# Opposition Brief — Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 544 U.S. 975

## Text

7

No. 04-1072

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RAYMOND ABRAMS, NICOLE BE SILBERKLEIT,
JANET HERMAN, LILY REDNER, BERNARD CARON,
ERNEST HAAR, HARRY CYBULSKI, YVONNE LITMAN,
CASSANDRA KIRBY CONAHAY FREUND, JEAN-JACQUES
FRAENKEL, LILIANE LICHTENSTEIN

and MARIE WEINRAUCH,
Petitioners,

v:
SOCIETE NATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER FRANCAIS,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD*

LinDA J. SILBERMAN
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
(212) 998-6208

* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Respondents

193083 ce

COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 * (800) 359-6859

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Does immunity from suit in United States courts
conferred on instrumentalities of a foreign state by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 apply to claims
based on conduct prior to passage of the Act?

ii
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6

Respondent Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer
Francais (SNCF) is a corporation formed under the Laws of
France, with the task of operating the French railway and
associated facilities. All of the stock of SNCF is owned by
the French Republic.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...........0--2000:.

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6 ......

pi Re eo bk i. 3 > i erie

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............

77 was a 6 Oy” » Rea a ee

ere ae ee eee

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................

ee eee ee ee ee eee

I.

Il.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
APPLIED THE ALTMANN DECISION TO

0 Oe rT er re reer ee

A. This Court’s Decision Left No Room for
Misund@standing .................

B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied
the Judgment in A/tmann to the Present
a ee eer Pere

THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR
PETITIONERS’ ATTEMPT TO INVOKE
THE LANDGRAF PRESUMPTION
AGAINST RETROACTIVITY TO REVIVE
per erre ree eee ee ee

10

iv

Contents

Ill. PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATION THAT
THEIR REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
ARE FRUSTRATED BY “RETROACTIVE
IMMUNIZATION” OF RESPONDENT
IS BASED ON A_ SERIES’ OF
ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS. ...........

Be 8 Per ei rer re ree rrr y
APPENDIX — LETTER FROM STATE AND

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO COURT OF
APPEALS DATED AUGUST 10, 2004 ........

Page

13

15

a ee ee ee

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases:
Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de
Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173 (2003) ........ 11, 13, 14
Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de
Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2004)
PPT TPE CREE et rrr rrr re eo At te
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corporation, 488 U.S. 428 (1989) ............ 8
Berizzi Brothers Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562
th) a eer rrrr rr ero ys rr yor rare 14
Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima,
S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938) ...... 14
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003)
PPE rer ee re hey Se 7, 8, 10, 11
Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) .. 14
Filartiga v. Peta-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
SOOU) oihinas3ceens sae eee 13
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677,
124 S. Ct. 2240 (June 7, 2004) ............. passim

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244
(ie: Eee ee ee eee eer T 4,10, 11, 12

vi

Cited Authorities
Page
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945)
6 0 0s 6 0.0-6:5.0:5'5 6 55-0 0-k eee we ee 14
Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v.

Abrams, 541 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14,

Fo) re 3, 4, 5, 8,9
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) ... 13
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774

(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003

CESGS) os vanced endabuaduau ee eeee eee 13
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.

GRO CIWS) onc csbiceeaeess see 7,14
Statutes:

40 UBS. § 1GGS 6c énaee settee eee l
20 USL. 2000 ii.inkas tence l

26 U.S.C. § HOGG ons isa sn eecsasneesee 5

l

STATUTE INVOLVED

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
U.S. Code, Title 28
(Excerpts)

§ 1602. Findings and declaration of purpose

The Congress finds that the determination by
United States courts of the claims of foreign states
to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts
would serve the interests of justice and would
protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in United States courts. Under
international law, states are not immune from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their
commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the
satisfaction of judgments rendered against them
in connection with their commercial activities.
Claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the
principles set forth in this chapter.

§ 1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter—
(a) A “foreign state”, except as used in section
1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision

of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).

2

(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state” means any entity—

(1) which is a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise, and

(2) which is an organ of a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof,
and

(3) which is neither a citizen of a Sate
of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created

under the laws of any third country.

3

STATEMENT

This is the second time the present controversy is before
this Court. When the case came before the Court for the first
time on petition of the present Respondent, the Court held
up the petition pending decision in Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (June 7, 2004).
Following the decision in A/tmann, the Court granted the
petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of the decision in Altmann. Société
Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v. Abrams, 541 U.S.
__, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004).

Following briefing by both sides, as well as by the
U.S. government, the Court of Appeals held that it was bound
by the Court’s decision in A/tmann and directed the District
Court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de
Fer Frangais, 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2004). The present
petition is based on the assertion that the Court of Appeals
misunderstood this Court’s decision in Altmann and the
remand order in this case. There is no reason to believe that
the Court of Appeals misunderstood, and no justification for
this Court to take up the case again.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The Court of Appeals correctly followed this Court’s
instruction, based on the clear holding that the immunity of
a foreign sovereign under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act is determined as of the filing of the action, regardless of
the date of the conduct on which the action is based. There
is no dispute that Defendant SNCF was entitled to immunity

4

as of the date the action was filed, and there is no basis for
distinguishing for this purpose between the state itself and a
corporation directly owned by the state.

2. Petitioners’ attempt to invoke this Court’s analysis
in Landgraf v.USI Film Products to revive their action is
directly contrary to this Court’s judgment in A/tmann.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED
THE ALTMANN DECISION TO THIS CASE.

A. This Court’s Decision Left No Room for
Misunderstanding

In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124
S. Ct. 2240 (2004), plaintiffs sought to bring a claim for
expropriation for which immunity would not be granted under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Their claim
was based on conduct by the government of Austria in the
1940s, when immunity from suit would have been in effect.
In response to the plea by Austria that permitting the action
to go forward would be “impermissibly retroactive,” Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, pointed first to the preamble
of the Act:

“Claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States
and of the States in conformity with the principles
set forth in this chapter.” 28 U.S.C. 1602 (emphasis
by the Court).

541 U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2252.

|
|
|
|

5

While this passage might not be an express command,
the Court’s opinion continues, “this language is
unambiguous: Immunity ‘claims’ — not actions protected by
immunity, but assertions of immunity to suits arising from
those actions — are the relevant conduct regulated by the Act;
those claims are ‘henceforth’ to be decided by the courts.”
124 S Ct. at 2252-53. Further, the judgment accepts the
District Court’s suggestion that “Congress intended courts
to resolve ali such claims ‘in conformity with the principles
set forth’ in the Act regardless of when the underlying conduct
occurred.” 541 U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.

Abrams v. Société Nationale presents the reverse fact
pattern from Altmann v. Austria, where it was defendants
that sought to avoid the FSIA, because the exception to
immunity for claims of expropriation was not adopted until
passage of the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). In the present
case, it is plaintiffs who seek to avoid the FSIA, based on
their contention (which Respondent rejects') that prior to the
passage of the Act Defendant SNCF would not have been
entitled to immunity, whereas under the Act there is no doubt
that Defendant SNCF is immune. But there is nothing in the
Court’s opinion in Altmann that could lead anyone to
conclude that application of the FSIA “regardless of when
the underlying conduct occurred” pertains only to instances
where the legislation limits immunity, thereby expanding
jurisdiction, and not when the legislation confirms or expands
immunity, thereby restricting jurisdiction.

In response to the invitation of the Court of Appeals when
considering the remand, the State and Justice Departments
filed a letter brief setting forth their view that after A/tmann

1. See pp. 14-15, infra.

6

the FSIA applied whether it broadened or narrowed the
immunity that a foreign state or instrumentality had had prior

to passage of the Act:

The Court’s analysis in A/tmann does not admit
of a distinction between instances in which the
FSIA offers a narrower immunity than foreign
states historically enjoyed and those cases in
which the current foreign policy confers a broader
immunity for foreign states. The FSIA, the
Supreme Court held in A/tmann, represents the
political branches’ current determination that
certain classes of suits present sufficient risk of
interfering with the country’s international
relations that they should not be heard in the
United States’ courts. Nothing in Altmann
suggests that only Congress’s determination that
certain cases can proceed should be given
immediate effect, or that a court is free to set aside
Congress’s conclusion that other suits should not
be heard based on the court’s own view that the
Executive Branch would historically have allowed
those suits to go forward. Indeed, if anything,
courts should be more deferential to the FSIA’s
provisions reflecting a determination that certain
cases should not proceed. Ignoring that policy
judgment risks disrupting our relations with
foreign states in a manner the political branches
have sought to avoid?

2. Letter Brief dated August 10, 2004 from Appellate Staff, Civil

Decision, U.S. Department of Justice and Office of Legal Adviser,
U.S. Department of State, at p. 4. The complete letter is reproduced

as an Appendix to this Brief in Opposition.

=

7

| Petitioners seek to avoid this Court’s holding in A/tmann
by contending that the opinion did not reach government-
| owned corporations. The Court’s opinion in Altmann
expressly rejects the thrust of that contention — that some
provisions of the FSIA could be applied in a given case, others
not, pointing out that the Act’s overall structure “strongly
supports” the conclusion that all claims against foreign
sovereigns, as defined, are to be resolved in conformity with
the principles set forth in the Act:

Many of the Act’s provisions unquestionably
apply to cases arising out of conduct that occurred
before 1976. In Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538
U.S. 468, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643
(2003), for example, we held that whether an
entity qualifies as an “instrumentality” of a
“foreign state” for purposes of the FSIA’s grant
of immunity depends on the relationship between
the entity and the state at the time suit is brought
rather than when the conduct occurred. In
addition, Verlinden [B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480], which upheld against
constitutional challenge 28 U.S.C. § 1330's grant
of subject-matter jurisdiction, involved a dispute
over a contract that predated the Act.... And there
has never been any doubt that the Act’s procedural
provisions relating to venue, removal, execution, .
and attachment apply to all pending cases. Thus,
the FSIA’s preamble indicates that it applies
“henceforth,” and its body includes numerous
provisions that unquestionably apply to claims
based on pre-1976 conduct. In this context, it
would be anomalous to presume that an isolated
provision (such as the expropriation exception on

8

which respondent relies) is of purely prospective
application absent any statutory language to that
effect.

541 U.S. at, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.

The State/Justice brief unequivocally supports Respondent’s

position that the FSIA applies to all actions filed following

passage of the Act:

Altmann itself makes clear that the FSIA’s
definition of foreign states to encompass agencies
and instrumentalities of those states is, like the rest
of the Act, to be applied to all post-enactment cases.
Indeed, A/tmann’s analysis of the retroactivity issue
of the FSIA relied in significant respect on the
Court’s understanding of its holding the prior year
in Dole Food, which focused on the agency or
instrumentality provision. As the Court explained
in A/tmann, Dole Food “held that whether an entity
qualifies as an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign state
for purposes of the FSIA’s grant of immunity
depends on the relationship between the entity and
the state at the time suit is brought rather than when
the conduct occurred.” A/tmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.
The scope Congress gave to the definition of a
“foreign state” to include an “agency or
instrumentality” is, as much as the other immunity
provisions of the FSIA, a foreign policy judgment
as to the extent of “comity” we should extend to
foreign states.’

3. State/Justice Letter Brief, note 2 supra, p. 5. See also Argentine

Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 488 U.S. 428, 437-

38 (1989).

AO SDP» Srteet ang ®

bee wae at Hat

9

In short, any attempt to distinguish Abrams from Altmann
— either on the basis that one case involved opening and the
other involved closing the door to U.S. courts, or on the basis
that one case involved the state itself and the other a state
instrumentality — must fail, as the Court of Appeals clearly
understood.

B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied the
Judgment in A/tmann to the Present Case.

On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the inquiry it had initiated when the case
first came before it was no longer necessary or appropriate,
because the purpose of sovereign immunity, as this Court had
held, is not to help shape foreign states’ future conduct but to
“reflect ... current political realities and relationships.”
369 F.3d at 63, quoting from 541 U.S. at _, 124 S. Ct. at
2252.

As to plaintiffs’ argument that this Court’s holding in
Altmann should not bind the court in Abrams because SNCF
was a corporate entity and not a state at the time of the alleged
conduct, the Court of Appeals correctly said that this fact is
immaterial after A/tmann, 389 F.3d at 64.4 Though the Court of
Appeals was clearly unhappy with the instructions from this
Court, it made no mistake in applying them. The District Court
had dismissed the action on the basis of sovereign immunity,

4. The Court ofAppeals apparently believed that SNCF was a
non-governmental entity at the time of the alleged misconduct.
This statement is not correct. See the District Court’s opinion, 173
F. Supp. 2d 423 at 425-26. However, the Court of Appeals was correct
in stating that this allegation is immaterial. As the court said, “Once
the railroad is encompassed by the FSIA, its prior incarnation as a
private entity does not bar the statute’s retroactive application.” /d.

=

and the reversal and remand of that judgment by the Court of
Appeals had been reversed by this Court. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals recalled its mandate to the District Court and affirmed
that court’s dismissal of the actio..

The judgment of the Court of Appeals leaves no room,
and supplies no reason, for this Court to revisit the case.

Il. THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR PETITIONERS’
ATTEMPT TO INVOKE THE LANDGRAF
PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY TO
REVIVE THEIR CLAIM.

Faced with the clear statement in A/tmann that the
presumption against retroactivity “is just that — a
presumption”, 541 U.S. at __, 124. S. Ct at 2250, and that
the rationales supporting the presumption do not fit the
considerations governing foreign sovereign immunity, id. at
___, 124 S. Ct. at 2252, Petitioners seek to distinguish the
present case by contending that the Court in A/tmann focused
only on defendant’s expectations, not on those of the
plaintiffs.

In fact, this Court distinguished between reliance by
parties on settled rules in shaping their primary conduct, as
in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and
the considerations governing the grant of sovereign immunity,
both before and after passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. As the Court wrote, sovereign immunity
“reflects current political realities and relationships, and aims
to give foreign states and their instrumentalities some present
protection from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of
comity.” 124 S. Ct. at 2252, quoting from Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 at 479 (2003). Accordingly, it was

ee ee

11

more appropriate, absent contraindications, to defer to the
decisions of the political branches — namely, the policy
reflected in the FSIA — “than to presume that decision
inapplicable merely because it postdates the conduct in
question.” /d. In other words, foreign sovereign immunity is
not about expectations at all, but about a judgment, made by
Congress since 1976, concerning what entities qualify as
foreign sovereigns and what claims against foreign sovereigns
may be heard in United States courts.

The Second Circuit, which in its earlier decision had
relied on Landgraf to remand the case to the District Court,
Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais,
332 F.3d 173 at 180-86 (2003), understood clearly that it
had been reversed precisely on this issue. Quoting the
passages quoted above, the Court of Appeals wrote:

... the [Supreme] Court concluded that the
retroactivity analysis established in Landgraf .. . ,
and upon which this panel had relied, was
inappropriate. Further, the Supreme Court stated
that the Act’s preamble, as well as its overarching
thematic structure, indicated Congress’ design for
the Act to apply retroactively.

Appellants [Petitioners here] misapprehend the
Altmann holding by stating that it “turns upon the
fact that the foreign government enjoyed no settled
expectation in avoiding suit.”. .. The Supreme
Court stated, to the contrary, that reliance interests
are inapplicable in assessing the retroactivity of
sovereign immunity principles because immunity

12

simply “reflects current political realities and
relationships.”

389 F.3d at 63, 64.

There is, of course, -one difference between A/tmann and
the present case: In Altmann, the post-conduct legislation
created jurisdiction where there was none before, while in
the present case the post-conduct legislation bars jurisdiction
where (at least arguably) jurisdiction existed previously.
In this connection, it is worth noting that even the dissenters in
Altmann, who would have applied the presumption against
retroactivity in that case, made clear that a statute that operated
to foreclose jurisdiction of a lawsuit (including where it in fact
stripped previously existing jurisdiction from the courts) could
be applied “without fear of working any retroactive effect.”
124 S. Ct. at 2267 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Thus, it is clear that
all nine Justices of this Court agreed that nothing in the Landgraf
doctrine would preclude recognition of immunity under the FSIA
for an entity such as SNCF, regardless of the date of the conduct
on which the claims were based.

There is no reason to revisit the relationship of the Landgraf
doctrine to the FSIA, and no reason to disturb the correct
disposition of this case by the Court of Appeals in accordance
with this Court’s instructions.

13

If. PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATION THAT THEIR REA-
SONABLE EXPECTATIONS ARE FRUSTRATED
BY “RETROACTIVE IMMUNIZATION” OF
RESPONDENT IS BASED ON A SERIES OF
ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS.

1. The assertion that plaintiffs in the 1940s had the
expectation of being able to sue a corporation owned by the
government of France in a United States court is inherently
incredible. Indeed, the fact is that not until well after passage of
the FSIA did some courts in the United States consider that
they had jurisdiction over the kind of claim attempted in this
case. Compare Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). See also
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, esp. 2761-66 (2004).

2. The assertion (Petition p. 5) that discovery in this case
“clearly indicated” that SNCF had no immunity prior to
enactment of the FSIA is false. No such outcome appeared
in the discovery process, which was halted by the Magistrate
Judge following this Court’s decision in A/tmann.°

5. The Court ofAppeals directed the District Court to develop
a record on which the Court could base a determination whether
plaintiffs legitimately could have expected to litigate their claims in
the United States, 332 F.3d at 187-88. On remand, the District Court
wrote to the State Department to see if it could provide any
information relevant to this factual inquiry. Eventually, a reply from
an attorney at the Civil Division of the Justice Department
“respectfully declined” the invitation to participate in the inquiry, at
least until the Supreme Court decided the A/tmann case and acted on
the petition for certiorari filed by the present Respondent and then
pending. Other aspects of discovery probed SNCF’s charters and
personnel at different times, but no evidence emerged to establish
that a claim for immunity by SNCF would have been denied prior to
passage of the Act.

4
’

;

3

4

:

: ‘

14

3. Petitioners’ entire case depends on the assertion that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 closed a door
io their claims that had previously been open. That assertion
runs up against the well-known fact that until 1952 the United
States followed the doctrine of absolute immunity for foreign
states, i.e., the doctrine that made no distinction between
claims arising out of commercial activity and claims arising
out of government activity. See, for a concise summary,
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 at
486-88 (1983). Notwithstanding some resistance in lower
U.S. courts and abandonment of the absolute theory of
immunity in many other countries (but not the United
Kingdom and states following the British model), this Court
several times reaffirmed the doctrine in controversies arising
out of commercial activities conducted by ships or other
government-owned entities. See Berizzi Brothers Co. v.
The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Compania Espanola
de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74
(1938) (dictum); Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578
(1943).

The Court of Appeals in the present case acknowledged
this fact, and also understood that courts in the United States
uniformly granted immunity whenever the State Department
made a suggestion to that effect. 332 F.3d at 176, 187. There
were a few instances in which the State Department did not
“recognize and allow” a claim of immunity, typically when
there was doubt about the ownership or possession of a vessel
for which immunity was claimed. See, e.g., Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). The most that could
have been said about the immunity of a state-owned
corporation prior to 1952 was that one could not always be
sure what position the State Department would take.

15

It was the possibility that the State Department might
not have “recognized and allowed” a claim of immunity that
led the Court of Appeals in the present case to vacate the
decision of the District Court and order discovery concerning
the State Department’s view at the relevant time, an inquiry
subsequently rejected in A/tmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2254. There
certainly could have been no settled expectations on the part
of Petitioners that they could have obtained jurisdiction over
SNCF on the present claims in United States courts, and to
speak of “retroactive immunization” (Petition p. 14) is well
wide of the mark.

CONCLUSION

The petition presents no open issue calling for Supreme
Court resolution, and no error by the Court of Appeals that
calls for correction by this Court. The petition should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD*
Linpa J. SILBERMAN

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
(212) 998-6208

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

|

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1375%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.