# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Musgrave v. Hoyos

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 546 U.S. 818

## Text

Ce U.S.
eo i1LED

OkLOOCMAT 20 Aled

IN THE
GOrricE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

KENDRA MUSGRAVE,

Petitioner(s),

against

INEZ Hoyos, HON., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE, HOUSING PART Q, Civit CouRT
OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK,

Respondent(s)

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KENDRA MUSGRAVE
Pro Se
9985 Appletree Place
Thornton, Colorado 80260
303-452-2854

A AT TE ATR SENATE MEO PE SCO cP ape ee eee

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Can courts under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of
abstention a) bar party who is a stranger to a proceeding,
from a filing a federal claim for cause arising out of such
proceeding; b) and make findings of fact and conclusions of
law?

2. Can a civil judgment be enforced against a) parties
joined in interest who have never filed such partnership in
accordance with local, state, or federal statute, and there
exists no legal recording of such partnership with any
county or secretary of state or any federal database in
relation thereto; b) otherwise against “John Doe,” and “Jane
Doe,” each as a party?

3. Does Defendant have immunity from this federal
claim?

4. Does a judge who contradicts statute or direct order
violate his or her oath of office?

ea ee ee Re

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, Kendra Musgrave, pro se, 9985 Appletree Place,
Thornton, Colorade 80260. Defendant, Inez Hoyos, a
hearing officer, whose powers are derived from New York
City Charter §§1041-1047 and the New York City Civil
Court Act, assigned to Housing Part of New York City Civil
Court, New York County (Manhattan).

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ati cititinlsstthaniehinsessitsinschtnanctencsinsanesdinias ok l

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS....1

EAL SRIMIOD COP TERE CAG in cscccessncecsacscosssonsicnssnssanancence l

II. COURTS CANNOT DENY JURISDICTION ON
ROOKER FELDMAN AND ISSUE FINDINGS OF
FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. .....cccccccscseseee 12

III. COURTS CANNOT RULE UPON A THIRD
PARTY LETTER, NOR SECOND CIRCUIT
UPHOLD SUCH RULING; AND NYAG CANNOT
BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE. ............ccsesecsesseees 14

IV. PIERSON V. RAY IS INAPPLICABLE.
DEFENDANT KNEW AND RELIED UPON THE
DISMISSAL, WITH PREJUDICE, OF NYC91440 02
AS AGAINST KENDRA MUSGRAVE AND
SUBSEQUENT TO DISMISSAL THERE WAS A
CLEAR ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION. .........0..... 19

V. THERE IS NO JURISDICTION FOR AT WHIM
SUA SPONTE ADDITION OF PARTIES OR
ALTERATION TO COURT RECORD OR ISSUING
A WARRANT AGAINST ANYONE AND
EVERYONE AS DEFENDANT KNOWS;
SUBSEQUENTLY THERE IS A CLEAR ABSENCE
ce ths ot cae ape ES AP Rene 21

VI. PIERSON V. RAY IS INAPPLICABLE. JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO
See SUN iitisiinitticcenbiniisctntinthsciitda mvc 22

Si i ile

VII. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY
FOR ACTS TAKEN OUTSIDE OF HER
GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION WHICH IS A
CLEAR ABSENCE OF ALL JURISDICTION........ 23

VIII. DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF
JURISDICTION BY STATUTE OVER NYC91440
02 AND SUBSEQUENTLY THERE IS A CLEAR
ABSENCE OF JURISDICTON. ............cccscscssssssseeees 25

IX. COURT FAILED, TO PROTECT DOCUMENTS,
EVIDENCE, AND PRIMARY WITNESS TO BE

‘USED FOR TRIAL, WHICH WAS UPHELD BY
SECOND CIRCUIT, THUS DENYING PLAINTIFF

Se Be snes diiletiiiinkaatelaipiih disci huiinhia 29
8 RN MRC MR IED 8 Thar Sa COT IE 30
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Crist v. Town Court, 156 F.R.D. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) .0.0........ 5

200-202 West 107th Street LLC v. Braun, Civil Hosing Court
New York County, NYLJ May 1, 2002, p. 23 col. 2........ 26
423 S. Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse 503,

ee RIE om EE Sa Te 5
and citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,

id EEF Fp scsesetiesisteciinhiddanchniiadlcapiasiiibadabibiiittetiniteibiaitasbmniiaes 10
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois

Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-329 (1971)......cccccccccssesees 10
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois

Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).....cccccsscssssseeseseeeee 11

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 94 S.Ct. 2963 1977. 5, 18
Boyd v. Carroll, 624 F.2d 730, 732-733

CS es Fe dtngntnadeahcdiatetamakbintinass 13, 20
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).........00000000. 5, 20
Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d 843 (CA9 2002). 11
Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)............ 5

Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President

Government, 279 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2002) ......cccsecsesessess 13
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
SD TT: GEE Ca iit cctchiiceilalbciekci it a 7, 8, 13

Douglas v. Collins, 152 Misc. 839, 273 N.Y.S. 663 (Sup Ct,
Kings Co, 1934), aff'd 243 App Div 546 (2nd Dept 1934),

aff'd 267 N.Y. 557, 196 N.E. 577 (1935) ..ccccscccscseseeees, 5, 23
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1941).....cccccssesssseees 5, 18
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)......ccccccsssesscessssssssecesesess -y
Exxon Mobil Corp., v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,

PRG CRs ER saline siccttaiiiteaedas eee eS 3 7, 8,9
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) .....ccccccccsesecsssssees 5, 20
Saar W. Bll, SREB, Th CGY ii ici i 5
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) ..cccscccccccscssssssessees 11
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 Sere ncittiiischaaaist 10
Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) w.ccccccccccecesesescsssceseceees 1]
Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) ....ccccccccccececssssscseees 10
Haring v Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 (1983) ....cccccececscseseesees 1]
Hartford Courant Company v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83

a PD iiciiiescasscineiaicechinlibliiicab ic tias insti a 6, 11
Heines v. City of Buffalo 436 NYS 2d 512 NY App 4th Dept.,

RDA. sssoanisisheininbesitagsidadjeabnichladsiamamainkiinicaeaaba teas: cits 5,12
Heintz, et al. v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) .....ccccccssseseseeees 26
Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291,

ore 6) COO. TA viii ee 13, 20
Hoya Saxa, Inc. v. Gowan, 149 Misc.2d 191;

571 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App Term 1991) .u.......ccccescscscesescscsees 27
Inre Roy Moore,__U.S.__,__S.Ct.__, 2003

WOE, DEP PIS seus catcnibaliisephieskcdccteuhaciicns oii ete es ee 18
Jersey Street Associates LLC v. Quality Cleaning Corporation

N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 2002. [Westlaw] ............cccccccccesssessssees 25
Johnson v. DeGandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) w.cccccccsssesecssssssecees 9

Kellman v. State of New York, __N.Y.S.2d__, 2005 WL
954643, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 25155, NYLJ April 26, 2005,
ES 2. 8 ppanienenmartenenmn namie) | Use al many cr re aie

La Pier v. Deyo 100 A.D.2d 710 (3rd Dept 1984)...........0.+. 25

ili

Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (CA7 1980).........-0++ 23
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 31 L.Ed.2d

G50 2DT DD iccisnisinsinionstiniineiiiailieiatasatearaiaalie hadi 5
Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 52 (CA2 1988), cert. den.

yt GY, a eer ee 5,24
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) ...ccscsssssssssssseee 5, 21, 22
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759 (1989) .sccscccccccssssssssseees 5,9
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) ......ccccccsssssssssseeee 10

Mennella v. Lopez-Torres, 229 AD2d 153,
655 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2nd Dept 1997), aff'd 91 N.Y.2d 474,

672 N.Y.S.2d 834, 695 N.E.2d 703 (1998) ......cccceeceeee 5, 22
Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F. 3d

195 (199-20B) (CA 1996) acccocccccececcccsesesccerescoscsccsseseveseseaee 7
Monroe v. Pape 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ....c.ccccccseeseeereersenenenees 12
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) .....cccceceereereereeneeee 5

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154-155 (1979).... 10
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964). 19
NLRB vy. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529-530,

BR, 10 (BIDE). .cccoccoscesercresccesnecssesnesensiestesteosbenensessosseesssnstensen 10
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, n.7 (1979).... 11
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) .......cccsecseeeseerensees 13
Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (CA9 1982)......... 20, 23
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir 1985)............ ll
Romea v. Heilberger & Assocs., 988 F. Supp. 712

(SDNY 1997), aff'd 63 F.3d 111 (CA2 1998)...........cce000 26
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)........00+ 7,8
Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (ED

Permnsylvamia, 197°7).....c.cccccccccccoscscscccsccccssscssscsssccsocsesccoecs 22

Soldal v. County of Cook United States 506 US 56 (1992) 5, 6
Stone v. Williams, 766 F.Supp. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd., 970 F.2d 1043 (1992), cert. denied, 124 L.Ed.2d 243

seceneseqnsescsoossnstessenbensatentennestenelessentessebenssinusssaseshsnnisestesuensnns 1]
Totaram v. Cordero, NYLJ, April 16, 2003, p.22, col.3 ...... 27
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc v. Pope, 485 U.S.

7B (1 DRG) scecccersessesssccsercnsincesonsensssesoneseteedsnssesonabeessnsnsnenes 10

iv

U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F2d 116, 120

a Ge, Ba cccersecnserecsrsenmnsninsnicatinntaiitiliiiatadasitibtaatans 18
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).........ccccc0000 18
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 66 L.Ed.2d 392.............. 5
William L. Bonnel Co., v. Katz, 23 Misc. 2d 1028,

1031 196 N.Y.S. 2d 763, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1960)...........000. 26
Wong Wing Fai Co., S.A. v. United States, 840 F2d 1462,

PRES hs Ce ee SED cttintcsieenchieapiteninteinaninrinitaates 18
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,

5 Sa re a icscimnnustsersinsiciiannnaiesisnbanisiniabsdaintpniiniibaiatiaidiis 10
Statutes
ee are By ee inteeaarneriscinnsiceteaneieiniticinneiiianiimeaiiaiiaes l
SB ie Se rey Be iccersensntntneniscnsennnphignainntsins sangesenninuieaniitin l
NIIUE> SETaP IT cccctnsiiipncesscendnnineunnccesnininintbenbabtinnnenninamaianmielonatias 18
Executive Order No. 11222 issued May 8, 1965, 30 F.R. 6469

ecenseonsnstnahennteqeventiepneantonszenasngiennqussinnabauhbanpenemeebimeunisduescanians 18
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204, July 30, 2002 .. 29
Other Authorities
Oey GENUINE xonscssnncennseinsinsenntinscstanendenlishinedsabieieabtionsl 14
Rules
Se a l
gE ee Ne ET 1, 17, 20
PAE NEE TID socscintpsensetinnanigecscvemiennatniaieinttentibnbinaiiiaiinieeniatibads l
gy ne ne CLT ey 1, 17, 20
Paar SN ED inicsecetecsisincnisciadaniieeiniindasiintaniinlandiabaianaiina 1, 13, 20

Constitutional Provisions

Constitution of the United States of America, 14" Amendment
RC a ee eR eae EE ES COPE NE 11,18

Constitution of the United States of America, 4th, 5th, 7th,
CE Be I ccertikerientsiictit ed es l

sentivieidenneesatbeeinhdeidnihaihiipuuhiiitnasstiasiiantiicbiataibaneisbunnivastitetntiindibi 11,18
Constitution of the United States of America
FRE OR ELLA EN OY HE I CINE RULE 14, 25

Constitution of the United States of America,
Be BG picecnncttettnitinsciteinnninnintiainnntannasiine l,
New York State Constitution Article 6..............cccccccccseeeeeeees

New York Civil Practices & Procedure

OG G1 ented FOB cccssnscccscccssssececencecononensscncsieosessecaseaconsnssncocscenees
BIO IZ ....cccccoccsnseccssensecenscasncsnnsssssscounanssssecososnasssnssescsossesscesscess
BE SI ao anccssacescecescennnsnesnnnsnsteneresensasnennnsennsnessnsanconnsasssonsenienah

SE SEL CO ICN AAR OCR AMR Th
TELESALES GAT EAE AI

New York Statute

DET BI cccncensnceccnssccocnncensnncensnsensnnenscsncssenshanennensansoonennte
AE, BE BO1 ete FER cencncesecncccnnsitnrnececenccccsnssssccscscsnssscsonssennss
MDL §328(3)........... PERE © EL Bk OTR TC ENS
Peis CGIOOE GS BA BB cccccsccccnenscnnenteccsstasasncccscccncncsnnssesccnees
PemTe Cee L600 BET ccsacccascecsssscsssccnscsnnnseccezacsccssnsccssannese

TERE ee ee creer cree

Peay Wears Clty CRUG OP csccaccscnccnscsnscsccnsnecncscsessnnteessosinescennss

vi

OPINIONS BELOW
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 USC §1251(1) and by
extension granted by this Court to file Petition on or before
May 20, 2005.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Constitution of the United States of America, 4th, 5th,
7th, and 14th Amendments; Constitution of the United States
of America, Article I, Section 9; Article 6, Clause 2; 42 USC
§§ 1983, 1988; 28 U.S.C. § 453; FRAP 31; FRCP Rule 56;
FRCP Rule 12; FRCP Rule 8(c); FRCP Rule 7; Local Civil
Rule 12.1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After an illegal seizure of Kendra Musgrave’s bank
account obtained by altering captions to make Kendra
Musgrave a party to a $9,855.18 money judgment issued by a
hearing officer (“JHO”) in Housing Part of Civil Court, New
York City, New York County (“Housing Part”) under New
York County L&T Index No. 83622/00 “NYC83622/00,
which judgment was never served, not even to the bank, and
the Housing Part file to which Kendra Musgrave was then
denied access to for almost a year; a portion of the alleged
judgment creditors then sued Kendra Musgrave, whose
address of 9985 Appletree Place, Thornton, Colorado 80260,
was court record, in New York County L&T Index No. 91440
02 (““NYC91440 02) as a partner joined in interest to tenant,
(“Dr. Margareta Griesz-Brisson & Kendra Musgrave
Respondent Tenant’’).

As is exhibited to Complaint and Amended
Complaint, after attorney for alleged creditors declared to
Housing Part that he did not know Kendra Musgrave’s
address and finally “No, she’s not a tenant,” JHO Shlomo
Hagler, dismissed with prejudice NYC91440 02, as against

Kendra Musgrave for lack of jurisdiction, the first day that the
matter appeared on the calendar.

No appeal was ever taken from the dismissal of the
petition (with prejudice) as against Kendra Musgrave. No
motion for reconsideration or renewal was ever made in
regard to that order.

Defendant rendered final judgment for subject
premises and over $20,448.35 against tenant, Dr. Margareta,
Griesz-Brisson, only under NYC91440 02. With contempt
then pending in New York City Civil Court, New York
County, NYC83622/00, for attorney’s willful non-compliance
to restore bank account, inter alia, to Kendra Musgrave,
Defendant then added Kendra Musgrave, and as a partner
joined in interest to tenant, on warrant of eviction Defendant
issued in NYC91440 02, so such warrant was executable
against “Dr. Margareta Griesz-Brisson & Kendra Musgrave
tenant,” also “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” each, as tenants,
making each liable fully to such judgment creditors for
judgment property and over $20,445.35.

In New York warrants of eviction are never available
to the public.

Plaintiff sued Defendant pursuant to 42 USC §§1983
1988, in her official and personal capacity in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York on or
about August 8, 2003. Plaintiff sought a temporary
restraining order pending injunction hearing; an injunction;
declaratory judgment, jury trial and the costs and fees thereof
from the federal court.

Defendant was personally served according to statute
and service was deemed proper.

In complying with clerk’s procedural instructions to
ensure proper service, Kendra Musgrave called New York
City’s Corporation Counsel, and the Office of the Attorney
General of the State of New York (“NYAG”), expecting
NYAG to refuse service. New York City Corporation

- |

ounsel refused service. NYAG requested service “just to be
safe.”

NYAG was previously contacted when Kendra
Musgrave’s bank account was seized, no judgment was
recorded, served, and otherwise denied access to Housing Part
file.

Court granted hearing on injunction scheduled
August 23, 2003 (“Hearing”) but denied temporary restraining
order pending hearing.

At NYAG’s request, NYAG was served courtesy copy
of Summons and Complaint (03 CV 5994) at approximately
4:00 p.m. August 13, 2003. ;

At approximately 9:00 a.m. August 14, 2003,
possession of subject premises was taken from Dr. Griesz-
Brisson, the tenant, locking up tenant’s exempt property
including, documentary evidence, stored information, as well
as court record made record exhibited in the federal court,
which was Plaintiff's supporting evidence, to the instant
action, and making also unavailable tenant for trial.

Original service papers were filed with the court. The
damage being done Plaintiff sought to enjoin, Plaintiff
requested at Hearing an injunction at least against the use of
plaintiff's name as a partner joined in interest to Dr. Griesz-
Brisson or anyone, without authorization, and against taking
or withholding of Plaintiffs personal property under
Defendant’s colour of authority; which Court denied but
never reduced to written order.

Assistant Attorney General William B. Jaffe remained
present at Hearing, but did not sit at Defendant’s table, make a
formal appearance on the record, or speak but a few word
words. The District Court ruled from the bench New York
was “not a necessary party.” The District Court also ruled
from the bench, denying Plaintiff injunction sought, but did
not reduce to written order.

The District Court then granted permission to Mr.
Jaffe, who did not participate in the Hearing, to write a letter

Sn

to court to influence the court to dismiss Plaintiff's action,
exhibited in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The court’s
docket is void of any filings by Defendant, NYAG or Mr.
Jaffe.

The District court deemed Plaintiff indigent status;

As is exhibited in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Mr.
Jaffe wrote the District court a letter on NYAG letterhead
dated August 23, 2003, citing “Rooker-Feldman” and
“absolute immunity” as court’s basis dismissing Plaintiff's
action.

After Defendant’ time to file an Answer expired, the
District court ruled upon Mr. Jaffe’s letter, dismissing
Plaintiff's action on Rooker-Feldman, and, Pierson v. Ray,
which order was then mailed to Plaintiff in Colorado.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or in the
alternative a default judgment was not docketed and returned
by mail Plaintiff in Colorado.

In Order dated September 26, 2003, Court denied the
transcript of record made of hearing held August 23, 2003,
necessary to appeal. The transcript is therefore missing from
the Appendix, filed with this petition.

Without this transcript, Plaintiff then appealed to
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(“Second Circuit”), arguing that District Court’s order was
void on its face: there was no “motion,” of any kind, for court
to “grant;” Rooker-Feldman, was inapplicable; Defendant was
not immune; Defendant otherwise defaulted; failure to grant
injunction contradicted federal statute and violated Plaintiff's
rights; and denial of the transcript necessary appeal, especially
an oral ruling, denied her due process, inter alia.

In Order filed February 2, 2004, Second Circuit
ordered appellee’s brief filed within thirty days (April 6,
2004) after appellant’s brief (March 5, 2004).

NYAG did not appeal District Court’s ruling at
Hearing, the only hearing, in action, that New York State was
“not a necessary party.” Without any motions or brief filed

by appellee, Plaintiff, in motion dated April 17, 2004, moved
the court to grant her appeal in its entirety. Second Circuit
denied motion “moot” because NYAG, without prior motion,
filed April 20, 2004 oversize, third-party appellee’s brief,
which brief contained voluminous argument, never raised or
asserted in the District court. Second Circuit then denied
Plaintiff's motion to reject NYAG’s papers.

Because Second Circuit accepted NYAG’s brief on
behalf of appellee filed April 20, 2004, Plaintiffs time to file
a reply had expired.

Despite, clear rulings of this Court and other Federal
and New York State Courts in Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.
264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
66 L.Ed.2d 392; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Ex
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1941); Monroe vy. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 825, 94 S.Ct. 2963 1977; Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 506 (1978); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986);
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 759 (1989); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991);
Soldal v. County of Cook United States 506 US 56 (1992);
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992); Crist v. Town Court, 156 F.R.D. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Douglas v. Collins, 152 Misc. 839, 273 N.Y.S. 663 (Sup Ct,
Kings Co, 1934), aff'd 243 App Div 546 (2nd Dept 1934),
aff'd 267 N.Y. 557, 196 N.E. 577 (1935); Mennella v. Lopez-
Torres, 229 AD2d 153, 655 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2nd Dept 1997),
afPd 91 N.Y.2d 474, 672 N.Y.S.2d 834, 695 N.E.2d 703
(1998); and even most recently Kellman v. State of New York,
__N.Y.S. 2d ___, 2005 WL 954643, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op.
25155, NYLJ April 26, 2005, p. 18 col.1; as well as Heines v.
City of Buffalo 436 NYS 2d 512 NY App 4th Dept., 1981;
423 S. Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse, 503 N.E.2d 63
(NY 1986); Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 52 (CA2 1988),
cert. den. 489 U.S. 196 (1989); and Hartford Courant

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Company v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (CA2 2004); inter alia,
the Second Circuit then denied Kendra Musgrave’s appeal on
the abstention doctrine of Rooker-Feldman.

Obviously, the question for this Court is just how far
does Rooker-Feldman doctrine extend?

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Rather than. complex issues of law that requires
determination by the minds of our country’s highest court,
what is at stake in the instant action is fundamental and to all
U.S. law, thus affecting everyone in these United States, the
Constitution and all rights secured thereunder, which this
Supreme Court of these United States has the duty to protect.

There is no reason why a case such as this should have
to come to the Supreme Court of these United States. That it
does is, is precisely why certiorari should be granted: there is
no other court to repair to for justice.

The courts below so contradicted federal statute, state
statute, its own rulings, this Court’s rulings, supplanting the
supremacy of the constitution, this Court and Congress, that
this Court needs to address it for all of the federal courts.

Circuit court condoned debt collection practices
impact everyone in the nation.

The lower courts condoned procedural practice,
impacts everyone in the nation.

Court’s decisions are contradictory in and of itself:
Abstention under Rooker-Feldman is a non-waivable
jurisdictional defect, and judicial immunity is an affirmative
defense;

The act of taking of personal property without due
process of law or in compliance with statute has already been
condemned as an illegal search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment in Soldal v. County of Cook United States
506 US 56 (1992).

I. THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE DOES
NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.

The Second Circuit upheld the judgment of the
District Court, on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983) under Moccio v. New York State Office
of Court Admin., 95 F. 3d 195 (199-200) (CA2 1996) as
support for dismissal of Plaintiff's civil rights action; which,
is the very Second Circuit case which the United States
Supreme Court exemplified as improper extension of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine so as to override Congress’s
conferral of jurisdiction upon the federal courts concurrently.
Exxon Mobil Corp., v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., (03-
1696) (U.S. 2005).

In the landmark case of Exxon Mobil Corp., v. Saudi
Basic Industries Corp., the United States Supreme Court
revisited the subject of the Rooker-Feldman abstention
doctrine and held

“..the doctrine -has sometimes been construed to °
extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and

Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of

federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction

exercised by state courts, and superceding the

ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28

U.S.C. section 1738. See, e.g. Moccio v. New York

State Office of Court Admin., 95 F. 3d 195 (199-200)

(CA2 1996).” Exxon Mobil Corp., v. Saudi Basic

Industries Corp., (03-1696) (U.S. 2005).

After upholding the dismissal on Rooker-Feldman
grounds, the Second Circuit found, “In addition, as the district
court observed....”, upon which a discussion of judicial

immunity followed. It is dicta in the most classic sense. Each
court, the Southern District and United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld dismissal pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

The United States Supreme Court clarified the correct
limitation of the Rooker-Feldman-Exxon doctrine:

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is

confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine

acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-

Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant

preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed

doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss
proceedings in deference to state-court actions.”

Exxon Mobil Corp., v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,

(03-1696) (U.S. 2005).

Thus defined by the highest legal authority in the
United States of America, the Rooker-Feldman abstention
doctrine does not apply to the case on certiorari. Plaintiff was
not a ‘state-court loser’. She was not even a ‘state-court’
party. For lack of jurisdiction, the proceeding NYC91440 02
in Housing Part was dismissed with prejudice, as against her,
on the very first day that the matter appeared on the calendar
of that Court.

A stranger whom the court rules it has no jurisdiction
over, who subsequently receives a dismissal of that
proceeding with prejudice, cannot be described as a ‘loser’.
Self-evidently, Plaintiff had prevailed Housing Part by
obtaining the dismissal with prejudice. The action complained
of are ministerial acts which robbed her of that victory and
further posed gross violations to her civil rights.

The Plaintiff in this federal litigation has, like Exxon-
Mobil, “...plainly has not repaired to federal court to undo the
Delaware judgment in its favor...”. Exxon Mobil Corp., v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., (03-1696) (U.S. 2005). In this

case it is a New York decision which favored the federal
Plaintiff rather than a Delaware judgment, but the principle is
clearly the same.

Plaintiff was not inviting the court to review or reject
the fact that the Housing Part proceeding was dismissed with
prejudice as against her.

Rather, the case on certiorari is on point with Exxon,
in that an independent federal claim is being pursued by a
party which had also prevailed in state-court litigation. Exxon
Mobil Corp., v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., (03-1696) (U.S.
2005).

It has long been held that Rooker-Feldman does not
bar a federal suit by one who was not a party to the state-court
proceedings. Johnson v. DeGandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
Clearly, since the underlying action was dismissed against her
with prejudice, Plaintiff cannot possibly be mistaken for a
party to the state-court proceedings at the time of all of the
actions complained of. Thus Johnson v. DeGandy is
applicable and Rooker-Feldman is not.

In Martin v. Wilks the United States Supreme Court
upheld: “...the general rule that a person cannot be deprived of
his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party.”
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759 (1989). In that case Chief
Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Brandeis:

“The law does not impose upon any person absolutely

entitled to a hearing the, burden of voluntary

intervention in a suit to which he is a

stranger....Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal

proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that

a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal

rights.” Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989),

quoting Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S.

431 (1934).

“...[I]t is a principle of general application in Anglo-
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment
in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a

party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.” Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, (1989), quoting
Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) and citing Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, n.7 (1979); Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-329 (1971); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969).
Certainly the same can be said of one ruled a stranger by
having the proceeding against them dismissed with prejudice
on the first day the case appears on the calendar.

The two exceptions recognized in Martin v. Wilks do
not apply. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989). In that
case the exceptions were spelled out as follows:

“We have recognized an exception to the general rule
when, in certain limited circumstances, a person, although not
a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone
with the same interests who is a party. See Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940)(“class” or “representative” suits);
FRCP Rule 23 (same); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 154-155 (1979) (control of litigation on behalf of one of
the parties in the litigation). Additionally, were a special
remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive
litigation by nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or
probate, legal proceedings may terminate pre-existing rights if
the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process. See
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529-530, n. 10
(1984)(“[P]roof of claim must be presented to the Bankruptcy
Court...or be lost”); Tulsa Professional Collection Services,
Inc v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (nonclaim statute
terminating unsubmitted claims against the estate).” Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989).

The Court in Parklane Hosiery makes clear that the
reason for this holding is based upon Constitutional grounds.
“It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding
on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has
never had an opportunity to be heard.” Parklane Hosiery Co.

10

v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, n.7 (1979) citing Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 329 (1971) and Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940). See also, Constitution of the United States of
America, 5" Amendment and Constitution of the United
States of America, 14" Amendment.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has also
recognized that the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine does
not bar suit by parties who were not a party to the state-court
proceedings. Hartford Courant Company v. Pellegrino, 380
F.3d 83 (CA2 2004). The same case also held that Rooker-
Feldman does not apply to administrative acts. Hartford
Courant Company v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (CA2 2004).

The party who is essentially sent home and released
from the case must be allowed to rest upon that determination.
It would be absurd to suggest that due process can be rendered
by dismissing with prejudice against a person whom the court
ruled it had no jurisdiction over, only to then affect their
rights during the execution phase of final judgment in that
case.

In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991), the
Court stated: "But one general limitation the Court has
repeatedly recognized is that the concept of collateral estoppel
cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision
is asserted did not have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate
that issue in the earlier case", quoted also in Haring v Prosise,
462 U.S. 306, 313 (1983). See, also Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir 1985), vacated on other grounds, 91
L.Ed.2d 56, cited with approval by Stone v. Williams, 766
F.Supp. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd., 970 F.2d 1043
(1992), cert. denied, 124 L.Ed.2d 243:

Moreover, the warrant of eviction had already been
fully executed. A Ninth Circuit case on point demonstrates
how the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine can be mooted
by later events. Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d 843
(CA9 2002).

11

Although Plaintiff has no legal standing to appeal an
administrative proceeding she was ruled a stranger to, which
is the legally established fact and can be taken judicial notice
of in the court's own file, Second Circuit yet terminated her
action under the Rooker Feldman doctrine that she should file
for remedy, of some kind, in “state court.” The Second Circuit
thus improperly used the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
supplant by Monroe v. Pape 365 U.S. 167 (1961):

“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state

remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and

refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the
fact that Illinois by its Constitution and laws outlaws
unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to
present suit in the federal court.” Id. at.482.
quoted in Heines v. City of Buffalo 436 NYS 2d 512 NY App 4th
Dept., 1981; 423 S. Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse 68
N.Y.2d 474, 510 N.Y.S.2d 507, 503 N.E.2d 63 (1986).

For all of the reasons cited above, and most certainly
due to the fact Plaintiff, was ruled a stranger to the state-court
proceedings and that this case is in no way reconcilable with
the landmark holding of Exxon-Mobil v. Saudi Basic
Industries the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine does not
apply to this case. Plaintiff was not suing because “default
judgment was entered against her,” Plaintiff sued because no
judgment was entered against her, but was specifically
enforced against her, and as a partner joined in interest to
judgment debtor.

Il. COURTS CANNOT DENY JURISDICTION ON
ROOKER FELDMAN AND ISSUE FINDINGS
OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch dismissed this
federal civil rights lawsuit holding that “Judge Hoyos has
moved to dismiss the complaint under the Rooker Feldman
doctrine and on the basis of a judge’s absolute immunity from

12

suit. The motion will be granted. [Since] “the acts
complained of here were clearly ‘within [the] judicial
jurisdiction’ granted to Judge Hoyos. Therefore she is
immune on account of them. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967). ...[W]hat Ms. Musgrave seeks, essentially, is
review of Judge Hoyos’s decision to enter a judgment against
her. However, “a United States District Court has no
authority to review final judgments of a state court judicial
proceedings. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).”

That District Court dismissed Plaintiff's civil rights
action for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, the District Court by its own order, had no
jurisdiction to make any finding of fact, i.e., “the acts
complained of here were clearly ‘within [the] judicial
jurisdiction’ granted to Judge Hoyos;” and “what Ms.
Musgrave seeks, essentially, is review of Judge Hoyos’s
decision to enter a judgment against her;” or, to then make
any conclusion of law: “Therefore she is immune on account
of them. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).”

Abstention under Rooker-Feldman is a non-waivable
jurisdictional defect. Judicial immunity is an affirmative
defense. The court could not deny jurisdiction under the
abstention doctrine of Rooker-Feldman, then also rule upon
an affirmative defense. A contradictory order is void on its
face. An affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded (FRCP
Rule 8(c)); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President
Government, 279 F.3d 273 (Sth Cir. 2002). “Absolute
immunity is an affirmative defense that is waived if it is not
pleaded.” Boyd v. Carroll, 624 F.2d 730, 732-733 (Sth Cir.
1980). “Failure to plead judicial immunity waived the
affirmative defense.” Henry v. First National Bank of
Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 298 n.1 (Sth Cir. 1979).

Defendant was personally and properly served
according to statute. Defendant did not assert any defense.

13

The time to answer had expired before any decision was
rendered in the District Court.

There was no defensive argument the Second Circuit
could hear. That it did, was entirely at the expense of
Plaintiff's rights. Neither, can the Second Circuit cannot
uphold a decision rendered in response to a letter, or
otherwise, entertain third parties, certainly any third party, the
District Court previously ruled was “not a necessary party,”
when they happen to show up and declare a lack of
jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman; but then go on to render
findings of fact on about judicial immunity. It is
contradictory.

Ill. COURTS CANNOT RULE UPON A THIRD
PARTY LETTER, NOR SECOND CIRCUIT
UPHOLD SUCH RULING; AND NYAG
CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE.

The Defendant is a hearing officer to the Housing Part
which was created by New York City Civil Court Act §110
(“NYCCA”), which restricts Defendant’s subject matter
jurisdiction thereto.

Defendant is not an elected judge, and cannot rule
over any claims of equity over $20 as set forth by the
Constitution of the United States, 7" Amendment.

Officers and employees of county courts are county
and not state officers. 1925, Op.Atty.Gen.903.

New York State’s Public Officer’s Law §2 states “The
office of a state officer is a state office. The office of a local
officer is a local office.”

New York State’s Public Officers Law §17 sets forth a
very comprehensive list of those State employees whom the
New York State Attorney General can defend in court. The
term “employee” is specifically defined and includes, inter
alia, employees of the Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning
and Policy Commission; the Dormitory Authority; soil and
water conservation districts; the Roswell Park Cancer Institute

14

corporation; the tourism council; the Niagara River Greenway
Commission; the Governor Nelson A Rockefeller Empire
State Plaza Performing Arts Center Corporation; and various
and sundry others. It does not list Defendants (or even
judges) of the Civil Court of the City of New York on its
exhaustive list. In fact no New York City employees are
listed therein because New York City has its own Corporation
Counsel to represent New York City employees. The website
for the New York State Attorney General’s Office boasts that
they have 500 attorneys. The website for the New York City
Corporation Counsel’s Office claims they have 650 attorneys.
It is a wholly separate entity from the State Attorney
General’s Office. Corporation Counsel has adamantly refused
to represent the Defendant in this civil rights action, as raised
to the Second Circuit.

The terms of employment for a state attorney is that
such attorney can represent only State of New York. There is
a conflict of interests NYAG paid by the taxpayers of New
York, to represent any but the State of New York.

There is a conflict of interest between NYAG’s
representation of this Defendant and its duty to defend the
State of New York with its duty to protect civil rights and
investigate criminal complaints, specifically, those previously
made by Plaintiff of the illegal seizure of her bank account.

There further exists a conflict of interests between
NYAG’s representation of this Defendant and New York .
Attorney General’s received campaign funds from NYC91440
02’s alleged judgment creditors, as is public record and raised
to Second Circuit.

Further, the constitutionality of state legislation was
not at issue or made of issue as set forth in Amended
Complaint and is further evidenced in court’s decision
dismissing action. District Court’s Order is void of any
reference to state statute or even NYAG, as is the docket to
such proceeding.

As well, the record is void of any papers filed for
NYAG to join this action.

Further, if and when a state statute is in question, and
NYAG properly joins an action, under New York’s Civil
Procedure Law & Rules (“CPLR”) §1012 NYAG can only
represent New York to support the constitutionality of
legislation of a state statute. NYAG cannot represent the
constitutionality of state statute and this Defendant, and not in
this action.

Since the Corporation Counsel has refused to
represent the Defendant, Defendant is required retain her own
counsel, or proceed pro-se such as Plaintiff. It is a further
violation of Plaintiff's civil rights to have to be opposed by
the State Attorney General’s Office at the appellate level,
when it has no authority for any involvement in this litigation.
NYAG is sworn to uphold civil rights, an obligation it cannot
fulfill by denying persons civil rights or representing others
who do so, or get around that fact by writing a federal judge
to get a ruling.

At Hearing Mr. Jaffe did not make a formal
appearance on the record. The few words he spoke may or
may not have been heard by the court reporter. Mr. Jaffe’s
was presence recognized by the Court and Plaintiff by the
record. Mr. Jaffe or NYAG never filed a notice of appearance
for Defendant. No papers of any kind were ever filed, as the
docket plainly shows, by or for Defendant in any capacity.

At Hearing District Court ruled that New York State is
“not a necessary party,” to Plaintiff's action. No appeal was
filed on such ruling.

At Hearing, District Court invited Mr. Jaffe to write
the court a “letter,” which letter is exhibited to Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint.

In response to Mr. Jaffe’s letter, Plaintiff wrote:

“Actually, I do not recall your Honor Gerald E.

Lynch, granting permission to Assistant Attorney

General, William Jaffee, [sic] to write a letter

16

(attached) to the court as a motion for summary

judgment to dismiss §1983 action 03 CV 5994, I, the
pro se plaintiff, filed. Nor, do I recall when Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
suspended for such purpose. The only purpose for
which is further denial of due process, the course of
action taken precipitating the instant action. So
disposing of my action mano_a_mano, and more
especially when Mr. Jaffee [sic] has not so much as
filed a paper in this action, is highly inappropriate.”

After Defendant’s time had expired under statute to
file an Answer, the court dismissed this federal civil rights
lawsuit holding that “Judge Hoyos has moved to dismiss the
complaint under the Rooker Feldman doctrine and on the
basis of a judge’s absolute immunity from suit. The motion
will be granted.” ;

The Order is void on its face.

There was no motion to “grant.” The court’s docket is
void of any papers filed for or on behalf of and none, not even
an Answer was ever served on Plaintiff or filed by Defendant
in any capacity.

Mr. Jaffe’s letter, even as it appears, on NYAG
letterhead is not a proper Answer or motion under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, FRCP Rule 7. FRCP Rule 12. FCRP
Rule 56 as well as Local Civil Rule 12.1, which, as of
February 26, 2003 requires “[a] represented party moving to
dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings against a party
proceeding pro se...shall serve and file the notice required by
Local Civil Rule 56.2 at the time the motion is served.” No
such notice was ever served because there was no such
motion. Any motion.

The Supreme Court has instructed us time and again
that, "courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statue what it says there."
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992)

Plaintiff's action was dismissed in response to a letter
from NYAG Attorney General’s Office, which fact was flatly
ignored by the Second Circuit Court. Constitution of the
United States of America, 5th Amendment. Constitution of
the United States of America, 14th Amendment.

Imposing onerous conditions denies access to the
court (e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1941) (state
and its officers may not abridge or impair a petitioner’s
rights); meaningful access to the courts is due process right to
“a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed
violations of fundamental rights to the courts.” Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 94 S.Ct. 2963 1977; Violation of
due process is not discretionary. Wong Wing Fai Co., S.A. v.
United States, 840 F2d 1462, 1470 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1988).

No court has discretion to violate constitution, statue
or applicable regulation. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United
States, 837 F2d 116, 120 (3rd Cir. 1988); In re Roy Moore,
__US.__,__—S. Ct. __, 2003 WL 21978095, quoting,
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).

“Article VI of the Constitution of the United States

provides that Constitution ‘is the Supreme Law of the

Land ... and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any

State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ The justices

of this Court are bound by solemn oath to follow the

law, whether they agree or disagree with it, because

‘All of the officers of the government, from the

highest to the lowest are creatures of the law, and are

bound to obey it.’ (Aug. 20, 2003)

“Any person in government should: Uphold the
Constitution, laws and regulations of the United States and of
all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion.”
5 USC §7301, Executive Order No. 11222 issued May 8,
1965, 30 F.R. 6469.

Confident in their belief that the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Second Circuit Scheduling Orders

18

are as inapplicable to them as New York Public Officer’s Law
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were below, without
any prior motion, NYAG, ‘vithout prior motion, then filed two
weeks after the expiration for filing appellee’s brief, an
oversize brief to advance various arguments not made below.
The docket shows no arguments or representations below.
There was therefore no argument that the court could hear on
behalf of Defendant, who was personally and properly served.
Yet, the Second Circuit accepted such filing, made the day
Plaintiff's reply was due. Therefore, Plaintiff was denied
even the opportunity. Plaintiff could only move the Second
Circuit to reject NYAG’s papers, which Second Circuit also
denied.

Second Circuit then upheld District Court on Rooker-

Feldman. Yet, Second Circuit’s failure to obtain jurisdiction
under Rooker-Feldman, somehow did not take away its
jurisdiction to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and
issue dicta about judicial immunity as with the Southern
District Court below. Nor did the Second Circuit address the
issue that it was upholding a letter — a letter from NYAG, a
third party, influencing a judge’s decision in a federal action.
In so doing the courts distinguished a superior class which is
repugnant to the constitution.
“The American Colonists were not willing, nor should
we be, to take the risk that ‘(m)en who injure and
oppress the people under their administration (and)
provoke them to cry out and complain’ will also be
empowered to ‘make that very complaint the
foundation for new oppressions and prosecutions.’
The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's St. Tr.
675, 721-722 (1735) (argument of counsel to the
jury)” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
300 (1964).

IV. PIERSON V. RAY IS INAPPLICABLE.
DEFENDANT KNEW AND RELIED UPON THE
DISMISSAL, WITH PREJUDICE, OF NYC91440

19

02 AS AGAINST KENDRA MUSGRAVE AND
SUBSEQUENT TO DISMISSAL THERE WAS A
CLEAR ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION.

Preliminarily, it must be noted that the one who is
claiming immunity has the burden of legally establishing that
immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978):

"No man in this country is so high that he is above the

law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance

with impunity. All the officers of the government,
from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law, and are bound to obey it.") (quoting United States

v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220, 27 L. Ed. 171, 1 S. Ct. 240

(1882)). Only when the person claiming absolute

immunity can prove that such immunity is justified

will we impose it”.
See also Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (CA9 1982).

Immunity is an affirmative defense which is waived if
not properly raised by an answer or a motion to dismiss.
FRCP Rule 12; FRCP Rule 8(c); Boyd v. Carroll, 624 F.2d
730, 732-733 (Sth Cir. 1980); Henry v. First National Bank
of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 298 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979). No
answer was ever filed in this case. The letter from the NYAG,
a non-party to this federal civil rights action, was not a
‘motion to dismiss' cognizable by the FRCP Rule 7.

Defendant is not an appellate judge. Defendant is not
a judge. Defendant does not have jurisdiction to overturn the
rulings of another hearing officer assigned to the Housing
Part, and specifically JHO Hagler’s who had previously
dismissed with prejudice NYC91440 02 as against Kendra
Musgrave for lack of jurisdiction.

Housing Part decisively ruled it did not have
jurisdiction over Kendra Musgrave and dismissed the
proceeding with prejudice as against Kendra Musgrave.
Defendant JHO Hoyos cannot un-rule it to obtain jurisdiction
over Kendra Musgrave, and most certainly not after the
proceeding was over.

20

No appeal or reconsideration was brought by anyone
seeking to reverse the dismissal of the case as against Kendra
Musgrave. The record exhibited to Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint is clear Defendant well knew of such ruling and
relied on such ruling of JHO Hagler, prior to issuing a warrant
of eviction against “Dr. Margareta Griesz-Brisson & Kendra
Musgrave tenant.”

The petitioner-landlord had previously stated to
Housing Part that Kendra Musgrave was “not a tenant.”
Kendra Musgrave is not on the lease as is Housing Part’s
record. Kendra Musgrave is not on any lease as is Housing
Part record. There is no record of any legal partnership
Kendra Musgrave formed with Dr. Margareta Griesz-Brisson
to create “Dr. Margareta Griesz-Brisson & Kendra
Musgrave,” nor does Defendant have any authority to so
create one on behalf of either Dr. Margareta Griesz-Brisson or
Kendra Musgrave.

CPLR §4511(a) requires judicial notice of all common
law, statutes, and constitutions without request.

The non-payment case was dismissed with prejudice
specifically as against Kendra Musgrave for lack of
jurisdiction.

This is as clear as clear absence of jurisdiction gets.
Jurisdiction was clearly absent as a matter of law.

Defendant’s clear lack of jurisdiction over Kendra
Musgrave is incontrovertible as Defendant well knew. It was
a matter of law, and a very straightforward and uncomplicated
matter of law. The law does not protect “the plainly
incompetent [and] those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).

V. THERE IS NO JURISDICTION FOR AT WHIM
SUA SPONTE ADDITION OF PARTIES OR
ALTERATION TO COURT RECORD OR
ISSUING A WARRANT AGAINST ANYONE
AND EVERYONE AS DEFENDANT KNOWS;
THERE IS A CLEAR ABSENCE OF

21

JURISDICTION.

The law does not protect “the plainly incompetent
[and] those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335 (1986).

VI. PIERSON V. RAY IS INAPPLICABLE.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO
MINISTERIAL ACTS

Defendant’s actions complained of are ministerial
acts. The New York State Court of Appeals, the highest legal
authority in the State of New York, held that the issuance of a
warrant of eviction was ministerial act. Mennella v. Lopez-
Torres, 229 AD2d 153, 655 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2nd Dept 1997),
aff'd 91 N.Y.2d 474, 672 N.Y.S.2d 834, 695 N.E.2d 703
(1998). Thus, when the New York State Appellate Division
recognizes the issuance of a warrant of eviction as a purely
ministerial act and when the highest legal authority of that
state, the New York State Court of Appeals upholds that
decision, we have an authoritative statement from the highest
legal authority in New York pertaining to New York
jurisprudence. That should be afforded great deference.

During the execution phase of a non-payment
summary proceeding in Housing Part, the warrant of eviction
is the paper which allows the marshal to physically evict
persons from real property. It is a creature of statute; the New
York State Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
(RPAPL) and RPAPL §749 in particular. These warrants are
never in a Housing Part file and are not available for public
review. To quote Plaintiff's Amended Complaint quoting a
New York City Housing Court Clerk, “That’s between them
and the judge.”

Many administrative acts have been found to be
outside the pale of judicial immunity. Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219 (1988) (employment decisions); Santiago v. City of
Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (ED Pennsylvania, 1977)
(administration of juvenile detention facility); Richardson v.

22

Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (CA9 1982)(Hawaii state judicial
selection commission denied immunity);

In Lopez v. Vanderwater a judge was held to be
immune from civil suit for his acts which were judicial in
nature, but was not immune from suit for acts which were
non-judicial in nature. Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229
(CA7 1980). When a judge’s actions are not judicial acts,
immunity will be denied.

New York State courts have also applied this rule
denying immunity in relation to non-judicial acts taken by
judges. That a judge’s alleged defamatory remarks were a
judicial act raised a question of fact for the jury. Douglas v.
Collins, 152 Misc. 839, 273 N.Y.S. 663 (Sup Ct, Kings Co,
1934), aff'd 243 App Div 546 (2nd Dept 1934), aff'd 267
N.Y. 557, 196 N.E. 577 (1935).

In Kellman v. State of New York, _-N.Y.S. 2d _,
2005 WL 954643, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 25155, NYLJ April 26,
2005, p. 18 col.1. Justice Lack of New York Court of Claims,
held New York Supreme Court Justice F. Dana Winslow
liable for acts which occurred after the judicial phase of that
proceeding, for what the court deemed a ministerial act..
Justice Lack wrote, “the judicial nature of the act was
completed when Justice Winslow signed the order of
attachment.”

Judicial acts are protected rather than judicial actors
because the United States Constitution forbids the granting of
titles of nobility. Constitution of the United States of
America, Article I, Section 9. If it were the person of the actor
rather than the act which was protected then this immunity
would be a_ personal privilege unacceptably and
unconstitutionally akin to privileges granted to nobility under
monarchical systems of governance.

VII. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO
IMMUNITY FOR ACTS TAKEN OUTSIDE OF
HER GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION

23

WHICH IS A CLEAR ABSENCE OF ALL
JURISDICTION.

Defendant’s territorial jurisdiction is Manhattan, only.
As exhibited to Amended Complaint, in rendering her final
judgment in NYC91440 02 against tenant only, Defendant
took judicial notice of pending NYC83622/00 in Civil Court
stopping the proceeding to examine contents thereof.
Wherein motion for contempt filed in NYC83622/00 exhibits
her address at 9985 Appletree Place, Thornton, Colorado.
Colorado is time zones away from the territorial jurisdiction
of Defendant. Her territorial jurisdiction does not extend
beyond Manhattan. Colorado is not part of Manhattan.

As was raised to Second Circuit, acting beyond the
reach of one’s territorial jurisdiction was the very reason for
which judicial immunity was denied a New York State town
justice in Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 52 (CA2 1988),
cert. den. 489 U.S. 196 (1989). Wherein Second Circuit set
forth a test, including knowledge and intent, and as compared
to knowledge and intent of the status quo, for a civil action,
for determining a judge’s immunity — that no reasonable judge
would have thought jurisdiction proper — and— that the judge
whose actions are questioned actually knew or must have
known of the jurisdictional defect — as where a judge
“knowingly acts outside his territorial jurisdiction.” Maestri v.
Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 52 (CA2 1988), cert. den. 489 USS.
196 (1989).

At least Town Justice Jutkofsky had to look at a map
to determine the clear absence of his jurisdiction. He was
denied immunity because he knew, or must have known, that
his township was not adjacent to a township some two miles
distant. Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 52 (CA2 1988),
cert. den. 489 U.S. 196 (1989). All Defendant had to consult
was the contents of her own files, if she had forgotten her
statements and conduct on the record. She did not even need
a map.

24

In this case Defendant was acting in the clear absence
of jurisdiction. No reasonable judge could have thought it
proper to exercise such jurisdiction.

In the case of La Pier v. Deyo 100 A.D.2d 710 (3rd
Dept 1984) another New York State town justice was held by
New York State’s Appellate Division to have acted in a clear
absence of jurisdiction when he presided over a case in which
his own brother was the plaintiff. La Pier v. Deyo 100 A.D.2d
710 (3rd Dept 1984). That case at least required reference to
the New York State Judiciary Law which prohibits judges
from hearing cases involving their relatives. La Pier v. Deyo
100 A.D.2d 710 (3 Dept 1984). Defendant’ clear lack of
jurisdiction could be determined from her own statements,
judgments, rendered against Dr. Griesz-Brisson only, and the
official record without any need for further research.

CPLR 4511(a) requires judicial notice without request
of other jurisdictions.

VIII. DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF
JURISDICTION BY STATUTE OVER NYC91440
02 AND SUBSEQUENTLY THERE IS A CLEAR
ABSENCE OF JURISDICTON.

By statute, Defendant’s subject matter jurisdiction is
limited to certain residential landlord and tenant disputes. She
is not a full judge under New York law and may not grant
certain forms of equitable relief in accordance with the
Constitution of the United States of America, 7th
Amendment. Prime tenant, and only tenant, Dr. Margareta
Griesz-Brisson asserted counterclaims in her answer.

Exhibited as record to Amended Complaint,
petitioners to NYC91440 02 held no privity of contract with
tenant. Jersey Street Associates LLC v. Quality Cleaning
Corporation, N.Y .City Civ.Ct., 2002. [Westlaw]

Tenant’s lease was signed by an agency that does not
and has not existed under New York law .

25

New York’s CPLR §§ 301 and 302, an entity may not
affirmatively use New York Courts until it obtains authority
to do business in New York William L. Bonnel Co., v. Katz,
23 Misc. 2d 1028, 1031 196 N.Y.S. 2d 763, 768 (Sup. Ct.
1960).

Dr. Griesz-Brisson, tenant, has never been sued for
occasions arising out of her lease, by Darrington Realty.
When each New York County L&T Index No. 83622/00 and
New York County L&T Index No. 91440 02 were filed, the
owner of the building housing subject premises, was listed in
New York City records was listed as Darrington Realty, also
exhibited to Kendra Musgrave’s Complaint and Amended
Complaint

There was no chain of title. 200-202 West 107th
Street LLC v. Braun, Civil Housing Court New York County,
NYLJ May 1, 2002, p. 23 col. 2.

The attorney, repetitiously suing on behalf of his
client’s various companies and corporations for alleged debts,
and specifically New York County L&T Index No. 83622/00
and New York County L&T Index No. 91440 02, does not
and never has had a license to collect debt as is required by
NYC Code §20-490. Heintz, et al. v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291
(1995), held that an attorney engaged in consumer debt
collection litigation is a debt collector. Second Circuit held
that an attorney seeking collection of rent is a debt collector.
Romea v. Heilberger & Assocs., 988 F. Supp. 712 (SDNY
1997), aff'd 63 F.3d 111 (CA2 1998);

The very limited subject matter jurisdiction Defendant
held under New York City Civil Court Act to enforce housing
code, was then voided by state statute in NYC91440 02.

The subject premises was not covered by a valid
certificate of occupancy and has not been since 1989 as was
court record in NYC91440 02, and almost entirely the record
made before Defendant, and exhibited as record in Amended
Complaint. When a subject premises is not covered by a valid
certificate of occupancy, New York’s Multiple Dwelling Law

26

(“MDL”) §§ 301 and 302 requires “no action or special
proceeding shall be maintained therefore, or for possession of
said premises for nonpayment of said rent.”

Rather than evict, Defendant was required by MDL §§
301 and 302, required Defendant to stop any eviction under
New York County L&T 91440 02. Totaram v. Cordero,
NYLJ, April 16, 2003, p.22, col.3,

Defendant knew subject premises did not have a valid
certificate of occupancy both because the issue was raised
before her and because violations issued by New York City
agencies were in the official database available to her through
the computer in her courtroom.

Pursuant to MDL § 328(3):
“ computerized violation files of the department
responsible for maintaining such files and all other
computerized data as shall be relevant to the
enforcement of state and local laws for the
establishment and maintenance of housing
standards...” “...shall be prima facie evidence of any
matter stated therein and the courts shall take judicial
notice thereof as if the same were certified as true
under the seal and signature of the commissioner of
that department.”

Thus the Court below was required (“shall”, not may)
take judicial notice of the computerized violation files that
were available to it. Exclusion of a printout of such records
was held an abuse of judicial discretion. Hoya Saxa, Inc. v.
Gowan, 149 Misc.2d 191; 571 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App Term
1991).

The clear absence of jurisdiction due to the lack of a
certificate of occupancy was known to JHO Hoyos and further
could easily be verified by checking her computer, which she
was required to do pursuant to MDL §328(3).

All such facts as set forth for above, were known to
Defendant, brought to he attention with certified copies, in
motion Defendant took judicial notice of, and made exhibit to

her written, final judgment rendered against tenant only for
premises and $20,448.35-on July 10, 2003, as exhibited to
Amended Complaint, for tenant’s failure to deposit
$20,445.35 with the court to vacate default judgment rendered
against tenant on May 16, 2003, as set forth Defendant’t
written decision dated June 12, 2003, and exhibited to
Amended Complaint.

There is no statute in the state of New York which
make deposit of funds, in any amount, a condition to vacature
of a default judgment.

It is also unclear how the amount $20,448.35 was
derived. New York State Constitution Article 6 requires civil
courts to be courts of record. New York City Charter §1046
requires record for an JHO’s proceeding. As was exhibited to
Amended Complaint the record made before Defendant on
May 16, 2003 in New York County L&T Index No. 91440 02
was erased. There was no record of Defendant’ rendering her
“default judgment” against tenant. New York State
Constitution thus prohibits any civil court proceeding without
a record.

Also, such “default judgment” was rendered May 16,
2003 by Defendant against Dr. Griesz-Brisson for $20,448.35
without any supportive affidavit or service thereof as is
required by CPLR §3215(f) and CPLR §3215(g)(4)(i). It
never happened. There is no affidavit.

New York’s CPLR §3215(b) requires, “The judgment
shall not exceed in amount or differ in type from that
demanded in the complaint or stated in the notice served
pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305.”

Defendant’ “default judgment” rendered against Dr.
Griesz-Brisson only, was approximately $13,000 over the
amount claimed in the petition.

Defendant then enforced that judgment against Dr.
Griesz-Brisson for $20,445.35 and possession of premises,
with a warrant of eviction she then added Kendra Musgrave’s
to, against whom the action had been dismissed with

28

prejudice, and whose residence was outside her geographical
bounds, and as a partner joined in interest to Dr. Griesz-
Brisson, as well as John Doe and Jane Doe as tenants. In fact,
John Doe and Jane Doe undertenants was specifically crossed
out, as was exhibited to Kendra Musgrave’s Complaint and
Amended Complaint.

As argued in appellant’s brief it is a misdemeanor in
the State of New York to declare a partnership when none
exists.

If this does not amount to a clear absence of
jurisdiction, then that doctrine can only be truly applied to a
Libyan judge appointed by his colonel, who enters the United
States by some covert method, and starts issuing edicts and
proclamations in the middle of the night.

IX. COURT FAILED, TO PROTECT DOCUMENTS,
EVIDENCE, AND PRIMARY WITNESS TO BE
USED FOR TRIAL, WHICH WAS UPHELD BY
SECOND CIRCUIT, THUS DENYING
PLAINTIFF DUE PROCESS.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204, July 30,
2002, requires the preservation of documents to be used for
trial. Plaintiff's only evidence was the underlying case
NYC91440 02 and such documents and stored information of
tenant. Without access to legal research, and not within time
Plaintiff had to file action, without access to legal research,
Plaintiff copied wholesale tenant’s legal arguments with its
New York citations of statute and caselaw, as is evidenced by
her Complaint and Amended Complaint. Sometimes Plaintiff
changed pronouns to fit her case, other places she did not.
Self-evidently, Plaintiff's needed such information and record
to proceed but to prove a negative, to enjoin such warrant of
eviction, which is unavailable to the public, until Plaintiff's
name was removed. As raised to Second Circuit, without
such items, including, the record being her primary witness,

29

as well as tenant, then unavailable, Plaintiff could not
proceed.

Wherefore, after being denied access to the law,
Plaintiff was then denied access to the court, any court, by
order of Second Circuit below. To date, Plaintiff has not
received restoration for the bank account illegally seized with
any judgment served even to Plaintiff's bank. Whatever
property Plaintiff could hope to obtain or preserve is then at
risk without recourse; and for any debts tenant may have
incurred, or, anyone else, for that matter, for Defendant’s
warrant of eviction.

CONCLUSION

Consistent through the cause of action and through
this proceeding are gross violations to Plaintiff's civil rights,
then denied access to proof thereof, but to protect
constitutional guarantees, all the while Plaintiff is forced to
prove a negative; and then finally denied access to any federal
court for repair under federal statute, by Order of Second
Circuit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of abstention, and
when Plaintiff has no legal standing to appeal an
administrative decision she was ruled a stranger to.

That this is what Rooker-Feldman doctrine has
become, needs to be addressed by this Court for the good of
the nation and in the interest of justice. There is simply no
other court to repair to.

Respectfytly submitted,

9985 Appletree Place
Thornton, Colorado 80260
303-452-2854

30

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

KENDRA MUSGRAVE,

Petitioner(s),

against

INEZ Hoyos, HON., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE, HOUSING PART Q, CIVIL COURT
OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK,

|
Respondent(s) |
|

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit

APPENDIX

KENDRA MUSGRAVE

Pro Se
9985 Appletree Place
Thornton, Colorado 80260
303-452-2854

ARTA AORN, AE ARR ARTISTRY TNT TIS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Re MII 0s PIs scccsecdesoscscscscasccosscocccsens A-]

Order of the United States Court of the Southern District of
New York, September 18, 2003..............csscsssssseeees A-4

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER

THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN
THE FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED
AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY
OTHERCOURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE
ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A
SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED
CASE, OR INANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
21* day of December, two thousand and four.

PRESENT:

Hon. John M. Walker, Jr.,
Chief Judge,

Hon. Rosemary S. Pooler,
Hon. Richard C. Wesley,

Circuit Judges.
X No. 03-9005(L), 03-
9219(con); 03-
9201(con)
KENDRA MUSGRAVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
INEZ HOYOS, Hon., Administrative Law
Judge, Housing Part Q, Civil Court

of the City and County of New York,
Defendant-Appellee.

Xx

APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: Kendra Musgrave, pro se,
Thornton, CO

APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Michelle Aronowitz, Deputy
Solicitor General (Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General for the
State.of New York, Carol Fischer, Assistant Solicitor
General, on the brief), New York, NY

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Gerard E. Lynch, District Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
judgment of said district court be and it hereby is
AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Kendra Musgrave, pro se, appeals the
September 25, 2003 judgment of the district court dismissing
Musgrave’s action against New York City Housing Court
Judge Inez Hoyos for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Musgrave’s complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleges that Hoyos violated her civil rights by, inter alia,
issuing a default money judgment and eviction order against
Musgrave. We review de novo a district court’s
determination that, as a matter of law, jurisdiction does not
exist. See Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin.,
95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996).

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’
arguments in this case, we agree that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over this complaint.

As an initial matter, any decision as to the merits of
Musgrave’s claims would necessarily require the district court
to review the propriety of Judge Hoyos’ orders, a task the
lower federal courts are not empowered to do. See District of

A-2

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486
(1983) (holding that district courts “do not have jurisdiction . .
. over challenges to state court decisions . . . even if those
challenges allege that the state court’s action was
unconstitutional”); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923) (holding that district court may not sit in
direct appellate review of a state court judgment because
“(t]he jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly
original”).

In addition, as the district court observed, it is well settled that
judicial officers like Judge Hoyos are entitled to absolute
immunity from civil suit for any acts taken in their official
capacities. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding
that judges could not be held liable for damages under § 1983,
even for allegedly unconstitutional acts). This immunity
serves to preserve judicial independence by shielding judges
from the inhibitory threat of economic sanction. See id.; Hili
v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 213 (2nd Cir. 1998). Asa
consequence, persons claiming to have been injured by
judicial misconduct must seek alternative forms of relief such
as state appellate or collateral review, judicial misconduct or
disciplinary proceedings, or working to prevent the judge’s re-
election.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
hereby AFFIRMED and Musgrave’s motion to strike
appellee’s brief is DENIED.

FOR THE COURT:

Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk

By:

Lucille Carr, Deputy Clerk

A-3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

X
KENDRA MUSGRAVE,
Plaintiff, 03-CV-5994 (GEL)
v. ORDER
INEZ HOYOS, Hon.,

Administrative Law

Judge, Housing Part Q, Civil Court
of the City and County of New York,
Defendant

X

GERALD E. LYNCH, District Judge:

In this Civil Rights action, plaintiff Kendra Musgrave
alleges that defendant The Hon. Inez Hoyos, a Judge in New
York City Housing Court, violated her due process rights by
adding her name to a default money judgment in connection
with an eviction proceeding. Judge Hoyos has moved to
dismiss the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and
on the basis of a judge’s absolute immunity from suit. The
motion will be granted.

Even accepting as true the allegations of Musgrave’s
complaint, as is required in considering a motion to dismiss,
this Court has no power to grant her relief. The acts
complained of here were clearly “within [the] judicial
jurisdiction” granted to Judge Hoyos. Pierson v. Ray 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Therefore, she is immune from suit on
account of them. Id. Furthermore, what Musgrave seeks,
essentially, is review of Judge Hoyos’s decision to enter a
judgment against her. However, “a United States District
Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state
court in judicial proceedings.” District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). Plaintiff's

remedy, if any, must be with appellate review of the
judgments entered against her within the state court system,
id, at 476, and, if not thereby satisfied, by seeking review in
the United States Supreme Court, id at 482.

Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED

DATED: New York, New York
September 18, 2003

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386007_0940%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.