# Reply Brief — Smiland Paint Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 525 U.S. 812

## Text

(3 \\ Supreme Court, U.S.
| FILED
No. 97-1817 | AUG 12 1998 |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

SMILAND PAINT COMPANY, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

WILLIAM M. SMILAND
Counsel of Record

SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN

601 West Fifth Street,

Seventh Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 891-1010

Am Attorneys for Petitioners

WILSON - Eres Printrinc Co.. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

I slat recreated tac enced ep ecaiogek
I. RECHARACTERIZATION OF PETITION

Il. STATUTORY ISSUE
aia? “ee UEIIIEE- PIII rcicohgind suites besuchiscsd aaiecohasacuns
IV. MOOTNESS POINT

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
: ; | ce nnn ne 4,6
Aero-Lineas Argentinas v. U.S., 77 F.3d 1564 (Fed.
+ | | eens enone eens nn 8 =
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
et. @ Ft) |} ae 6

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d

729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) .........---...---.--2----0---------000--000--- 6
Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) . Roane oe 4
Chalmers v. U.S., 43 F.R.D. 286 (D. Kan. 1967)... 9
Conservation Law Foundation of New England v.

Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992) -............. 9
Dow Chemical Co. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 673 (3rd Cir.
| | | nee mtarmanenrn nen TO Se 10 .

Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization
Corp. v. EPA, 857 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C.

I ie cc cccisiteenntndeneneneelionamnenaiiniaaeans 7
Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization
Corp. v. EPA, F.Supp. , 1998 WL

408884 (M.D.N.C. 1998) ........-...-.--.-.--..----.------------ S
Group Against Smog & Pollution v. . EPA, 665 F.2d

1284 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . 9
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Iu. “446 US. 578

SUED sscenisats TE ee ae Bee NR a a aE ke Pon 4
International Mortgage & Investment Corp. v. Von

~ Clemm, 301 F.2d 857 (2nd Cir. 1962) ................. Q

League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Trounday, 598 F.2d
1164 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943

I vice ccna cmtricieennenenmidienieiaeeneninoas 10
Maryland National Bank v. Madam Chapel, 46

F.8d 895 (9th Cir. 1995) .............-..........-.------------- x
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561

F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .........-..-..-------------------+- 9
Ohio Forestry Asociation v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct.

lo: | eee eee me 7

Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp.
1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991) affirmed, 952 F.2d
SOT (Sth Clr. 20018) n-nonane nee 8

popes 8 guage oy ey

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp.
1484 (W.D. Wash. 1992) affirmed sub nom.
Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699
(Oth Cir, 1908)... a... -2n-neeennoe-saconsnncencecnenneees 3
Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106 (5th Cir.
a ait sanininkibseinllaniaeneenteninoc tems on 9
Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977) .. 10
Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) .. 4
Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service
Corp., 810 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987) ................. 10
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
GSE TIS. GID CAGTE) 02. nnn nanan nnvnetnsnce rene sonenenne 10
DOCKETED CASES
Sierra Club v. Browner, Civ. No. 97-1984-PLF
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 29, 1997) -..........--------------------- 8
FEDERAL STATUTES
42 U.S.C.
Section 7511b(e) -...... piesa MEARE AE ee aa passim
"> Sa eieen pine ae SEENON oe passim

SS\— SEALE TT RET RE Oe passim

INTRODUCTION

In this reply brief, petitioners respond to four new
points raised by EPA in its opposition brief: (1) EPA
improperly attempts to recharacterize the petition; (2)
EPA’s new point about the statutory issue is erroneous,
(3) EPA’s new point about the ripeness issue is errone- —
ous; and (4) EPA incorrectly argues that the petition will
soon become moot.

I. RECHARACTERIZATION OF PETITION

EPA attempts to recharacterize the legislative mandates
and litigation claims involved in the case to such an ex-
tent that a reply is required.

Legislative Mandates. EPA generally construes Section
183(e) as a direction “to promulgate regulations” of, or
a requirement “to begin regulating,” products which emit
organic compounds. Opp. 2. It sees the Section 183(e)
process as a single “ongoing rulemaking.” Opp. I, 4, 7,
8, 12. It characterizes the study and list mandated by
Congress as preliminary steps taken “during the course of
a rulemaking.” Opp. 4, 7. In particular, EPA describes
-the required study as “an informational study on the po-
tential magnitude of the problem.” Opp. 3, 8, 10. Then,
EPA says, it must issue what it calls a “timetable” for
regulating. Opp. 3, 5, 7.

The study and the list mandated by Section 183(e) are
not simply preliminary steps of one “ongoing rulemaking.”
Instead, each is a mandatory step in a three-phase regula-
tory process, compliance with each of which is a neces-
sary prerequisite to commencement of the next. Indeed,
the final phase does not consist of one rulemaking, but
many, all based on the same omnibus study and list.

The initial part of the study is much more than “an in-
formational study of the potential magnitude of the prob-
lem.” It is to be a study of emissions of hundreds of
organic compounds from thousands of products in numer-
ous non-attainment areas to determine whether and to
what extent each such compound has the potential to
contribute to ozone non-attainment in any such area. The
other part of the mandated study is the establishment of

2

regulatory criteria, taking five specified factors into
account.

The mandated list is not merely a regulatory “time-
table,” but the methodology by which, based on a comply-
ing study, EPA is to determine which products will not be
subjected to any regulation at all and, as to all other
products, whether they will be regulated in the first, sec-
ond, third, or fourth group.

Petitioners’ Claims. EPA asserts that the claims de-
scribed in the petition are a “guise” for, and present
“merely a semantic recasting” of, petitioners’ true claims.
Opp. 12. In fact, petitioners’ claims are precisely as de-
scribed in the petition. It is EPA’s opposition brief which
mischaracterizes the claims petitioners attempt to present
for adjudication.

First, EPA tells this Court: “The claim here is not
that EPA has... refused to issue its study...” Opp. 11.
But petitioners do, in fact, charge that EPA refused to
issue the study (and the list) mandated by Congress.

Second, EPA contends that petitioners merely challenge
the “substance” of its 1995 report. Opp. 2, 12. It states
that petitioners allege that the report was “deficient,” “in
adequate,” or “[un]satisfactor[y].” Opp. 7, 11, 12, 13.
EPA argues that petitioners’ complaint “amounts to a
quarrel with [its] exercise of discretion in choosing an ap-
propriate methodology. [citation]” Opp. 12. In particular,
EPA asserts that petitioners charge that it did not “properly”

r “adequately” consider the five statutory factors. Opp.
6, 7. In fact, petitioners allege that EPA is guilty of
unlawful inaction which must be judicially compelled, not
inadequate action which must be judicially reversed.

Third, EPA represents that petitioners also challenge
the substance of the “proposed architectural coatings
rule,” itself. Opp. 2, 12. It states that petitioners attempt
to use Section 304(a)(2) to provide judicial review of
the “proposed rule.” Opp. 10, 13. EPA claims they al-
lege that the “proposed rule” is deficient. Opp. 7, 11.
EPA implies that petitioners sue because they are dissatis-
fied with its interpretation of its statutory duties in an-

3

nouncing “a proposed rule.” Opp. 7.1 EPA’s representa-
tions are false. Petitioners’ claims do not, and could not,
seek review, let alone reversal, of the non-existent archi-
tectural coatings rule.

Fourth, EPA states that petitioners are prosecuting their
suit “to enjoin EPA from proceeding with its rulemaking.”
Opp. 6. It contends that they attempt to use Section
304(a)(2) to “enjoin issuance of the final rule.” Opp.
10. (Emphasis in original). This, too, is misleading.
The District Court had explicit jurisdiction under Section
304 only “to order [EPA] to perform” its study and list-
ing duties. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Such a mandate is the
principal form of relief sought by petitioners.*

II. STATUTORY ISSUE

Conflict of Circuits. As to the question of the proper
interpretation of Section 304 in light of Section 307, EPA
argues that the interpretation applied in the Ninth Circuit
does not “conflict” with that applied in the D.C., Second,
Third, and Sixth Circuits, as none of the cases from those
circuits supports the principle that citizen suit jurisdiction
provides a basis for mandatory injunctive relief in the first-
step inaction context. Opp. 7, 9-10. In particular, EPA

1 As discussed below, EPA also bases its new mootness argu-
ment on the supposition that petitioners challenge the “proposed
rule.” Opp. 7, 13. Indeed, EPA even states the purported issue as
if petitioners seek judicial review of ‘ta proposed rule.” Opp. I.

2 Certain courts have held that, where nondiscretionary acts are
the initial steps in a multi-step process, a district court may com-
pel performance of the nondiscretionary duty and also enjoin the
subsequent steps until the mandated predicates have first been per-
formed. E.g., Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F.Supp. 1081,
1096 (W.D. Wash. 1991) affirmed, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991)
(mandatory injunction requiring the Forest Service to adopt guide-
lines and prepare an EIS, supplemented by prohibitory injunction
forbidding the Forest Service from awarding timber sales in the
meantime); Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F.Supp. 1484,
1493-94 (W.D. Wash. 1992) affirmed sub nom. Seattle Audubon
Society v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (mandatory injunc-
tion requiring Forest Service to cure EIS defects, supplemented by
prohibitory injunction preventing any timber sales in the mean-
time).

4

argues that foreclosing such relief does not create a
“bureaucratic limbo” or “twilight zone” where “EPA is
proceeding apace with promulgating” final rules, and that
seeking such relief “is designed to interfere with and dis-
rupt that process.” Opp. 10.

A bureaucratic limbo or twilight zone does, indeed,
exist here, and will continue to exist. It is EPA which is
interfering with and disrupting the three-phase process
mandated by Congress. It is doing so by proceeding apace
to the third phase without having performed, as man-
dated, the first two necessary prerequisites. The facts of
this case fall squarely within the interpretation followed
in the D.C., Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits and, there-
fore, a conflict of the circuits does exist.*

3QOn the merits of this jurisdictional question, should certiorari
be granted, EPA aserts that the statutory interpretation followed
by the Ninth Circuit is “correct.” Opp. 7, 12. It cites Bennett v.
Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997). Opp. 8. But that case strongly sug-
gests that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is not correct. At issue
there was jurisdiction under the citizen suit provision of the En-
dangered Species Act which authorizes suit for failure to perform
~a nondiscretionary duty. The ESA mandated that the government
“shall” designate critical habitat in a biological opinion “on the
basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into
consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact,”
of specifying any particular area. Plaintiffs complained of the
“omission” of these impacts from the biological opinion. 117 S.Ct.
at 1166. This Court held that the district court had citizen suit
jurisdiction, saying: “It is rudimentary administrative law that
discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does not
confer discretion to ignore the required procedures of decision-
making. [citations]” Jd. In order to imply an exception to Section
304 jurisdiction covering the first two steps simply because any
action under the third step might be reversed under Section 307,
this Court would demand a far clearer expression of Congressional
intent. Stimpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 198, 197 (1980). The
expansive language offers no indication whatever that Congress in-
tended the limiting construction of Section 304. Harrison v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980). “. .. [I]t requires an
artificial statutory construction to read a general grant of a right
to judicial review begrudgingly, so as to cut out agency actions
that a literal reading would cover.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner, 387 U.S. 136, 145 (1967).

5

Important Issue. EPA concedes that “Section 304 pro-
vides a basis for relief from agency inaction in the face
of a mandatory duty.” Opp. 4, 7-8. Yet it still suggests
that it is unimportant to decide whether potential Sec-
tion 307 jurisdiction trumps actual Section 304 jurisdic-
tion in the first-step inaction context. EPA asserts that
Section 307 “effectively ensures” that there will be a later
opportunity for judicial review of all final product regula-
tions. Opp. 3. EPA notes that Section 307(d)(9)(A)
allows review of a regulation which is “not in accordance
with law.” Opp. 3. The D. C. Circuit may “reverse” such
a regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9). But even if all
of the 21 product regulations EPA has scheduled for
promulagtion in the next eight years were to be reviewed
by the D.C. Circuit in 21 separate actions and all 21,
because they had not been based on a statutory study and
list, were reversed, the study and list mandated by Con-
gress would still not exist. The 15 groups of products
explicitly exempted from regulation in EPA’s 1995 sched-
ule, plus the numerous other products exempted sub
silentio, will never be the subject of regulation and, there-
fore, circuit court review. No court will ever pass on
EPA’s failure to study and list those products which
should have been, but were not, listed for regulation and
should, but will not, be regulated.

EPA also argues more specifically that petitioners “will
be able” to obtain judicial review of the final rule relating
to architectural coatings and that the D.C. Circuit will
have “ample authority” to consider (unspecified) substan-
tive and procedurz! challenges to that final rule. Opp. 9.
But, for the five reasons discussed in the petition, any
opportunity to obtain an effective order directing EPA to
perform its study and listing duties under Section 183(e)
is likely to prove illusory. Pet. 23-25.

III. RIPENESS ISSUE

Conflict of Circuits. EPA contends that the ripeness
rule applied by the Ninth Circuit in the first-step inaction
context does not “conflict” with the D.C. Circuit rule.
Opp. 7, 9, 11. EPA claims that the D.C. Circuit cases

6

cited in the petition deal with “a fundamentally different
type of legal claim than that of petitioners.” Opp. 11. It
States that petitioners are seeking “premature judicial re-
view of nonfinal agency action. [citation]” Opp. 1. EPA
contends that its 1995 report and schedule were “non-
final,” implying that it might later perform its as yet un-
performed study and listing duties. Opp. 5.

Self-serving statements by an agency to the effect that
inaction is not final and a mandatory duty may later be
performed are not binding on the courts. Albertson v.
subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 76
(1965); American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d
729, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Adjudication is not pre-
mature where agency inaction has become “definitive” and
“effective.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151.

Here, EPA’s report was formally published a year-and-
a-half after the statutory deadline for a complying study.
That report merely stated that, “collectively,” products
contribute to ozone non-attainment, a fact assumed by
Congress in enacting Section 183(e). It purported to
establish regulatory criteria, considering only two of the
five statutory factors and relying mainly on two non-
Statutory factors. The report was used to prepare EPA’s
schedule, which determines which products are to be reg-
ulated, and when, and which ones are to be exempted.
That schedule, which ignores reactivity, was then pub-
lished in the Federal Register. EPA published the report
and schedule more than three years ago. Since that time,
EPA has done nothing to perform the nondiscretionary
study and listing duties at issue in this case. What it has
done is propose, without having first performed such
duties, three of the regulations set out in the first group
in the schedule.

The D.C. Circuit would have held EPA’s inaction to be
ripe for judicial review. The Ninth Circuit regards such
inaction as unripe. This conflict of the circuits should be
resolved.*

4As to the merits of the ripeness issue, should certiorari be
granted, EPA aserts that the Ninth Circuit rule is “correct.” Opp.

7

Important Issue. Despite EPA’s suggestions to the con-
trary, whether claims to compel the mandatory initial
steps in a multi-step governmental process are ripe is an
important issue. Both parties discuss this Court’s exten-
Sive ripeness jurisprudence. Pet. 20; Opp. 7-9. Whether
petitioners’ study and listing inaction claims are ripe prior
to regulation is of comparable importance to the other
ripeness issues this Court has previously heard, and should
now be decided to fill a large lacuna in existing law.

7. The case on which it mainly relies, Ohio Forestry Assn. v. Sierra
Club, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 1670, 1672 (1990), is readily distinguish-
able. First, Ohio Forestry found that withholding court considera-
tion of the general plan until after specific projects were approved
would not cause hardship to the environmental plaintiffs. Jd. at
1670-71. Here, by contrast, the placement of products, including
architectural coatings, on EPA’s schedule, especially in the first
group (not to mention the proposal of a rule) gravely stigmatizes
petitioners’ products, alters research and development, and affects
market choices. Second, Ohio Forestry concluded that there was a
real possibility that the government might “revis[e]” and “correct”
the mistakes in the plan. Jd. at 1671. Here, it is manifest that EPA
has no intention to perform the study and listing duties omitted
from its 1995 report and schedule. Third, Ohio Forestry noted that
the environmentalists’ claim that the plan’s analysis was “errone-
ous” would enmesh the court in “time-consuming judicial considera-
tion of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan.” Jd. at
1669, 1671. In the case at bar, petitioners merely claim that certain
analyses mandated by Congress have never been performed and
were totally omitted from the report and schedule. Fourth, Ohio
Forestry did not involve a statute which “guarantees a particular
procedure.” Jd. at 1672. Here, Section 183(e) mandates a par-
ticular study and-list as necessary prerequisites to making any
specific regulatory decisions. Where EPA fails to perform study
or listing duties mandated in clean air legislation as a prelude to
government regulation, judicial intervention is not premature. Flue-
Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 857 F.Supp.
1137, 1141-45 (M.D.N.C. 1994).

SEPA suggests that if certiorari is granted and the Court re-
verses the Ninth Circuit’s two jurisdictional holdings, petitioners
will nevertheless lose their substantive claims in the district court
on the merits. EPA asserts that it acted “in accordance with the
congressional directives.” Opp. 4. It repeatedly asserts that it
completed the “study” mandated by Congress. Opp. 2, 4, 5, 7, 11,

8
IV. MOOTNESS POINT

Finally, EPA makes this new point: “EPA intends to
promulgate the final architectural coatings rule in the
near future, and once the final rule is issued, petitioners’
challenge to the proposed rule will become moot. Further
review by this Court is therefore not warranted.” Opp. 7,
13. EPA’s new mootness point is erroneous.

In particular, EPA refers to the case of Sierra Club v.
Browner, Civ. No. 97-1984-PLE (D.D.C. filed Aug. 29,
1997). Opp. 13. In that case Sierra Club sued EPA, in
the District Court for the District of Columbia to compel
it to adopt three proposed regulations, including one relat-

-ing to architectural coatings, and others identified in the
first group of EPA’s schedule. On March 3, 1998 peti-
tioners moved to intervene in that case as a party de-
fendant in an effort to insure that the District Court did
not order EPA to promulgate any regulations unless and
until EPA had first performed its study and listing duties.
Petitioners argued that they, as parties threatened with
regulation, were entitled to intervene under Rule 24 of

12. Specifically, EPA states that its report concluded that emissions
of organic compounds of all types from all “products” as a group
have the potential to contribute to ozone non-attainment in at least
some non-attainment areas. Opp. 4. It asserts that, in establishing
regulatory criteria in its report, it “explained how it evaluated each
of the five factors” specified by Congress. Opp. 4. Finally, the EPA
claims that it published a “list.” Opp. 5. However, the undisputed
evidence in the District Court, testimony of leading scientific and
economic experts, showed that the study and list mandated by Con-
gress do not exist. Judicial relief will be granted where EPA fails to
obey congressional study mandates under clean air legislation as a
prelude to governmental regulation of products. Flue-Cured Tobacco
Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, F.Supp. , 1998
WL 408884 (M.D.N.C. 1998). EPA twice notes that the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that petitioners “have not demonstrated that the EPA
has failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty. [citation]” Opp.
6-7, 12. But where, as here, a case is dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, any statement about the merits is “dicta and therefore not
persuasive.” Maryland National Bank v. Medem Chapel, 46 F.3d
895 (9th Cir. 1995). In such event, “there can be no preclusive
findings or conclusions on the merits.” Aero-Lineas Argentinas
v. U.S., 177 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

9

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 908-11 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Conservation Law Foundation of New Eng-
land v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1992);
Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109-10 (Sth Cir.
1996). Petitioners further argued that district courts have
supplemental jurisdiction to entertain intervenors’ defenses
in suits against the government. I/nternational Mortgage
& Investment Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 863-
64 (2nd Cir. 1962); Chalmers v. U.S., 43 F.RD. 286,
291 (D. Kan. 1967). On July 15, 1998 the District
Court denied intervention, holding that regulated parties
have no “protected interest in the defendant’s side.” Peti-
tioners filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit on
July 24, 1998.

On July 15, 1998 the District Court also filed a con-
sent decree signed by Sierra Club and EPA ordering EPA
to “promulgate” the three proposed regulations, including
the one relating to architectural coatings, “no later than
August 15, 1998,” and three other regulations, no later
than December 1, 1998. However, the decree provides
that EPA may modify such dates or amend its schedule.

As discussed above, petitioners did not challenge, and
could not have challenged, “the proposed rule” in the Dis-
trict Court below, as EPA erroneously asserts in the moot-
hess context. Opp. 7, 13. They sought—and seek—an
order directing EPA to perform its study and listing
duties, because rational rulemaking as to any product is
impossible unless EPA first does so. Even if EPA really
means that petitioners’ actual claims below, as opposed to
the claims EPA here invents, are “moot,” then EPA is
mistaken for the following reasons.

The possibility that a subsequent mooting action will
occur does not, itself, render a claim moot. Group A gainst
Smog & Pollution v. EPA, 665 F.2d 1284 n. 58 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). Here, no rule promulgation has yet occurred,
and it may not occur.

In any event, a claim against EPA is not mooted by its
subsequent action where the alleged violation may continue

Le
ence eee ne ee

10

unabated thereafter. Dow Chemical Co. v. EPA, 605 F.2d
673, 679-80 (3rd Cir. 1979). Here, even if EPA promul-
gates a final regulation outlawing architectural coatings,
its unlawful inactions (failures to conduct the mandated
study and establish the mandated list) will continue un-
abated thereafter. Performing such duties will continue
to be a necessary prerequisite to corrective amendments
to any prematurely adopted rules and also to adoption of
all future rules.

Furthermore, a suit against EPA is not mooted by EPA
action giving rise to a second suit when the second is not
certain to afford the full measure of relief available in
the first. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 535 n. 14 (1978); League to Save
Lake Tahoe v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1166 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979); Sierra Club
v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488 (Sth Cir. 1977). Here, for
the five reasons stated in the petition, EPA’s failure to per-
form its study and listing duties under Section 183(e)
may not be adequately remedied by subsequent review
and reversal of the architectural coatings ban, or any
other regulations, under Section 307. Pet. 23-25.

Finally, agency action forcing a piaintiff to institute a
second suit in another forum does not moot the first case
instituted in the plaintiff's choice of forum. Ten Mile In-
dustrial Park v. Western Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d
1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1987). In the case at bar, it was
petitioners’ desire to pursue this claim in a Section 304
action in California and, if that section authorized the suit
and it was ripe, as they will show if certiorari is granted,
then their choice of forum cannot be negated by adminis-
trative action taken by EPA in the interim.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the new points in EPA’s opposition
brief lack merit.

Dated: August 12, 1998

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM M. SMILAND
Counsel of Record

SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN

601 West Fifth Street,

Seventh Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 891-1010

Attorneys for Petitioners

|

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1515%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
