# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rodriguez v. Vander Jagt

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 543 U.S. 1187

## Text

CF, ae U2.
04 867 DEC > 7 298

No. OFFICE OF THe Cy,

IN THE |

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.,
Petitioner,

v.
Guy Vander Jagt, Esq., Harrison Pledger, Esq., Law
Offices of Pledger & Feord, LP; HFP INC.; IOTA Part-
ners; Jack Harbeston; Edris E. Harbeston; Jerome

Barron; and Murdock & Co.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari
- To the Supreme Court of Virginia and The Fairfax
County Circuit Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Counsel for Petitioner

THE LAW OFFICES OF RODRIGUEZ, SIBLEY, &
MENDOZA, L.L.P.

2304 Farrington Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22303-1520

(703)960-0225

In 1988 Petitioner Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. —
(“Rodriguez”) was specifically retained as an active
Virginia attorney to provide pro hoc vice legal services
to Respondent SSA Entities’ $10 Billion contract claim
against the Republic 'of Colombia, described by Con-
gressmen Dan Burton and Phil M. Crane, “as the largest
private claim by American citizens against a foreign
state pending in the world.” In 1998-SSA Entities’
Lobbyist Respondent Guy Vander Jagt surreptitiously
negotiated a settlement involving the lobbying for Plan
Colombia to include $300 million of “soft money,”
simultaneous with SSA Entities dissolving and fraudu-
lently transferring their claims. Therefore based on
Virginia State Bar Ethics Opinion issued under VA Code
§ 54.1-3910, to Rodriguez confirming that though his
pro hoc vice practice was outside of Virginia the VSB’s
jurisdiction, and his right to sue SSA Entities for fraud,
this Complaint was filed to enforce his perfected VA
Code § 54.1-3932 attorney’s lien, and to protect this
lien from the VA Code § 18.2-500 business conspiracy.
But the Courts of Virginia in discriminatory unpub-
lished summary orders dismissed the action and
denied him of the rights granted by special legislation
of the General Assembly to all other Virginia Attorneys.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY
CLAUSE ARTICLE IV, SEC. 2 OF THE U. S. CONSTITU-
TION WAS VIOLATED BY THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA
DISCRIMINATORY REFUSAL TO ENFORCE AND
PROTECT FROM THE FRAUD OF SSA ENTITIES,
VANDER JAGT AND PLEDGER, RODRIGUEZ’S STAT-

(i)

UTORY RIGHTS UNDER VA CODE § 54.1-3932 AND §
18.2-500, GRANTED TO ALL OTHER VIRGINIA AT-
TORNEYS LOCATED IN VIRGINIA, BECAUSE HIS PRO
HOC VICES PRACTICE IS OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA
THOUGH UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE VIR-
GINIA STATE BAR?

2. WHETHER THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA
VIOLATED RODRIGUEZ’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION BY THEIR DISCRIMINATORY REFUS-
ING TO ENFORCE AND PROTECT HIS STATUTORY
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER VA CODE § 54.1-3932
AND § 18.2-500 BECAUSE HE IS A VIRGINIA ATTOR-
NEY PROVIDING PRO HOC VICES SERVICES OUTSIDE
OF VIRGINIA?

3. WHETHER THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA
VIOLATED RODRIGUEZ’S RIGHTS UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITU-
TION TO EQUAL PROTECTION BY THEIR DISCRIMI-
NATORY REFUSAL TO PROTECT AND ENFORCE HIS
PERFECTED VIRGINIA ATTORNEY’S LIEN UNDER VA
CODE § 54.1-3932 AND § 18.2-500 BY NOT GRANT-
ING HIS DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL AS REQUIRED
BY THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION AND VA CODE §
8.01-336, AND NOT COMPLYING WITH THEIR OWN
STARE DECISIS ON ENFORCEMENT OF SPECIAL
LEGISLATION?

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ......-- (i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......--eeeeeeeees (iii)
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........---- (v)
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW .......----- 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......----++-- 1
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.4(c) ...-- 2
U.S. and VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONS, AND VIRGINIA

STATUTES INVOLVED ........-..----- 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......----++++e> 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........-------- 9

I. THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE IN
VIOLATION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND IMMU-

NITY CLAUSE ARTICLE IV, SEC. 2 OF THEU.S. -

CONSTITUTION AND SHERMAN ANTITRUST
ACT THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DENIED
RODRIGUEZ AS A VIRGINIA ATTORNEY OF
HIS RIGHT TO A PRO HOC VICE PRACTICE
OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA UNDER THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR BY
DISCRIMINATORY DENYING HIM OF HIS
STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHTS .....--- 9

(iii)

A. Privilege and Immunity ............ 12
B. Sherman Anti Trust and Privilege and Immu-
Set 4a-¢0'0s on 6 O46 a ae ae eee eae 17

Il. THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE
COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DISCRIMINA-
TORY DENIED RODRIGUEZ OF DUE PROCESS
IN NOT ENFORCING AND PROTECTING HIS
STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHTS GIVEN TO
ALL VIRGINIA ATTORNEY LOCATED IN
VIRGINIA BECAUSE HIS PRO HOC VICE
PRACTICE IS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE BUT
UNDER THE VSB’S JURISDICTION. ..... 19

Ill. | THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE
COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DISCRIMINA-
TORY DENIED RODRIGUEZ EQUAL PROTEC-
TION OF THE LAWS BY NOT PROVIDING THE
DEMANDED JURY TRIAL AND NOT FOLLOW-

SOUUs EPRI DG, in ca cccccccucede 21
A. Bosal Protection .... 1... cc ccc ccccs 21
B. Demand for Jury Trail ............. 22
C. The Court of Virginia ignored
ES C06 oho ets ae 25
RAGE 6 Ohh 54 ake KES Ok eek 29

Appendix A--Orders, Relevant Portions of Transcript
Below, and Virginia ‘ate Bar Ethics Opinion.

Appendix B--U.S. and Virginia Constitution, and
Virginia Statutes.

‘ (iv)

onc es

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases:

English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d 36, 39 (4 Cir.
WOOD ocak cecesdenneseenean 14, 16, 20, 26, 27

Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) .. 14

Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) ..... 15
Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (CA7 1984)

- so case cd eekeahicesesed ea eras wee wae eure 23
Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991 F.2d 100, 103-04 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 182 (1993) ....... 19
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701,
33 L.Ed. 2d 548 (1972) ......c2eccceeeee 12, 19
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ..... 23

Brown v. Sparks, 262 Va. 567, 554 S.E.2d 449 (2001)

Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200, 212, 24 S.E. 830,
B33 (1G9G) onc cncdcnaccadidegetsneveeees 24

Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 52

L. Ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34, 6 Ohio L. Rep. 498 (1907)
lanatneaseecdsnnasss4e464100.0052—00— 22

(v)

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98
S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978) ........... 18

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (CCED Pa.
i: DPPPrrrrTrrrrrr Tet 12, 13

Edlow v. Arnold, 243 Va. 345, 347, 415 S.E.2d 436,
GST CESSES oc éntkecdaeeu oe cece eeeeeees 24

EPLUS Technology, Inc. v. Patricia Aboud et al, 155
F.Supp2d 692 (E.D. VA 2001) ............ 12,17

Etheridge [v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376
S.£.26 SEB GOUGP) 0 ccstvcascacccouseuas 10, 24

Fary v. Aquino, 218 Va. 889, 241 S.E. 2d 799 (1978)
0000000ctéeeweeeeeb bs bbe eee eee 27

Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) ......... 15
Garcia v. San Antonio MTA, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 44 L.Ed.
2d 572, 95 S.Ct 2004, reh. den 423 U.S. 886 (1975)
PITTS TTT eee ee 17

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) ........ 14

Hinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958 at
064, 234 $2.26 Bee CISTI) cxcscsnnsseunens 27

(vi)

ee ee

at Cer ee wey =

Hughes v. Cole, 251 Va. 3, 465 S.E.2d 820(1996).
cde veesekewnckoe Oa benen ae eeeeneee 11, 26, 27

In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 14 S.Ct. 1082, 38 L.Ed.
GEO CIDE) 2c cccscccccccoscccssccosessen 21

Katopodis v. Liberian S/T Olympic Sun, 282 F.Supp. 369
(E.D. Va. 1968) .......cccccccccccsccccess 27

Knoingsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77
S.Ct. 722 1 L.Ed. 2d 810 (1957) ...........-- 22

M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473,
117 S. Ct. 555-107 (1996) ........------es 23

Mandel v. Allen, 81 F.3d 478, 481 (4th Cir. 1996)

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) . 19

Montavon v. United States, 864 F.Supp. 519 (E.D. Va.
BOE. ov ciccnneynsennsccecsnsdscensevaes 27

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109
S. Cz. 2765, m. 6 C19BD) 2. ccccccccccccceces 23

New York. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)
ee Sey er re reer re ee 19

Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 83 S.Ct. 1363, 10 L.
Ed. 2d. 456 (1963) ......ccccccccccccceces 21

(vii)

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539,
og eS i. re 23

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 93 U.S. 2694, 33
Eo eo ba coo ak od awe eens 12

Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, 257 Va. 1, 509
De CE kana cbeceecdeses Secee 10°24

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)

Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d. 170 (4" Cir. 1933) ... 27

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77
SAX. 7T5a, 1 LAGSAESIO C1957) 2 cee cdccsdess 21

Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1418 (4th
ahs SE ia) Sos each dn ow le Ge ee a eee 19

Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 355 S.E.2d
—¢) 8 is POPP EP ERE EPT CLT TET TEC Terre 28

Supinger +. Stakes, 255 Va. 198, 203, 495 S.E.2d 813
PE +c tdscecnrwkepk canes bee nates 24

SEED 62d kb capaho ca Wkwees ee ene vedas 15, 26

SRO 04 4460 tower Senos wankeceeeeeee 14, 15

(viii)

ee eS ee °

Swekel v. River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259 (CA6 1997)

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.
Ed. 1460 (1948) ......cccccccccsecccccces 17

Turner v. Lotts, 244 Va. 554, 422 S.E.2d 765 (1992)

Warren Christopher, Former Secretary of State, et AL,
Petitioners V. Jennifer K. Harbury, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
4647, 536 U.S. 403; 122 S. Ct. 2179; 153 L. Ed. 2d
iy Ce 1 a ree Pre ee eee 22

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94
S. Ct. 2963, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 336 (1974) ....... 23

Constitution, Treaty, Statutes, and Regulations:

Art. I, Section 8, cl. 3, United States Constitution 17
Article IV, sec 2 of the U.S. Constitution . 12, 16, 22
5" Amendment to the Constitution ........ 19, 23

14 Amendment to the Constitution . 14, 16, 20, 26,

a7
15 U.S.C. Sec. 1, Sherman Antitrust Act ....... 17
28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) and (bD) .......---- +e eee 2

(ix)

Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia . 24, 27
Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia . 11, 26

Article IV, § 14 of the Constitutien of Virginia ... 10,

26, 27
VA Code § 18.2-499 and § 500 settee teen e ees 12
VA Code $18.2-500 ......0cceees 14, 16, 20, 25
VA Code § $4.1-S910 . wc cc cccccccccesn 5, 17, 20
VA Code § 54.1-3932 ..ccccccsccsace 10, 11, 17
WA COORG COL SIS cicccccecscensnesas 24, 25
Miscellaneous Material:
1992 Va. AG 155 ...... ke aes 14, 16, 20, 26, 27
1996 Va. AG 23 ....... PT Te ee Tee TT Ore 11

(x)

aa

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished orders of the Supreme Court of
Virginia whose review is sought are reproduced in the
Appendix at A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5. The unpub-
lished bench and written summary orders of the Fairfax
County Circuit Court (“Circuit Court”) whose review is
sought are reproduced in the Appendix at A-6, A-10, A-
11, and A-16."

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Virginia denied motions
for a stay of the mandate on November 5, 2004 (A-1
and A-2). As to Respondents HFP Inc.; IOTA Partners;
Jack Harbeston; Edris E. Harbeston; Jerome Barron;
and Murdock & Company (“SSA Entities”),” the panel

la.” references are to pages in the first section of the
attached Appendix. :

2SSA Entities are a joint venture that assumed Sea Search-
Armada and Armada Company’s claim to 15 treasure troves targets
sunk in the territorial/international waters off the coast of
Colombia valued at $10 Billion (“Treasure Trove”): (i) Respondent
IOTA Partners LP, is an Idaho limited partnership organized by
Respondent Jack Harbeston in 1988, for the sole purpose of the
“salvage of treasure trove in or about Colombia,” which is owned
by Sea Search-Armada and Armada Company; (ii) Respondent
Murdock & Co., and James Barron are the main investor in IOTA
Partners; (iii) Respondent HFP, Inc., is owned by Harbeston and
incorporated in the State of Washington, to serve as the General
Partner of IOTA Partners LP. Because Sea Search-Armada and
Armada Company fraudulently dissolved in 2002 and their assets
were secretly transferred to SSA Entities, they are not parties.

1

of the Supreme Court of Virginia entered an order on
October 12, 2004 (A-3), refusing the appeal of the
summary bench order of the Circuit Court dated
February 27, 2004(A-9 and A-10). As to SSA Entities
Chief Lobbyist Respondents Guy Vander Jagt (“Vander
Jagt”), and their attorney Harrison Pledger and the
Law Firm of Pledger & Feord LP (“Pledger”), on Octo-
ber 1, 2004 the Supreme Court of Virginia denied a
Petition for Rehearing (A-4). The panel of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia entered an order on August 13,
2004 (A-5), denying appeal of the summary bench
order of the Circuit Court dated January 23, 2004 (A-
15 and A-16). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257(a), Article IV, Sec. 2, of the
U.S. Constitution, and the V and XIV Amendments.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.4( c )

The Court is informed that 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b)
may apply and this Petition has been served upon the
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Neither the Supreme Court of Virginia nor the Circuit
Court certified to the Attorney General that pursuant to
Article of IV, sec. 2, the 5“ and 14 Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution the constitutionality of their rules of
procedure is called into question as depriving Rodri-
guez of the privileges and immunities of the laws of
Virginia as a Virginia attorney providing pro hoc vice
services outside of Virginia under the jurisdiction of the
Virginia State Bar, Virginia Code. § 54.1-3910, due
process and equal protection of his perfected Virginia
Attorney’s Lien for pro hoc vice legal services pursuant
to VA Code § 54.1-3932 and VA Code § 18.2-500.

ys

SAE Wa I RR gh Ae de eta baw idk

aaa neler hacsd esas

PRN Ne le a Me

U.S. and VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONS, AND
VIRGINIA STATUTES INVOLVED*

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, Art. IV,2 ..... B-1
AMENDMENT V .....----eeeeeeteeterret? B-1
AMENDMENT VII ....------eeeeetrrrteee? B-1
AMENDMENT XIV....------+eeesteereere? B-1

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, SECTION 11 ... B-1
Virginia Code § 54.1-3932. Lien ee B-2
Virginia Code § 18.2-499, Business Conspiracy . . B-2
Virginia Code § 18.2-500, Business Conspiracy . . B-3

Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1. Virginia’s Long-Arm
CN 8 pee ees ee esses essecese doses B-3

Virginia Code § 54.1-3910. Organization and govern-
ment of Virginia State Bar ....----+-++++++0> B-4

Virginia Code § 8.01-336. Jury trial of right; waiver of
Hp tad oo cece cece ce ccceecevces B-4

“B.” references are to pages in the second section of the
attached Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 2, 1988 when SSA Entities Chief
Lobbyist Vander Jagt was a Member of the U.S. House
of Representatives, he protested in the Congressional
Record (E-1806), the attempted “expropriation” of SSA
Entities contract claims to the Treasure Trove by Colom-
bia. Shortly thereafter in September 1988, Respondent
Jack Harbeston (“Harbeston”); on behalf of SSA
Entities retained Rodriguez as a Virginia Attorney
providing pro hoc vice fiduciary and legal management
services as their Legal Representative responsible for
the contract litigation against Colombia.*

Two years after the filing of the contract litiga-
tion against Colombia, due to SSA Entities failure to
pay invoices for services under their contract Rodriguez
filed for and obtained on February 27, 1990, Virginia
Bar Legal Ethics Opinion #1325 (A-18)(“VA Ethics
Opinion”), which stated,

. . . [Rodriguez being] admitted to practice in

Virginia is subject to the Virginia Code of Profes

“ THE COURT: Because I believe the motion is well
taken. That's the only reason I'm going to give you.

i: = 2 2 "
(At 10:37 a.m. proceeding concluded)
Joy R. Dawson, Registered Merit Reporter

A-9

VIRGINIA:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
RODRIGUEZ

Plaintiff/Complaint
V. Law No. 215327
Vander Jagt et al.,
Defendant/Respondent,
ORDER

This case came to be heard on the 27" day of
February, 2004, on the Defendants motion to dismiss.

Upon the matters presented to the Court at the
Hearing it is, ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED
as follows: that the motion of the defendants HFP, Inc.,
IOTA Partners LP; Murdock & Company; Jerome
Baron, Jack Harbeston and Edris S. Harbeston to
dismiss is granted. Further Ordered that these
defendants motion for sanctions is denied.
Entered, this 27" day of February, 2004.

/S/
Robert W. Wooldridge, Circuit Court Judge

Objection based on issues raised in Response
Brief, and as noted in argument.

/S/ ae
Isidoro Rodriguez R. Harrison Pledger, Jr.
Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for Defendant

A-10

VIRGINIA: | |
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.,

Plaintiff,
At Law No.
vs. 215327
GUY VANDERJAGT, ESQ., et al.,
Respondent.
* * = * *

The above-entitled matter came for motion
hearing on Friday, January 23, 2004, commencing at
11:50 a.m., at 4110 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax,
Virginia, before Deborah Rinaldo, Notary Public,
M.A.R. Reporting Group, Professional Court Reporters,
www.mar-reporting.com, (703)534-1225

BEFORE:
THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR.

* * * * *

MR. MCDONOUGH (Page 6, line 12):.... I represent
the attorney who was hired by SSA and its various
entities and general partners in defense of the lawsuit
by Mr. Rodriguez to try to collect his claimed attorney's
fees that he earned representing that entity.

It's our position that this is --really what Mr.
Rodriguez is trying to do is to prosecute that core case
against his former client and he wants to do it in

A-11

Virginia. He's been rejected twice by the Eastern
District of Virginia, and those were affirmed on appeal.

The petition to the U.S. Supreme court was
denied and now the second federal case has gone
through Eastern District of Virginia, Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and now that’s on petition to the
Supreme Court. I suspect that will be rejected as well.

Mr. Rodriguez wants to have those claims heard
in Virginia. In order to do that he has added Mr.
Pledger and his law firm and Mr. Vander Jagt as
individual defendants of the claim solely to try to get
jurisdiction in Virginia to his claims.

He doesn’t want to go where the federal court
told him to go. The federal Court told him, you don’t
have proper jurisdiction in Virginia. You may have
claims. Go to them in the right court.

That's our position there today. It's the same

thing again. If he wants to pursue his attorney's lien,
he needs to go against his former client, SSA in a
proper jurisdiction following the federal court's
instructions on that regard. ...
MR. RODRIGUEZ (Page 9, line 15):. . . .This case
essentially involves statutory rights on the attorney's
lien as well as a business conspiracy statute. And the
benchmark, as stated by Supreme Court in dealing with
statutory construction, is Abby v. Willey, W-I-L-L-E-Y, at
497 southeast 526-253 Virginia 88, 1997.

And I quote, "Where the legislature has used
words of a plain and definite import, the court cannot
put upon them a construction which amounts to
holding the legislature did not mean what it has
actually expressed."

With regard to those two statute, there were two

A-12

2
4
sf

clear public expressions of policy that the Virginia
legislature intended. One was the payment of ar
attorney for his fees if he was dismissed prior to the
termination of litigation of contracts; and two, if there
was an attempt to deprive him and damage him of his
business convention to have a cause of action.

Now, the [interpretation of ] Virginia statute of
attorney's lien from the Virginia Supreme Court in
Hague v. Cole says it very emphatically. And I quote,
"Virginia Code 54-392 is broad and permits no
interpretation limits to the benefits of [the] statute to
a Virginia lawyer."

The business conspiracy _ statute says,
"Conspiracy is an agreement between two individuals
or more who by concert in action seek to commit an
offense." . . . That's in Bowman v. Commonwealth, 11
Virginia Appeals 259 (1990).

Again, the Virginia Court of Appeals stated in
Brown v,. Commonwealth at 10 Virginia Appeals 73
(1990), "Proof of an explicit agreement is not required.
The agreement may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. |

What we have here is a lobbyist/negotiator/
attorney by the name of Guy Vander Jagt, former
congressman, who form 1988 to the present or to
sometime - - unspecified time was the negotiator of a
contract litigation against the Republic of Colombia.

At the same time that I was legal representative
for the entities that was litigating and forced to be in
Colombia, when the negotiations began and I began to
inquire [in 1998], then shut me out. I cam forward to
Virginia to find out what occurred.

A-13

THE COURT: I have read your motion for
judgement and I’ve read the amended motion for
judgement. We are really dealing now with the issues
that are raised on the demurrer.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Page 12, line 20) The issue is whether or not giving
12 years of participation as a chief lobbyist/negotiator
[by] Mr. Vander Jagt, all of a sudden the entities that
I had been litigating [for can be permitted to ] simply
disappear.

They negotiated some type of settlement in the
Republic of Colombia and dissolved ....

Now, Mr. Pledger, during the period that I was
attempting to exercise my rights [as a Virginia
Attorney] under the Virginia code, and Mr. Vander ~
Jagt, as well as in the federal district court in the
District of Columbia, raised the issue as if it was [only
a simple] contract suit.

They used whatever influence they had. Ans as
I pointed out int the [U.S. Supreme Court petition,
unless there is an exception--The Rodriguez exception
to the Virginia statute that permits the federal [and
state] courts to ignore the statutory language and
simply decide the case on contracts, there is a prima
facie case that has to go to a jury....

(page 13, line 13) .... [the demurrer] as the
Court knows, in effect accepts as true, for purposes of
he demurrer, all of my allegations in the first amended
complaint.

The only question before this Court is a legal
one, whether the statute that gave me the attorney's
lien. . . deserves the protection of the statute against a
business conspiracy.

A-14

(Page 14, line 18). . . . there is not one citation
to the statutory issue which was the basis of the
gravamen of the entire complaint. . . .

Because of that fact that the case was never
dealt with, the gravamen of the complaint [regarding
rights under Virginia Statute], they dealt with the case
[as if it were] a contract, the twin doctrines of
collateral estoppel or res judicata are not germane.
And I fact, the business conspiracy statute was never
even discussed.

The Court (page 16, line 3) The defendants'
demurrers are sustained without leave to amend, and
I dismiss these defendants as parties in this case. I
dismiss the claims against them.

The defendant’s motion for sanctions is denied.
The plaintiffs motion are moot. give me an order
please before you all leave.

A-15

VIRGINIA:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq..,

Plaintiff/Complaint,
v. Law No. 215327
Guy Vander Jagt et al.,
Defendant/Respondent,

ORDER

This case came to be heard on the 23 day of
January, 2004, on the Defendants motion to Strike,
Demurrer and Sanctions filed by Pledger and by
Vander Jagt. ,

Upon the matters presented to the Court at the
Hearing it is, ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED
as follows: Pledger’s motion to Strike and Motion for
Sanctions is denied and Vander Jagt’s motion to strike
and Motion for Sanctions is Denied. Pledger’s
Demutrrer is Sustained and all claims against Pledger
individually and Pledger & Feord are dismissed with
prejudice. Vander Jagt’s Demurrer is sustained and all
claims against Vander Jagt are dismissed with
prejudice.

_Entered, this 23rd day of January, 2004.

/S/
Robert W. Wooldridge, Circuit Court Judge

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Objection to dismissal of
Vander Jagt and Pledger.
Objection to dismissal
with prejudice.

/S/ /S/
Isidoro Rodriguez Counsel for
Counsel for Plaintiff Defendant Vander Jagt
/S/
Counsel for
Defendant Pledger

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[SEAL]
50 Years Public Service
Virginia State Bar
1938-1988

VIRGINIA STATE BAR
Tenth Floor, Ross Building, 301 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 2319 (804)786-2061

(804)736-5966 (Voice/TDD)
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS

February 27; 1990
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Isidoro Rodriguez C., Esquire
Calle 84 No. 56-51

Piso 2, Oficina 4
Barranquilla, Colombia S.A.

Re: Legal Ethics Opinion # 1325

Dear Mr. Rodriguez:

I am writing in response to your letter dated January
3, 1990, requesting an informal advisory opinion
from the Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on
the Legal ethics (“committee”).

You have advised that, although you are a member of
the Virginia State Bar, you reside and practice in a
South American country. You further indicate that
you entered into an agreement, which was executed
in Idaho, to represent a foreign corporation in the
negotiation, settlement, and/or litigation against a
foreign government resulting from the corporation’s

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claim as finder of a shipwreck which contained an
estimated $3 billion in treasure. The agreement
provided for an hourly fee rate, costs, and monthly
detailed invoices and was affirmed by the
corporation’s Board of Directors which also named
you as Legal Representative for the corporation. You
have described for the committee that a Legal
Representative In the country in which you practice
is distinct from an attorney at law and is the
commercial. representative for the company in that
country with all of the corporate powers of the Board
of Directors and all, of the potential individual
liability. Furthermore, such a Legal Representative is
not required to be an attorney at law. Subsequent to
those corporate actions, you were authorized to bring
a legal action against the foreign government and
you authorized your then-law partner, which
partnership has subsequently been dissolved, to file
the suit as Attorney of Record. The facts you have
provided indicate that the suit was filed shortly after
you authorized your partner to do so.

You indicate that, although much time has been
expended on the case and the corporation repeatedly
expressed satisfaction with the work being performed
by your firm, the corporation has failed to comply
with its contractual agreement to pay invoices after
they were presented. Specifically, the corporation
agreed to pay $10,000 approximately two months
after suit was filed and an additional $50,000 within
30 days thereafter. The first payment ($10,000) was
made as scheduled, but no further payments have
been made by the corporation. Subsequent to that

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first payment, the corporation requested a contingent
fee agreement be submitted for consideration; such a
contract was prepared and submitted, but the
corporation has not responded.

In addition to the failure to pay fees, you indicate
that the corporation, without your knowledge, sent a
defamatory letter against the foreign government
which then prepared an official protest to the United
States Embassy. You indicate that the letter accused
the government and unnamed officials of criminal
acts, subjecting you, as the corporation’s Legal
Representative, to civil liability and both you and
your former law partner to physical danger.

As a result of both issues, failure to pay fees and
costs owed and the defamatory latter, you requested
that the corporation retain a new Legal represen-
tative and a new attorney. You indicate that to date
you have not received any response from the corp-
oration’s Board of Directors.

Finally, you advise that under the law and profes-
sional norms of the foreign government, your former
lev partner has a right to unilaterally and voluntarily
withdraw from the litigation, without any
requirement to seek permission of the trial court. You
indicate that he may also file a civil suit against the
corporation for monies owed during or after litiga-
tion. Your former partner has not exercised those
rights pending your receipt of this informal

advisory opinion.

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You have asked that the committee opine as to the
propriety of your renunciation of your fiduciary
appointment as Legal Representative to the
corporation in view of the non-payment of costs and
fees owed and of the defamatory letter sent by the
corporation to the foreign government. You have
further inquired as to the propriety of your instituting
suit against the corporation for their non-payment of
fees and costs owed.

The appropriate and controlling rules relative to your
questions are DR 1-102(A) (4) which prohibits a
lawyer from engaging “in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation which reflects adversely
on [the] lawyer’s fitness to practice law”; DR 2-
108(B)(2, 3, and 4) which proscribe the conditions
which permit a lawyer to withdraw from
representing a client; DR 2—108©) which directs
that counsel of record in a court proceeding may not
withdraw except by leave of court after notice to the
client of the timeand place of a motion for leave to
withdraw; and DR1-102(B) which instructs that a
lawyer admitted to practice in Virginia is subject to
the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility
although engaged In practice elsewhere, unless
disciplinary rules of the foreign jurisdiction permit
the activity [emphasis added].

The committee is of the opinion that the provisions
of DR 1-102(A)4) embrace far more than an
attorney's conduct in the context of an
attorney/client relationship. Thus, the committee

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opines that when an attorney assumes the
responsibility of acting as a fiduciary and violates his
or her duty in a manner that would justify
disciplinary action had the relationship been that of
attorney/client, the attorney may be properly
disciplined pursuant to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The committee thus specifically
adopts the conclusions reached in ABA Formal
Opinion 336. See also: State. v_Freeman, 229 Kan.
639, 629 P.2d 716 (1981); and Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Gross, 322 N.V2d 82 (Iowa
1982).

Virginia Disciplinary Rule 2-108(B), subsections (2),
(3), and (4), directs that a lawyer may withdraw
from representing a client if (2) the client persists in
a course of conduct involving the lawyer’s services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is illegal or
unjust; (3) the client fails to fulfill an obligation to
the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and such
failure continues after reasonable notice to the client;
or (4) the representation

will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably
difficult by the client. The committee is of the
opinion that, under the facts you have provided, it
would nét be improper to move to withdraw as Legal
Representative for the corporation. See also LEO
#974. The committee understands, however, from
your recitation of the facts, that such permission of
the court is not required in the foreign country in
which you practice. Under those circumstances, the
committee directs your attention to

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DR 1-102(B) which, as noted above, would control.
Therefore, if the professional norms in that country
permit unilateral and voluntary withdrawal from
representation without authorization by the court, it
would not be improper for you to act accordingly.

The committee has earlier opined that there is no
disciplinary rule ethically prohibiting an attorney
from bringing an action against his client for past-
due attorney’s fees end costs. See LEOs #974 and
995. Guidance I available under Ethical
Consideration 2-25 which urges that a lawyer should
not sue a [current] client for a fee unless necessary
to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client.
See LEO 11117. But see LEOs #1230 and 1257.

This opinion is advisory only, based only on the facts
you presented and not binding on any court or
tribunal.

Very truly yours,
Kathleen O’Brien

Encl.

cc: C. Torrence Armstrong, Esquire
Willard M. Robinson, Jr., Esquire
Susan B. Spielberg, Esquire

A-23

U.S. CONSTITUTION, PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art IV, 2,
provides that the "Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States."

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides in pertinent part, that no person shall “be
deprived of . . . property, without due process of
law.”

The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at
common law, .. . , the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved... .” |

The Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that, “No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the iaws.”

VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION AND VIRGINIA
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, SECTION 11. DUE
PROCESS OF LAW; OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS;
. ..3 JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES.

That no person shail be deprived of his .. .
property without due process of law; that the

B-1

General Assembly shall not pass any law impairing j
the obligation of contracts, . .
That in controversies respecting property, and
in suits between man and man, trial by jury is prefer-
able to any other, and ought to be held sacred....

Virginia Code § 54.1-3932. Lien for fees.

Any person having or clajming a right of
action sounding in. . . contract, may contract with
any attorney to prosecute the same, and the attorney
shall have a lien upon the cause of action as security
for his fees for any services rendered in relation to
the cause of action or claim. ...

Title 18.2 Crimes and Offenses Generally , Chap. 12
Miscellaneous, §§ 493 - 510, Art. 2 Conspiracy to
Injure Another in Trade, Business or Profession, §§
499 - 501

Virginia Code § 18.2-499. Combination to injure
others in their reputation, trade, business or
profession: right of employees

(a) Any two or more persons who shall
combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or
concert together for the purpose of wilfully and
maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade,
business or profession by any means whatever, or for
the purpose of wilfully and maliciously compelling
another to do or perform any act against his will, or
preventing or hindering another form doing or
performing any lawful act, shall be jointly and
severally guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. Such
punishment shall be in addition to any civil relief

B-2

recoverable under § 18.2-500.

(b) Any person who attempts to procure the
participation, cooperation, agreement or other
assistance of any one or more persons to enter into
any combination, association, agreement, mutual
understanding or concert prohibited in subsection (a)
of this section shall be guilty of a violation of this
section and subject to the same penalties set out in
subsection (a) hereof.

Virginia Code § 18.2-500. Same; civil relief;
damages and counsel fees; injunctions. —

(a) Any person who shall be injured in his
reputation, trade, business or profession by reason of
a violation of § 18.2-499, may sue therefor and
recover three-fold the damages by him sustained,
and the costs of suit, including a reasonable fee to
plaintiff's counsel; and without limiting the
generality of the term, “damages” shall include loss
of profits. Such counsel shall in no case receive any
other, further or additional compensation except thai :
allowed by the court and any contract to the contrary
shall be null and void.

Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1.

When personal jurisdiction over person may
be exercised.

A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to
._a cause of action arising from the person's:

1. Transacting any business in this
Commonwealth;...;

B-3

3. Causing tortious injury by an act or ))
omission in this Commonwealth;
4. Causing tortuous injury in this Common-
wealth by an act or omission outside this
Commonwealth if he regularly . . .engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from . . . services rendered, in
this Commonwealth;. . . .

Virginia Code § 54.1-3910. Organization and
government of Virginia State Bar.

The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and
regulations organizing and governing the Virginia
State Bar. . . . All advisory opinions issued by the
Virginia State Bar's Standing Committees on Legal
Ethics . . . shall be incorporated into the Code of
Virginia....

Virginia Code § 8.01-336. Jury trial of right; waiver
of jury trial... .—

A. The right of trial by jury as declared in
Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia
and by statutes thereof shall be preserved inviolate to
the parties.

B. Waiver of jury trial. — In any action at law
in which the recovery sought is greater than $100,
exclusive of interest, unless one of the parties
demand that the case or any issue thereof be tried by
a jury, ..., the whole matter of law and fact may be
heard and judgment given by the court... .

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pom eS

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_1237%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.