# Opposition Brief — Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 544 U.S. 913

## Text

' Supreme Cour us
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| FEB 2- 2005 |

No. 04-889 |
me n= CLERK |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

MILWAUKEE METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE DISTRICT,
Petitioner,

Vi

FRIENDS OF MILWAUKEE’S RIVERS AND
LAKE MICHIGAN FEDERATION,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
KAREN M. SCHAPIRO BARRY LEVENSTAM *
DEWITT ROSS & STEVENS, S.C. ROBERT L. GRAHAM
13935 Bishop’s Drive JAMES A. VROMAN
Suite 300 STEVEN M. SIROS
Brookfield, WI 53005 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
(262) 754-2840 One IBM Plaza

Chicago, IL 60611
(312) 222-9350

* Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Respondents
Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers and Lake Michigan Federation

—— Se ne erm a Le See A
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This case actually raises the following questions.

1. Whether the court of appeals properly applied
Wisconsin’s state law doctrine of res judicata.

2. | Whether the court of appeals properly remanded this
case to the district court for consideration of whether
Wisconsin’s “fairness” exception to its res judicata doctrine
should apply here, given the unique facts of this case, i.e., a
municipal sewerage district, which consistently has failed for
decades to comply with its permit obligations and the Clean
Water Act, entered into a quick settlement of state
enforcement litigation filed (after Respondents had filed their
citizen suit) by state officials who had tolerated the district’s
years of noncompliance.

il
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Respondent Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers is a not-for-
profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of

Wisconsin. It does not have a parent corporation and no
publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Respondent Lake Michigan Federation is a not-for-profit
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois.
It does not have a parent corporation and no publicly held
company owns 10% or more of its stock.

iil
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .................... 14

I. This Court Should Not Issue The Writ Of Certiorari
To Review The Decision Below, Which Applies
Wisconsin State Law And Holds Merely That A
Remand Is Necessary To Determine Whether

Wisconsin’s Doctrine Of Res Judicata Applies To
adda ciaicndaiaphisnnabedintincesiiapdidiahs aapnanad 15

II. The Judgment Below Does Not Conflict With
Precedent From Other Circuits And Is Consistent
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1V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

’

Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc.,

Sy Se, CENT 21,22
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman

Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991)... 20
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) ........... ee 19
Comfort Lake Ass'n v. Dresel Contracting, 138

Fe ee re Se itteatnninnnncsdedenaeentincdnesetimnnaeen 21
DePratt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d

PO, FSS E,W. ee CD iiicn ses tiiceniansieniensarisnianminses 15
Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461 (6th Cir.

Ps Lackeithdnibssbihesnsninlsnitbsadaiianaiaammaaebabaicieieaalalaiies 22
Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000)............ 17

Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 139 Wis. 2d 833, 407
N.W.2d 895 (1987), vacated on other grounds,
486 U.S. 1050 (1988), rev'd on other grounds,

150 Wis. 2d 563, 441 N.W.2d 734 (1989) 0.0... 16
Gwaltney of Southfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) ................. 20, 21
Herb v. Pitcarin, 324 U.S. 117 (1945)... eee 19
McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194
GREE cisistaiasioucnonaies phacbnesiicngilaiid sniiicaninbediapisibuiahabicnalborias 17
Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 495 N.W.
Be GD hcteniisidcnndeiidiciniladasenumatanusietinbnaiasaiinine 15
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).............004. 16, 19
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) uu... cee eeeeteeeeeee 19

p EEE

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N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541,
DAD hs OE An Fe Ue ee ic laintntchewnighsnnlannkatinaatededeipanienl 16
North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Scituate,
DEF F268 Se CH CO Fi svccediote 21
Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 230
Wis. 2d 212, 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999).................ccee 17
Taggart v. Weinacker’s Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970) ........ 23
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. City of Green Forest,
S20 F268 158 Ce. Poincare 17
Universal Die and Stampings, Inc. v. Justus, 174
Wis. 2d 556, 497 N.W.2d 797 (1993) ...........ceeeeeeeeeees 15
Statues:
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Miscellaneous:
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No. 04-889

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

MILWAUKEE METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE DISTRICT,

PETITIONER,
Vv.

FRIENDS OF MILWAUKEE’S RIVERS AND
LAKE MICHIGAN FEDERATION,

RESPONDENTS.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

This case does not present the issues asserted by
Petitioners. Rather, the decision of the court of appeals
below tums upon applying Wisconsin state law on res
judicata to a unique set of facts: a municipal sewerage district
that has not met its permit obligations for decades confronted
with a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act quickly settles

2

a subsequently-filed state enforcement action filed by
officials who steadfastly had refused to enforce its permit
obligations before the citizen suit. Perhaps most significant,
the court of appeals merely has remanded the case below to
the district court for a more detailed analysis of how
Wisconsin res judicata law applies to these facts.
Consequently, the preclusive effect of the state court
judgment has not even been resolved as yet. There is,
therefore, no reason for this Court to issue a writ of certiorari
in this case at this time.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Invoking their nght to sue under the Clean Water Act
(“the Act”), Respondents filed their citizen enforcement
action in federal district court against the Mulwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District (“the District”) in the
morning of March 15, 2002, a date more than sixty days after
notifying the District of their intent to sue, as allowed by the
Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). Respondents’ complaint
alleged, in pertinent part, that the District had discharged
untreated sewage (also referred to as sanitary sewer
overflows (“SSOs”)) from at least 165 locations, in
fundamental and continuing violation of the Act and the
District’s discharge permit.

Later in the day of March 15, 2002, the State also
filed a complaint against the District but did so in Wisconsin
state court. The State’s lawsuit alleged a total of only eight
violations.

On May 29, 2002, in the State’s lawsuit, the
Milwaukee County Circuit Court approved a stipulation
agreed to by the State and the District, which purported to
resolve all claims the State raised in its lawsuit. Respondents
were not parties to and did not participate in the formulation

3

of the stipulation. Two days later, on May 31, 2002, the
District filed a motion in federal court to dismiss the
Respondents’ complaint, arguing (1) that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, in the alternative, (2)
that in light of the resolution of the state lawsuit, the
Respondents’ claims were barred by the doctrines of
mootness and res judicata. The district court granted the
motion to dismiss on September 29, 2003, holding that
Respondents’ citizen suit was barred because the State had
diligently prosecuted the District for its violations of the Act.
In addition, the Court found that the doctrine of res judicata
barred litigation of the issues raised in the Respondents’
complaint.

BACKGROUND FACTS

For more than thirty years, the District has violated
the terms of its Wisconsin Pollution Discharge Elimination
System. (““WPDES”) permit and the Act repeatedly,
discharging over 13 billion gallons of untreated wastewater
into Lake Michigan and the rivers in and around of the City
of Milwaukee. (S. App. at 00095.) The District is the
municipal corporation that provides sewer services to the
City of Milwaukee and twenty-seven other surrounding
municipalities. (/d. at 00217.)!

The District has been, and currently is, subject to a
WPDES permit, issued by the State under the Act, that
specifically prohibits SSOs: “No bypass or overflow of
wastewater from the permittee’s sanitary sewage system is

| Citations to the Record on Appeal are “R- at.” Citations to the
Appellants’ Attached Required Short Appendix below are “App. at.”
Citations to the Appellants’ Separate Appendix below are “S. App. at

4

authorized by this permit.” (S. App. at 00128.)? Despite this
clear prohibition against SSOs, SSOs have occurred from at
least 165 separate locations between 1995 and 2002. (/d. at
00102.)3

The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (the
“State”) — the state agency entrusted with protecting
Wisconsin’s valued natural resources and environment — for
thirty years has failed to discharge its responsibilities to stop
these illegal SSOs. (S. App. at 00219, 00231.) When it
became clear that the State had failed to perform the duty the
federal government delegated to it and prosecute an
enforcement action (through its attorneys, the Wisconsin
Department of Justice) against the District, the Respondents
filed this citizen suit in an effort to protect the citizens who
reside, work, and recreate in the Milwaukee area and who
use, enjoy, or rely on the waters of Lake Michigan and its
surrounding waterways. (/d. at 00095 - 00114.)

Sewer Overflows Into Lake Michigan and Connecting
Rivers.

Separated sanitary sewers are used to carry sewage,
often untreated, from residences, commercial buildings,
industnes, and other institutions to interceptor sewers, which
feed into wastewater treatment facilities. (S. App. at 00056-
00057.) Separated sanitary sewers protect the public health
and the environmeni by transporting this waste safely to

2 The WPDES permit enumerates three exceptions to the prohibition

of SSOs. At no time during this litigation has the District invoked one of
these exceptions in its defense.

3 The District also oversees an older system of combined sewers,
which carry both untreated sewage and storm water. Its WPDES permit
allows a maximum of six combined sewers overflows (“CSOs”) a year,
provided that Lake Michigan’s water quality does not suffer. (S. App. at
00231, 00269, 00278.)

Te a a a aa ie ale

5

wastewater treatment facilities for treatment before being
discharged to local waterways. (/d. at 00057.) When a
separated sanitary system has inadequate capacity or is
improperly managed, however, the untreated sewage is
discharged directly into local waterways. (/d.) Usually these
discharges, or overflows, occur during heavy rain events. The
District, however, also has caused a number of dry weather
sewer overflows, which result from either operational errors
or equipment failures. (/d.) These unpermitted discharges,
whether during dry spells or heavy rain events, are referred to
as sanitary sewer overflows, or SSOs, and they violate the
Act. (/d.)

SSOs pose significant public health problems. (S.
App. at 00263.) Untreated sewage can be extremely
dangerous to the health of area residents, aquatic plants, and
wildlife. (/d.) Chronic overflows, like those caused by the
District, deprive fish and other aquatic life of oxygen. (/d. at
00263-00264.) Untreated sewage degrades the water quality
of lakes and rivers. (/d.) One million gallons of SSO waste
water can contain 833 pounds of biological oxygen demand,
16.7 pounds of phosphorous, 1,000 pounds of suspended
solids, and 19 million pounds of fecal coliform.4 (S. App. at
00264.) The District has discharged over one billion gallons
of SSOs since 1995. (/d. at 00233.)

Untreated SSO waste water can taint community
water supplies. (S. App. at 00265.) Raw sewage can force
communities to close beaches and curtail recreational
activities because of the health risks posed by the sewage,
thus depriving citizens of their ability to enjoy its natural
resources. (/d. at 00265-00266.) In recent years, Milwaukee
area beach closures have increased due, in part, to significant

4 Biological oxygen demand is oxygen-demanding pollutants that
deplete the volume of oxygen in the water. (R-23 at 97.)

6
repeated SSOs. (/d.) Residents who swim, boat, or fish in
lakes and rivers that have been contaminated with sewage
can be exposed to disease-causing bacteria, viruses, and other
pathogens, including cryptosporidium, which can cause
gastroiniestinal illnesses and, in extreme cases, even death.
(/d. at 00263.)

The District has violated its WPDES_ permit
continuously at least since 1976. (S. App. at 00219, 00231.)
From 1995 to 2002 alone, the District’s sanitary sewer
system discharged over 13 billion gallons of untreated
sewage and storm water into Lake Michigan and the

Milwaukee, Kinnickinnic, and Menomonee Rivers. (J/d. at
00233.)

The State’s Abdication of Enforcement Responsibility.

Since at least 1976, the State has abdicated its
responsibility to hold the District accountable for the
District’s failure to comply with the Act and its WPDES
permit. (S. App. at 00219, 00231.) In 1976, the District’s
predecessor sued the State seeking a declaratory judgment
that the District need not comply with the Wisconsin
regulations that implemented the Act’s secondary
pretreatment standards for wastewater. (/d. at 00001-00002.)
The litigation was resolved by a stipulation (the “1977
Stipulation”) that contained few enforceable standards and
did not contain any provision requiring the District to cease
SSOs or comply with the Act. (/d. at 00003.)

The District’s key capital project to eliminate SSOs
under the 1977 Stipulation was its planned “Deep Tunnel”
project. (See S. App. at 00211.) The Deep Tunnel finally
started operating seventeen years later, in 1994. (/d.) The
District claimed that the Deep Tunnel would eliminate SSOs

|

:
by providing sufficient capacity for storing untreated waste
and storm water until the untreated waste water could be sent
to the treatment facilities. (/d. at 00222.) Soon after Deep
Tunnel became operational, however, it became evident that
this was not the answer to the District’s capacity problem.
(Id. at 00231.) The quality of the surface waters in the area
the District serves did not improve (id. at 00268-00274), and
the District continued to experience numerous significant
SSOs that violated its WPDES permit and the Act. (/d. at
00211-00212, 00231, 00237-00239.) Nevertheless, the State
did not initiate any enforcement action against, or otherwise
diligently prosecute, the District to require further specific
actions to comply with the law, or to recover penalties. (/d.
at 00231, 00247.)

Respondents’ Citizen Suit.

In light of this history of noncompliance and the
State’s lack of diligent enforcement, Respondents sent their
statutory Notice Letter to the District on July 11, 2001,
copying the State and other necessary parties. (S. App. at
00105-00111.) The Notice Letter identified “at least thirteen
(13) occasions during which at least 165 SSO discharge
locations within [the District’s] jurisdiction discharged
sanitary sewage” from the District’s sewerage collection
system since January 1, 1994, including dry weather SSOs.
(/d. at 00106.)

Five days after receiving Respondents’ Notice Letter,
the State finally sent a letter to the District informing it that
several SSO discharges identified in the Respondents’ Notice
Letter were violations of the District’s WPDES Permit and
the Act. (R-19 at 86-89.) Before this letter, the State had not
notified the District of any SSO violations, even though the

8
District’s quarterly reports revealed repeated violations of the
District’s WPDES permit and the Act. (S. App. at 00215.)

Respondents heard nothing from the District or the
State in response to the Notice Letter until late in the
afternoon of Friday, September 7, 2001, just one day before
the expiration of the sixty-day waiting period required by the
Act. (R-19 at 90-116.) On that date, Respondents received a
facsimile copy of a “new” stipulation (the “2001
Stipulation’) that the State had executed with the District,
and which the State apparently already had filed that same
day in the 1/977 case before the Dane County Circuit Court.
(/d.) The State and District provided no opportunity
whatsoever for Respondents or the public to comment on the
“new” stipulation. (R-18 at 7.)

The Dane County Circuit Court, however,
subsequently refused to enter the proffered stipulation on the
docket of its 1977 case, stating: “It does seem to me that at
some point a court’s involvement in a case must end. It also
seems to me that this case has gone well beyond that point.”
(R-19 at 117.)

Only after the Dane County Circuit Court rejected the
new stipulation did the District finally agree to discuss with
Respondents their concerns over the terms of the proposed
2001 Stipulation and to meet with representatives of both
organizations. (R-19 at 119.) Three months later, after
settlement negotiations failed, Respondents filed this lawsuit
on March 15, 2002 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. (R-1 at 1-10.)

Several hours after Respondents filed their citizen
suit, the State filed a new lawsuit against the District. (R-18
at 9-10.) This time, however, the State filed its lawsuit in the

9

Milwaukee County Circuit Court, instead of the Dane County
Circuit Court. (/d.) In contrast to the 165 locations where
violations occurred, as alleged in Respondents’ complaint,
the State’s complaint alleged that the District wolated its
WPDES Permit on only eight occasions and did not allege
any dry weather SSOs. (R-18 at 10.)

The 2002 Milwaukee County Lawsuit and Stipulation.

On May 29, 2002, while the Respondents’ citizen suit
was pending, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, at the
request of the State and the District, entered a stipulation (the
“2002 Stipulation”) that settled the State’s lawsuit. (S. App.
at 00178-00204.) The 2002 Stipulation, which basically
mirrored the 2001 Stipulation that the Dane County Circuit
Court rejected, allowed the District to follow a “program”
rather than requiring the District to stop violating the law and
harming the environment. (/d. at 00179.) Just like the 1977
Stipulation, the 2002 Stipulation contained lengthy and
generous schedules to implement vague and ambiguous
corrective measures with few enforceable guidelines. (/d. at
00178-00204.) It also failed to provide any consequences in
the event of the District’s non-compliance with the 2002
Stipulation’s provisions. (/d.) In addition, the 2002
Stipulation did not require the District to pay any civil
penalties for any of the District’s past SSOs and did not
prohibit future SSO discharges from the District’s sewerage
system. (/d.)

Notably, the 2002 Stipulation also failed to
incorporate many of the lengthy and _ detailed
recommendations made by the State to the Natural Resources
Board in a March 15, 2001 report entitled “Sewer Overflows
in Wisconsin.” (S. App. at 00089-00092.) Although the State
made these same recommendations in its July 16, 2001 letter

10
to the District (R-19 at 86-88), the State stipulated to far less

rigorous, and less protective, measures. (S. App. at 00178-
00204.)

The Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau Report.

Only two months after the Milwaukee County Circuit
Court approved the stipulation, the Wisconsin Legislative
Audit Bureau released its audit evaluating the District (the
“Audit Report”). (S. App. at 00205-00301.) This report
came on the heels of the earlier report produced by the State
to the Natural Resources Board in response to the escalating
number of SSOs that occurred in 1999 and 2000. (/d. at
00050.) The Audit Report, titled “An Evaluation: Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District,” highlighted the State’s
continuing failure to act in an effective and diligent manner
to address the District’s continued violations of the Act, and
graphically detailed how the District had failed to eliminate
the discharge of sewage into area waterways. (/d. at 00211-
00213.) The Audit Report noted that the Deep Tunnel had
not functioned in the manner in which the District had
promised. (/d. at 00211-00212.) Although the Deep Tunnel
was designed to “virtually eliminate” SSOs and significantly
reduce combined sewer overflows, both types of overflows
repeatedly have occurred in each year since the Deep Tunnel
became operational. (Jd. at 00231.)

The Audit Report also found that the District has had
serious and continual operational and management problems.
(S. App. at 00240-00244.) For years, the District has failed
to vaddress inflow and infiltration problems caused by
groundwater leaking into the sewerage system, despite being
aware of the problem. (/d. at 00239-00240.) Because it has
not controlled the inflow and infiltration of groundwater, the
District frequently directs its contractor, United Water

11

Services, to discharge untreated sewage into Lake Michigan
and the surrounding waterways even when the Deep Tunnel
is at significantly less than capacity. (/d. at 00240, 00243,
00259-00260.) This action allowed an additional 107 million
gallons of untreated wastewater to be discharged into area
waterways during six overflow events from June 1999 to
December 2001. (/d. at 00243.) These unlawful overflows
also occurred because the District allowed United Water
Services to shut off Deep Tunnel pumps during periods of
peak electricity rates to save money. (/d.) During the
summer of 2002, the District’s contractor also failed to repair
a broken sluice gate, which, on several occasions, also
allowed significant overflows. (S. App. at 00280.) The
Audit Report further noted that, instead of allocating its
resources to ensure compliance with its WPDES permit and
the Act, the District often makes decisions concerning
resource allocation based on faulty economic and political
considerations. (/d. at 00254-00258.)

The District’s Performance Since The 2002 Stipulation.

The 2002 Stipulation has failed to stop significant
SSOs from occurring. (S. App. at 00305-00308.) During
one week in August 2002, the District dumped 412 million
gallons of sewage into Lake Michigan and rivers surrounding
Milwaukee — the largest such overflow in nearly two years.
(/d.) Boaters on Lake Michigan at the time noted that “debris
including condoms and other trash generally flushed from
toilets ended up in Lake Michigan.” (/d. at 00307.)
Observers of the Milwaukee and Kinnickinnic Rivers noted
that the sewage discharged into those waterways contained a
wide assortment of debris, including bottles, condoms, bags,
and tampons. (/d.)

12

Indeed, even after argument before the court of
appeals in this case, which occurred on March 29, 2004, the
District’s poor performance continued. As the court of
appeals noted in its opinion, heavy rainfalls in May 2004 led
the District to dump “‘an unprecedented 4.6 billion gallons of
raw sewage’ directly into Lake Michigan and Milwaukee
area streams and rivers.” (Pet. App. A, at 3a n.1, quoting
Rohde and Schultze, Sewage Dumped in May: 4.6 Billion
Gallons, Milwaukee Sentinel, May 29, 2004, at IA (Court’s
emphasis)). Half a billion gallons of that total came from
SSOs; the remainder came from CSOs.

The Court of Appeals Opinion.

The court of appeals issued a carefully-crafted 35-
page opinion that demonstrates a complete understanding of
the highly-detailed record on appeal and a thoughtful analysis
of the law. After an accurate and unchallenged outline of the
Clean Water Act’s conditions for filing and maintaining a
citizen suit (Pet. App. A at 8a-9a), the Court addressed
whether any of the State’s actions had barred Respondents’
suit ab initio, and concluded that none had. (/d. at 9a-18a.)
The District’s Petition leaves this conclusion unchallenged.
In other words, the District has abandoned its contentions
that the Clean Water Act barred Respondents from filing
their citizen suit in the first place in light of any actions the
District or the State had taken in court or administratively.

The court of appeals then turned its attention to the
district court’s ruling on res judicata. The Clean Water Act
does not specify what effect to give the settlement of a State
enforcement action filed after the commencement of a citizen
suit. (/d. at 18a.) The court of appeals rejected Respondents’
argument that judgment in an after-filed state enforcement
action cannot have a res judicata effect upon a prior-filed,

13

ongoing citizen suit. (/d. at 22a & n.9.) Instead, the court of
appeals ruled, as the District had argued, that Wisconsin’s
doctrine of res judicata governs whether the settlement of the
state enforcement action between the State and the District
precluded Respondents’ citizen suit. (/d. at 18a-19a.)
Assessing Wisconsin res judicata law, the court of appeals
rejected Respondents’ argument that res judicata did not
apply to their citizen suit because that citizen suit is broader
than, and different in scope from, the State enforcement
action. The court of appeals further rejected Respondents’
argument that there could be no privity between the State and
Respondents. (/d. at 19a-22a & n. 9.)

The court, however, also rejected the District’s
position that Respondents were bound by res judicata even if
the State had not diligently prosecuted its enforcement
action. (/d. at 22a.) Ultimately, after examining the record
facts concerning the State’s prosecution of its after-filed
enforcement action, the court of appeals concluded that
questions remained for the district court to address
concerning the diligence, or lack thereof, of the State’s
prosecution. (/d. at 3la-33a.) Consequently, the court
remanded the matter and, in doing so, specifically directed
the district court to address the question of the State’s
diligence, and also to “determine whether Wisconsin’s
fairness exception to the res judicata doctrine should be
applied here.” (/d. at 32a-33a & nn. 16-17.)

In so concluding, the court of appeals made the
following observation concerning the conduct of the State
and the District, up to and including the 2002 Stipulation:
“The record to date does not inspire confidence that effective
and timely action will be taken to address problems of long
standing. While the 2002 Stipulation will hopefully result in
fewer and smaller violations after the mandated projects are

14
completed, it is still, when all is said and done, a stalling
tactic rather than a compliance strategy.” (/d.)

Although the District did not ask the court of appeals
for a stay pending this Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f), it
did ask the district court to stay the proceedings until this
Court ruled on this Petition. Upon Respondents’ objection
that such a stay was merely another “stalling tactic” to delay
compliance, the district court denied that stay motion. The
case is now proceeding to a resolution of the res judicata
issue in the district court.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

As a review of the opinion of the court of appeals
reveals, the court agreed with the District that Wisconsin
state res judicata law applies to determine whether
Respondents’ Clean Water Act citizen suit may proceed in
light of the District’s prompt settlement of the State’s after-
filed enforcement suit. (Pet. App. A at 18a-19a.) The
District’s disagreement with the court of appeals concerns
how the court applied Wisconsin state law. Consequently,
the decision below presents only the questions of whether the
court of appeals has correctly interpreted Wisconsin’s
doctrine of res judicata and whether that court has concluded
correctly, based on the factual record before it, that a remand
was required to assess whether the District’s hasty settlement
with the State should bar this suit under Wisconsin state law
of res judicata. Should the district court decide that this case
falls within Wisconsin’s fairness exception to its res judicata
doctrine, proceedings before this Court will be moot, because
no ruling by this court on the issues the District has raised
could then bar this citizen case from going forward.

15
I. This Court Should Not Issue The Writ Of
Certiorari To Review The Decision Below, Which
Applies Wisconsin State Law And Holds Merely
That A Remand Is Necessary To Determine
Whether Wisconsin’s Doctrine Of Res Judicata
Applies To Bar This Suit.

Although the District seeks to cloak the decision
below in federal garb, its complaint is with the court’s
application of state law. In its Petition, the District states:
“The res judicata effect of final state court orders depends
instead on the preclusion law of that State.” (Pet. at 14.) The
court of appeals so held. (Pet. App. A at 18a-19a.)
Consequently, there is no issue here concerning the standard
to be applied under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

Rather, the District’s complaint with the decision
below is that “the Seventh Circuit ignored Wisconsin law
under which persons with the same legal interests are held, as
a matter of law, to be in privity. . . . Moreover, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has never applied or adopted
§ 42(1)(e) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
(1982), on which the Seventh Circuit relied for its
authorization to graft a federal diligent prosecution analysis
onto Wisconsin preclusion law.” (Pet. at 15.)°

5 Nor has the Wisconsin Supreme Court ever rejected section 42(1)(e),
though the Wisconsin courts have adopted other sections of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS many times. See, e.g.,
Universal Die and Stampings, Inc. v. Justus, 174 Wis. 2d 556, 567, 497
N.W.2d 797, 802 (1993) (discussing Res. (2d) Judgments sec. 44);
Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681 688-89, 495 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1993)
(discussing Res. (2d) Judgments secs. 77 & 85); DePratt v. West Bend Mut.
Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306, 311, 334 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1983) (discussing Res.
(2d) Judgments sec. 24 & 25). As the following text illustrates, however,
this is not the kind of issue worthy of a grant of certiorari.

16

This Court does not review questions of state law and
therefore should have no interest in assessing the validity of
the ruling on Wisconsin res judicata law by the court of
appeals. “The process of examining state law is
unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret state laws
with which we are generally unfamiliar... .” Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983). But even if this Court
were interested in Wisconsin’s doctrine of res judicata, the
District would be in no position to ask this Court to look over
the shoulder of the court of appeals. In its brief to that court,
the District cited only one Wisconsin state court case on res
judicata, N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541,
525 N.W.2d 723 (1995) — which the court of appeals used
as its primary guidepost on this issue. (Compare Brief of
Appellee at 44-48, with Pet. App. A at 19a.) Of the ten other
cases the District cited on res judicata, nine come from
federal courts and one from Indiana state court. (Brief of
Appellee at 44-48.) The District did not cite the court of
appeals to Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 139 Wis. 2d 833,
407 N.W.2d 895 (1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S.
1050 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 150 Wis. 2d 563, 441
N.W.2d 734 (1989), the only case it cites to this Court for the
proposition that Wisconsin’s doctrine of res judicata applies
even though the State had failed to prosecute its enforcement
action diligently.®

Ironically, the court of appeals discussed more cases
from the Wisconsin Supreme Court in its opinion than the

6 Moreover, Gerhardt is inapposite. Gerhardt was a paternity case
instituted by the State, in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded
that the mother’s interests and the child’s interests were in many respects
identical. As between the State and the child’s interests, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court said that “the district attorney, in deciding whether to
initiate a paternity action, did not represent the interests of the illegitimate
child.” 139 Wis. 2d at 840 (1987) (Court’s emphasis).

17

District did in its brief, as well as many of the federal
decisions the District had cited. (See Pet. App. A at 18a-33a
& nn. 16-17.) Included among these cases are several
discussing Wisconsin’s fairness exception to its res judicata
doctrine, see Sopha v. Qwens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 230
Wis. 2d 212, 236, 601 N.W.2d 627, 638 (1999); McCourt v.
Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958); Froebel v.
Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (Pet. App. A at
32a-33a & nn. 16-17). Because the court of appeals singled
out Wisconsin’s fairness exception to its res judicata doctrine
for consideration on remand, this state law exception to a
state law doctrine provides an independent state law basis for
the decision of the court of appeals to remand. (/d.)

Furthermore, the District’s suppused conflict between
the decision below and U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. City of
Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1990), is illusory.
Indeed, the court of appeals below cited City of Green Forest
with approval in connection with its privity analysis. (Pet.
App. A at 22a.) As did the court of appeals below, the court
in City of Green Forest stated: “We recognize that there may
be some cases in which it would be appropriate to let a
citizens’ action go forwatd in the wake of a subsequently-
filed government enforcement action.” 921 F.2d at 1404. In
City of Green Forest, the court deemed the consent decree
negotiated by the U.S. E.P.A. sufficient to avoid that
eventuality: “In view of the consent decree in the instant case
negotiated by the EPA and Green Forest, however, this is not
such a case.” Jd. After a review of the state’s history of non-
enforcement and the failure of the hastily-assembled
settlement even to chart a course towards compliance by the
District with its permit obligations (after more than thirty
years of noncompliance), however, the court of appeals
below remanded this case to the district court with directions

to determine whether this is “such a case.”

18

Indeed, the District itself reveals the lack of a conflict
between the decision below and City of Green Forest. In
straining to make two cases applying the same law to very
different facts appear to conflict, the District accuses the
court of appeals below of “paying lip service” to the
appropriate standard. (Pet. at 19.) In other words, the
District acknowledges that the court of appeals identified the
standard correctly, but argues that the court applied it
incorrectly. Even if it were true that the court of appeals
misapplied the correct standard below — and it is not — that
would not justify a grant of certiorari: “A petition for a writ
of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists
of . . . the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”
S. CT. R. 10.

Were these reasons not enough to deny this Petition,
there is yet another: this case is currently ongoing before the
district court, which is addressing state law issues that may
well moot this appeal or, at the very least, render any opinion
of this Court advisory. For example, even in the unlikely
event that this Court were to conclude that Wisconsin law
would bind Respondents to the settlement between the State
and the District although the State’s prosecution fell far short
of diligent, the district court could conclude, based on the full
record compiled during its ongoing proceedings, that this
case falls within Wisconsin’s fairness exception to its res
judicata doctrine. This Court’s ruling would not even control
the outcome of this case in that instance — and of course its
holding would be subject to a subsequent contrary decision
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which is the ultimate
arbiter of the scope of Wisconsin’s res judicata doctrine. Yet
“if the same judgment would be rendered by the state [here
lower] court after we corrected its views of federa! laws, our
review could amount to nothing more than an advisory

|

19
opinion.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041-42 (quoting
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1945)).

Furthermore, if the lower courts were to conclude on
remand that the State’s conduct constituted diligent
prosecution sufficient to invoke the bar of Wisconsin’s res
judicata doctrine — though Respondents acknowledge that
this is an unlikely outcome — then this Court’s proceeding
would prove moot as well. /d.; see generally Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969) (“It is well settled that
federal courts may act only in the context of a justiciable case
or controversy.”); cf Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653
(1895) (noting that an appellate court that had jurisdiction
over an appeal when it was filed nevertheless must dismiss
the appeal when subsequent events moot the appeal).

Il. The Judgment Below Does Not Conflict With
Precedent From Other Circuits And Is Consistent
With Gwaltney.

The court of appeals did not “‘adopt[] an interpretation
of § 1365(b)(1)(B)’s diligent prosecution provision that
requires the district court to second-guess the State’s choice
of remedy” (Pet. at 20) and consequently did not create any
split among the circuits. To the contrary, the court of appeals
expressly “recognize[d] that diligence on the part of the State
is presumed.” (Pet. App. at 23a.) Not a single court of
appeals, however, has ever held that the presumption of
diligence accorded the State is irrebuttable; such a holding
would render the Clean Water Act’s diligent prosecution
requirement a nullity.

What the court of appeals actually did, therefore, was
apply the proper legal standard for diligent prosecution to the
unique factual record presented by this case. That record
revealed a history of State enforcement so inept that the

20
District has not had to comply with its permit or the Act for
more than two decades. (Pet. App. at 3la.) The factual
record also revealed that the State, having failed to
commence any enforcement proceeding against the District
until after Respondents filed their citizen suit, hastily agreed
to a settlement that effectively provided the District with
another decade of relief from having to comply with its
permit. (/d.) Specifically, the record below contained,
among other proofs, the District’s “own admission that the
2002 Stipulation is aimed at reducing, not eliminating,
violations. .. .” (/d.) Even so, the court of appeals did not
conclude as a matter of law that there was no diligent
prosecution and therefore no res judicata; rather, it remanded
to the district court for a more careful analysis of the
diligence issue. (/d. at 32a-33a.)

The contention that, by citing to Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1991), the court of appeals added to a circuit split and
abandoned Gwaltney of Southfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), is just plain wrong.
The court of appeals cited Atlantic States twice. First, it did
so as authority for rejecting Respondents’ argument that
privity can never be established between a suing citizen and
the State when the citizen suit precedes State enforcement.
(Pet. App. at 22a n. 9.) Second, the court of appeals cited
Atlantic States for the unremarkable proposition that courts
may consider as one factor in assessing the diligence of a
State prosecution “whether violations will continue
notwithstanding the _ polluter’s settlement with the
government.” (/d. at 3la.) The District surely does not
complain of the former, and cannot locate a single case
holding that the latter is not a proper factor to consider in
assessing diligence.

21

As for Gwaltney, the District’s repeated suggestion
that the court of appeals has abandoned that decision is
incorrect. (See Pet. at 12, 16, 20.) In fact, the court of
appeals cites Gwaltney in support of its discussion of the
reasons that the State is presumed to have acted diligently.
(Pet. App. at 22a-23a.) But Gwaltney does not create an
irrebuttable presumption that the State is diligently
prosecuting a suit filed after commencement of a citizen suit
that challenges ongoing violations; to the contrary, its
hypothetical discussion focuses on whether citizens may file
suit addressing past violations “months or years” after the
Government concluded its enforcement as to those violations.
484 US. at 61. Hence, Gwaltney is quite different from this
case. Indeed, here the court of appeals simply remanded to
the district court with directions to determine whether the
facts rebut the presumption of diligent prosecution. (Pet.
App. A at 32a-33a.)

Similarly, the District’s effort to portray a conflict
| among the circuits based on the decision below, on the one
hand, and Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas,
Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (see Pet. at 20-25) or North
& South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552
(1st Cir. 1992) (see Pet. at 22-25), on the other, is equally
incorrect. The court of appeals commenced its privity
discussion with a quote from Comfort Lake Ass'n v. Dresel
Contracting, 138 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1998), a case decided by
the Eighth Circuit four years after its Arkansas Wildlife
decision. (See Pet. App. at 2la.) Arkansas Wildlife is
perfectly consistent with Comfort Lakes — indeed, both
opinions were authored by Judge McMillian — and thus with
the decision below as well. The court of :.ppeals also cites
Scituate with approval in its discussion of the presumption it
was according the State in this case. (See id. at 24a.) In

pS

22
other words, even though their outcomes may differ, all of
these cases apply the same legal principles.

The District also tries unsuccessfully to demonstrate a
circuit split using Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461
(6th Cir. 2004). But Ellis cites with approval to Atlantic
States, see 390 F.3d at 475 — the very decision that, the
District claims, lured the court of appeals below into a circuit
split with Ellis. Obviously, if both Ellis and the decision
below rely on Atlantic States, they do not stand on opposite
sides of a circuit split over whether Atlantic States misstates
the law.

The court of appeals below reached an outcome
different from that in these cases not because it was applying
a different standard — and not even because it was applying
the same standard differently — but rather because the
underlying facts of this case are different from the facts in
those cases in many outcome-determinative ways. The
Arkansas Wildlife decision is a perfect illustration. That case
differs from this in no fewer than four key particulars, each
of which would justify a different outcome under the same
law. First, Arkansas law allowed the Arkansas Wildlife
plaintiff to intervene as of nght in the State’s action, which is
consistent with the federal scheme. 29 F.3d at 381.
Plaintiffs in this case, however, had no such comparable right
under Wisconsin law. Second, the administrative order at
issue in Arkansas Wildlife actually required compliance with
the law, whereas here the State has not required the District
to comply with its permit or the law. Jd. at 378. Third, in
Arkansas Wildlife the plaintiff was allowed limited
jurisdictional discovery — a necessary benefit the district
court denied Plaintiffs. /d. Fourth, the Arkansas state
agency actually imposed civil monetary penalties against the
violating entity; here the State has never penalized the

23
District for its repeated SSOs. /d. There is, therefore, no
conflict of law for this Court to address.

Ultimately, the court of appeals was not even directly
addressing federal law here. (Pet. App. A at 22a.) Rather, it
was seeking guidance from federal law on the state law issue
of privity under Wisconsin’s doctrine of res judicata.
Consequently, the decision below does not have a direct
impact on the development of what constitutes diligent
prosecution under federal law. Moreover, because it
addresses state law, this decision remains subject to rejection
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Review by this Court
would be pointless.

Perhaps most important, the decision below was
forged in the furnace of the factual record before the lower
courts. . The State’s lax conduct here overcame the
presumption favoring the State, at least at the dismissal stage,
thus requiring a remand to develop a fuller factual record.
The facts — at least as known at this preliminary stage — do
not make this case an appropriate vehicle for making legal
decisions of broad and general import. See Taggart v.
Weinacker’s Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 225 (1970) (dismissing
certiorari as improvidently granted where the legal question
was “overshadowed by special facts of the case’’).

24
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

KAREN M. SCHAPIRO BARRY LEVENSTAM*
DEwITT Ross & STEVENS S.C. ROBERT L. GRAHAM
13935 Bishop’s Drive JAMES A. VROMAN
Suite 300 STEVEN M. SiROS
Brookfield, WI 53005 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
(262) 754-2840 One IBM Plaza

Chicago, IL 60611
(312) 222-9350

“Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Respondents Lake Michigan Federation and
Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers

February 2, 2005

ST OME FE EET FETE MEY ORS)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1256%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
