Continued

(7) A judge shall accord to every
person who has a legal interest in a
proceeding, or that person’s lawyer,
the right to be heard according to
law...

D. Disciplinary Responsibilities.

(1) A judge who receives information
indicating a substantial likelihood that
another judge has committed a violation
of this Code should take appropriate »
action. A judge having knowledge that
another judge has committed a violation
of this Code that raises a substantial
question as to the other judge’s fitness
for office shall inform the appropriate
authority.

(2) A judge who receives information
indicating a substantial likelihood
that a lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct [substitute correct title if
the applicable rules of lawyer
conduct have a different title] should
take appropriate action. A judge
having knowledge that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct [substitute
correct title if the applicable rules of
lawyer conduct have a different title]
that raises a substantial question as
to the lawyer’s honesty,

64

Canon 3 Continued

E. Disqualification

trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects shall
inform the appropriate
authority.

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to
instances where:

(a) the judge has a personal bias

or prejudice concerning a party
or a party’s lawyer, or personal
knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding;

65

APPENDIX F

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(in part )
Rule 3.6 Trial Publicity

(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated
in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall
not make an extrajudicial statement that the
lawyer knows or reasonable should know will be
disseminated by means of public communication
and will have a _ substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding
in the matter.

Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

(f) “.. ., refrain from making extrajudicial comments
that have a substantial likelihood of. heightening
public condemnation of the accused and exercise
reasonable care to prevent investigators, law
enforcement personnel, employees or other persons
assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a
criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement
that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making
under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.

66

APPENDIX G
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
V. Depositions and Discovery> Rule 34

Rule 34. Production of Documents and Things and
Enrty upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes

(a) Scope.

Any party may serve on any other party a request (1)
to produce and permit the party making the request,
or someone acting on the requestor’s behalf, to
inspect and copy, any designated documents
(including writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, phone records, and other data
compilation.

(b) Procedure.

The request shall set forth, either by individual item
or by category, the items to be inspected, and describe
each with reasonable particularitSy. The request shall
specify a reasonable time, place, manner of making
the inspection and performing the related acts.
Without leave of court or written stipulation, a
request may not be served before the time.specified in
Rule 26(d).tions from which information can be
obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent
through detection devices into reasonably usable
form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any
tangible things which constitute or contain matters
within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the
possession, custody or control of the party upon
whom the request is served; or (2) to permit enrty
upon whom the request is served for the purpose of
inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing,
testing, or sampling the property or any designed
object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule
26 (b).

67

The party upon whom the request is served shall
serve a written response within 30 days after the
service of the request. A shorter or longer time may
be directed by the court or, in the absence of such an
order, agreed to in writing by the parties, subject to
Rule 29. The response shall state, with respect to each
item or category, that inspection and related activities
will be permitted as requested, unless the request is
objected to, in which event the reasons for the
objection shall be specified and inspection permitted
of the remaining parts. The party submitting the
request may move for an order under Rule 37.

68

APPENDIX H
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
V. Depositions and Discovery> Rule 37.

Rule 37 Failure to Make or Cooperate in Discovery;
Sanctions.

(a) Motion for Order Compelling Disclosure or
Discovery.

A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and

all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order

compelling disclosure or discovery as follows:

(1) Appropriate Court.

An application for an order to a partSy shall
be made to the court in which the action is
pending. An application for an order to a
person whom is not a party shall be made to
the court in the district where the discovery is
being, or is to be, taken.

(2) Motion.

(a) If a party fails to make a disclosure
required by Rule 26 (a), any other
party may move to compel disclosure
and for appropriate sanctions. The
motion must include a certificate that
the movant has in good faith conferred
or attempted to confer with the party
not making the disclosure in an effort
to secure the disclosure without court
action.

(b) If a deponent fails to answer a question
propounded or submitted under Rules
30 or 31, or a corporation or other
entity fails to make a designation

69

under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a
party fails to answer an interrogatory
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party,
in response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, fails to
respond that inspection. will be
permitted as requested or fails to
permit inspection as requested, the
discovering party may move for an
order compelling answer, or a
designation, or an order compelling
inspection in accordance with the
request. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in
good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with the person or party failing
to make the discovery in an effort to
secure information or material without
court action. When taking a deposition
on oral examination, the proponent of
the question may complete or adjourn
the examination before applying for an
order.u

70

Section

5122.11

5122.12
5122.13
5122.14

5122.14]

5122.15

5122.16
5122.17
5122.18
3122.19

APPENDIX I
OHIO REVISED CODE
CHAPTER 5122
Hospitalization of Mentally Ill

Judicial Hospitalization

Judicial hospitalization; affidavit; temporary
detention order.

Notice of hearing

Investigation by court

Pre-hearing medical examination

Hearing to determine if person is mentally ill
subject to hospitalization; continuance;
discharge; interim order; waiver of hearing.

Full hearing; ninety-day order; disposition of
respondent

Hospitalization to federal facility

Temporary detention

Notice of hospitalization

Medical examination after admission

71

5122.11 Judicial hospitalization; affidavit; temporary
detention order

Proceedings for the hospitalization—of a person
pursuant to sections 5122.11 to 5122.15 of the ORC shall be
commenced by the filing of an affidavit in the manner and
form prescribed by the department of mental health, by any
person or persons with the court, either on reliable
information or actual knowledge, whichever is determined to
be proper by the court. This section does not apply to the
hospitalization of a person pursuant to section 2945.39,
2945.40, 2945.401, or 2945.402 of the ORC.

The affidavit shall contain an allegation setting forth
the specific category or categories under division (B) of
section 5122.01 of the ORC upon which the jurisdiction of
the court is based and a statement of alleged facts sufficient
to indicate probable cause to believe that the person is a
mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order.
The affidavit may require that the affidavit be accompanied,
by a certificate of a psychiatrist, or a certificate signed by a
licensed clinical psychologist and a certificate signed by a
licensed physician stating that the person who issued the
certificate has examined the person and is of the opinion that
the person is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization
by court order, or shall be accompanied by a written
statement by the applicant, under oath, that the person has
refused to submit to an examination by a psychiatrist, or by a
licensed clinical psychologist and a licensed physician.

Upon receipt of the affidavit, if a judge of he court or
a referee who is an attorney at law appointed by the court has
probable cause to believe that the person named in the
affidavit is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by
court order, the judge or referee may issue a temporary order
of detention ordering any health or police officer or sheriff to
take into custody and transport the person to a hospital or
other place designated in section 5122.17 of the ORC, or may
set the matter for further hearing.

72

5122.11 Continued (in part)

The person may be observed and treated until the
hearing provided for in section 5122.141 of the ORC. If no
such hearing is held, the person may be observed and treated
until the hearing provided for in section 5122.15 of the ORC.

Constitutional issues

1. In an involuntary civil commitment proceeding
undertaken pursuant to ORC 5122.15, the due process clause
of the US Constitution Amendment 14, requires that
individuals subject to such proceedings be advised of their
right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they
are unable to afford counsel that counsel will be appointed
for them at public expense; if such individuals are incapable,
at the time, of understanding their right to counsel in such
proceedings, the probate court shall appoint counsel to
represent each indigent person who is alleged to be mentally
ill; such right to be represented by counsel must be made
available at the earliest stage of the proceedings
commensurate with the individual’s need for a timely
preparation of a defense or advancement of an argument for
alternative modes of treatment, preferably upon the filing of
an affidavit in probate court under ORC 5122.11. In re Fisher
(Ohio 1974) 39 Ohio St.2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851, 68 O.0.2d
43.

5122.12 Notice of hearing (in part)

After receipt of the affidavit required by section
5122.11 of the ORC, the court shall cause written notice by
mail or otherwise of any hearing as the court directs to be
given to the following persons:

(A) The Respondent;
73

(B) The respondent’s legal guardian,

if any, the respondent’s spouse,
if any, and the respondent’s
parents, if the respondent is a
minor, if these persons’
addresses are known to the court
or can be obtained through
exercise of reasonable diligence;

(C) The person who filed the

affidavit;

(D) Any one person designated by

the respondent; but if the
respondent. does not make a
selection, the notice shall be sent
to the adult next of kin other
than the person who filed the
affidavit if that person’s address
is known to the court or can be
obtained through exercise of
reasonable diligence;

(E) The respondent’s counsel;
(F) The director, chief clinical

officer, or the respective
designee of the hospital, board,
agency, or facility to which the
person has been committed;

(G) The board of alcohol, drug

addiction, and mental health
services serving the respondent’s
county of residence or an agency
the board designates.

Any person entitled to notice under this section, with
exception of the respondent, may waive the notice.

A copy of the affidavit and the temporary order of
detention shall be served with the notice to the parties and to
the respondent’s counsel, if counsel has been appointed or

74

5122.14 Pre-hearing medical examination (in part)

Immediately after the acceptance of an affidavit
required under section 5122.11 of the ORC, the court may
appoint a psychiatrist, or a licensed clinical psychologist and
a licensed physician to examine the respondent, and at the
first hearing held pursuant to 5122.141 of the ORC, such a
psychiatrist, or licensed psychologist and licensed physician,
shall report to the court his findings as to the mental
condition of respondent, and his need for custody, care, or
treatment in a mental hospital. The court may accept as
evidence the written report of a psychiatrist, or the written
report of a licensed clinical psychologist and a licensed
physician, designated by the board of alcohol, drug addiction,
and mental health services as the report and findings referred
to in this section.

The examination, if possible, shall be held at a
hospital or other medical facility, at the home of the
respondent, or at any suitable place least likely to have a
harmful effect on the respondent’s health.

The court shall prior to a hearing under section
5122.141 or 5122.15 of the ORC release a copy of the report
to the respondent’s counsel.

5122.141 Hearing to determine if a person is
mentally ill subject to hospitalization; continuance;
discharge; interim order; waiver of hearing

(A) A respondent who is involuntarily placed in a
hospital or other place as designated in section
5122.10 or 5122.17 of the ORC, or with respect to
whom proceedings have been instituted under section
5122.11 of the ORC, shall be afforded a hearing to
determine whether or not the respondent is a mentally
ill person subject to hospitalization by court order.

75

The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to section
5122.15 of the ORC.

(B) The hearing shall be conducted within five court days
from the day on which the respondent is detained or
an affidavit is filed, whichever occurs first, in a
physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on
the respondent, and may be conducted in a hospital in
or out of the county. On the motion of the
respondent, his counsel, the chief clinical office, or
on its own motion, and for good cause shown, the
court may order a continuance of the hearing. The -
continuance may be for no more than ten days from
the day on which the respondent is detained or on
which an affidavit is filed, whichever occurs first.
Failure to conduct the hearing within this time shall
affect an immediate discharge of the respondent. If
the proceedings are not reinstituted within thirty
days, all records of the proceedings shall be
expunged.

(C) If the court does not find that the respondent is a
mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court
order, it shall order his immediate discharge, and
shall expunge all record of the proceedings during
this period.

76

APPENDIX J

Miscellaneous Labor Provisions
(in part)
Section 4113.52 Employee to report violations of state
or federal law: retaliatory conduct
prohibited.

(A)(1)(a) if an employee becomes aware in the course of
his employment of a violation of any state or federal
statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political
subdivision that his employer has authority to correct,
and the employee reasonably believes that the violation
either is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an
imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to
public health or safety or is a felony, the employee orally
shall notify his supervisor or other responsible officer of
his employer of the violation and subsequently shall file
with that supervisor or officer a written report that
provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the
violation. If the employer does not correct the violation or
make a reasonable and good faith effort to correct the
violation within twenty-four hours after the oral
notification or the receipt of the report, whichever is
earlier, the employee may file a written report that
provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the
violation with the prosecuting authority of the county or
municipal corporation where the violation occurred, with
a peace officer, with the inspector general if the violation
is within his jurisdiction, or with any other appropriate
public official or agency that has regulatory authority
over the employer and the industry, trade, or business in
which he is engaged.

77

(b) If an employee makes a report under division
(A)(1)(a) of this section, the employer, within twenty-
four hours after the oral notification was made or the
report was received or by the close of business on the
next regular business day following the day on which the
oral notification was made or the report was received,
whichever is later, shall notify the employee, in writing,
of any effort of the employer to correct the alleged
violation or hazard or of the absence of the alleged
violation nor hazard.

(3) If an employee becomes aware in the
course of his employment of a violation of
Chapter 3704., 3734.,6109., or 6111. of
the Revised Code that is a criminal
offense, the employee directly may notify,
either orally or in writing, any appropriate
public official or agency that has
regulatory authority over the employer and
the industry, trade, or business in which he
is engaged.

(B) Except as otherwise provided in division (C) of this
section, no employer shall take any disciplinary action
against an employee for making any report authorized by
division (A)(1) or (2) of this section, or as a result of the
employee’s having made any inquiry or taken any other
action to ensure the accuracy of any information reported
under either such division. No employer shall take any
disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee for
making any report authorized by division (A)(3) if this
section if the employee made a reasonable and good faith
effort to determine the accuracy of any information so
reported, or as a result of the employee’s having made any
inquiry or taken any other action to ensure the accuracy of
any information reported under that division. For the
purposes of this division, disciplinary or retaliatory action by
the employer includes, without limitation, doing any of the
following:
78

(1) Removing or suspending the employee from
employment;

(2) Withholding from employee salary increases or
employee benefits to which the employee is
otherwise entitled; |

(3) Transferring or reassigning the employee;

(4) Denying the employee a _ promotion _ that
otherwise would have been received;

(5) Reducing the employee in pay or position

(D) An employee shal] make a reasonable and good faith »
effort to determine the accuracy of any information reported
under division (A)(1) or (2) of this section. If the employee
who makes a report under either division fails to make such
an effort, he may be subject to disciplinary action by his
employer, including suspension or removal, for reporting
information without a reasonable basis to do so under
division (A)(1) or (2) of this section.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1671%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.