# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Harris County Appraisal District v. Virginia Indonesia Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1996
- **Citation:** 518 U.S. 1004

## Text

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BS 1528 MAR 20 199%
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LLL, SLA EN ET eR EEE IESE
NO.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

Petitioners,

Vv.

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY,
Respondent.

Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To
The Supreme Court of Texas

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KENNETH WALL

Three Allen Center, Suite 3485
333 Clay Street

Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone (713) 759-0696
Fax (713) 759-0342

March 20, 1996
Counsel of Record for Petitioners

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether the Import - Export Clause prohibits
state and local ad valorem property taxation of goods in
transit in the stream of export even if the tax offends none of
the policies underlying the Clause, a question which the
Court has deferred deciding. Department of Revenue v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S.
734, 757 n.23 (1978).

y Whether an ad valorem property tax usurps the
Federal Government’s ability to “speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments”
for the sole reason that it is levied on goods in transit in the
stream of export.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: sock 3G Hew OOS bar i‘
TABLE OF COMINGS .... ..n:cilacand. erwin cst Su ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .... .@iiiiecs, iti
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........ l
OPINIONS BELOW: 2.6 cséiick. Linea. wtsias i
JURISDICTION . nce cc cesses ce se tA NN 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ..... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CABE .. 2. ccc ccs 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 9
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APUG OD gins + bab sie 6 tee 22a
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE
Barclays Bank PLC vy. Franchise Tax Board,
U.S. : , 114 S.Ct.
SED bo. Heb Be: BE cok PHEW BN a e's 13

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
Co ee Oe a are 5, 11-13

Department of Revenue v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S.

TE ees 6 co we MOVIE. Ce ee i, 6, 11, 13
Empressa Siderurgica v. County of Merced,

Bee es ME Ss PRE Rw ce wes 7
Itel Containers International Corporation v.

Huddleston, 507 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1095,
RIE Fe eae 6, 11, 12

Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los Angeles,
a 5, 12

Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co..,
ES 0:7, 43

Louisiana Land and Exploration Company. v.

Pilot Petroleum Corporation. 900 F.2d 816

(Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
eee 7, 8

Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Company,
a a a a 9

iV

Low v. Austin,
oF Wes ie ee BA, EE CROTED Conk és 0 ee hae 9

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 US: Zre (ieee: tas Va 04 OT Sack ae 6-13

Richfield Oil Corporation v. State Board of
Education, 329 U.S. @B CIDSB) ow we tt ee 6, 7

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES

Federal

U.S. CONST. artidy §BycloeOics. 2 ccs eervice 4
ie Ree oe BS Saree oe 13
U.S. CONST.t. OC Mi. 2... 824 Vas 2,3
ee Sins © APO 6 Oe RO ee 2
Texas

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1992) ..... 3
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6.41, 41.41 (Vernon 1992 and
Vernal Supp. 3996)-02604 sitiaciaR ees bea Lanvin 3
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon 1992) ....5

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01, 42.21 et seq. (Vernon
1992 and Vernon Supp. 1996) ..............6.. 4

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.23 (Vernon 1992) ....4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

Petitioners,

Vv.

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY,
Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To
the Supreme Court Of Texas

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners, Harris County Appraisal District and
Harris County Appraisal Review Board, respectfully pray that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion
of the Supreme Court of Texas, entered in the above-entitled
proceeding on October 27, 1995.

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas is

reported at 910 S.W. 2d 905 and is reprinted in the Appendix
hereto, p.49a, infra.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourteenth District of Texas is reported at 871 S.W. 2d 864
and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto, p. 49a, infra.

2

The judgment of the 333rd Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Texas has not been reported. It is reprinted
in the Appendix hereto, p.96a, infra.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Texas entered its judgment on
October 27, 1995 reversing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas and rendering
judgment in favor of respondent and against petitioners.

On December 22, 1995, the Supreme Court of Texas
overruled petitioners’ timely filed motion for rehearing. See
p. 78a, infra.

Petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to
review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
United States Constitution, Article I, § 10, cl. 2

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
LM -0 as

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an ad valorem property tax case in which the
Supreme Court of Texas held that the Import - Export
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, prohibits ad valorem
property taxation of goods in transit in the stream of export.

3

Petitioner, Harris County Appraisal District, is a
political subdivision of the State of Texas responsible for
appraising property within its boundaries for ad valorem tax
purposes. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1992).
Appraisal districts in Texas do not levy taxes. Rather, they
furnish appraisal rolls listing taxable property to units of
government within their boundaries which impose ad valorem
property taxes. Petitioner, Harris County Appraisal Review
Board, is a separate legal entity whose responsibilities
include determination of property owner protests. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. §§ 6.41, 41.41 (Vernon 1992 and Vernon Supp.
1996). Respondent, Virginia Indonesia Company, is a
Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Texas.
For convenience, this petition refers to petitioner, Harris
County Appraisal District, as “district”, to petitioner, Harris
County Appraisal Review Board, as “board”, and to
respondent as “VICO.”

The parties do not dispute the material facts. VICO
is the operator of an Indonesian joint venture that explores
for oil and gas in the Republic of Indonesia. It purchases
goods for use by the joint venture from vendors throughout
the United States. Upon notification that certain goods are
needed, VICO issues a request for quotation to an Indonesian
purchasing agent which forwards the request to another agent
who solicits bids. VICO evaluates the bids and selects the
vendor. VICO’s standard purchase order is marked
“FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER” and states “Ultimate
destination for all items on this order is Indonesia.”
Generally the vendors ship the goods directly to an
independent export packer in Houston, Texas. The goods
are committed to export to Indonesia at the time of purchase
and are never used in Texas or any other state.

At the export packer’s yard in Houston, the goods are
inspected for quality and correctness. If the goods are

4

damaged or otherwise incorrect, VICO or its export packer
resolves the irregularities with the vendor. VICO then
requests approval from Indonesia to import the goods. When
import approval is granted, an international inspection agency
in Houston inspects the goods on behalf of Indonesia. Local
inspection enables the goods to avoid customs inspection
upon their arrival in Indonesia. VICO’s export packer then
packs the goods for shipment. A separate freight forwarder,
not related to the export packer, arranges for shipment of the
goods. The freight forwarder notifies the export packer
when and where to deliver the goods for shipment.

Most items are exported within 45 days of their
arrival at the export packer’s yard. In some cases, however,
goods may remain with the export packer for 90 days or
longer. VICO has goods at the export packer’s yard
throughout the year.

Prior to 1991, the district exempted VICO’s goods in
its export packer’s yard from taxation. In 1991, the district
determined that the goods were taxable and notified VICO
that the appraised value of its property as of January 1, 1991
was $380,260.00. VICO protested the taxability of its goods
before the board. The board, by written order following
hearing, determined the protest in favor of the district and
adverse to VICO.

VICO then brought suit against district and board in
the 333rd Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas
under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01, 42.21 ef seq.
(Vernon 1992 and Vernon Supp. 1996). See p. 80a, infra.
Judicial review of an appraisal review board order
determining a property owner’s protest is by trial de novo.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.23 (Vernon 1992). VICO
alleged that taxation of its property violated the Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Import - Export

5

Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, and various
provisions of Texas law not applicable here. See pp. 87a-

92a, infra.

Ail parties moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted VICO’s motion and entered its final judgment
in favor of VICO and against district and board. See p. 96a,
infra. In its final judgment, the trial court held that VICO’s
property is immune from taxation under the Import - Export
and Commerce Clauses and the Texas Tax Code. District
and board appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
judgment and remanded the case to that court for
determination of the amount of exemption to which VICO
was entitled under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon
1992). See p. 77a, infra. The court of appeals, however,
held that taxation of VICO’s goods violated neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Import - Export Clause.

VICO contended that its goods were in transit in the
stream of export and were, therefore, immune from state and
local property taxation under both the Commerce Clause and
Import - Export Clause. The court of appeals heid that the
Supreme Court of the United States has abandoned the
“mechanical in transit” analysis of state taxation under the
Commerce Clause. The court of appeals applied the six-part
test established by the Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and Jay .1 Line, Lid. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).

Taxation of VICO’s goods did not run afoul of the
Commerce Clause because the tax was applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus to the State of Texas, was fairly
apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate

6

commerce, was fairly related to services provided by the
State of Texas, did not create a substantial risk of multiple
international taxation, and did not prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice when regulating
international commercial relations. See pp.55a-59a, infra.

The court of appeals likewise rejected VICO’s
argument that its goods were immune from taxation under
the Import - Export Clause because they were in transit in
the stream of export. The court of appeals applied the
modern Import - Export Clause approach first announced by
the Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976). Prior to Michelin, the Court’s analysis of state taxes
under the Import - Export Clause focused on the status of the
goods being taxed as “imports” or “exports.” Goods were
“exports,” and immune from state taxation, if they had
entered the “export stream” in a continuous journey out of
the country. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417
U.S. 62, 70-71 (1974); Richfield Oil Corporation v. State
Board of Education, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).

Michelin changed the Court’s focus from the status of
the goods as “imports” or “exports” to the nature of the tax
as an “impost” or “duty.” If the tax offended none of the
purposes underlying the Clause, the Import - Export Clause
did not preclude the tax. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286, 293.
Although Michelin involved a tax on imported goods, the
Court extended its approach to exports in Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978).

Although neither Michelin nor Washington
Stevedoring involved taxation of goods in transit, the court
of appeals held that the question of the applicability of the
Michelin analysis to a state tax on goods in transit was
resolved by this Court’s recent decision in /tel Containers

7

International Corporation v. Huddleston, 507 U.S.
113 S.Ct. 1095, 1106 (1993). See p. 60a, infra. Since the
tax at issue offended none of the policies underlying the
Clause, it was not prohibited by the Import - Export Clause.

VICO sought discretionary review of the opinion and
judgment of the court of appeals in the Supreme Court of
Texas. The supreme court granted VICO’s application for
writ of error to the court of appeals, reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals, and rendered judgment that VICO’s
property was immune from taxation under the Import -
Export Clause. See p. 21a, infra. Two justices dissented.
See p. 22a, infra. The Supreme Court of Texas decided the
case solely on Import - Export Clause grounds. It did not
reach VICO’s additional arguments that the tax violated the
Commerce Clause or the Texas Tax Code. There is no
independent state law basis for its decision.

Although it recognized the change in focus of Import
- Export Clause analysis originated by the Michelin decision,
the supreme court applied the “stream of export rule” to
taxation of VICO’s goods. It did so because this Court has
not expressly overruled the pre-Michelin line of cases holding
that taxation of goods in transit in the stream of export
violates the Import - Export Clause. See p. 13a, infra;
Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974);
Empressa Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154
(1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,
329 U.S. 69 (1946); see also, Louisiana Land and
Exploration Company v. Pilot Petroleum Corporation., 900
F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 (1990).

The court held that VICO’s goods were in transit in
the stream of export at the time of their taxation. Because
the goods were in transit, their taxation violated the Import -
Export Clause. See p. 18a, infra. Although district and

8

board vigorously contested the “in transit” status of the
goods, they accept, for purposes of this petition, the lower
court’s determination of the issue.

The court further held that taxation of VICO’s goods
was contrary to one of the purposes of the Import - Export
Clause identified by the Court in Michelin. Relying on
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company v. Pilot Petroleum
Corporation, 900 F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 897 (1990), the court found that the tax “impairs the
federal government’s ability to speak with one voice in
matters of foreign commerce.” See p. 18a, infra. Since the
tax is levied on exports that will become Indonesian
property, it may interfere with commercial relations with
Indonesia because Indonesia might buy its goods from other
countries or levy retaliatory taxes on its goods destined for
the United States.

The dissent would hold that the tax at issue is not
inconsistent with the policies advanced by the Import -
Export clause. See p. 24a, infra. According to the dissent,
the court’s “adherence to the ‘export stream’ rule as an
exclusive test conflicts with both the rule and the spirit of
Michelin.” See pp. 23a-24a, infra. According to the
dissent, foreign purchasers cannot reasonably expect to avoid
payment for governmental services benefiting their
purchases. See p. 43a, infra.

The dissent distinguished the tax at issue in this case
from that before the court in Louisiana Land . The tax in
Louisiana Land was an excise tax levied on aviation fuel.
The tax here is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
like the one before the Court in Michelin. Since the tax is
not contrary to the purposes of the Import - Export Clause
identified in Michelin, it does not violate the Clause.

9

The question presented was first raised by VICO in
the trial court. See p. 87a, infra. District and board raised
the @ sstion in the court of appeals. See p. 59a, infra.
VICO raised the question in the Supreme Court of Texas.
See p. 2a, infra. District and board again raised the question
in their motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court of Texas.
See p. 79a, infra.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The court below incorrectly decided an important
constitutional question: does the Import - Export Clause give
“bright line” immunity from state taxation to exports in
transit? Because this Court has not expressly overruled its
pre-Michelin decisions so holding, the Supreme Court of
Texas followed those decisions and struck down the tax at
issue. Beginning in 1976 with its Michelin decision, this
Court dramatically altered its Import - Export Clause analysis
of state taxation, and there is no reason why the Michelin
approach should not be applied to goods in transit.

In Michelin, the Court upheld against an Import -
Export Clause challenge a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax on an inventory of imported tires stored in a
wholesale distribution warehouse. Michelin, 423 U.S. at
279. It expressly overruled its decision in Low v. Austin, 13
Wall. 29, 20 L.Ed. 517 (1872), which held that the Import -
Export Clause prohibited ad valorem property taxation of
imported goods until they were no longer imports. In
Michelin, the Court changed the focus of its Import - Export
Clause analysis from whether the challenged tax was a tax on
“imports” to whether the tax was an “impost” or “duty”.
See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Company, 466 U.S. 353,
360 (1984).

10

In Michelin, the Court identified three principal
concerns of the Framers which underlie the Import - Export
Clause.

...[1] the Federal Government must speak
with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments . . .; [2]
import revenues were to be the major source
of revenue of the Federal Government and
should not be diverted to the States, and [3]
harmony among the States might be disturbed
unless seaboard states . . . were prohibited
from levying taxes on citizens of other States
by taxing goods merely flowing through their
ports to the other States... .

Michelin, 423 U.S. at 285-286.

A tax which does not create the evils at which the
Import - Export Clause is directed is not an “impost” or
“duty” prohibited by the Clause. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 293.
The nondiscrimin; ‘ory ad valorem property tax before the
Court in Michelin was not the type tax considered by the
Framers to be an “impost” or “duty,” and its prohibition
would not promote the purposes underlying the Import -
Export Clause. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 283, 293.

Like the tax upheld by the Court in Michelin, the tax
at issue here is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax.
The tax which the lower court struck down was, however,
levied not on imported goods no longer in transit but on
exports in transit in the stream of export. The Court noted
that to the extent a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property
conflicts with the Import - Export Clause purpose of
prohibiting taxes which may be imposed only because of a
State’s peculiar geographic location, the Clause may prohibit

11

a tax on goods merely in transit through the taxing state.
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290.

Two years after its decision in Michelin, the Court
held that Michelin’s Import - Export Clause analysis applied
to taxation of exports as well as imports. Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978). The tax at issue in
Washington Stevedoring was imposed not on goods but on
the business of loading and unloading ships’ cargo, both
imports and exports. The Court specifically declined to
reach the question of Michelin’s application to goods in
transit, imports or exports, deferring decision until faced
with appropriate facts. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at
757 n.22. The Court also noted that a tax on goods in transit
would not be valid “under traditional Commerce Clause
analysis.” (emphasis added) Perhaps the Court foresaw the
dramatic change in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
began the following term. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

Since Michelin, the Court has not decided an Import -
Export Clause case involving ad valorem property taxation
of goods in transit. It has not, therefore, been required to
decide whether the Michelin approach applies in such cases.
Although it has not decided the question, it has recently
implied that Michelin altered its prior approach to taxation of
exports in transit. /tel Containers International Corporation
v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1095, 1106
(1993).

The “bright line” rule of Import - Export Clause tax
immunity for goods in the stream of export may have the
virtue of simplicity. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co.,
417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974). There is little, if anything, else to
commend it after Michelin. So long as the tax in issue does

12

not offend its purposes, the Import - Export Clause should
not be a barrier.

That is not to say, however, that the in transit
character of taxed goods is immaterial. As pointed out by
the dissent in the lower court, taxed goods’ presence in a
taxing unit may be so transitory that the tax constitutes
nothing more than a transit fee. See p. 40a, infra; see also,
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290. Further, depending upon the
circumstances, taxation of goods in transit may fail to satisfy
the Commerce Clause requirements of nexus and fair
relationship to services provided. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

The tax at issue here, even though imposed on goods
in the stream of export, did not offend any of the purposes
underlying the Import - Export Clause. The first policy
consideration identified by Michelin, the ability of the
Federal Government to speak with “one voice” when
regulating international commercial relations, is the same as
the “one voice” component of the Foreign Commerce Clause
test established by Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), Itel Containers Internatinal
Corporation v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. BAe et.
1095, 1150 (1993). The lower court believed the tax
transgressed the “one voice” policy of the Clause. See p.
18a, infra. It was concerned that, because of the increased
cost of goods resulting from the tax, Indonesia might buy its
goods from other countries. Further, Indonesia might levy
retaliatory taxes on goods it exports to the United States.
See p. 20a., infra.

Of course, the lower court would have allowed the
tax if the goods were not in the stream of export. Had they
been taxed prior to entry into the stream of export, their cost
to Indonesia would reflect that tax resulting in the same

ADoser astra

13

potential harm which the lower court found in this case.
Further, Congress, not the courts, is given the power to
regulate foreign commerce. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Board, __U.S. - , 114 S.Ct. 2268, 2285
(1994). Neither VICO nor the lower court has identified any
Congressional policy which might prohibit the tax. See /tel,
507 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 1105.

The second policy underlying the Import - Export
Clause, protection of federal revenues, is not implicated by
a tax on exports because the Constitution prohibits federal
taxation of exports. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5;
Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978).

The third policy identified by Michelin, preservation
of state harmony, parallels the four-prong Commerce Clause
test established by Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977). Itel, 507 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 1105-
06. VICO has goods on hand at its export packer throughout
the year. They receive governmental services, particularly
fire and police protection. See p. 45a, infra. There is no
indication in the record that VICO pays more than its fair
share for the services received.

Where, as here, a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax on goods in the stream of export offends none
of the policies underlying the Clause, the courts should not
apply a “bright line” rule whose sole virtue is its simplicity
to invalidate a tax on Import - Export Clause grounds.

14
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court should grant this
petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

KENNETH WALL

Three Allen Center, Suite 3485
333 Clay Street

Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone (713) 759-0696
Fax (713) 759-0342

March 20, 1996 Counsel of Record for Petitioners

la

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

No. 94-0245

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
RESPONDENTS

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Argued on December 15, 1994

JUSTICE CORNYN delivered the opinion of the
Court in which CHIEF JUSTICE PHILLIPS, JUSTICE
GONZALEZ, JUSTICE HIGHTOWER, JUSTICE ENOCH,
JUSTICE SPECTOR, and JUSTICE BAKER join.

JUSTICE HECHT, joined by JUSTICE OWEN,
dissenting.

In this case we consider whether goods purchased by
the Virginia Indonesia Company (VICO) on behalf of an
Indonesian joint venture are exempt from a state ad valorem
tax. The trial court granted VICO’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the goods are exempt from
taxation under the import-export and commerce clauses of

2a

the United States Constitution and under section 11.01 of the
Texas Tax Code. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (import-export)
& art. 1, § 8 (commerce). The court of appeals reversed.
871 S.W.2d 864. We reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and render judgment that the tax at issue violates the
import-export clause of the United States Constitution.

VICO, a Delaware corporation, is the operator and
agent for an Indonesian oil and gas exploration joint venture.
As one of its duties as operator, VICO purchases goods from
vendors throughout the United States on behalf of the joint
venture. Pursuant to a production sharing agreement
between the joint venture and Pertamina, a state enterprise of
the Republic of Indonesia, the goods become the property of
Pertamina upon arrival in Indonesia. WICO is reimbursed
for its costs, but it receives no additional compensation.

VICO uses a standard purchase order marked
"FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER" that includes the notation
"Ultimate destination for all items on this order is
Indonesia." At the time of purchase, the goods are
committed to foreign export and cannot thereafter be diverted
to domestic use. The goods are transported from the vendors
directly to an independent export packer in Houston, Harris
County, Texas. Upon arriving at the export packer’s
facility, the goods are checked to confirm that the proper
items were shipped, and that they meet specifications
required for import to Indonesia. Any dispute over the items
are resolved at that time. VICO then requests approval from
Indonesia to import the goods. When approval is granted, an
international inspection agency inspects the goods on behalf
of Indonesia and clears the goods for shipment. The goods
are then packed and shipped abroad on the next available
vessel.

3a

In most instances, the goods remain with the export
packer no longer than 45 days while these procedures are
being performed. In exceptional cases, however, this period
may be somewhat longer: if the goods received from the
vendor are damaged or defective, or if VICO encounters
problems obtaining approval for import to Indonesia, the
goods may remain with the export packer for up to 175 days.
VICO has some quantity of goods present at the export
packer’s facility year-round.

For the tax years 1989 and 1990, VICO was granted
an exemption from ad valorem taxation for its personal
property in Harris County. In September 1991, VICO was
notified by the Harris County Appraisal District that its
estimated ad valorem tax liability for 1991 was $8,441.74,
which was based on a $380,260.00 appraisal of VICO’s
property at the export packer’s facility on January 1, 1991.
VICO timely protested the tax assessment, including the
appraised value, to the Harris County Appraisal Review
Board. The Review Board affirmed, and VICO filed suit in
district court against the Appraisal District and the Review
Board (collectively, Harris County).

In its motion for summary judgment, VICO argued
that its goods are merely in transit through Texas and that
they are therefore immune from state taxation under the
import-export and commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution. WVICO further argued that its goods are not
subject to the state’s taxing authority because they do not
meet the criteria of Texas Tax Code § 11.01(c). The trial
court granted VICO’s motion for summary judgment on both
grounds. The court of appeals reversed, holding that VICO
failed to conclusively prove the existence of either federal or
State grounds for an exemption from the ad valorem tax.
871 S.W.2d at 871.

4a

Our summary judgment standard is well established.
The movant must show that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.,
690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). If the movant
establishes the right to judgment, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to raise a fact issue that would preclude summary
judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589
S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). In deciding whether there is
a disputed material fact issue, we regard evidence favorable
to the nonmovant as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49.

I

The import-export clause of the United States
Constitution provides:

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its Inspection Laws... .

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.

Historically, the United States Supreme Court decided
import-export clause challenges by focusing on the nature of
the goods, that is, whether the tax-burdened goods were
imports or exports. Under the "original package" doctrine,
goods were deemed to be imports, and hence immune from
state and local taxation, as long as they retained their original
form or package of import. Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29, 34
(1871) (holding that French champagne, which had been
stored in its “original cases, unbroken and unsold” since its
importation, was immune from a nondiscriminatory state
property tax); see also Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v.

Sa

Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933); Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).

Whereas the original package doctrine applied to
imports, the "stream of export" doctrine controlled exports.’
Under this doctrine, goods are not subject to state taxation
once exportation has commenced, which occurs when goods
"have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for
transportation to another State, or have been started upon
such transportation in a continuous route or journey." Coe
v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886). The mere intent to
export is not enough, Empresa Siderurgica v. County of
Merced, 337 U.S., 154, 157 (1949); the goods must begin
their "physical entry into the stream of exportation."
Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71
(1974); see also Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 81-83 (1946). Once exportation
has begun, goods retain their "export" status, and thus
remain exempt from state taxation as long as they are in
transit. Temporary interruptions "due to the necessities of
the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience in
the course of the movement" do not break the continuity of
transit; however, stoppages that serve the owner’s business
purpose interrupt the goods’ continuity of transit, rendering
them subject to the taxing power of the state. Minnesota v.
Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1933). The continued validity of
the stream of export doctrine is of prime importance in this
case.

In the seminal case of Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 301 (1976), the United States Supreme Court
altered its approach to import-export clause challenges and

' This doctrine, which analyzes whether the goods are in transit at
the time of taxation, has been developed under both the import-export and
commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution.

6a

rejected the original package doctrine of Low v. Austin. See
generally Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages;
Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV.
99 (explaining Michelin). The issue in Michelin was whether
Georgia could assess a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on
imported goods held in the taxpayer’s warehouse. Rejecting
the argument that the tax was unconstitutional simply because
it burdened goods in their original packages, the Michelin
court concentrated on whether the tax offended any of the
three policies underlying the import-export clause:

[(1)] the Federal Government must speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign government, and tariffs, which might affect
foreign relations, could not be implemented by the
States consistently with that exclusive power; [(2)]
import revenues were to be the major source of
revenue of the Federal Government and should not be
diverted to the States; and [(3)] harmony among the
States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with
their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from
levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing
goods merely flowing through their ports to the other
States not situated as favorably geographically.

423 U.S. at 285-86 (footnotes omitted). Addressing the first
of these concerns, the Court determined that the tax levied on
the taxpayer’s goods did not impede the federal government’s
power to speak with “one voice" explaining that:

[b]y definition, such [nondiscriminatory property
taxation] does not fall on imports as such because of
their place of origin. It cannot be used to create
special protective tariffs or particular preferences for
certain domestic goods, and it cannot be applied
selectively to encourage or discourage any

Ta

importation in a manner inconsistent with federal
regulation.

Id. at 286. Nor, the Court held, did the tax offend the
second policy concern which implicates only the federal
government’s right to the revenue raised from taxes assessed
on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into the
United States. Id. at 286-87 (stating that nondiscriminatory
ad valorem taxation "deprives the Federal Government of
nothing to which it is entitled").

Finally, the Court held that the tax did not interfere
with the harmony among the states policy. The
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax at issue, explained the
Court, was simply "a quid pro quo for benefits actually
conferred by the taxing State." Jd. at 289. The Court
reasoned that the taxpayer’s imported goods, like all other
property within the taxing jurisdiction, benefit from the
provision of local services such as police and fire protection,
and that the import-export clause was not designed to shield
such goods from paying their fair share for these services.
Id. The Court, however, qualified its holding in the
following words:

[T]he Clause was fashioned to prevent the imposition
of exactions which were no more than transit fees on
the privilege of moving through a State. A
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax obviously
stands on a different footing, and to the extent there
is any conflict whatsoever with this purpose of the
Clause, it may be secured merely by prohibiting the
assessment of even nondiscriminatory property taxes
on goods which are merely in transit through the
State when the tax is assessed.

8a

Id. at 290 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted). This
qualification was not implicated in Michelin because the
Court determined that the taxpayer’s goods “were no longer
in transit.” Id. at 302. Having concluded that the Georgia
tax did not impinge on any of the three policies underlying
the import-export clause, the Court upheld its
constitutionality.

The next year, the United States Supreme Court
applied Michelin’s analytic framework in Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington stevedoring Cos. , 435
U.S. 734 (1977).? In that case, the State of Washington
assessed a business and occupation tax on stevedoring, the
business of loading and unloading cargo from ships.
Addressing the taxpayer’s import-export clause challenge, the
Court concluded that the tax violated none of the policies
articulated in Michelin. The Court went on to consider the
significance of Michelin’s exception for in-transit goods:

The Court in Michelin qualified its holding with the
observation that Georgia had applied the property tax
to goods "no longer in transit." 423 U.S., at 302.
Because the goods were no longer in _ transit,
however, the Court did not have to face the question
whether a tax relating to goods in transit would be an
"Impost or Duty" even if it offended none of the
policies behind the Clause. Inasmuch as we now face
this inquiry, we note two distinctions between this
case and Michelin. First, the activity taxed here
occurs while imports and exports are in transit.

? The Michellin test applies with equal force to imports and exports.
Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 758. However, U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 9 forbids federal taxation of exports; therefore, the second “federal
revenue enhancement” policy in Michelin is not implicated in export tax
cases. Id.

9a

Second, however, the tax does not fall on the goods
themselves. This levy reaches only the business of
loading and unloading ships . . . . Despite the
existence of the first distinction, the presence of the
second leads to the conclusion that the Washington
tax is not a prohibited "Impost or Duty” when it
violates none of the policies.

435 U.S. at 755 (footnote omitted). Thus, drawing a
distinction between a direct tax on goods and a tax on the
business of handling goods, the Court upheld the stevedoring
tax. Jd. at 756-77 (stating that the “immunity of services
incidental to importing and exporting [is] not so broad as the
immunity of the goods themselves"). Because the tax did not
directly burden the goods, the Court expressly declined to
consider the applicability of the Michelin approach when a
State directly taxes imports or exports in transit. Jd. at 757
n.23.

Most recently, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a Tennessee sales tax on the rental of
leased cargo containers violated the policies underlying the
import-export clause. tel Containers Int’l Corp. vy.
Huddleston, 113 S.Ct. 1095 (1993). Because the containers
were used in the international shipping industry, the taxpayer
argued that the tax violated the import-export clause. The
Court concluded that the tax did not violate any of the
policies identified in Michelin, noting specifically that the tax
was not “a tax on importation or imported goods, but a tax
on a business transaction occurring within the taxing State."
Id. at 1106.

Just last year, we considered the impact of the import-
export clause on the scope of state taxing authority in
Diamond Shamrock, we assessed whether oil imported from
a foreign country directly into Texas, the state of its final

10a

destination, may be subject to state ad valorem taxation. Id.
at 298. The parties stipulated that the oil was in transit
through Nueces County at the time of taxation. The taxpayer
argued that the tax fell within Michelin’s “merely in transit"
qualification and was, thus, unconstitutional under the
import-export clause. We disagreed, stating:

[T]he Michelin Court’s qualification clearly applies
only to goods in transit through the state to or from
another state and not to goods merely in transit within
the only state the goods ever enter.

Id. at 301 (citing Robert C.W. Frantz, Comment,
Constitutional Law--Nondiscriminatory Ad Valorem Tax May
Be Applied to Imports, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 197
(1976)). We then held that the third policy in Michelin,
preserving harmony among the states, was not implicated
because the imported oil was not transported to or from
another state. Jd. at 300-01. Rather, the imported oil
reached its first and final domestic destination upon arrival
in Texas. Thus, there was no risk of multiple taxation by
different states. Neither did we perceive that the tax could
conflict with either the “one voice" or "federal revenue
enhancement" policies articulated in Michelin, Id. at 301 n.3.
We expressly declined to reach the issue of whether the
import-export clause prohibits state taxation of goods passing
through Texas on their way to a foreign country. /d. at 299.

II

VICO argues that neither Michelin nor its progeny
have altered the fundamental rule that goods in the export
stream of commerce are exempt from taxation. Rather than
supplanting this doctrine, VICO urges that Michelin’s
qualification for in-transit goods, 423 U.S. at 286, requires
a threshold determination of whether the goods are merely in

lla

transit through the state at the time of taxation. If so, VICO
argues, the tax is unconstitutional, and it is unnecessary to
analyze whether the tax impinges upon the Michelin policies.
While Harris County acknowledges that the stream of export
doctrine has not been expressly overruled, it questions its
continued viability after Michelin. See Itel, 113 S.Ct. at
1106. Harris County urges this Court to apply the approach
set forth in Michelin, which, it argues, demonstrates that the
tax at issue undermines none of the clause’s underlying
policies.

The United States Supreme Court has yet to announce
whether the new approach set forth in Michelin should be
applied to a direct tax on imports or exports in transit.
Although the Michelin court rejected the original package
doctrine, it did not overrule Coe v. Errol or any of the
stream of export cases, and the two doctrines are different
enough that the rejection of one does not, of itself, signify
the demise of the other.

The sole relevant factor in the original package
doctrine was whether the goods’ original packaging remained
intact. This led to criticism that the doctrine tended to
produce superficial and disparate results. See Michelin, 423
U.S. at 282-83. The doctrine’s broad reach shielded not
only goods that were in import transit, but also goods that
were permanently situated within the state of their final
destination. As the Court wrote in Michelin, “[njothing in
the history of the Import-Export Clause even remotely
suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
which is also imposed on imported goods that are no longer
in import transit was the type of exaction that was regarded
as Objectionable by the Framers of the Constitution." 423
U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).

12a

In contrast, the definition of “exports” under the
stream of export doctrine has been much narrower,
encompassing only those goods that have commenced "an
actual movement into the stream of export." Kosydar v.
National Cash Register Co. , 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974). Unlike
its corollary, commentators have regarded the stream of
export doctrine as “commendably intelligible and consistent, "
see Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp v. Wages:
Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV.
99, 132, and just two years before Michelin, the United
States Supreme Court praised it. Kosydar, 417 U.S. at 71
("This is an instance, however, where we believe that
simplicity has its virtues."). As one commentator has noted,
“poth the language and the expressed purpose of the clause
as being designed to prohibit the seaboard States ‘from ...
taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to other
States,’ indicate that property taxes imposed on exports
awaiting shipment abroad ... were intended to be
proscribed." 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION 4 5.4 (1983) (quoting Michelin, 423 U.S. at
285-86).

Abandoning the original package doctrine "brought
import tax immunity into alignment with export tax
immunity" and eliminated what had previously been a wide
loophole to state taxation. Robert C.W. Frantz, Comment,
Constitutional Law--Nondiscriminatory Ad Valorem Tax May
be Applied To Imports, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 203
(1976); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that
the original package doctrine operated as a shield to state
taxation). Nonetheless, the rejection of the original package
doctrine does not compel the conclusion that the Michelin
court abandoned the rule of immunity for in-transit goods.
To the contrary, by explicitly articulating an exception for in-
transit goods, Michelin appears to preserve bright-line

13a

immunity for goods in the stream of export. Whether this is
indeed the case, however, remains uncertain because none of
the Court’s post-Michelin cases has involved a direct tax on
in-transit goods,’ and the Court has stated its preference to
“defer decision [on this issue] until a case with pertinent facts
is presented.” Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 757
n.23.

Faced with the decision of whether to apply the
stream of export rule or to abandon it, we choose the former.
In reaching this choice, we are mindful of the words of the
United States Supreme Court: “If a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [the lower
court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see also Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring). In light of the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has not overruled Coe v. Errol or any of its
progeny, we apply the long-standing rule that a tax on goods
in the export stream of commerce violates the import-export
clause.* See generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &

> The United States Supreme Court has carefully distinguished the
taxes at issue in Michelin, Washington Stevedoring, and Intel from one
that falls directly on in-transit goods. See Michelin, 423 U.S. at 302;
Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 755-757; Itel, 113 S.Ct. at 1106.

* This approach is consistent with that recently taken by the Fifth
Circuit in Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Pilot Petroleum
Corp. ,900 F.2d 816, 820-21 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 897
(1990). In that case, the Fifth Circuit relied on Richfield Oil Corp. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946), in striking down an
Alabama excise tax on oil ihe export stream of commerce. See
discussion infra part III.

l4a

JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTION
LAW § 13.2 (2d ed 1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (2d ed.
1988); 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION
q 5.4 (1983).

Ill

The question we now determine is whether VICO’s
goods were in the export stream of commerce when the tax
was addressed. VICO argues that exportation began when its
goods were shipped from the vendors to the export packer’s
facility and that the temporary stoppage of the goods in
Harris County did not break the continuity of transit.

In this case, it is clear that VICO’s goods entered the
export stream of commerce when they were shipped from the
vendors to the export packer’s facility in Harris County
because, at that point, the goods began their movement to a
precommitted foreign destination. See Kosydar, 417 U.S. at
70; Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 82-83 (holding that delivery of
oil into a storage tank of a foreign-bound steamer "marked
the commencement of the movement of the oil abroad"); A.
G. Spaulding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 68 (1923)
(holding that delivery of goods to an export carrier for
shipment abroad constituted a significant "step in
exportation"). The more difficult question before us is
whether the temporary stoppage of the goods at the export
packer’s facility disrupted the goods’ continuity of transit,
thus subjecting them to taxation in Harris County on January
1. It is the purpose of the stoppage that is important. See
Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366,
376-77 (1922). If the stoppage is attributable to the business
purpose of the owner, then the exportation is deemed to have
terminated, and the goods are subject to tax in the
jurisdiction of their stoppage. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290

15a

U.S. 1, 11-12 (1933). For instance, if goods are delayed for
the purpose of further processing or for storage pending the
receipt of orders, the goods are no longer in the stream of
commerce. See Bacon v. Illinois. 227 U.S. 504 (1913)
(holding that stoppage of grain for processing served owner’s
business purpose); Blasius, 290 U.S. at 12 (holding that
storage of inventory awaiting orders served owner’s business

purpose).

If, however, a stoppage is "due to the necessities of
the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience in
the course of the movement,” continuity of transit is not
interrupted, and the goods remain immune from taxation
throughout the stoppage. Blasius, 290 U.S. at 9-10. Delays
that are incidental to the journey and to a necessary change
in the mode of transportation do not affect the continuity of
transit. In Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S.
469 (1926), the United States Supreme Court considered
whether logs retained their in-transit status during a delay
between the time they floated down the river and the time
they were loaded on to a ship for further transport. In
concluding that the logs retained their in-transit status
throughout the stoppage, the Court stated:

The character of the shipment in such a case depends
upon all the evidential circumstances looking to what
the owner has done in the preparation for the journey
and in carrying it out. The mere power of the owner
to divert the shipment already started does not take it
out of interstate commerce is the other facts show that
the journey has already begun in good faith and
temporary interruption of the passage is reasonable
and in furtherance of the intended transportation ....

Id. at 475-76.

16a

This passage was later cited in Carson Petroleum Co.
v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1929). In that case, the
taxpayer transported oil, which was destined for foreign
export, by rail to the Louisiana coast. The oil was held in
a storage tank while awaiting the arrival of a ship. By
storing sufficient quantities of oil in the tanks, the taxpayer
was able to promptly deliver the oil on arrival of the ship,
thereby avoiding costly demurrage charges. The Court first
noted that "it would be impracticable to carry on the export
oil business by any other method.” /d. at 100. The Court
went on to question the precedential value of one of its
earlier cases, General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211
(1908), in which it had held that the temporary storage of
oil, which was necessitated by the practical constraints of
shipping and distributing oil, constituted a break in the
continuity of transit for business purposes. /d. at 104.
Having rejected the applicability of Crain,’ the Court then
noted that "[t]here has been a liberal construction of what is
continuity of the journey, in cases where the court finds from
the circumstances that export trade has been actually intended
and carried through, "id. at 105-06, and concluded that the
stored oil remained in transit during its stoppage in
Louisiana. Id. at 109.

5 The Court stated:

The [General Oil] court was divided and there was very
vigorous dissent. The case has caused discussion, and
it must be admitted that it is a close one and might
easily have been decided the other way. The result was
probably affected by the impression created by the
original situation and the somewhat artificial
rearrangement of tanks in a large entrepot for
redistribution of oil to avoid previous taxability.

Carson Petroleum, 279 U.S. at 105.

17a

Turning to the case before us, we are persuaded that
the stoppage of VICO’s goods in Harris County was
attributable to an exportation, not a business, purpose.
VICO purchases goods from vendors throughout the country
for the exclusive use of the Indonesian joint venture. From
the moment of purchase, VICO retains no control to divert
the goods from their precommitted foreign destination or to
sell the goods in a domestic market. Indeed, VICO has no
domestic market because it is not in the business of procuring
or marketing goods. Rather, VICO’s duty is simply to see
that the joint venture receives the goods necessary for its
operations abroad.

At the export packer’s facility, VICO checks the
goods to ensure they meet necessary specifications for import
into Indonesia, which enables VICO to resolve discrepancies
with its vendors prior to export. Harris County contends that
this activity serves VICO’s business purpose and, therefore,
breaks the goods’ continuity of transit. We disagree.
Indonesian law requires a pre-shipment inspection of the
quality and quantity of the imported goods by an independent
inspection agency selected by the Republic of Indonesia. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade Policy
Review - Indonesia, Vol. 1, pp. 79-82 (1991) (citing
Presidential Instruction No. 4 (1985)). We view VICO’s
examination of its goods as merely incidental to the
inspection mandated by Indonesian law. VICO’s goods are
also delayed pending approval for import by the Indonesian
government, a requirement that is outside of VICO’s control
and that serves no business purpose of VICO. Thereafter,
VICO’s goods are packaged for shipment, a step that must
occur after approval and inspection.

While in Harris County, VICO’s goods undergo only
those procedures -- inspection, approval for import to
Indonesia, and packaging -- required for exportation. See

18a

Carson Petroleum, 279 U.S. at 109 ([T]he selection of the
point of shipment and the equipment at that point were solely
for the speedy and continuous export of the product abroad
and for no other purpose."). VICO makes no profit from the
export of the goods, its role is simply to facilitate their
shipment abroad While we realize that the delay necessary
to perform these procedures is somewhat longer than that
which is generally associated with a "transportation" delay,
it is no longer than is necessary to get the goods on their way
to Indonesia, and consequently we are persuaded that under
these circumstances the delay is "due to the necessities of the
journey. "See Blasius, 290 U.S. at 9. Because we view the
presence if VICO’s goods in Harris County as a necessary
stoppage incident to their transportation abroad, we conclude
that, while at the export packer’s facility in Harris County,
VICO’s goods remain in the stream of export and immune
from state taxation.

Finally, under the circumstances of this case, the tax
imposed on VICO’s goods transgresses the “one voice”
policy of the import-export clause. On this issue, the Fifth
Circuit’s recent opinion in Louisiana Land and Exploration
Co. v. Pilot Petroleum Corp., 900 F.2d 816, 820-21 (Sth
Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 897 (1990), provides
guidance. Louisiana Land involved an Alabama excise tax
levied on jet fuel that was in transit for export to Canada.
Although the court noted th: . Michelin had marked a change
in the approach to import-..) A person is entitled to an exemption from
taxation of the appraised value of that portion of the
person's inventory or property consisting of freeport

65a

(i) The exemption provided by Subsection (b) does
not apply to a taxing unit that takes action to tax the
property under Article VIII, Section 1-j, Subsection
(b), of the Texas Constitution.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon 1992).

Significantly, the Texas Constitution was also
amended to provide a constitutional underpinning for the

statutory freeport goods exemption. Section 1-j of the Texas
Constitution provides:

(a) To promote economic development in the State,
goods, wares, merchandise, other tangible personal
property, and ores ... are exempt from ad valorem
taxation if:

(1) the property is acquired in or imported
into this State to be forwarded outside this State,
whether or not the intention to forward the property
outside this State is formed or the destination to
which the property is forwarded is specified when the
property is acquired in or imported into this State;

(2) the property is detained in this State for
assembling, storing, manufacturing, processing, or
fabricating purposes by the person who acquired or
imported the property; and

(3) the property is transported outside this
State not later than 175 days after the date the person
acquired or imported the property in this State.

66a

(6) Tangible personal property exempted from
taxation in Subsection (a) of this section is subject to
the following:

(1) A county, common, or independent school
district, junior college district, or municipality,
including a home-rule city, may tax such property
otherwise exempt, if the governing body of the
county, common, or independent school district,
junior college district, or municipality, including a
home-rule city, takes official action as provided by
this section and in the manner provided by law to
provide for the taxation of such property.

(2) Any official action to tax such exempt
property must be taken before April 1, 1990. If
official action is taken to tax such exempt property
before January 1, 1990, such property is taxable
effective for the tax year 1990. However, if such
official action to tax such exempt property is taken
prior to April 1, 1990, but after January 1, 1990, the
official action shall not become effective to tax such
property until the 1991 tax year.

(4) The governing body of a county,
common, or independent school district, junior
college district, or municipality, including a home-
rule city, that acts under Subdivision (2) of
Subsection (b) of this section to tax the property
otherwise exempt by Subsection (a) of this section
may subsequently exempt the property from taxation
by rescinding its action to tax the property. The
exemption applies to each tax year that begins after
the date the action is taken and applies to the tax year

67a

in which the action is taken if the governing body so
provides. A governing body that rescinds its action
to tax the property may not take action to tax such

TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-.

Under the prior law, then, the Texas legislature had
sought to clarify the meaning of “located in this state longer
than a temporary period” by establishing the freeport law
presumption, which Texas courts held to be subject to
rebuttal by application of federal constitutional principles.
However, as discussed earlier, in determining the
constitutionality of a state tax, current federal commerce and
import-export clause jurisprudence no longer focuses on
whether goods are “in interstate transit,” committed to the
“export stream,” or have retained their “status” as “imports”
or “exports.” We have found that current federal
constitutional law does not preclude Texas’ non-
discriminatory ad valorem property tax.

Under current Texas law, the legislature has replaced

the freeport law's rebuttable presumption with the freeport
goods exemption, which has been expressly validated by
amendment of the Texas Constitution. Therefore, under
present Texas tax law, the critical inquiries in judging the
validity of the 1991 property tax on VICO’s goods, are (1)
whether any eligible taxing entities “took official action to
tax" freeport goods prior to April 1, 1990, thereby
preempting the exemption, see TEX CONST. art. VIII, § 1-
j®)(1)&Q2), (2) whether VICO’s goods met the freeport
goods criteria, see id. § 1-j(a), and (3) whether VICO
applied for the exemption, see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §
11.43 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994).

68a

Did the taxing entities "Take Action to Tax" Freeport
Goods?

The notice of appraised value issued to VICO listed
nine taxing entities: the Aldine Independent Schod District,
Harris County Education District, Harris County, Harris
County Flood Control District, Port of Houston Authority,
Harris County Hospital District, Harris County Department
of Education, North Harris/Montgomery Communty College
District, and the City of Houston. The record doe: not show
(1) which of these taxing entities are political swdivisions
authorized to preempt the freeport goods exemption, see
TEX. CONST. art. VIE, § 1-j(>)(1), (2) which of the
eligible political subdivisions did, in fact, prempt the
freeport goods exemption by taking official action 0 tax such
property prior to April 1, 1990, see id. § 1-j(b)@) and (3)
which of the latter political subdivisions resciided their
action to tax, see id. § 1-j(b)(4). If an eligible ta:ing entity
did not exercise its option and take official action 0 tax such

Section 1-j(a) states that goods “are exempt from ad
valorem taxation” if the freeport goods criteria ar met. Jd.
§ 1j@ (emphasis added). _ Section 1-j() ‘tates that

69a

action to tax the property prior to April 1, 1990, and did not
subsequently rescind its action.

With respect to VICO’s motion for summary
judgment, as discussed below, VICO did not establish as a
matter of law that any of its 1990 or 1991 goods met the
freeport goods criteria. Therefore, the presumption of a non-
preempted exemption did not arise. Had VICO established
that its goods were freeport goods, then the presumption of
a valid exemption would have arisen, and the burden would
have shifted to the District and Board to rebut the
presumption.

On the other hand, regarding the District and Board’s
motion for summary judgment, the District and Board
provided no evidence that any taxing entity had preempted
the freeport goods exemption. Therefore, the District and
Board’s motion fails to the extent that the District and Board
relied on the taxing entities having preempted VICO’s
freeport goods exemption. We note that the District’s 1991
Rendition Form, with its express provision for taxpayers to
invoke the freeport goods exemption, suggests that at least
one of the taxing entities allows the exemption, i.e., that at
least one taxing entity did not take official action to preempt .
the exemption.

Were VICO’s Goods "Freeport Goods?"

We find that the summary judgment proof shows that
VICO’s property met the first two elements of the freeport
goods criteria. That is, the property was (1) acquired in or
imported into Texas to be forwarded outside Texas, and (2)
detained in Texas for storing and processing. See TEX.
CONST. §1-j(a)(1)&(2). However, we find that a fact issue
exists regarding which items of property were transported
outside Texas no later than 175 days after the date VICO

70a

acquired or imported the property into Texas. i/d. § 1-
j(a)3). VICO’s summary judgment proof merely identifies
several items that had been in Texas more than 175 days as
of January 1, 1991. The proof does not establish whether
the remaining items of property were, in fact, shipped out of
Texas within 175 days of their acquisition or importation into
Texas.

Moreover, we find that a fact issue exists as to which
items of VICO’s property owned in the preceding year met
the freeport goods criteria. This is important because of the
appraisal procedures specified by § 11.251:

(d) ...The chief appraiser shall determine the
percentage of the markei value of inventory or
property owned by the property owner in the
preceding calendar year that was contributed by
freeport goods. The chief appraiser shall apply that
percentage to the market value of the property
owner’s inventory or property for the current year to
determine the appraised vai ue of freeport goods for
the current year.

(g) If the property owner or the chief appraiser
demonstrates that the method provided by Subsection
(d) significantly understates or overstates the market
value of the property qualified for an exemption
under Subsection (b) in the current year, the chief
appraiser shall determine the market value of the
freeport goods to be exempt by determining according
to the property owner’s records and any other
available information, the market value of those
freeport goods owned by the property owner on
January | of the current year ....

Tila

** *& *

TEX. TAX CODE ANN.§ 11.251(d) & (g) (Vernon 1992).

We are unable to extract from the summary judgment
proof the information needed to apply § 11.251. In any
event, this is a matter best left to the trial court and the
parties with the necessary records and expertise to properly
implement the technical aspects of the appraisal process. We
therefore find that fact issues exist precluding summary
judgment in favor of either VICO or the District and Board.

Did VICO Apply for the Freeport Exemption?

We next ask whether VICO applied for its freeport
goods exemption. Section 11.43 of the Tax Code provides:

(a) To receive an exemption, a person claiming the
exemption ... must apply for the exemption. To
apply for an exemption, a person must file an
exemption application form with the chief appraiser

(b) ...[A] person required to apply for an éxemption
must apply each year the person claims entitlement to

the exemption.
*’- * *

(d) A person required to claim an exemption must
file a completed exemption application form before
May ! and must furnish the information required by

(e) ...[{I]}f a person required to apply for an exemption
in a given year fails to file timely a completed
application form, the person may not receive the
exemption for that year.

72a

*_* * &

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43 (Vernon 1992) (emphasis
added).

The summary judgment proof included VICO’s 1991
Rendition of Business Personal Property. In the section of
the form captioned “Inventory of Merchandise, Finished
Goods, or Consigned Goods" VICO typed the following
note:

Note: This inventory is exempt from sales and use tax
and we hereby apply for property tax exemption. All
is being exported. You have exempt in past.
(Emphasis added.)

However, in the section of the rendition above this note were
the following pre-printed instructions:

If you claim entitlement to the "freeport exemption"
provided by Sec. 11.251 Texas Tax Code, check this
box. Report full original cost of all inventory on this
rendition and attach a completed exemption
application using form 11.251 prescribed by the State

Property Tax Board.

The box preceding these instructions was not checked. Nor
is there anything in the record to show that VICO completed

an “exemption application form” per se.

The legislative intent of the free-port goods
exemption, as stated expressly within § 1-j itself, is “[t]o
promote the economic development in the State.” TEX.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j. With this intent foremost in mind,
we find that VICO’s failure to complete a § 11.251

73a

exemption form for 1991 is not fatal to its claim for property
tax immunity.

VICO applied for the exemption in the same manner
that it had in the prior tax years of 1989 and 1990 by
annotating its annual rendition form and _ supplying
supplemental justification. VICO’s application in those years
was apparently adequate for the District to exempt VICO’s
property in those years. In 1991, VICO provided a complete
listing of inventory as of January 1 and supplemented its
rendition with a letter detailing the nature of its exporting
operation. All this was done prior to the May | deadline for
claiming an exemption. There is no indication in the record
that VICO intentionally withheld information or failed to
respond to any District request for records.

We take judicial notice of the Texas Register and its
description of the required contents of the § 11.251
exemption form: (1) the owner’s name, street address,
mailing address, and telephone number; (2) a description of
the inventory affected by the exemption; (3) the total cost of
goods sold from inventory held by the property owner in the
preceding year; (4) the total cost of goods sold from
inventory that in the preceding year met the criteria set forth
in the Tax Code, Texas Constitution, Article VIII, § 1-
j(a)(1)@), excluding the cost of equipment, machinery, or
materials that entered into and became part of the inventory
described in paragraph three of this subsection but did not
themselves meet the criteria set forth in the Texas
Constitution; (4) a statement that the property owner holds
items in inventory that in the current year meet or will meet
the requirements of the Texas Constitution; and (6) a
statement indicating how long the property owner has
engaged in the business of transporting goods out of this
state. 17 Tex. Reg. 1159 (1992) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 9.404) (Comptroller of Public Accounts).

T4a

The tax law had recently been changed and new
information requirements and forms introduced. Our opinion
should not be read as condoning a taxpayer’s failure to
provide information to the taxing authority in a format
necessary for maximum administrative efficiency. However,
on the unique facts of this case, we find that VICO did make
a bona fide effort to apply for its property tax exemption and
provided most of the required information to the District.
We believe that the purpose of the freeport goods exemption, _
to promote economic development, would not be served by
our holding that VICO’s tax exemption turned on whether
VICO checked a particular box or completed a particular
form. Therefore, we find that VICO established that it
applied for the freeport exemption. What supplemental
information the trial court and District may require to
calculate VICO’s 1991 tax liability can be gathered on
remand.

Appraisal Value

The trial court granted VICO’s summary judgment on
tax liability and did not reach VICO’s contention that the
appraised value of the goods and equipment was overstated.
VICO argued that the District’s appraisal was based on a
computational error resulting in an appraised value of
$380,260.00 rather than the correct value of $296,846.95.

We have found that VICO, in principle, is entitled to
a freeport goods exemption. On remand, VICO’s tax
liability, if any, will be determined under § 11.251. In the
event that an over-appraisal question arises on remand, we
note that the tax code provides for the correction of
computational errors.

VICO was entitled to protest to the Board the
“determination of the appraised value" of its property, TEX.

timeline specified i in § 41.44. Additionally, VICO was
entitled to move the Board to “direct by written order
changes in the appraisal roll to correct ... clerical errors that
affect [VICO’s] liability ..... TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §
25.25 (Vernon 1992). Still further, “At any time, the
governing body of a taxing unit, on motion of the assessor
for the unity or of a property owner, shall direct by written
order changes in the tax roll to correct errors in the
mathematical computation of a tax." TEX. TAX CODE
ANN.§ 26.15 (Vernon 1992)’ see Liland v. Dallas County
Appraisal Dist., 731 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. App.-- Dallas
1987, no writ). Section 26.15(c) does not appear to set a
time limit on the correction of mathematical computation of
a tax. See § 26.15(c). And under § 25.25, the Board may
correct clerical errors in the appraisal roll at any time before
the end of five years after January | of a tax year. See §
25.25(c).

"In order for a taxpayer to protest an action taken by
a taxing authority, the taxpayer must follow the procedures
outlined by the Tax Code. These requirements are
jurisdictional." Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Texas Nat’!
Bank, 775 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.--Houston [Ist Dist.]
1989, no writ). The remedies defined in the Tax Code are
exclusive, and failure to exhaust the available administrative
remedies precludes a taxpayer from seeking judicial review.
See id. at 70; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon
1992).

Therefore, if in the trial court VICO seeks to correct
the computational error, it would need to demonstrate that it
had exhausted its administrative remedies.

76a

Summary

Although an ad valorem property tax on VICQO’s
goods does not run afoul of the U.S. commerce or import-
export clauses, Texas has exempted freeport goods to
promote the economic development of the state. While
VICO made a bona fide effort to apply for the exemption,
fact issues remain precluding summary judgment. On
remand, to determine VICO’s tax liability, the trial court will
first need to ascertain which taxing entities allow the
exemption, then, if necessary, VICO’s 1990 or 1991 freeport
goods activity history.

IV. Conclusion

We conclude that an ad valorem property tax on
VICO’s goods and equipment does not violate the U.S.
Constitution’s commerce or _ import-export clauses.
However, we also conclude that VICO, in principle, was
entitled to the freeport goods exemption under Texas law and
that VICO substantially complied with application
requirements. However, fact issues remain as to the actual
amount of VICO’s exemption and tax liability. This will
depend on what information the District and Board provide
regarding taxing entities’ official actions to preempt the
freeport goods exemption. Assuming an exemption exists,
the amount of VICO’s tax liability will turn on what
information VICO provides, in compliance with § 11.251d),
as to previous-year freeport goods activity history.
Alternatively, should § 11.251(g) be invoked by either party,
VICO’s tax liability will depend on VICO’s 1991 freeport
goods activity.

We therefore find that the trial court erred in granting
VICO’s summary judgment. Fact issues exist precluding
summary judgment for either party. We sustain the District

77a

and Board’s point of error one and remand the cause to the
trial court to calculate the amount of VICO’s tax liability, if
any. Since the trial court did not err in denying the District
and Board’s motion for summary judgment, we overrule
point two.

/s/ Robert E. Morse, Jr.
Former Justice

Judgment Rendered and Opinion Filed February 10, 1994.

Panel Consists of Justices Robertson, Cannon and Morse,
(sitting by designation).

Publish - Tex. R. App. P. 90.

78a
APPENDIX D

THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
Post Office Box 12248
Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 463-1312

December 22,1995

Mr. J. Randolph Burton
Moerer & Burton

440 Louisiana, Suite 350
Houston, TX 77002

Mr. Kenneth Wall

Olsen & Olsen

Three Allen Center, Suite 3485
333 Clay Street

Houston, TX 77002

RE: Case Number 94-0245
Style: VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY v. HARRIS
COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD
Dear Counsel:

Today, the supreme Court of Texas overruled the
motion for rehearing in the above referenced cause.

Sincerely,

John T. Adams, Clerk

by_S/

Courtland Crocker
Deputy

oi watt ; FA

79a
APPENDIX E

NO. 94-0245

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY
Petitioner,

v.
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
Respondent

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAs:

Respondents, Harris County Appraisal District and
Harris County Appraisal Review Board, file this Motion for
Rehearing from the judgment and opinion of this Court

rendered on October 27, 1995.

POINT OF ERROR

The Supreme Court of Texas erred by holding that ad
valorem property taxation of Petitioner’s goods violates the
Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution.

80a
APPENDIX F

NO. 91-59779

VIRGINIA INDONESIA
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

IN THE DISTRICT
COURT OF

§
§
:
§
VS. § HARRIS COUNTY,
§ TEXAS
HARRIS COUNTY §
APPRAISAL DISTRICT = §
§
§
§
§

and HARRIS COUNTY 333RD JUDICIAL

APPRAISAL REVIEW DISTRICT
BOARD,
Defendants.
PLAI ’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION

FOR REVIEW APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD ORDER
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "VICO"), Plaintiff, and
files this its First Amended Petition for Review of Appraisal
Review Board Order, complaining of HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD (hereinafter sometimes
jointly referred to as the "Defendants"), and for cause of
action would respectfully show unto the Court as follows:

ee RARER Alaa

8la

Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation duly incorporated
and existing under the laws of Delaware and authorized to do
business in Harris County, Texas.

Defendant, HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL
DISTRICT (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"APPRAISAL DISTRICT"), is located in Houston, Harris
County, Texas, duly organized and acting pursuant to the
laws of Texas. Defendant APPRAISAL DISTRICT has
appeared and answered herein by and through its attorney of
record, Mr. Kenneth Wall, at Olson & Olson, Three Allen
Center, 333 Clay Street, Suite 3845, Houston, Harris
County, Texas 77002.

Defendant, HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL
REVIEW BOARD (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"REVIEW BOARD"), is located in Houston, Harris County,
Texas, duly organized and acting pursuant to the laws of
Texas. Defendant REVIEW BOARD has appeared and
answered herein by and through its attorney of record, Mr.
Kenneth Wall, at Olson & Olson, Three Allen Center, 333
Clay Street, Suite 3845, Houston, Harris County, Texas
77002.

DEFINITIONS
III.
Each of these words or terms shall have the following

meaning unless a different meaning is stated clearly or is
reflected by the context in which the word or term is used:

82a

(a) “Appraised value" means a property’s value
according to the APPRAISAL DISTRICT’s
appraisal roll for the tax year.

(b) "Code" refers to Title 1 of the Texas Tax
Code, more commonly known as the Texas

Property Tax Code.

(c) "Property" means that personal property
owned or possessed by Plaintiff that is the
subject of this suit, said Property being more
accurately described as follows:

Various materials and supplies related
to conducting onshore oil and gas
exploration and development activities
in a foreign country, more particularly
described by the summary record
shown in Exhibit "A," which is
attached hereto by reference and
incorporated herein for all purposes.

(d) “Tax year" means the 1991 calendar year.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
IV.

This First Amended Petition is a petition for review
filed within the time required by Section 42.21 of the Code.
Plaintiff brings this cause as an appeal from the REVIEW
BOARD’s order determining a taxpayer protest duly and
properly prosecuted by Plaintiff under Chapter 41 of the
Code. The REVIEW BOARD and the APPRAISAL
DISTRICT are established for and located in the county in
which this First Amended Petition is filed. The Court has

83a

jurisdiction to hear and decide Plaintiff's appeal pursuant to
Chapter 42 of the Code.

FACTS AND BASIS FOR REVIEW
V.

On or about September 10, 1991, Plaintiff was
notified by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT that, for the tax year
ended 1991, the appraised value of personal property
(rendered under Harris County Appraisal District account
number 0385507) possessed by Plaintiff would be
$380,260.00. The subject "property" consists of various
materials and supplies related to conducting onshore oil and
gas exploration and development activities in a foreign
country, said materials and supplies being more particularly
described in the attached Exhibit "A" which Plaintiff
incorporates herein by reference for all purposes (hereinafter
referred to as the "Property"). A true and correct copy of
the "Notification of Appraised Value for Property Tax
Purposes" is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated
herein by reference for all purposes.

On or about September 16, 1991, Plaintiff timely filed
a Notice of Protest of the appraised value given the Property
by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT in the manner required by
law. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Protest is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by
reference for all purposes. Plaintiff presented evidence and
argument before the REVIEW BOARD as provided by law.
A true and correct copy of the Confidential General
Personal Property Rendition of Taxable Property for January
1, 1991, submitted on behalf of VICO by Clarke and
Company is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated
herein by reference for all purposes. This Exhibit "D"
includes a letter to the Harris County Appraisal District dated

84a

March 14, 1991 (Exhibit "D-1") and a description of the
Property on hand at the Houston packer, McClean Cargo, as
of January 1, 1991 (Exhibit "D-2"). The total value of the
Property shown on Exhibit "D-2" is $380,260.00. Exhibit
"D-2" contains the exact same individual items with the exact
same price extensions as those shown on the attached Exhibit
"A". However, due to a computational error, these items
were incorrectly added and given an appraised value of
$380,260.00 by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT when, in fact,
their correct total equals $296,846.95 as shown on Exhibit
"A". Thereafter on October 11, 1991, the REVIEW
BOARD made its Final Order determining Plaintiff's protest
in which the value of Plaintiff's Property was determined to
be $380,260.00. A true and correct copy of the Notice of
Final Order and Order Determining Protest are attached
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference
for all purposes. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff's right
of judicial review of the REVIEW BOARD ’s decision having
been performed or having occurred, Plaintiff is entitled to a
trial de novo review of the REVIEW BOARD’s Final Order.

Plaintiff VICO functions as the operator of an
Indonesian joint venture which explores for oil and gas
overseas. The joint venture’s operations are limited to an
area of mutual interest ("AMI") in a single foreign country,
namely, the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian joint
venture, by and through its operator, VICO, purchases
certain goods, wares and equipment for use in petroleum
operations in the AMI, all pursuant to that certain Amended
and Restated Production Sharing Contract (hereinafter
referred to as the "Production Sharing Contract") by and
between the joint venture participants and Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina"),
a state enterprise of the Republic of Indonesia. Based upon
requests from the Division Office in Indonesia, VICO, as
operator of the Indonesian joint venture, purchases certain

85a

goods for and on behalf of PERTAMINA, all for exclusive
use in the above mentioned AMI. Pursuant to the
aforementioned Production Sharing Contract, the property
purchased for the Indonesian joint venture, by and through
its operator, VICO, becomes the property of PERTAMINA
upon arrival at the Indonesian port of import.

Upon being notified that certain goods are needed in
Indonesia, VICO, in accordance with Indonesian law
(Indonesian Presidential Decree 14A, implemented in 1981,
requiring production sharing contractors to prepare their
imported material purchase orders in Indonesia for issue to
Indonesian agents), issues a request for quotation to an
Indonesian company which acts as an agent. The Indonesian
purchasing agent then obtains bids from several companies
for the product needed. The best bids are taken and a
quotation is furnished to VICO. VICO evaluates the bids
under PERTAMINA procedures and selects a winning bid.
VICO then issues a purchase order through the proper
channels for the product. The product is then purchased
from the company holding the winning bid and, where
appropriate, the goods are shipped directly to an export
packer used by VICO which is located in Houston, Harris
County, Texas. The export packer maintains a yard for
preparation of shipments overseas to the Indonesian
operations.

Generally, after shipment to the export packer, VICO
is invoiced for the goods. Upon receipt of the invoice,
VICO confirms that the proper item(s) were shipped and that
they meet all necessary quality specifications. VICO then
requests approval for import into Indonesia. Provided the
goods meet the necessary specifications for quality and
correctness, and, in most cased, provided approval for
import into Indonesia is obtained, VICO pays the invoice and
the goods are then packed for export and shipped on the next

86a

available vessel destined for Indonesia. In most instances,
the goods remain with the export packer no longer than
forty-five (45) days. However, should any of the goods be
unacceptable (e.g., damaged, lacking parts, or otherwise
faulty or unsuitable), VICO insists that the problem be
corrected before accepting the goods and issuing payment for
same. Such action may involve having the item replaced,
waiting on the arrival of missing parts, problems with
obtaining approval for import into Indonesia due to its
stringent standards on imported goods, or, if the item is
unacceptable or unsuitable, returning it to the vendor. It is
in this process of quality control that goods occasionally
remain with the export packer for longer than 175 days.

VICO does not pay for nor does it take actual
possession and control of the goods until the goods are
deemed complete, acceptable, and ready for shipment
overseas. At that point, pursuant to the Production Sharing
Contract, VICO, as operator for the Indonesian joint venture,
acquires only bare legal title to the Property, with equitable
title residing with PERTAMINA from the moment of
purchase. Subsequently, upon the Property’s arrival at the
Indonesian port of import, both equitable and legal title
merge and full ownership of the Property passes to
PERTAMINA, pursuant to Section 10, "Title to Equipment,"
of the Production Sharing Contract. VICO is, therefore,
never vested with full ownership of the Property itself.
VICO’s sole purpose in this process is to guarantee that the
proper items were purchased, that they meet certain quality
standards, and that they will be accepted for import by
Indonesia. At no point in this process can the Property be
diverted to domestic use and, therefore, the Property is
committed from the moment of purchase for export to a
foreign destination. The sole purpose for the Property held
at the export packer’s yard is inspection and packing in
preparation for shipment overseas to the Indonesian

87a

operations.
Property Is Exempt From State Taxes Under
U.S. Constitution
VII.

It is VICO’s primary position that all of the goods in
question are in-transit goods, are part of the export stream,
and are, therefore, exempt from taxation. Goods-in-transit
are specifically protected under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. CONST.Art. I, §8, cl.3.
Goods which are committed to foreign commerce and are in-
transit are conferred immunity under the Commerce Clause.
Goods which are dedicated to the export stream are,
likewise, specifically protected under the Import-Export
Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. Art.
i, §10, cl. 2. The Import-Export Clause expressly prohibits
states from taxing imports and exports. At all time, the
Property made the subject of this lawsuit was in-transit in
that there was no pause, lull, cessation, halt or stoppage to
the transport of the Property except that which was necessary
and incidental to its transport. Further, at all times, the
Property’s final destination was determinable. All of the
goods in question were purchased on behalf of or as agent
for a foreign entity and destined for export to a foreign
country. The tax imposed upon VICO by the APPRAISAL
DISTRICT and REVIEW BOARD thus violates both the
Commerce and Import-Export Clauses because the Property
in question was still in-transit.

Plaintiff VICO incorporates herein by reference for

88a

all purposes the foregoing Paragraphs IV though VIII as if
copied herein verbatim. Even if the Court were to hold that
the Property is non-exempt under federal constitution law,
before a local taxing unit can levy taxes on non-exempt
tangible personal property moving in interstate commerce,
the state must have jurisdiction to tax the Property. Under
Texas law, the Plaintiff would show the Court that the State
of Texas lacks jurisdiction to tax the Property. The Texas
Tax Code (the "Code") provides that non-exempt tangible
personal property is subject to the state’s taxing authority if
it meets any one of three criteria:

(1) located in this state for longer than a
temporary period;

(2) temporarily located outside this state and the
owner resides in this state; or

(3) used continually, whether regularly or
irregularly, in this state.

V.T.C.A., Tax Code §11.01(c), entitled "Real and Tangible
Personal Property.” VICO would show the Court that the
Property upon which this lawsuit is based is not subject to
Texas’ taxing jurisdiction based upon the criteria established
in §11.01. First, under §11.01(c)(1), the Property is only
located temporarily in Texas, and the sole purpose of the
Property being located in Harris County, Texas, is for
inspection and preparation for exportation to a foreign
country. Second, under §11.01(c)(2), VICO, as operator,
merely purchases goods for and on behalf of PERTAMINA.
It is this foreign entity, not VICO, for which the Property is
purchased and to which title to the Property passes. Third,
under §11.01(c)(3) none of the Property is ever "used" in
Texas and, thus, it is not used “continually, whether
regularly or irregularly,” in Texas.

89a

Therefore, VICO contends that the Property made the
subject of this lawsuit meets none of the above criteria and,
thus, meets the statutory presumption that none of the
Property is subject to Texas’ taxing jurisdiction.

Pag npg ae ar :
i 175 Days
IX.

Plaintiff VICO incorporates herein by reference for
all purposes the foregoing Paragraphs IV though IX as if
copied herein verbatim. Should the Court deem said
Property not protected by the exemptions provided under the
Import-Export or Commerce Clauses of the United States
Constitution, nor outside Texas’ taxing jurisdiction under
$11.01 of the Code, then only $10,030.60 of the Property
could conceivably be considered within the taxing jurisdiction
of the state of Texas on the basis that said portion of the
Property was in Texas situs longer than 175 days. VICO
argues that such claim is tenuous at best given the fact that
each item of Property located at the export packer’s yard for
over 175 days was delayed due to import permit problems
over which VICO had no control to prevent nor to correct
within a preset period of time.

Section 11.251 of the Code, in pertinent part, states
as follows:

§ 11.251. Tangible Persona: Property Exempt

(a) In this section, "“freeport goods" means
property that under Article VIII, Section 1-j,
of the Texas Constitution is not taxable.

(b) A person is entitled to an exemption from
taxation of the appraised value of that portion

90a

of the person’s inventory or property
consisting of freeport goods.

Art. VIII, §1-j, of the Texas Constitution describes
certain tangible personal property exempt from ad valorem
taxation and provides, in part:

Sec. 1-j. (a) To promote economic development in
the State, goods, wares, merchandise, other tangible
personal property, and ores, other than oil, natural
gas, and other petroleum products, are exempt from
ad valorem taxation if:

(1) the property is acquired in or imported
into this State to be forwarded outside this State,
whether or not the intention to forward the property
outside this State is formed or the destination to
which the property is forwarded is specified when the
property is acquired in or imported into this State;

(2) the property is detained in this State for
assembling, stering, manufacturing, processing, or
fabricating purposes by the person who acquired or
imported the property; and

(3) the property is transported outside of this
State not later than 175 days after the date the person
acquired or imported the property in this State.

In no event should the remainder of the Property,
with an appraised value of $370,229.40, be subject to
taxation in as much as it was in the export packer’s yard for
substantially less than 175 days.

If the Property is indeed subject to the tax authority
of the State of Texas, the levying of a tax on Plaintiff's

9la

Property based on the higher valuation of $380,260.00 is an
unlawful levy, creates an illegal lien on Plaintiff's Property,
and is a cloud on the title of the Property.

Appraisal District Over-Valued the Property

X.

Plaintiff VICO incorporates herein by reference for
all purposes the foregoing Paragraphs IV though X as if
copied herein verbatim. Plaintiff would show the Court that
through a summation error the Property was over-valued in
total amount by at least $83,413.05. The total value of the
Property shown on the attached Exhibit "A" is $296,846.95.
Exhibit "A" contains the exact same individual items with the
exact same price extensions contained in Exhibit "D-2".
However, due to a computational error, these items were
incorrectly added to a total of $380,260.00, the valuation
given by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT and REVIEW
BOARD, when their correct total equals $296,846.95. This
$296,846.95 amount represents the price paid and/or owed
by VICO (on behalf of PERTAMINA) on the Property
located at the Houston packer on January 1, 1991. Such
price is the purchase order value of the Property, i.e., the
market value of the property plus a five percent (5%)
commission that VICO is obligated to pay the Indonesian
agent. VICO would argue that the actual market value of the
Property is $282,004.60, or at least $98,255.40 less than the
value placed on the Property by the Defendants for tax
purposes, and that any appraisal on the Property as a whole
should be based on that figure. Therefore, should the Court
deem that all the Property was non-exempt and subject to
Texas Property Tax jurisdiction, the gross value of the
Property rendered should be deemed to be $282,004.50, but
in no event more than $296,846.95.

ae

Plaintiff VICO incorporates herein by reference for
all purposes the foregoing Paragraphs IV though XI as if
copied herein verbatim. Plaintiff would show the Court that
Defendants have waived their right to tax the Property in
question by virtue of their previous findings that the Property
was exempt from taxation. In previous years where VICO
applied to exempt the Property from ad valorem taxation, the
APPRAISAL DISTRICT took the position that similar
property should be granted a blanket exemption and rendered
it as having a zero (0) assessed value. In both 1989 and
1990, VICO was requested to submit an explanation as to
why the Property should be exempt from taxation, and in
each year VICO submitted summary legal arguments to the
APPRAISAL DISTRICT that were virtually identical to the
position taken by VICO and presented in the case at bar.
Under identical circumstances, involving similar property,
VICO presented legal arguments as to the property's
exemption based upon federal constitutional principles, which
were accepted by the Defendants in their decision not to tax
the property located at the export packer used by VICO.
Now, inexplicably, Defendants have taken a contrary position
with full knowledge of the identity of the facts and arguments
previously accepted as valid authority for exempting the
Property from taxation. VICO is entitled to rely upon
Defendants’ previous exemption of the Property, where
applicable federal and state laws remain unchanged.

Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees

93a

pursuant to §42.29 of the Code. This suit is brought
pursuant «0 §42.25 of the Code which provides that a
taxpayer may bring a suit for review of a REVIEW BOARD
order as a remedy for an excessive appraisal. Since VICO’s
lawsuit is based upon the premise that the Property in
question is exempt or, alternatively, not subject to Texas
property tax jurisdiction, and was previously rendered as
having a zero (0) value by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT, the
current valuation of the property at $380,260.00 clearly
exceeds the appraised value as required by law. Plaintiff is,
therefore, entitled to recover its attorneys’ fee and expenses.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY prays that it have
judgment against Defendants "HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD, that this Court grant
Plaintiff an exemption on the referenced Property rendered
under Harris County Appraisal District account number
0385507 fixing the value of Plaintiff's Property as of January
1, 1991, at zero dollars ($0), that it compel the imposition of
the properly rendered value of Plaintiff's Property as well as
correction of the tax rolls to show the proper value of the
Plaintiff's Property, that it compel acceptance by the
APPRAISAL DISTRICT and the REVIEW BOARD that no
personal property taxes are due for the tax year 1991 and all
future years on Plaintiff's Property based on application of
the approved tax rates to the proper assessment, that it award
Plaintiff its reasonable attorneys’ fees through summary
judgment and on appeal, costs of Court, and for all such
other and further relief, at law or in equity, general or
special, to which Plaintiff may show itself justly entitled.

Risso: nearer arene eam nenemmeel

94a

Respectfully submitted,
MOERER & BURTON

BY: _/s/

J. Randolph Burton

Texas State Bar No. 03479050
440 Louisiana, Suite 350
Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 222-6262 (telephone)
(713) 222-6811 (facsimile)

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY

95a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Plaintiff's First Amended Petition for
Review of Appraisal Review Board Order has been
transmitted to all counsel of record herein, either by hand
delivery, facsimile or via certified mail, return receipt
requested, on this the _14th_ day of _ July _, 1992, and
addressed as follows:

Mr. Kenneth Wall

Olson & Olson

Three Allen Center

333 Clay Street, Suite 3485
Houston, Texas 77002

BY: _/s/

J. Randolph Burton

96a

APPENDIX G
NO. 91-59779
VIRGINIA INDONESIA §_ IN THE DISTRICT
COMPANY, § COURT OF
Plaintiff, §
VS. § HARRIS COUNTY,
§ TEXAS
HARRIS COUNTY §
APPRAISAL DISTRICT § 333RD JUDICIAL
and HARRIS COUNTY § DISTRICT
APPRAISAL REVIEW §
BOARD §
Defendants. §
JUDGMENT

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on this the__ day of
, 1992, came to on to be heard the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff, VIRGINIA
INDONESIA COMPANY, against Defendants, HARRIS
COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD. The Court, having
examined the documents and pleading on filed herein as well
as having heard argument of counsel, is of the opinion that
said Motion for Summary Judgment should in all things be
granted. It is therefore

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
Property of Plaintiff VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY,
more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto
and listed under Harris County Appraisal District account
number 0385507, is protected from state taxation by
exemptions provided under the Import-Export or Commerce
Clauses of the United States Constitution and is, therefore,

97a

not subject to taxation under the Texas Tax Code, more
commonly known as the Texas Property Tax Code. It is
further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
State of Texas lacks jurisdiction to tax the Property of
Plaintiff VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, more
particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and
listed under Harris County Appraisal District account number
0385507, in that the Property fails to meet the criteria as
outlined under the Texas Tax Code. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED | that
Plaintiff, VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, is not liable
for the taxes on Harris County Appraisal District account
number 0385507 for the tax year ended December 31, !991.
It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that all
relief requested and not expressly granted herein is hereby
denied.

SIGNED this _8th_ day of _September_. 1992.

/s/

PRESIDING JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1273%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
