# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Williams v. Pennsylvania

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 525 U.S. 816

## Text

Ne Supreme Court. U.S.
OF, FILED

9718 98 may 26 198
woonstoneesaxemnrnn wants

IN THE

Suprente Gourt of the United States

OcTronEeR TERM, 1997

DAVID L. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN G. BERGDOLL
Counsel of Record
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN G. BERGDOLL
300 West Market Street
York, Pennsylvania 17401
( 717 ) 845-5131
Attorney for Petitioner

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether Petitioner’s Constitutional rights of Double
Jeopardy and Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated

due to the unconstitutional dual prosecution and penalty in this
case.

3

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE COURT BELOW

The caption of the case in this Court contains the names
of all parties to the proceedings in the appellate courts of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW..........0.00.... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING. ........:sccssessssseesseses ii
I aaa chea ie saiiatcniesiscecincnsnse iii
po Be BN toy y |”, eae ne v
I as sivsslecespsszenoenestuncoies 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. .......cccscsssssessesscesss 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED....... 1
re MR cc titisccisnasccsndniensnsannassonsinihsvobachers 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..........c.ccsccsssscsssssessecsecoess 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT................... 7

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO DETERMINE WHETHER PETI-

TIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE

PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

WERE VIOLATED DUE TO THE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUAL

PROSECUTION AND PENALTY IN

REG SIR tC ee ae 7

ELT saiasicinipibdanentesiaiinlachineninsiiesisiessiiasinsvissivoniee 15

iv

APPENDIX

Page

A--Order of the Supreme Court of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania dated February 23,
1998 and filed February 24, 1998.................ccsessrees A-1

B--Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Superior
Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
dated August 28, 1997 affirming the trial Court’s
CI sisiitincrinccsninpeirnissiealasiisiiccdaidcniatentiestnsiadvebieiuieiaiinis B-1

C--Memorandum in Support of Order Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) as filed by The Honorable
Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge, dated September
Fi Sh evcpacbichapeiniiinicuaeesiscastaniniesitiasebenisoailavniens C-1

D--Judgment of Sentence and Order Issued by
The Honorable Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge,
ER TE FR, Tei iitvescnitn initiate nsiitensteintneienninns D-1

E--Opinion and Order issued by the Honorable
Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge, York County
Court of Common Pleas, dated February 5,
1996 affirming the Summary Conviction
Appeal and Refusing and Denying the
I TE Be siiaiichahinin tasepinpdeaesisheciniiniasansessdnsiucienisanin E-1

G--License Suspension Letter from Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation dated
FOIE Ba, Wes tikiciesbetcnsentaicthasaccctanianin G-1

Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases cited: Page
Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 547 Pa. 332,

690 A.2d 222 (1997), cert. den., U.S. _,
118 S.Ct. 98, 139 L.Ed.2d 53 (1997)............cccseseees 14

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct.
2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1999).............ccscssssssssesseeees 13

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586,
oP RM PU MEE batedichihccsssceictatacniidescunias Sauccte ass 12

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056,
et RR FE Ga rrctivnicinevscnnntektsabmstiieakediscnciisies 9

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779,
Re Sng I Pin cinudinticcceacticblceleage el ee 10

Department of Revenue of Montana v, Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937,
Se Ra Ee TI iiibetkstiss teens 12, 18, 14

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct.
Fark Se Aa ET SD ccistechnidcitennpolaienabnnnosenmmenians 10

Hudson v. United States, U.S. _, 118 S.Ct 488,
RIP Rp: Ge CE i vicvncesnsorvnttiesinneeataiesctcntaninsandocs 9-12

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (19638)......00..00.. eee 11

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673,
Fe Re I icici i 10

Moore vy. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 HOW 13,
Se eae I i iiiiaitidtinii ae tn 10

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109

S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)...........cccscseeee 10, 12, 14

vi
Page

United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,

63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943)...........eeseereee 10
United States v. Ursery, 618 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct.

2135, 185 L.Ed.2d 549 (1906)..........crsrcecscosscserreees 14
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct.

2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1080).........0rsssccscscescsrseecrssees 11
Constitutional Provisions Cited:
Ras GG TIE, Viscciscictiniciniccobessssinintineeiinnsieuiiainees 1
TE. COME. TROMINE, TEE Y ciccacesinanecnncnessnnsicinpuhtittmiunisiaes 2
Statutes Cited:
Be ais: FN a ceirenechcnieeineneiennicecitnscdbiuntincniandicidansbiianiocd 1
Be ns | Bi erciniichactinantipnhecsiinaneasnieianiqennbdgsscbasedasiahaneh 14
Fe ces Bi edieemscnsniricinsatanessnninicoensincnnsveniatiiieniieess 7
Miscellaneous:

1996 Pennsylvania Crash Facts and Statistics,
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Highway Safety and Traffic
TIE ccc eccerennnevisevivtnnsrveaenniesanuanunniseesenataninen 13

1

The Petitioner, David L. Williams, respectfully prays that
a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the denial by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Petitioner’s Petition for
Allowance of Appeal therein as filed on February 24, 1998.

OPINIONS BELOW

On February 24, 1998, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania denied without opinion, Petitioner’s Petition for
Allowancz of Appeal. The Supreme Court Order (A-1) is cited at
___ Pa.__, 706 A.2d 1213 (1998). Said Petition was filed
based on the unpublished memorandum decision by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court (B-1) on August 28, 1997 as cited
at ___ Pa. Super. __, 704 A.2d 696 (1997) which affirmed the
Judgment of Sentence and Order issued by the trial court on
April 29, 1996 (C-1).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

On February 24, 1998, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania entered its Order for which Petitioner seeks the
Writ of Certiorari.

This Court has jurisdiction to review this case under 28
U.S.C. 1257.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in the time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

2

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

STATUTE INVOLVED

75 Pa.C.S.A. 1543 (F-1)

3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

David L. Williams, Petitioner herein, was stopped by
Patrolman Timothy Harvey of the Springettsbury Township
Police Department (York County, Pennsylvania) on November
20, 1994. Patrolman Harvey followed Mr. Williams who was
driving on Route 30 for approximately one-half mile before
activating his lights whereupon the Petitioner immediately and
properly pulled over his vehicle.

No citations were issued at the scene and Mr. Williams
was released.

Mr. Williams was charged with a violation of driving
under suspension under Section 1543(b) (F-1) of the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code by citation filed with the office
of District Justice Roy L. Lam in Springettsbury Township on
December 9, 1994.

The summary trial was held on January 25, 1995 before
District Justice Roy Lam, a lay justice sitting in a court not of
record, at which time the Petitioner was found guilty.

Notwithstanding that the Petitioner had a right to appeal
the decision to the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Pennsylvania and in fact timely and properly filed a summary
conviction appeal on February 24, 1995 for a De Novo Hearing,
District Justice Lam immediately notified the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation of his finding of guilt.

In response to the certification by the District Justice of
the ruling as to guilt, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation, by notice dated February 24,
1995, notified the Petitioner that the Department was taking
action against him to suspend his driver’s license for one year on
the basis of the same acts and the "conviction" by the District
Justice of him for Driving Under Suspension (G-1).

The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation took
action to suspend and in fact the Petitioner’s Pennsylvania

4

driving privileges were suspended on March 23, 1995 for one
year.

The separate action by the Department of
Transportation proceeded without reference to the fact that the
Petitioner had in fact appealed the decision of the District
Justice to the Court of Common Pleas of York County, which

appeal was an Appeal De Novo to the Trial Court of Record in
this case.

The Petitioner, partially for financial reasons, attempted
pro se to respond to the Notice of action of Suspension from the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation dated February 24,
1995 (G-1) by forwarding a copy of the appeal papers in this
summary criminal case to the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation indicating to them that the Appeal De Novo had
been filed and that no Trial of Record had been held.

The Department in fact continued to prosecute the
stspension and Mr. Williams’ license was suspended in
accordance with the Notice of Action of Suspension for the acts
giving rise to this case of Driving Under Suspension on March
23, 1995 in that the Petitioner sent to the Department of
Transportation the wrong appeal papers, i.e. the Summary
Appeal papers and not those papers necessary to effect an
"appeal" in the suspension action by the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation.

The Petitioner at the time of the De Novo trial of this
criminal case, on May 31, 1995, in fact was well into serving his
one-year license suspension penalty for the charge filed in this
case by Officer Harvey and yet had not been convicted of the
crime that was to bring about the suspension penalty.

In the Summary Conviction Appeal in the Common Pleas
Court of York County, Pennsylvania, Petitioner’s Motions were
filed on May 15, 1995. Said Motions as presented included
reference to constitutional violations of double jeopardy and due
process protections as provided in the United States
Constitution.

5

A hearing on said motions and a De Novo Summary Trial
were held before the Honorable Joseph E. Erb (York County,
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas) on May 31, 1995. The
record of said hearing included a reference to the constitutional
violation of double jeopardy and resulting due process violations.

The Officer testified at the May 31, 1995 combined Pre-
trial Hearing and Trial of this case that he had pulled Mr.
Williams’ vehicle over after he had followed him from
approximately North Hills Road in Springettsbury Township,
York County, Pennsylvania for one-half mile to North Sherman
Street. The Officer testified as follows:

I observed that it was traveling approximately
30 to 35 miles an hour, and also that the right
wheels of the vehicle were juggling off the
roadway onto the berm, basically straddling the
white line by about one to two feet....

The Petitioner was cooperative with the Police Officer
and at the Officer’s request performed field sobriety tests which
the Officer determined that he passed. As was observed in the
factual Hearing of this case the Petitioner is blind in one eye.

At the time the Officer approached Mr. Williams’ vehicle
after having pulled him over, the Officer asked Mr. Williams for
his driver’s license and registration and at that time was told by
Mr. Williams that he did not have a license.

Petitioner’s Memorandum was filed in the trial court on
June 23, 1995 and included references to the double jeopardy
and due process violations of the United States Constitution.
The Commonwealth responded with their brief on July 24, 1995.

An Opinion and Order was issued by The Honorable
Joseph E. Erb of the York County, Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas, the Court of record, on February 5, 1996 (E-1)
denying and refusing Petitioner’s Motions and finding the
Petitioner guilty.

6

Sentencing was scheduled for March 25, 1996 and
continued to April 29, 1996 at which time Petitioner was
sentenced in this case to penalties including a $1,000.00 fine and
ninety days incarceration (D-1).

Before the time of sentencing, the Petitioner had fully
served the one-year suspension penalty in the action by the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.

Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
was timely filed on May 24, 1996.

On May 29, 1996, The Honorable Joseph E. Erb filed a
Direction to Defendant to File a Statement of Matters
Complained of under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(b) and said response was filed by the Petitioner on June 11,
1996, which again included assertions as to violations of due
process and double jeopardy as contained in the Federal and
State constitutions.

As required, the Criminal Docketing Statement was filed
with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on July 2, 1996 which
listed the issues for appeal and said issues contained reference
to the double jeopardy and due process violations under the
Federal and State Constitutions.

A Brief and accompanying Reproduced Record were filed
in support of the appeal on November 3, 1996 in the
Pennsylvania Superior Court. Said Brief also raised the due
process and double jeopardy violations of the Federal
Constitution.

On September 25, 1996, The Honorable Joseph E. Erb
filed a Memorandum in Support of Order Pursuant to
Pa.R.App.P. 1925(a) (C-1).

Following briefing and oral argument, the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed the Lower Court’s Opinion on August
28, 1997 (B-1) wherein the Court addressed the double jeopardy
issue.

oon enaaay

7

On September 26, 1997, Petitioner filed a Petition for
Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
which also referenced the aforesaid violations of the
Constitutions of the United States and of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.

Said Petition was denied by the Supreme Court, without
opinion, on February 24, 1998 (A-1).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO DETERMINE WHETHER
PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED DUE TO THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUAL PROSECUTION AND
PENALTY IN THIS CASE.

Petitioner’s rights of Due Process and Double J eopardy
under the Constitution of the United States were violated in that
the Petitioner was tried, convicted and sanctioned twice for the
same criminal offense.

Section 1543 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code
(F-1) is repugnant to the United States Constitution in that this
dual statute is unconstitutional in creating a duality of procedure
lacking due process, resulting in dual penalties for the same acts
and thus violating the Fifth Amendment as to Double J eopardy
and the Fourteenth Amendment as to deprivation of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness without due process of law. The
statute reads as follows:

75 PaC S.A. § 1543 TITLE, REGISTRATION,
LICENSING

$ 1543. Driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked

8

(a) Offense defined.- Except as provided in
subsection (b), any person who drives a motor
vehicle on any highway or traffic way of this
Commonwealth after the commencement of a
suspension, revocation or cancellation of the
operating privilege and before the operating
privilege has been restored is guilty of a
summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be
sentenced to pay a fine of $200.

(b) Certain offenses.-

(1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on
any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth
at a time when their operating privilege is
suspended or revoked as a condition of
acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative
Disposition for a violation of section 3731
(relating to driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance) or because of a violation of
section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for
refusal) or 3731 shall, upon conviction, be guilty
of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to
pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo
imprisonment for a period of not less than 90
days.

(2) This subsection shall apply to any person
against whom one of these suspensions has been
imposed whether the person is currently serving
this suspension or whether the effective date of
suspension has been deferred under any of the
provisions of section 1544 (relating to additional
period of revocation or suspension). This
provision shall also apply until the person has
had the operating privilege restored. This
subsection shall also apply to any revocation
imposed pursuant to section 1542 (relating to
revocation of habitual offender’s license) if any
of the enumerated offenses was for a violation of
section 3731.

(c) Suspension or revocation of operating
privilege. - Upon receiving a certified record of
the conviction of any person under this section,

9

the department shall suspend or revoke that
person’s operating privilege as follows:

(1) If the department’s records show that the
person was under suspension, recall or
cancellation on the date of violation, and had not
been restored, the department shall suspend the
person’s operating privilege for an additional
one-year period.

(2) If the department’s records show that the
person was under revocation on the date of
violation, and had not been restored, the
department shall revoke the person’s operating
privilege for an additional two-year period.

(d) Citation of appropriate subsection. -Prior to

filing a citation for a violation of this section
with the issuing authority named in the citation,
the police officer shall verify the basis for the
suspension with the department. Upon
receiving the verification, the officer shall cite
the appropriate subsection of this section on the
citation.
1976, June 17, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1, imd.
effective. Amended 1982, Dec.15, P.L. 1268, No.
289, § 4, effective in 30 days; 1986, Dec. 11, P.L.
1530, No. 166, § 4, effective in 60 days; 1987,
Nov.23, P.L. 399, No. 82, § 3, effective in 60
days; 1994, Dec.12, P.L. 1048, No. 143, § 2,
effective in nine months.

This Court held in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89

S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) that the "double jeopardy
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental
ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to

the States through the Fourteenth Amendment".

v. United States,

Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court in Hudson

(1997) that:

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no
“person [shall] be subject for the same offence to

U.S. __, 118 S.Ct. 488, 189 L.Ed.2d 450

10

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." We
have long recognized that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not prohibit the imposition of any
additional sanction that could, "in common
parlance,” be described as punishment. United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549,
87 L.Ed. 443, 63 S.Ct. 379 (1943) (quoting
Moore vy. lilinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 HOW 13, 19, 14
L.Ed. 306 (1852)). The Clause protects only
against the imposition of multiple criminal
punishments for the same offense, Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 82 L.Ed. 917, 58
S.Ct. 630 (1938); see also Hess, 317 U.S. at 548-
549 ("Only" "criminal punishment” "subjects the
defendant to ’jeopardy’ within the constitutional
meaning"); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 44
L.Ed.2d 346, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975) ("In the
constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk
that is traditionally associated with a criminal
prosecution"), and then only when such occurs in
successive proceedings, see Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U.S. 359, 366, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 103 S.Ct. 673
(1983).

Certainly, Section 1543 of the Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Code and the dual procedure and punishment set forth
therein for the same acts, which is most often successive
procedure and punishment, are criminal in nature under the
criteria set forth in Hudson, cited supra, (disavowing in part the
analysis in U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104
L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) which analysis it is submitted would also
bring the conclusion that Section 1543 is an unconstitutionally
dual criminal procedure and penalty).

The statute with its dual procedure and punishment is
on its face criminal in nature and it is clear that the
Pennsylvania Legislature intended it as such. Both procedures,
that by the District Attorney in prosecuting this case under
1543(b) of the statute, and the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation in prosecuting under 1543(c) do so based on a
"conviction". The language used by the Pennsylvania Legislature

11

is criminal in nature and intent. The conviction is that of a
summary criminal offense as defined in Section 1543(a) and
1543(b). The penalty of suspension under 1543(c)(2) is increased
if the defendant was under revocation at the time of the
"violation", a type of penalty enhancement and recidivism
deterrence.

The Legislature has clearly labeled and intended the
statute criminal and not civil. See United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980).

Since the Pennsylvania Legislature has not "indicated an
intention to establish « civil penalty", it is submitted there should
be no need to apply the second stage of the Hudson and Ward
analysis, that is, to by the "clearest proof" override legislative
intent and transform...a civil remedy into a criminal penalty".
Ward, cited supra, at p. 249 and see Hudson, cited supra.

Moreover, even if the second stage of the Hudson and
Ward analysis would be applied that is:

(1) "whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3)
“whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment -- retribution
and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignalle for it"; and (7)
"whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned."

Hudson, cited supra, and Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d
644 (1963).

this dual criminal statute considered in relation to the statute on
its face involves (1) a clear disability and restraint in both the
incarceration of 1543(b) and the suspension penalty of 1543(c);
(2) has historically been considered punishment at least to the

12

extent of a requirement as to due process - see Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); (3) in 1543
there is scienter involved that is knowledge and criminal intent
to drive while under suspension; (4) certainly there is deterrence
and retribution in loss of license to Mr. Williams who is partially
disabled and lives alone and who is cut off from society for all
intent and purposes by the loss of the ability to drive because no
other means of transportation is available to him; (5) the
behavior penalized is clearly made a crime in 15493 itself; (6) the
only alternative purpose to which it might connect, that is, taking
those off the highway who drive while suspended, is hardly a
factor where the person has merely driven while under
suspension and not committed some heinous crime making her
or him a danger to society. The Petitioner, Mr. Williams, in the
case before the Court was not charged with any unsafe driving
and was not even involved in any accident or near an accident;
and (7) certainly, in light of the foregoing, dual punishment for
driving under suspension is not only excessive but unnecessary
and of no benefit to any alternative purpose of public safety the
Legislature might have considered if in fact it did.

The criteria in the Hudson case are clearly met showing
the dual procedure and penalties of 1543 to be both criminal in
nature and thereby clearly implicating double jeopardy and due
process provisions of the United States Constitution.
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994).

The dual procedure in this case has overwhelmed Mr.
Williams, as it has many others in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, with the necessity to defend two separate
prosecutions with different procedures in different hearings and
with different prosecutors all for the same single act of driving
while under suspension.

This is in violation of due process and protections as to
double jeopardy as provided in the Constitution of the United
States. See Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,
cited supra; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109
S.Ct. 1892, 104 S.Ct. 487 (1989), disavowed in part by Hudson
v. United States, U.S. __, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450

13

(1997) and Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct.
2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993).

Clearly under the criteria set in Hudson, Kurth Ranch
and Halper, cited supra, jeopardy has attached and further
prosecution and penalty in this case would amount to excessive
and dual process and punishments for the same offense.

The action of the Department of Transportation in this
case was a separate action, brought for the purpose of exacting
a punishment and sanction. The procedure and punishment by
the Department’s action is clearly set forth in its notice of action
to suspend (G-1).

In most geographical areas of the United States,
including most areas of York County, Pennsylvania where this
offense occurred, the sole means of transportation is by
automobile. To the great number of persons in these places, the
inability to drive creates the inability to work, the inability to
obtain the necessities of life such as food and medical assistance
and the inability to exercise the constitutional rights of a citizen
to participate in government and to vote and, of course, social
isolation especially for those persons who live alone. Very clearly,
there is a deprivation of life, liberty and property.

On the other hand by comparison, incarceration takes
away few of these basic needs and rights and is for many persons
much less punitive and much less restrictive of liberty. A person
who is incarcerated is housed, fed, and cared for and he for the
most part maintains the ability to exercise his rights as a citizen,
can obtain all his necessities, and often can work in work release
at his place of employment.

As to whether there is any remedial benefit to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a suspension imposed for
driving under suspension there is certainly room for great doubt,
as has been recognized in somewhat recent legislation in
Pennsylvania restoring the licenses of thousands of persons who
were too harshly penalized for driving under suspension (Section
4 of Act 1994, December 12, P.L. 1048, No. 143, 75 Pa.C.S.A.

14

1542 as amended).

It was by the enactment of this statute that the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania admitted and determined that
the Commonwealth was not served, yet made whole, by these
suspensions but in fact damaged by them.

Statistical data after the enactment and release of these
suspended drivers to drive again in fact showed a decrease in
accident fatalities per vehicle miles traveled. 1996 Pennsylvania
Crash Facts and Statistics, Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Highway Safety and Traffic
Engineering, Page 11.

A license suspension proceeding is a very personal
proceeding involving a very personal punishment as personal and
as severe as incarceration and is not an in rem proceeding as
analyzed in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct.
2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) and Commonwealth v. Wingait
Farms, 547 Pa. 332, 690 A.2d 222 (1997), cert. denied, _—*US.
_., 118 S.Ct. 98, 139 L.Ed.2d 53 (1997).

The criteria set forth in Kurth Ranch, cited supra, are
certainly met by such a suspension. Herein the suspension in a
separate proceeding is conditioned on a crime, imposed after
arrest and the only person subject to suspension is the person
charged with the offense. See this Court’s interpretation in
Ursery, cited supra, of Kurth Ranch, cited supra, including also
an analysis of Halper, cited supra, with dissent by Justice
Stevens.

In that the Petitioner has already had his license
suspended for one year by the process initiated by the District
Justice and concluded with actual suspension of the Petitioner’s
license by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, the
case at bar should be dismissed on double jeopardy and/or due
process grounds, the Petitioner discharged, and the dual
procedure used to prosecute the Petitioner condemned.

15
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorari should be issued
to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to
review the question presented by this Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN G. BERGDOLL

Counsel of Record

Law Offices of John G. Bergdoll
300 West Market Street

York, Pennsylvania 17401

(717) 845-5131

Attorney for Petitioner

A-1
APPENDIX A
IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH : No. 759
OF PENNSYLVANIA, : Middle District
: Allocatur Dkt. 1997
Respondent,
Vv.
: Petition for
DAVID L. WILLIAMS, : Allowance
: Appeal from
Petitioner. : Superior Court
ORDER

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 23rd day of February, 1998, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is hereby DENIED.

TRUE & CORRECT COPY
ATTEST:
FEB 24, 1998

/s/ Shirley Bailey
SHIRLEY BAILEY
CHIEF CLERK

B-1
APPENDIX B

COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID L. WILLIAMS,
Appellant

)
)
)

v. )
)
) NO. 00481 HARRISBURG,
) 1996

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence in the

Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Criminal Division, No. 70 SCA 1995

BEFORE: TAMILIA, J., HUDOCK, J. and CERCONE, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM:

This is an appeal of the judgment of sentence of ninety
(90) days’ incarceration and a $1,000 fine imposed following
appellant’s de novo summary trial. Appellant’s motion to dismiss
was denied and he was found guilty of driving while his license
was suspended for a DUI conviction.*

The following statement of facts was provided by the trial
court in its February 5, 1996 Opinion, which was adopted as its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.

Defendant was stopped by the Springettsbury
Township Police on November 20, 1994, after
following the defendant for approximately one-
half mile on the Route 30 by-pass. The
defendant was driving below the posted speed
limit of 40 m.p.h. and had its right tires
travelling on the berm.

175 Pa. C.S. § 1543(b).

B-2

The defendant, who is blind in one eye, passed
the field sobriety tests that were administered.
The defendant informed the officer that he did
not have a driver’s license because his had been
suspended as the result of a DUI conviction.
Defendant alleges that the officer violated his
rights when he neglected to inform the
defendant of the mandatory penalties under
§1543(b) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code.

On December 9, 1994, a citation was issued. The
officer issued the citation after official
certification of the suspension from the
Department of Transportation which he received
on December 5, 1994.

The defendant was found guilty of driving
without a license by the District Justice, and a
timely appeal to the Court of Common Pleas
followed. Irrespective of this appeal, the
defendant’s conviction was transmitted to the
Department of Transportation. The Department
processed the conviction because the defendant
had submitted the wrong appeal papers.

(Slip Op., Erb, J., 2/5/96, pp. 1-3; footnote omitted.)

Appellant first argues the patrolman, Officer Harvey who
stopped his vehicle on November 20, 1994 did so without
articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that appellant had
committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Second,
appellant asserts Officer Harvey failed to properly and timely
initiate the instant proceeding, as a citation for driving with a
suspended license was not immediately issued at the scene of the
traffic stop. Third, appellant asserts the evidence presented was
insufficient to demonstrate that he was notified, prior to his stop
by the officer, of the penalty imposed for a violation of section

B-3

1543(b) and, as such, a verdict of not guilty, dismissal and/or
discharge of appellant is required. Lastly, appellant argues his
prosecution under section 1543(b) of the Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Code is violative of the double jeopardy clauses of the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

Appellant’s first argument is without merit. An officer may
conduct a traffic stop if there is "articulable and reasonable
grounds to suspect" that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code
has occurred. Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa. Super. 69,
____, 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993). Because Officer Harvey observed
appellant driving erratically, articulable and reasonable grounds
to suspect that he was violating the Motor Vehicle Code were
established at trial. Commonwealth v. Hamme, 400 Pa. Super.
537, 583 A.2d 1245 (1990). Therefore, the officer’s stop of
appellant’s vehicle was justified.

Next, appellant argues that, rather than filing the traffic
citation for driving with a suspended license on December 13,
1994, Officer Harvey should have immediately issued the citation
at the scene of the traffic stop on November 20, 1994. This
argument is also without merit. In filing the citation for the
summary offensé within thirty (30) days of its occurrence, Officer
Harvey followed proper procedure. The citation was timely fil
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5553, Summary offenses involving
vehicles (proceedings for summary offenses under Title 75 must
be commenced within 30 days after the commission of the alleged
offense), and was properly filed pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543
(d), Citation of appropriate subsection, as Officer Harvey verified
through the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation that
appellant’s license had been suspended due to a DUI conviction.

Appellant contends in his third argument that a dismissal,
discharge and/or verdict of not guilty is required because the
evidence presented was insufficient to demonstrate he had notice
of the nature and extent of the mandatory penalty under section
1543(b). The case of Commonwealth v. Gamble, 376 Pa. Super.
590, 546 A.2d 681 (1988), is cited by appellant for the proposition
that, in order to be subject to the section 1543(b) penalty, a

B-4

defendant must be made aware of the fact that the penalty
consists of a $1,000 fine and ninety (90) days’ incarceration.
Appellant’s understanding of that case, however, is incorrect. In
Gamble, as was subsequently explained in Commonwealth v.
Crockford, 443 Pa. Super. 23, 660 A.2d 1326 (1995),

this court ruled that although evidence of
mailing (to a prior, stale address) was
presented and appellant was under the belief
that his license was suspended, judgment was
nevertheless properly arrested. Appellant
believed that his license was suspended for
failure to respond to citations. In fact, it was
suspended for driving under the influence.
Appellant claimed he was unaware of the nature
of his suspension. This court held that
appellant not only had to have actual notice of
his suspension, but actual notice of the true
nature of the suspension. The court refused to
subject appellant to the more severe penalties of
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b).

Id. at _, - 660 A.2d at 1329 n. 2. As indicated above, the
holding of Gamble, supra, is helpful to appellant’s case only if he
did not have actual notice of the nature of his suspension. Jd. It
is not necessary that a defendant be given notice of potential
penalties that will accompany subsequent convictions of driving
while under a license suspension.

In the instant case, appellant did have actual notice that his
license was suspended due to his DUI conviction. The Bureau
of Driver Licensing Certification Statement, which outlined the
chronology of appellant’s violations and departmental actions,
was made a part of the record in order to demonstrate that
appellant’s license was under suspension for a DUI conviction as
of March 23, 1994, and official notice of that suspension was
mailed to his correct address on April 12, 1994. Furthermore,
appellant admitted to Officer Harvey and to the trial court that
he was aware of his license suspension for his DUI conviction at

B-5

the time he was stopped (T.T., 5/31/95, pp. 18-21). Therefore,
sufficient evidence was presented to sustain appellant’s
conviction.

Lastly, appellant contends the suspension of his driver’s
license for driving while already under a suspension for his DUI
conviction constituted punishment, and any subsequent criminal
prosecution under section 1543(b) is violative of the double
jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend V; Pa. Const. art. 1, section
10. Our Court recently addressed this issue in Commonwealth
v. Wolfe, 454 Pa. Super. 93, 684 A.2d 642 (1996), wherein we
held that double jeopardy principles are not violated when a
criminal conviction is accompanied by a motorist’s license
suspension. Id. Although suspensions may have an "incidental
deterrent or punitive effect", the court held "the primary purpose
of such suspensions is not to punish the individual but to protect
the public." Id. at _, 684 A.2d at 646.

In the same respect, while the Commonwealth seeks to
punish appellant with the sentence of 90 days’ incarceration and
a $1,000 fine for driving with a suspended license, his 12-month
suspension by the Department of Transportation on March 23,
1995 was imposed to protect the public from a motorist who
had been recently adjudicated guilty of DUI and who the
Department of Transportation had recently determined was an
unsafe driver. The Department of Transportation had not, as of
the date appellant was pulled over by Officer Harvey, received
from appellant proof that he had obtained insurance and
successfully completed a DUI treatment program, as was required
for restoration of appellant’s operating privileges. Pursuant to
this Court’s reasoning in Wolfe, supra, we conclude that
appellant’s consecutive suspension by the Department of
Transportation did not constitute punishment triggering
protection from a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Accordingly, the prosecution of appellant for driving while

B-6

under a license suspension is not barred by the double jeopardy
clauses of either the United States Constitution or the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and the trial court properly refused
to dismiss the charges.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

B-7

COMMONWEALTH OF IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
PENNSYLVANIA OF PENNSYLVANIA
¥.

DAVID L. WILLIAMS,
Appellant

No. 00481 HARRISBURG,
1996

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence in the
Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Criminal Division, No. 70 SCA 1995

JUDGMENT

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of York County, be, and the same is
hereby Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ David A. Szewezak
Prothonotary

Dated: August 28, 1997

C-1
APPENDIX C

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of : No. 70 8.C.A. 1995
Pennsylvania :

Vv. °
: Driving/Suspension
David L. Williams : D.U.L. Related

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ORDER
PURSUANT TO Pa.R.App.P. 1925(a)

Defendant, David L. Williams, has filed an Appeal to the
Superior Court from the Order of this Court dated February 5,
1996. Pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. 1925(b), the Trial Court directed
Defendant to file a concise statement of matters complained of
on appeal. Said statement was filed by David L. Williams on
June 11, 1996.

We have reviewed the 1925(b) issues assigned by David
L. Williams as issues to be raised on appeal and we refer the
Superior Court to the Trial Court’s Opinion and Order of
February 5, 1996.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Joseph E. Erb
Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge

Dated: September 25, 1996

D-1
APPENDIX D

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH : No. 70 SCA 1995
VS.

DAVID L. WILLIAMS : Driving Under Suspension

York, Pa., Monday, April 29, 1996

Before the Honorable Joseph E. Erb, Sr. Judge

APPEARANCES:

CRAIG R. MILSTEN, Esquire
Assistant District Attorney
for the Commonwealth

JOHN G. BERGDOLL, Esquire
for the Defendant

MR. MILSTEN: This is Commonwealth versus
David L. Williams, 70 SCA 1995, Defendant was charged with
driving under suspended license, DUI-related. This is the date
set for his sentencing.

MR. BERGDOLL: If the Court please, we
understand that there’s a mandatory sentence involved here,
Your Honor. We will ask for a continuation of bail, so we might
have an opportunity to appeal the decision made by the Court.

I do understand at this point that there are no
options available for house arrest or any intermediate punish-

D-2
ment, so I think we’re prepared to proceed with sentencing.

I have explained to my client the various rights
of appeal, and the rights that he would have in reference to this
sentence.

THE COURT: The mandatory sentence is.

MR. MILSTEN: I’m sorry, I don’t have that
information.

MR. BERGDOLL: 90 days.
ORDER

Under the circumstances, we will direct that the
Defendant will undergo imprisonment in York County Jail for a
period of 90 days, pay $1,000 fine, and the costs, $10 under Act
45.

We direct that the execution of sentence will be
withheld until an appeal can be taken by the Defendant. If an
appeal is not taken within ten days, he will report to York
County Jail.

MR. BERGDOLL: Your Honor, there’s a 30 day
appeal period. It is a direct appeal.

THE COURT: Within 30 days.
MR. BERGDOLL: Thank you.

THE COURT: If an appeal is taken, the Court
will direct counsel to advise the Court if the appeal is dismissed,
or the Commonwealth’s position is upheld on appeal, so that the
Court then will set a date for the Defendant to begin his

incarceration.
**. *

blw 5/30/96

E-1
APPENDIX E

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH OF : 70 SCA 1995
PENNSYLVANIA

V.
: Driving/Suspension
DAVID L. WILLIAMS : DUI Related

APPEARANCES:

JONELLE L. HARTER, ESQUIRE
For the Commonwealth

JOHN G. BERGDOLL, ESQUIRE
For the Defendant

OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the motion of the
defendant, David L. Williams, seeking that the case be dismissed.
For the following reasons, the defendant’s request will be
refused and denied.

Defendant was stopped by the Springettsbury Township
police on November 20, 1994, after following the defendant for
approximately one-half mile on the Route 30 bypass. The
defendant was driving below the posted speed limit of 40 m.p.h.
and had its right tires travelling on the berm.

The defendant, who is blind in one eye, passed the field
sobriety tests that were administered. The defendant informed
the officer that he did not have a driver’s license because his had
been suspended as the result of a DUI conviction. Defendant
alleges that the officer violated his rights when he neglected to

E-2

inform the defendant of the mandatory penalties under
§1543(b)! of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.

On December 9, 1994, a citation was issued. The officer
issued the citation after official certification of the suspension
from the Department of Transportation which he received on
December 5, 1994.

The defendant was found guilty of driving without a
license by the District Justice, and a timely appeal to the Court
of Common Pleas followed. Irrespective of this appeal, the
defendant’s conviction was transmitted to the Department of
Transportation. The Department processed the conviction
because the defendant had submitted the wrong appeal papers.

First we address whether the officer had reasonable and
articulable grounds to support the stop of the defendant on the
evening of November 20, 1994. The court finds that the erratic
driving of the defendant was sufficient to cause the officer to
stop the defendant. Accordingly we will refuse and deny this
alleged insufficiency.

Next, we determine whether the charges were properly
initiated by the officer. The law requires that a citation in a
summary case shall be filed within thirty days of the date of the

‘The relevant portion of 75 §1543 Driving while
operating privilege is suspended or revoked is as
follows:

1543(b)(1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on
any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a
time when their operating privilege is suspended or
revoked ...as a violation of section 3731 (relating to
driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled
substance) ...shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a
summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine
of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of
not less than 90 days.

E-3

offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §5553(a)*. The record supports that the
date of the offense was November 20, 1994 and that the citation
was filed on December 13, 1994. The suspension was properly
authenticated prior to issuance, as is required by 75 Pa. C.S.A.
$1543(d)?. Accordingly, we determine that the charges were
properly initiated by the officer.

Next, we discuss the issue of "actual notice" to the
defendant of the penalties under §1543(b) of the Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code. The Commonwealth has the burden of
proving that the defendant had actual notice of driver's
suspension or revocation for a DUlI-related offense. See,
Commonwealth v. Crockford, _ Pa. Super. _, 660 A.2d 1326,
1329 (1995). The record reveals that the defendant had actual
notice of his DUI related suspension. The defendant informed
the officer as the time of the stop that he had no license because
of the DUI related suspension. The defendant surrendered his
license in open court at the time of the conviction, and the
official notice was sent to his verified correct address by the
Department, mailed April 12, 1994. Accordingly, we determine
that the record supports sufficient evidence of the actual notice

75 Pa.C.S. §5553 Summary offense involving vehicles
(a) General rule.- Except as provided in subsection (b)
or (c), proceedings for summary offenses under Title
75 (relating to vehicles) must be commenced within 30
days after the commission of the alleged offense or
within 30 days after the discovery of the commission
of the offense or the identity of the offender,
whichever is later, and not thereafter.

31543(d) Citation of appropriate subsection.- Prior to
filing a citation for a violation of this section with
the issuing authority named in the citation, the police
officer shall verify the basis for the suspension with
the department. Upon receiving the verification, the
officer shall cite the appropriate subsection of this
section on the citation. Amended 1894, Dec. 12, P.L.
1048, No. 143, §2.

E-4
to the defendant under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1543(b).

Finally, we address the issue of double jeopardy as it
applies to the separate processing of the violation by the
Department of Motor Vehicles. Defendant relies on a line of
cases which lend some support to his contention that a DUI
prosecution is barred after the civil penalty of license suspension
has been effected. However, the cases are distinguishable. In
Pennsylvania, §1543(b) is a criminal statute that has the license
suspension included in the statute. The penalty is triggered by

the finding of guilty of the defendant. See, Helt v. Pennsylvania
D.O.T., 69 Pa. Cmwlth. 333, 452 A.2d 74 (1982).

Under the facts of this case, the suspension processing
was premature in light of the failure of the defendant to properly
give the Department notice of his intention to appeal his
conviction. The procedural flaw cannot trigger a double jeopardy
violation for the underlying conviction as a separate or successive
proceeding. Accordingly, we will refuse and deny all alleged
error and will affirm the summary judgement conviction.

BY THE COURT,

(s/ Joseph E. Erb
Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge

E-5

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEALTH OF : 70 SCA 1995
PENNSYLVANIA :
V. :
: Driving/Suspension
DAVID L. WILLIAMS : DUI Related
APPEARANCES:

JONELLE L. HARTER, ESQUIRE
For the Commonwealth

JOHN G. BERGDOLL, ESQUIRE
For the Defendant

ORDER

AND NOW, TO WIT, This 5th day of February, 1996,
the summary conviction appeal of the defendant, David L.
Williams is hereby affirmed. The alleged points of error are
refused and denied.

The defendant is directed to appear for sentencing on
Monday, March 25, 1996, 9:30 a.m.

BY THE COURT,

(s/ Joseph E. Erb
Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge

F-1

APPENDIX F

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543 TITLE, REGISTRATION, LICENSING

§ 1543. Driving while operating privilege is suspended or
revoked

(a) Offense defined.- Except as provided in subsection (b), any
person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or traffic
way of this Commonwealth after the commencement of a
suspension, revocation or cancellation of the operating privilege
and before the operating privilege has been restored is guilty
of a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced
to pay a fine of $200.

(b) Certain offenses.-

(1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway
or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when their
operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of
acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a
violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of
alcohol or controlled substance) or because of a violation of
section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3731
shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and
Shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo
imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.

(2) This subsection shall apply to any person against whom
one of these suspensions has been imposed whether the person
is currently serving this suspension or whether the effective
date of suspension has been deferred under any of the
provisions of section 1544 (relating to additional period of
revocation or suspension). This provision shall also apply until
the person has had the operating privilege restored. This
subsection shall also apply to any revocation imposed pursuant
to section 1542 (relating to revocation of habitual offender’s
license) if any of the enumerated offenses was for a violation
of section 3731.

F-2

(c) Suspension or revocation of operating privilege. - Upon
receiving a certified record of the conviction of any person
under this section, the department shall suspend or revoke
that person’s operating privilege as follows:

(1) If the department’s records show that the person was
under suspension, recall or cancellation on the date of
violation, and had not been restored, the department shall
suspend the person’s operating privilege for an additional one-
year period.

(2) If the department’s records show that the person was
under revocation on the date of violation, and had not been
restored, the department shall revoke the person’s operating
privilege for an additional two-year period.

(d) Citation of appropriate subsection. -Prior to filing a
citation for a violation of this section with the issuing authority
named in the citation, the police officer shall verify the basis
for the suspension with the department. Upon receiving the
verification, the officer shall cite the appropriate subsection of
this section on the citation.

1976, June 17, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1, imd. effective. Amended
1982, Dec.15, P.L. 1268, No. 289, § 4, effective in 30 days;
1986, Dec. 11, P.L. 1530, No. 166, § 4, effective in 60 days;
1987, Nov.23, P.L. 399, No. 82, § 3, effective in 60 days; 1994,
Dec.12, P.L. 1048, No. 143, § 2, effective in nine months.

G-1
APPENDIX G

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Bureau of Driver Licensing
Harrisburg, PA 17123
FEBRUARY 24, 1995

DAVID L. WILLIAMS 950489283815557 001
R D 4 BOX 4555 02/17/1995
13523414
SPRING GROVE PA 17362 07/21/1948
LICENSE IN BUREAU

Dear Motorist:

As a result of your conviction on 01/25/1995 of violating
Section 1543 of the Vehicle Code, DRIVING WHILE
SUSP/REVOKE on 11/20/1994, your driving privilege is being
SUSPENDED for a period of 1 YEAR(S) as mandated by Section
1543 of the Vehicle Code.

Effective Date of Suspension: 03/23/1995, 12:01 a.m.

The above mentioned sanction is in addition to any
previously issued sanction(s).

You will be notified of any outstanding restoration
requirements approximately 30 days before the eligibility date of
the restoration of your driving privilege. You must follow those
instructions very carefully in order to have your driving privilege
restored.

You have the right to appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of
the county of your residence within 30 days of the mail date
(February 24, 1995) of this Notice. Sending a copy to this
department of a timely, filed appeal will stay the department’s
action pending a final decision by the court. The copy must be
sent by certified mail to:

G-2

Room 103
Transportation and Safety Building
Harrisburg, PA 17120

9504892838 15557

Sincerely,

/s/ Douglas K. Tobin
Douglas K. Tobin, Director
Bureau of Driver Licensing

SEND FEE/LICENSE/DL-16LC/TO:
Department of Transportation
Bureau of Driver Licensing

P. O. Box 68693

Harrisburg, PA 17106-8693

‘INFORMATION (7:00 AM TO 6:30 PM)

Pittsburgh Area - 412-565-5670
Philadelphia Area - 215-698-8100
Harrisburg Area - 717-787-3130

Toll Free 1 - 800-932-4600

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1595%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.