# Transcript of Record — Southern Pacific Co. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Transcript of Record
- **Published:** January 1, 1925
- **Citation:** 268 U.S. 263

## Text

(30,120)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1923

No. 810

SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, APPELLANT
3

THE UNITED STATES

APPEAL FROM COURT OF CLAIMS

INDEX
Original
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Reargument and submission of case

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{fol. 1] COURT OF CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 33946
SourTueRN Paciric COMPANY
vs.
The Unirep STATES
|. Hisrory or PROCEEDINGS

On Mareh 1. 191S. the plaimtiY filed its original petition,

On May 1. 191S, a general traverse was entered under Rule 3.

Subsequently, to wit, on May 4. 1918, by leave of court, the plain-
tiff filed an amended petition.

On December 31, 1919. by leave of court, the plaintiff filed its
Second Amended Petition,

On January 3, 1922, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the
second amended petition by striking out Paragraph V thereof. Said
motion was allowed Ly the court, January %, 1922, so that said pe-
tition new reads as follows:

Il. Secoxp AMENDED Prririon——Filed December 31, 1919, as
Amended by Court’s Order of January 9, 1922

The Southern Pacifie Company, claimant, respectfully represents :
]

Claimant is a corporation duly created, organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and as such corporation
now is, and was, during all of the times when the services herein-
after mentioned were performed, engaged as a common carrier by
(fol. 2| railroad in the transportation of passengers and freight in
and through various States of the United States and between the
points referred to herein, either directly over its own lines or in con-
junction with connecting carriers.

Il

Under the Acts of Congress granting lands in aid of railroads and
Acts of Congress regulating the expenditure of appropriations by
the United States for Army transportation over such land-grant
railroads, said land-grant railroads were required to transport troops
of the United States for certain less amounts than those charged
private parties for similar transportation ; but in none of said Acts
were said land-grant railroads required, nor have they ever agreed.

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to transport for such less amounts, as “troops of the United States,”

nor at other than full tariff fares, the certain persons more particu-
larly referred to in Paragraph 1V hereof.

Ill

Some years ago, and prior to the times when the services herein-
after mentioned were performed, the railroad companies of the
United States generally, including claimant, severally agreed with
the Quartermaster-General of the United States Army (subject to
certain exceptions not necessary here to be stated) to accept, for the
transportation of troops of the United States, the lowest net fare.
and lowest net excess baggage rate. lawfully available as derived
through deductions on account of land-grant distance via a usually
[fol. 8] traveled route for military traflie from a lawful fare filed
with the Interstate Commerce Commission as applying from point
of origin to destination at time of movement. These agreements,
commonly known 2s “Tand-Grant Equalization Agreements”, were
in force at the times of the transactions hereinafter referred to. (Cir-
cular No. 23. Quartermaster General's Office, 1911, dated November
15. 1911. and Cirevlar No. 6 Office of the Chief, Quartermaster
Corps. 1913. dated March 1, 1913. entitled “Prejoht and Passenger
Land-Grant Equalization Agreements and List of Carriers Partici-
pating,” printed and published by the Government.)

IV

At various times between March 1, 1912. and the date of the filing
of the original petition herein. claimant, upon transportation re-
quests issued by the War and Navy Departments of the United
States, transported certain persons belonging to the following classes,
to wit:

1. Applicants for enlistment in the Army:

(a) Accepted applicants. i. ¢.. applicants examined at general
recruiting stations and found mentally, morally and physically fit
for service and being forwarded to reeruiting depots or depot posts
for final examination and actual enlistment.

Lh) Rejected applicants. i. o.. those finally rejected at the recruit-
ing depots or depot posts and being returned to the reeruiting sta-
tions whence they came.

2. Discharged military prisoners, 1. ¢., discharged enlisted men en
route to their homes or elsewhere after serving sentence as military
prisoners.

(fol. 4] 3. Discharged soldiers. i. e., former enlisted men of the
Army en route to their homes after discharge.

4. Retired soldiers. i. ¢., enlisted men of the Army en route to
their homes after retirement.

s ae “ “ Sila cee pit ET ae Se coene acta MR arene Wa Ra es RM i I Ne pl TN SPT

5. Furloughed soldiers, i. e., enlisted men of the Army on fur-
lough en route back to their proper stations.

3

6. Deserters from the Army and Navy, payment for whose trans-
portation was charged and collected by the Government from said
deserters at full tariff fares.

7. Coast Guard, while under the Treasury Department.

8. Members of the National Guard prior to their muster into, or
subsequent to their muster out of, the service of the United States.

9. Selective service men prior to their muster into, or subsequent
to their muster out of, the service of the United States.

10. Other persons not mustered inte the military or naval service
of the United States.

In making payment for said transportation services the United
States, through its accounting oflicers. (in many instances against
the express protest and objection of the claimant) paid claimant for
said transportation only the less amounts authorized for the trans-
portation of “troops of the United States” over land-grant railroads,
instead of at the published tariff fares.

VI

The total difference between the amounts so paid claimant for
fol. 5] such transportation at land-grant rates, as for the transpor-
tation of “troops of the United States’, and the amounts which
claimant was entitled to receive therefor at published tariff fares
without land-grant deductions. is. according to the claimant’s books
and records, $219,091.26.

VIT

Wherefore claimant says there is now justly due and owing it by
the United States the sum of Two Hundred and Nineteen Thousand
and Ninety-one Dollars and Twenty-six Cents ($219,091.26), ex-
clusive of all just credits and offsets, for which amount it prays judg-
ment.

Claimant has at all times borne true allegiance to the United
States, and has made no assignment or transfer of the aforesaid
claims or of any interest therein.

Southern Pacifie Company. Claimant, by Charles TT. Bates,
Its Attorney in’ Fact. Tfarr & Bates, Attorneys for
Claimant.

ffol.6] Jurat showing the foregoing was duly sworn to by Chas.
IT. Bates: omitted in printing.

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4
[fol. 7] III. Generat TRAVERSE
No demurrer, plea, answer, counterclaim, set-off, claim of damages.
- demand, or defense in the premises, having been entered on the part
of the defendant, a general traverse 1s entered as provided by Rule 34.
+
: IV. ArGUMENT AND SuBMISSION OF CASE
:
: On December 14, 1921, this case was argued and submitted on
merits by Mr. William R. Harr, for the plaintiff, and by Mr. Perry
_ _ W. Howard, for the defendant.
‘ V. History or FurTHEr PROCEEDINGS
‘ On December 19, 1921, the court filed an order remanding the
ease to the Calendar, and allowing plaintiff to amend its petition
and for the introduction of further testimony by either party.
¥
VI. REARGUMENT AND SUBMISSION OF CAsE
On January 30, 1925, the case was argued and submitted on merits
by Mr. William R. Harr, for the plaintiff, and by Mr. Perry W.
Howard, for the defendants.
$ VII. History or Purtier PROCEEDINGS
5 On February 19, 1928, the court filed an order filing tentative
findings, and setting same for hearin- March 5, 1923.
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of these bills relate back to the time of their presentment to and pay-
ment by the disbursing officer, and we are unable to see how that sit-
uation can be affected by the understanding of anyone in the account-
ing office when the disbursing oflicer’s accounts were thereafter being
audited. The clerks in the account office were then determining
the credits to whieh the disbursing oflieer was entitled, in the settle-
ment of his accounts, by reason of the payments made on these
vouchers and with that determination their duties with reference
thereto ended. They were not then considering any claim of the
plaintiff submitted for allowanee or otherwise and had no question
hefore them as to the purpose or effect of the protest, and authority to
speak as to the “understanding” of the accounting oflicers does not
appear,

It should now be suggested that during consideration of this case
on first submission certain information then came to our attention
with reference to possible practices in the oflices of disbursing officers
by way of departure from authorized procedure, indicating ihe
possibility that injustice to the plaintiff might result if the case were
considered solely in the light of authorized rather than actual pro-
cedure on the part of disbursing officers, and the case was remanded
with leave to take further testimony if desired.

Upon resubmission the record contains the testimony of a witness
Who was a clerk and for a part of the time head clerk in the office
of the disbursing officer by whom these bills were paid, this clerk
[fol. 19] having in usual course handled the bills or at least. a part of
them so that he had knowledge of the use thereon of this short-form
protest,

Based upon his testimony and that already in the record above
referred to we are now asked to modify the tentative findings by
adding a finding to the effect that it was understood by the disbursing
officer and by the accounting officers that in using this short-form
protest the plaintiff was protesting against the settlement of its bills
at land-grant rates and was preserving a right to make further claim
for full commercial rates before the accounting officers and the courts.

We are very willing to give the plaintiff any finding to which it
may be entitled and prefer to err through liberality rather than
otherwise, but we do not find that this witness qualified himself
to testify as to the understanding of the disbursing officer, and we
have, we think, gone as far if not further than justified when we in-
corporate in the findings of facts a statement as to the understanding
of this witness himself as to the meaning and purpose of this protest.
And in connection with the testimony of this witness we may suggest
that if all his statements as to practice in the disbursing office were
converted into findings of fact. it would be of very doubtful value
to plaintiff, for it must carry with the things relied upon as of value
other matters clearly not so to be regarded by the plaintiff, notably
the refusal to settle disputed claims and the settlement only of those
matters as to which the claimant and the disbursing officer were in
agreement. Comment upon this testimony, not incorporated in the
findings, is only justified for the purpose of indicating its careful
consideration in all its phases.

Aside from the probative value of the testimony as to the under-

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16

standing of the disbursing officer, it is to be suggested in this con-
nection, perhaps to be again referred to, that whatever the under-
standing of the disbursing officer may have been as to the purpose
or effect. of this protest, he was an officer of very limited powers,
and his understanding or even his approval could not have served
to create any liability against the United States not otherwise ex-
istent. .

Other testimony upon resubmission, apparently intended to in-
dicate the continuing intention of the plaintiff to contest the appli-
cation of land-grant rates to the classes of transportation involved,
is largely a recital of communi ‘ations between railroad officials on
the subject, not a proper basis for a finding of fact, and probably
with fyll comprehension of that fact no request for a finding based
thereon is submitted.

In addition to suggestions made as to the indefinite character of

this protest, we are asked to conclude that a public voucher made in
the detailed form indicated and certified to be correct, not only as
to its details but as to the “amount claimed,” and which is re-
quired to be completely filled in before certification, without alteration
or erasure all to the evident purpose that there shall be stated a
clean-cut demand which may be paid by a disbursing officer at the
“amount claimed” and that only, for which it becomes his ae-
quittance, can be converted into a claim for a partial payment with
reserved right to make further claim as to the same service by
stamping thereon the statement that the “amount claimed” which
has been stated and certified by the claimant, is “accepted under
rotest.””
[fol. 20] We can not subscribe to such a theory. Its inconsistency,
as well as its apparent purpose to take advantage of a method of settle-
ment designed to accomplish finality while at the same time subvert-
ing that purpose, condemns it. And in that connection the neces-
sities of Government accounting are properly for consideration and
perhaps ought to be reverted to more than they.are. With these ne-
cessities and the disadvantages of lack of finality in Government ac-
counting those doing business with the Government not only are,
for the most part, familiar, but should be chargeable with knowl-
edge and, unless required for the protection of a legal right not
otherwise to be asserted, practices which impose unnecessary bur-
dens on the governmental system should not be encouraged by
judicial sanction. And for consideration also is the fact that appro-
priations are for the service of fiscal years—that they are available
for such time thereafter as Congress has thought reasonable to
permit the adjustment of claims payable therefrom, a situation
indicative of intention to accomplish reasonably prompt present-
ment and settlement of claims.

And if by such a procedure as that under consideration the finality
of a settlement such as those here involved may be suspended and an
account thus settled be held to be still open for further claims,
predicated on the same service, to be asserted at any time within
the six-year period of limitation, is there any reason why such a pro-
test stamped upon any voucher in settlement of any claim of any

sh ih RE el EO

17

character might not obviate its finality and serve to hold the whole
matter open and subject to further claim at least until the interven-
tion of the statute of limitation’ Tf there is one thing apparent,
predicated upon our observation in these matters, it is the great
need for a revised system which shall require the prompt presenta-
tion of claims not only to the administrative and accounting offices
but to this court as well, and while we can mot assume legislative
function, ad we certainly can not but recognize and protect: any
right legal under the present system, we are not disposed by judicial
construction to extend beyond legal requirements the effect of unnee-
essary and detrimental practices.

We think it quite clear that the use during this period of this
form of protest could avail the plaintiff nothing. Aside from the
infirmity in the form of the protest, whieh sufficiently determines its
value, what must be said in the discussion of the following period as
to the efficacy of any protest will be applicable.

As to the third period the contention is that at the beginning
thereof, on October 1, 1914, a different practice was inaugurated in
that on the vouchers, all stated on the approved form as hereinbe-
fore outlined, there was typed, before presentment, the long form
of protest, as follows:

As U.S. Government accounting officers claim they have no
authority to allow or pay for the transportation of discharged soldiers
more than the fares for troops of the U. S., such fares are shown
herein but under protest, and S. P. Co. for itself and connecting ear-
riers does not waive any of its rights to full published tariff fares and
wy payinent at any less amount will be accepted as part payment
only for the service performed.”

During this period extending to the taking effect of the inter-
territorial military arrangement on June 138, 1916, there was pre-
[fol. 21] sented 728 vouchers involving land grant to the amount of
875.467.74 516 of which, involving land grant to the amount of
$50,678.94, bore this long form of protest; and 212 involving
$24.788.80 of land grant bore no protest, so that the practice was not
uniform but sufficiently so as to justify the treatment of the period
on the basis of the long-form protest.

It is for observation first that this form of protest is not subject
to the objection of indefiniteness suggested as to the short form. It
pointed out the specifie subject matter of the protest and the reason
therefor.

But while it is specific, the very respect in which it is specifie pre-
cludes the construction sought to be put upon it. Tt is urged as
preserving a right in the plaintiff to seek additional compensation
as to all persons within any of the classes under discussion, whereas
by its express terms it is addressed only to “discharged soldiers,”
And it is to be interpreted not alone upon the inclusion of this class
only in its terms but also upon the familiar-rule, Inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius. Any right preserved, therefore, by this form of
protest must be limited to discharged soldiers. the class, however,
which involves the larger part of the claim.

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The effect of the use of this form of protest upon these vouchers
under such circumstances is the important question for consideration
and one, perhaps, not free from doubt. The findings have stated the
facts separately as to each one of the classes involved, because it was
conceived that under this form of protest there might be a right of
recovery as to discharged soldiers which did not extend to other
classes.

But, after all, does either form of protest under the circumstances
preserve any existing right to additional compensation? The ques-
tion can not be treated with the brevity which is desirable and its
importance must justify such extended discussion as may seem neces-
sary to a comprehensive presentment of the situation dealt with and
our views with reference thereto.

A protest can not create a right. It may preserve an existing
right, although, when opposed by inconsistent action or cireum-
stances, it may not always do that. Its chief function is, under ap-
propriate circumstances, to avoid the effect of apparent acquiescence
in the action of another.

Let us assume that at the time now in question the plaintiff be-

lieved, contrary to the holding of the comptroller, that it was en-
titled to be paid full tariff rates for the transportation in question.
By its protest it indicates knowledge of the fact that the “account-
ing officers” disclaimed any authority. to pay more than for the
transportation of troops of the United States—that is, more than
land-grant rates. It uses the words “accounting officers” although
it was dealing with the presentment of its claims to disbursing of-
ficers, and there is a difference. The accounting officers, as the ae-
counting system was then constituted under the Dockery Act. were,
so far as its business was concerned, the Auditor for the War De-
partment and the Comptroller of the Treasury. A disbursing of-
fier was an accountable officer who accounted to the accounting of-
ficers for funds advanced to him on accountable warrants for which
the vouchers paid by him are his aequittance when his accounts
go to the auditor for settlement.
[fol. 22] An essential difference in practice is found in the fact
that a Government creditor could present him claim to an auditor
for the full amount claimed to be due, in this case full tariff rates.
Upon disallowance by the auditor of any part of an item of a claim,
land grant in this instance, the claimant had a right of appeal to the
comptroller, but by statute it could not accept the part of a claim
allowed by the auditor and have an appeal as to the disallowed part.
(28 Stat., 208.) It must in case of appeal to the comptroller, send
in the warrant issued to it for the allowed part of the claim so that
the comptroller might pass upon the whole claim and adjust an over
as well as an under payment. Then there was, of course, access to
this court, in connection with which it is important to consider that
previous action either by accounting or disbursing officers is not an
essential to the jurisdiction of this court in this class of cases.

Quite materially different was the practice when claims were pre-
sented to a disbursing officer for payment and, aside from the pre-
sumptions, it is quite out of the question to assume anything else

2165 eseie et el Mb eat

19

than actual knowledge of dis! ising officer’s practice and authority
on the part of those dealing so frequently with them. The number
of claims involved in this case is illustrative of the extensive resort
to this method of settlement and necessarily resultant knowledge,
A disbursing officer was not permitted to receive a claim, disallow
a part and pay the remainder as was the auditor, Reasons are too
apparent to need amplification. A disbursing officer could only pay
a claim when he deemed himself authorized to pay the “amount
claimed.” This is in line with and explains the suggestion fre-
quently made in this class of cases, and in the instant case, that
when claims were sometimes presented to disbursing officers for
such transportation at full tariff rates claimants were informed that
they could not be paid as presented and if it was desired to procure
payment at the hands of the disbursing oflice, the most expeditious
way of realizing on a claim, it was necessary to restate the bill on
a basis upon which the disbursing offieer was authorized to pay,
since, as stated, the disbursing officer could not disallow in part and
pay in part as might the auditor, and the necessary restatement of
accounts, fo procure payment by this method, is the basis of econten-
tion that the claim is thus under duress.

It is perhaps as well here as later to say that with this contention
we can not agree, for in point of fact there is to be found in the
transaction no element of duress at all, and this seems so apparent
that it is hardly worth while to diseuss at length what may consti-
tute duress. The disbursing officer, in such circumstances, does in
effect say to the claimant, “You must state your claim on the basis
upon whieh T ean pay it and none other if you want payment at
my hands,” but there is noe compulsion so to proceed, for other doors
are open wherein the claimant may state its claim as it sees fit. And
if it suggests, as has so often been done, the probable futility of
proceeding through the accounting officers, where it could, at least
be in the position of asserting its full claim, no matter what the
result, its contention is not aided, for in addition to the right to so
assert the claim to the accounting officer there was always access
to this court independent of precedent action. And so the stating to
a disbursing officer of an account upon the basis required by him if
he is to pay it is nothing but a compliance with conditions neces-
|fol. 25] sary to procure a settlement by that method, which a
claimant must regard as to its advantage, rather than other pro-
cedure, and can not be regarded otherwise than as purely voluntary
on its part.

This condition, however, is of weight in determining the status
of a disbursing officer’s settlement, a matter of importance in the
consideration of the effect. if anv, to be given a protest indorsed
thereon, a procedure which the disbursing officer should not have
permitted, since its purpose is to convert a disbursing officer’s
voucher into something else than that which, under authoritatively
established practice, it was intended to be. And that was not a right
possessed by a claimant, for it amounted, if it amounted to anything,
to a modification of a voucher form prescribed by proper officers
under authority of law and therefore as essentially a requisite of a

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20

proper amount as if prescribed by the law itself, For this form of
voucher, used in the instances under consideration, a form for use
in claiming for transportation subject to land-grant deduction, pro-
vided for the statement in appropriate columns of all the data neces-
sary to the proper determination of the “amount claimed” which
was required to be certified by the claimant as correct, contemplated
a complete statement of the claim in full, nof subject to alteration,
and evidencing, when paid, a completed transaction, the voucher
having no further function than to procure for the disbursing officer
a proper credit for the amount shown thereby to have been claimed
by the creditor and paid by the officer. Mistakes of fact occurring
therein would no doubt be subject to correction, but with that matter
we have nothing to do here.

It is therefore clearly subversive of the intended character and
effect of a settlement made as lawfully prescribed to conclude that
such a settlement in all respects intended to be final, and which
without the element of finality in the sense of payment in full, did
not authorize the payment thereon of appropriated publie funds by
a disbursing officer, to conclude that a claimant by some process of
protest indorsed by it thereon could thus convert such an instrument
into a claim for partial payment with reserved right as to further
compensation for the same service.

The inconsistency of the procedure has heretofore been alluded
to. Its attempt to accomplish by this method that which by usual
processes could not be accomplished is strongly argunfentative. We
have seen that the claimant might not, in one of the instances under
consideration, have presented to a disbursing officer a claim for full
tariff rates, have procured the disbursing officer to disallow a part
and to allow and pay a part, making of the transaction a partial set-
tlement, The requirement in such a case that the claim be stated
on the basis on which it can be paid in full has also been cited. Yet,
the adopted method, if recognized as effective for the intended pur-
pose, does in fact, and that purpose is expressed in the protest, con-
vert the claim into a claim for partial payment and put the disbursing
officer in the position of doing the very thing which it is recognized
he could not do in regular course.

AIL claims were required to be submitted on approved forms,
forms which had back of them the authority of law and the right
to prescribe their use for the intended purposes, There were voucher
forms for the submission of claims for transportation where full
commercial rates were claimed upon the face of which their nature
[fol. 24] and use was indicated by the words “No land grant in-
volved.” They were intended to be and were used where the claim-
ant was asserting a right to compensation at full commercial rates.
and they were not used and could not be used to procure a_settle-
ment by a disbursing officer in cases where he eould or would pay
only land-grant rates. If presented to a disbursing officer for pay-
ment under such cireumstances, and the claimant was not willing
to restate its claim on the basis on which it could be paid by the dir-
bursing officer, it became his duty to transmit the claim for direct
settlement by the auditor without making any payment thereon at

no ale
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21

all, for he could not on such a voucher pay the amount due at land- '
grant rates and leave an unpaid balance over. He could not settle
in part a disputed claim, but must send it where there was authority
so todo. His settlement must be a clean-cut settlement of the whole
claim as presented or nothing. If, with full knowledge of all these
facts—and knowledge thereof has never been disputed by any rail-
road company with whose claim we have had to do—a railroad
claimant presents its claim on a land-grant voucher at land-vrant $
rates, certified by it to be correct, for the purpose of procuring pav-
ment at the hands of a disbursing officer, is it possible that it can of
its own motion, by an unauthorized indorsement on an oficial
voucher, convert it into a claim for full commercial rates and make «
of it in effeet just such a claim as the disbursing officer had no an-
thority to settle? Such a right, if a claimant had it, would permit
it to subvert the whole prescribed svstem of settlement and aceount-
ing and to make of an official voucher something else than. that
which by authority of law it is prescribed to be, And, if so, must
he held effective for that purpose without presentment, in connes-
tion with a claim, to any one having authority to consider disputed
claims; for the vouchers upon which they appeared were defunet, as
claims, when paid by the disbursing officer, could not go to the ae- F
counting officers for further allowance thereon as claims and serve] j
only as vouchers te sumport the disbursing officer’s claims in his ac
count current for eredits in the amounts thus shown to have heen $
paid by him out ef the funds for which he was accountable. E
And it may be added that no aet of a dishursing officer outside of £.
his authority could ereate any liability against the United States
|

LA AG TRE ARNE AIT NRE ES OOTP

which did not otherwise exist or abrogate any existing right. and
payment by him of a voucher bearing such a protest could under ne
cireumstances be construed as a recognition on the part of the
United States of a richt to make further claim for the same service
He had no sueh authority. Nor could the elaimant create for itself
ony right by attenmoted desarture from established methods. The
law gave to the Comptroller of the Treasury power to prescribe :
forms and to regulate ‘the methods of expending and acecountin« .
for public funds and conditions imposed by him within the proper 3
exereise of his prerogatives were as if prescribed by the law itself ;
and protest can not in any manner circumvent statutory conditions. :
In Dowdy, Exx., v. United States, 22 Ct, Cls. 97, interpreting an :
act authorizing payment of certain claims allowed by the aceennt- d
ing officers but nroviding that such payments should be accepted a-
a full and final discharee of the claims, it was said, “The faet that
the money was received under protest. although no receipt was re-
[fol. 25] quired except the necessarv indorsement of the Tressur:
check, indicates that the elaimant understood the statute as we wn-
derstand it, and endesvored by a protest to avoid it,” a suggestion
peculiarly anplicable to our interpretation of a disbursing officer's
voucher, and later it is said, “No effect can be given to the protest.”
referring. of course, in that ease to the terms of the aet, but applic
able, we think. to a condition here of equal force. Fr

In Savage, Executrix, v. United States, 92 U. S. 382, we find 1

GON RT I> BG Ua BL AORN

22

many pertinent statements, some of them very much in point on
questions already discussed. Savage had purchased $15,000 of Treas-
ury notes represented by a special agent of the Treasury Department
as payable in gold but held by the Secretary of the Treasury, at
time of payment, as not so payable but payable in currency. Gold
was then worth a premium of 32 cents. It is said that there was an
honest difference of opinion, Savage contending for payment in gold
while the Secretary refused to make payment otherwise than in
currency, and so informed him. Savage sent his Treasury notes
to his banking representatives in Washington and they were pre-
sented at the Treasury Department and gold demanded in payment
which was refused. Savage then instructed his bankers to accept
payment in currency and surrender the notes, but with instructions
to first demand payment in gold, but if refused to accept payment
otherwise than in gold under protest. The bankers presented the
notes and asked for payment in gold which was refused, and they
thereafter, by a communication in writing, in which they recited the
presentation of the notes with a request for payment in gold and
on refusal, presented them for payment “in accordance with the
terms proposed by the Treasury Department,” but stating also that
“at the same time we beg, under our instructions, to enter protest
against payment otherwise than in gold.”

The decision of the Supreme Court was on appeal from this court
where the administratix of Savage had sought to recover the dif-
ference between the value of the currency in which payment was
made and gold, the right to receive which was asserted. In the
Supreme Court questions presented in this court upon which the
decision against the plaintiff was predicated were disregarded and
the case turned upon the final transaction of the surrender by Sav-
age of the Treasury notes and the receipt of payment therefor in
currency even though accompanied by a protest. Much stress is laid
upon the actual surrender of the Treasury notes by Savage, referred
to as a condition precedent to his right to receive payment, but
the stressing of the surrender of the notes was but the natural basis
of the reasoning of the court, under the circumstances of that case,
and does not seem to us to detract from the force of the principles
stated as applicable to the transaction. In faet the surrender of the
notes would not seem to differ so materially from the presentment
of a proper disbursing officer’s voucher as to change the conelusion
to be reached as to the effect of an accompanying protest in either
case, ‘i ie Treasury notes held by Savage and presented for payment
were the evidence that he was a creditor of the United States in
return for-which he received $15,000 of principal in currency because
the Secretary refused payment in gold worth $19,800 to which he
asserted he was entitled, and endeavored by protest to preserve an
asserted right to an additional payment of $4,800 representing the
[f.|. 26] difference in value between what he asserted he was entitled
to receive and what the Secretary was willing to and did pay. The
difference was a difference in medium but it necessarily resolved it-
self into a difference in dollars measured by legal tender currency
and upon such a demand was the suit predicated. The plaintiff's

—

23

vouchers in this case represented its claims as a creditor of the United
States because of services rendered and if stated and presented
for payment at land-grant rates, even though it deemed itself en-
titled to other and higher rates, because it had been informed that
the disbursing officer had refused and would refuse to pay more, it
would seem to be in the same position as Savage when * presented
his notes for payment in currency and received payment in cur-
reney, a lesser value than he claimed, because he had been informed
that the Secretary would not pay otherwise. And it would seem
that a properly stated voucher, certified and paid, was as full an
acquittance of the United States as to the claim stated therein as was
the surrender of the Treasury notes, for it must be conceded, because
so decided, that all vouchers involved in this case, so stated, certified
and paid, if without protest, would preclude further recovery for
the same service. Can a protest, then, avail in the one case when it
was held to be ineffective in the other?

The opinion is replete with apt statements, addressed, of course, in
many instances, to the fact that the Treasury notes were voluntarily
surrendered, but stating conclusions as clearly applicable here, since,
as we have already pointed out, the plaintiff’s statements of its ac-
counts at land-grant rates and acceptance of payment on that basis
was clearly voluntary. Since it is a matter of common knowledge
that disbursing officer’s settlements secure more prompt payment
than otherwise and that this is the reason for resorting thereto in
cases like this the following language is pertinent:

“Prompt payment, no doubt, was desired; but the decedent was
under no legal compulsion to accept any other medium of payment
than that which he demanded. Both he and his agents were doubt-
less convinced that the secretary would not recede from the position
he had taken; but he was at perfect liberty to reject the terms pro-
posed and to refuse to surrender the overdue securities which he
held.”

And summarizing the case with a reference to the effect of the
protest, it is said:

“Taken as a whole, the findings of the court below show beyond all
doubt that the decedent, voluntarily and with a full knowledge of all
the circumstances, elected to accept payment of the Treasury notes in
the manner proposed by the secretary, and that the surrender of the
same to the United States was absolute and unconditional. Nothing
less can be inferred from the communication of his agents inclosing
the securities when the same were transmitted for redemption, in
which his agents say that they ‘present the notes for payment in
accordance with the terms proposed’ by the department. Such an
acceptance, if intended to waive every variation from the terms ante-
cedently demanded, could hardly be more complete or explicit; nor is
its real character changed in any respect by the fact that the agents
asked leave in the same communication ‘to enter protest, under their
instructions, against payment otherwise than in gold.”

(fol. 27] Reverting to our discussion of the form, purpose, and

ae een re

authoritative character of these disbursing officers’ vouchers as stated,
presented, and paid in this case, we can not but conclude that their
real character was not changed in any respect by the attached pro-
test.

Very forcible and peculiarly pertinent is the language of Justice,
afterward Chief Justice, White, speaking for the Supreme Court in
International Contracting Company v. Lamont, 156 U.S. 305 at
310. where, referring in general terms to the efficacy of a protest, it
is said: “A party ean not avoid the legal consequences of his acts by
protesting at the time he does them that he does not intend to sub-
ject himself to such consequences.” The legal consequences of the
presentment of these claims to the disbursing officer as they were
presented without protests thereon and receipt of payment of the
amount claimed have been determined by this court with the ap-
proval of the Supreme Court in cases cited. They precluded further
recovery. From such consequences resulting from its own acts the
plaintiff may not relieve itself by protesting that it didu’t mean it,

There is another condition bearing upon plaintiff's claims herein,
and particularly, i) ems to us, upon the question of proiest ‘which,
while sometimes suggested in other cases, has never received any
lengthy consideration. It is observed that under some decisions of
the Comptroller of the Treasury involving payment to land-grant
railroads for the character of transportation here involved it: has
not been specifically held that classes of persons under consideration
were essentially “troops” of the United States, but the holding has
been that the transportation companies were not entitled to be paid
therefor more than land-grant rates.

This holding has been predicated upon provisions found in the
Army appropriation acts under the subhead “Transportation of the
Army and its supplies,” which provisions were repeated in all of
such appropriation acts during the period here invelved and for a
number of years theretofore, The appropriation act for the liseal
year 1914, beginning July 1, 1913, 37 Stat. 715, a propriated under
the subhead stated, “For the transportation of the Army and its
supplies; * * * for transportation of recruits and reeruiting

ies; of applicants for enlistment between reeruiting stations and
recruiting depots; for travel allowance to enlisted men on discharge:
of persons on their discharge from the United States military prison
or from any place in which they have been held under a sentence
of dishonorable discharge and confinement for more than six months,
* * ® ‘for the payment of Army transportation lawfully due
such land-grant railroads as have not received aid in Government
bonds (to be adjusted in accordance with the decisions of the Su-
preme Court in cases decided under such land grant acts), but in no
case shall more than fifty per centum of full amount of service be
paid: Provided, That such compensation shall be computed upon
the basis of the tariff or lower special rates for like transportation
SS for the public at large and shall be accepted as in full
or all demands for such service:’” followed by a further proviso
limiting payments to land-grant roads in the expenditure of the
money appropriated by the act and providing again that “the amount

PORE ey — ~* e bl

— Bn a ee

29

so fixed to be paid shall be accepted as in full for all demands for
such service.” =
[fol. 28] The tendency of Congress «enm< to have been to gradually
provide for the payment of the class. of transportation under con-
sideration here out of this appropriation and subject it to the limita-
tions thereof. Some time before the peried in question the trans-
portation of applicants for enlistment had been payable out of
another appropriation, and previous to the fiseal vear of 1914 travel
allowance of discharged soldiers was provided for by a separate item
found in Miscellaneous Provisions in the Army Appropriation Acts,
and for the first time was brought within the provisions for the
transportation of the Army and its supplics om the passage of the
act referred to for the fiseal year 1914.

It is the matter of transportation of discharged soldiers with
which we are particularly concerned. In view of what has already
been said with reference to the situation during the third period here
invelved and in that connection, it is not inappropriate to suggest
that while the appropriation in terms “for travel allowance to enlisted
men on discharge” implics a payment to be made to the enlisted
men, the law had authorized and it was the practice te furnish to the
enlisted man, in lieu of a part of his travel allowance, transportation
in kind which is evidenced by a transportation request issued to him
and finally made the basis of a claim by the transportation company
for the transportation furnished upon that request.

The particular matter for consideration is, of course, the effect of
the limitation put upon the expenditure of the funds appropriated
for this particular purpose by this act. It is limited to fifty per
cent of commercial rates, or, in other words. limited te payment at
land-grant rates, with the specifie provision thet ,avment so made
must be accepted as in full for the tran « furmshed. With
the provisions of this act the transportation com ~ are. of course,
chargeable with knowledge. a Knowledee whieh they. no doubt, pos-
sessed in fact, and it would secon that it meust necessarily follow that
when a transportation company presented te o disbursing officer a
claim for transportation which it knew, or at least was presumed to
know, was payable out of this particular appropriation, and could
not be paid out of any other, it must subject uself te the limitations
of the act and be chargeable with the acceptance of the amount paid
as in full, In Dowdy, Exeeutrix, v. United States, supra, involving
& payment under a statute providing that the amount paid should
be accepted as a full and final discharge of the several claims ex-
amined and allowed by the accounting officers, in which case it was
sought to preserve a further right by a protest, it was said:

“No effect can be given to the protest. The act prescribed the
only terms upon which payment could be tendered or received.
It is very clear to the court that a party accepting money under
positive statutory conditions can not vary the conditions by merely
protesting against them. Acceptance of the money is necessarily an
agreement to the terms. Cape Ann Granite Cu v. The United States,
20 Ct. Cls. R. 1; Savage v. The United States, v2 U.S. R. 382.”

4—810

If it be said that the provisions of this act may not be here invoked
against the plaintiff because it has been held that the classes of per-
sons here involved are not “troops” of the United States, it is suffi-
cient to say that for transportation purpose at least Congress saw
fit to so treat them, and by making their transportation payable out
of this particular appropriation it necessarily made these payments
[fol. 29] subject to the conditions attached to the expenditure of the
moneys appropriated for that purpose. It is not necessary to hold
that the limitations of that act could effect or alter the right of this
court to adjudge whatever compensation it might deem railroad com-
panies entitled to for this class of transportation. The effect of the
act manifests itself not upon the jurisdiction of this court but upon
the transaction as between the claimant and the disbursing officer at
the time of the presentment and payment of a claim payable out of
the moneys appropriated by this act and subjects the claimants to the
limitations prescribed, necessarily precluding any further recovery
by reason thereof.

The question herein presented and diseussed was not involved in
the Union Pacific case, wherein the status of these various classes of
persons was considered and determined, It is noticeable that in that
case, which was prepared for the purpose of testing the status of
these classes of persons as “troops” of the United States and which
was prepared during the period covered by the transactions here
involved and by the same attorney representing that plaintiff and
this, and which was based upon transportation furnished during
1913, 1914, and 1915, relianee was not on “protested” disbursing
officer’s vouchers but upon claims for full commercial rates presented
to the auditor for direct settlement, upon settlement of which that
official disallowed and deducted land grant, a procedure entirely
within his proper powers, against which deduction the plaintiff pro-
tested and appealed to the Comptroller of the Treasury and there-
after brought its suit for the amounts disallowed by the auditor, viz.
the difference between the amount claimed and the amount allowed.
The distinction is manifest.

The views expressed require the conclusion that the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover as to either of the periods considered. A dis-
missal of its petition has therefore been directed.

Reference is made to the opinion by the Chief Justice discussing
practically the same question In case No, 30-A, Western Pacifie Rail-
road Company. this day decided.

Graham, Judge; Hay, Judge; Booth, Judge, and Campbell, Chief
Justice, concur.

[fol. 30] XIII. JunGMent oF THE CouRT

At a Court of Claims held in the City of Washington on the Sev-
enth day of January, A. D., 1924, judgment was ordered to be en-
tered as follows:

The Court, upon due consideration of the premises, find in favor of
the defendant, and do order, adjudge and decree that the plaintiff,

ea a

ba

wine 9 Cte UN hon LES

as aforesaid, is not entitled to recover and shall not have and recover
any sum in this action of and against the United States; and that the
petition herein be and the same is dismissed: And it is further or-
dered, and adjudged that the United States shall have and recover of
and from the plaintiff, as aforesaid, the sum of Three hundred and
twenty-seven dollars and eight cents ($327.08), the cost of printing
the record in this Court, to be colleeted by the Clerk, as provided by
law.

By the Court.

NIV. Prarntirr’s Appiication ror Appeat—Filed January 22,
1924

From the judgment rendered in the above-entitled cause on Janu-
ary 7, 1924, plaintiff hereby makes application for the allowance of
an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Ilarr & Bates, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

XV. Orper or Court ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’s APPLICATION FOR
Aprrat—Entered February 4, 1924

It is ordered by the court that the plaintiff’s application for appeal
he and the same is allowed,

By the Court.

|fol. 81] Court oF CLAIMS OF THE UNITED States
| Title omitted |

I, F.C, Kleinschmidt, Assistant Clerk Court of Claims, certify that
ihe foregoing are true transcripts of the pleadings in the above-en-
titled cause ; of the arguments and submissions of case; of the findings
of fact, conelusion of law, and opinion of the court by Downey, J.;
of the judgment of the court; of the plaintiffs application for an
appeal; of the order of the court allowing said application,

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of said Court at Washington City this Eighth day of February,
A. D., 1924.

F. C. Kleinschmidt, Assistant Clerk Court of Claims. (Seal
of Court of Claims. )

Endorsed on cover: File No. 30,120. Court of Claims. Term No.

810. Southern Pacifie Company, appeliant, vs. The United States.
Filed February 11th, 1924. File No. 30,120.

(2550)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_0250%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
