# Reply Brief — Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 524 U.S. 952

## Text

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,
_ Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ANDREA BEAR FIELD
Counsel of Record

MAIDA O. LERNER

Davip S. HARLOW

LEE A. CASEY

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

DOUGLAS W. DAVIS

JOHN CHARLES THOMAS
acanmnagguains CYNTHIA S. CECIL

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

tiverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
June 5, 1998 (804) 788-8200

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................. enieuhte
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THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
“DEFERRED” TO EPA IS COMPLETELY AT ODDS
WITH THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF DEFER-
ENCE AS ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT .

UNLESS LIMITS ARE PLACED ON THE APPLI-
CATION OF SEMINOLE ROCK’S DEFERENCE
STANDARD, SEMINOLE ROCK SHOULD BE
OVERTURNED, AND THIS IS THE VEHICLE FOR
DOING So ....... hacia hbcdinieeidnsaeediaadh Fa AEN SARE ANI RN ae

EPA MISSES THE POINT OF HCC’S ARGUMENT
THAT ONCE A COMPANY GETS GOOD NOTICE,
IT IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE TIME IN
WHICH TO COMPLY .....

CONCLUSION .

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10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Bowls S Vv.
(1945)
Che

Page
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325

» VLD U.S. 110

2, d, 6, 7, 10
vron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defens.
Council, 467 U.S.

837, reh’a denis d, 468 U.S.
1227 (1984)
General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) |
Spencer v. Kemna, —— U.S. —~—, 118 8. C
(1998) ...

6
FEDERAL STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U

seq.

a,
s
t

o
Ciean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq

}. 5, 8
ARTICLES
John F. Manning, stitutional Structure and
J idicial dD. f¢ rence

Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612

(1996)

IN THE
Supreme Cowt of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-1578

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

- Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

EPA has it wrong. This seemingly “little case’”—which
the government would dismiss out of hand—is much more
important to the nation than EPA will ever admit. The
point of this case is that EPA—though pursuing the
worthy goal of environmental protection—has far ex-
ceeded any power it has or could ever have under our
system of government. This case is about separation of
powers; about who says what the law is: about the remedy
that a citizen is entitled to once a court has ruled that the
federal government has infringed his rights.

EPA has every incentive to say to this Court, “don’t
look at this case” because this case demonstrates that
EPA has found a way to make itself a law unto itself.
And EPA does not want to be “found out” even though
the result of its actions is that there is greater uncertainty

a i

2

about what its rules mean and more obstacles in the paths
of those that want to comply.

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
“DEFERRED” TO EPA IS COMPLETELY AT ODDS
WITH THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF DEFERENCE
AS ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT.

The present day incarnation of the deference standard
dates back to Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410 (1945), where this Court said that an agency’s
“interpretation [of its own regulations] becomes of con-
trolling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.” Jd. at 414. In the 53 years since
Seminole Rock was decided, the essence of the “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” phrase has
been eaten away until today the Fourth Circuit—and
other circuits—act as if Seminole Rock stands for the raw
proposition that, in almost all circumstances, an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations must be given “con-
trolling weight.”

Had the federal courts consistently followed the actual
holding in Seminole Rock, they would have retained the
ability to look at objective criteria in determining the
propriety of agency conduct. In this case, that would have
meant an examination of the actual language of the rule,
what the Administrator actually said in the accompanying
preamble, and the actual examples used by EPA at the
time of promulgation.

The preamble to the final benzene NESHAP, in fact,
describes the types of sources that were to be covered by
the exemption: both “small process units” and “process
units that use minor amounts of benzene.”? HCC’s
Celriver Plant—with thousands of pieces of equipment in
benzene service—is clearly not a small unit. But Celriver

1 See App. 112a. The government’s opposition to HCC’s petition
for certiorari noticeably fails to acknowledge that part of the pre-
amble that says the exemption applies to process units that use
minor amounts of benzene. See Opp’n at 9.

3

was a user of a minor amount of benzene when compared
to the key targets of the original benzene NESHAP rule-
making: benzene producers and feedstock users. At the
time EPA was developing the benzene NESHAP, produc-
tion facilities and feedstock users of benzene annually pro-
duced and used millions of megagrams of benzene and
were responsible for 99.5% of all benzene emissions.”
Compared to such sources, a facility like Celriver—that
had on site only a few hundred megagrams of benzene per
year—was indisputably a user of “minor amounts” of
benzene.

Even more importantly, the preamble to the final ben-
zene NESHAP contains a specific example of how the
exemption applied to a user of minor amounts of benzene.
(App. 113a.) The example concerned a pharmaceutical
company that, just like HCC’s Celriver Plant, used re-
cycled benzene as a solvent and had far more than a
thousand pieces of equipment in benzene service. Simi-
larly, the pharmaceutical company’s facility used a lot
more than 1,000 megagrams of benzene if the benzene
were to be counted over and over again as it recycled
through the facility’s processes. And, like Celriver, that
pharmaceutical company’s facility was designed to con-
sume (i.e., “use up”)* several hundred megagrams of
benzene (but less than 1000 megagrams of benzene) per
year.* In the preamble, EPA established that facilities that
used or consumed benzene in this way and in these
amounts were exempt from the NESHAP.

2 See 4th Cir. J.A. at 392, 402, 552-55.

3 Despite the government’s claim to the contrary (Opp’n at 9),
HCC has repeatedly explained that, while the word “use” can admit
of more than one interpretation, EPA in the preamble to the rule
resolved any ambiguity in this regard by establishing that, in the
context of the exemption, ‘‘use” of benzene means a single counting
of benzene. See Cert. Pet. at 3; App. 42a.

4 To maintain their financial viability, benzene-recycling processes
must remain efficient, t.e., they have to minimize their leakage of
benzene. Thus, before EPA developed its own program in the 1984

4

These authoritative statements by the Administrator—
presented in the final rule—should have been binding upon
EPA and should have led to a quick disposition of this
case in favor of HCC. After all, that is what EPA had
said the rule was.

Yet, EPA has—in six years of litigation—been able to
slip the constraints of its own published rule by piecing
together snippets of the rulemaking record to present a
story that reads well but is so out-of-kilter with what EPA
actually said at the time of NESHAP promulgation that:

* All four judges who have reviewed this case have
concluded that EPA’s “story” could not have been
gleaned by HCC from the regulatory language,
the preamble, or the rest of the record (App. 17a-
18a, 28a, 62a);

Regulators from EPA’s own staff and from Vir-
ginia and Texas failed to comprehend what EPA
now says its rule means (App. 54a-57a); and

It conflicts with the unrebutted expert testimony
about the plain meaning of the technical terms
that underlie the rule.

EPA has glossed over all these inconsistencies by claim-
ing that its current interpretation is consistent with the

NESHAP, Celriver had in place a benzene leak detection and repair
program. As a result of that program, Celriver’s annual consump-
tion of benzene was far less than the 1,000 megagram exemption
cut-off (see 4th Cir. J.A. at 296). Indeed, it was significantly less
than the 325 megagrams consumed by the preamble-discussed phar-
maceutical facility. (App. 113a.)

5 See Cert. Pet. at 15 n.13. For example, although EPA now
claims that the exemption was based upon a plant’s design produc-
tion capacity (Opp’n at 3), that concept—like nameplate capacity—
is a single count concept. (App. 185a.) “Indeed, none of the capac-
ity data studied by EPA [during the rulemaking] involved quan-
tities inflated by some form of multiple counting of internal recycle.
This is despite the fact that virtually all producers and most
benzene-using facilities, by their very nature, have internal recycle.”
(App. 185a-186a.)

5

alleged “purpose” of the rule. (Opp’n at 9 n.5.) And
the Fourth Circuit deferred to EPA’s interpretation be-
cause that interpretation “harmonizes with the purpose of
[the Clean Air Act].” (App. 8a.)

It is irrelevant to the proper disposition of the instant
case, though, that regulation of the Celriver Plant can be
“harmonized with the purposes” of the Clean Air Act.
That means only that EPA could have promulgated an
exemption to the benzene NESHAP that is based on mul-
tiple counting. Because that is not what EPA said it was
doing—in either its regulatory language or the accompany-
ing preamble—that is not a permissible way to interpret
the exemption now before the Court.®

The Court should grant certiorari in this case to make
clear to the federal courts that there are real limits to
deference and that this Court did not in 1945—nor does
it today—intend for deference to mean that federal agen-
cies can engage in the kind of “revisionist rulemaking”
evident in this case.

UNLESS LIMITS ARE PLACED ON THE APPLICATION
OF SEMINOLE ROCK’S DEFERENCE STANDARD,
SEMINOLE ROCK SHOULD BE OVERTURNED, AND
THIS IS THE VEHICLE FOR DOING SO.

EPA argues in its Opposition that overturning Seminole
Rock is essentially unthinkable because that decision has
been in place since 1945 and its progeny has built up over
the years. HCC disagrees because, in HCC’s view, the
longer a faulty legal concept is allowed to stand, the more
compelling is the reason to swat it down. As members of
this Court have observed, “[w]isdom too often never

6 Nor is it appropriate for EPA to try to distance itself from the
Administrator’s explanation of the exemption at the time of pro-
mulgation by claiming that explanation was a “mistake” or “acci-
dent.” See 4th Cir. J.A. at 65-66, 72-73. If it was a mistake, EPA
should have used notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to
correct its mistake, as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act and Clean Air Act. See Cert. Pet. at 5.

6

comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because

it comes late.” See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, USS.
, 118 S.Ct. 978, 990 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring), quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank
& Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).

EPA contends that HCC has not given a good reason for
overturning Seminole Rock and its progeny. But HCC
argued in its Petition (Cert. Pet. at 19-24) and repeats
here that EPA is being allowed to usurp the judicial func-
tion, i.e., violate separation of powers. HCC is not the
first or only one to see the harm that Seminole Rock has
led to and to call for a new look by this Court at that
decision. In his article, Constitutional Structure and Judi-
cial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996), Professor John F. Man-
ning discusses the need for this Court to revisit Seminole
Rock. He argues that Seminole Rock and its progeny,
“contradict[] a major premise of our constitutional scheme
and of contemporary separation of powers case law—that
a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially
dangerous to our liberties.” /d. at 617 (footnote omitted).

Also, despite the commonly perceived close association
between deference to agency interpretations of their own
regulations under Seminole Rock and the deference courts
give to agency interpretations of statutes they are charged
with implementing under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natitral Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the logic
of Chevron runs contrary to the notion that an agency,
having adopted a rule whose meaning is unclear, should
be deemed as also having the authority to state virtually
conclusively what that meaning is through a_ post-
promulgation interpretation. For whereas “Chevron re-
tains one independent interpretive check on lawmaking by
Congress, Seminole Rock leaves in place no independent
interpretive check on lawmaking by an administrative
agency.” Manning at 639 (emphasis in original).

EPA is similarly wrong in claiming that to depart from
Seminole Rock would “encourage litigation and prolong

5

uncertainty concerning the meaning of regulations.” (Opp’n
at 11.) The instant case concerns a regulatory provision
first promulgated 14 years ago. It is hard to imagine that
departing from Seminole Rock could “prolong uncertainty”
over the “meaning of regulations” any longer than is now
the case.

Nor is there any merit to EPA’s contention that to
depart from Seminole Rock would “encourage litigation.”
HCC submits that getting rid of the Seminole Rock line
of cases could well serve to curb litigation: once agencies
know that the federal courts will no longer give “knee-
jerk” deference to agency interpretations of their rules,
those agencies would try harder to promulgate clearer,
more readily understandable rules. And that would lead
to less litigation.

EPA MISSES THE POINT OF HCC’S ARGUMENT THAT
ONCE A COMPANY GETS GOOD NOTICE, IT IS EN-
TITLED TO A REASONABLE TIME IN WHICH TO
COMPLY.

The Fourth Circuit ruled in HCC’s favor with respect to
“fair notice,” agreeing that HCC’s Celriver Plant did not.
at the outset, receive the notice of the meaning of the rule
that the Constitution calls for. Rather, said the Fourth
Circuit, Celriver did not receive notice of the meaning of
the rule until five years later, in the summer of 1989.7

HCC submits that once the Fourth Circuit concluded
that fair notice came late in the day, it should have fash-

7 Despite the government’s claims to the contrary (Opp’n at
11-12), HCC has never conceded that it had violated the benzene
NESHAP, although the company had substantially met (and, in
some instances, exceeded) the terms of NESHAP by September
1991. Moreover, for the reasons explained by both Judge Anderson
(App. 69a) and Judge Niemeyer (App. 33a), nothing that HCC
received from EPA Region 4 in or after the summer of 1989 con-
stituted “actual notice” that multiple counting was the Agency’s
authoritative interpretation since it conflicted with the preamble
and, even after the summer of 1989, EPA representatives continued
to espouse differing interpretations of the exemption.

8

ioned a remedy that would have put HCC in at least no
worse a position than HCC would have been in had HCC
received good notice from the start. But the Fourth Cir-
cuit did just the opposite. Its remedy with respect to “fair
notice”—saying that HCC would be liable for violating
EPA’s rule if it did not meet the numerous terms of that
rule within just 90 days—puts HCC in a much worse
position than it would have been in had it gotten proper
notice at the outset.

Contrary to what EPA says, HCC’s position is not that
it “was entitled to a waiver of the [NESHAP] require-
ments for two years after receiving EPA’s letters in the
summer of 1989.” (Opp’n at 12.) Rather, HCC contends
that, under basic principles of due process, a regulated
party—upon being given actual notice of an agency’s
regulatory interpretation—is entitled to a reasonable pe-
riod of time in which to conform to that interpretation.
Absent that, the “fair notice” concept, as most recently
expressed in such cases as General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53
F 3d 1324, 1328-31 (D.C. Cir. 1995), is shorn of most,
if not all, of its meaning and effect.

Thus, rather than contending it had a “right” to a
waiver, HCC asserts that in deciding whether HCC had
met the terms of the NESHAP “within a reasonable time”
following receipt of actual notice, it was fitting and proper
for the district court to take into account the compliance
time-frame set out by $112 of the Clean Air Act and
EPA’s own rules. Those provisions gave regulated enti-
ties at least 90 days in which to comply and the opportu-
nity to obtain a waiver for up to two years in which to
achieve compliance. See 4th Cir. J.A. at 78a-79a, 156a.
Those two provisions establish that a two-year compliance
period is reasonable for someone who got good notice at
the start of the process.* Because it is undisputed that

8 Had HCC received notice that it was subject to the NESHAP
at the time the rule was promulgated, it would have been prepared
to move promptly to apply for the waiver that was then available.

9

HCC met virtually all the terms of the benzene NESHAP
at its Celriver Plant within the two-year time frame that
both Congress and EPA have defined to be reasonable,
HCC should not be subject to liability within that two-year
period. If it is subject to liability starting 90 days from
receipt of good notice, HCC is in a much worse position
than it would have been in with good notice from the
Start.

The district court understood and agreed with this rea-
soning. Indeed, the court found that HCC “acted respon-
sibly to meet—and far exceed—the terms of the NESHAP
in advance of EPA-accepted deadlines” and thus that a
finding of liability for its compliance within that stipulated
time frame would be inconsistent with “fundamental con-
siderations of fairness.” (App. 69a-70a. )

The Fourth Circuit’s majority holding to the contrary—
a holding that HCC was “necessarily” required to have
been in compliance in no more than 90 days—is unjust.
It penalizes HCC for EPA’s failure to have provided fair
notice of its multiple counting interpretation in 1984,
when there were procedures in place which would have
allowed HCC to seek additional time to comply.

It is important that the Court take this case and reverse
the Fourth Circuit, not only to correct an injustice but to
clarify how the concept of “actual notice” is to work in
relation to the “fair notice” principle. As best HCC can
determine, there are no other decisions in which a court
has grappled with the issue of how much time should be
considered reasonable for a regulated entity to come into
compliance with a regulation after an agency has sup-

Five years later, that waiver was no longer available—the chance
to seek it expired in September 1984 (see App. 156a)—and it was
unclear what procedures HCC was supposed to follow in order to
secure a reasonable time in which to meet the standards. So HCC
did the best it could: it met with EPA representatives and followed
a compliance course consistent with the one it set out for EPA and
to which EPA never objected. See App. 69a-71la.

10

posedly provided that entity with “actual notice” of a
regulatory interpretation.

It is inevitable, though, that the federal courts will face
more regulatory enforcement cases construing General
Electric’s “fair notice” principles. Indeed, this would ap-
pear all the more certain if the Court declines to revisit
Seminole Rock or otherwise fails to impose some meaning-
ful restrictions on courts that would otherwise give defer-
ence to any not “nonsensical” agency interpretation,
thereby elevating the importance of “fair notice” as the
last line of defense for the regulated community. At a
minimum, therefore, this case provides the Court with the
opportunity not only to correct the Fourth Circuit's error,
but also to resolve and clarify other important fair notice-
related issues that lower courts will be facing in the future.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREA BEAR FIELD
Counsel of Record

MAIDA 0. LERNER

DAVID S. HARLOW

LEE A. CASEY

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

DOUGLAS W. DAVIS

JOHN CHARLES THOMAS

CYNTHIA S. CECIL

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

Riverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219
June 5, 1998 (804) 788-8200

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1292%3A04. Public record. Not legal advice.
