# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cuadra v. Houston Independent School District

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1134%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2011
- **Citation:** 563 U.S. 1033

## Text

Suprsure Luu. U.S.

| G0
No. 10- 101291 APR 19 201

IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States

Se

KENNETH CUADRA

HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
CAROL WICHMANN; MARMION DAMBRINO;
BILLY ALDRICH; BETHT BONNETTE;
MELBA MARTIN; ANNE PATTERSON,

Respondent

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNItTED STATES Court OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAURENCE W. Warts
Counsel of Record

Watts & ASSOCIATES
9002 Sienna Parkway
P.O. Box 2214
Missouri City, TX 77459
(281) 431-1500
wattstrial@pmail.con

285024 ce

IUESTIONS PRESENTI

\ A i> . ° oY : j , a. t = i
Whether Petitioner asserted a clalm [or malic1o

rosecution grounded in a specific federal right

uaranteed by the Constitution of the United Stat

Whether Petitioner raised a ge

ict on elements of the Te»

| ’

TABLE OF APPENDICES

L\PPENDIX A OPINION OF THI
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, FILED
NOVEMBER 17, 2010

APPENDIX B OPINION AND ORDER
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS, HOUSTON DIVISION
DATED SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 .

-ENDIX C REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS, HOUSTON DIVISION
FILED AUGUST 17, 2009. .

APPENDIX D— ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT, FILED JANUARY 19, 201]

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Sanders v

950 F.2

fexas Beef Cattle Co. v. Gree
921 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1996

STATUES

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Cireuit filed November 17, 2010 is set forth
as Appendix A. The unpublished opinion of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division, dated September 11, 2009 is set forth
as Appendix B.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit denied a timely filed Petition for Rehearing En
Banc on January 19, 2011. (App. D.) The Supreme Court
of the United States has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28
U.S.C., section 1254 (1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari from the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirming the trial court’s order granting Respondents’
Motion for Summary Judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Petitioner, Kenneth Cuadra (“Petitioner” or “Cuadra”),
alleges a Title 42 USC Section 1983 action against the
Respondents in this matter for his seizure by arrest and
indictment in 2005 and re-indictment and re-arrest in 2006,
after he and a co-worker, Kathleen Henry-Love (“Henry”),
at Respondent Houston Independent School District’s
(“HISD”) Sharpstown High School (“SHS”) appeared
in investigatory television interviews in February 2003
regarding claims that HISD administrators had falsely
reported student dropout numbers at SHS to the Texas
Edueation Agency (“TEA”) in the annual reporting of

student data for the re-enrollment of 2001-2002 students.
The indictment against Petitioner was dismissed by
the Harris County District Attorney on November 1,
2006. Petitioner filed this suit against Respondents,
Dave Vollmer, and Rusty Hardin and Associates, P.C.
(“Hardin”), on October 7, 2007. Petitioner voluntarily
dismissed his action against Vollmer. After responses
to Petitioner’s written discovery were made by Hardin,
and the depositions of Rusty Hardin and Andrew
Drumheller (a Hardin shareholder) had been taken,
Petitioner learned that HISD had not provided a certain
document (denominated the “Smoking Gun’) to Hardin,
and Petitioner dismissed his claims against Hardin.
Respondents, having filed motions to dismiss which had
been denied, jointly filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The District Court referred the matter to United States
Magistrate Judge John Froeschner, who recommended
that Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment
be granted. (App. C.) The District Judge adopted the
magistrate’s recommendation and entered judgment
against Petitioner on September 11, 2009 (App. B), from
which an appeal was taken to the United States Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on
November 17, 2010. (App. A.) Petitioner then timely filed a
Petition for Rehearing En Banc on January 4, 2011, which
was denied on January 19, 2011. (App. D.) Consequently,
Petitioner files this Petition for Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As a member of the Fifth Circuit’s panel commented
during recorded argument, “If [Cuadra}’s right about what
[ Respondents] did, it is not a pretty sight.” Unfortunately,
what Cuadra has said is true.

Contrary to suggestions by the Fifth Circuit, this is
not a case about nor has Cuadra asserted “a free standing
Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim” (App. A, pg.
4a). While it was observed that the manufacturing of
false evidence and withholding “exculpatory evidence”
to influence a criminal prosecution are merely part of “a
free standing malicious prosecution claim” or common law
tort, Cuadra contends that in this case where the District
Attorney dismissed an indictment with an accompanying
Press Statement, after receiving exculpatory evidence
from Cuadra’s defense lawyer, which Respondents
withheld, implicates a federal right.

This is a case where an innocent person was indicted,
not merely in the absence of probable cause, but because
evidence was fabricated to inculpate him, and exculpatory
evidence was kept from the District Attorney and two
grand juries, which fabrication and deprivation influenced
and/or tainted the process to produce two indictments of
Petitioner Cuadra. This is also a case about the retaliation
against Cuadra with a tainted criminal prosecution
because he went to the media and aided in the revelation
of the false reporting of dropouts in HISD. Neither of
those claims were time-barred. The facts span four years

Cuadra served as a network specialist at SHS,
immediately supervised by SHS Business Manager

Col. Robert Kimball, USA (Ret’d), Ed.D. (“Kimball”),
until February 19, 2003, when he was transferred
to HISD’s West District Office by Respondent West
District Superintendent Anne Patterson (“Patterson”)
and Respondent SHS Principal Carol Wichmann
(“Wichmann”), and targeted, by the decision of both, in
an investigation by Respondent Billy Aldrich (“Aldrich”).
Before his sudden transfer, Cuadra played a role in SHS’
required annual reporting of student dropout data to
HISD’s Federal and State Compliance office (“FSC”) and
the TEA.

The investigation and Cuadra’s transfer were
triggered by a media investigation, conducted by KHOU
Channel 11, a Houston television station and CBS affiliate
(“Channel 11”)

On February 6, 2003, Channel 11 commenced a
series of reports (at least ten), spanning five months,
and focusing on SHS’ and HISD’s official reports to
TEA underreporting SHS’ student dropouts. The series
began with an on-camera interview on February 6, 2003
by investigative reporter Anna Werner with Wichmann,
observed by Patterson. Werner’s interview with
Wichmann was broadcast in segments on February 10, 11,
and 13, 2003. It was described by Patterson as “awful.”

On February 7, 20038, the day after Werner’s interview
ff Wichmann, Patterson wrote the Director of HISD’s

1. Citations to the Clerk’s Record prepared by the District
Court and provided to the Fifth Circuit, and to deposition
testimony, have not been included, but will be furnished on request
or in response to objection.

Department of Professional Standards (“DPS”) and asked
that an investigation be initiated, focused on Kimball,
Cuadra, and Henry (Kimball’s clerk). According to
Wichmann, both she and Patterson decided to initiate
the investigation, and Patterson wrote the February 7,
2003 email to DPS. In her email, Patterson asked that
DPS assign “Mike M.” as the investigator to “intimidate”
Kimball and cause Cuadra and Henry to “fold.” “Mike
M.” was unavailable, and Aldrich, who was “just as good
[as ‘Mike M.’},” was assigned. Patterson identified the
purpose of the investigation as discovering who leaked
to Werner a document listing thirty (30) dropouts, when
Wichmann, in reporting to FSC and TEA, had reported
on December 6, 2002 and certified by her signature on
January 27, 2003 that SHS had zero (0) dropouts. As a
result of Channel 11’s revelations (including the airing
of an interview with Cuadra on February 26, 2003)
exposing SHS’ dropout fraud, the TEA embarked on an
investigation of HISD in Spring of 2003; issued a report
condemning HISD’s false reporting of student dropouts;
lowered State accountability ratings of various HISD
schools, specifically lowering SHS to “Unacceptable”;
there was negative national and local media directed at
HISD; and caused loss or risk of loss of financial benefits
from the “Campus Incentive Pay Program.”

In suggesting to DPS motives for leaking information
by Cuadra, Henry, and Kimball, Patterson falsely
portrayed Cuadra and Henry as being on the brink
of imminent termination (suggesting that they were
disgruntled employees), and additionally identified
Cuadra as having viewed Carlton Tucker, a former
administrator adversary of Wichmann’s, as a “father.”
Patterson described Kimball as a person who previously

had reported claimed misdeeds of other administrator(s)
Patterson also alerted the DPS director to the potential
for a “whistle blower” claim.

Wichmann and Respondent Associate Principal
Marmion Dambrino (“Dambrino’”) had decided to transfer
Kimball and Cuadra from SHS at least as early as
February 15, 2008, when Wichmann and Dambrino told
SHS Assistant Principal Andrew Monzon (“Monzon’”’) that
both were to be transferred or reassigned away from SHS.

A pretextual opportunity to transfer Cuadra wa:
found on February 18, 2003. Wichmann received an open
record request from Channel 11 for all emails related to the
dropout issue. Wichmann met with Dambrino, Respondent
Principal Intern Merrie Beth Bonnette (“Bonnette”), and
Assistant Principal Jane Lozano (“Lozano”) and conducted
an after-hours “search” of Cuadra’s office. In the “search,”
Lozano found a file labeled “Dropouts” in Cuadra’s desk.
One of the runs was from October 22, 2002, 8:07 p.m.,
listing 30 students’ names, with 29 marks on the right
side of the column and 10 on the left, and the word “Done”
written in brown marker, along with three numbers (to
wit: 73, 74, and 21). Wichmann telephoned Patterson and
reported Lozano’s find. The following day, February 19,
2003, Aldrich came unannounced to SHS to surprise
Cuadra, and interrogated him. Aldrich interviewed
Cuadra on three occasions, at least two of which Aldrich

2. PEIMS was the TEA’s database into which student data
was uploaded from the local HISD SASI program by Cuadra
Cuadra would accomplish the uploading function at an appropriate
and agreed time by locking out all other accessors at SHS and
upload to TEA via a program called “Edit+ | Plus].” He would then
usually make print-outs (“runs”) of the new version of the data

tape recorded. The Fifth Circuit stated, “During the
course of his investigation, Aldrich spoke to HISD and
SHS employees and interviewed Cuadra twice [sic]. In
both interviews with Aldrich, Cuadra did not disclose that
anyone asked him to change the dropout data.” (App. A,
pg. 4a.) Wichmann delivered a prepared letter to Cuadra
which stated in part, “I have been informed that you are
accused of altering student records without authorization.
In light of the serious nature of the allegations, I believe
it is in your best interest and that of the school district
that you be relieved of your duties . . . until a thorough
investigation can be completed and a decision reached as
to how the matter will be resolved. .. . [Signed] Dr. Carol
Wichmann On behalf of the West District Office and Anns
Patterson, District Superintendent.”

On February 20, 2003, Kimball met with Aldrich and
gave him a memo and supporting exhibits. Amongst the
documents provided to Aldrich by Kimball was a copy of
the “Smoking Gun.”* Kimball’s meme to Aldrich stated

[In early [sic] October, Kenneth Cuadra was off
campus for training. He returned one evening
after the training session and briefly informed
me that he was called by Ms. Dambrino and told
he had to clean up some reports because Dr
Wichmann had to meet with the Superintendent
the next day. I advised Mr. Cuadra not to falsify

3. The “Smoking Gun” is a portrait-printed dropout roste1
of 30 students’ names alongside six (6) columns of data containing
Respondent Martin’s and Respondent Dambrino’s handwriting. It
has alternatively been referred to throughout this lawsuit as, “the
Smoking Gun,” “Melba’s List,” “SRS 1028,” and/or some variatio.
of the phrase, “the portrait print dropout roster.”

iny data because it would constitute fraud and
that if he was being told to do so and did it he
would be just as guilty as Ms. Dambrino and Dr
Wichmann, if they implied our suggested that
he do it. The next morning Mr. Cuadra told m¢e
that he had put everything back the way it wa

On February 26, 2003, Channel 11 aired Werner
nterview of Cuadra. In the broadcast portions of that
interview, Cuadra related how he had been asked to

delete names from the dropout list, deleted the names

and then restored them. Cuadra also told Werner how
he had been instructed to sign off as responsible for the
dropout reporting when he was not the person responsible
ind had refused.‘

Un ix nruary fo¥ 2005, Kimball w: ripped Oi Nn

and reassigned to Patterson’s W istrict Offic

Both Kimball and Cuadra filed administrative
rievances because of their transfers. Kimball’s eventually
dtoa “whistleblower” claim against HISD whi

1. After Cuadra refused to sign as responsible for the dropo
eport on January 27, 2003, Wichmann’s secretary told Assistant

Principal Monzon that Wichmann wanted him to sign as beings
the person responsible instead of Martin. Monzon complied. As z
result of Channel 11’s broadcasts of Wichmann’s and SHS’ falsi
certification of zero dropouts to the TEA on January 27, 2003
(KA investigated HISD’s false dropout reporting. For having
complied with Wichmann’s instruction to sign as being the person
responsible for the zero dropout report of 2002-2003, Monzon wa
administratively disciplined. Monzon wrote about being duped b

Wichmann into accepting responsibility for the dropout report

publi hed lette LA Liv editor | ay ene) | { nronie

aqal

>100,000.00 and reinstating him to the position of Assista

!
rincipal at another

school. Cuadra’s grievance wv

eassigned by Superintendent Stripling from Patte)

» Executive Deputy Superintendent Saavedra. Cuadr
vas reassigned to “Transportation,” lost his grievance
\ugust 29, 2003, and was eventually indicted for a f
alteration of a governmental record

lefraud,” letob

yay

sé > witar rr » LEnaurn
used “a computer program known

laintain official reeords of student data, 1
tudent drop-out information.” (App. A, pg. 2a.)
chools, including SHS, make official student data repot
iantifying each school’

~ ODE
INP? 5 ‘}

October 22, 2002. Assista

Dambrino] and | Wiehmann] told him ti
n to fifteen names from the

yrandomly de]

drop-out list
nticipation of a meeting with Ge cle
Caye Stripling Dambrino

I 41)
} ,
rs)

4

FAT CII

ff-campus In a training course wh
mm SHS at approximately 4:00-4:30 |

D1

he page and Kimball answered the phot

poke with Dambrino and Wichmann
at Bonnette was there and Wichmar
report in a fold

’

1)? me
a cain it

Ach

semi. ;
Wichmann], for a meeting

id to attend the ne

LA

Martin] had not done her job that y toe
at they [Wichmann, Dambri
d called [Martin] |

: " ‘
CPLA itd

ind Dambrino gave Cuadra was from Antonia Dru
(with FSC); Wichmann didn’t know what Cuadra would |
vorking on; Wichmann and Dambrino both put the folde
1 Cuadra’s desk for him to come back to in his offic
she did not know what was in the folder; she nev
the folder; and she never looked in the folde Y’.
euit chose to believe that Cuadra was not
authorized by Wichmann or Dambrino to mak
ee to dropout data on October 22, 2002. Accordir
» Wichmann and Dambrino, of the four (Wichmanr
Daailetae Bonnette, and Cuadra), only Cuadra loo
n the folder and knew what changes he
hich documents -- for Wichmann’s meeting 1
: r W3

en

anges to the student dropout data
instructed | »y Dambrino and Wichmann, an
torations on heichias 23, 2002,in HISD’s AF! scres
t is celal inferable that Cuadra first Regie changin
— datainthe AFI screen with Aldrich o »br
2003. Aldrich knew of the significance of
cbr uary 19, 2003, because Aldrich notes that he ret
1is office and met with “Dave Vollmer/Te: ‘hnolog”
deur the AFI data screens ... and was not able
dentify anyone who might have changed the data.” |]
Aldrich not known of - » AF'l’s significance in
senna nips dni 1 LAF]

ms
|

rk
A}

‘ohr

cnange
mM — pondents c

art youts to 30 non-dro

a a .
lade

y Martin, “trump” or override
ploaded to the PEIMS databa
false, final et was

} yarai

ie a

NOT to enter the militar,

; 7
ictover

private
Tt

changes on the night of October 22
idence that Aguirre’s leave

aver (dropout) code before a
versed the instructed changes
ntered on Aguirre’s MIS sc

Martin, it didn’t alter the

vidence remains. Because of

£ T ry

e
vhen the information changing the
lropouts to non-dropouts was input into
MIS, otherwise AF'l’s “dropout” status would have
flected after October 24, 2002, when the dropout va
were uploaded to TEA’s PEIMS database. MIS “tri

FI. and it was the MIS

ZS

0 other students, which were

hanging the status of the
after : * re

>

yllmer ver

C2 ado¢

is aropouts

rom Novemb

fallax

Vichmann

inet Nolte, Manager, HISD’s F‘
» Wichmann on December 18
zero dropout report

ys tiot VA ¢ ) + a0 ¢ & (\t ,
Yruary, YVest Distt ICL Fawr 11ice}

SHS’ report of a zero dropout rate in Decemb:
2002 raised flags of unreasonableness, and tha
ther schools under Anne Patterson’s supervisi

vhich had reported zero dropout had raised

“flag

ruary pointed out to. )and Hal |
SHS had been “alerted ... about making su
their zero dropouts had documentation befo1
heir resubmission to [S]tate [Clompliance
Jantuary 2003]. They had plenty of time to ge
heir information correct.” (Emphasis addet

ruary emailed Martin, copying Damb:
nd Monzon, on December 5, 2002 regardi1
Presumed Under-Reported Students,” student
vhose leaver or dropout status had not -
een determined, and asked that the roster
resumed under-reported stud

fore December 10, 2002

that she had been told as early as late in the
Spring semester of 2001-2002, there would be a
zero dropout rate in the Fall Collection of the
2002-2003 school year. Lozano also said that she
knew from the SASI data that a former student
of hers was a dropout (Juana Juarez) because
she had withdrawn from school to care for her
baby and was a dropout, and that she not only
told Dambrino and Wichmann, she had shown
them the SASI screen entry made by her in the
2001-2002 school year.

On May 15, 2003, Aldri

Mr. Cuadra then questioned... if I examined
Melba Martin’s data... I replied that I did
not want to try the case at this time, that
all he needed to know at this point is that
have evidence that he changed the data, and
that he is a liar. I told him that each time he
comes up with a different story, he has some
supposed evidence that will support him, but
it never materializes .... There is no evidence
to support his contention that he modified the
student records and then changed them back.
[ told him that the evidence supports that he
changed the data, and it remained changed
until the final submission in January

After Wichmann became Principal of SHS in 1999, shi
eported 0% dropouts for 1999-2000, 0.2% for 2000-2001

1d. according to Lozano, announced the rate for 2001

|

2002 was to be zero while officially predicting a dro}
rate at SHS for the 2001-2002 school year to “be at
below 1.0%.” Wichmann told Kimball, when he challenge
the accuracy of the dropout numbers in November 200%
that she had been instructed by Patterson to produc:
dropouts when she was hired

or apout January 2/, 2UU05, | Wich!
signed and submitted to the Department
State and Federal Compliance the Fall PEIM
Resubmission Approval Report. One of the dat
elements on the report that was approved by D

T
J
Wichmann was the number of dropouts. Th
number was reported as zero. In her testimon
Dr. Wichmann says that she first knew tl

Sharpstown had zero dro)

) DNNYP

about the zero dropouts being reported, the
consistently checked with [Martin], . .
ensure that the data were accurate and the
appropriate documentation was on file. Dr
Wichmann and Ms. Dambrino stated tha
Ms. Martin on numerous occasions assu!
them that everything was in orde)

uadra argues hespondents wrongfully pinns
sponsibility on him, though he 1s ennocent. Th
uncontestable evidence supports his argument, e.g
Cuadra was probably told by Dambrino and Wichmann
to make dropout data changes on October 22, 2002
(only his deposition testimony of the three--Wichmann
Dambrino, and Cuadra--is unambiguous and plausible
Cuadra’s changes were reversed by him according té
HISD’s AFI screens, Dambrino’s notes of October 24
2002, and Wichmann’s and Dambrino’s testimony abou
the dropout status of 30 on Novemeber 6, 2002; Wichman
admitted to Kimball that she had been told by Patterso
to fix the “paperwork” cause of the dropout problem a
SHS; Kimball warned Wichmann by email on Novembe
», 2002 that Melba Martin was inaccuartely reportin;
lropouts, and Martin’s handwriting, with Dambrino
;on the Smoking Gun; and Lozano informed Wichmaz
nd Dambrino of her personal knowledge that the

Wron?y

uadra nad no reason on UCctovdel

i¢chmann’s and Dambrino’s directive t
O |

to believe his obedience wa

e Fifth Circuit states, “In May 200 mba
rote a letter to Lester Blizzard (‘Blizzard’), a Harri
ounty Assistant District Attorney, and alleged tha
sHS administrators, including several of the nam
Respondents], were responsible for the false dro
ut numbers. Blizzard contacted Aldrich

requested a copy of Aldrich’s completed report,
Aldrich sent in June 2003. Aldrich’s report conclude:
that Cuadra knowingly changed student leaver cod:
vithout authorization. Ultimately, Blizzard d

rye eure ( dra Ay

Aldrich was an ex-Houston Police Officer who Blizzard
and his successor Buess both knew. Blizzard conditioned
his request for Aldrich’s complete Report on whether
Aldrich found “sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing”
in his investigation incriminating Cuadra. In that event,
Aldrich was to forward a copy of his Report to Blizzard “for
further prosecution.” Therefore, Aldrich’s transmission of
the Report to Blizzard was not simply Aldrich’s cooperation
with a request by Blizzard for information, but a statement
by Aldrich that he had satisfied Blizzard’s condition and
found evidence which incriminated Cuadra. HISD hired
Hardin for a “makeover” of Aldrich’s investigation an
ordered that Hardin’s effort be sent to District Attorney}
Blizzard. Hardin was provided the accumulated materia
by Aldrich--except Hardin was not told about or giver
the Smoking Gun, which supported Cuadra’s innocenc:
by demonstrating that leaver codes made in Martin’
handwriting® on the document appeared in the TEA
final dropout data for the 30 SHS students, certified by
Wichmann not to be dropouts. Hardin’s re-do of Aldrich’
investigation implausibly concluded, as had Aldrich, that
Cuadra’s change of data was not authorized by Wichman1
or Dambrino, and that Cuadra’s alterations of data o1
October 22, 2002 had caused the submission of false dat:
to the TEA. After receiving both Aldrich’s and Hardin’

report, Blizzard communicated to Hardin’s Drumhelle)

that he was not going to initiate a prosecution agai?

AMaAUSLEC I

6. Martin’s handwriting
orker, Henry. Dambrin

|

) September 200 3 |

eceeded by ADA Terese Bue (“Bur Ww!
slizzard, admittedly viewed the charge:
r which the statute of |

i

as misdemean
mitations barred prosecuti
uess, no stranger to the Bracewell & Giuliani firm (whe

r sister had practiced law ). telephoned Ra sponde
ounsel and reported that the pros ecution wv
arred. Respondents’ counsel ;

1]

upre
il time LO prosecute

‘tatute of limitation
ecution until October
ie felony was

idicated

tatute. bur acquiesced a
felony prosecution, Dut a

espondents with all relevant
th Aldrich

rif

‘Oommunicated v

fold | OZANO K

» dropout of the vear: the zero are

re ordained by Pa I

n: Wichmann and Dambrin

nnette’ presence, ordered Cuadra to return to se
| Tuesday, October 22, 2002 to make data changes in
lder” left at his desk: Tuesdays in October 2002 were d
n Cuadra attended training; there we

Opoutl for SHS on October 2A 2002.

ri -4() report
and 30 re port

t \

Wich

-rincipal Monzon to verify on January 27, 2!
hat he was responsible for dropouts when he was not, J
vhich he was reprimanded; and Respondents withhel

SHS Registrar Carraway’s Documents which

that the final changes to create the zero dropouts had

nade inthe SASI’s MIS screen, and

,

Huess obtained the first indictment against Uua
n October 7, 2005.* Cuadra was arrested and made bond
On October 11, 2005, after Cuadra was indicted, Kimbal]
obtained an interview with Buess and provided her with
documents including the Smoking Gun, whether she knev
it or not. Buess did say in her deposition that she didi
ive great weight to Kimball

in pre-trial communications petween bu

uadra’s defense attorney, Matthew Hennessy, on or about
October 26, 2006, Buess first knowingly received a
the Smoking Gun
It was clear Buess did not recall having the Smoku
run before receiving it from Hennessy on October 2!
2006. Specifically, Buess was asked in her deposition
why the Smoking Gun, received from Hennessy on
October 26, 2006, was “a surprise... if [she] had been
given a copy of that [document] by Kimball on October
11, 2005?” Buess replied, “A [by Buess] Because at that
point, | had so much paper that I wasn’t recalling that |
had that in my file. Q | by Petitioner’s attorney, Watts] You
just didn’t remember it? A [Buess] I didn’t remember it
) | Watts] And you didn’t remember it until after when
lhe initial indictment agai
ut October 22, 2002, Cuadra unlawfully and knowingly ma
i false alteration of a governmental record, namely a public s«
cord (Exhibit A) and Cuadra’s actions were done with inte
defraud and harm another. Exhibit A was the PEIMS D

| by 1? y ; )

Watt {ter the indictments were dismiss«

I don’t remember when. I just realized it wa
hox and I had had it all alanc.” (Emp

4 ?

} >
uwueSS| Wanhl
Lo

hness\

att Hen

2

OSE

a
i

y

wi

KneWU

IMac uln te
nd 228th District Court Grand Juri¢
’ectober of 2005 and May of 2006 all

i eged U!

‘uadra had tampered with the 2002 drop

report from Sharpstown High School.
seeking these indictments, this office
Ipon circumstantial evidence that h:

issembled and examined by the
rofessional Standards, as well as by

iS

r'¢
i t

3

ndependent School District

unsel Rusty Hardin & Associati

rformed an In 1

> | LITO]
; rt

Tense attorney detaliled 1

«A

nanifir Aaf, Ie AMraAIN } pn
ecifie defenses against the aececus

a

Ta)

efenses had not been provided to t]
ince

| Professio 1a] st andard

aArAIhY
{aradl |

Dist

(
tr, |
y 4 ak

yv¥nen reviewing a grant Of Summary judgment, t!
ifth Circuit does so de novo, applying the same standar:
required of the district court. Summary judgment
is improper if the pleading, discovery and disclosures
materials on file, and any affidavits, show that there is a
genuine issue of a material fact. Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d
142, 149 (5th Cir. 2004). The trial court, and therefore the
court of appeals, is compelled to construe all facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party when weighing a motion for summary judgment. Ths
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. An issu
is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonablk
jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. A fact
is “material” if its resolution in favor of one party might
iffect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law
The Fifth Circuit noted, “Cuadra alleges that
Respondents] violated his Fourth Amendment rights |
intentionally withholding infermation and manipulati1

}

idence to procure the indictment.” (App. A. pg. 8a

Uadra Was SUCCESSIVELY INGIctead DY tne granada pial

e

two courts, according to the prosecutor, because th
District Attorney and the grand juries had “relied upor
‘ircumstantial evidence ... assembled and examined b
Aldrich], as well as by [Hardin], who had perform

in lepend mT ey rth] i] ' 21 t } t re Bets sf of HISD’

at CcVa ia

pecifically, fact issue S were ra ] at AVA
san intermediary, would not have sought, and the g1
urles would not have v voted for, indictment of Cuadra. -
Buess had the information provided to her by Cuadra

}

defense attorney, Hennessy, on October 26, 2006, whi
she characterized as “defenses” in her Press Statement

lhe only document provided to her by Hennessy wi

Smoking Gun. Buess did not receive the Smoking Gun

varraway'’s Documents, along with other material f.

Aldric

nt ++

DUCSS de D OS LESUTNOTLY

| 7

it lear t
naware Kimb: m wy provided her wi
Gun on October 11, 2005, and did not bec
the document’s existence amongst the boxes of paper

maintained by her in this case, until later... after Octobe
26, 2006. Buess apparently attempted to help Aldrich an
Hardin when writing her affidavit by stating that neithe
iad the Smoking Gun informati

ave it, and Hardin didn’t |

. . 1

trindad thand ,

(ie CT ft t (i¢)
‘ ‘

i
1 "OVT YT1}]
Wrongtul

eution sh

3S F.2d 1420, 1428 (oth Cir. 1988 App. A, pg. 1Ua.
court then states, “both Buess and two separate gran
juries qualified as independent intermediaries. Cuadra’
mere allegations of ‘taint, without more, are insufficient
to overcome summary judgment. Taylor [v. Gregg], 3
EF. 3d [453] at 457 [(5th Cir. 1994)] (emphasizing that th:
‘taint’ must be shown and finding no summary judgment
evidence to support assertions that an intermediary relied
n an officer’s false report).” /d. (Emphasis added.) Cuadra
alleged specific facts of “taint,” so the court misstated
Cuadra has “not raised a fact issue as to whether an)
f the [Respondents] knowingly withheld the ‘smoking
gun’ document or any other. . . exculpatory information,
thereby tainting Buess’s independent decision to see}
Cuadra’s indictments or either grand jury’s decision tf

-n the indictments.” (App. A, pg. 10a

Aldrich was given the Smoking Gun by Kimb

February 20, 2003, along with information whic!

ipported Cuadra’s innocence of having unilaterally

decided to make changes to student dropout data
October 22, 2002, i.e. without authorization or instr

Wichmann and/or Dambrit

ss or Hardin, but Hardin’s Drumhel

ee Ly

\ “t

ALLit

LOCUTILE TL! pre ULWeu ‘ ( ¢ fit L7T~ESSY. ONE SU: ‘
“These defenses had not been provided to [Aldrich], t!
staff of [Hardin], or the 338th or 228th District C

“ . T - e . = |
Lr! and Juries

Buess’ ignorance of the Smoking Gun was the basi
for Cuadra’s indictments. Specifically, Buess says she ha
boxes of paper related to this case and was surprised t
later see the Smoking Gun document in her files

Most importantly, evidence that the Smoking Gun witl
Martin’s and Dambrino’s handwriting had been knowing]
withheld from Buess is found in the conduct of Aldrich ar
Dambrino on October 26, 2006.

Buess was “blindsided” by Hennessy’s prot

VUUCLIUII

t i
1e Smoking Gun, and the part it played in decipheri
ie time line of post-October 22, 2002 event:

lhe Fifth Circuit remarks that the Smoking Gun}
lated. The Smoking Gun, though undated as to creatio
points to the date of its use in its “leaver codes,” when rea
in light of the TEA’s dropout status for the students. |
becomes very clear that the Smoking Gun was used as
form upon which Martin and Dambrino made their not«

° ]
ind the notes were to turn dropouts into non-arcvnoutl

he prooi that Aldrich and, at least, Damb)
cnowingly withheld from Buess information about tl
Smoking Gun is that on October 26, 2006, Aldrich an
Dambrino discussed Buess’ report of her receipt of th

Smoking Gun, and her questions of where it came fron

ind whose handwriting it bore. Although Dambrino h:

3 1 | } } 4
ritTen oO} rne SMOKMME na iaTrer paanel

her handwriting, Buess wasn’t told. Althoug
Dahetnn, Martin’s supervisor, obviously knew Martin's
handwriting, Buess was told it was not Martin’s
handwriting on the document. Although Henry had
identified Martin’s handwriting on the Smoking Gun t

Hennessy, Aldrich and Dambrino “wouldn’t tell.”

‘he Smoking Gun was not the only informatio1
xculpatory of Cuadra, or at least inculpatory o
Wichmann, Dambrino, Patterson, and Martin, whic!
\ldrich and Dambrino didn’t share with Buess.

Aldrich made no disclosure to Buess of the following
icts: 1) on February 20, 2008, Kimball had verified
Cuadra’s version of the events of October 22-23, 2002;
2) Dambrino recorded in her notes that there were 30
dropouts on October 24, 2002; 3) Lozano told Aldrich
that she personally knew and had reported to Wichmann
and Dambrino that a student listed as a non-dropout had
dropped out to take care of her baby and refused a GED;
and 4) the AF'I screens where Cuadra made his changes on
October 22, 2002 revealed original, pre-October 22, 2002
values even into June 2006. There were other facts not
lisclosed to Buess which Buess conceded in her depositi
uld have been significant
ie Fifth Circuit says that “Cuadra fail
ict issue on several of those elements” to the ce:

j y A
: 2 Ty?)

cult states, “Cuadra has 1 .
» | Respondents] initiated or procured |
‘act. King p) Graham. 126 S.W.3

Pg

information cannot complain if a prosecutor acts on it;
cannot be heard to contend that the prosecutor should hav
known better. Such a person has procured the resulting
prosecution, regardless of the actions of the prosecutor
and the causation element for malicious prosecution
is satisfied.” (EXmphasis added.) When Aldrich and
Dambrino, with Martin, Wichmann, Patterson, and
Bonnette, failed to disclose the Smoking Gun informatio.
or other material facts to Buess to have Cuadra indict
causation was satisfied

Certainly the other common law elements of malicis
prosecution have been satisfied. The criminal actio!
was commenced against Cuadra when Respondent
counsel guided Buess from a time-barred misdemeant
to a nearly time-barred felony in September 2005, and
Aldrich supplied documents and information to Buess t
support the rush to indict. The prosecution was initiated
or continued “by or at the insistence a ei
Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 207 (T

L

1996), or with their varying levels of aid

It is worth noting that Buess never '
read either Aldrich’s or Hardin’s reports, placed by hi
predecessor, Blizzard, in the back of his desk drawe1
Buess only indicates scant knowledge of the accusatior
against Cuadra until she made was she apparent!
believed to be a perfunctory, lawyer-to-lawyer call t
inform Respondent’s counsel, Ms. Schneider-Vogel, of
time-barred misdemeanor prosecution. That conversati:
ignited a felony prosecution. Buess asked Se hneider Vog
and Aldrich for files and documents, forced by the di

if October 22. 200

ioking Gun was not considered exculpatory. (See
i, pg. 10a.) Yet, when considering her conversations
October 26, 2006 with Aldrich, her Press Statement
November 1, 2006, and her deposition testimony, it
clear that, but for the withholding or non-disclosure of t]
smoking Gun, she would not have sought the indictment

ind, but for the production of the Smoking Gun, she wou
Novemb »- 1 Of)

4
4

t have dismissed the indictment on

fant ny? | ¢aont , ' . y
ViaALECrlal [act questions emana

fusal to produce the document, refusal to tell Bue
n October 26, 2006 of Dambrino’s handwriting on tl
locument, and falsely reporting to Buess on October 2

2006 that he had investigated or inquired to discov

_ 5 mawriting ar +} A,

was Martin’

Y) ;

iT} & y ri recy ¢
rit il ivf : LWLIOLILILY 4 t

€@ evidentl. Y i AULA D Il
several. Cuadra was instructed by Wichmann
Dambrino to make changes on October 22, 2002. He mas
the ordered changes on condition that he would revet
hem for Martin to address when available. The changs

}

nd restoration to original values performed by Cuad1
vere in the AFI screen, verifying even in 2009 the lea\
‘odes for the 30 students on the subject dropout rep

emained at pre-October 22, 2002 values. The Smoki1
run reveals that Martin’s handwriting changes the le

odes from dropouts to non-drol

| | ubmitted t my

repor |

pond

iropout leaver codes on Octot

LITVO iT} Ail VV ICI
ents of October 22, 2002, and t!

1 material quest

‘he number of di pou
ctober 24, 2002, down to zero on November 5, 2002, de
» zero on November 5, 2002. back to 30 on Novemhbe
6, 2002, down to zero on December 6, 2002-January
003. At no time in that period v Cuad |
ny SASI data editin;:
In addition to the pane! laliure LI la
ferences in favor of Cuadra, the panel apparently adde
to the state common law elements of malicious prosecutio
ind required Cuadra to create a fact issue as to wheth
iny of the Appelle tive] cht | liet

nr) {

'

ates, “I’o prevail on a malicious prosecution cl
[exas, the Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff to she
that (1) a criminal action was commenced against him; |
the prosecution was caused by the defendant or with |
iid; (3) the action terminated in the plaintiff's favor;
the plaintiff was innocent; (5) the defendant acted with
robable cause; (6) the defendant acted with malice

) the eriminal proceeding damag ci th tT}

vv nen the panel con luded t _uaqdard

act issue as to whether any of the Appellees knowin;

ithheld the ‘smoking gun’ document or any oth

illegedly exculpatory information, thereby tainting Bue

ndependent decision to seek Cuadra’s indictment or eit!
170) '

Press Statement
roft Re ponat

\ithough tne Vall aC)

th Cir. 2004) and Murray v. Harle, 405 k
paid LO constru

516 Ale OLN |

1005), it appears lip-service only | 1

ill facts and inferences in the light most favorable to

nonmoving party when reviewing grants of motion

ummary judgment.” It does not appea)

delved through the record to set forth all of

light most favorable to [Cuadra|
0 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 199

stella got re

nendment CialmM based On an aril

robable cause .... [but] [t]his cireuit ha

|
» placed betore

that once ‘facts supporting an arrest
independent intermediary such a
ntermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation
hese constitutional violations Nevertheless, the:
claims may be maintained if the plaintiff affirmativel
shows that ‘the deliberations of that intermediary we
in some way tainted by the actions of the defendar

, 9 4 ' n (T]

grand jury

APPEALS FOR THE |

NOVEMRE!I

s
c LV ¢ ~ rl
° - > } 4 ”
r —_ — d “ - + “ 4
4 a = a «
“ —" ~~ 4
: eo 4 4°
— . = > > be
4 eT ' » v7 — y « e
. , =) .
- a" — ~ a aan a, +
f ro ad - fp +
- 4 fd . , =
’ . ' p , == rf pnd f ‘ 4
, r J c
. . “ 4 f £ > od ~ ~— " -
P —_ 4 we rré@ ~e 4
> - - 4 rt c ‘
i ? - al and >
P a 4 ~ wd a 8 ~~ a +? 4 ’ 4

one i
. , . na as — ad
—_ ~ ° - ~ ~ ~ —
~, — a ~y os we . -_ - .
P . — ¢
_ J a ah
om GO ~ ial “ _ ns - >
~ a + P 4 . «
: ote Yo r = 4 +4 — -
\ — 7 + ar - > - -
, 4 pe: a) - + —— ys a
y- a] tens! ~/ I. rr ae ar’ r , _ ~/ eo” ¢
> lan pe ») - > A a > Sunt
- — CY. “ { ° + — e mad 1 -
ag (Oe) ope «CQ rr ip / = ‘ ‘ Ae
le | cy —_ aang - A > 4 a f ig
Ne! i @ A) —, - a r J , A - n
A od Puan ° . s ” — he ” 4
eet mee = ¢
Oo_ ~ - > a4 - Ff $. = ~
° + ot ms >— »« - mw. f) a4 Cg
= ~ 4 = vw ~x a be a > e
an (| = = as ~~ . ) “ - —@# OH pot
( a‘ i a _ - ~ oe } of ~ [ " my —
Nee - ~—_ (OF _ ~ i ¢ es SS a r t
oe ~- _ —/ (€ . - ~ me ad e
ly “tl om —{ +4 wd ~ bh + Sn4
[x 7 ‘a f = a P He. w —
N , Co 8 1 “ -— mui & «
~ pmanal ~ . h
‘ = ~ _ ~ $a = o-- ' ~ b —
aan pom ~ n~
5 y%®aas.S 5s MBSE :
a _— ct - Ar) ar 2
-_ co . — a o - 4 + - = a ena » -
| AA rw pa f - rn
os wp x “S ob m4 a tod j ¢ be "a o>
“, + ~ : ° ‘ ay r dow TT ~ ‘
pa ‘ > % % ., Ww Yo Sin te ae ae =
—~ _ ~~ = f “ foun] 4 noe ¢ c ¢ ‘ -
~ on ~ ~~ freset = — a) = » ; 4e
ae ? _ roe A ret a cm ix ( , _
rs : = —_ 2 ome ° “> a aN LO - , :
i eae. a) ae ee: eae ee PE ees j
KH ~~ =~ io wer Cet lo tmnt t.4 “y' ° - + °
~ = rc = ~~ ’ J ‘ a » J
=) » "| om é = ~ + ~
e ~~ , = a - ~ - a
cc oa F a =? , hea BD os oo
pe : raat —~ WwW : 1d ’ - .
at aa —_ U — ‘= pS | _ paar aa .
oS ¢ - 4 4 —@ Olt f ~_ at Ww + ee 4 —
+. | “yh __~ = — CSO oo =r J a)
4+ f ag - ~ a ~ ct fm ¥
— ly = ‘. Tt ae -” h = = b C
one co MN uf ‘ . fy tug °F a j ¢
4 ¢ + r er al ~— 2 es f -
‘2 es | - a , ”
a Ae e —_ ~ CU or ae} 7 he, = os w~ >
AY den - 4 * - — c 4 y - ~*
co ~ we 2 ” ome .
ro all o\ =. - a . ~ “J ’
« 5 wd ~ a one —— 4 Ld ad _ - oo 4- home
~ wo ~ = a. ~~ - ound re — onal 2s ‘ = “
- ~ Se EE oe ~ a ne! - \ b ee apa ja *'
ale = oe dud r ne os * + Aa
- $— — . ot = = ~ r
— + > pas ‘ , + ~ = '
~ * ~ f * ad = ) ~ 4 ~
- — ) — — waked m4 e +—/ 4 .
open A 4 ae + e 2 — j ;
c oe A bm van i f 4 a — “
dana ~ apd 7” wa poten bo ~ de . be ea er « ”
te me : 4D - or “a ~/ = ~~ + ~ % >
¢ a ’ Nf nah . A = be ~ 4 ,
i. ty ip, ~ at an ~ 4 ad ‘ ~—. a > ( =
r ae = " —_ = » ° . as rs 4 — . -
7 ae ae — e AN 2 4 OS we
— — — TP Ae — 4. a ~
ood = 4 —_ y 9
4 = = = ee - » be A, a =
~ —- — ° . — ~ => —_— +
— pas a dun A mm L - oF A + ” ra
} f e ] ard - ~ + “4 out f G.
4d rs ~ —_ my —— ~ 4
. . b. om
= : 4 ts a . 4 pat
: os ‘ aed ~

November

doy
Udy.

i

‘ ri}
C TThh

}
revealed

1OT)

a

}

ht

aD
De di prove e | hy comput é

to d}

SUU00

Hx. I’). Aldrich cal

ave diffieult.

‘ak

i

rt Dee

|
Tet
| ’
‘
|
{

rixro

resolve the issue

t 340; Blackwell
th Cir. 1994). To defeat summary judgment, t
must demonstrate that either (1) the record affirmative
stablishes that probable cause was lacking or (2) enoug

renuine, material factual
elements of probable

tablishes probable cause t
he offense charged. See ¢
43 F.3d 973, 976 (5th ¢

;

3d

7

} #
i

Sponsibilitis

tne aeterminatlo
. i. ne y
LO Dpelleve

nmnroanan
t | Pca

q
cA

tablishes tha

"tf ’ > ae
} i |

| AQOry / A ~. + se 7 }
nello, 357 U.S. at 487, 78S. Ct. 1245). Never ‘

has been acknowledged that “simply obtaining a
indictment is not enough to insulate state actors from al
iction for malicious prosecution under § 1983.” Hand
rary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir. 1988). ‘ ‘The e probabl
-ause for the indictment must not be tainted by malicious
actions” . ghana officials. Cornett v. Longois, 871
F.Supp. 918, 922 (E.D.Tex.1994) (citing Hand, 838 F.2

t 1426). s ‘the absence of evidence that material facts
vere withheld or that the deliberations of the grand jury
r other intermediary were otherwise tainted by thi
ictions of the defendant, however, no liability for maliciou
prosecution can attach. See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 45:
57 (5th Cir. 1994): Hand, 838 F.2d at 1428
n the present Case, the evidence reflects that Aldri
ent his report to the District Attorney’s office only after
Blizzard, the lead prosecutor for the Public Integrity
Division : the District Attorney’s office, requested
(Doc. No. 80, Ex. 26 at 1 3; Doc. No. 130, Ex. V
Pherenfter Buess, who replaced Blizzard as the lead
prosecutor in the Public Integrity Division, reviewed the
file and talked to potential witnesses before exercising
her discretion in deciding to present the information to
rrand jury. The evidence clearly reflects that the decisi:
to seek the indictment was made by Buess (Doc. No
130, Ex. E at 183:6-10), without influence by any of the
Defendants (Doc. No. 180, Ex. E at 189:4-23), and it w:

based on her assessment that probable cause ode 4 te
lo so. (Doe. No. 180, Ex. E at 191:17-25, 192:1-6; 198:23-25
199: 1-12); see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357

4 x ' . ' c ,
1’ / Ss fomynry ACQIZ7INGO TT? t ? r 9a T

>

hat Aldrich’s f:
rosecutor tainted the o
ide his speculation and his c

1O¢

ndisputed evidence «

‘irst, the

hysically alte

vidence does not s Iipperi

knowingly suppressed an’

Doc. No. 130, Ex. E at

he evidence
d unequivocally

vyhich Cuadra refe

Hy at 175:14-2¢

iZew.O7G4e))
T }

yt support Cuadra’s contentions that

uinted by Defendants because there 1
ny of them testified in front of the

99OR.1_1

| at 9 IA: OF 2.

pPerenagants Malntaln flat a

d the evidence does not support,
favor. The Court canne

that the underlyi1
iminal action terminated in his
gree. Favorable termination of the criminal proceedi1
an essential element of § 1983 malicious prosecutio
laim. Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (5t
ir. 1991). The termination of a criminal proceedings d
0 a plea bargain is not considered a favorable terminatio
Taylor, 36 F.3d at 455-56. However, the instant case do
ot involve those circumstances. Rather, the undisputi
facts shows that the prosecutor made the affirmat!
lecision to dismiss the criminal charges against Cuad)
Where the criminal charges against a plaintiff wv
lropped based on the prosecutor’s affirmative decision
prosecute, the Fifth Cireuit has determined that tl]

|

ni T Vorante

ne 1S innocent.

prosecution li

’
alsa :
allC1ous

riminal proceeding

vas innocent of the underlying Clalm. OULL C17
States, 234 F.3d 30 at *1 (5th Cir. 2000). Cuadra allege:
that evidence existed which, if taken together, establishe:
his innocence of any wrongdoing, but the undisputed
evidence refiects that Cuadra admitted to both Kimball
and then later to Aldrich that he had, in fact, changed the
data. (Doc. No. 13, Ex. Z). While Cuadra claims to hav
changed the data back, there is no evidence that he did so
Thus, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorabl
to Cuadra, the evidence offered by Cuadra merely call
into question whether the State would have been able t«
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty o
the crime for which he was indicted; however, consider

the evidence, it does not prove his innoce?
j ,
(ia q

uadra alleges that ne was unlawtull

oreed to make bond for his freedom, suffered restricti\
movement and associations ...” (Doe. No. 34 (PI’s Second
Am. Compl.) at 43-44, 1 2). Defendants maintain tha

Cuadra has failed to establish his claim for false arre

\

Defendants also maintain that the . entit

;

BY » ° j
ualified immunit

ne Fourth Amendment | LOW ONSUItULIE
ght upon a person to be free from unreasonabl
eizures of both his person and effects. Const. AMENI
LV: see also, Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 328 (5t)
ir. 1998). Violation of this right may be grounds fo

uit under 42 U.S. § 1983. Sorenson, 134 F.3d at 328

, } ! ¥ A " ‘
ier to actahlich a k'nyrt \rn nan { f

) ‘ y : ¥ i ~~ + - “)1 ’ |
r ( under Hpeebion Lvs, a plaintitl Ifiu ADI

tate common law elements of false arrest, as well as th
deprivation of a constitutional right. The state commo
law elements require a plaintiff to show that there wa
a (1) willful detention, (2) it was without consent, and (:
without authority of law. Casanova v. City of Brookst
119 F.Supp.2d 6389, 651(S.D. Tex. 2000)

“If there was probable cause for the arrest, a cla
x false arrest is not viable.” Casanova, 119 F. Supp
2d at 651. The Fifth Circuit has held that a grand jury
determination that probable cause exists to issue a
indictment also establishes probable cause for issuing
the warrant to arrest the person charged. Rodrigue:
Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1977); see also
Campbell, 43 F.3d at 976. Here, there is no dispute that
Cuadra was arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest
warrant that was issued after a grand jury determined
probable cause existed to issue an indictment against hin

Doe. No. 80, Ex. 24)

(uadra nevertheless contends that proDdable cau
as lacking because he is innocent. Unfortunately, a
explained by the Supreme Court, “|tlhe Constitution
loes not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested
If it did, § 1988 would provide a cause of action for every
defendant acquitted-indeed, for every suspect released
See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 187, 145 (1979): see also
Casanova, 119 F.Supp.2d at 652 (recognizing that
warrant is valid even though the court, through lack

" ,
rormation or otherwilst Na ied it for the arrest

le |

ndm

YY
LLit
C

TY)
Ail

~

re

}

>
-

TL

.4h

+4
ad
~~
e
pa
,

avid

protect

vould impermissibly
mployee grievance.’
federal court is

which to view
lecisions that
arencies. [citation omit

¥ \

typically have a variety
the sort of personnel

Y? nk | 1 mwiniainc hipt
ALLL S| COTMDIALTIS, ru

lagra alieges

n of his Fourth At

t by «yt

lal he altered stude

by remaining silent to protect

.

prosecution, and Dy

A

gainst him. (Doc

|

Amendment rights by maliciously and falss

evidence, shifting the blame to him, and refusing to tak«

action which could have prevented his indictment, arrest
ind criminal prosecution. (Doc. No. 34 (Pl’s Second Am

Comp)) at 43-44, §§ f-h; see also, Doc. No. 34 at 46, 11 4
1)(i) concerning his Fourteenth Amendment claims

Defendants have moved for summary Judgment
Cuadra’s conspiracy claims based on the intra corporat
conspiracy doctrine. It is true that the Fifth Circuit has
determined that a single legal entity, such as HISD and
its employees, “is incapable of conspiring with itself’
for purposes of the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrins

Hillard v. Ferguson, 30 F. 3d 649, 653 (Sth Cir. 1994); s
also, Hankins v. Dallas Independent School District, 698
F.Supp. 1323, 13830 (N.D.Tex.1988) (claims under § 1985(8)
for conspiracy cannot stand when the plaintiff teacher sue:
a school and its officials because a school and its official

constitute a single legal entity which cannot conspire wit!
itself); Zentgraf v. Texas A & M University, 492 F.Supp
265, 272-273 (S.D.Tex.1980) (University and officials
constitute single legal entity which cannot conspire wit!
itself). However, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrin
does not apply where the corporation conspires wit!
a third-party. See Applied Capital In«

Fr. seasn 2d 1189, 1199 (D. NM 2007° ); Zc

Travel Office, 130 F.Supp.2d 991, 997 (N.D

(citing Mehl v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 670 F. Sup}

N.D. Tl. 1987

Defendant Rusty Hardin. Defendants nevertheles:
maintain that the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine still
applies because Hardin has been dismissed from the case

Defendants refer the Court to no authority in support of
their position. While the Court is not entirely convinced
by Defendants’ argument (Cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27 (1980) (dismissal of judge as a defendant based on
judicial immunity did not negate conspiracy claim)), it
need not resolve the issue because Hardin’ will not be
considered a third-party for purposes of the doctrine

See General Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,

337 F.3d 297,313-14 (8rd Cir. 2008) (absent a showing that
attorney acted for personal reasons, an insured’s claim
that insurer’s attorney conspired with the insurer t
abuse process under the law was barred by intracorporat
-onspiracy doctrine)

Notwithstanding, Veftendants maintain th

» the extent that Cuadra could state a claim that th
defendants, in their individual capacities, conspired t

-

iolate his rights,'’® his claim fails as a matter of la

ld. The evidence reflects that the attorneys at

‘m considered HISD their client insofar as they asserted thi
attorney-client privilege to their communications and billed
HISD approximately $58,000.00 in legal fees for the work the
performed. (See Doc. No. 130, Ex. J (Andy Drumheller Depositio1

Pee

4 4 AA :
rN A? | j } , - y j . a ?
ha ALU LLI ra | t/ LS i¥J oo Ren

.n. 30 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (recognizing that an actionable clai1
night exist where defendants act for their own personal benefits

o + } } + —- > > > +34 7 I
- f } r } , ser ‘ , |
Oppt Sed | eP Dé ] 0} eT ILS Ve j it ¢

because he cannot pr le requ}
conspiracy claim and, by failing to establ in ;
deprivation of his constitutional rights, Defendant
entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 80 at 61]
73). The Court agrees

In order to establish a prima
under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate

]

agreement between persons Send inder color of |:
to commit an illegal act, and (2) an actual deprivation |
the plaintiff's constitutional rights s in furtherance of tl
conspiracy. Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th C

1995). To acme the plaintiff must plead specific fa
that, if proved, would establish the elements of the clai1
Marts v. Hines, 68 F.3d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1995). It is tru
that an agreement may be inferred from circumstanti
evidence, however, the circumstantial evidence mu
be “sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclud
that a meeting of the minds had occurred and that t)
parties had an understanding to achieve the conspirac
objectives.” Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 665-66 (71
Cir. 2002). A plaintiff’s mere conclusory allegations
a conspiracy are insufficient to support a claim unde
§ 1983. Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987). Her:
aside from his beliefs or speculation, Cuadra offers 1
evidence to support his claims that Defendants engag:

in a conspiracy. Cuadra’s claim also fails becau

F.Supp.1258, 1261 (&.D. Tex. 1992) (noting that, wi
cannot conspire with itself, a conspiracy may be estab
individual de fendants are named and those defendant

the scope of their en ) rT nt for

' 2 | } 1 ot 2 | + Sk ‘
Lt Stablisneg af} a\ Luda! dep) lVavl

H‘ourteenth Amendment right

HISD Board’s Liability Under

Defendant HISD moves for summary judgm«¢
uadra’s claim of governmental liability. (Doc. No. 80 a
93-61). In particular, Defendant maintains that Cuadra’
claims against it are time-barred; that his allegation:
cannot be attributed to an HISD policymaker; that ther
no evidence of an “official policy”; and, even assuming
an official policy existed, there is no evidence that it wa
the moving force behind the alleged violations of Cuadra
nstitutional rights. (/d. at 61)

In Monell v. Di partment of soc. Servs. of New 2
ie Supreme Court concluded that a municipality i:
“person” within the meaning of § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t
of Social Servs., 486 U.S. 658, 689 (1978). The Court
liminated respondeat superior liability for governmental
inits when it held that a municipality may not be sued
under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employee:
Id. at 694. “Instead, it is when execution of a government

17. Insofar as Cuadra attempts to plead new claims in ]
tesponse (e.g., HISD and/or Stripling and/or Patterson and
r Wichmann failed to implement appropriate training ar
upervision of Martin, Bonnette, Dombrino, Wichmann, Patterso
ind Aldrich not to engage in [unJethical behavior and accurate
report student data), that were not alleged in his Second Amends
omplaint, Defendants’ have objected to any such attempt. (D:

34 at 13). Defendant ect ure tained

|

tom, whether made by its lawmaker:

policy or cus
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government

in entity is responsible under § 1983.” /d. at 694

Congress did not intend to impose liability
municipality under § 1983 unless deliberate action
attributable to the municipality itself is the “moving force’
behind the plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights. Board
of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 400 (1997). The Brown Court further stated that
a § 1988 plaintiff must “show that the municipal action wa
taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal
action and the deprivation of federal rights.” /d. at 404
Thus, to prevail on a claim for school district liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof by the plaintiff o!
(1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy or custom; and (3
a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving forces

the policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houstor
237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Monell v. Dept
Social Services. 436 U.S. 658. 694 (1978&))

iS

Defendant initially argues that the Superintendent
SHS principal and other SHS employees that Cuadr
identifies in his amended complaint are not “policymaker
for purposes of imposing § 1983 liability. Defendant

18. In his Second Amended Complaint, Cuadr:
HISD Superintendents Stripling, DeWalt, Patterson, Saav
ind SHS principal Wichmann as the poli

1D:6.9D

correct 1n tnell position. ine 1agentity of the nin:

policymakers whose conduct can create lability |
letermined by state law. In fivera v. Houston Indep
School Dist., 349 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2008), the Fifth Circuit
held that under Texas law, the Board of Trustees, not the
Board in combination with any subordinate school district
officials (2.e. teachers, principals, and superintendents), |
he “official policymaker” for purposes of § 1983 liability
ld. at 247-48. Although principais and superintendent:
might have “decision-making authority” under the Texa:
Education Code, they do not have “the policymaking
wuthority required to sustain liability under § 19838.” Se
d. at 248. The Fifth Circuit stated that “the Board is th
ne and only policymaker for HISD,” and the Board ha
ot delegated any policymaking authority to subordinate
chool district personnel. See 2d. (“ [‘T{his delegation «
lecision-making authority [to the principal] does no
egate the fact that both under Texas law, and the Board

wn policie , final policyn iking thor) 7
th the Board.
adra ClallIMl Le } LE LRADLLIVY Ue

because he has failed to show any violation that woul
attributable to a “policymaker” for HISD. Cuad)
innot impute the actions of either the superintendent
r the principal to the HISD Board for purposes of § 192
ability. Brittany B. v. Martinez, 494 F.Supp.2d 534, 5
W.D.Tex.2007). In addition, while Cuadra attempt

} \ (
vue that a aelepation ol dee) ion-nN aking LO SLrip!

55a
Appendix C

3d at 248; see generally, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
A85 U.S. 112, 125 (cautioning that “a federal court would
not be justified in assuming that municipal policymaking
authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable
law purports to put it.”).

Notwithstanding the lack of a Defendant with official
policymaking authority, Cuadra cannot establish a basis
for imposing liability on the school district for another
reason. As asserted by HISD, Cuadra has presented
no evidence of a policy, practice, or custom of deliberate
indifference that was the moving force in a violation of his
rights; nor does HISD have a policy of being deliberately
indifferent to the rights of its employees. In order to
prevail on his § 1988 claim against HISD, Cuadra must
show that his constitutional rights were violated through
the execution of an official policy or custom properly
attributable to the school board itself. Hugene v. Alief
Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.8d 1299, 1304 (5th Cir.1995). It is
not enough for Cuadra to merely identify conduct properly
attributable to the district; he must also demonstrate
that, through its deliberate conduct, the custom or policy
of the district was the “moving force” behind the injuries
alleged. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 216
(5th Cir.1998); Brown, 520 U.S. at 403.

Kor purposes of the § 1983 claim against HISD,
“official policy” is:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision that is officially adopted and
promulgated by the [district’s] lawmaking

hoa
Appendix C

officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers
have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice
of [district] officials or employees which,
although not authorized by officially adopted
and promulgated policy, is so common and
well settled as to constitute a custom that.
fairly represents [district] policy. Actual or
constructive knowledge of such custom must
be attributable to the governing body of the
[district] or to an official to whom that body had
delegated policy-making authority.

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th
Cir.1984). Of course, Cuadra has not presented evidence
of a formal “policy statement” of maliciously prosecuting,
falsely arresting or engaging in retaliatory criminal
prosecution against employees who speak out about issues
that was “officially adopted and promulgated” by the
board. In fact, Cuadra has coneeded that the HISD has
policies that prohibit retaliation against an employee who
exercises his constitutional rights. (See Doe. No. 34 at 48,
{| a.(2).ii). Rather, relying on the second definition of “official
policy,” Cuadra essentially argues that the HISD Board
established an informal custom of ignoring or condoning
the actions of its Superintendents or principals when they
are maliciously prosecuting, falsely arresting or engaging
in retaliatory criminal prosecution against employees who
speak out on issues such that it constituted official Board
policy, and that this policy was the moving force behind
the alleged violation of Cuadra’s constitutional rights.

ola
Appendix C

Cuadra’s conclusory allegations are not sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact to defeat Defendant's
summary judgment motion. Further, no evidence shows
that HISD’s Board had actual or constructive knowledge
of any such alleged custom or practice.

Finally, even assuming Cuadra could show the
Board was not assiduous in preventing its supervisory
employees from maliciously prosecuting, falsely arresting
or engaging in retaliatory criminal prosecution against
employees who speak out on issues, this does not
demonstrate that the Board was deliberately indifferent
towards the constitutional rights of Cuadra. The evidence
not only reveals HISD’s appropriate actions upon learning
of the reporting issues, but the evidence also reveals
that Defendants’ actions prior to the media reports were
appropriate and satisfied any duty owed to Cuadra. The
evidence in this case is insufficient as a matter of law
to establish that HISD maintained a policy, custom or
practice of maliciously prosecuting, falsely arresting or
engaging in retaliatory criminal bed. SA against its
employees or Cuadra.

G. Punitive Damages

Cuadra has asserted a claim for punitive damages
against Defendant HISD, however, as a matter of law,
punitive damages are not recoverable against a publie
school district such as HISD. See, City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (198); Mosley v.
Houston Community College, 951 F.Supp. 1279, 1290
(S.D. ‘Tex. 1996).

Appendix (
CONCLUSION

Kor all the reasons discussed herein, the Court
RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 80) be GRANTED; that Plaintiff's
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 87) be
DENIED; and that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint

be DISMISSED, with prejudice, in its entirety.

The Clerk SHALL send copies of this Report and
Recommendation to the Parties. The Parties SHALL
have until September 1, 2009, to have written objections,
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 686(b)(1)(C), physically on
file in the Office of the Clerk. The Objections SHALL be
electronically filed or mailed to the Clerk’s Office at P.O
Box 61010, Houston, Texas 77208. Any Objections filed
SHALL be contained in a written document specifically
entitled “Objections to the Report and Recommendation
of the Magistrate Judge”, which will then be forwarded
to the District Judge for consideration. Failure to file
written objections within the prescribed time SHALL bar
the aggrieved party from attacking on appeal! the factual
findings and legal conclusions aecepted by the District
Judge, except upon grounds of plain error

DONE at Galveston, Texas. this 17th dav of Augu
Z0QY

JOHN R. FROESCHNER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDG

ova
APPENDIX D — ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,
FILED JANUARY 19, 2011

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAI
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Appeal from the United States District Court for tl
Southern District of Texas, Houston

No. 09-20715

KENNETH CUADRA

HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT;
CAROL WICHMANN; MARMION DAMBRINOQO;
BILLY ALDRICH; BETH BONNETTE; MELBA

MARTIN; ANNE PATTERSON,
Defendants-Appelle

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANG

(Opinion 11/17/10, 5 Cir., , 3d

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY
HAYNES, Cireuit Judges

AT)

as a Petition for Panel Rehearing, the Petition
for Panel Rehearing is DENIED. No member
of the panel nor judge in regular active service
of the court having requested that the court be

polled on Rehearing En Bane (Fep. R. App. P
and 5™ Cir. R. 35), the Petition for Reh

venearills

lreating the Petition for Rehearing En |

Kin Bane is DENIED

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_1134%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
