# Appendix — College Standard Magazine v. Student Ass'n of the State University of New York at Albany

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2011
- **Citation:** 563 U.S. 969

## Text

APPENDIX

Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (July 1, 20130)................................... la

Decision of the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of New York (August 8, 2005)
(Excerpt of Transcript Proceedings containing
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Amended Decision of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of New York (February 6,
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Decision of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York (October 18,
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Order denying Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing
en banc of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (September 20, 2010) .................... 18a

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

COLLEGE STANDARD
MAGAZINE, JEFFREY SCOTT
BAREA, AND JULIEN A.M.

STARR,
No. 07-0891

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vU.

STUDENT ASSOCIATION OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK AT
ALBANY’,

Defendants-Appellants.

Argued: December 22, 2008.
Decided: July 1, 2010

Before: NEWMAN, CALABRESI, and SACK, Circuit
Judges. Judge Calabresi concurs in a separate
opinion

PER CURIAM:

* The State University of New York at Albany, named as a
defendant in the Verified Complaint, was voluntarily dismissed
while this case was pending in the district court.

2a

Defendant Student Association (the “SA”) of the
State University of New York at Albany (“SUNY-
Albany”) appeals from a decision of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
New York granting summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs College Standard Magazine (“CSM”), a
campus organization that publishes a_ politically
conservative newspaper, and its founders, Jeffrey
Barea and Julien Starr, on their challenge under the
First Amendment to a policy pursuant to which the
SA distributed funds comprising the proceeds of a
mandatory student activity fee to student groups.
The district court concluded that the policy was
facially unconstitutional because it vested in the SA
“unbridled discretion” to decide how to distribute the
funds, thereby presenting an impermissible risk of
viewpoint discrimination, and because unwritten
guidelines allegedly employed by the SA in making
funding decisions improperly implicated’ the
viewpoint of putative recipients.

The plaintiffs were denied funding under the
challenged policy in February of 2003. They initially
challenged the policy both facially and as-applied.
After the district court ruled in their favor on the
facial challenge, the plaintiffs stipulated to the entry
of summary judgment against them on the as-
applied challenge from which they cannot and have
not appealed. Thus the plaintiffs have conceded, for
present purposes, that they suffered no harm from
the denial of funding to their organization under the
challenged policy.

This appeal therefore concerns only the plaintiffs'
facial challenge to the policy. But the funding policy
challenged by the plaintiffs is no longer in place at

3a

SUNY-Albany. The SA amended its constitution in
the Spring of 2003 to include regulations on funding
that explicitly require viewpoint neutrality. The
plaintiffs have made clear that this lawsuit does not
challenge the new funding policy, and there is no
indication that the former, challenged funding policy
will be reinstated.

We are thus’ asked to _ consider’ the
constitutionality of a funding policy that is no longer
in effect, and that is not alleged to have caused the
plaintiffs harm when it was in effect. This we cannot
do. We are restricted to deciding “actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried
into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles of law which cannot affect the matter in
issue in the case before [us].” Local No. 8-6, Oil,
Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v.
Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 367, 80 S.Ct. 391, 4 L.Ed.2d
373 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted).

There is no judgment we could issue here that
could be effective. Even if we could enjoin the
challenged policy now that it has been repealed, that
is not the remedy the plaintiffs are currently
seeking. In their stipulation, they have agreed that
“with regard to the claim in the complaint that the
defendant Student Association's policies for
allocating mandatory student activity fee money to
recognized student groups in effect on February 14,
2003 were unconstitutional on [their] face, the
plaintiffs are entitled to an award of nominal
damages in the amount of one dollar ($1.00) upon
the [District] Court's determination set forth in the
transcript of the Court's bench Decision.” See

4a

Stipulation of Settlement and Order, College
Standard Magazine v. Student Ass'n of the State
Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, No. 03 Civ. 0505 (N.D.NLY.
Mar. 30, 2005), Doc. No. 107 (Feb. 2, 2007). The
district court's judgment, from which the plaintiffs
have not cross-appealed, similarly reflects that the
parties stipulated to an amount of damages in the
total sum of $1.00, without any mention of an
injunction. And we could not order damages for any
harm the policy inflicted on the plaintiffs because
the as-applied challenge has been conceded. Any
declaration that the policy was unconstitutional
would be strictly advisory. Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 482
U.S. 755, 761, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987)
(“The real value of the judicial pronouncement-what
makes it a proper judicial resolution of a ‘case or
controversy rather than an advisory opinion-is in
the settling of some dispute which affects the
behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.”)
(emphasis 1n original).

In light of the repeal of the challenged policy and
the concession as to the as-applied challenge, we
cannot issue a decision that would confer any relief
to the plaintiffs and therefore lack jurisdiction over
this appeal. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v.
United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121
L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (‘appeal must be dismissed” as
moot where court cannot grant “ ‘any effectual relief
whatsoever’ ”) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651,
653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895)); see also Ky.
Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 645 (6th
Cir.1997) (referring to “general rule that legislative
repeal of a statute renders a case moot”); cf. City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289,
102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) (upholding

5a

justiciability of challenge to practice that City had
voluntarily ceased but planned to reinstate).

The parties' failure to raise in their briefs the
question of whether this appeal is moot for the
foregoing reasons does not allow us to proceed
despite the absence of a live case or controversy.
“{[W]e have an independent obligation to consider the
presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte.” Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d
Cir.2006); see also, e.g., Muhammad v. City of New
York Dep't of Corr., 126 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d
Cir.1997) (mootness is an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction).

For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed as
moot and the judgment of the district court is
vacated.! “It is well established that, when a matter
becomes moot on appeal, federal appellate courts
will generally vacate the lower court's judgment
except where actions attributable to one of the
parties rendered the appeal moot....” Catanzano uv.
Wing, 277 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.2001) (nternal
quotation marks omitted). See United States uv.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40, 71 S.Ct. 104,
95 L.Ed. 36 (1950); see also Van Wie v. Pataki, 267
F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that vacatur
“avoids giving preclusive effect to a judgment never
reviewed by an appellate court” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Cf. Russman v. Bd. of Educ. of

1 Because we vacate the judgment of the district court on
the basis of the mootness of the appeal, we need not determine
whether this case was moot while it was pending before the
district court, which it may have been. See concurring opinion
of Calabresi, J. If it was, of course, we would also be required to
vacate the district court's decision for that independent reason.

6a

Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of City of Watervliet, 260
F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir.2001) (noting exception to
general rule of vacatur where “appellant has caused
the mootness’”).2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, and the district court
judgment is vacated. The case is remanded to the
district court and the court is directed to dismiss the
Verified Complaint as moot.

2 The actions of the appellant SA did not cause the
mootness. The challenged policy had already been repealed
before the district court ruled on the facial challenge. Following
that ruling, the parties stipulated to the entry of summary
judgment against the plaintiffs on the as-applied challenge,
thus effectively agreeing that the plaintiffs had suffered no
harm from the policy. Cf. Russman, 260 F.3d at 122 (“[W]Jhen
the appellee has caused the case to become moot, we vacate the
district court’s judgment to prevent the appellee from
insulating a favorable decision from appellate review.”).

la

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with everything substantive in the per
curtam opinion! and join it in full. I add a few lines
because I think it is worthwhile to point out that this
case was in fact moot at the district court level.

In Spring 2003, the defendant Student
Association abolished the challenged funding policy.
In September 2005, the district court granted the
Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion as to liability.
In October 2006, the parties entered into the
stipulation that-we have held-caused this case to
become moot. Then, in February 2007, final
judgment was entered, and the Student Association
timely appealed.

The event which led us to find that this case is
moot happened between the district court's grant of
summary judgment and the entry of final judgment
below. I write to underscore that even after
summary judgment has been granted, if, before the
entry of final judgment, something occurs that
causes a case to cease to be an Article III case or
controversy, that action becomes moot and should be
dismissed forthwith. This is so because the “case-or-
controversy requirement subsists through all stages
of federal judicial proceedings,” Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Altman
v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 70 (2d
Cir.2001).

1 [ would, however, for the sake of Latin, substitute “[nostra
)’ for “sua ” in the quotation from Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d
87, 89 (2d Cir.2006), ante, at 35.

8a

Moreover, the fact that the case was moot before
the district court entered final judgment forecloses
any possible claim by the Plaintiffs for attorneys'
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “Whether [a plaintiff]
can be deemed a ‘prevailing party’ in the District
Court, even though its judgment was mooted after
being rendered but before the losing party could
challenge its validity on appeal, is a question of some
difficulty.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 483, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400
(1990); see also Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587
F.3d 445, 454 (1st Cir.2009) (answering the question
in the affirmative and collecting other cases doing
the same). But that question cannot arise in this
case. “Since the judgment below is vacated on the
basis of an event that mooted the controversy before
the [district court's] judgment issued, [the Plaintiffs
were} not, at that stage, ... ‘prevailing part[ies]’ as
[they] must be to recover fees under § 1988.” Lewis,
494 U.S. at 483, 110S.Ct. 1249.

9a
(Excerpt of Transcript Containing Decision)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE STANDARD
MAGAZINE, et al.

Plaintiffs,
03-CV-505

-versus-

(DECISION)
STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW YORK AT ALBANY,
et al.,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held in and
for the United States District Court, Northern
District of new York, at the James T. Foley United
States Courthouse, 445 Broadway, Albany, New
York 12207, on MONDAY, AUGUST 8, 2005, before
the HON. THOMAS J. McAVOY, United States
District Court Judge.

THE COURT: This case is back before the Court
on a motion for reconsideration. Familiarity with the
background and the prior decision in this case is
assumed. Plaintiffs move for reconsideration on the
ground that the Court did not address. their
argument that defendants’ unwritten funding

10a

policies are unconstitutional on their face. The
defendants cross move for reconsideration on the
ground that the Court failed to consider plaintiffs
lack of evidentiary proof that the opinions of certain
student association members may have tainted a
majority of the voting student association members
and that such taint led to the denial of funding.

Plaintiffs argue that the student association’s
unwritten funding policy is unconstitutional on its
face because it gives the student association
unbridled discretion and because defendants
admitted having taken into consideration such
factors as the number of active members in the
organization and whether the organization was
active on the campus and accessible to a wide group
of students.

Although the student association did not have
any written internal policies at the time plaintiffs
applied for funding, it did have to work within the
boundaries of 8 New York Rules and Regulations
Section 302.14(c)(3). Thus, it did have some
limitations. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with
plaintiff that there is insufficient evident of adequate
standards to avoid the problem of unbridled
discretion. This Court adopts the reasoning in
Southworth v. Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin, 307 F. 3d 566, 578 and 579, wherein the
Seventh Circuit held that a prohibition on unbridled
discretion is an element of viewpoint neutrality. See
also Forsyth County Georgia v. The Nationalist
Movement, 12 S. Crt. 2395. The existence of
unabridged discretion presents the risk that the
decisionmaker — here, the student association — will
use its broad discretion to favor or disfavor speech

lla

based on its content. Southworth at 579. Although
New York State regulations discussed above provide
very broad categories of purposes for which funding
may be allocated, it does not set out a mechanism for
approving or disapproving funding requests or
otherwise allocating funding among _ recognized
student organization.

As mentioned in the Court’s prior ruling from the
bench, the defendants have admitted not having a
written policy. To the extent that defendants did
have standards, they admitted to using criteria such
as the number of active members in the recognized
student organization, whether the recognized
student organization was active on campus, how
accessible the recognized student organization was
to students, and whether the recognized student
organization was a small group who merely wanted
money for a party. There’s also evidence that
defendants believed they could be denied funding for
any reason at all.

Several of these written factors, however, can be
related to speech or viewpoint. As the Seventh
Circuit noted in Southworth, quote, the University
cannot use the popularity of the speech as a factor in
determining funding, close quote. Southworth, at
594. Thus, for example, looking to the number of
active members in the recognized = student
organization can be seen as getting involved in
issues concerning the popularity of a particular
recognized student organization. Granting funding
based on the number of students in the organization
can be seen as treating minority viewpoints
differently from majority viewpoints. While the
number of students in the organization may in

12a

certain circumstances be a legitimate factor in
determining the amount of financing, see
Southworth, 307 F. 3d at 595, it is not proper in
determining whether to grant funding at all. The
Seventh Circuit further noted in Southworth that,
quote, consideration of the length of time in
organization has been in existence and the amount
of funding an organization has received in the past
discriminates against less traditional viewpoints,
end quote. Southworth at 594. The reasoning in
Southworth equally applies here to consideration of
the number of members in an organization and
whether the recognized student organization is
accessible to a wide range of students and how active
the group was on campus. An organization with less
popular viewpoints I unlikely to have many member,
may not have the resources to be as active as more
popular groups, and may be less known or less
interesting to a wide range of students. Nonetheless,
as noted, a group holding less popular viewpoints is
not entitled to any less First Amendment protection
than any other groups. Accordingly, the Court find
that the largely unbridled discretion afforded the
student association, coupled with the improper
factors it used in its unwritten policy, were facially
invalid.

Because plaintiffs raised the facial invalidity of
the funding policies in their motion for summary
judgment and the Court did not consider the facial
validity of the funding policy in light of defendants’
contentions concerning its claimed unwritten policy,
plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is granted.
Accepting defendants’ facts as true, and assuming
they did have such as unwritten policy, the student
association’s unwritten policy allows for too much

l3a

discretion. The student association’s policy also
takes into consideration factors that are improperly
related to the content of the speech. Accordingly,
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be
granted. Because the Court finds the student
association’s funding policy to have been facially
unconstitutional, the Court need not address
defendants’ motion for reconsideration. Accordingly,
that motion is denied.

Plaintiffs shall submit an order on notice to
defendants within 11 days of today’s date.

(Court adjourned at 10:40 AM.)

l4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE STANDARD
MAGAZINE, et al.

Plaintiffs,
AMENDED
v.
Judgment in a Civil
STATE UNIVERSITY OF Case

NEW YORK AT ALBANY,
et all., Case No. 1:03-CV-
505

Defendant.

JURY VERDICT. This action came before this
Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been
tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

DECISION BY COURT. This action came to
trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have
been tried or heard and a decision has been
rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED pursuant
to plaintiffs’ [11] Notice of Dismissal dated May
13, 2003, the complaint was _ voluntarily

dismissed against defendant, State University of
New York at Albany.

15a

As to the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First
Amendment right violations, the Court granted
plaintiffs summary judgment against defendant,
The Student Association of the State University
of New York at Albany, finding that such student
association funding policy owas deemed
unconstitutional in accordance with Senior Judge
Thomas J. McAvoy’s [90] Order dated September
3, 2005. The parties have stipulated to the
amount of damages in the total sum of $1.00 as
placed upon the record on October 11, 2006.

Dated: February 6, 2007

Lawrence K. Baerman
Clerk of Court

s/ C.M. Ligas

By: Deputy Clerk

16a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE STANDARD
MAGAZINE, et al.

Plaintiffs,
AMENDED

U.
Judgment in a Civil

STATE UNIVERSITY OF Case
NEW YORK AT ALBANY,
et al., Case No. 1:03-CV-
505

Defendant.

_. JURY VERDICT. This action came before this
Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been
tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

xx DECISION BY COURT. This action came to
trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have
been tried or heard and a decision has been
rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED pursuant
to the plaintiffs’ [11] Notice of Dismissal dated
May 13, 2003, the complaint was voluntarily

dismissed against defendant, State University of
New York at Albany.

As to the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First
Amendment right violations, the Court granted

17a

plaintiffs summary judgment against defendant,
The Student Association of the State University
of New York at Albany, finding that such student
association funding’ policy owas deemed
unconstitutionai in accordance with Senior Judge
Thomas J. McAvoy’s [82] Order dated July 9,
2005; however, the Court did not reach a decision
as to the remaining cause of action relating to the
discriminatory voting practices. The parties have
stipulated to the amount of damages in the total
sum of $1.00 as placed upon the record on
October 11, 2006.

Dated: October 18, 2006

Lawrence K. Baerman
Clerk of Court

s/ C.M. Ligas
By: Deputy Clerk

18a

UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEAL FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Filed September 20, 2010

At a stated Term of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel
Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500
Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 20th
day of September, two thousand-ten,

x

Docket No. [s]: 07-0981-cv

College Standard Magazine, Jeffrey Scott
Barea, and Julien A.M. Starr,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.

Student Association of the State University
of New York at Albany,

Defendant-Appellant.

xX

Appellees College Standard Magazine, Jeffrey
Scott Barea and Julien A.M. Starr filed a petition for
panel rehearing, or in the alternative, for rehearing
en banc, and the panel that determined the appeal
having considered the request for panel rehearing,
and the active members of the Court having
considered the request for rehearing en banc.

19a

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition be
denied.

FOR THE COURT:

s/Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_0757%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
