# Appendices — Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1292%3A02

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendices
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 524 U.S. 952

## Text

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Plaintiff-A ppellant,

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,
Defendant-A ppellee.

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURER'S ASSOCIATION; CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL: NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS: PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA: Com-
MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; SCIENCE & ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PoLicy PRoJECT; TEXAS INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCE-
MENT OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED:
NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS;
TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION CoMMIS-
SION (TNRCC),

Amici Curiae.

No. 96-2051

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Plaintiff-A ppellee,
V.

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,
Defendant-A ppellant.

aaa

2a

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURER'S ASSOCIATION; CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL; NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS; PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA; COM-
MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; SCIENCE & ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PoLicy PROJECT; TEXAS INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCE-
MENT OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED;
NaTIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS;
TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMIS-
SION (TNRCC),

Amici Curiae.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-92-1879-0-17)

Argued: May 5, 1997
Decided: October 27, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
STAMP, Chief United States District Judge for the
Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

In 1984, pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air
Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pro-
mulgated regulations governing fugitive emissions of ben-
zene, a carcinogenic pollutant posing significant risk to
human health. This case involves the proper interpreta-
tion of those regulations, which impose numerous preven-

3a

tative and reporting requirements on industrial plants
emitting benzene, but exempt plants designed to use less
than 1,000 megagrams of benzene a year from these re-
quirements. The issue here is whether a plant owned by
Hoechst Celanese Corporation (HCC) is exempted from
the requirements of the regulations. If not, that plant
(one of the largest sources of fugitive benzene emissions
in the United States from 1987 through 1993) indisput-
ably violated the regulations in numerous respects.

The district court sustained EPA’s interpretation of its
own regulations, an interpretation that did not exempt the
HCC plant. United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corp..,
964 F. Supp. 967, 971-76 (D.S.C. 1996). Nevertheless.
because the court concluded that the EPA did not pro-
vide HCC with “fair notice” of EPA’s interpretation, the
court declined to find HCC liable for any regulatory viola-
tions. Id. at 979-986. Both EPA and HCC appeal. In
most respects, we affirm tlhe judgment of the district court.
That court correctly concluded that EPA’s interpretation
of its own regulations is entitled to deference. The district
court also correctly held that EPA did not initially afford
HCC fair notice of that interpretation and so the company
cannot be held liable for violations of the regulations dur-
ing the period (1984 to 1989) when it lacked fair notice.
However, the court erred in concluding that HCC could
rely on a fair notice defense for violations that occurred
after 1989—-when EPA provided the company with ac-
tual notice of EPA’s interpretation of the regulations.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court
in this single respect and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The United States, on behalf of EPA, initiated this ac-
tion against HCC for alleged violations of. the National
Emission Standard for Equipment Leaks ( Fugitive Emis-
sion Sources) of Benzene (“/ESHAP or regulations), 40
C.F.R. pt. 61, subpts. A, J, and V (1996), at HCC’s

———————— a

4a

Celriver plant in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The
NESHAP provides controls on the amount of benzene
that can be emitted into the atmosphere. EPA propounded
these controls because it concluded that they could sub-
stantially “reduce the estimated annual incidence of leuke-
mia” for persons living within 20 kilometers of plants
with equipment that leaked benzene—roughly twenty to
thirty million people. NESHAP preamble, 49 Fed. Reg.
23, 498, 23,501 (1984). Specifically, the NESHAP re-
quires industrial plants that are designed to produce, use,
or otherwise have in service benzene to monitor equip-
ment regularly for leaks, repair leaks promptly, and install
equipment that prevents, captures, or destroys benzene
emissions. The regulations include reporting and record-
keeping requirements and provide that violations are to be
punished by civil penalties.

The regulations. however, exempt “[a]ny equipment in
benzene service that is located at a plant site designed to
produce or use less than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per
year.” 40 C.F.R. §61.110(c)(2) (1996) (emphasis
added).' The exemption reflects EPA’s conclusion that
the benefit achieved by regulating small volume users of
benzene does not justify the cost involved. See NESHAP
preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,510. The question that
divides the parties is what does “use” mean in the ex-
emption.

The EPA defines “use” broadly to mean utilization,
employment, or putting in place; this definition includes
but is not limited to “consumption” of benzene, i.e., the
overall amount needed to keep processes operational. The
Celriver plant was designed to utilize benzene as a
“quench” to cool hot ketene gases and as a “reflux agent”
to help separate water and other compounds from acetic
anhydride and acetic acid; after each of these uses the
benzene was cooled, purified, and then recirculated as a
“quench” or “reflux agent.” Under EPA’s definition of

1 One megagram is equivalent to approximately 2,200 pounds.

|

Sa

“

use,” counting each time benzene circulated through
pipes and valves capable of leaking, the Celriver plant
was designed to “use” more than a million megagrams of
benzene a year, and was not exempt from the NESHAP.
Indeed, the Celriver plant not only “used” vast amounts
of benzene, it also leaked substantial amounts of the car-
cinogen: as the district court noted, “the Celriver plant
ranked in the top 5% of all plants reporting benzene fugi-
tive emissions in every year between 1987 and 1993.”
Hoechst Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 974.

Nevertheless, HCC claims the Celriver plant was ex-
empt from the NESHAP. The company asserts that “use”
in the exemption has only a single narrow meaning—
“consumption.” Since the Celriver plant continually re-
cycled benzene, the total quantity it “used,” under the
company’s theory, never exceeded 1,000 megagrams a
year and thus the plant qualified for the exemption under
40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(2). The company concluded that
the exemption was self-executing and for this reason HCC
neither filed reports for the Celriver plant nor complied
with any of the monitoring or other requirements of the
regulations.

Because HCC never applied for an exemption for the
Celriver plant or filed any reports as to its benzene usage,
EPA did not become aware of the possibility of sub-
stantial benzene emissions at the Celriver plant until
1989. At that time, EPA’s Region 4 office, which exer-
cised enforcement authority over plants located in South
Carolina, expressly notified the company in writing that
if “benzene is recycled or reused in any process . . . the
total cumulative flow through the process rather than net
benzene consumption or usage” is to be counted as “use”
of benzene for purposes of the regulations. After further
communications between the parties, EPA determined that
the Celriver plant had violated the NESHAP and so ini-
tiated this action.

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EPA alleged that HCC, at its Celriver plant, violated
NESHAP leak detection and repair requirements as well
as requirements related to the installation of control de-
vices, reporting, and recordkeeping. EPA asserted the
Celriver plant did not qualify for the exemption and, even
if it did, HCC could not claim this protection because it
never applied to EPA for the exemption. In response,
HCC argued that EPA’s interpretation of the exemption
was erroneous and merited no deference. Alternatively,
HCC contended that if EPA’s interpretation were ac-
cepted, HCC should not be held responsible for any viola-
tions of the regulations because it lacked fair notice of
that interpretation. On cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court sustained EPA’s interpretation of
the regulations, but concluded that HCC lacked fair
notice of this interpretation both before and after EPA’s
direct contacts with HCC in 1989. The court therefore
refused to find HCC liable for any violations of the regu-
lations.

II.

The Clean Air Act unquestionably provides EPA with
broad powers to promulgate regulations necessary to iden-
tify and control hazardous air pollutants. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7401-7671q (West 1995 & Supp. 1997). HCC makes
no claim that the benzene regulations in any way violate
or are contrary to EPA’s statutory authority. Cf. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (rejecting
appellant’s contentions that agency’s interpretation con-
flicts with language and legislative history of statute).
Nor does the company assert that either the Clean Air
Act or the NESHAP contravenes any constitutional provi-
sion. Finally, HCC does not contend that EPA’s proce-
dures in promulgating the regulations were flawed. Thus,
the initial question before us is simply whether EPA’s
interpretation of its own authorized, and properly promul-
gated, regulations should be accorded deference.

The Superme Court has continually reaffirmed that an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled

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to substantial deference. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ.
v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give
substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations.” ); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,
45 (1993) (“[PJrovided an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a
federal statute, it must be given controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion.”). When an agency applies its “regulation to com-
plex or changing circumstances,” the Court has explained,
this “calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policy-
making prerogatives” and courts must “presume that the
power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is
a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking
powers.” Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).

At least implicitly, HCC acknowledges that generally
EPA’s interpretation of property promulgated, statutorily
authorized, regulations is entitled to deference. HCC con-
tends, however, that “[t]his is not a deference case.” Brief
of Appellee at 22. The company asserts that the plain
language of the NESHAP does not permit EPA’s inter-
pretation. It further argues that EPA’s interpretation
merits no deference because the agency assertedly did not
espouse its present interpretation when it originally pro-
mulgated the regulations, but only “created” that inter-
pretation “during this litigation.”

A.

In resolving this question, we begin with the plain lan-
guage of the regulations. The NESHAP itself does not
indicate any intent to limit the meaning of the term “use”
to consumption. Indeed, EPA’s decision to give “use”
a more expansive treatment than that advocated by HCC
is consistent with the ordinary meaning of “use.” See
Black’s Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
“use” to include “to make use of, to employ” as well as
“to put into action or service, to utilize”).

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Nor is the agency’s broad interpretation nonsensical.
After all, recycled benzene is just as likely to create a
health threat as new benzene; each time benzene passes
through a valve or pipe, it can potentially leak. Regula-
tions designed to reduce the risk posed by this carcinogen
should logically treat new and recycled benzene alike.
Thus, EPA’s interpretation of its own regulatory exemp-
tion harmonizes with the purpose of the authorizing stat-
ute, the Clean Air Act: “to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of
its population.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b)(1) (West
1995). Congress mandated that EPA set emission stand-
ards that promote the public health and welfare with “the
maximum degree in reduction in emissions of the hazard-
ous air pollutants” subject to the Act, including cancer-
causing benzene. 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(d)(2) (West
1995). A broad reading of “use” certainly best achieves
this goal.

Moreover, EPA’s interpretation of its exemption ac-
cords with the purpose of the exemption itself. As the
preamble to the regulations notes, the exemption was
designed as a “small plant exemption” intended to exclude
“most research facilities, pilot plants, and intermittent
users of benzene.” 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,510. EPA drafted
the exemption in response to comments that the proposed
NESHAP (which contained no exemption) was not cost
effective for small plants, explaining:

EPA believes it is reasonable to exempt plants from
the standard when the cost of the standard is unrea-
sonably high in comparison to the achieved emission
reductions. Therefore, EPA decided to determine a
cutofi for exempting these plants based on a cost and |
emission reduction analysis.

Office of Air Quality, EPA, Pub. No. 450/3-80-032b,
Benzene Fugitive Emissions - Background Information for
Promulgated Standards 2-104 (1982) (BID). F

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The agency recognized that industrial plants with the
fewest pieces of equipment, and so the fewest sources of
leaks, were probably the least likely to emit emissions.
But it determined that it could not define the exemption
in terms of number of pieces of equiqment or sources of
leaks because such an approach “could not be applied
readily to small or intermittent users of benzene” whose
“facilities often require frequent repiping.” BID at 2-104.
Instead, EPA conducted studies and found that when the
design production of a plant was about 1,000 megagrams
per year, the plant contained 87 pieces of equipment and
would be expected to emit only about 6 megagrams of
benzene per year, applying the proposed regulations to
such plants would only result in a reduction of 4 mega-
grams of benzene emissions per year. EPA concluded that
the cost of imposing the regulatory requirements to such
small plants was “unreasonably high in comparison to the
achieved emission reductions” and so those plants could
Properly be exempted from the regulatory requirement.
Id. (emphasis added) 2

Accordingly, in formulating the exemption, EPA used
the 1,000 Mg cut off rate as a proxy to exempt plants
that had so few sources of leaks that they would be ex-
pected to emit only 6 megagrams of fugitive benzene per
year. The Celriver plant most decidedly does not fall
within that category. Rather. it had thousands of sources
of benzene leaks (nearly 17,000 as of November 1990)
and was one of the largest sources of benzene emissions
in the nation during the period at issue in this suit, with
annual emissions reaching 226 megagrams (nearly
500,000 pounds). Thus, HCC’s Celriver plant was not

* HCC asserts that this regulatory history only demonstrates that
the purpose of the exemption “was to exempt facilities from imple-
menting the standards of the benzene NESHAP where the eoet
would be unreasonably high.” Brief of Appellee at 26 (emphasis
added). That argument, of course, overlooks the remainder of the
language from the administrative record, which is quoted and em-
phasized above.

10a

the kind of plant that EPA envisioned in creating the
exemption.

In sum, EPA’s interpretation accords with the plain
language of the NESHAP, as well as the purposes of the
Clean Air Act and of the exemption itself.

B.

Nevertheless, HCC asserts that EPA's interpretation
merits no deference because it was one “created” after
the fact for this litigation. HCC principally relies on
isolated language in the preamble, BID, and EPA cor-
respondence.* This scattered language hardly compels the
company’s interpretation of the regulations.

For example, in the preamble, EPA does occasionally
employ the term “consume” in lieu of “use” in a discus-
sion of the operations of pharmaceutical companies. See
NESHAP preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,510. However,
as the district court explained, this scarcely proves that

3 HCC erroneously asserts that “there are over 100 places in the
rulemaking record where EPA uses the terms ‘use’ and ‘consume’
interchangeably.” Brief of Appellee at 8. In fact, there are only a
few occasions in the rulemaking record in which EPA employs
“consume” in lieu of “use” and, as explained in text above, those
instances are ambiguous. The additional references on which HCC
relies are not contained in the rulemaking record at all. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 7607 (d)(7) (A) (West 1995) (defining rulemaking
“record” for purposes of judicial review) ; 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e) (4)
(West 1995) (applying § 7607 standards to emissions standards).
Rather, they appear in correspondence with various EPA regional
offices or state environmental agencies after the NESHAP was
promulgated. Many of the references in this correspondence were
authored by plant owners and operators, not EPA or other environ-
mental agencies; furthermore, the agencies’ use of “consume” in
lieu of “use” even in the post-promulgation correspondence is sub-
ject to differing interpretations. See infra n.6.

HCC also refers to its interpretation of use as a “single counting”
approach and denominates EPA’s interpretation as a “multiple
counting” approach. Although the district court adopted this nomen-
clature, it does not appear anywhere in the NESHAP or in the rule-
making record. Accordingly, we do not employ it here.

lla

EPA limited the meaning of “use” in the regulations to
“consume”,

These passages from the [administrative] record . . .
do not lead inevitably to the conclusion that EPA
intended the word “use” in the exemption to mean
only “consume”.

Hoechst Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 976. (emphasis
added). Clearly, one type of “use” is “consumption;” EPA
does not claim to the contrary. The agency simply as-
serts that “use” also includes utilization or employment.
Although the preamble contains evidence that “use” in-
cludes “consumption,” it in no way requires the conclu-
sion that “use” is limited to “consumption.”

Similarly, EPA describes the exemption in the rule-
making record as establishing a cut off for “a plant design
usage or throughput rate of benzene equal to or less than
1,000 Mg/yr per plant” and explains that “throughput” is
“determined by a mass balance during the design stages of
Process operation, accumulating all benzene processed in
1 year.” BID at 2-105. HCC asserts that “throughput” in
this context can only refer to a “plant’s overall net produc-
tion or consumption . . . not recirculation rates.” But
again, the district court recognized that “ ‘throughput’ and
‘consumption’ are not synonymous... . ‘throughput can
describe, for example, the flow of benzene through equip-
ment like the quench chamber and main still”—just as
EPA asserts.

Finally, numerous EPA letters issued in the summer
and fall of 1984, shortly after the initial promulgation of
the NESHAP in June 1984, severely undermine HCC’s
entire post-hoc argument.* For example, on August 20,

* Recognizing the impact of these EPA documents, HCC urges
(somewhat inconsistently with its claim that EPA’s interpretation
is an after-the-fact creation for litigation) that these documents
demonstrate EPA’s attempt immediately after promulgation of the
NESHAP to narrow the exemption by broadening the meaning of
“use.” Brief of Appellee at 15. To prevail on this argument, HCC

iat

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1984, EPA answered an inquiry from a Texaco plant
manager stating that “use” was to be determined by “the
overall quantity of benzene used in equipment,” not “con-
sumption.” On October 5, 1984, EPA told an applicant
seeking an exemption, “the 1000 megagrams per year cut
off limit is applicable to total processing rates rather than
net consumption (usage) or net production, of all affected
equipment at an entire plant site.” (emphasis in original).
That same month. EPA informed another exemption ap-
plicant that the “1,000 megagrams per year cut off limit
is applicable to total processing rates, rather than net con-
sumption (usage) or net production.” A few days later,
EPA wrote still another applicant that the “1,000 mega-
gram per year cut off limit is applicable to total processing
rates of all affected equipment at an entire plant site.”
(emphasis in original). The next month, EPA informed
its regional offices that “We have determined the cut-off is
based on the throughput or processing rate, rather than
consumption.” There are a number of other contempo-
raneous letters from EPA to the same effect. In view of
this evidence, it is simply impossible to conclude, as HCC
argues, that EPA formulated its broad interpretation of
the exemption as a strategy for litigation initiated in 1992,
eight years after the regulation was originally promul-
gated.

For all of these reasons, we agree with the district court
that EPA’s interpretation of its own regulations deserves
deference.*

would have to have demonstrated that “use” in the NESHAP neces-
sarily meant only “consume.” As noted above, the district court
concluded and we agree that this conclusion is unwarranted.

5In reaching this conclusion, we give no weight to the 1995
affidavit of a former EPA employee, Robert Ajax, which was pre-
pared and submitted on HCC’s behalf for this litigation. Like
similar affidavits from individual legislators, it is entitled to no
weight as to the meaning of legislation enacted, or in this case a
regulation promulgated, eleven years earlier. See Consumer Prods.
Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13

a

l3a
Il.

The more difficult question is whether, and if so when,
HCC was afforded fair notice of the EPA’s interpretation.

Due process requires that a party must receive fair
notice before being deprived of property. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950). Moreover, it is well established in criminal law
that no punishment can be imposed without notice. See,
e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); United States v. Bennett, 984
F.2d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1993). Although the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the question, we have
concluded that because civil penalties are “quasi-criminal”
in nature, parties subject to such administrative sanctions
are entitled to similar “clear notice.” See First American
Bank v. Dole, 763 F.2d 644, 651 n.6 (4th Cir. 1985).
A “regulation[ ] which allow[s] monetary penalties against
those who violate [it], . . . must ove... fair warning of
the conduct it prohibits or requires, and it must provide
a reasonably clear standard of culpability to circumscribe
the discretion of the enforcing authority and its agents.”
Id. (quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d
645, 649 (Sth Cir. 1976) (citation omitted ) ).

To determine if a party has received fair notice, we
must examine the relevant facts of each case. See Bennett,
984 F.2d at 605. In this case, that requires separate
examination of two time frames: (1) the period from
1984 (when the exemption was Originally promulgated )
to 1989 (when EPA became aware of the operations of
the Celriver plant and directly contacted HCC); and (2)
the period after the 1989 contacts between EPA and HCC
until 1992, when HCC finally complied with the regula-
tion). We address each period in turn.

(1980) (“Such history does not bear strong indicia of reliability .. .
because as time passes memories fade and a person’s perception of
his earlier intention may change.”).

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A.

In support of its claim that HCC had fair notice of
EPA’s broad interpretation of the regulations from the
time they were originally promulgated in 1984, EPA of-
fers two interrelated arguments.

1.

First, the agency asserts that the plain language of the
NESHAP and the rulemaking record should have put
HCC on notice that the Celriver plant did not qualify for
an exemption. For example, EPA contends that HCC
should have known that its Celriver plant with nearly
17,000 pieces of equipment and substantial benzene emis-
sions could not possibly be exempt. In support of this
argument, EPA points out that “use” is a broad term,
and that what is at issue here is an exemption and exemp-
tions are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Duquesne
Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (nar-
rowly construing a Clean Air Act exemption). EPA also
notes that-the rulemaking record indicates that this was
intended to be a “small plant” exemption designed to
accommodate companies with limited use and emissions
of benzene. See NESHAP preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. at
23,510. EPA maintains that if HCC had any doubt on
the matter because of EPA’s reference to “consume” in
lieu of “use” in some portions of the rulemaking record, it
had an obligation to contact the agency for clarification.
See, e.g., Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co. v. OSHRC, 827
F.2d 46, 50 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding fault with com-
pany’s failure to make any inquiry of the administrative
agency responsible for the regulations at issue).

EPA’s argument is not without force and in another
case might well carry the day. Generally, “ignorance of
the law or a mistake of the law is no defense,” Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991), and a claim
of lack of notice “may be overcome in any specific case
where reasonable persons would know that their conduct

————————

15a

is at risk.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361
(1988). However, as EPA recognizes, “it is crucial to
examine the particular situation of the defendant, and
whether it lacked reasonable notice.” Brief of Appellant
at 29 (emphasis in original). Examination of the partic-
ular facts of this convinces us that, prior to 1989, HCC
did not have fair notice of the EPA’s broad interpretation
of the term “use.”

Although as noted above, nothing in the NESHAP it-
self or the rulemaking record forecloses EPA’s interpreta-
tion of the exemption, at the same time nothing mandates
it. Indeed, some of the language in the preamble (e.g.,
EPA's references to “consume” in lieu of “use”) supports
HCC’s narrower interpretation. Moreover, as the district
court noted, just because the Celriver plant was not a
small plant with few emissions, it was not necessarily put
on notice that it was subject to the regulations, given that
even under EPA’s interpretation of “use,” some plants
with many pieces of equipment and significant emissions
theoretically could be exempt. Thus, we cannot hold that
the regulations, their preamble, or purpose clearly put
HCC on notice that the Celriver plant did not qualify for
an exemption.°®

We need not determine if, as EPA maintains, the
NESHAP and rulemaking record at least provided HCC
with “reason to know that its exemption claim rested on

®* HCC also contends, and the district court held, that EPA re-
gional offices assertedly interpreted the exemption inconsistently
and that this provides additional support for the company’s claim
that EPA failed to provide it fair notice. See Hoechst Celanese,
964 F. Supp. at 981. Some of the EPA documents on which HCC
relies can be read, as the company asserts, as providing conflicting
interpretations of “use.” Most, however, can at least as easily be
read as consistently requiring EPA’s broad interpretation whenever
that question was raised and/or relevant. But given our conclusion
that EPA failed to provide fair notice to HCC from 1984 to 1989,
we need not reach the question of whether these documents con-
stitute a proper additional basis for a grant of summary judgment
on that question.

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16a

extremely shaky grounds” and so triggered an obligation
to ask for clarification of the meaning of “use.” Brief of
Appellant at 31. If HCC did have such an obligation, it
fulfilled it by communicating with the Texas Air Control
Board (TACB), the state agency that EPA had em-
powered to implement and enforce the NESHAP in Texas.

The undisputed facts are as follows: in August 1984 (a
few months after promulgation of the NESHAP), HCC
sought information from the TACB as to whether an
HCC plant located in Bishop, Texas, which also recycled
benzene, was exempt under 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(2).
The TACB referred HCC to an August 1984 letter that
EPA’s Region 6. office sent to a Texaco facility in Texas
that used recycled benzene. This letter stated that “use
is not meant to imply consumption, but rather is meant to
reflect the overall quantity of benzene used in equipment
at a facility.” This letter does seem, as EPA maintains, to
support EPA’s broad definition of “use.” Indeed, contem-
poraneous HCC internal communications indicate that
HCC itself so interpreted EPA’s response; for example.
one HCC official hand wrote on the Texaco letter “Read
it and weep” and another HCC official wrote a memo not-
ing “EPA recently advised . . . that ‘use’ of benzene in-
cludes recycle.” However, the TACB interpreted EPA
Region 6’s letter to Texaco as indicating that overall in-
ventory was the determinant factor. Thus, the TACB
concluded that the Bishop plant qualified for an exemp-
tion because it did not maintain an inventory of more than
1,000 megagrams of benzene. In December 1984, the
TACB sent a short letter to HCC informing the company
that the Bishop plant was “exempt from the requirements
of Section 61.112,” the section mandating source complli-
ance with the NESHAP. Although EPA Region 6 re-
ceived a copy of that letter, it took no action to rescind
or invalidate the exemption. HCC then concluded that
the Celriver plant, which used benzene in a manner simi-
lar to the Bishop plant, was also exempt.

SE

amma eae aa

17a

In addition to the Bishop plant, HCC operated another

plant in Pampa, Texas. That plant, like the Celriver and

Bishop plants, continually recycled benzene through a

closed loop system but because the Pampa plant “con-

sumed” more than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per year

even under HCC’s interpretation of “use,” it was not ex-

empt from the NESHAP requirements. For this reason, in

September 1984, HCC applied to the TACB for a two-

year waiver from compliance with the NESHAP for the

Pampa plant so that HCC could “reduce the quantity of

benzene consumed in the plant to less than 1,000 mega-

| grams” and thus become exempt. In April 1985, the

TACB approved the waiver request; copies of that request

| and TACB’s approval were sent to EPA Region 6, which
took no action to invalidate the waiver.

These undisputed facts demonstrate that, although HCC
made no direct inquiry as to the application of the exemp-
tion to the Celriver plant, it did not fail to make any
inquiry as to the meaning of the NESHAP. Cf. Texas
| E. Prods., 827 F.2d at 50. Rather, it asked TACB for
an exemption and wavier of the regulation for two HCC
plants located in Texas, which recycled benzene just as the
Celriver plant did. In response, TACB issued the re-
quested exemption and waiver, with copies to EPA’s
Region 6. We recognize that although Region 6 received
copies of TACB’s letters granting the exemption and
waiver to the Bishop and Pampa plants respectively, those
letters were short and may not have fully informed the

Peer) eee ae Sen a ee ee

PONE IS Vieille Fe

agency of their impact. But in addressing whether a party
has received fair notice, we look at the facts as they
3 appear to the party entitled to the notice, not to the
: agency. On the basis of the TACB’s actions and the inac-

tion of EPA Region 6, the company had reason to believe
3 that its interpretation of the exemption—equating “use”
i to “consumption”—was accurate. When these facts are
/ viewed in the context of a rulemaking record that in-
: cluded some references to “use” in lieu of “consume,” we

18a

must conclude that HCC did not receive fair notice of
EPA’s broader interpretation of the term in the 1984-89
period.

y 2

As a corollary to the above argument, EPA asserts that
the NESHAP required a plant owner to apply for an
exemption and file an initial report and that HCC’s failure
to do either prevents it from now claiming a right to the
exemption. As noted above, immediately after EPA issued
the NESHAP in 1984, numerous other plant owners in-
quired as to the meaning of “use,” applied for exemptions,
and filed initial reports. HCC, in contrast, never applied
for an exemption or filed reports.

The district court held that HCC’s contacts with TACB
constituted as “indirect[],” informal application for an
exemption for the Celriver plant. Hoechst Celanese, 964
F. Supp. at 979. We cannot agree. Whatever the author-
ity of the TACB or EPA Region 6 in Texas, they had no
authority to grant an exemption in South Carolina and no
ability to grant an exemption (by implication) to a plant
about which they knew nothing. Thus, if the NESHAP
had clearly mandated that the owner of a plant seeking
an exemption apply for the exemption, HCC’s Celriver
plant failed to meet this requirement.

Accordingly, we turn again to the relevant regulatory
language. The NESHAP provides in pertinent part:

Any equipment in benzene service that is located at
a plant site designed to produce or use less than 1,000
megagrams of benzene per year is exempt from the
requirements of § 61.112.

§ 61.110(c)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain lan-
guage of the regulation suggests that the exemption is
self-executing and provides no discretion to the EPA ad-
ministrator to determine whether or not to grant an
exemption. Section 61.110(c)(1) does state that “filf

a i

IVS AOE OE EASE Eas Caren

19a

an owner or operator applies for one of the exemptions in
this paragraph,” he must maintain certain records. (em-
phasis added). But it is impossible to conclude that this
reference clearly requires a plant owner or operator to
file an application for an exemption, in view of the
absence of any explicit directive in § 61.110(c)(2), or
any instructions in any other portion of the regulations
as to how, where, when, or in what form such applications
for exemptions are to be made. We note that elsewhere in
the same regulations when EPA requires an application
for a waiver of the NESHAP’s requirements, it specifies
in detail the procedures for the application. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 61.10(b), 61.11 (1996); see also § 61.112(c) (1996)
(setting out procedures for application for an alternative
method for attaining compliance). Thus, we do not be-
lieve the NESHAP provides fair notice that a plant owner
or operator must apply for an exemption.

Nor do we believe the regulations provide fair notice
that the owner of exempt equipment must file an initial
report. The NESHAP requires an “owner or operator of
[an] existing source” of benzene emissions to file an
initial report within 90 days of promulgation of the regu-
lations. 40 C.F.R. § 6.10(a) (1996). EPA asserts that
the exemption in § 61.110(c)(2) does not allow an
Owner or operator to avoid the initial report requirement
because that exemption only exempts “equipment,” i.e.,
“sources,” and does not eliminate reporting obligations
imposed in other portions of the NESHAP on owners and
operators of such equipment. EPA may be correct that
this is what is intended. But we cannot hold that the plain
language of § 61.10(a) provides clear notice of this
intent. As EPA concedes, the reporting requirement is
linked to the exemption provision: by requiring exempt
companies to file reports, EPA can determine continued
eligibility for that exemption. Since we have determined
that HCC lacked fair notice of the need to apply for an
exemption, we can not now hold it should have known to

20a

submit reports to monitor continued eligibility for an
exemption.

In sum, we agree with the district court that prior to
1989, HCC did not have fair notice of EPA’s interpreta-
tion of the NESHAP or of a regulatory obligation to
apply for an exemption or file reports.

B.

Finally, we must determine whether HCC continued to
lack fair notice after 1989, when EPA’s Region 4 office,
the office responsible for enforcement of the NESHAP in
South Carolina, directly informed officials at HCC’s Cel-
river, South Carolina plant of the proper interpretation of
the regulations.

l.

On June 13, 1989, EPA Region 4 wrote the HCC offi-
cial responsible for regulatory compliance at the Celriver
plant, informing him that “[i]f benzene is recycled” then
“use” for purposes of the exemption must be calculated
on the basis “of total cumulative flow through the process
rather than net benzene consumption or usage.”” The EPA
letter stated that “it appears that [HCC] may be subject”
to the NESHAP requirements and asked HCC to forward
information necessary “to determine the full extent and
duration of all benzene emissions” within thirty days.
Two weeks later, on June 26, HCC responded. Asserting
that the Celriver plant recycled benzene and so under
HCC’s definition of “use,” i.e., consumption, the plant was
exempt, the company did not forward the requested
information.

However, on July 28, 1989, senior HCC Celriver offi-
cials met to discuss the EPA’s June 13 letter. Minutes of
that July meeting indicate that by that time, HCC officials
well understood that EPA did not accept the company’s
interpretation of “use.” The minutes of the July meeting
note in pertinent part:

raat

2la

The EPA standard for fugitive benzene emissions
may be applied to Celriver. The limit of 1000 mega-
grams benzene per year (2,205,000 pounds per year)
is applied to throughput instead of consumption.
Process throughput or recycle is considerably greater
than this limit. Stringent EPA controls would thus
apply to existing process equipment. The full impli-
cation of this interpretation must be determined and
steps taken to meet compliance.

(emphasis added).

Moreover, unaware of HCC’s internal discussions of
the matter, on August 18, 1989, EPA Region 4 responded
to HCC’s June 26 letter noting that “it appears that you
are unaware of EPA’s interpretation of benzene usage as
the term is used to determine applicability.” In this letter,
EPA proceeded to explain carefully and in no uncertain
terms that benzene usage equaled “total cumulative flow
through equipment in benzene service rather than net
consumption.” The letter contained an explicit example
of how to determine usage in the exemption and asked
HCC to forward the information originally requested in
mid-June within thirty days. In September, still noting its
objection to EPA’s interpretation, HCC finally forwarded
the requested information—pursuant to EPA’s interpreta-
tion of “use,” the Celriver plant’s use of benzene exceeded
2.5 million megagrams of benzene per year. On February
20, 1990, EPA Region 4 issued HCC Celriver a notice
of violation and in April 1990, HCC submitted a plan to
redesign its Celriver plant to bring it into compliance with
the NESHAP.

In short, HCC received in June 1989 a letter from
EPA Region 4 unequivocally setting forth the agency’s
interpretation, and the record establishes that at least by
July 1989 HCC well understood EPA’s position. More-
over, in August 1989 EPA Region 4 expressly reiterated
the interpretation stated in its June letter. Further, these
1989 letters from EPA Region 4 to HCC Celriver must

ee ee

22a

be regarded as representing the agency’s authorative inter-
pretation of the benzene exemption as it affected the
Celriver plant. In its appellate brief, HCC itself concedes
as much. See Brief of Appellee at 45 n.29 (“HCC does
not dispute the fact that EPA Region IV is authorized to
communicate the agency’s interpretations of its own regu-
lations to the regulated community.” ).

ye

In spite of these uncontroverted facts, the district
court held that HCC “did not have actual notice” of
EPA’s interpretation “in the summer of 1989.” Hoechst
Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 984. The court reasoned that
EPA Region 4’s 1989 letter to HCC were contrary to
“statements” in the rulemaking record (e.g., “consume”
in lieu of “use”) and to other letters from EPA and state
environmental agencies interpreting the NESHAP. 17d.
For this reason, the court concluded that HCC had a
“legitimate basis for believing” that the 1989 letters from
EPA Region 4—the region charged with supervision of
the Celriver plant—did not “speak[ ] for the Administra-
tor” of the EPA. /d. The district court further held that
even the notice of violation could “not be deemed as hav-
ing provided Hoechst Celanese an authoritative interpre-
tation of the benzene exemption.” /d.

With regard to the asserted conflict between EPA
Region 4’s 1989 letters to HCC Celriver and statements
in the rulemaking record, the district court’s conclusion
is at odds with its earlier holding deferring to EPA’s inter-
pretation of the NESHAP. The district court initially
held that it should and would defer to EPA’s interpreta-
tion inter alia because the rulemaking record did not
conflict with that interpretation. We believe, as explained
above, that the district court correctly analyzed this issue
at the outset of its opinion, when it concluded that
“[t]hese passages from the record . . . do not lead in-
evitably to the conclusion that EPA intended the word
‘use’ in the exemption to mean ‘consume.’” Jd. at 976.

23a

Accordingly, we necessarily must reject the argument that
Statements in Region 4’s 1989 letters to HCC conflicted
with the rulemaking record.

Nor can HCC rely on letters from EPA and state en-
vironmental agencies to other owners or operators about
other facilities that allegedly adopt an interpretation of
the exemption contrary to that which EPA directly con-
veyed to HCC Celriver in 1989. First, no communication
from EPA Region 4—the office charged with enforcement
of the NESHAP in South Carolina—conflicts with Region
4’s definitive 1989 letters to HCC Celriver.”

As to the asserted contrary interpretation of “use” by
other EPA offices or state agencies, HCC presents no
evidence that the company knew of any contrary inter-
pretations issued during or after 1989. Without contem-
poraneous knowledge of and reliance on these allegedly
inconsistent interpretations, HCC had no reason to believe
EPA Region 4 was providing it with anything other than
EPA’s definitive interpretation of the NESHAP.

Finally, the fact that previous letters from state environ-
mental agencies concerning HCC plants in Texas and
Virginia * assertedly conflict with Region 4’s 1989 letters
to HCC Celriver does not in anyway undermine the force
of the latter. Whether a state environmental agency had
previously supplied advice that may appear to conflict
with EPA Region 4’s definitive instruction to the Celriver

™Thus, HCC’s reliance on Region 4’s communications with the
Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site (SRS) is misplaced.
Based on information SRS initially supplied in 1989, the EPA
could not determine whether the not-yet-built consolidated incinera-
tion facility (CIF) would be exempt. Subsequently, in 1995, upon
learning that the CIF would recirculate benzene in amounts greater
than 1,000 mg/yr, EPA concluded the operation would be subject
to the benzene NESHAP.

* There is little evidence in the record as to the circumstances of
the Virginia exemption. However, there is no evidence that any
EPA regional office approved that exemption.

24a

plant in the summer of 1989 is immaterial. In 1989,
EPA Region 4, indisputably the office responsible for
enforcement of the NESHAP in South Carolina, provided
the HCC Celriver, South Carolina plant with unequivocal,
actual notice as to how the regulation pertained to that
plant’s operations, i.e., benzene usage applied to “total
cumulative flow through equipment in benzene service
rather than net consumption.” It is well established that
“even if the agency has not given notice in the statutorily
prescribed fashion, actual notice will render that decision
harmless.” Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d
1479, 1487 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992); Shelton v. Marsh, 902
F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); New York
v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 776, 780 (2d Cir. 1987) (same);
Small Refiner Lead Phase-down Task Force v. EPA, 705
F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same) (dicta). See
also Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors’ Liquidating Trust,
F.3d , No. 96-1111, 1997 WL 523681 (4th
Cir. Aug. 26, 1997); Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708
F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1983).

It would be another matter if different officials within
EPA Region 4 had issued conflicting interpretive letters
to HCC Celriver. But that is not the case here. The HCC
Celriver plant received but one message from EPA Region
4—recycled benzene must be counted in determining how
much benzene a plant is designed to use. Letters from the
EPA regional office responsible for the State of South
Carolina—regardless of any conflict with previous guid-
ance received by another HCC plant from an agency with
no authority in South Carolina—placed the HCC Celriver
plant on actual notice of EPA’s interpretation.

For these reasons, we must conclude that EPA Region
4’s 1989 communications with HCC Celriver not only
should have put the company officials at the Celriver plant
on notice, but did put them on notice of EPA’s inter-
pretation of the NESHAP. Minutes from HCC’s July 28,
1989 meeting convened after receipt of the first EPA
letter supports this conclusion. These minutes unequivo-

nen er nr een ee

25a

cally demonstrate that HCC officials understood that
“[t}he limit of 1,000 megagrams benzene per year... is
applied to throughput instead of consumption.” Moreover,
if HCC had had any remaining doubts after receipt of
EPA’s first letter, EPA’s second (August 1989) letter
would have eliminated them.

x

We also reject the district court’s alternative grounds
for refusing to find HCC Celriver liable for any violations
of the NESHAP after August 1989. The district court
apparently believed that imposition of liability was in-
appropriate for two additional reasons: (1) EPA did not
object to the redesign schedule that HCC Celriver sub-
mitted in April 1990 to bring the plant in compliance
with the NESHAP and the company made significant ex-
penditures pursuant to that plan to reduce overall benzene
use by August 1992; and (2) if HCC had applied for a
waiver for the Celriver plant, it would likely have re-
ceived one. Hoechst Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 984-85.

At oral argument, HCC conceded, as it had to, that
the present litigation solely addresses liability. Congress
has directed that a court should address a “violator’s full
compliance history and good faith efforts to comply” not
at the liability phase of the litigation but at the penalty
phase. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(e) (West 1995): see also
United States v. B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d 362, 368
(7th Cir. 1994) (applying § 7413(e) criteria in penalty
deliberations). Thus, the district court erred when it

factored in compliance efforts as a reason for denying
liability.

Moreover, nothing in the NESHAP provides that upon
receiving a proposed compliance schedule, EPA is deemed
to accept that schedule if the agency does not respond
within a certain period of time. Nor did EPA’s lack of
response to the proposed compliance schedule preclude it
from imposing civil penalties on HCC. The only possible

Pe

26a

legal basis for such a result would be an estoppel of some
sort, and it is well-established that with rare exceptions
“equitable estoppel will not lie against the Government
as it lies against private litigants.” OPM v. Richmond,
496 US. 414, 419 (1990); see also United States v.
Agubata, 60 F.3d 1081, 1083 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 929 (1996).

Finally, HCC cannot rely on the NESHAP waiver pro-
vision which states:

Based on the information provided in any request
. the Administrator may grant a waiver of com-

pliance with a standard for a period not exceeding

two years after the effective date of the standard.

40 C.F.R. § 61.11(a) (1996) (emphasis added). The
regulatory language unambiguously provides that the
grant of a waiver is within the EPA Administrator's dis-
cretion. EPA might—or might not—have granted the
HCC Celriver plant a waiver if the plant had not met
NESHAP’s standards within ninety days, but HCC had no
right to expect one. We will therefore not presume here
that the company would have received a waiver.

Officials at the HCC Celriver plant had actual notice
of EPA’s interpretation of the NESHAP at least by the
time they received EPA’s August 1989 letter. The
NESHAP mandates full compliance from an existing
source within ninety days of the standard’s effective date.
See 40 C.F.R. §61.05(c) (1996). Since HCC lacked
fair notice of EPA’s interpretation at the time of promul-
gation of the benzene NESHAP, the ninety-day period
does not commence until HCC’s received actual notice of
that interpretation in August 1989. By failing to comply
with the NESHAP’s requirements within ninety days after
receiving EPA’s August 1989 letter, HCC Celriver neces-
sarily violated the regulations. These violations continued
at least until August 1992. We remand the case to the
district court for consideration of the proper penalties, if
any, for those violations.

27a
IV.

We affirm the district court’s order in all respects, ex-
cept as to whether after August 1989, HCC Celriver had
notice of EPA’s interpretation of the NESHAP exemp-
tion. We hold that by August 1989, EPA had provided
HCC actual notice that the Celriver, South Carolina plant
did not qualify for that exemption. We remand the case
to the district court so that it can determine if, and in
what amount, penalties should be imposed for the post-
August 1989 violations of HCC’s Celriver plant.

28a

No. 96-2003—AFFIRMED IN PART AND RE-
VERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART

No. 96-2051—AFFIRMED

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part:

I concur in Parts I., If., and III.A., but I find that I
must dissent from Part III.B. I believe not only that the
regulatory scheme was ambiguous but also that the EPA
interpreted its regulations with considerable ambivalence,
denying any person seeking to comply with them a con-
sistent and clear course to follow. To penalize a com-
pany that, by concession of the majority opinion, was not
given fair notice of any EPA interpretation at least until
1989 and then thereafter chose to follow one EPA Re-
gion’s interpretation over another would be, in my judg-
ment, fundamentally unfair. I have no difficulty with en-
forcing any consistent and rational EPA interpretation
prospectively, but to impose penalties in the circumstances
of this case is tantamount to punishment on the unfocused
whim of a bureaucracy that could not itself agree on the
proper reading of its own regualtion.

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., creates a
diverse regulatory scheme to lessen air pollution and con-
fers broad power on the EPA to draft regulations to
implement the statute. In 1984, the EPA published regu-
lations to control the emission standards for equipment
leaks of benzene, requiring industrial plants producing or
using benzene to monitor for leaks, to repair leaks, and
to install equipment to capture benzene emissions. The
regulations also impose reporting and record keeping re-
quirements. Violations are subject to civil penalty. In-
tending to exempt small volume producers and users of
benzene because of cost concerns, the regulations exempt
those plants that are designed “to produce or use less than
1,000 megagrams of benzene per year.” 40 C.F.R.

|

29a

§ 61.110(c) (2) (emphasis added). The issues in this
case are whether Hoechst Celanese’s Celriver (South Caro-
lina) Plant produces or uses 1,000 megagrams of ben-
zene per year and whether the EPA’s interpretation of
“produces or uses” was sufficiently clear to Hoechst Cela-
nese in 1989 so as to justify imposing on it penalties for
not complying with an EPA official’s interpretation of the
regulation within 90 days.

Reading the regulation on its face, the words “produces
or uses” are complementary terms designed to provide a
basis of measurement for the amount of benzene manu-
factured by or employed at a plant. The amount of ben-
zene that a plant produces would seem to be a straight-
forward calculation measured by the amount of benzene
that exits from a plant’s manufacturing process. To meas-
ure the amount of benzene that a plant “uses” in a year
would appear to require a measurement of the amount of
benzene introduced into the manufacturing process during
the course of a year. This natural reading would thus
include in the amount all inventory of benzene in use at
a plant during the entire year plus any amounts consumed
by the process. If that total were less than 1,000 mega-
grams per year, one would expect that the plant would be
exempt from regulation.

At different times and in different contexts, the EPA
has shared in part my natural reading of the regulation.
When the EPA first published its regulations, it appears
to have assumed that its own regulations were to be read
so that “use” means “consumption.” This is reflected in
the preamble to the regulation as originally published,
where the EPA stated:

The possibility that pharmaceutical operations could
be adversely affected by the standard is very small.
This is true for several reasons. First, most pharma-
ceutical plants use very little benzene. According to
estimates contained in Market Input/Output Studies
—Benzene Consumption as a Solvent (EPA-560/6-

i

30a

77-034, October 1978, p. 41), 1978 benzene con-
sumption by pharmaceutical manufacturers was about
0.72 Gg. No companies consumed more than 1,000
Mg/yr in 1978. The commenter states that they
consumed about 325 Mg/yr during 1981. Thus, it
is unlikely that pharmaceutical operations would be
affected by the standard because the final standard
exempts equipment at plant sites that are designed to
produce or use 1,000 Mg/yr or less of benzene.
Second, Benzene consumption by the pharmaceutical
industry is declining rapidly. The market input/
output study just noted estimates that consumption
declined from 2.14 Gg in 1976 to 0.72 Gg in 1978,
a decline of about 66 percent over the 2-year period.

49 Fed. Reg. 23,510 (June 6, 1984) (emphasis added).
But when individual representatives of the EPA inter-
preted EPA regulations, they recognized that if benzene
was introduced into a manufacturing process and exited
it, the “throughput” should be the basis for measurement
in determining “use.” For example, on October 16, 1984,
an internal memorandum from the EPA Standard Devel-
opment Branch to another section provided:

As you requested, I will articulate our position on
the 1,000 Mg/yr plant site cut-off in the benzene
equipment leak standard. This cut-off is based on an
analysis showing plants having few [pieces of] equip-
ment in benzene service should not be covered by
the standard. This analysis relates the low number
of [pieces of] equipment to a process rate in Mg/yr.
This process rate is not based on consumption of |
benzene but rather throughput through the equip-
ment in all process units of a plant site. The stand-
ard requires owners/operators to demonstrate the de-
sign capacity for each process unit in a plant, and we
should sum these capacities and compare this sum
to the 1,000 Mg /yr.

(Emphasis added). This position was reiterated a month
later by the EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and |

Ee

3la

Standards which issued a memorandum to all EPA Re-
gional Air Program Branch Chiefs as follows:

The question is whether the cut-off total is based on
consumption or processing rate. We have determined
the cut-off is based on the throughput or processing
rate, rather than consumption.

While various persons at the EPA were debating whether
“consumption” of benzene or the “throughput” was to be
the basis for measurement, the EPA Regional Director
from Region VI took the position that the benzene used
was to be quantified in the same way as any inventory
of a plant normally would be quantified:

After review of [the regulatory provision], and
based on our discussion with Headquarters’ staff, we
differ from you [Texaco] in our interpretation of the
provision. It is EPA’s position that the word use is
not meant to imply consumption, but rather is meant
to reflect the overall quantity of benzene used in
equipment at a facility. In determining the en-
vironmental, health economic and energy impacts
in setting the benzene standard, estimates were
based on the number of pieces of equipment utilizing
benzene and the quantity of benzene in use, rather
than on the overall plant consumption (conversion)
rate of benzene. Therefore, to determine if a plant
produces or uses greater than 1000 megagrams per
year of benzene, the total quantity of benzene in
use at the facility needs to be considered. not the
consumption.

(Emphasis in original). Region VI, thus, required the
amount of benzene used to be measured by the “total
quantity in use” at the facility—i.e., an inventory meas-
urement. This letter, Originally written to Texaco, was
provided to Hoechst Celanese by the Texas Air Control
Board in the course of giving Hoechst Celanese an exemp-
tion for its Bishop Plant in Texas, as it was authorized to
do under the Act.

32a

The EPA thus had at least three different approaches
for measuring use: (1) the consumption of benzene in
a year, (2) the throughput of benzene through a plant
for a year, and (3) the total quantity in use at the plant.

In June 1989, the EPA Regional Director in Region IV,
which included jurisdiction over Hoechst Celanese’s Cel-
river Plant, wrote Hoechst Celanese that the Celriver
Plant “may be subject” to benzene regulation and re-
quested data on Celriver’s benzene “throughput on an an-
nual basis.” When Hoechst Celanese responded that the
Celriver Plant was exempt because it consumed less than
1,000 megagrams per year, the Region IV Director sent
a letter stating that “it appears that you are unaware of
EPA’s interpretation of benzene usage as the term is used
to determine applicability.” The Region IV Director then
explained: ,

[B]enzene usage is intended to mean total cumulative
flow through equipment in benzene service rather
than net consumption[.] [Y]Jou reported your ben-
zene usage for the years 1984 through 1989 in terms
of the amount of benzene added to maintain the
levels in your closed recirculation system. Therefore,
the paragraph below provides an example of how to
calculate benzene usage for a hypothetical example.
After reviewing the example, you should have a better
understanding of how the term benzene usage is to
be interpreted.

The letter then described how in a closed recirculation
system, the benzene should be measured at a single point
so that it is counted every time it passes a fixed point. The
Region IV Director considered that this form of measure-
ment was an acceptable interpretation of “throughput.”

Up until this point, the EPA as an agency had not ad-
dressed how to measure benzene in a closed recirculation
system. While the EPA Region VI Director applied the
regulation to a closed system by directing the measurement

33a

of the “total quantity in use” at the plant, the Region IV
Director was interpreting it as the rate of flow through
a single point in a closed system. Thus, Region IV pro-
posed recounting the benzene every time it passed the
single point. EPA Region IV did not, however, explain
how many measuring points should be utilized. In a com-
plex recirculation system made up of a grid of thousands
of pieces of equipment, as was involved at the Celriver
Plant, there are theoretically an unlimited number of
measuring points at each joint and valve. Under this
method, virtually any plant with a closed recirculation

system would never qualify for the 1,000-megagram-per-
year usage exemption.

| While I agree with the majority that Hoechst Celanese
| had notice of the position of the EPA Region IV in Au-
| gust 1989, this notice should not, against the background
| of inconsistent EPA interpretations over time and through-
| out the different regions, constitute a definitive agency-
wide EPA notice such that penalties could be imposed for
| non-compliance with one interpretation. For these rea-
| sons, I firmly believe that the district court properly con-
cluded that the 1989 Region IV notice should not be con-
sidered the “authoritative interpretation” of the EPA.

| I would go yet further and question whether the Region
| IV Director’s notice is at all meaningful in view of the
ambiguity about his interpretation.

For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district
court’s findings in their entirety.

34a

APPENDIX B
[Filed May 19, 1996]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION

C/A No. 0:92-1879-17

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
-VS.-

HoECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Introduction

The question presented in this case is whether Hoechst
Celanese Corporation’s Celriver Plant in Rock Hill, South
Carolina, was required to comply with the National Emis-
sion Standard for Equipment Leaks (Fugitive Emission
Sources) of Benzene (Benzene NESHAP), 40 C.F.R.
Part 61, subpart J, during the period 1984 to 1991. The
Company implemented the NESHAP in 1991 and sub-
sequently eliminated the use of benzene altogether from
the Celriver plant. Thus, the focus of this litigation is the
1984-1991 time period.

On behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the United States initiated this action against
Hoechst Celanese for allegedly violating the Clean Air
Act. 42 U.S.C. $ 7401 et seq., and the benzene NESHAP
at Celriver. These regulations prescribe standards for

35a

equipment in certain stationary sources that produce, use,
or otherwise have in service benzene, a hazardous air pol-
lutant, by requiring subject plants to monitor equipment
regularly for leaks, to repair leaks promptly, and to install
(in some circumstances) equipment that prevents, cap-
tures, or destroys benzene emissions. The regulations also
include reporting and record keeping requirements. In
its complaint, the United States seeks civil penalties of up
to $25,000 for each violation.

The pertinent regulation provides an exemption for
“any equipment in benzene service” that is “located at a
plant site designed to produce or use less than 1,000
megagrams of benzene per year.” 40 C.F.R. § 61.110
(c)(2). The EPA contends that the Celriver Plant was
designed to use more than two million megagrams of ben-
zene per year, and therefore was not exempt from the reg-
ulation. Hoechst Celanese contends that the Celriver
Plant was designed to use ( and, in fact, used) less than
1,000 megagrams of benzene per year, and therefore was
exempt. The dramatic difference between the two calcula-
tions is caused by the different ways the parties count the
benzene for purposes of the exemption.

The two approaches produce vastly different results be-
cause the Celriver Plant recycled benzene, continuously
using the same benzene. The total quantity of benzene at
the Celriver Plant site never exceeded 1,000 megagrams
per year. Hoechst Celanese maintains that the benzene
should be counted only once, and therefore the Celriver
Plant was exempt under the regulation. EPA argues that
the benzene should be counted each time it cycles through
two separate points inside the system, and therefore the
Celriver Plant was not exempt.

Hoechst Celanese further argues that, even if the exemp-
tion contemplated what it calls the “multiple count”? ap-

1 The government disagrees with the use of the words “multiple
count” in describing its interpretation of the regulations. Whether

36a

proach, the Company still should not be required to pay
the civil penalty sought by the government because the
Company did not receive the constitutionally required fair
notice of the “multiple count” interpretation of the regu-
lation.

The matter is now before the court on pivotal cross mo-
tions for summary judgment. The United States moved
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for
violations allegedly occurring between June 1986 and
August 1992. The United States contends that Hoechst
Celanese violated virtually all of the leak detection and
repair requirements in the regulations, failed to install
equipment designed to reduce fugitive benzene emissions,
and failed to keep records and make reports to EPA. In
total. the United States alleged thousands of violations of
the Benzene Leaks NESHAP. Hoechst Celanese has cross
moved for summary judgment on all claims. Oral argu-
ment was heard on both motions on February 2, 1996.

For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant
the plaintiff's motion in part, by finding plantiff’s interpre-
tation of the applicable regulation to be reasonable. The
court will also grant, in part, defendant’s motion, conclud-
ing that because the Company was not afforded fair no-
tice of the EPA’s interpretation of the regulation, no civil
penalty should be awarded in this case.

Summary judgment may only be granted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party demonstrates
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
court must inquire into the genuineness and materiality
of all purported factual issues and view all facts and in-
ferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778 (4th
Cir, 1993); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corporation,

the government’s gloss on the regulation is denominated “multiple
count”, “internal recycle’, or something else is not significant for
purposes of this decision.

37a

759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). When no genuine
issue of material fact exists, the court has a duty to award
summary judgment. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d at 778-79.

The Celriver Plant was exempt under 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.110(c)(2) if it was designed to produce or use less
than 1,000 megagrams of benzene annually. The facts
regarding benzene at the Celriver Plant are essentially un-
disputed. Until March 1993, the Celriver Plant used ben-
zene in, among other things, the production of acetic
anhydride.* Hot ketene gases flowed into a quench cham-
ber and were cooled with a continuous stream of benzene,
with some of the ketene thereby being converted to acetic
anhydride. The benzene used to cool ketene gases was
called a “quench.” The substances in the quench chamber
then moved to a main still. In the main still, benzene,
water, and other substances rose to the top and exited,
while acetic anhydride and acetic acid left from the bot-
tom of the still. A stream of benzene flowed into the still
to make this separation process more efficient. Benzene
used to increase the efficiency of the main still was called
a “reflux agent.”

* The facts in this section describing the Celriver Plant’s design
and use of benzene were derived from U.S. Mem. at 27-31, United
States’ Response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and the Defendant's Opposition to the United States’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (U.S. Resp.”) at 3-6, and Hoechst
Celanese’s Initial Brief at 26. The court’s description of benzene
use at Celriver focuses specifically on one of two process units at
the plant, the acetic anhydride manufacturing process. A_ full
description of this process is too technically complex to warrant its
inclusion here, but the parties have provided a useful. if greatly
simplified, depiction of certain of the most pertinent features of
that process. The court notes that benzene was also used in another
process unit at the Celriver Plant, the acid recovery unit. The
Government does not discuss how benzene use would be calculated
in this other process unit.

38a

Benzene entering the quench chamber and main still
had a prescribed temperature and purity. After it entered
the quench chamber and main still, the benzene became
hotter and less pure. For this reason, some of the benzene
leaving the main still went through a series of steps that
removed impurities and cooled the benzene back to its
original temperature, while other portions of the benzene
were recirculated immediately back to the main still. When
the purification process was complete, the benzene that
had been purified also recirculated back to the quench
chamber and main still.

II

EPA contends that the Celriver Piant was not exempt
because it was designed to use more than 1,000 mega-
grams of benzene annually. The court has jurisdiction to
review EPA’s interpretation, but “the scope of its review
is limited to whether EPA’s interpretation is plainly erro-
neous.” Potomac Elec. Power v. U.S. EPA, 650 F.2d
509, 513 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982). EPA’s interpretation need not be the only rea-
sonable one, or even the interpretation the court would
have preferred if the question had first arisen in a judicial
proceeding. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
Rather, the “agency’s interpretation of its own regulation
is of ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.’” Talley v. Mathews,
550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977), quoting Bowles v.
Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). See
also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,
566 (1980).

Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation for pragmatic and constitutional reasons. Def-
erence to the agency’s view ensures that a nationally uni-
form interpretation prevails without the need for the Su-
preme Court to opine on the meaning of every regulation.
Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408,
412 (7th Cir. 1987). An agency is also more suited than

ne ee

3
5
q
:

oe ee Poe Ee, ee eee

39a

a court to make policy and scientific judgments within the
agency's area of expertise. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Re-
sources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (de-
ferring to EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act);
Citizens Against Refinery’s Effects v. U.S. EPA. 643 F.2d
178, 181-83 (4th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, courts recog-
nize that Congress often confers upon an agency, rather
than the courts, the province of “filling the interstitial
silences within a statute or a regulation.” Milhollin, 444
U.S. at 565.

A court’s review of regulations under Section 112 of
the Clean Air Act, such as the Benzene Leaks NESHAP,
is particularly limited because of the broad discretion Con-
gress gave EPA to control hazardous air pollutants. Un-
der the Clean Air Act in effect when EPA promulgated
the Benzene Leaks NESHAP, Congress delegated author-
ity to EPA to identify hazardous air pollutants and their
sources, to determine methods of controlling emissions
from these sources, and to determine the level of control
hecessary to protect public health.* Through its exercise
of these powers, EPA has developed considerable scientific
and policy expertise in the regulation of hazardous air
pollutants. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.
EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
This court treads lightly when construing the scope of an
exemption that allows a source of hazardous air pollutants
to go unregulated. The court will not substitute its own
judgment on the scope of the exemption unless EPA’s in-
terpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation.

* Clean Air Act, sec. 4(a), §§ 111(b)(1)(A) and 112(b) (1), 84
Stat. 1676, 1684-85 (1970), sec. 110, § 112(e), 91 Stat. 685, 703
(1977), and sec, 13(b), § 112(e) (5), 92 Stat. 3443, 3458 (1978)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-12 (Supp. V 1993)).

|

40a

Il

A. The Language of the Regulation

The exemption that Hoechst Celanese claims reads as
follows:

§ 61.110(c) ,, , (1) If an owner or operator applies
for one of the exemptions in this paragraph, then the
owner or operator shall maintain records as required
in § 61.246(1).

(2) Any equipment in benzene service that is lo-
cated at a plant site designed to produce or use less
than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per year is exempt
from the requirements of § 61.112.

The government argues that Hoechst Celanese does not
qualify for the exemption provided for in section 61.110
(c)(2). Additionally, the government argues that even
if Hoechst Celanese qualifies for the exemption, it never-
theless cannot claim the exemption in this case because
it never affirmatively applied for the exemption. The court
will address these issues seriatim.

ee

1. The Interpretation of the Exemption

Interpretation of the exemption at issue in this litigation
tzimus on the phrase “designed to . . . use” in section
61.110(c)(2).

EPA claims to give the word “use” its broad, ordinary
meaning: to put into service, to employ, to utilize, to
consume. In EPA’s view, a plant is not exempt if, under
its design, it uses benzene in one of these ways at a rate
greater than or equal to 1,000 megagrams per year.

EPA maintains that the Celriver Plant was not exempt
because it was not designed to use less than 1,000 mega-
grams of benzene annually. The Agency relies on the
flow of benzene through two internal pieces of equipment
in one process unit at the plant (namely, the main still

4la

and the quence chamber in the acetic anhydride manu-
facturing process) in reaching that conclusion. As EPA
Sees it, that equipment in the Celriver Plant was not “de-
signed to consume” benzene. Rather, the equipment was
designed to “utilize” benzene as a quench and as a reflux
agent in the manufacture of acetic anhydride. The acetic
anhydride manufacturing unit of the plant was designed
to use benzene as a quench by putting it into service in
the quench chamber, and to use benzene as a reflux agent
by putting into service in the main still According to
EPA, these two pieces of equipment in the acetic anhy-
dride unit at the Celriver Plant were designed to put ben-
zene into service at the rate of 1,517,700 megagrams per
year. Because these rates exceeded the exemption thres-
hold of 1,000 megagrams, EPA concludes that the Cel-
river Plant as a whole was designed to use more than 1,000
megagrams per year and, hence, did not qualify for the
exemption.

Hoechst Celanese reads the exemption far differently.
The Company agrees that the exemption is phrased
in terms of a rate Beyond that, however, EPA’s and
Hoechst Celanese’s analyses diverge significantly.

At the very outset, Hoechst Celanese alleges that the
Government's emphasis on the words “designed to use”
is a litigation position embraced by the Government post
hoc, and that the Government's explanation of the exemp-
tion can be found only in the Papers it has filed in this
litigation. As such, the Company contends, the “designed
to use” argument is entitled to no deference from this
court. According to the Company, “designed to use”
merely indicates that a plant site’s benzene usage is to be
calculated on the basis of its maximum “design” or “name-
plate capacity,” rather than its “actual” capacity for any
Particular year. This is made clear. according to Hoechst
Celanese, both from the context of the phrase as it is
used in the exemption itself and from the rulemaking
record.

a a

42a

Moreover, Hoechst Celanese argues, the Government's
multiple counting explanation of the exemption strays far
from any common understanding of the word “use.” To
illustrate, the Company gives the example of how much
oil an automobile might be said to “use” in a year. An
automobile that circulates several quarts of oil in its en-
gine might plausibly be viewed as using either those sev-
eral quarts of oil, or perhaps the amount of oil needed
as “makeup” for that lost from the engine over the course
of the year. Under multiple counting, however, the auto-
mobile would be said to “use” hundreds of thousands,
if not millions, of quarts of oil per year.

Hoechst Celanese claims that, unlike the Government’s
multiple counting explanation, its interpretation of the ex-
emption provision gives the word “use” its ordinary mean-
ing. According to the Company, there are two dictionary
definitions of the word that might apply in the context of
the exemption: (1) to “expend or consume by putting
to use,” and (2) to “put into action or service: have
recourse to. . .: to carry out a purpose or action by
means of.*

At Celriver, Hoechst Celanese contends, the amount
of benzene “used” in a year could thus mean either the
amount of benzene the plant is designed to “use up” (/.e.,
consume) over the course of a year, or the amount of
benzene that the plant is designed to “utilize” or “put into
service” over the course of year (i.e., the amount used up
during the year plus the amount remaining in equipment
at year’s end). Either of these definitions is a “single
counting” approach, the Company notes, contrasting them
with the so-called “multiple counting” interpretation that
the Government advances. The distinction is critically
important, as it is not disputed that the Celriver Plant was
exempt under either single counting interpretation.

4 Hoechst Celanese’s Initial Brief at 53 quoting Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, p. 2523-24 (1976).

43a

2. The Administrative Record

Both sides assert that the administrative record sup-
ports their respective reading of the exemption language.
Hoechst Celanese argues that the administrative record
establishes that the exemption is based on the single count-
ing concept of plant nameplate capacity or consumption,
terms that are wholly incompatible with EPA’s multiple
counting approach.

For its part, EPA relies on the administrative record
to support its claim that its interpretation is consistent
with the purpose of the exemption. Typically, that por-
tion of the administrative record formally adopted by the
EPA Administrator (i.e., the Preamble and rulemaking
documents incorporated by reference in the Preamble) is
to be read in harmony with the language of the regulatory
Provision so as to provide guidance as to the Agency’s
true meaning. I turn, then, to an examination of the ad-
ministrative record.

Deference to an agency’s interpretation is particularly
warranted when the interpretation harmonizes with the
purpose of the statutory scheme and the purpose of the
regulations. Mourning v. Family Publication Service, Inc.,
411 U.S. 356, 369-72 (1973): United States v. Unitank
Terminal Service, 724 F.Supp. 1158, 1165-66 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (interpreting the Benzene Leaks NESHAP).

One purpose of the Clean Air Act is “to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and the productive
capacity of its population. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b).
To fulfill this purpose, Congress required EPA to prom-
ulgate emission standards for hazardous air pollutants
that protect the public with an ample margin of safety.
42 U.S.C. $7412. EPA promulgated the Benzene Leaks
NESHAP under this authority in order to protect the
public from benzene that leaks from equipment, a type of
pollution known as “fugitive emissions.” EPA believed

44a

that these controls would significantly reduce the inci-
dence of leukemia for people living within twenty kilom-
eters of leaking equipment. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,501 (June
6, 1984). As discussed below, the exemption was in-
tended to reach only plants that were not cost-effective to
regulate because they had few pieces of equipment and
low emissions from leaking equipment.

EPA drafted the exemption in response to a comment
that Benzene Leaks NESHAP proposed in 1981 was not
cost-effective for some plants. EPA agreed that an exemp-
tion for such plants was appropriate. In a document sup-
porting the final regulations, the agency wrote: “EPA
believes it is reasonable to exempt plants from the stand-
ard when the cost of the standard is unreasonably high in
comparison to the achieved emission reductions. There-
fore, EPA decided to determine a cutoff for exempting
these plants based on a cost and emission reduction ana-
lysis.” Benzene Fugitive Emissions—Background Infor-
mation for Promulgated Standards, EPA 450/3-80-032b
(“BID”), at 2-104.

EPA performed a cost and emission reduction analysis
by analyzing actual data from plants that produced ethy-
lene, cumene, and vinyl acetate.° Based on its review of
five data points provided by the three studied production
facilities, PES plotted lines purporting to make correla-
tions between cost-effectiveness and (1) the nameplate
capacity of plants producing so-called “synthetic organic
chemical manufacturing industry (“SOCMI”) chemicals,
(2) emissions from such facilities, and (3) the number
of pieces of equipment at the facilities.

5 EPA’s description of this cost and emission reduction analysis
appears in U.S. Mem. at Appendix B. The court notes that, while
the PES Memo was part of the rulemaking record, it was not itself
published in the Federal Register, nor were its contents fully
explicated in the BID. Rather, interested persons had to be able to
identify the PES memo as being relevant to the benzene exemption
and could then obtain a copy only by writing to EPA and request-
ing it.

45a

According to EPA, the data show a rough correlation
between a plant’s equipment count, emissions from leak-
ing equipment, and plant production nameplate capacity,
in that plants with higher production rates had more
equipment and thus more fugitive emissions.

After assuming that the data it had derived from five
data points was an accurate reflection of SOCMI produc-
tion facilities generally, and by relating the data to ben-
zene production plants, EPA’s consultant plotted a corre-
lation between plants with nameplate capacity producing
1,000 megagrams of benzene per year and benzene emis-
sions of approximately 6 megagrams before regulation and
emission reductions of about 4 megagrams after regula-
tion. On the graph plotted by PES, emissions at these
levels corresponded to plants having fewer than 87 pieces
of equipment, such as valves, pumps, and pressure relief
devices.

EPA determined that plants designed to use 1,000
megagrams of benzene per year would have approximately
the same equipment count and emissions as plants that
produced 1,000 megagrams of benzene annually. In the
BID, EPA stated:

For plants in which the benzene emission reduction
achieved by implementing the standard is about 4
Mg of benzene per year, EPA has determined that
the cost of achieving this emission reduction is un-
reasonable. In order to exclude plants on this basis,
EPA selected a minimum cutoff of 1,000 Mg/year
per plant site based on a benzene design usage rate
or throughput.

BID at 2-105. The BID further explained that “[t]wo
approaches for setting the [1,000 megagram per year] cut-
off were considered: (1) number of sources at a plant
site and (2) benzene usage per plant site.” BID at 2-104.
EPA said it rejected a “cutoff based on the number of
sources at a plant site” because such a cutoff “could not

46a

be applied readily” to small or intermittent users of ben-
zene. Id. Rather, a cutoff “based on benzene design us-
age” was chosen “because it is easily understood and can
be applied readily to a plant site.” Id. The BID also in-
dicated that it would be reasonable to exempt from the
NESHAP plants emitting benzene in “significant quan-
tities” when the “cost of the standard is unreasonably high

in comparison to achieved emission reductions.” BID at
2-104.

The Preamble to the Benzene Leaks NESHAP sim-
ilarly explains that the exemption was based indirectly
upon an analysis of equipment count and emissions. The
Preamble states:

EPA is exempting from the standard equipment at
plant sites that are designed to produce or use 1,000
Mg/yr or less of benzene. This cutoff is based on
the amount of equipment in a process unit and re-
lates this amount to a design production rate. The
1,000 Mg/yr exemption would exclude most research
facilities, pilot plants, and intermittent users of ben-
zene from the standard.

And finally, even though pharmaceutical operations
that are designed to use benzene in excess of 1,000
Mg/yr are subject to the standard, they have substan-
tial equipment inventories in benzene service, and,
therefore, emit benzene in enough quantity to war-
rant coverage by the final standard.

49 Fed. Reg. 23,510 (June 6, 1984).

EPA contends that its position that the Celriver Plant
did not qualify for the exemption is consistent with the
purpose of the regulation. Unlike plants that EPA in-
tended to exempt, EPA says, the Celriver Plant had thou-
sands of pieces of equipment and high fugitive benzene
emissions. Between June 1984 and February 1991, for
example, the Celriver Plant operated almost 17,000 pieces

Piven ee ee 5

47a

of equipment allegedly covered by the Benzene Leaks
NESHAP. Between 1984 and 1993, the Celriver Plant’s
fugitive benzene emissions ranged between 69 and 226
megagrams annually. According to EPA’s Toxic Release
Inventory, the Celriver Plant ranked in the top 5% of all
plants reporting benzene fugitive emissions in every year
between 1987 and 1993,

EPA raises other arguments to support its claim of
consistency with guidance in the administrative record on
applying the exemption. In the BID, EPA drew a parallel
between benzene use and benzene “throughput.” Accord-
ing to EPA, the term throughput generally refers to the
rate at which material is put through something, whether
it be a system, a process, or a piece of equipment. In-
stead of looking at the “throughput” for the plant as a
whole—which, as it explained below, Hoechst Celanese
and its engineering experts contend is the only way for it
to be consistent with the plant nameplate capacity ele-
ment of the PES analysis and other aspects of the admin-
istrative record—the Government’s multiple count ap-
proach would base eligibility on the throughput for one
or more pieces of equipment inside the plant process. To
accomplish this, EPA equates “throughput” with the term
“processing rate,” which, in turn, is more typically used
when referring to the flow of material through a piece of
equipment. This precise term, however, does not itself
appear in the administrative record.

The BID states, “EPA selected a minimum cutoff of
1,000 Mg/year per plant site based on a benzene design
usage rate or throughput. Throughput is determined by
a mass balance during the design stages of process opera-
tions, accumulating all benzene processed in 1 year.”
BID at 2-15. This passage, EPA explains, describes both
how throughput should be determined (by a mass bal-
ance),° and what benzene should be included (all benzene

* A “mass balance” is a technique based on the scientific principle
that matter can never be destroyed. To apply a mass balance, one

48a

processed in one year). The Government argues that the
“mass balance” referred to in the BID was not intended
to be conducted on the plant manufactuing process as a
whole, but rather should really have been understood to
contemplate one or more mass balances to measure the
accumulated flow through pieces of equipment inside the
plant manufacturing process selected by Agency staff
after reviewing plant process diagrams.

Notwithstanding the fact that the term “processing rate”
does not appear in the rulemaking record, EPA argues
that the BID reiterates the connection between “use” and
processing rate or throughput in several other places as
well. In a summary section under the heading “Benzene
Usage Cutoff,” EPA stated:

An analysis by EPA indicated that the cost effective-
ness of the standard for equipment at plant sites
processing less than 1,000 Mg/yr is unreasonably
high. Because this cost is unreasonably high in com-
parison to the minimal emissions reduction, achiev-
able, EPA provided an exemption for plants designed
for low benzene usage.

accounts for all mass or material entering, leaving, and remaining
in a defined area. Typically, the accounting of a material is ex-
pressed in a mathematical equation, When all material is accounted
for, the equation “balances.” While both EPA and Hoechst Celanese
agree with this general definition of the term “mass balance,” they
disagree profoundly over the scope of the “defined area” on which
this mass balance is to be performed under the exemption. At
Celriver, EPA instructed Hoechst Celanese to provide benzene
usage figures derived from mass balance calculations on individual
process streams. The Company contends that both the plain lan-
guage of the exemption and rulemaking record indicate that the
mass balance is to be »verformed on the “plant site” as a whcele.
Such a calculation, Hoechst Celanese maintains, is specifically in-
tended to eliminate any multiple counting resulting from internal
flow. For most facilities that use benzene in their manufacturing
process, it would generally result in the measurement of a plant’s
consumption.

eespemaeiaiiiaiiiiea is aid

49a

BID at 1-10. In response to a comment that research and
development plants should be exempt, the agency stated:

a plant design usage rate or throughput rate of ben-
zene equal to or less than 1,000 Mg/yr per plant
has been selected as a cutoff. Based on the minimal
amount of benzene processed at laboratory facilities
and pilot plants, the 1,000 Mg/yr cutoff is likely to
exempt most of these sources from the standard.
Large-scale pilot plants or commercial tests might
process more than 1,000 Mg/yr. If this happens,
these plants would not have difficulty in achieving
the standard since there are no major equipment re-
quirements and the work practice requirements are
reasonable, considering costs and emissions reduc-
tions available.

BID at 2-105. In response to a comment from a pharma-
ceutical company seeking an exemption, EPA stated:

And finally, even though pharmaceutical operations
with a benzene throughput in excess of 1,000 Mg/yr
are subject to the standard, they have substantial
equipment inventories in benzene service and, there-
fore, emit benzene in enough quantity to warrant
coverage by the final standard.

BID at 2-91.

EPA relies on these passages in support of its view that
the Celriver Plant was not exempt. EPA contends that
the Celriver Plant was not exempt based on the flow rate
of benzene through two pieces of equipment inside the
manufacturing process—the quench chamber and main
still. EPA obtained this flow from among the mass bal-
ances that Hoechst Celanese prepared, at EPA’s direction,
On various benzene streams in Celriver’s internal proc-
esses to show those streams’ “throughput,” which the
Agency then defined as meaning “total cumulative flow

50a

through equipment in benzene service rather than net
consumption.” *

Some parts of the administrative record provide support
for the Defendant’s “consumption” interpretation. Chief
among these is a paragraph from the Administrator’s Pre-
amble which uses the word “consumed” or “consumption”
four times, and appears to use the concept synonymously
with the word “use”. This paragraph reads as follows:

The possibility that pharmaceutical operations could
be adversely affected by the standard is very small.
This is true for several reasons. First, most pharma-
ceutical plants use very little benzene. According to
estimates contained in Market Input/Output Studies
—Benzene Consumption as a Solvent . . ., 1978 ben-
zene consumption by pharmaceutical manufacturers
was about 0.72 Gg [gigagrams]. No companies con-
sumed more than 1,000 Mg/yr in 1978. The com-
menter states that they consumed about 325 Mg/yr
during 1981. Thus, it is unlikely that pharmaceutical
operations would be affected by the standard because
the final standard exempts equipment at plant sites
that are designed to produce or use 1,000 Mg/year
or less of benzene. Second, benzene consumption by
the pharmaceutical industry is declining rapidly.

49 Fed. Reg. 23,510 (June 6, 1984) (emphasis added).

In its brief the government explains that the placement
of the words “consumed” and “consumption” in close prox-
imity with the word “use” in both the Preamble and the

7 Elsewhere in this same communication, the Agency observed
that it “may be time-consuming to calculate actual annual benzene
usage as interpreted by EPA,” and indicated that the Agency
“would be willing to review any estimation methods [Hoechst]
Celanese might use in formulating a response” to the Agency’s
request, “Any response that relies that on estimation methods,”
EPA continued, “should contain enough backup information to allow
us to evaluate the method used and the results obtained with it.”

S5la

BID is ‘accidental” and that EPA could have drafted
these passages “more exactly”.

Hoechst Celanese contends that the Preamble indicates
that EPA intended to exempt small users of benzene, but
EPA’s multiple counting interpretation would virtually
eliminate the exemption in even the simplest and smallest
of recycle operations. Hoechst Celanese asserts, for ex-
ample, that a research facility that intermittently recycles
one gallon of benzene through an aquarium pump at a
design flow rate of one gallon per minute would not be
exempt.

Additionally, the precise term “processing rate,” (the
term relied upon by some EPA staff as the basis for a
multiple count interpretation) is not mentioned anywhere
in the record. Hoechst Celanese argues that EPA adopted
nameplate capacity and specifically rejected “processing
rate,” a version of multiple counting, as unsuitable for
this type of exemption. Moreover, it cites to a parallel
EPA rulemaking to establish other standards for the syn-
thetic chemical manufacturing industry where the use of
that term was specifically rejected because it was “difficult
to establish.” The government argues that although the
words “processing” and “rate” do not appear together in
the BID, the BID does describe the scope of the exemp-
tion in terms of the rate at which benzene is processed.

Hoechst Celanese also points to the 1980 BID which
listed the types of processes which were being considered
for benzene regulation. The listed processes included
those that produced benzene (refineries) and those that
used benzene in the production of benzene derivatives.
The 1980 BID had information on 133 sites, but did not
list any of Hoechst Celanese’s plants, some of which had
been operating for decades.

These passages from the record, however, do not lead
inevitably to the conclusion that EPA intended the word
“use” in the exemption to mean only “consume.” As the

52a

Defendant concedes, a mass balance can be used to de-
termine the flow of benzene through equipment. The De-
fendant prepared such a mass balance for EPA in order
to show the flow of benzene through various parts of its
plant, including the quench chamber and main still. Ben-
zene throughput sometimes refers to a plant’s benzene
consumption, but the words “throughput” and “consump-
tion” are not synonymous. The word “throughput” can
describe, for example, the flow of benzene through equip-
ment like the quench chamber and main still. Further-
more, EPA maintains that the Defendant has not shown
how its consumption interpretation squares with the pur-
pose of the Benzene Leaks NESHAP, which according to
EPA was to control fugitive benzene emissions at all
plants except those with few pieces of equipment and low
emissions.’ In sum, the passages cited by the Defendant
from the administrative record do not establish that EPA’s
interpretation is plainly erroneous.

The court concludes that EPA’s interpretation of the
regulation is permissible and should be sustained by the
court. Although Hoechst Celanese’s interpretation of the
regulation is also reasonable, the court must “refer to the
reasonable judgment of the agency to which Congress has
entrusted the development of rules and regulations to en-
sure [the protection of the environment].” General Elec-
tric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328 (D.C.Cir. 1995).
EPA’s interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(1) is not
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”
Tally v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977).

3. The “Application” Argument

EPA’s other argument is that Hoechst Celanese never
applied for the exemption it now claims for itself. Hoechst
Celanese contends, on the other hand, that the exemption
is self-implementing because the plain language of Section

8 The Benzene Leaks NESHAP also exempts coke byproducts
plants. 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(b).

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53a

61.110(c)(2) provides that a plant designed to use less
than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per year “is exempt
from the requirements.” 40 C.F.R. § 60.110(c)(2) (em-
phasis added).

Courts look to the language and design of the whole
law when construing the meaning of particular phrases,
U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon y. Independent Ins. Agents,
113 S.Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993), and avoid constructions
that render words superfluous. Ratzlaf v. United States,
114 S.Ct. 655, 659 (1994). The paragraph containing
the exemption begins, “[i]f an owner or operator applies
for one of the exemptions in this paragraph... .” 40
C.F.R. § 61.110(c) (1). Elsewhere, the NESHAP re-
quires that applications made pursuant to Part 61 should
be sent to the appropriate EPA regional offices. 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.04.

The criteria that must be met for the exemption is
specified in 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(2). The regulatory
language does not give EPA discretion in determining
who qualifies for the exemption; a plant qualifies for the
exemption if it meets the criteria set forth in the regula-
tion. EPA still maintains, however, that this lack of dis-
cretion, does not make an application unnecessary.

The word “apply” in the regulation cannot be ignored.
The EPA acknowledges, however, that the regulation does
not specify the content of an application, nor does it give
any real guidance as to an application procedure. Hoechst
Celanese maintains that the regulation is self-executing and
that the EPA has advanced the application argument only
for the purposes of litigation and that in actual practice,
the regulated community has not been applying for, nor
have they been required to apply for this exemption.
Hoechsi Celanese also argues that key EPA staff have con-
firmed that there is no obligation to apply for the exemp-
tion.

EPA acknowledges that the ordinary meaning of the
verb “apply” in 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(1) means at least

S$4a

that plants seeking the exemption must “communicate”
their request to EPA.® Because of this, an examination
of the communications between EPA representatives and
the Company after promulgation of the NESHAP in 1984
is appropriate. The relevant facts, derived from the un-
disputed evidence in the record, are as follows.

In 1984 Hoechst Celanese operated two Texas plants
that recycled benzene: the Bishop and Pampa Plants.
Following the June 1984 promulgation of the NESAP,
Hoechst Celanese undertook to determine the scope of the
“use” exemption. The initial evaluation was made by
Jaime Garza, a senior environmental engineer at Bishop.
Mr. Garza considered a full range of: regulatory interpre-
tations—both plausible and implausible. He also asked
for a review of the matter by in-house counsel, who evalu-
ated the rulemaking record including the regulatory Pre-
amble and the BID. After these evaluations, Mr. Garza
concluded that “use” meant “consumption” and that Bis-
hop was exempt because it consumed less than 1,000
megagrams per year of benzene.

On August 31, 1984, Mr. Garza wrote a letter seeking
confirmation of Bishop’s exempt status from the Texas
Air Control Board (TACB), the agency to which EPA
had delegated the authority to implement and enforce the
benzene NESHAP in Texas.

Mr. Garza provided the TACB a detailed breakdown
of annual bezene consumption and purchases for Bishop.
His letter and attachments showed that Bishop recycled
benzene and that its total consumption and purchases of
benzene for each of the prior six years were less than
1,000 megagrams.

In response to Mr. Garza’s letter, another TACB rep-
resentative (Mr. Rodgers) informed Mr. Garza about an

® The definition of the verb “apply” includes, “To ask or seek aid,
employment, or admission.” Webster’s II New Riverside University
Dictionary.

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55a

August 20, 1984 letter sent from EPA Region VI (EPA’s
regional office for Texas) to a Texaco Chemical Com-
pany facility in that same EPA Region. The letter to
Texaco said that the term “use” was “not meant to imply
consumption,” but rather was “meant to reflect the overall
quantity of benzene used in equipment at a facility,” and
that the “total quantity in use at a facility needs to be
considered” not just consumption.

After receiving a copy of that letter in September 1984,
Mr. Garza called the TACB and discussed the matter
with Mr. Palmer, the director of the TACB region re-
sponsible for the Bishop Plant. After reviewing the Tex-
aco letter and checking with EPA, the TACB told Mr.
Garza that the TACB wanted additional information re-
garding the amount of benzene “kept at the Bishop Plant
site at any point in time.” In response, on October 22,
1984, Mr. Garza sent another letter to the TACB, ex-
plaining that the maximum amount of benzene present at
Bishop, both in equipment and Storage, was less than
1,000 megagrams a year.

Before responding to Mr. Garza’s letters, Sabino
Gomez, then Director of TACB’s Compliance Division,
conferred with EPA Region VI about EPA’s interpreta-
tion of the word “use” in the exemption. From those
conversations, Mr. Gomez understood that EPA. inter-
preted the exemption to be based not on benzene con-
sumption at a plant site, but rather on what a plant’s
inventory of benzene was. Mr. Gomez also specifically
asked EPA Region VI “whether ‘designed’ is the key
word in this rule.” EPA Region VI staff, after consulting
with EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
in North Carolina, informed Mr. Gomez, “design capa-
city, irrespective of actual use. is the operating factor.” *°

1° The government has not set forth any evidence which indicates
that EPA told Mr. Gomez or anyone else at the TACB that “de-
signed to use” was to be interpreted consistent with the multiple
counting approach.

56a

On the basis of those conversations with EPA and
based on the information in Mr. Garza’s August and
October 1984 letters, the TACB confirmed—by letter of
December 7, 1984—that Bishop was exempt from the
benzene NESHAP. Significantly (for purposes of this liti-
gation), as soon as Hochest Celanese received the con-
firmation letter from the TACB, it circulated the informa-
tion to company personnel whose responsibilities included
the Celriver Plant.

TACB sent EPA a copy of the December 7, 1984 let-
ter confirming the exempt status of the Bishop Plant.
After receiving the letter on December 21, 1984, EPA
did not seek further information from either the TACB
or Hoechst Celanese, nor did EPA indicate that it dis-
agreed with the TACB’s confirmation of the exempt status
of a plant that recycled benzene as Bishop (and Celriver)
did.

During this same period, Hoechst Celanese was also
evaluating the terms of the exemption for its Pampa
Plant. Like Celriver and Bishop, Pampa then recycled
benzene continuously through a closed-loop system. Un-
like Celriver and Bishop, however, in 1984 Pampa was
consuming more than 1,000 megagram of benzene per
year. Consequently, in September 1984, the Pampa Plant
applied to the TACB for a two-year waiver from com-
pliance with the benzene NESHAP so that the plant could
become exempt from the benzene NESHAP by reducing
“the quantity of benzene consumed in the plant to less
than 1,000 megagrams.” The TACB approved the waiver
request for Pampa on April 9, 1985, stating that if ben-
zene consumption were reduced to 1,000 megagrams per
year by June 1986, the exemption would apply. Copies
of both the waiver request and TACB approval were sent
to EPA Region VI.

In June 1986, the Pampa Plant reported to the TACB
that the facility had reduced its benzene consumption to
less than 1,000 megagrams per year and was therefore

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57a

entitled to the exemption. The Company provided EPA
Region VI with a copy of the letter. On December 9,
1986, EPA Region VI inspector George Marusak con-
ducted a compliance monitoring inspection at the Pampa
Plant, during which he and the TACB evaluated whether
Pampa was in compliance with the benzene NESHAP.
Dr. Marusak’s Compliance Monitoring Report concluded
that Pampa was exempt because it had reduced its “con-
sumption of benzene to less than 1,000 Mg per year.”
This report was received and approved by Dr. Marusak’s
supervisors at EPA Region VI.”!

As discussed later in this opinion, the Company did
not communicate with EPA about an exemption specifi-
cally for the Celriver Plant until 1989. The facts reveal,
however, that it was confirmed to the Company by EPA
representatives that Hoeschst Celanese’s other plants
Which used benzene in identical processes were exempt.
Although the Company did not formally apply to the EPA
for an exemption for Celriver, it did so indirectly through
its communications with EPA regarding its Texas plants,
which used essentially the same process as Celriver.
Therefore, the court declines to accept the EPA’s asser-
tion that a formal application was a necessary prerequisite
to qualifying for the exemption and concludes that the
communications with EPA were sufficient to qualify for
an exemption for the Celriver Plant.

IV.

The second issue before the court is whether Hoechst
Celanese received fair notice of the government’s inter-
pretation of the benzene NESHAP exemption, as re-
quired under constitutionally based principles of due

In addition to these two Texas plants, Hoechst Celanese also
operated the Celeo Plant in Virginia. In 1984, Virginia’s State
Air Pollution Control Board confirmed that the Celco Plant was
exempt from the NESHAP based on a single counting of benzene
at the plant site.

58a

process. Hoechst Celanese is not liable and is not sub-
ject to penalties if the multiple counting interpretation
described and deferred to above™ is not “ascertainably
certain” from the regulatory language and the Adminis-
trator’s statements in promulgating the rule. See General
Electric, 53 F.3d at 1328-29, 1333-34. For the reasons
discussed below, the court determines that Hoechst Cel-
anese is not liable and is not subject to penalties.

A. The “Fair Notice’ Standard ™

Where an agency has provided no pre-enforcement
warning of its interpretation, the question facing a review-
ing court is “whether the regulated party received, or

12 During the past 12 years, the government has provided several
different, inconsistent articulations and applications of a multiple
counting approach. Hoechst Celanese argues that none of those is
a cogent explanation of how to apply a multiple counting approach in
a manner that will consistently provide the same result at the same
plant. In fact, although the government has calculated Celriver’s
“use” of benzene based on the benzene flow through two specific
internal pieces of equipment at that plant, it is not clear why the
government chose those particular pieces over the many other
flanges, valves, and other pieces of equipment in benzene service
at Celriver.

18 The government contends that Hoechst Celanese is in actuality
asserting a defense of estoppel. It is well-settled that estoppel gen-
erally does not run against the United States. Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990). This principle is
grounded on the separation of powers doctrine. U.S. v. Marine
Shale Processors, 1996 WL 185815 (5th Cir. 1996). (“Judicial
adoption of estoppel based on agency misrepresentation would ...
vest authority in [government] agents that Congress would be
powerless to constrain.”) “Fair notice” on the other hand, is a
principle rooted in the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (The due process clause “prevents defer-
ence from validating the application of a regulation that fails to
give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires.’”’). In
determining that Hoechst Celanese should not be sanctioned in this
case, the court relies on the fair notice doctrine, not principles of
estoppel.

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59a

should have received, notice of the agency’s interpretation
in the most obvious way of all: by reading the regula-
tions.” General Electric Co., 53 F.3d at 1329. Fair
notice is not provided unless a regulated party acting in
good faith is able to identify with “ascertainable cer-
tainty,” on the face of regulations and other public state-
ments issued by the agency, the standard to which the
regulating agency expects it to conform. Id. Without
such fair notice, the regulated entity does not commit a
wrong when it fails to meet the regulatory standard.

Unclear or ambiguous regulations do not provide the
requisite notice. If a violation of a regulation subjects pri-
vate parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation
cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but
did not adequately express. Gates & Fox, 790 F.2d 154,
156 (D.C. Cir. 1986), quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v.
OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976). The test is
“not what [the agency] might possibly have intended, but
what [was] said.” U.S. v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60
F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995) (brackets in Original).

A regulated party may also be found to have been
given fair notice of the agency’s interpretation in those
situations where, prior to the commencement of enforce-
ment efforts, the regulated party was given actual notice
of the interpretation. See General Electric. Co., 53 F.3d
at 1329. However, such notice must be an “authoritative
interpretation of the regulation” from the regulating
agency. Gates & Fox Co., 790 F.2d at 157.

Particularly compelling evidence that fair notice of a
rule has not been given exists where the agency itself has
not provided a definitive or consistent reading of the regu-
lation. See, e.g., General Electric Co., 53 F.3d at 1332:
Diamond Roofing Co., 528 F.2d at 649. When the
“agency itself is uncertain of the meaning of its regula-
tion” and “agency personnel give conflicting advice to pri-
vate parties about how to comply with it,” it is “arbitrary

60a

to find the regulation ‘clear.’” Rollins v. Envtl. Services
v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Due process concerns are clearly raised when unpub-
lished “clarifying” interpretations cause the regulatory lan-
guage and published guidance to be misleading. Mislead-
ing regulatory language, even if “clarified” with the best
of intentions, is itself an ongoing cause of noncompliance
and confusion. Unlike the unpublished clarification, the
Official :anguage is clearly authoritative and available to
the public. Only the agency can amend the regulation
and publish guidance when correcting an “accident” to
ensure that they clearly communicate the meaning that
will be enforced. Awarding penalties where the problem
is the language chosen by the agency, rather than any un-
willingness to comply would only “delay the day when

. regulations will be written in clear and concise lan-
guage” so that regulated parties “will be better able to
understand and observe them.” Diamond Roofing Co. v.
OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 650 (5th Cir. 1976).

B. Information in the Regulatory Record

Even though the court has deferred to the EPA’s inter-
pretation of the NESHAP exemption as permitting a mul-
tiple counting of recycled benzene, the court believes that
the regulatory record in this case “* does not provide fair
notice of that interpretation. Indeed, Hoechst Celanese
has provided numerous examples of ways in which rule-

'4 The record includes the rule itself, the Preamble, and documents
referred to and incorporated into the Preamble as part of the Ad-
ministrator’s further description and interpretation of the regula-
tion. See 5 U.S.C. §551(4) (definition of “rule” in the APA); 44
U.S.C. §1507(4) (contents of the Federal Register “shall be
judicially noticed”). Never having been superseded by a subsequent
rulemaking, the Preamble is as much a current statement of what
the regulation means today as it was when the benzene NESHAP
was published on June 6, 1984. It provides evidence of the Admin-
istrator’s intent. See State cf Vermont v. Thomas, 850 F.2d 99,
103 (2nd Cir. 1988).

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6la

making record statements fail to give notice of a multiple
count meaning. These examples and the court’s analysis
thereof, have been set forth on pages 19-21 of this memo-
randum opinion and order.

Additionally, Hoechst Celanese provides an affidavit
from Robert Ajax, Chief of the EPA unit that actually
developed the benzene NESHAP. Mr. Ajax states that
EPA chose to have the exemption on benzene “use,”
based on single counting, because it was an easy-to-apply
surrogate for the cost-effectiveness policy that EPA wanted
the exemption to implement. It is “unequivocally clear,”
Mr. Ajax says, that “internal recycle”’—i.e., multiple
counting—was never “considered [nor suggested as the
basis for the NESHAP exemption.”

Similarly, the rulemaking record is inconsistent con-
cerning EPA’s claim that a multiple counting approach
would ensure that facilities with low fugitive emissions or
few pieces of equipment in benzene service would be ex-
empt while those with higher emissions and more equip-
ment would be subject to the NESHAP. As noted in At-
tachment F of Hoechst Celanese’s Initial Brief, under the
government’s approach, some very large emitters of ben-
zene would be exempt and some plants with very low emis-
sions and very few pieces of equipment in benzene service
would not be exempt.

In addition, the rulemaking record is somewhat incon-
sistent as to EPA’s claim that it intended to exempt only
small sources. The Preamble shows that EPA also in-
tended to exempt users of small amounts of benzene—a
category that would include all those that recycled ben-
zene as a solvent or quenching agent, as was done at
Hoechst Celanese’s Celriver Plant and at the pharmaceuti-
cal facility described by—and declared to be exempt in—
the NESAP Preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. 23510 (June 6,
1984).

'® According to Hoechst Celanese, when EPA was developing its
benzene NESHAP, refineries and feedstock users of benzene pro-

62a

In this regard, the court also finds compelling that in
the months (and years) following promulgation of the
NESHAP, because of the confusion precipitated by EPA
staffers’ conflicting internal communications, various EPA
offices understood the exemption in a variety of different
ways."° In fact, the record in this case establishes that on
various occasions from 1984 through at least 1990, EPA
advised some facilities that they were exempt based on a
single counting of recycled benzene and in other cases,
EPA did not dispute state exemption decisions based on
single counting. If the rulemaking record did not give
EPA staffers notice of a multiple counting interpretation,
it cannot reasonably be said that Hoechst Celanese should
have understood that to be what the Administrator meant.

The court concludes from all this that although the
multiple counting approach is reasonable enough to be
sustained when deference is given to the government’s
present interpretation, the regulatory language and admin-
istrative record do not afford sufficient notice of the EPA
interpretation.

C. Actual Notice from Events in 1984-1986

EPA argues that, apart from anything contained in the
public record, Hoechst Celanese had actual notice that
EPA was interpreting the benzene NESHAP exemption
as requiring a multiple counting of recycled benzene. Ac-
cording to EPA, this defeats Hoechst Celanese’s reliance
on a “fair notice” defense. EPA’s actual notice argu-

duced or consumed millions of megagrams of benzene annually, In
contrast, those that recycled benzene as a solvent or quenching agent
—as Hoechst Celanese’s Celriver Plant did—collectively used or
consumed a total of only 1,500 megagrams annually.

'® Hoechst Celanese points out that at least some of that confu-
sion was generated by EPA staff’s issuance of guidance documents
that contradicted the Administrator’s clear language in the benzene
NESHAP Preamble (calling for single counting) and tried to de-
velop alternative approaches.

|
.
;

63a

ments are based largely on the previously described events
that occurred in Texas after promulgation of the NESHAP,
in particular Hoechst Celanese’s receipt of a copy of the
Texaco letter, which stated that the word “use” was to
mean the “total quantity in use at a facility.” "" Although
the Texaco letter cannot reasonably be said to have pro-
vided Hoechst Celanese with actual notice that its benzene
usage was to be determined by multiple counting,’* EPA
argues that the Texaco letter did give Hoechst Celanese
notice that the Agency did not intend to equate “use” with
“consumption” and that, in turn, should have prompted
Hoechst Celanese to ask EPA staff—rather than the
TACB-——whether its plants were exempt. Instead of seek-
ing such confirmation, the government suggests that
Hoechst Celanese chose to remain ignorant of EPA’s read-
ing of the regulation.

The court disagrees. This argument ignores that
Hoechst Celanese sought—and received—confirmation of
the exempt status of its plants from both State regulators

'’ The government attaches significant weight to a handwritten
phrase at the top of Hoechst Celanese’s copy of the Texaco letter
which stated “Read it and Weep”. The words were written by Mr.
Garza and the memo was sent to Jim Mullins, Garza’s counterpart
at Hoechst Celanese’s Pampa Plant. The government maintains
that this comment is affirmative proof that Mr. Garza knew that
EPA had adopted the multiple counting approach. After reviewing
this letter as a whole, the court declines to make this bold presump-
tion. Rather, the court finds that the most plausible explanation for
this comment was that Mr. Garza read this letter to mean that the
EPA might be reading the exemption as calling for an evaluation
of the overall quantity of benzene used at a plant—that is, the
plant’s consumption of benzene plus the amount of benzene in
service at the plant. Mr. Garza testified that he believed this
approach would not affect his plant, but would affect Mr. Mullins’
Pampa Plant and thus, would require his colleague to work harder.

‘8 Hoechst Celanese points out that according to the testimony
of both the author of the EPA Region VI letter and the recipient
of that letter, neither read it as saying that “use” is to be deter-
mined based on a multiple counting benzene at a plant site.

64a

and EPA Region VI. In fact, Hoechst Celanese received
a copy of the Texaco letter only because the Company
went to the appropriate agency (the TACB*) and asked
it to confirm the exemption’s applicability. TACB re-
sponded to Hoechst Celanese’s inquiry only after firs

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1292%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
