# Reply Brief of Petitioner — Chicago, M. & St. PR Co. v. Coogan

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief of Petitioner
- **Published:** January 1, 1926
- **Citation:** 271 U.S. 472

## Text

APR15 1

Noa 268 WM. R. Sian

Supreme Court of the United States

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & St. Patt RAtway Company,
Petitioner,

Vs.

Epirn F. CooGaAn, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE Es-
TATE OF WILLIAM CooGAN, DECEASED, Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF AND ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER.

IF. W. Roor,
C. O. NEWCOMB,
A. C. ERDALL,
29 Milwaukee Station,
Minneapolis, Minnesota,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Of Counsel:
0. W. Dynes, Esq.,
Chicago, Illinois.

Hayward Brief Company, 601-607 Fourth Ave. So., Minneapolis

Pi
i > ls Set
Ss, aR ttt, arene
ee et WA e es : That he was standing in oa steeping position and bis

foot slipped baek.

6. That at the time he was at the point where the iron

air pipe was bent or bulged.

7 That at the time of the accident he was standing with

his right foot inside and lett foot outside the rails.

S. That his left shoe did not have a dent on the counter
before the accident.

9 That the dent in the counter of the left shoe. first
noticed some time after the funeral was enused in the aeei

dent.

10. That the shoe did not become seratcehed or dented

While on the floor of the undertakers garage.

11. That the shoe was indented in the accident but not
on account of hitting some part of the ear. rail pebble. tie
or air pipe line,

1.) That the dent in the shoe was caused by the shoe
and foot being eaught under the round air pipe line.

3. That while his foot was fastened under the round
air pipe his clothing was caught in the rigging of the ear

and he was thrown under the train and run over.

AUTIIORITIES.

In her brief, respondent quotes from the case of ( aiou
Pacific Company ¢. HWierall, 2A VOR. SIS AS Sup. Ct. Rep.
IST. In the Huxell case it was claimed that the power brake
on the locomotive was defective. The engineer was notified
instantly that the engine had strnuek a oman and he imme
diately applied the brake. The proof showed that if the
power brake was in good order the engine conld have been
stopped in eight or ten feet and the proof showed it actually
moved [35 feet. Tuxolls arm was run ever by the middle
driving wheel. This is, of course, considerably more than ten
feet from either end of the engine. In that case. therefore,
there were facts in evidence from which the inference could
reasonably be drawn that the defective power brake was the
proximate cause of Huxolls fatal injuries.

In the present case it has net been shown that the bend
in the air pipe line or that the air pipe line had anything
to do with the accident or that the accident occurred at the
point where the air pipe line was bent. On the contrary, the
evidence shows the accident cecurred from 15 to 35 feet east
of the bend in the air pipe.

In the Huxoll case the defective power brake was applied
to stop the engine and the only inference which it wees
necessary for the jury to decide in the Huxoll case was what
effec: the defect in the power brake had in the stopping of
the engine and whether or not THuxell would have been
killed if the power brake had been in good condition. In
the instant case there is no causal connection between the
air pipe line and the accident.

Respondent cites Wyers rv. Pittsburgh Coal Company, 233

U.S. Sd, 34 Sup. Cr. Rep. Sot, which reverses an opinion

bee

of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Third Cireuit, to-wit :
Pittshurgh Coal Co. vr. Myers, 208 Federal 221. Petitioners
were not aware that this case had been decided by the United
States Supreme Court when cited in their brief. We con-
sidered this case as a rather extreme one and were inelined
to be skeptical of the soundness of the decision. Neverthe
less, in as much as it was a decision of the Circuit: Court
of Appeals we felt that it should be given some weight uncil
overruled by the United States Supreme Court. Tt will be
noted that the case was cited without comment. The United
States Supreme Court brought out certain facts mot) dis-
closed in the opinion of the Cirenit: Court of Appeals. on
the Mvers case the decedent was a brakeman on an electric
train used underground ina coal mine. The electrie motor
kicked several cars to make a movement known as a flying
switeh. Decedent at this time and when last seen alive was
sanding on the bumper of the last ear. The flying switch
was made and the cars proceeded down on the track on which
they were to move. Shortly thereafter the electrie motor
in following these cars ran over Myers. In the immediate
Vieinity of the accident an electric wire crossed the track
only five feet and eight inches above the rails and it) was
shown that at this height a man standing on the car would
be struck by the wire. Myers’ hat with a lighted lantern
upright lay beside him at the time he was run ever. The
headlight on the electric engine was defective so that Myers
Was not noticed on the track and it wis shown that if the
light had been in proper condition Myers could have been

seen and the engine stopped,

The Cirenit Court of Appeals’ decision did not bring out
the fact that Myers was alive when run over. The United

States Supreme Court decision showed this fact and showed

15

that he was alive even after he was run over. The Supreme
Court decision also brought out the fact that he was a voung
man of unusual strength and vigor immediately before the
aecident, On page 22h of the Circuit Court of Appeals’ de-
cision the Cirenit Court indicated that it was of the opinion
that Myers may have been killed by the current in the wire
or by the fall from the ear. The United States Supreme
Court decision brings out the fact that this could not be
true because he was alive after being run over by the electric
motor The evidence was sneh that the jury contd prop:
erly find that Myers was not killed by coming in contact
with the wire and could find that he was run over and
killed on account of the defective headlight. The United
States Supreme Court decision as indicated brought out the
faet that he was an excellent pliysieal specimen and it was
also shown that the voltage in the wire was intermittent
only and that it was doubtful whether or not the voltage
would be of sufficient strength to materially injure the man
in question. We think it clear. therefore, that the Myers
cause is not controlling.

On page 16 of her brief respondent quotes from the case of
Chesepeake & Ohio Raiticay vr. Ware, 95 8. Eo 1838, whieh in
turn cites Hinshaw rv. State, VAT Ind. 334. The rule stated
in the case just mentioned seems to be in conflict with the
rule laid down by this Court. The correct rule is stated in
Inited States vr. Ross, 92 US. TOT. 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281
at 2St. and is as follows:

“A presumption which the jury is te make is nota
circumstance in proof: it is not, therefore. a legitimate

foundation for a presumption.”

The inference must be drawn from a faet proved in the

case, This is rather aptly expressed in Reading Company v.

oithtaeeremcitien

cos |

ee ———

Royer (Cirenit Court of Appeals, Third Cirenit) 6 PL ¢2d)
ISS. at page IS6. In this case Brakeman Bover was last
seen getting off the engine that ran over him. [Tt was claimed
that he stepped on the ground and lest his footing for the
reason that at the place in question the track was unhal
lasted and that he fell ander the train in consequence there
of and was killed. The Court said:

“As there were other wavs in which Bover might
have met his death which did net invelve negligence of
the defemdant, the ease falls, we think, within the rule
of Marrvray vr. Pittshurah, ete. R. R. Co., 962 Pa. 28s,
Wi, POT AL 2h 28. followed bw this court in Philadel
phia a Reading Ru. Co. cr. Cannon, 26 FL Or. wherein
the Supreme Court of Pennsvivania said:

‘Tt is net enough for plaintiff? to show his injury
might have been due te mere than one possible cause,
for only one of which defendant is responsible. Te
is obliged to go further amd show the canse that
fastens liability upon defemdant was the proximate
one and the jury should not be permitted to hase a
verdict upen a mere conjecture that the injury was

caused by one or the others

This ix but another statement of the old rule that a
party seeking to recover damages for injuries occasioned
by negligenee must establish negligence by afirmative
testimony. Of course, this docs not mean that neagliqeuce
must alicays be proved by the testimony of eye wit-
nesses, Philadephia & Reading Ry. Co. rv. Effinger
moe. AL. Oo FL O50, bat it does mean that it must be
established if not by the testimony of eye witnesses, then
hy surrounding facts and circumstances which, though

inanimate, speak the truth and affirmatively prove the

ss
.

Ce A a IN FE a Be er

fact. We cannot find in the record any testimony which
tends to prove how Bover met his death and, accord.
ingly, we have not found any evidence to support the
verdiet of the jury that his death was occasioned by

negligence of the defendant.” (Tialies my own.)

In the Bover case the Court, on page IS6. also said :
“There is no evidence which remotely indicates that
the deeedent ‘lost his footing and was thrown under the

train’ beenuse of lack of ballast.”

In the instant case there is no evidence which remotely in-
dicates that Coogan canght his left foot under the pipe where
it was alleged to be defective and was caught by the rigging
of the cars and thrown under the wheet.

On page 17 of her brief, respondent in endeavoring to dis-
tinguish ation vr. Teras & Pacific Raitleuy Company, 179
US. G58, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275, says:

“In the Patton ease there was no evidence tending
to point to any one particular cause for which the mas

ter would be responsible”

We think a like statement sheeld properly be applied to
this case, Coogan was the rear brakeman. Men in that
position ordinarily ride in the caboose or in other words, the
rear end of the train. Tle must have known that the train
would leave ina very shert time on its journey but he may
net have known that the train was te be moved immediate:
Iv. At the time of the accident it is very probable that he
was in the act of getting on the caboose and had his right
foot on the step and that his left foot was still in the air
when the cars were moved so that the caboose moved away
from him and he lost his balance and fell on the track be-

tween the caboose and the car attached te it and was run

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over by the last mentioned car. Under these circumstances
his left leg and arm would be apt to be inside the rail and
the right side of his body outside the rail Tf the accident
happened in this manner there would, of course, be no Tia
bility.

He may have been approaching the caboose from the south
and tripped over the end of the ties and fallen on the rail
just as the train was moved and in endeavoring to scramble
out was caught and run over. Tf the accident happened in
this manner there, of course, would be no liability,

Ile may. as railroad emploves sometimes do, have stepped
in between the caboose and the ear attached to it to answer
acallof nature. Tie may have been entirely inside the rails
preparing to couple the air hoses and have been knocked
down by the train when the cars were shoved to the east.
He may have been between the caboose and ear attached to
it for the purpose of coupling the air hoses, as claimed by
respondent, but with his right foot outside the rail and
his left foot inside the rail. facing the angle cock and while
in such position have been hit by the cars moving backward
and knocked on the rail so that the left arm and leg were
inside the rail and the right side was outside the rail. Under
any of the above presumptions there would, of course, be
no liability and we feel that the above inferences are just as
consistent with the evidence as respondent's theory. We

feel, however, that there is insufficient evidence on which a

jury could find that any one ef the above presumptions or

the presumption indulged in by the respondent was the actial

manner in which Mr. Coogan lost his life

1)

ASSUMPTION OF RISK.

Certain cases were cited by respondent on the question of
assumption of risk. In Gilo Valley Ry. Co. vr. Mall, 232.0.
S.94 Sb Sup. Ct Rep. 229. it wais held that an employe in-
jured by the derailment of a three-wheeled gasoline car on
which there was a defective flange, was not presumed to know
of the defect where he had been emploved in work that re-
quired him to ride on such gasoline car fora period of a few
days only prior to the accident. This case does not appear
to be in point. Coogan had worked on trains YL and 92 for
three or four months and had had considerable experience
on trains running in and out of the Farmington Yard prior
to that period of time (RR. 56, 62.63. 64 and 75). Tt would
seem that Coogan should be presumed to know of the condi-
tions existing on and around the track on account of his ex-
tensive experience working in and around that track,

Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. rv. Brown, 229 US. 317,
2h Sup. Ct. Rep. S40. is a case where a brakeman after re-
peated unsuecessful attempts to uncouple moving cars by the
uncoupling lever, found it necessary to reach in between the
cars to lift the pin. The cause of action, therefore, was gov-
erned by the Federal Safety Appliance Aet. Under that
act contributory negligence and assumption of risk are not
available as defenses.

In the present case the rights and liabilities of the parties
are governed by the ederal Emplover’s Liability Act. Un-
der this act contributory negligence is a comparative de-
fense while assumption of risk is an absolute defense. The
Brown case, therefore, is mot in point as the statutes in-
volved are radically different. The Brown case is so dis-

similar from the present case as to be of no assistance to

the Court on any phase of the matter before them,

The quotation from the Brown case on page 20 of respon-
dent's brief, if read in connection with the balance of the
decision, shows that the United States Supreme Court agreed
with the conclusion reached by the trial court and the Cir
cenit Court of Appeals and therefore aflirmed the lower court.

Teras & Pacific Railway Co. v. Harvey, 228 Ul OS. ST 33
Sup. Ct. Rep. SES, involved the interpretation of the stat
ute of the state of Texas relating to assumption of risk and
that portion of the decision should, of course, he disregarded.

In Teras & Pacific Railieay Company v. Sivearingen, 16
UL S057, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164. it appears that a switchman
riding on the side of a string of box cars was swept off the
car by coming in contact with a scale box located only two
feet from the rail. The accident happened at night and he
was looking to the rear for signals. Tle had not observed
the scale box carefully, prior to the accident, had taken no
measurements and had merely observed it) from a distance
and was unaware of its nearness to the track. This decision

would also appear to be of little benefit: in the instant case.

The decisions cited by petitioner in its brief in chief on

assumption of risk would seem to be controlling.

MINNESOTA DECISIONS.

On page 13 and on page 15 of her brief respondent has
referred to certain decisions of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. None of these decisions involve facts similar to those
of the instant case. The decisions speak for themselves and
a discussion of them in this brief would not seem to be par-
ticularly helpful. Most of these decisions were discussed in

petitioner's brief on the appeal to the State Supreme Court

21

and features distinguishing them from the Coogan case were
pointed out,

The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently placed consid
erable reliance on the case of Melutosh ro GN. Ry. Co. V1
Minn. 527. In that decision the Chief Justice and one of
the four Associate Justices, on reareument, dissented to the
opinion of the majority. We feel that that decision is at
varkince with the rule adopted by this Court,

It is clear that the Minnesota Supreme Court was very
skeptical of the soundness of their position in the instant
case. The decision is reported on pages 104 and 105 of the
record and contains the following :

“On the left side of the defendants left) shoe just
above the heel was an indentation such as might have

been made if it had been caught beneath the air line.”

In other words the indentation didn't point to the fact that
the shoe was caught, but they merely held that if the shoe
was caught such an indentation might have been made. The
important thing is, was the shoe caught. The Court also
said :

“The position of the body of a man who has met his
death in a violent accident, or physical marks thereon,
usnally do not furnish persuasive proof of the manner

of the occurrence.”

In other words, the State Supreme Court recognized the
fact that the nature of Coogan’s injury to his left lew and
left arim were inconsistent with a theory that his left foot
was outside of the rails.

If physical marks on a body do not furnish persuasive
proof of the manner of the occurrence it} would seem the

sume reasoning would apply to physical marks on a shoe

on the foot of the same body. In other words, the dent in
the counter of the shoe doesn’t show that it was caught under
the air pipe line.
The Court also stated:
“Though the case is a close one we reach the conclu
sion that the finding of a causal connection between the
bent air line and the death of the decedent has sub-

stantial evidence in its support.” (italics my own.)

In some of their decisions the Minnesota Supreme Court
has adhered more closely to the rule that verdicts must not
be based on speculation and conjecture.

See Perkins ro Go N. Ry. Co., 152 Minn. 226.

Bruckwan ve OC. St. Po. Mb OL Ry. Co., 110 Minn, 309.

This last decision, in the index to petitioner's brief in
chief, was erroneously cited as 220 Federal 555.

The case of Truar v. Mpls., St. Po & SNS. SN. ML Ry. Co. 89
Minn. 143, is a well reasoned decision. In that case a mail
avent while throwing a mail bag from a depot platform toa
passing mail car, lost his balance and fell between the plat-
form and train and was seriously injured. Two weeks after
the accident he investigated the premises and decided that
he was at a particular point on the platform because the
platform gave under his weight in the same manner that it
did at the time of the accident. On page 146 of the de-
cision, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated as follows:

“At the trial he said he did not slip or stumble on
anything and did not know what it was that caused him
to lose his balance until about two weeks after the ac-
cident when upon examining the platform he discovered
the loose planks and that when stepped upon at the

outer edge they would give under his weight. THis only

2 bel Ae RETR ENA CRM

— —————— Pee ns ATT ARES TITS

o>?

method of connecting this condition of the platform
with the accident was the facet that he found by stepping

upon the planks he experienced ao similar sensation

to that which he felt after throwing the bag into the

-

MELE ELLY

On page LIT, the Court further said:

PRE yyy

“Tn the absence of positive proof that the planks were
actually stepped upon and ata point where they gare e
way under the weight imposed upon them, the whole
matter is left in the realm of pure conjecture. Verdicts
based upon evidence of this character cannot be per
mitted to stand. There must bea definite and reason-
able connection between the cause and effect. Juries
are not permitted to speculate in arriving ata conclu
sion, howerer unfortunate the result man be for the in-

jured person” (Wtalies my own.)

The above case, we feel. is controlling for the reason that :
in that case the plaintif! was unable te connect the de- :
fective condition up with the accident. In the instant case
there is absolutely no competent evidence either direct. or
circumstantial to show or indicate that William Coogan‘s
foot was caught or fastened under the alleged defective air
pipe line, There is absolutely no proof to show that either ——
of his feet were ever under the air pipe line at the point ¢
Where if was bent or at any other point. There is no proof
that he was on the day in question, ever in the immediate
Vicinity of the air pipe line where it was claimed to be de-
fective, There is absolutely no proof whatever that the air
pipe line caused or contributed or had anything whatever to
do with Coogan’s death.

We respectfully suggest that the decisions of this Court

| a
Seer etree st seers

a4

cited by the petitioner in its brief in chief are controlling in
the instant case.
Respectfully submitted,
Ee. W. Beer,
C. O. NEWCOMER,
A. ©. EADARL.,
25 Milirauhee Station,
Vinneapolis, Vinnesota,
Ifforneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
O. W. DYNES, Esy.,
Chicago, [linots.

April, 1926,
S. A. ANDERSON,

ittorney for Respondent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_0505%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
