# Appendix — D. A. S. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Chao

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 544 U.S. 1048

## Text

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APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DECIDED MAY 26, 2004 AND
AMENDED OCTOBER 14, 2004

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 03-40668

D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL, INC.,

Petitioner,
V.

Elaine L. CHAO, United States Secretary of Labor, Mine
Safety and Health Administration, and Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission,

Respondents.

Argued: May 10, 2004
Decided: May 26, 2004
Amended: October 14, 2004

Before: FEINBERG, MESKILL, and CABRANES,
Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The principal questions presented by this appeal are
(1) whether, in enacting the Federal Mine Safety and Health

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Appendix A

Amendments Act of 1977 (“the Mine Act” or “the Act”),
Pub.L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, codified at 30 U.S.C.
§ 801 ef seg., Congress intended to regulate mines like that
operated by petitioner, the products of which are sold only
to intrastate purchasers; and (2) if so, whether Congress has
the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate such
mines.

BACKGROUND

The Mine Act charges the Secretary of Labor with
promulgating mandatory safety and health standards for the
nation’s mines and enforcing those standards by means of
regular inspections. See 30 U.S.C. § § 811, 813. Section 4 of
the statute provides that regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor under the Act apply to “[eJach coal or
other mine, the products of which enter commerce, or the
operations or products of which affect commerce... .”
Id. § 803. The Act defines “commerce” as “trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication among the
several States... .” /d. § 802(b).

After inspectors of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration within the Department of Labor inspected
the mine operated by petitioner D.A.S. Sand & Gravel, Inc.
(“DAS”) and cited it for several regulatory violations under
the Act, DAS contested the citations before an Administrative
Law Judge of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission (“the Commission”).'

1. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission is

an adjudicatory body independent of the Department of Labor that
(Cont'd)

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Appendix A

DAS argued primarily that Section 4 of the Act does not
apply to mines like that operated by DAS—a New York mine
the products of which are undisputedly sold only to
purchasers within the State of New York. See Secretary of
Labor v. D.A.S. Sand & Gravel, Inc., 25 FMSHRC 364, 367
(July 7, 2003) (“D.A.S.”). The administrative law judge
rejected DAS’s argument that DAS’s mine is not subject to
regulation under the Mine Act, see id. at 367-69, and DAS’s
subsequent petition to the Commission for discretionary
review’ was denied on August 18, 2003. DAS timely appealed
to our Court pursuant to Section 106 of the Mine Act, 30
U.S.C. § 816, which provides us with jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Commission.

(Cont'd)

adjudicates claims challenging the Department of Labor’s
enforcement of the Mine Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 823; see also Ingalls
Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir. , Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep't
of Labor, 519 U.S. 248, 267-68, 117 S.Ct. 796, 136 L.Ed.2d 736
(1997); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 204, 114
S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994).

2. The Act provides that an aggrieved party may seek a second
level of review from the Commission after an initial adverse decision,
but that such a second review is discretionary. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d).
Unless a petition for discretionary review has been granted, the
original administrative law judge’s decision becomes a final decision
of the Commission forty days after its issuance. /d.

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Appendix A

DISCUSSION
I. Congressional Intent

DAS argues, first, that the Commission misinterpreted
the Mine Act by holding that the Act applies to mines the
products of which are sold entirely intrastate, such as the
mine operated by DAS. Petitioner claims that, because the
Act defines “commerce” as occurring “among the several
States ...,” id. § 802(b), and DAS, the operator of a New
York mine, sells the mine’s products entirely within the State
of New York, the mine operated by DAS does not qualify as
a mine “the products of which enter commerce, or the
operations or products of which affect commerce,” id. § 803.

When we review an agency’s interpretation of a statute,
we must first determine “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If Congress
has spoken unambiguously, “that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” /d. at 842-
43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In determining whether a particular
provision is unambiguous, we consider “the particular
statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design
of the statute as a whole, and where appropriate, its legislative
history.” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham,
355 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted) (interpreting the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, as amended by the National Appliance
Energy Conservation Act). In the-instant case, all three of

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Appendix A

these factors—the language of Section 4, the language and
design of the Mine Act as a whole, and the Act’s legislative
history—lead us to conclude that the language of Section 4
of the Mine Act unambiguously expresses Congress’s intent
to regulate mines to the full extent of its power under the
Commerce Clause.

Turning first to the plain language of the statute, it is
well established that “the statutory term ‘affecting ...
commerce,’ .. . when unqualified, signal[s] Congress’ intent
to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause.”
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854, 120 S.Ct. 1904,
146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000); see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,
Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 (2003)
(reaffirming in an opinion interpreting the Federal Arbitration
Act that the “familiar term ‘affecting commerce’” consists
of “words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible
exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power’); accord
United States v. Lake, 985 F.2d 265, 267-68 (6th Cir.1993)
(holding that the language of the Mine Act, its broad remedial
purpose, and its legislative history establish that Congress
intended to exercise its full power under the Commerce
Clause); Marshall v. Kraynak, 604 F.2d 231, 232 (3d
Cir.1979) (stating that “[i]n enacting [Section 4 of the Mine
Act], Congress intended to exercise its authority to regulate
interstate commerce to ‘the maximum extent feasible through
legislation’ ”) (citation omitted).

The language and design of the Mine Act as a whole
support our interpretation of Section 4. In Section 2 of the
Act, Congress articulated findings that led to the Act’s
adoption, including “an urgent need to .. . improv(e] the

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Appendix A

working conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or other
mines,” because “the disruption of production and the loss
of income” caused by mining accidents and mining-related
illnesses “unduly impede[] and burden[] commerce.”
30 U.S.C. § 801(c), (f). Moreover, Congress found that “the
existence of unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices
in the Nation’s coal or other mines is a serious impediment
to the growth of the coal or other mining indusiry. .. .”
Id. § 801(d). The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]hese
congressional findings [contained in the preamble to the Mine
Act] were based on extensive evidence showing that the
mining industry was among the most hazardous of the
Nation’s industries.” Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602
n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (citing evidence
contained in the legislative history of the Act).

These provisions support the position of the
administrative law judge that the Act evinces Congress’s
intent “to regulate the business of mining because of the
nature of mining activity and not because of the business
economics that determine the geographic service area of a
particular mine.” D.A.S., 25 FMSHRC at 369. Accordingly,
these provisions provide no support for DAS’s argument,
see Petitioner’s Br. at 10, that Congress, in adopting the Mine
Act, did not intend to regulate mines like that operated by
D.A.S.

Finally, the legislative history of the Mine Act
corroborates our interpretation of Section 4. The Senate
Report accompanying the bill that would become the Mine
Act reads, in relevant part:

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Appendix A

[I]t is the Committee’s intention that what is
considered to be a mine and to be regulated
under this Act be given the broadest possibl[e]
interpretation, and it is the intent of this
Committee that doubts be resolved in favor of
inclusion of a facility within the coverage of the
Act.

S.Rep. No. 95-181, at 14 (May 15, 1977), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3414.

Accordingly, having considered “the particular statutory
language [of Section 4], as well as the language and design
of the statute as a whole, and .. . the legislative history,”
Abraham, 355 F.3d at 198, we conclude that Section 4
unambiguously indicates that Congress intended to regulate
mines to the full extent of its power under the Commerce
Clause.

Il. Commerce Clause Power

Because we hold that Congress intended to regulate
mines to the full extent of its authority under the Commerce
Clause, we turn now to the question whether the Commerce
Clause permits Congress to regulate DAS’s mine - whose
products are sold entirely intrastate.

Petitioner argues that regulation of mines the products
of which are sold entirely intrastate is beyond the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause. However, the
Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause does
not preclude Congress from regulating the activities of an

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Appendix A

economic actor whose products do not themselves enter
interstate commerce, where the activities of such local actors
taken together have the potential to affect an interstate market
the regulation of which is within Congress’s power. See
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87
L.Ed. 122 (1942); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542, 547, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975) (“Even
activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated
by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct
by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the
States... .”). No one disputes Congress’s power to regulate
the mining industry under the Mine Act. Accordingly, just as
in Wickard a farmer who grew wheat solely for personal
consumption was subject to regulations applicable to the
nationwide wheat market, see Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28,
63 S.Ct. 82, the mine operated by DAS is subject to the
regulations imposed on the mining industry under the Mine
Act. See Lake, 985 F.2d at 269 (“Even if the coal production
at defendant’s mine was small and sales were entirely local,
under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Wickard and Fry,
defendant’s efforts are deemed to affect interstate commerce,
since such small efforts, when combined with others, could
influence interstate coal pricing and demand.”). Because we
hold that the Commerce Clause allows Congress the authority
to regulate DAS’s mine, and because we hold that Congress
intended to wield its regulatory authority to the full extent
provided it by the Commerce Clause, the mine is within the
scope of Section 4 of the Mine Act, and is therefore subject
to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.

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Appendix A
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we hold (1) that Section 4 of the Mine
Act unambiguously expresses Congress’s intent to regulate
the mining industry to the full extent of its power under the
Commerce Clause, and (2) that Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause includes the power to regulate mines
whose products are sold entirely intrastate, such as that
operated by DAS. Accordingly, we affirm the Decision of
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.

10a

APPENDIX B — NOTICE OF THE FEDERAL MINE
AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
DATED AUGUST 18, 2003

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND
HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Suite 9500
Washington, D.C. 20001

August 18, 2003

Docket Nos. YORK 2001-67-M
YORK 2002-30-M
YORK 2002-59-M
YORK 2003-11-M

SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, MSHA,
on behalf of ANDREW J. GARCIA,
Petitioner
V.
D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL,
Respondent
NOTICE

On August 4, 2003, a petition for discretionary review
was filed by D.A.S. Sand and Gravel with the Federal Mine

Safety and Health Review Commission under section
113(d)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,

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Appendix B

30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. at § 823(d)(2). That section provides
that review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge
may be granted upon specified grounds and upon the
affirmative vot: of two Commissioners. Such review is
discretionary. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A). However, no two
members of the Commission voted to grant the petition or
otherwise order review under 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(B).
Consequently, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
is final as of 40 days after its issuance. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1).

s/ Jean H. Ellen
Jean H. E'len
Chief Docket Clerk

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APPENDIX C — DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MINE
AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
DATED AUGUST 18, 2003

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND
HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Suite 9500
Washington, D.C. 20001

July 7, 2003
CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDINGS

Docket No. YORK 2001-67-M
A.C. No. 30-03254-05508

Docket No. YORK 2042-59-M
A.C. No. 30-03254-05510

Docket No. YORK 2002-30-M
A.C. No. 30-03254-45509

Docket No. YORK 2003-1 2003-11-M
A.C. No. 30-03254-05511

D.A.S. Sand & Gravel

SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, MSHA,
on behalf of ANDREW J. GARCIA,

Petitioner
V.
D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL,
Respondent

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Appendix C

DECISION
Before: Judge Schroeder

These cases are before me on Petitions by the Secretary
for the assessment of Civil Penalties for the alleged violation
of mine safety regulations. The cases were consolidated
without opposition in the interest of economical adjudication.
A hearing was held in Rochester, New York, on April 23,
2003. Both sides were given an opportunity to submit written
argument on the legal and factual issues raised at the hearing.
After giving the record and the several presentations of
counsel careful consideration, I make the following findings
and conclusions:

Factual Findings
Jurisdiction

D.A.S. Sand and Gravel is a small business engaged in
the extraction of sand and gravel from a native deposit for
sate to the general public. David Scheer has been the owner,
president and chief executive since 1998. It is not disputed
that D.A.S. has sold sand and gravel only to buyers within
New York State although purchasers may have used the
materials for purposes with multi-state consequences, e.g.,
road construction. Equipment used in the business has been
purchased from suppliers in other states.

An essential element of the D.A.S. operation is the use
of a front-end loader. A loader is used to remove native
materials and transport them to a sorter. After the sorted

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Appendix C

material is moved to stockpiles by belt, a loader is used to
move material from an appropriate stockpile to a buyer’s
truck. At least three front-end loaders in various mechanical
condition were identified in the record as used by D.A:S.
The majority of the citations issued by MSHA in these cases
involve mechanical defects alleged to be present in the
front-end loaders.

An MSHA inspector visited the Respondent’s business
on two occasions relevant to these cases, September 19, 2000,
and November 8, 2001. There was no apparent change in the
way the business was conducted between those two dates.
Respondent does not claim any significant changes in the
period since the last inspection.

Citations

The facts regarding specific alleged violations of mine
safety regulations can be best grouped by business function.
The allegations concern (1) front-end loaders, (2) handrails,
(3) electric faults, (4) guards, and (5) record keeping.
Respondent’s evidence was directed more to the potential
significance of the violations than to the actual occurrence
of a violation.

(1) Front-end loaders

Of the fifteen (15) citations at issue, nine deal with some
aspect of the front-end loaders used by the Respondent. Three
citations, 7724561, 7741669, and 7741667 allege that
back-up alarms were not functional. Back-up alarms are the
noise- makers that are intended to alert people other than the

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Appendix C

driver that the vehicle is in reverse and the driver is probably
unable to clearly see the immediate area behind the vehicle.
The MSHA inspector, William Korbel, testified that he
observed the vehicles in operation backing up and did not
hear a back-up alarm. He also testified the vehicles constitute
a very significant safety risk to other persons in the area,
both those on foot and those in other vehicles. It was his
opinion that the operator was at risk even in low speed
impacts to other vehicles because of the persistent failure to
wear seat belts. Mr. Scheer testified to facts intended not to
dispute the violations (failure to have working backup alarms)
but to lessen the perceived risk of injury. He testified the
business is small. The customers are usually repeat buyers
that are familiar with the operations that involve the front-
end loaders. People do not wander around the grounds on
foot, but stay in the truck they drove to pick up sand or gravel.
Mr. Scheer did not deny knowing the regulatory requirement
for a back-up alarm.

Four citations, 7724562, 7724564, 7724574, and
7741668, deal with the brakes on the front-end loaders, either
the parking brakes or the services brakes. Mr. Korbel testified
he observed the vehicles, had operating tests performed on
both level ground and inclines, and found serious defects in
the brakes. Mr. Scheer testified to facts which he believed
minimized the likelihood of injury from inadequate brakes.
He testified most of the work with front-end loaders is
performed on level ground at very low speeds by people
familiar with the operation. It was his opinion that the weight
of the machines made stopping the engine an effective
braking technique. He did concede that some ramps and
inclines are part of the area used by the frontend loaders.
He also conceded that the area is sometimes wet and slick.

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Appendix C

Two Citations, 7741666 and 7724560, deal with the
failure to use seat belts in operating the front-end loaders.
Mr. Korbel testified that on his first visit to D.A.S. in
September 2000, the seat belts were stuffed under the seat to
keep them out of the way. A similar scene greeted him on his
return in October 2001. Mr. Scheer did not dispute the failure
to wear seat belts, but merely testified as to the slow speeds
in limited circumstances in which the vehicles were operated
as lessening the likelihood of injury from failure to wear seat
belts. He did not dispute his knowledge of the regulatory
requirement to use seat belts.

(2) Hand Rails

One citation, 7724567, was issued for failure to have
adequate handrails on an elevated catwalk. A slack rope was
draped across an opening of approximately twenty-five feet.
The deck was more than ten feet in the air. Workers were
required to be on the deck on a regular basis for service of
the sorter. Mr. Korbel testified the rope was more of a tripping
hazard than a safety aid for people working on the deck. Mr.
Scheer testified he was instructed to use a rope by a MSHA
inspector, whose name he could not recall. He testified the
risks of injury were small because the deck is used only for
short periods of time by people familiar with the location.

(3) Electric Faults

Two citations, 7724568 and 7724570, were issued for
electrical problems. One citation involved the alleged failure
to include adequate circuit overload protection in the sorter
motor circuits. The other citation involved an alleged failure

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Appendix C

to perform and document ground resistance or continuity
tests of the sorter electrical circuits. Mr. Korbel testified the
lack of circuit overload protection presented a risk of fire.
The lack of testing of the circuits, in his opinion, made
monitoring of the adequacy of electrical protection very
difficult, and hence, the prevention of serious shock hazards
was made more difficult. The electric current levels are
sufficient to cause serious injury or death if shock hazards
are not avoided. Mr. Scheer testified the electric circuits were
created by a qualified electrical contractor familiar with
MSHA requirements. He denied instructing the contractor
to omit necessary, but expensive, components in the circuits.
He attempted to articulate a theory under which ground
resistance or continuity tests were unnecessary. He claimed
extensive knowledge of electrical circuits and their hazards
because of work experience prior to owning a sand and gravel
facility. I found his testimony confusing and unpersuasive.

(4) Guards

Two citations, 7741670 and 7741671 were issued for
failure to maintain guards on the conveyer belt tail pulleys.
Mr. Korbel testified the tail pulleys were at a working level
and had exposed pinch points that presented a significant
risk of injury to hands and feet of workers. Mr. Scheer did
not dispute the lack of guards at the time of inspection and
merely testified as to the small number of persons exposed
to the risk because of the small! size of his business.

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Appendix C

(5) Record Keeping

One citation, 7741672, was issued for failure to maintain
records of ordering parts to correct previously identified
safety risks. Mr. Scheer did not testify as to any reason for
failure to maintain the necessary records.

Legal Conclusions

The legal issues in these cases divide easily into two
groups: (1) those associated with the jurisdiction of the
Secretary over the activities of D.A.S., and (2) those
associated with the obligation of the Secretary to provide
evidence of particular violations of mine safety regulations
with an appropriate sanction. Unless the Secretary is
successful on the first issue, the second issue need not be
decided.

Jurisdiction

In contesting jurisdiction of the Secretary, D.A.S. argues
it does not operate a “mine” as that term is used in the Mine
Safety Act. D.A.S. contends its products are not introduced
into interstate commerce as required under the Act.'
Mr. Scheer testified the essential economic realities of
transportation costs compared to value make it impossible
for a sand and gravel pit to sell to buyers more than

1. Section 4 of the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977
provides “[e]ach coal or other mine, the products of which enter
commerce, or the operations of products of which affect commerce,
and each operator of such mine, and every miner in such mine shall
be subject to the provisions of this Act.

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Appendix C

a relatively short distance from the material source.
The location of the D.A.S. source, goes the argument, makes
it economically impossible for any of its product to cross a
state line.

With one exception noted below, all of the Respondent’s
arguments were raised and answered in favor of jurisdiction
in the Secretary in the case of Secretary of Labor v. Tide
Creek Rock, Inc., 24 FMSHRC 210 (February 2002). Tide
Creek involved a small, family-run, crushed stone operation
quite similar to the D.A.S. facility. Judge Barbour specifically
noted:

It is true that Tide Creek is small and most of
its product is sold locally. However, even under
these circumstances, it has been found that
interstate commerce is affected because of the
cumulative effect small scale operation can have
in interstate pricing and demand.

D.A.S. attempts to avoid the effect of this and similar
cases over the years by relying on a recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2003),
which involved the use of an abandoned sand and gravel pit
for a municipal waste dump. The Supreme Court overturned
the position of the Corps of Engineers on the requirement
for a permit under the Clean Water Act to allow the filling of
the abandoned pit. The language used by the Supreme Court
is enticing. Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses limitations on
federal power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
in terms that suggest the Court intends a retreat from prior

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Appendix C

holdings on the limits of this power. But a careful reading of
the case leads to the conclusion the decision was not intended
to limit authority of the federal government such as that
exercised by the Secretary in this case.

The Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether the jurisdictional definition in the Clean Water Act
of “navigable waters of the United States” included the ponds
which remained after the abandonment of a sand and gravel
pit. The Corps of Engineers argued that the regular use of
those ponds by migratory birds supplied a Commerce Clause
nexus sufficient for Congress to exercise power to regulate
the use of the ponds. Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that
the hypothetical limits of the power of Congress were not at
issue. At issue were the actual limits of the exercise of the
power of Congress with respect to the gravel pit ponds.
On this issue the Chief Justice replied that Congress has not
expressed an intent to exercise its power over the ponds,
assuming it had power to exercise. The opinion is actually
limited to a interpretation of the statutory language of the
Clean Water Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically notes
that the potential constitutional issue is not being decided in
this case.

Nothing in the Solid Waste decision would inhibit
Congress from exercising Commerce Clause power over
health and safety in small sand and gravel pits. The question
is whether it chose to exercise that power. The legislative
history of the Mine Safety Act is very different from the Clean
Water Act on the issue of congressional intent to occupy the
field.

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Appendix C

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. § 801 et.seg., was passed after a series of mine
disasters had illustrated the need for consistent and uniform
standards for the mining industry that would be enforced at
the federal level. Attempts to secure adequate state
enforcement of health and safety standards had been
unsuccessful, with some states doing more than others.
The Congress, in passing the Mine Safety Act, specifically
noted that the business of extracting minerals from the earth
is an inherently dangerous activity that must be carefully
administered if it is to serve the needs of both customers and
employees. To assure that consistent and uniform standards
and practices would be implemented, Congress included
in the Mine Safety Act a very broad definition of a mine.
The Senate Committee which drafted the bill that became
the Mine Safety Act noted “it is the Committee’s intention
that what is considered to be a mine and to be regulated under
this Act be given the broadest possible interpretation, and it
is the intention of this Committee that doubts be resolved in
favor of inclusion of a facility within the coverage of the
Act.” U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News
1977, 3401, 3414. This legislative intent was early recognized
and implemented by the courts. United States v. Lake, 985
F.2d 265 (C.A. 6, 1993), Marshall v. Kravnak, 604 F.2d 231
(C.A. 3, 1979)

It is clear to me that Congress intended to regulate the
business of mining because of the nature of mining activity
and not because of the business economics that determine
the geographic service area of a particular mine. For the
purpose of this case, I conclude that Congress exercised
sufficient authority under the Commerce Clause of the

22a
Appendix C

Constitution to make the Respondent’s sand and gravel
business subject to regulation by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration and this Commission.

Citations

In evaluating the claims by the Secretary, my
responsibility is to follow a two-step process: (1) determine
whether a regulation was violated, and (2) determine the
appropriate penalty for any violations under the criteria in
Section 110(i) of the Mine Safety Act. Secretary of Labor v.
Lexicon, Inc., 24 FMSHRC 1014, 1029 (Nov. 2002). D.A.S.
is a small company with no established history of prior
violations, but which has not established a practice of good
faith efforts to abate violations or correct safety problems.
The Respondent made no attempt to show that its financial
condition is such that payment of any particular level of Civil
Penalty would endanger its ability to stay in business.

(1) Front-end Loaders

In Citations 7724561, 7741669, and 7741667,
Respondent is alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14132,
which provides:

(b) (1) When the operator has an obstructed
view to the rear, self-propelled mobile equipment
shall have - (i) An automatic reverse-activated
signal alarm;

This regulation was violated. The front-end loaders must
be equipped with a functioning back-up alarm. It is a

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Appendix C

mandatory safety standard. It was known by the Respondent
to be a mandatory safety standard. Because of the setting in
which operations occurred, the gravity of the violation is
moderate. Because of the Respondent’s size, I consider the
penalties proposed by the Secretary to be excessive. I find
the appropriate penalty, after consideration of all the statutory
criteria, to be $600.00 for the three Citations.

In Citations 772462, 7724564, 7724574, and 7741668,
Respondent is alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R.
§56.14101(a)(1) which provides:

(1) Self-propelled mobile equipment shall be
equipped with a service brake system capable of
stopping and holding the equipment with its
typical load on the maximum grade it travels.

This regulation was violated. The front-end loaders must
be equipped with functioning brakes that make it possible
for the operator to stop a loaded vehicle on a ramp within a
reasonable distance. This regulation seems such an obvious
mandatory safety standard that the Respondent must be
presumed to have been aware of the requirement. Because
of the setting in which operations occurred, the gravity of
the violation is moderate. Because of the Respondent’s size,
I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be
excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration
of all the statutory criteria, to be $1,000.00 for the three
Citations.

24a
Appendix C

In Citations 7741666, and 7724560, Respondent is
alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14130(g), which

provides:

(zg) Seat belts shall be worn by the equipment
operator except that when operating graders from
a standing position, the grader operator shall wear
safety lines and a harness in place of a seat belt.

This regulation was violated. The operators, including
the owner and supervisor, regularly failed to wear seat belts
in the front-end loader. This regulation was known to the
supervisor and operators. Because of the low speeds involved
in the setting in which operations occurred, the gravity of
the violation is minimal. Because of the Respondent’s size,
I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be
excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration
of all the statutory criteria, to be $200.00 for the two
Citations.

(2) Hand Rails

In Citation 7724567, Respondent is alleged to have
violated 30 C.F.R. §56.11002, which provides:

Crossovers, elevated walkways, elevated
ramps, and stairways shall be of substantial
censtruction, provided with handrails, and
maintained in good condition.

This regulation was violated. The catwalk was not
provided with a substantial handrail in place of a designating

25a

Appendix C

rope. There is a reasonable dispute as to Respondent’s
knowledge of this requirement, and the gravity of the
violation is minimal. Because of the Respondent’s size,
I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be
excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration
of all the statutory criteria, to be $50.00.

(3) Electric Faults

In Citation 7723568, Respondent is alleged to have
violated 30 C.F.R. §56.12001, which provides:

Circuits shall be protected against excessive
overload by fuses or circuit breakers of the correct
type and capacity.

This regulation was violated. The motor circuits did not
include protection against overload in the form or either fuses
or circuit breakers. Respondent claimed to have relied upon
a qualified electrician in the creation of the circuits.
Mr. Scheer claimed, on the other hand, to be knowledgeable
on the subject of electrical circuits. The need for overload
protection seems so clear as to make it impossible to claim
ignorance of the requirement. Mr. Scheer did not claim
ignorance but, rather, claimed the equivalent safety factor
was provided by other means. His explanation of the other
means was unpersuasive. Because of the Respondent’s size,
I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be
excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration
of all the statutory criteria, to be $50.00.

26a
Appendix C

In Citation 7724570, Respondent is alleged to have
violated 30 C.F.R. §56.12028, which provides:

Continuity and resistance of grounding
systems shail be tested immediately after
installation, repair and modification; and
annually thereafter. A record of the resistance
measured during the most recent tests shall be
made available on a request by the Secretary or
his duly authorized representative.

This regulation was violated. Respondent was quite
candid in testifying that the testing was not performed so a
record could not be maintained. Mr. Scheer testified as to
various theories of electric circuits under which such
information would not be required. His testimony on this
subject was unpersuasive. No electrical injuries have been
sustained in the Respondent’s business. Because of the
Respondent’s size, I consider the penalties proposed by the
Secretary to be excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after
consideration of all the statutory criteria, to be $50.00.

(4) Guards
In Citations 7741670 and 7741671, Respondent is

alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14107, which
provides:

(a) Moving machine parts shall be guarded
to protect persons from contacting gears,
sprockets, chains, drive, head, tail, and takeup
pulleys, flywheels, coupling, shafts, fan blades and
similar moving parts that can cause injury.

27a
Appendix C

This regulation was violated in both instances.
The conveyer belt pulleys contain pinch points that can cause
injury to people moving in the area. Respondent made no
claim the pulleys were guarded, but merely attempted to
minimize the risk because of the small number of people
exposed to the unguarded machinery. I find the appropriate

penalty, after consideration if all the statutory criteria, to be
$250.00.

(5) Record Keeping

In Citation 7741672, Respondent is alleged to have
violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14100(d), which provides:

(d) Defects on self-propelled mobile
equipment affecting safety, which are not
corrected immediately, shall be reported to and
recorded by the mine operator The records shall
be kept at the mine or nearest mine office from
the date the defects are recorded until the defects
are corrected. Such records shall be made
available for inspection by an authorized
representative of the Secretary.

This regulation was violated. The testimony indicates
records were not kept of either brake or back-up alarm
malfunctions, and this failure was the reason why records
were not produced at the request of the MSHA inspector. |
find the appropriate penalty, after consideration of all the
statutory criteria, to be $200.00.

Fe ee

28a

Appendix C

Summary

It is my conclusion that the Respondent has violated a
variety of mine safety regulations, perhaps in part motivated
by his strongly held conviction as to his legal position, with
serious consequences for the health and safety of his
employees and customers. The total Civil Penalty appropriate
to redress these violations is $2,400.00.

ORDER

The Respondent is directed to pay a Civil Penalty of
$2,400.00 within 40 days of the date of this Order. The parties

are to bear their own costs.

s/ Irwin Schroeder
Irwin Schroeder
Administrative Law Judge

29a

APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DATED AND FILED OCTOBER 15, 2004

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse
40 Foley Square
New York 10007

Roseann B. MacKechnie
Clerk

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 15th day of October two thousand four.

D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL, INC.,

Petitioner,

¥.

ELAINE L. CHAO, United States Secretary of Labor,
MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

A petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc
having been filed herein by the petitioner DAS Sand &

Gravel, Inc.

30a

Appendix D

Upon consideration by the panel that decided the appeal,
it is Ordered that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

It is further noted that the petition for rehearing en banc has
been transmitted to the judges for the court in regular active
service and to any other judge that heard the appeal and that
no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.

For the Court,
Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk

By: [illegible]
Motion Staff Attorney

31a

APPENDIX E — STATUTES INVOLVED

30 USCS § 801. Congressional findings and declaration
of purpose

Congress declares that—

(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal
or other mining industry must be the health and
safety of its most precious resource—the miner;

(b) deaths and serious injuries from unsafe and
unhealthful conditions and practices in the coal
or other mines cause grief and suffering to the
miners and to their families;

(c) there is an urgent need to provide more
effective means and measures for improving the
working conditions and practices in the Nation’s
coal or other mines in order to prevent death and
serious physical harm, and in order to prevent
occupational diseases originating in such mines;

(d) the existence of unsafe and unhealthful
conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or
other mines is a serious impediment to the future
growth of the coal or other mining industry and
cannot be tolerated;

(e) the operators of such mines with the assistance
of the miners have the primary responsibility to
prevent the existence of such conditions and
practices in such mines;

32a

Appendix E

(f) the disruption of production and the loss of
income to operators and miners as a result of coal
or other mine accidents or occupationally caused
diseases unduly impedes and burdens commerce;
and

(g) it is the purpose of this chapter (1) to establish
interim mandatory health and safety standards and
to direct the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and the Secretary of Labor to develop
and promulgate improved mandatory health or
safety standards to protect the health and safety
of the Nation’s coal or other miners; (2) to require
that each operator of a coal or other mine and
every miner in such mine comply with such
standards; (3) to cooperate with, and provide
assistance to, the States in the development and
enforcement of effective State coal or other mine
health and safety programs; and (4) to improve
and expand, in cooperation with the States and
the coal or other mining industry, research and
development and training programs aimed at
preventing coal or other mine accidents and
occupationally caused diseases in the industry.

30 USCS § 803. Mines subject to coverage

Each coal or other mine, the products of which
enter commerce, or the operations or products of
which affect commerce, and each operator of such
mine, and every miner in such mine shall be
subject to the provisions of this Act.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1310%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
