# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 544 U.S. 1018

## Text

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12

I. The Ninth Circuit misconstrued the meaning of
RCRA’s statutory definition of “solid waste” ... 14

II. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling seriously erodes RCRA’s
effectiveness in protecting human health and the
environment ........-:0eeee cece eee eee teeees 20

Ill. The Ninth Circuit's ruling conflicts with the rulings

of other federal courts of appeals that have construed
the same statutory language ..........-++-+-+-: 25

IV. Review by this Court of the legal issue presented by
this case is warranted now 28

CR 8 ccc ccscanncceduns cevedeveduewres

Appendices ...........eeeeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeees

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
American Mining Congress v. EPA,
SOR 2G TA77 COA. CAR, TG) aicescccsccnesenisansccnanssenacs 21, 27, 28
American Mining Congress v. EPA,
SOT FA BETS CA. Ce, TG) scsresnssccccessrncsntnsssnancss 26, 28
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,
FOS FG TEP CK, COR, TID cetetninsccnciciconsctnsnsenesitsnsetins 26
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,
See Fe re Ras (AE, TIPU Hsrinieitisctniianensninaincnnnsitnianniit 25
Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA,
Be SG TOG CK. Ga, TI seerctccnescsesnstncensinsesionns 28
Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) ...... 8, 29
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,
A CF TRO CUD scereinntstsnsininitnsiitnisinesscnihiciciinisnnidinaiecanatan 3

of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,

CS FER CRIED. cnssenslinitpusinitnentnnteceicincineannssiianieadiaatiosee 30
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,
OE Aas SND CUA ccciinsitnnsntiistnistifaitnsisttinnabincnisimcsbaniatsniniiaiinn 3, 4
Comite Pro Rescate de la Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct
& Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1989) ............ 20, 22
Connecticut Coastal Fisherman’s Ass’n v. Remington
Arms, 909 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1995) ............c.cecsssscsese 19, 21
Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air pace,
Management Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) oe eeeeeeeees
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
FF SEB: Re CFSE tictecinitaiiisencsindpvntsaiacnideenbannsnstentbities 30

(iv)

Cases (continued):

Meghrig v. KFC Western, 516 U.S. 479 (1996) ..........00+ 3
Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass’n,

96 PDE GBT CIO TIED ssceicsecnacsenssncesasiseisasiiascnsingsnasicnes 24
Owen Electric Steel Co. of South Carolina v. Browner,

ST BSE TOG COU CBr. TOG) wccscscscscsnssnancesincscstnaneaninstnansas 26
Safe Food & Fertilizer v. EPA,

SEO FSG TAGS COL. Ces, MID) carcensienssriccssenssnnsnnsosnmnsntisn 28
United States v. ILCO, Inc.,

DOG BD TUDG C11 Cae, TTD) ascscdcicscccssiscesiescncnlaonisiapaas 25
United States v. Marine Shale Processors,

Si PSG USGS CK, Cie, DIGG) ccetesinteriniassieisinntiinscorinnasiat 26
United States v. Self,

2 FBG WATS CIO Clr. GTS) cecnteinsasccsinsascnsshinctiscsiabenih 27

Statutes and Regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et Se. ......scsessssereeres 3, 23, 24

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et Seq. ........ssccssssseseees 3,23

Idaho Smoke Management and Crop Residue Disposal

Act, Idaho Code §§ 22-4801 to 22-4804 000... eeeeseeeeees 15
Idaho Code § 22-4803(a) ............scsscsssscssssssssesssssseesess 15
Idaho Code § 22-4803A(6) ............scssssssssssssrssessessesees 24

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),

42 USC. § GFO1 6 B06, acccscrcsinsncosesssaseesciendescssnsnsoasonans passim
M2 USK § GID ssscctscrnsctscceen ccenicacpinciaiieiial 17
42 US, § CIGD) ncorasannuciiinratsivensnsincsiteviiiiiansmnicianiililaih 4

Statutes and Regulations (continued):

USC. (ORG .o Gi 2, 4, 23
€USC. $000 ieee 17
UG: COI scissile 5, 23
2 USC. § GRR ...nnnitsniieicdeee 23
@USC. § CUMS ob chiiniibel eas 23
UBL. CIE cccinisiecemnnnnn 7,10, 19, 21, 25
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) sesessssscccsscssssssssesessesssee 2, 7, 24
42 UBC. § QUOD sccictnicieicentnceglecne 24
CO CPR. 06 208.5 ere of the Ninth

‘4

effectively eliminating the statute’s application to
secondary materials susceptible to some, even fairly
nominal, recycling. The court below has, in practical
effect, created a gigantic loophole from regulation ina law
that, ironically, Congress intended to close the last
remaining loophole in environmental law. Not on! would
citizens lose the ability, as in this case, to use Section 7002
to challenge waste management activities that present
imminent and substantial endangerments to their health,
but RCRA’s entire hazardous waste program would be
seriously jeopardized.

1. For more than two decades, a central pillar of EPA’s
hazardous waste program under RCRA has been the
Agency’s 1985 rulemaking that the er ——
“solid waste” could be reasonably construed to include
many materials subject to recycling and therefore RCRA’s
strict management requirements could apply to related
recycling activities. See 50 Fed. Reg. 614 (1985); pages 5-6,
supra. If, as the Ninth Circuit ruled in this case, the plain
meaning of the statutory definition of “solid waste” does
not extend to materials subject to the kind of recycling
accomplished here, including burning for destruction,
burning as “fuel,” and burning to recover incidental
chemical constituents in residual ash, then EPA would
have no authority to construe that same _ statutory
language anywhere in RCRA, including its hazardous
waste program. The wide ranging kinds of recycled
materials and recycling activities that EPA has for two
decades concluded must be regulated as “hazardous
waste” to accomplish RCRA’s important objectives would

° American Mining Canen v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.,
989 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1993); 68 Fed. Reg. at 61561.

|

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instead necessarily fall outside the statute’s reach.”

2. Nor can this direct and far-reaching consequence of
the court's ruling be avoided on the ground that EPA has
made clear that its RCRA regulations construing “solid
waste” apply only to its hazardous waste program. See 40
C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(1); page 5, supra. To be sure, if EPA were
contending that the term “solid waste” somehow had a
broader meaning in the context of the hazardous waste
program than under the statute in general, such an
argument could be fairly made. But, it most certainly
cannot be fairly made where, as here, the reason for EPA’s
disclaimer in its hazardous waste regulations is its
opposite determination that the term “solid waste” should
have a narrower meaning in the hazardous waste context
than in the statute as a whole.” A plain meaning

EPA concluded that the definition of “solid waste” should include
most recycling activities because otherwise the Agency could not
effectuate congressional intent to protect the public from the health
and environmental threats presented by such activities. See 48 Fed.
Reg. 14472, 14473, 14502-505 (1983); 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 616-618 (1985).
To be sure, EPA did narrowly define some recycling activities, such as
closed loop industrial processes, as not warranting such regulation,
but the Agency’s general policy was one of regulatory inclusion in
seeking to define the kinds of recycling activities that were sufficiently
akin to disposal (such as burning as fuel and placement on land) as to
warrant heightened control. See page 5, supra. In justification of its
decision, EPA included in its rulemaking a lenis list of 67 hazardous
waste sites around the nation, many of w ich were then on the
Superfund National Priority List, that had been created by “recycling
activities.” 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 658 App. A (1985). Not surprisingly,
many of these sites contained wastes that had avoided early RCRA
regulation because industry had claimed that the materials involved
were not waste but instead “fuel” capable of being burned. Id. Indeed,
it was the desire to avoid more such Superfund sites that was largely
why EPA decided in 1985 that RCRA’s definition of “solid waste”
should extend to many recyclable materials, especially those involving
burning as fuel and placement on land. Id.

*! EPA chose to construe more narrowly the term “solid waste” as
— to its hazardous waste program in order to avoid unduly
chilling certain kinds of recycling activities that the Agency
determined did not present the degree of health and environmental
risks that warranted the full application of RCRA’s very stringent
requirements applicable to hazardous waste management. Comite Pro
Rescate de la Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 888
F.2d 180, 187 (1* Cir. 1989).

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construction of “solid waste,” like that adopted by the
Ninth Circuit below, that exempted virtually all recycled
materials and recycling activities, would necessarily bar
EPA from regulating such materials and activities under
its Subchapter C hazardous waste program. If they fall
outside the statutory definition of solid waste, they would
necessarily fall outside the regulatory definition.

3. Like the statutory language, the statutory structure
supports EPA’s decision. 1984, Congress amended
RCI to provide for oe ema of small en
_,. waste, which had previously been exempted.

42 US.C. § 6921(d). The new law required the EPA
Administrator to promulgate generator, transporter, and
treatment, storage and disposal requirements applicable to
such waste. Id. g 6921(d)(1). But, for the purposes of this
case, what is relevant is that Congress further provided
that such standards should likewise be “applicable to the
legitimate use, reuse, recycling, and reclamation of such
wastes ***.” Id. § 6921(d)(2). Congress, therefore, clearly
contemplated that the category of “solid wastes” would
extend to material being recycled. Congress understood
the health and environmental risks caused by these
activities and their close kinship to classic disposal
activities (see note 20, supra) and, accordingly, instructed
EPA to ensure that “such standards shall be sufficient to
protect human health and the environment.” Id.

4. Finally, there is no merit to the Ninth Circuit's
apparent belief (Pet. App. A19-A20n.16) that the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq., justifies the court’s crabbed
reading of RCRA. RCRA nowhere suggests that waste
management activities potentially subject to Clean Air Act
air emissions controls are exempt from RCRA regulation
as “solid wastes.” Indeed, when Congress wanted to create
just that type of exclusion, it did so narrowly and
expressly, as it did by excluding from the statutory
definition of solid waste “solid or dissolved material in
domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in
irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are
point sources subject to permits under [Section 402 of the
Clean Water Act].” 42 U.S.C § 6903(27). Absent such an
explicit exclusion, there is no room within RCRA’s plain

24

statutory terms to read into the Act a far more expansive
Clean Air Act exception, especially when RCRA’s driving
purpose was to eliminate statutory loopholes and gaps.
Indeed, RCRA 7002(a)(1)(B), the citizen suit provision
upon which petitioner relies in this case, is specifically
aimed at filling the very kind of statutory gap presented
here. Congress did not condition the right of a citizen to
bring a suit under Section 7002(a)(1)(B) on the threshold
showing of any violation of any specific requirement of a
federal environmental law, whether based in RCRA, the
Clean Air Act or any other law. Congress instead
deliberately created a catch-all provision designed to
provide judicial redress whenever an “imminent and
substantial endangerment to health” is presented by the
“handling, storage, treatment, transportation of any solid
or hazardous waste.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Congress
created this public health safety net without regard to the
precise environmental media (i.e., air, water, land) by
which the threat was conveyed in order to guard against
the possibility that statutory gaps and loopholes might
otherwise leave the public unprotected from serious
human health hazards from environmental contamination.
See Richard B. Skaff, Emergency Provisions in the
Environmental Protection Statutes: A Sipaiation fora Unified
Emergency Provision, 3 Harv. Envt’l L. Rev. 298, 300-303
(1979); H.R. Rep. No. 98-198, 98" Cong. 2d Sess. Pt 1, 47-49
(1984). It is, accordingly, no answer to the plain meaning
of RCRA, including Section 7002(a)(1)(B), to contend that
SAFE should look elsewhere for judicial redress.”

# Nor is the possibility of an action under state nuisance law a
reason to deny relief in this case. RCRA does not supplant state
nuisance law (42 U.S.C. § 6972(f)), but neither does state nuisance law
supplant RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B). There is particular reason,
moreover, not to do so in this case because of the tendency of many
States, including Idaho, to create statutory provisions that immunize
agricultural pone from common law nuisance lawsuits. Indeed, at
the behest of some respondents in this case, Idaho recently enacted a

state law effectively immunizing them from any possible state tort
nuisance or trespass action based on harm caused by open field
burning, no matter how severe the human health consequences. See
I.C. § 22-4803A(6). Not only do such legislative enactments raise
substantial constitutional concerns, in light of their negative impact on
both private property values and human health (see Moon v. North

25
Congress concluded differently.

III The Ninth Circuit’s ruling conflicts with the
rulings of other federal courts of appeals that
have construed the same statutory language

The Ninth Circuit’s extraordinary ruling that a
secondary material falls outside the statutory definition of
“solid waste,” even if 99.9 percent of the reason for its
destruction is to get rid of it, because the material's
destruction is “beneficial,” finds no support in any
decision of any other federal court of appeals. The divided
panel’s ruling, moreover, is indicative of growing
confusion in the courts of appeals concerning the meaning
of “solid waste” as applied to recycling under RCRA. That
this confusion could have produced an appellate ruling in
such defiance of RCRA’s plain meaning and overriding
purpose strongly counsels in favor of this Court's review.

1. Five other circuits have rejected the Ninth Circuit's
central view that “solid waste,” within the meaning of
RCRA, cannot extend to secondary materials when being
recycled so long as such recycling provides some economic
“benefits” to the recycler. They also all further refute the
extreme notion that material can be destroyed without
being “discarded” if it is beneficial to destroy material that
would otherwise be harmful. In sharp contrast to the
court below, they all share the essential premise of the
D.C. Circuit in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 216
F.3d 50, 57-58 (2000) that the “predominant purpose” in
handling material determines whether it is ‘discarded”
and therefore a RCRA “solid waste.”

In United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126 (1993), for
instance, the Eleventh Circuit held that lead parts
reclaimed from spent car and truck batteries for recycling
purposes constituted “solid waste,” notwithstanding their
potentially significant economic value. The court rejected
claims, analogous to those made by respondents and

Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637 (Idaho 2004), petition for writ of
certiorari pending No. 04-594), but they also underscore the wisdom
of Congress’s decision in Section 7002 to — the public with
protection in the face of hazards rising to the very high level of an
‘imminent and substantial endangerment.”

Ac TT

26

upheld by the courts below, that the fact that the lead parts
had potentially significant value necessarily took the
secondary material involved outside RCRA’s scope. The
court instead ruled that “EPA has the authority to define
materials destined for recycling as a subset of ‘solid
waste.” Id. at 1131 n.8.

To similar effect was the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (1990). At
issue in that case was the regulatory status of slag residue
from the production of steel. It was undisputed that the
slag residue was a valuable economic commodity based on
its susceptibility to reclamation and the recovery of
valuable metals. Yet, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the sla
residue plainly fell within the statutory definition of “soli
waste,” actually — a more narrow interpretation
offered by EPA at the time. Id. at 740-742.”

In Owen Electric Steel Co. of South Carolina v. Browner, 37
F.3d 146 (4" Cir. 1994), the secondary material in dispute
was once again siag material from steel production. On
this occasion, the beneficial reuse was that the slag was
being sold for use in roadbed construction. The Fourth
Circuit, however, had no difficulty in concluding that
EPA’s regulations, which treated the slag as “hazardous
waste,” did not extend beyond the bounds of the same
statutory definition of “solid waste” quite differently
construed by the Ninth Circuit in this case. Id. at 149.

The Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Marine
Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1361 (1996) is | priageme4 relevant
because it underscores the pitfalls of the Ninth Circuit's
heavy reliance on the fact that the grass residue was
capable of being burned as fuel. In Marine Shale Processors,
the defendant claimed that contaminated soil was not a
“waste” because the defendant was using it as a“ product”
in the form of a feedstock that was being burned.
Presumably, the defendant in that case could have argued,
like the court below held in this case, that one of the

* In American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1185 (D.C. Cir.
1990), the D.C. Circuit rejected the mining industry argument that
sweeney Brgeoseen F see by mining was not a “solid waste”
because that material was “‘beneficially reused in mineral processin

operations.” Id., quoting Final Brief of Consolidated Petitioners at 1

aE _—_--eewoor_'———r—rorororrreaeEeEeEeEeEyEeyyErQGEey--——— ee

27

benefits produced from the burning was getting rid of the
contaminated soil. Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit had
little difficulty rejecting the defendant's argument, ruling
that the district court had erred in granting summary
judgment to the defendant without first allowing the jury
to consider factual allegations that the defendant's burning
activity amounted to sham recycling. Id. at 1366.

Also in fundamental tension with the Ninth Circuit's
sweeping rationale in its decision below is the Tenth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (1993).
In Self, the Tenth Circuit ultimately concluded that a
particular reuse of a natural gas condensate did not
amount to a “solid waste” under EPA’s regulations more
narrowly defining that term for the p of its
hazardous waste program. The court of appeals, however,
never questioned the validity of EPA’s central position
that “certain types of materials that are being recycled by
being burned for os recovery are considered solid
wastes.” Id. at 1077. The court agreed with EPA that the
statutory definition of solid waste generally allows the
Agency to regulate materials being recycled. Id. at 1077-
79. The court also did not dispute that the burning of
secondary materials er toa “discard.” Id.
The court parted ways with EPA only with regard to the
Agency’s interpretation of its own regulations as applied
to a specific use of natural gas condensate. Id. at 1 2.

2. This case would also be the right time for the Court
to decide the legal issue presented. The Ninth Circuit's
ruling is simply the most recent and extreme product of
growing confusion in the lower courts concerning the
status of recycled materials as “solid waste” under RCRA
in general and Subchapter C in particular. Ever since 1987,
when the D.C. Circuit handed down its ruling in American
Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
both EPA and the lower courts have struggled to develop
a coherent principle for distinguishing between recycled
materials that fairly fall within the statutory definition of
“solid waste” and those that do not. The D.C. Circuit's
suggestion of a guiding principle purportedly based ona
reading of the statute's plain meaning - which is little
more than whether the waste materials are “part of the

28

waste disposal problem” (824 F.2d at 1186) - has proven
largely circular and ultimately unhelpful. The resulting
confusion has prompted EPA to make a series of missteps
on either side of the D.C. Circuit's fairly illusory and

anel-shifting dividing line.* It has also prompted the
Lind of extraordinarily misguided interpretation embraced
by the Ninth Circuit in this case.

3. Finally, the existing circuit conflict is not one that
should be iolevebed. The conflict concerns the meaning of
“solid waste,” which is the central term defining the
jurisdiction of RCRA, a national environmental program
administered by EPA that is designed to protect human
health and the environment. That jurisdiction should not
be differently defined in different parts of the nation. As
contemplated by Congress, the statute’s scope as applied
to both solid and hazardous wastes should be the same
throughout the nation.

IV Review by this Court of the legal issue presented
by this case is warranted now

Review is warranted because this case provides a good
vehicle for resolution of an extremely important legal issue
that divides the lower courts. There is no reason to await
further litigation.

This case is an especially good vehicle because it
“ogee the important legal issue as a pure question of
aw unencumbered by any procedural matters. The
exclusive basis for the lower court's judgment was its
interpretation of the threshold jurisdictional term “solid
waste,” as defined in RCRA Section 1004(27). The court
did not dispute the validity of petitioner’s claim that the

** Compare American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d at 1186 (the
D.C. Circuit 1987 holding in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d
at 1185 “concerned aay materials that are ‘destined for immediate
reuse in another phase of the industry's ongoing ere ry rocess’")
with Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1047, 1052-

1054 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting EPA’s claim that the 1987 D.C. Circuit
decision in American Mining Congress turned on the material bein
subject to “immediate reuse” in a temporal sense) and Safe Food
Fertilizer v. EPA, 350 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“But we have
never said that RCRA compels the conclusion that material destined
for recycling in another industry is necessarily ‘discarded.””).

29

open burning of the crop grass residue created an
imminent and substantial endangerment to human health
and the environment, including the deaths of several
residents in the immediate vicinity of the burning activity.
The procedural posture of the case also presents the
legal issue regarding the meaning of “solid waste” in an
especially advantageous posture for this Court’s review.
The Ninth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of
respondents, which means the court was bound to
consider any conflicting factual allegations of the parties
in the light most favorable to the petitioner, as the non-
rene. arty. See Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 849 (2002). The court did not, for this reason, dispute
that the almost exclusive purpose of the burning was to
get rid of the crop residue because of the harm otherwise
created by the presence of the residue on respondents’
fields. See Pet. App. 14a & n.11; note 6, supra. Nor did the
court question petitioner's evidentiary submission that any
small amounts of nutrients remaining in the ash residue
after the burning could be of little use to the soil. Pet. App.
A15 n12. This case, therefore, raises the fundamental
question of the regulatory status of recycling activities
under RCRA in an especially clear and stark fashion.
Both the regulated industry and the public, such as
members of SAFE, whom Congress intended to be the
ultimate beneficiaries of RCRA’s peg 65 need this
Court's attention to this caper of law. The legal issue
concerning the relationship of recycling to the lain
meaning of “solid waste” under RCRA has now perco ated
in the lower courts for 18 years and the upshot has been
more, rather than less, regulatory incoherence, and finally
this untenable court of appeals ruling. SAFE'’s interests at
stake in this case are also immediate and compelling.
Respondents’ burning of massive amounts of grass residue
is causing serious and widespread adverse health effects,
which are especially severe for children and the elderly.
There have been repeated hospitalizations, emergency
medical care, and even several deaths. This Courts
review of this important legal issue is now warranted.

30
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.”

Respectfully submitted.
RICHARD J. LAZARUS*
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
LAW CENTER

600 NEW JERSEY AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
(202) 662-9129

JOEL M. GROSS FORD ELSAESSER

ARNOLD & PORTER, LLP ELSAESSER,JARZABEK,

555 TWELFTH ST., N.W. ANDERSON, MARKS, ELLIOTT &

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 MCHUGH, CHTD.

(202) 942-5000 123 S. THIRD AVENUE

SANDPOINT, ID 83864
(208) 263-0759

Counsel for Petitioners
* Counsel of Record

February 2005

* Because of the implications of the lower court's decision for EPA’s
administration of RCRA, the Court might also invite the Solicitor
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States on the
question presented either after granting the petition (see International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 475 U.S. 1081 1986) or instead to assist the
Court's decision whether to grant the petition in the first instance (see
City or Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 504 U.S. 906 (1992)).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1361%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.