# Opposition Brief — Campbell v. Louisiana

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1996
- **Citation:** 517 U.S. 1187

## Text

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In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

October Term, 1995
>

TERRY CAMPBELL,

No. 95-1240

Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Respondent.

«

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Louisiana Supreme Court
+
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+
J. WILLIAM PUCHEU RICHARD P. IEYOUB
District Attorney Attorney General
RICHARD W. VIDRINE KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN*
Assistant District Assistant Attorney
Attorney General
Thirteenth Judicial District State of Louisiana
Parish of Evangeline Department of Justice
P.O. Drawer 780 P.O. Box 94095
Ville Platte, La. 70586-0780 Baton Rouge, La. 70804-9095
(318) 363-3438 (504) 342-7552

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Respondent

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a white defendant has standing under Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), to bring an equal protection claim
based upon the exclusion of blacks from service as state grand
jury foremen?

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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SEG ESO SURE GEE 6.504 06 cnccerecunsnsevecceaccts 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............... 22sec eeee 6
REPT hsknsén ceeds ekgacesectasssguiebeackeeens 7
I. Given that petitioner’s case may still be subject
to further judicial review in state court on
possible federal questions of law, petition
for writ of certiorari should be dismissed for
wane OE TG ooo o.s sv cukh dabei ean Seennsace 7
II. Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State of
Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321
(La. 1995), is consistent with decisions of this
FORO GIIUD, 3 on ds oncasvaveds betschoebadivand 12

III. A perceived conflict of the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision in State of Louisiana v. Terry
Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), with United
States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1984),
does not, ipso facto, mean that petitioner is
entitled to this Honorable’s supervisory review,

IV.

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page
especially where the state court decision is
consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions. ...14

Any perceived conflict between United States v.
Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th Cir. 1983) and other

decisions of the United States Court of Appeals,

11th Circuit, disappears when one considers that

the latter decisions pre-dated Hobby v. United
cE 16

If this Honorable Court should invoke its
supervisory jurisdiction and review the

Louisiana Supreme Court's decision below,

such review should be limited to only the equal
dari lar 55 oes Ni aes ew eas ve. 18

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
FEDERAL CASES
Alien 0. McCurry, 408 US: SOIR) oii cece ii ieccesesecs 9
Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F. 2d 672 (11th Cir. 1985) ........-..2005. 14
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ......-.eeeeeeeeee cence 9
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) ..........005: 13,15,18
Collies 0. Milter, 25a US. SOG IGE) ossccsccccccesecccceseees 8
California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ... 6.2... eee eee eens. 11
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) ....... 11,12
Department of Banking, State of Nebraska v. Pink,

DEF A Oe PE Randa rake th ab dem RUE Kaan ehneadee 8
Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981)... 00. ices csceccees 10,11
Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Adams Extract Company, ........ 16

473 U.S. 911 (1985)

Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982) ..... 0... cece eee eee 11

Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984) .. . .4,6,13,15,16,17,18

North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug
Stare; We. GE CES. TES Care © i aE es oe )

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982)... 20... cece cece ee eee 9
PORTS 0. Ei, G07 US. GIO CITE) vc cccccccenscvcccvess 12,13,17
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270(1971) ....cccccccccccccccccecs 7)
Poe v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail Co. v. City of San Diego,

ae i ce caule’ )
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) ... 02... cece cece eee eee 12,13
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945) ........ 11,12
Ramirez v. California, 476 U.S. 1152 (1986) ...............06% 15
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) ........... i4,6,13,14,15,18
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,

Sy RE EIR tarde cg gir i nee Y
United States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (1983) ............. 6,14,16
United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340

See ee ia eer can cnis en cous 15,16,17
United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380
Bete ee 15,16,17

United States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333
OL cg awaee ai 14,15,16,17,20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) ...... 0c eee eee ee eens 11

LOUISIANA CASES

State of Louisiana v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995),
__reh’g denied, 661 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1995),

petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3535

(Jan. 31, 1996) (No. 95-1240) ......... 0. eee 4,6,7,12,13,14

State of Louisiana v. Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995), rev'd, 661 So. 2d 1321
a Tees PD i Kicun cck dba ceank cavksscee 3,4,7

State of Louisiana v. Campbell, No. 94-1140,
slip op. (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., 3/13/96) __ So. 2d
___, 1996 WESTLAW 109052 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.,
DETSPI va nkesciecisdsss Gates eqeesatsenanta 5,7,10

State of Louisiana v. Mouton, 393 So. 2d 1337
EO SUED +s 0:6 0005s59s cerns eraeeruar seeneas 18,19

State of Louisiana ex rel. Williams v. Whitley,
CO Ga. Bi DAS GA, COUR ni kccsancbncdaceneiieen 13

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

MUSL..§IRD s visicsdinivi ere Riven ens 6,7,10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
III ce ae eM oes ol a ies 5,7,14
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NM HON Bion pei nite sade cnn av ay ic vuneubneadsecud 4
PM MEE aaa Vitd ce peat ee ouceas see kure dela sbe dave’ 10
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es eee: Se OU vee canvaeena 7
Lia GANG, RU PURINE, ccc sc cccccccdccccccce 7,19,20
U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment ................... 10,14
LOUISIANA STATUTES AND RULES
SORE RO a ee ene Oy i ne En 19
CNET MEEEE Ch cnikciiiesnusncss ss ck us ox dose ck bcm eneax 19
Sly See UM ies naciesibonsadeues eet 19
tae 335 6 oh sshd ev Fede sawed denvoecesevecs 13

MCU NN, < FnciGeed ss Naked Gi aNwbShdh sco bo 0ssas asap 1,3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
ih US POON Hs SU ea na rad uev eae kes evaees UbvanvEnenaneae 19
LR CLE, FO DO RAOMOE bc tv cnnecdecs Kecheascucwasueea 5,8
er og TR eo) Sy.) rere rrr erry rar rr rT 57

OTHER

Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice
ie Py SESE RE PTY Teed ee eT Th ery Pes Phe ee 8,9,19

\

a ee

No. 95-1240
oe
In The
Supreme Court Of The United States
October Term, 1995

-o—
TERRY CAMPBELL,

Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Respondent.

) ee
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Louisiana Supreme Court

—
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
+
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Terry Campbell, a white male, was indicted by

the Grand Jury of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Parish of
Evangeline, State of Louisiana, on February 4, 1992, in which
petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted in Docket
No. 45,690-F of the second degree murder of James L. Sharp,
also a white male, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. See Petition

For A Writ Of Certiorari at Appendixes, E-8, E-30, and E-35
through E-37 (hereinafter Pet. at App., at__), and Appendixes
herein attached at 3a (hereinafter App. at ).

Prior to trial, petitioner, through defense counsel Jesse B.
Hearin, filed a Motion To Quash Grand Jury Indictment in the
trial court, alleging that the indictment was defective because
“the grand jury foreperson selection process in Evangeline
Parish is discriminatory and violates the Sixth and the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as
Article I, Section 2, Article 1, Section 15 and Article I, Section
16, of the Louisiana Constitution.” See Pet. at App., 1-2. Follow-
ing a hearing on the motion before the Honorable Preston N.
Aucoin, Judge, Thirteenth Judicial District, presiding, on De-
cember 2, 1993, the motion was orally denied; subsequently
the trial court issued a written judgment on December 6, 1993,
confirming the denial of the motion to quash. See Pet. at App.,
E-1 through E-39, and D-1 through D-2.

Following a 12-person jury trial, petitioner was convicted
as charged on May 12, 1994. In a Motion For New Trial filed in
the trial court by defense counsel Richard V. Burnes and Ray-
mond J. LeJeune, petitioner again claimed his previously de-
nied motion to quash was meritorious because petitioner had
been “charged by a grand jury indictment which was returned
by a grand jury which was illegally and unconstitutionally se-
lected in that the grand jury foreperson selection process in
Evangeline Parish is discriminatory and violates the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as
well as Article I, Section 2, Article 1, Section 15, and Article 1,
Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution,” and thereby re-
quested a new trial on this basis, inter alia. See Pet. at App., H-2,
H-1 through H-9. Following a contradictory hearing on May
20, 1994, the motion for new trial was subsequently denied; pe-
titioner was thereby sentenced to the mandatory sentence of

life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, pro-
bation or suspension of sentence. See Pet. at App., C-1 through
C-8 and La. R.S. 14:30.1.

During appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Cir-
cuit, through defense counsel, Mr. Burnes and Mr. LeJeune, pe-
titioner again asserted as Assignment of Error No. 1 the trial
court’s denial of the motion to quash because the petitioner’s
indictment “was returned by a Grand Jury which was illegally
and unconstitutionally selected in that the Grand Jury foreper-
son selection process in Evangeline Parish was discriminatory
and in violation of Louisiana and United States constitutional
provisions”. Also alleged as Assignment of Error No. 10 on ap-
peal was the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial;
however, petitioner did not distinguish, from among the 11
reasons previously cited to the trial court, the underlying basis
for Assignment of Error No. 10. In the original motion for new
trial filed with the trial court, one reason, inter alia, for relief
was based upon an allegation of racial discrimination in the se-
lection of grand jury foremen in Evangeline Parish. See Pet. at
App., G-1 and G-3, G-1 through G-4, and H-1 through H-9.

In State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 1995), the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Cir-
cuit, on March 1, 1995, in addressing petitioner’s first assign-
ment of error in Docket No. CR-94-1140, reversed the trial
court’s finding that petitioner, a white male, lacked standing to
allege racial discrimination against blacks in the grand jury
foreman selection process of Evangeline Parish. See Id., 651 So.
2d at 413-414 and Pet. at App., B-1 through B-5. The Third Cir-
cuit remanded the proceedings back to the trial court for fur-
ther review of the petitioner’s racial discrimination claim based
upon due process and equal protection. See Id. Given the action
by the Third Circuit, that reviewing court did not reach the
other assignments of error. See Id. and Pet. at App., B-5.

On March 31, 1995, the District Attorney for the Thirteenth
Judicial District filed an application for writ of certiorari and
review with the Louisiana Supreme Court; in an opinion is-
sued on October 2, 1995, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State
of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995),
granted the State’s writ application in Docket No. 95-K-0824,
and subsequently reversed the prior ruling by the Louisiana
Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, in State of Louisiana v. Terry
Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995), holding
that petitioner lacked standing under both the equal protec-
tion clause and the due process clause to bring a claim of racial
discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen under
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) and Hobby v. United States,
468 U.S. 339 (1984). See also Pet. at App., A-1 through A-2, and
A-3 through A-10. The Louisiana Supreme Court also re-
manded the case back to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third
Circuit, for consideration of petitioner’s remaining assign-
ments of error. A petition for rehearing with the Louisiana
Supreme Court was subsequently denied on November 3,
1995. See State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1374
(La. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3535 (Jan. 31,
1996)(No. 95-1240), and Pet. at App., F-1.

On January 31, 1996, petitioner filed the instant Petition
For A Writ Of Certiorari with this Honorable Court. Pursuant
to Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (effective Octo-
ber 2, 1995), petitioner, through defense counsel Mr. Richard V.
Burnes and Dmitrc I. Burnes, notified Honorable J. William
Pucheu, District Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District, Parish
of Evangeline, Honorable Richard W. Vidrine, Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District, Parish of Evange-
line, and Honorable Richard P. leyoub, Attorney General,
Louisiana Department of Justice, of the instant petition, and
that pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 15.3 (1995), a brief in opposition to
the petition for certiorari would be due March 6, 1996.

Pursuant to a request for assistance by District Attorney J.
William Pucheu, the Attorney General is filing the instant Re-
spondent’s Brief In Opposition To Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.
In a letter sent by Federal Express to this Honorable Court on
February 23, 1996, the State of Louisiana respectfully re-
quested an extension of time upon which to file the brief in op-
position. See App. at 4a, 5a. Defense counsel Dmitrc I. Burnes
responded in a letter dated February 26, 1996, that defense
counsel had no opposition to the requested extension of time.
See App. at 6a. In a letter dated March 4, 1996, this Honorable
Court informed the State of Louisiana that the extension of
time within which to file a response to the petition for a writ of
certiorari was granted, and that the brief was now due on or
before April 5, 1996. See App. at 7a.

Subsequent to the filing of the instant petition, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, has denied relief on
petitioner’s remaining assignments of error, and affirmed peti-
tioner’s conviction and sentence, with the exception of a re-
mand to the trial court to amend the court minutes to reflect
that the petitioner is entitled to credit for time served. See State
of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, No. 94-1140, slip op. (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir., 3/13/96), ___ So. 2d , 1996 WESTLAW 109052
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., 3/13/96). Under La.Ct. App. R. 2-18.1
(1995), petitioner had 14 days to petition the Louisiana Court
of Appeal, Third Circuit for a rehearing, or if no rehearing is re-
quested, under La.Sup. Ct. R. 10, § 5 (1995), petitioner had 30
days from March 13, 1996, to file an application for writ of cer-
tiorari and review with the Louisiana Supreme Court, before
the judgment is final in state court. Petitioner filed a petition
for rehearing with the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Cir-
cuit, on Friday, March 29, 1996.

6

+
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In opposing the petitioner’s application for writ of certio-
rari, the State of Louisiana argues that because the matter is
still pending in state courts upon questions of federal law, this
Honorable Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to
exercise this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Further, the
State of Louisiana contends that Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), is con-
sistent with prior decisions of this Honorable Court. Addition-
ally, any conflict between the Campbell decision and decisions
of the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals is
clearly explained by the fact that those federal decisions cited
by the petitioner herein pre-dated this Court’s decision in
Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984), and their validity to-
day is highly questionable. Further, any conflict between the
Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals in United
States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th Cir. 1983) and those decisions
of the Eleventh Circuit are equally explainable in that the latter
should not carry much weight, again in light of the Hobby deci-
sion. Finally, if this Honorable Court decides supervisory re-
view is necessary, the State of Louisiana would respectfully ar-
gue that such review should be limited to the only federal
question properly before this Court, i.e., whether a white de-
fendant has standing under Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979)
to bring a claim under the equal protection clause that blacks
have been excluded from service as state grand jury foremen.

ARGUMENT
I. Given that petitioner’s case may still be subject to fur-
ther judicial review in state court on possible federal
questions of law, petition for writ of certiorari should be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

In granting a petition for writ of certiorari, this Honorable
Court is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review “[flinal judgments
or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a de-
cision could be had...” (emphasis added). See also Pet. at 3. In
the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court, while admit-
tedly denying an issue of federal law concerning one assign-
ment of error, remanded the matter back to the Louisiana
Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for consideration of peti-
tioner’s remaining assignments of error. See State of Louisiana
v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), rev’ing, State of Louisiana
v. Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995). Pursuant
to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s mandate, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, on March 13, 1996, reviewed
the remaining nine assignments of error (an additional assign-
ment of error was abandoned as being assigned but not
briefed), and affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence.
Petitioner’s claims for relief on appeal include both issues of
Louisiana and federal law, including but not necessarily lim-
ited to, petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See State
of Louisiana v. Campbell, No. 94-1140, slip op. (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir., 3/13/96), ___So.2d__—_—, 1996 WESTLAW 109052 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir., 3/13/96). The instant petition for writ of cer-
tiorari was mailed by the petitioner, as pointed out above, on
January 31, 1996, forty-two days before the March 13, 1996, de-
cision of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. More-
over, as allowed by La.Ct. App. R. 2-18.1 (1995), petitioner has
filed a petition for rehearing with the Louisiana Court of Ap-

peal, Third Circuit. If no rehearing is timely requested, under
La.Sup. Ct. R. 10, § 5 (1995), petitioner had 30 days from March
13, 1996, to file an application for writ of certiorari and review
with the Louisiana Supreme Court, before the judgment is fi-
nal in state court. Further, if a rehearing was timely requested
but denied, petitioner would have 30 days to seek review from
the order denying the rehearing. Finally, if a rehearing is
timely requested and granted, the aggrieved party would have
30 days to seek review with the Louisiana Supreme Court from
the lower court’s judgment on rehearing.

Given the pending status of petitioner’s appeal, the State of
Louisiana responds that in order to avoid piecemeal litigation
on possible federal issues of law involving the same petitioner,
this Honorable Court should decline the instant application for
petition for writ of certiorari without prejudice until all matters
of federal law are resolved by the Louisiana courts. See Robert
L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice at 90 (7th ed. 1993). Clearly
the instant judgment in this matter is not final. Because this
Honorable Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is necessarily lim-
ited to final judgments of a state’s highest court of last resort
where a substantial federal question has been properly raised
and necessarily decided upon, the context of the instant litiga-
tion necessitates a ruling by this Honorable Court that the mat-
ter is not yet ready for review. Clearly the remand of the matter
from the Louisiana Supreme Court back to the Louisiana Court
of Appeal, Third Circuit, indicated that matters of substance re-
mained unresolved; it is equally clear that what was left unre-
solved was more detailed than simply a lower court perform-
ing a ministerial act, for example where a lower court simply
enters a judgment at a higher court’s direction. See Department
of Banking, State of Nebraska v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 267 (1942).
Moreover, a judgment to this Honorable Court should be final
not only as to all parties, but also as to the whole subject matter
involving all possible causes of action. See Collin v. Miller, 252

U.S. 364, 370 (1920). Most important to the instant case, the re-
mand of a case that leaves open some matter that is not simply
ministerial and which might itself create a federal question,
means, ipso facto, that the judgment is not yet final, and thus, is
not yet subject to judicial review by this “Ionorable Court.
Supreme Court Practice at 94-95; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1981); O’Dell v. Espinoza,
456 U.S. 430 (1982); and Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail Co., 345
U.S. 379, 382 (1953). See also North Dakota State Board of Phar-
macy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. 414 U.S. 156, 159 (1973)(requir-
ing finality of state court judgments avoids piecemeal review
by federal courts of state court decisions.) Contrast Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85 n. 1 (1963)(review granted on federal
question because resolution of that issue would decide whether
suppression of evidence would require retrial on the merits as
well as on the issue of punishment).

Another reason counseling hesitation by this Court to
grant review at this juncture is the policy consideration of lim-
iting federal review of state courts’ determination of federal
constitutional issues as a means to minimize federal intrusion
into state affairs. Supreme Court Practice at 95. Furthermore,
this Court has often recognized and insisted that state courts
be allowed the first opportunity to pass upon federal constitu-
tional challenges to state action in the first instance, and that
state courts, as their federal counterparts, are equally as com-
petent in adjudicating federal constitutional claims. Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980)(confidence in state courts to
adjudicate federal claims). This Honorable Court had also
adopted a policy of allowing state courts the opportunity to
correct any possible constitutional violation caused by state ac-
tion. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-278 (1971). Most com-
pelling here is that further proceedings pursuant to a remand
by a state supreme court to a lower state court to resolve other
issues of federal law provides a strong basis by which this

10

Court should rule that the pending state court judgment is not
final, and thus, not reviewable.

Petitioner should be required to establish to this Court’s
satisfaction why federal review at this juncture is necessary.
Petitioner has failed to do so. Allowing a review at this point
runs counter to the general rule that only final judgments of a
state’s highest court of last resort are reviewable by this Hon-
orable Court. See Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 622 (1981)(holding
no important federal interests would be eroded if state crimi-
nal proceedings went forward following denial of a federal
claim of selective and discriminatory prosecution under the
equal protection clause.) '

Petitioner certainly has failed to establish that a federal
question or federal questions raised by the instant petition
would be lost but for this Court’s invoking its supervisory ju-
risdiction even though no final judgment has yet been ren-
dered.

In Flynt, supra, this Honorable Court held that it lacked ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review a state Supreme
Court ruling, which had rejected a federal claim of Hustler
publisher Larry »“lynt concerning discriminatory prosecution
under obscenity laws. Even though the First and Fourteenth
amendments to the U.S. Constitution were involved in the de-

' The State of Louisiana has not reproduced the opinion of State of
Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, No. 94-1140, slip op. (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.,
3/13/96), So. 2d , 1996 WESTLAW 109052 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.,

3/13/96), given the length of the decision, the added costs for printing and
reproduction, and the burden on the petitioner to establish why review
should be granted. However, the decision is available to this Honorable
Court through the Westlaw service, and petitioner has the option to include
that decision if he opts to file a reply brief under Sup.Ct.R. 15.6., which is in
compliance with Sup.Ct.R. 14.1 (i) (ii), and R. 15.8.

11

cided federal claim, this Court held that there was no final
judgment, and that none of the four exceptions to the general
rule that only final judgments are reviewable applied, citing
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479-485 (1975). In
Flynt, this Court was satisfied that federal review could wait
until final judgment without any adverse impact upon impor-
tant federal interests. Moreover, a state court’s decision that an
earlier ruling by that court would be deemed law of the case
would not affect the supervisory jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court to re-examine the earlier state court rulings. Hathorn v.
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1982)(Supreme Court has jurisdic-
tion to consider all substantial federal questions determined in
the stages of earlier state proceedings; whether such a federal
claim is untimely under state procedural rules is not generally
an independent and adequate state basis upon which further
federal review is barred). See also Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545 (1967)(holding that denial of defendant's claim that grand
jury was selected in a discriminatory manner was reviewable
after final judgment of conviction, but not after interlocutory
appeal permitted under state law). Contrast California v. Stew-
art, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(state court’s reversal of conviction on
federal constitutional ground and remand for a new trial did
not bar federal review because an acquittal would possibly
preclude such review).

The State is cognizant of this Court’s decision in Radio Sta-
tion WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945), where Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in writing for the Court, acknowledged a
“penumbral area” for the general rule that only final judg-
ments are reviewable by this Honorable Court. The State
urges that to grant review in the instant petition could possi-
bly result in piecemeal resolution of federal questions of law
involving the same petitioner. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
“...Of course, where the remaining litigation may raise other
federal questions that may later come here, to allow review of

12

an intermediary adjudication would offend the decisive objec-
tion to fragmentary reviews.” Id., 326 U.S. at 127.

For the foregoing reasons, the State of Louisiana respect-
fully requests the petition for certiorari be dismissed for lack
of a final judgment unless the petitioner establishes to this
Court’s satisfaction why an exception under Cox Broadcasting
Corp., supra, should apply.

II. Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in State of
Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995), is
consistent with decisions of this Honorable Court.

In the petition for writ of certiorari, petitioner claims that
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision is flatly inconsistent with
this Honorable Court’s decisions in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493
(1972) and Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). Pet. at 4. More-
over, petitioner claims that the Louisiana Supreme Court “has
decided important questions of federal law that have not been,
but should be, settled by this Court.” Ibid.

The State of Louisiana counters that these claims defy a
plain reading of the decisions in question. The Louisiana
Supreme Court expressly declined petitioner’s invitation to
expand Powers beyond the context of an equal protection at-
tack to race-based exclusions of prospective petit jurors
through the use of peremptory challenges. State of Louisiana v.
Campbell, 661 So. 2d at 1324. In Powers this Honorable Court
held that a defendant, regardless of his or her race, had stand-
ing under the equal protection clause to object to the race-
based exclusion of any prospective petit juror whether or not
that defendant and the excluded juror shared the same race.

Moreover, in Peters v. Kiff, supra, this Honorable Court held
that a white defendant had standing to object on the basis of
the due process clause to the racial composition of a grand and
petit juries even though the claim centered on allegations that

13

blacks had been systematically excluded.

Given the fact that this Honorable Court has not decided
whether a white defendant has standing under Rose v. Mitchell,
supra, to bring an equal protection challenge to alleged racial
discrimination against blacks in the context of a state grand jury
foreman, the Louisiana Supreme Court was correct not to ex-
tend Powers beyond its equal protection holding. This is espe-
cially true in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's dicta that
“[t]he role of the grand jury foreman in Louisiana appears to be
similarly ministerial’, which was the same conclusion es-
poused by this Honorable Court in Hobby concerning the role of
a federal grand jury foreman. See State of Louisiana v. Campbell,
661 So. 2d at 1324; and Hobby, 468 U.S. at 344. See also State of
Louisiana ex rel. Williams v. Whitley, 629 So. 2d 343 (La. 1993)(Mar-
cus, J., dissenting, “[t]he role of the foreman of the grand jury in
Louisiana also appears to be ministerial in nature.”)

Given the holdings of Powers and Peters, the Louisiana
Supreme Court was without express binding authority from
this Honorable Court to grant petitioner the relief he was seek-
ing. Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision is
also consistent with Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
(1977)(Mexican-American defendant had standing under the
equal protection clause to object to the exclusion of Mexican-
Americans as state grand jurors) and Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
at 565,(black defendants had standing under the equal protec-
tion clause to challenge exclusion of blacks as state grand jury
foremen)’ in requiring that petitioner establish under the equal
protection clause that the “procedures employed resulted in

* Whether or not the duties of a Louisiana grand jury foreman are minis-
terial would, in the first instance, be a question of state law best left for reso-
lution by Louisiana courts. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 436.

* Petitioner misconstrues the Rose holding by stating that in Rose this
Honorable Court “held that racial discrimination in the selection of grand

id

substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifi-
able group to which he belongs.” Accordingly, the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s decision is consistent with decisions of this
Honorable Court. Petitioner’s claim otherwise is without
merit.

III. A perceived conflict of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell, 661 So. 2d
1321 (La. 1995), with United States v. Sneed, 729 FE. 2d 1333
(11th Cir. 1984), does not, ipso facto, mean that petitioner
is entitled to this Honorable’s supervisory review, espe-
cially where the state court decision is consistent with
prior Supreme Court decisions.‘

Petitioner claims that the Louisiana Supreme Court deci-
sion in question here conflicts with United States v. Sneed,729 F.
2d 1333 (11th 1984), and thereby, this Court should invoke su-
pervisory review. Pet. at 4, 11, and 23. The United States Court

jury foremen violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and requires reversal of a state conviction.” (Emphasis added.) While it
is clear from the Rose decision that discrimination against blacks in the selec-
tion of grand jury foremen violates the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it is not clear that such discrimination warrants reversal
of a subsequent conviction. In Rose, this Honorable Court “assumed, with-
out deciding, that invidious discrimination in the selection of only the fore-
man requires that a subsequent conviction be set aside, just as if the discrim-
ination proved had tainted the selection of the entire grand jury venire.” Id.,
443 U.S. at 551 n. 4 (Citations omitted.)

‘ Petitioner cites Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F. 2d 672 (11th Cir. 1985) as a federal
appeals decision that conflicts both with State of Louisiana v. Terry Campbell,
661 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1995) and United States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (1983). The
State of Louisiana fails to comprehend this argument given that in Bowen, the
issue before the federal court revolved around an equal protection claim con-
cerning the exclusion of women from petit jury service. The instant claim be-
fore this Honorable Court deals only with an equal protection claim based
upon a state’s grand jury foreman selection process. Petitioner has not ever
claimed discrimination in the selection processes of either state grand juries

15

of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, in Sneed did not distinguish be-
tween discrimination in the selection of a state grand jury fore-
man and discrimination in the selection of a state grand jury it-
self. Rather, the 11th Circuit in Sneed dealt only with a federal
defendant's claim against the federal grand jury foreman se-
lection process, and subsequently extended holdings of
Supreme Court cases dealing with discrimination in the selec-
tion of grand juries to consider a claim of discrimination in the
selection of grand jury feremen. Moreover, the Sneed court
was bound by clear precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, United
States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982) and United
States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982). As ar-
gued below, all of these federal decisions were issued prior to
Hobby v. United States, supra. Furthermore, there is no indica-
tion in Sneed that an issue before the court was whether a white
defendant could bring a claim of racial exclusion of blacks in a
state grand jury foreman selection process. The decision
clearly centered upon a federal defendant attacking his federal
conviction due to alleged discrimination in the selection of
federal grand jury foremen. Most importantly, the Eleventh
Circuit today may possibly retreat from this line of prior deci-
sions given this Court’s binding precedent in the Hobby case.
See Sneed, 729 F. 2d at 1335 n. 3 (finding federal grand jury fore-
man to be constitutionally significant). Accordingly, given this
Court’s decision in Hobby on a due process claim concerning
federal grand jury foremen, and this Court's decisions under
the equal protection clause of Castaneda and Rose, there is no
outstanding conflict that has not been resolved.

The State of Louisiana further contends that a conflict alone
is insufficient in and of itself to grant supervisory relief. See

or state petit juries. Accordingly, a federal decision not on point with the in-
stant claim could not possibly create the necessary “conflict” by which this
Honorable Court invokes supervisory review pursuant to Sup.Ct. Rule 10.

16

Ramirez v. California, 476 U.S. 1152 (1986)(J. White, dissenting,
joined by J. J. Brennan and Powell), wherein the Supreme Court
denied a petition for writ of certiorari despite the opinion of
dissenting Justices that a conflict existed between a Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision and a California Supreme Court
decision, and between the latter decision and a Supreme Court
decision. See also Green Bay Packaging, Inc., v. Adams Extract
Company, 473 U.S. 911 (1985)J. White, dissenting in the denial
of a petition for writ of certiorari because of a conflict between
decisions of the Fourth Circuit and Fifth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate —
that relief is warranted on the basis that the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s decision is in direct conflict with Eleventh
Circuit decisions.

IV. Any perceived conflict between United States v.
Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th Cir. 1983) and other decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit, disap-
pears when one considers that the latter decisions pre-
dated Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984).

Finally, petitioner claims review by this Honorable Court
is warranted given that United States v. Cronn, 717 F. 2d 164 (5th
Cir. 1983) conflicts with the following decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit: United States v.
Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982)(per curiam);
United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982); and
United States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1984.) Pet. at 11
and 24.

While these decisions at first glance may appear to be in
conflict with Cronn, all these decisions cited by the petitioner
were issued without the benefit of Hobby v. United States,
supra, and dealt with the issue of a federal grand jury foreman,

17

not a state grand jury foreman. Accordingly, those same fed-
eral courts could decide the same issue differently today given
the holding of this Honorable Court in Hobby. As such, inter-
vention by this Honorable Court to resolve what the petitioner
claims is an apparent conflict is clearly not warranted. An ex-
amination of the cited federal case law by the instant petitioner
shows that the petitioner’s claim of a conflict is clearly illusory.

In United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380 (11th Cir.
1982)(per curiam), decided on April 15, 1982, the 11th Circuit
held that a hispanic defendant had standing under the equal
protection clause to object to the exclusion of blacks and
women from service as federal grand jury foremen. It is also
noteworthy that the 11th Circuit in Perez-Hernandez also re-
jected the government's argument that the role of a federal
grand jury person is “constitutionally insignificant.” Id. at
1386. Contrast Hobby, supra, decided on July 2, 1984. The 11th
Circuit also placed heavy reliance on Peters v. Kiff, supra, even
though that decision was based upon the due process clause as
opposed to the equal protection clause.

In United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982),
decided on July 22, 1982, the 11th Circuit obviously felt bound
by United States v. Perez-Hernandez, supra, when it held that a
white defendant had standing to complain about the exclusion
of blacks and women from service as federal grand jury fore-
men. That Court stated: ”... The panel [in United States v. Perez-
Hernandez] reached that conclusion [of standing] despite its ac-
knowledgement of prevailing Supreme Court precedent
which would appear to deny standing to sucha defendant:...In
accord with our existing precedent, we find standing on the
part of the instant appellants.” Id., 680 F. 2d at 1355-1356.

Likewise, United States v. Sneed, 729 F. 2d 1333 (11th Cir.
1984), decided on April 16, 1984, cites the binding precedent of
United States v. Holman and United States v. Perez-Hernandez for

18

its decision.

The State of Louisiana contends that petitioner had plainly
failed to establish to this Court any viable conflict in the lower
federal circuits. Given the holdings of Hobby, Castenda and
Rose, supra, the federal cases cited by the petitioner fail to
prove a jurisdictional basis by which a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari should be granted.

V. If this Honorable Court should invoke its supervisory
jurisdiction and review the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision below, such review should be limited to only the
equal protection claim. z

Petitioner claims that the questions presented for review
include three federal bases for relief: the equal protection
clause, the due process clause and the fair cross-section re-
quirement of the Sixth Amendment. Pet. at i. The State coun-
ters that the only possible federal question left unresolved for
this Honorable Court is whether a white defendant has stand-
ing under Rose to bring an equal protection claim based upon
the exclusion of blacks from a state’s selection process for
grand jury foremen.

Petitioner’s claim that a white defendant has standing to
bring a due process attack is foreclosed by this Court’s deci-
sion in Hobby, supra. Considering the Louisiana Supreme
Court's dicta that a Louisiana grand jury foreman’s role is min-
isterial, petitioner’s request for relief squarely runs counter to
the Hobby decision. For the petitioner to distinguish Hobby
based upon a claimed difference in the selection of a grand
jury foreman in the federal system as opposed to the selection
of a grand jury foreman in the Louisiana system, clearly rings
hollow when the petitioner himself has deliberately chosen
not to attack the Louisiana grand jury venire from which his
Louisiana grand jury was chosen. Moreover, the Louisiana

19

Supreme Court in State of Louisiana v. Mouton, 395 So. 2d 1337
(La. 1981), upheld the state statutes governing the selection of
grand juries in Orleans Parish, whereby the district judge
picks each of the 12 grand jurors from the grand jury venire. In
Mouton, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed that La.C.CrP.
arts. 412, 413 and 414 and La.R.S. 15:114 did not violate the fed-
eral due process or equal protection clauses because the defen-
dant had failed to establish an affirmative showing that the
system was discriminatory. In the petitioner’s case, applicable
Louisiana statutes allow district judges of parishes other than
Orleans Parish to chose only the grand jury foreman from the
grand jury venire; the remaining 11 grand jurors and two alter-
nates are picked randomly and by lot. In light of Mouton, peti-
tioner’s claim that allowing a district judge to select the grand
jury foreman necessarily taints the grand jury itself has no
merit. Moreover, the argument fails to account for the peti-
tioner’s own decision to forego an attack on Louisiana’s sys-
tem of selecting the grand jury itself. Accordingly, review on
the due process claim should be denied.

Finally, petitioner claims he is entitled to federal review on
a fair cross-claim analysis under the Sixth Amendment. The
State of Louisiana counters that this federal claim has not been
heretofore addressed by the state courts in question. A review
of the record herein demonstrates that the state courts did not
rule on petitioner’s Sixth Amendment fair-cross section claim,
given the fact the focus was on petitioner’s standing to bring
either an equal protection attack or a due process attack upon
the grand jury foreman selection process itself. Further, the
record before this Court does not demonstrate that the peti-
tioner adequately represented a Sixth Amendment fair-cross
claim as an adequate basis for relief before the state courts.
Given this Honorable Court's policy considerations that state
courts should be given the first opportunity to consider the ap-
plication of state statutes in light of federal constitutional chal-

20

lenges, this Court’s review on this basis is not warranted.
Supreme Court Practice at 117.

Moreover, authority which petitioner himself cites to this
Honorable Court notes in dicta that a grand jury foreman at-
tack is not by its nature subject to the Sixth Amendment'’s re-
quirement of a fair cross-section. See Sneed, supra, 729 F. 2d at
1335 n. 2:“[a]lthough the composition of a grand jury or petit
jury venire may be challenged under the sixth amendment’s
guarantee of a right to be tried by a group drawn from a source
representing a fair cross-section of the community,...this re-
quirement does not extend to the office of grand jury foreper-
son because ‘[o]ne person alone cannot represent the divergent
views, experience, and ideas of the distinct groups which form
a community.” (Citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court’s
review under the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section is not

warranted.

21

+
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State of Louisiana
would respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny the
petitioner’s application for writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD P. IEYOUB
Attorney General

KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN*
Assistant Attorney General

State of Louisiana
Department of Justice

P.O. Box 94095

Baton Rouge, La. 70804-9095
(504) 342-7552

J. WILLIAM PUCHEU
District Attorney

RICHARD W. VIDRINE
Assistant District Attorney

Thirteenth Judicial District
Parish of Evangeline

P.O. Drawer 780

Ville Platte, La. 70586-0780
(318) 363-3438

Counsel for Respondent

* Counsel of Record

la

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

2a

APPENDIXES
Bill of Indictment, State of Louisiana v. Terry
Campbell.

Letter to Clerk William Suter from Kath-
leen Petersen, Assistant Attorney General.

Letter to Kathleen E. Petersen, Assistant
Attorney General, from Dmitrc I. Burnes,

Esquire.

Letter to Kathleen E. Petersen, Assistant
Attorney General, from Francis J. Lorson,
Chief Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court of the
United States.

3a

APPENDIX A
BILL OF INDICTMENT
STATE OF LOUISIANA PARISH
OF OF
LOUISIANA EVANGELINE
45,690F

In the name and by the authority of the State of
Louisiana, the Grand Jurors of the State of Louisiana, duly
impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire within and for
the body of Evangeline Parish, State aforesaid, upon their
oath do present:

That on or about the 11th day of January, 1992, at the Parish of
Evangeline, State of Louisiana, TERRY D. CAMPBELL com-
mitted second degree murder of James L. Sharp

contrary to the form of the Statute of the State of Louisiana in
such cases made and provided in contempt of the authority of
said State and against the peace and dignity of the same.

/s/ J. William Pucheu
District Attorney, 13th Judicial
District of Louisiana

4a

APPENDIX B

LETTER TO CLERK SUTER FROM
KATHLEEN PETERSEN,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of Louisiana
Department of Justice
Criminal Division
Baton Rouge

Richard P. Ileyoub P. O. Box 94095
Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9095
Telephone:

(504) 342-7552

Fax:

(504) 342-7893

SENT BY FEDERAL EXPRESS

Honorable William Suter

Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street Northeast

Washington, D.C. 20543

RE: No. 95-1240, October Term, 1995
Terry Campbell v. State of Louisiana

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to Rule 30.4, the respondent herewith requests
that the time within which to respond to the petition for cer-
tiorari be extended 30 days, to and including April 5, 1996.
The petition for certiorari was served on and received by re-
spondent, the Honorable J. William Pucheu, District Attorney,
Parish of Evangeline, on February 14, 1996, and the brief in
opposition is now due, unless extended, on March 6, 1996.

This request is made necessary by the fact that on Febru-
ary 14, 1996, Mr. Pucheu contacted Tim Screen, Director,
Louisiana Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, Criminal Division, and requested assistance in respond-
ing to the petition. Pursuant to that request, Mr. Screen has as-
signed the undersigned counsel to prepare a brief in

5a

opposition in the above-captioned matter. The undersigned is
scheduled to begin trial in State of Louisiana vs. Catherine A.
Doucet, Docket No. 9-93-1, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th
Judicial District Court, on three felony counts of theft of
$500.00 or more beginning on Monday, February 26, 1996, be-
fore the Honorable Bonnie Jackson, Judge, presiding, in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. In order to adequately research legal issues
and to review relevant court documents and transcripts, the
undersigned hereby requests the extended period herein.

Petitioner’s counsel, Dmitrc I. Burnes, contacted this date
by telephone, has consented to this request for an extension.

Sincerely yours,

/s/Kathleen E. Petersen
KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General

Louisiana Department of Justice
Criminal Division

P.O. Box 94095

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095
(504) 342-7552

cc/ Mr. Dmitrc I. Burnes, Esq.
Hon. J. William Pucheu, D.A.
Mr. Richard W. Vidrine, Asst. D.A.

6a

APPENDIX C

LETTER TO KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL, FROM DMITRC I. BURNES
‘Burnes & Burnes
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 650
Alexandria, LA 71309-0650
Telephone (318)448-0482
Facsimile (318) 442-8600

Richard V. Burnes Street Address:
Dmitre Ian Burnes 711 Washington Street
E. Grey Talley Alexandria, LA 71301-8030

February 26, 1996

SENT VIA FACSIMILE (504) 342-7893
AND BY FIRST CLASS MAIL

Ms. Kathleen E. Petersen
Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
Criminal Division

Post Office Box 94095

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095

Re: State of Louisiana v. Terry D. Campbell
Supreme Court of the United States
Docket Number 95-1240

Dear Ms. Petersen:

This letter confirms our telephone conversation of Friday,
February 23, 1996, wherein you advised me that you would be
handling the Terry Campbell case for the office of the Attor-
ney General. This letter also further confirms my agreement
to your request to include a statement of my lack of opposi-
tion to your planned request for an extension of time within
which to file your response to our Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari to be filed with the United States Supreme Court.

7a

With best regards, I am
Very truly yours,

/s/Dmitre I. Burnes
DMITRC I. BURNES

DIB/ mal

cc: Mr. Terry Campbell 4
Mrs. Clara Campbell

8a

APPENDIX D
LETTER TO KATHLEEN E. PETERSEN,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL FROM FRANCIS J. LORSON, CHIEF DEPUTY
CLERK, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk
Washington, DC 20543

William K. Suter Area Code 202
Clerk of the Court 479-3011

March 4, 1996

Kathleen E. Peterson
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 94095

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095

Re: Terry Campbell v. Louisiana
No. 95-1240

Dear Ms. Peterson:

Your request for an extension of time within which to file
a response to the petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-
entitled case has been granted; the time has been extended to
and including April 5, 1996.

No further request for an extension of time will be enter-
tained by the Clerk.
Very truly yours,

WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk
By /s/ Francis J. Lorson
Francis J. Lorson

Chief Deputy Clerk

cc: Richard V. Burnes

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1804%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.