# Appellees Brief — Idaho Irrigation Co. v. Gooding

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellees Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1924
- **Citation:** 265 U.S. 518

## Text

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INDEX AND LIST OF CASES CITED

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Argument:

No method provided by Carey Act whereby is-
suance of patent to state can be contested...
Determination of Secretary of Interior not final
Decisions of Cireuit Court not conflicting...
Determination of Secretary in issuing patent does
not conclude the issues of this cause...
Construction company can sell the water for use
upon a smaller acreage than that patented
Water sold for use upon certain land does not
become inseparably appurtenant thereto...
Contract of Carey Act settler conveys a definite
amount of water

Provision for rotation has to do with method of
application and does not limit the ET
Construction company not entitled to lien until
water rendered permanently available...
State owns the water and the government the land
Appellees are in court with clean hands...
Relief sought by appellees is not contrary to publie
poliey

District Court did not err in determining the
amount of water available...

Amendments of pleadings to conform to proof
proper

District Court did not err in paki amount of
losses

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ii.
Appendix containing Idaho statutes referred to........

Cases and authorities cited:
Bennett v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 150 Pac. 336..........
Boley v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 917 Pae. 258....15, 19, 28, 31
Burke v. Southern P. R. Co., 58 Law Fd. 1627... 9
Caldwell v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 225 Fed. 5354... 8
Childs v. Neitzel, 141 Pac. 77.........-...:200- s+. caus -
Evans v. Swendsen, 200 Pac. 136..........-.-:----
Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 Pace, 208................
Furbee v. Alexander, 176 Pace. 97.......-.--.---:-:0+
Idaho Irr. Co. v. Gooding, 285 Fed. 458..........0.....
Ide v. United States, 68 Law Ed, 201..... ...............
Powers v. Webster, 91 Pac. 569.............
Short v. Praisewater, 208 Pac, 844-.......--.....-
St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 26 Law Ed. 875
Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 200 Pae.

Oe -cabtaneuneanibeesand eqnkencannayntiaemintenesiges 40 Be
State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 121 Pac. 1039............
State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pae. 220.0...

Fe cs ca idcadauanaxiaweetlsavaxsDreateryaneaeyns 11, 15, 23, 24, «
State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 217 Pace. napa 96, ;
Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Alexander, 260 Fed. 2 wy
Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Caldwell, 242 Fed. 177. 1, 15, 2
Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. 356. Ree 15, 3
Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. 382........ 15, 29, 3:
Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Lind, 94 Pace. 348.........---
Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. 428
15, 18, 23, 28, 29, :

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. aa cesceasen sie
Sec, 4685 U. S. Comp. Stats.........-.-------- err 8,
Sec, 4686 U. S. Comp. Stats..........--.------eeee 8,
Sec. 917 et seq. R. S. Wyo. 1889......---------ee--

Art. 15, See. 1, Constitution SNR chiomennen

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Sec, 2998 Ida. Comp, Stats, .....0.cccececcccocevesosescoveneees 28,
Sec. 3004 Ida. Comp. Stats... 00ccccccccccccceceeeeeeee.
Bec, SUGE Tele. Comp, Btate eon n....cccccceccececececesesess....
Sec. 3065 Ida, Comp, Stats... cccccccccccccecceeee. 28,
Sec. 5636 Ida. Comp Stats... 24,
Sec. 5640 Ida, Comp. Stats... ccc cccccee ee.

Sec. 5582 Ida. Comp. Stats... cccccccccc..-... 33,
See, 7033 Ida, Comp, Stats... ccccccccccccecceceeee...

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The Supreme Court of the Anited States

February Term, 1924

The Idaho Irrigation Company, Limited;

The Kquitable Trust Company of New York,

a corporation, and Lyman Rhodes, as trus-

tees, et al,

Appellants, No. 324
vs.
Fred W. Gooding, Novinger & Darrah Sheep
Company, Limited, T. B. Jones, et al,

Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLEES GOODING, ET AL

This brief is on behalf of the appellees Gooding, et al,
who were the original plaintifs in the trial court, and
is in reply to the brief of appellant, Idaho Irrigation
Company, Limited. In this brief all figures in paren-
theses refer to the respective page numbers of the
transcript of the record, and all bold faced type
appearing in the quotations is that of the writers.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As appelless have attempted to make a full statement
of the facts and issues in their brief upon the cross-
appeal in this cause we assume that it is not necessary
to do so again here. There are one or two matters
Which we feel counsel for appellant have inadvertently
gotten confused in the statement of facts contained in
appellant’s brief, which we hope to correct,

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On page six appellant’s brief various acreage figures
are quoted which appear to have been taken from de-
fendants’ exhibit 11. The full text of this exhibit is
as follows:

Carey Act entries ...........-.-:-eeceeceeeeeeeeneee 69,107.20
Non-Carey Act, School, Desert, ete......... 19,728.51

Total water shares sold.............-......+ 88,835.7
Held by company at time suit commenced 8,467.07

Held by purchasers at time
Suit COMMENCEM ............--ccceeeeeeeeeeees 80,368.64
Acquired by company since suit commenced 4,255.57
Held by purchasers at present time 76,113.07
Land entries subject to cancellation (Ix 27) 887.49

Net lands in hands of seters............ veee 4 Oy220,62

This exhibit is entitled ‘Ownership of land under
Idaho Irrigation system.’’ Appellant concludes that
12,045.80 of said 19,728.51 shares had been traded for
decreed water. We are unable to find any showing in
the record supporting this statement. The Idaho Irr-
gation Company (which company will hereafter be
referred to as the ‘‘construction company ’’) did purchase
some decreed rights and issue in lieu thereof shares in
the company, but these purchased rights are considered
as a part of the construction company’s water right,
and the shares issued therefor are considered a part
of the outstanding water contracts and water rights
which must be supplied from the available supply of
the company. All of said 19,728.51 shares have to he
supplied with water from the supply of the construction
company. Apparently counsel have confused these
decreed rights that were bought by the construction

company with certain ‘‘old rights’’ that are referred to
at several points in the record. It is also very apparent
that the Cireuit Court did not thoroughly understand
the exact situation as to these various shares and old
rights (675-6). We hope the following detailed state-
ment renders the situation entirely clear to this court.
At the time the construction company filed upon the
waters in question a number of appropriations had
already been perfected upon the same streams and of
the same aggregate supply by individual settlers. A
number of these rights were of many years standing
and because of their priority their water supply was
generally adequate even in low water seasons. Others
of these rights were of more recent years and were often
inadequate during seasons of low water. The con-
struction company aequired quite a number of the latter
class of water rights. This it was able to do because
the individuals considered that with the storage facilities
contemplated their water right would be made consistent
throughout the varying seasons, These individuals were
issued shares of stock in the construction company in
liew of such water rights, which shares had to be on a
parity with all other contract holders deriving their
water from the same system (50). See also, Sanderson
V. Salmon River Canal Company, 200 Pae. (Ida.) 341.
The owners of many of the “old rights’? retained their
rights. The extent of these old rights is approximately
100,000 acre feet (254 and 258). Since the filings of
the construction company were perfected many other
filings have been made by individuals, which filings
tend to absorb the excess and flood waters during
seasons of unusually high water (259). It will therefore
be understood that at the time of the trial of instant

SN ee ae

4

eause there were three classes of water rights all de-
pending upon the same source of supply, which supply
the construction company contend constituted the *‘avail-
able’? supply for the purchasers of its contracts alone
(pp. 10, 67, et al. brief). These three classes have right
of priority in and to the aggregate water supply in the
order named, to-wit; (1)Old rights, (2) Construction com-
pany rights, and (3) Flood rights. This state of faets
appears from plaintiffs’ exhibit 3 (249), which is ex-
plained at page 248 of the record; the testimony of witness
Tallman at pages 254, 258 and 259; plaintiffs’ exhibit 9
(305); intervener’s exhibit 1 (430); plaintiffs’ exhibit 2
(245); the testimony of witness Baer (279), and other
parts of the record.
At some points in the record these ‘‘old rights’? are
described as ‘‘decreed rights.’? By reading testimony of
Watermaster Chapman on pages 244 and 245 it can be
readily understood that ‘‘decreed rights”’ refers to those
decreed rights which are of prior right to the water
right of the construction company and its purchasers.
And from this and the above portions of the record it
will also be understood that the water for all of these
three classes of water rights comes from the same general
watershed and that all of it must of necessity pass
through the reservoir and system of the appellant con-
struction company.
Therefore, it must be concluded, as stated by Mr.
Kays, vice-president and general manager of the con-
struction company (430), at page 454, that the figure
$8,835.71, as shown in defendants’ exhibit 11 supra
‘‘represents the total number of shares of stock sold

for Carey Act land, for school land, desert land,
homestead land, and all other lands on the date
mentioned. At that time, there were certain lands

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5

standing in the name of M. R. Kays, trustee, Lyman
Rhoades, trustee, and Equitable Trust “ompany of
New York, trustee. I believe the Idaho Irrigation
Company to be the owner, the beneficial owner, of
lands standing in the names of the various parties
mentioned and was the beneficial owner at the time
of the filing of the complaint and lis pendens in
the district court.’’

The District Court evidently considered that these
shares standing in the names of the various trustee de-
fendants, of which the Idaho Irrigation Company was
the ‘beneficial owner,’’ should properly be treated as
the property of the construction company for the pur-
poses of this suitand in sofar as the rights of the
appellees are concerned, because they were enjoined
from selling the same, The Cireuit Court’s decree permits
certain of these shares so held by the trustee defendants
to be sold. This latter decree is the basis of the eross-
appeal in this cause, and is presented by separate briefs.
Such matters as percentage loss and the effect of
raising the spillway, discussed at pp. 8 and 9 of appel-
lant’s brief, will be taken up at the appropriate place
in our argument.

BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT

When patent for lands under a Carey Act project
issues to a state and as a condition precedent thereto
the Secretary of the Interior concludes that an ample
supply of water has been furnished, this conclusion is
merely for the purpose of issuing the patent and passing
title to the lands to the state, and this conclusion does
not relieve the Carey Act construction company of its
liability upon contracts made with settlers upon the
Project to furnish them with a definite and positive

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amount of water. Argued and authorities cited at pages
8 to 23 hereof.

A Carey Act construction company is not required to
sell and distribute its water over all the patented area
if there is not enough water to properly irrigate the

same. Argued and authorities cited at pages 25 to 2

hereof.
When title of government lands passes to the state,

under the provisions of the Carey Act, the water does
not thereby become an inseparable appurtenance to the
land, but may be sold and conveyed separately. Argued
and supporting authorities cited at pages 25 to 26 hereof,

Under the contracts between the State of Idaho and
the construction company and between the latter com-
pany and the settlers the settlers are entitled to a definite
and positive amount of water, together with a propor
tionate interest in the system; and this construction is
not contrary to the spirit or letter of the state or na
tional Carey Act. Argued and authorities cited at
pages 26 to 28 hereof.

The rotation system provided for
mentioned in the preceding paragraph
with the method of applying the water to the
does not mean that the contracted amount of water for
each settler shall be reduced. Argued and authorities
cited at pages 28 to 29 hereof.

It is contrary to the laws of Idaho for a Carey Act
construction company, or any other company, to contract
to sell more water than it has title to; and the fact that
patent to the lands under a Carey Act project may have
been issued to the state by the government does not
warrant the construction company in contracting to sell
the entire patented area, if as a matter of fact it has
not sufficient water to supply said contracts at the rate

in the contracts
has to do merely
land, and

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provided therein. In the event the water supply is not
sufficient to supply the entire patented area at the
contract rate the acreage must be restricted. Argued
and authorities cited at pages 31 to 34 hereof,

The appellees are in this court with clean hands.
Argued at pages 34 to 37 hereof,

The relief asked for by appellees is not contrary to
public policy nor inequitable, Argued at pages 37 to 38
hereof,

The Distriet Court did not err in determining the
amount of water available to the construction company,
nor in determining the transmission losses, nor in fixing
the duty of water. Argued and supporting authorities
cited at page 38,

ARGUMENT
Appellant's First Specification of Error

This specification is to the effeet that in issuing
patent to the lands in this project the Secretary of the
Interior determined that there was a sufficient available
supply of water to irrigate all the lands patented, to-wit,
7,677.24 acres, and that such finding is conclusive upon
the issues raised in this cause,

Under subdivision one of the first specification, ap-
pellant cites several cases to the effect that the decision
of the land department upon questions of fact is con-
elusive, As to this general statement we can not take
exception, but we strenuously question the application
of such rule to the issues now before the court, for the
reason that the issues in the cited cases and those in the
instant case are entirely foreign, The cited cases having
to do with attacks upon patents and similar questions,
While the instant ease is founded upon contracts in

8

writing between individuals. Neither the government
nor its officials are parties to these contracts.

The second subdivision of the first specification, is
that by the issuance of a patent to the lands under the
project the Secretary of the Interior determined that
an ample supply of water had been furnished, (The
patent to 117,000 odd acres issued from the government
to the State of Idaho in 1915 (448), and this suit was
not filed until 1917). Appellant contends that this
patent was issued after due notice thereof was given to
the publie and after protests and contests had been
invited by posted and published notices (brief 16), and
since no opposition was made and the patent issued the
question of the sufficiency of the water supply cannot
now be questioned in any manner of proceeding.

In the first place, from a careful study of the state
and federal Carey Acts it will be noted that this pro
cedure of posting and publishing notices calling for
protests and contests is not authorized, either direetly
or indirectly. No mention is made thereof, Under such
circumstances what rights did the participants gain!
True the act of August 18, 1894, U.S. C. 5. 4685, makes
reference to reclamation of land as under the desert land
law, but the act of June 11, 1896, U.S. C. 8, 4686, under
which appellant claims to have made proof and obtained
a patent to the state, makes no reference to the desert
land law, and it must be assumed that under the new
law such proof as made in the instant case was nol
intended, Therefore, nothing could have been gained by
a protest or contest of the issuance of the patent because
there is no provision therefor, and an attempted contest
would have had no standing in court.

In the second place, and admitting that a contest eould
have been made, the notice in question was dated April 9,

1912, and required any contemplated contests or protests
to be made ‘‘within the next xty days following the
date of this notice’? (444). At) oat time a comparatively
small number of contracts were outstanding (564), Of
course, we understand that the figure of 25.068, taken
from exhibit 10 at page 564 does not accurately represent
the actual number of land then sold, but it will serve
to illustrate, The contract holders would certainly be
the only parties who could contest under any cireum-
stances, because a mere private citizen, having no special
interest in the patented area, would not be able to main-
tain the contest. Powers v. Webster, 91 Pae, (Wash,) 569,
St. Louis Smelting Co, v. Kemp, 104 U. S, 636, 26 Law
Kd 875-9,

‘Does the fact that the appellant was not. in
privity with the government in any respect at the
time when the patent was issued to the railroad
company prevent him from attacking the patent on
the grounds of fraud, error, or irregularity in the
issuance thereof as so alleged in the appeal?
‘**Answer—It does,’’

Burke v. Southern P. R. Co., 234 U.S, 669, 58 Law
Kd 1527-1556,

Then contests could have been made only as to a com-
paratively small portion of the patented area, and even
had such contests been made it is more than likely that
at that time there was sufficient water for the lands sold,
It is the land that has been sold since that time and since
the institution of this suit for which water is wanting, and
for these lands the remedy by contest, which appellant
contends is the only remedy, is no remedy at all. Every
wrong has its remedy, If the allegations of appellees’
complaint are true, as the District Court has found to be

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the case, it is certain that they have a grievous wrong.
In the third place, it is the contention of appellees that
the determination, if any there was, of the Secretary of
the Interior in issuing the patent was made merely for
the purpose of passing the legal title from the government
to the state. That has been done, and appellees are not
seeking to undo it. Let the title to those lands remain
unmolested forever.
Under the Wyoming statutes having to to do with the
appropriation of water and the acquisition of permits
therefor, sec. 917 et seq. R. S. Wyo. 1889, the procedure
is somewhat similar to that followed in passing title of
the lands from the government to the state in the present
ease. In considering a permit issued by a state officer
this court recently said:
‘The permits were based on ex parte applications
and were mere licenses to appropriate in accordance
with the laws of the state, if the water was
available.”’
Ide v United States, (Adv .Ops. Oct. Term, 1923),
68 Law Ed. 201-9.
The patent was issued long before the project had
been completed and it was a physical impossibility for
the secretary to have actually determined and found
that sufficient water for all the lands patented had been
furnished. Such an amount of water has not been
furnished at this time. Under the very nature of the
transaction it must have been intended by Congress that
the Secretary of the Interior should estimate the acreage
that could be reclaimed. This is the view that the Cireuit
Court took of a similar situation:

‘“‘The word ‘determined’, so used, was evidently
used in the sense of estimated; for in the nature of
things it could not then—in advance of even the

11

beginning of any work or the actual diversion of
any of the water—be known what would be the
exact capacity of the system. It was necessarily
but the estimate of the proposer of the plan ap-
proved by the state engineer and the state board of
land commissioners, and subsequently by the Seere-
tary of the Interior in segregating the tract applied
for from the publie domain. How greatly all of
them erred in their estimate is shown by the record
in the case; the capacity of the system being, as has
been said, only about one-third of what it was then
thought it would be.’’

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Cald-
well, 242 Fed. 177-192.

‘*Tlowever, it is well known that the water supply
of streams in the arid region fluctuates considerably
from year to year so that the question of the suf-
ficiency of the water supply for the irrigation of a

tract of land must always be a matter of approximate
estimate.’’

State v Twin Falls Salmon River L. & W. Co.,
166 Pae. (Idaho) 220-228,

By the act of August 18, 1894 (U.S. C. S. 4685) it
will be noted that the lands had to be ‘*reclaimed and
oecupied by actual settlers’? before patent would issue.
By the act of June 11, 1896, (U. S. C. S. 4686) patent
may issue ‘‘when an ample supply of water is actually
furnished in a substantial ditch or canal.” The latter
provision is extremely uncertain. Does the canal have
to be within one mile or forty miles of the land, or does
it have to be on the land to be reclaimed? It is generally
known that irrigation canals are often many miles in
length. When the indefiniteness of this provision is
considered, together with the further fact that this latter
act provides for the creation of a lien upon the land

12

immediately after patent issues, which lien shall include
‘‘the actual cost and necessary expenses of reclamation,”
it is apparent that it was the intention of Congress in
enacting the latter act to hasten the issuance of the
patent and thereby make the lien possible, which would
in turn encourage the construction of Carey Act projects
by making security for the investment available at an
earlier stage of the construction. In order to accomplish
this intent less exacting proof was required before is-
suance of patent. All of which tends to prove thiat the
Secretary of the Interior, in issuing the patent, was
merely of the opinion that there was enough water to
warrant the passing of title of the lands to thie state,
‘n order that a lien might attach thereto and security
be made available for the construction of the project.
It can not be reasonably said that under such an wt-
certain requirement as that above noted the secretary
really conclusively determined that there was sufficient
water to produce ordinary agricultural crops on each of
the 117,000 odd acres.

If we are wrong in the foregoing proposition and this
court is of the opinion that the Secretary of the Interior
in fact found that there was ample water for the patented
lands. that would not be equivalent to holding that such
finding of the Secretary concludes the issues raised by
the pleadings in the present controversy. We think this
is one of the vital points of the case. Namely, that the
present action is based upon the contracts between the
construction company and the settlers, and not upon the
patent. We are not attacking the patent, either directly
or collaterally.

Independent of the patent proceedings the construction
company has entered into contracts with the settlers
and issued them certificates of stock which provide,
among other things, that

13

‘‘Kach share entitles the owner thereof to receive
one-eightieth of a cubie foot of water per second of
time for the irrigation of and domestic uses on the
following described land . . . in the County of
Lincoln and State of Idaho; and this certificate also
entitles the owner to a proportionate interest in the
dam, canal, reservoir, water rights and all other
rights and franchises of this company, based upon
the number of shares finally sold, in accordance with
the contract between the Idaho Irrigation Company,
Limited, and the State of Idaho, dated August 21,
1907, as amended.’’ (89),

The amended contract with the state of Idaho referred
to requires this provision—71, 79 and 82. It is apparent
that the Secretary of the Interior, in issuing patent, was
only required to determine that an ample supply of water
had been actually furnished in a ditch or canal, while
the construction company agreed with the state and
settlers to do a great deal more than that. The con-
struction company has contracted, not only that there
‘is an ample amount of water to irrigate the settler’s
land and make it produce ordinary agricultural crops,
but also that it will construct (or has constructed) a
reservoir and irrigation system sufficient to keep and
continue that ample supply available at all seasonable
pericds and in all ordinary seasons for use by the settler.
In other words, the Secretary of the Interior only deter-
mined, at most, that the ample supply was there at that
particular moment, but the construction company has
contracted that such supply will continue to be available
during the life of the contract. It is these latter contracts
that this action is founded upon.

It is safe to state that the settlers relied upon the
plain and unequivoeal statements contained in the con-
tracts providing that a certain amount of water, together

as at

ent

USER Pee

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with an interest in the dam and system, would be
delivered for use upon the lands they were buying. They
were not then concerned with the determination the
Secretary of the Interior may have made; a large ani
then financially responsible corporation, which had built
a large reservoir and irrigation system, tenedered them
contracts whereby such corporation obligated itself to
furnish the purchasers with a positive and ample supply
of water. It is ecrtainly not unreasonable to conclude
that the purchasers relied upon these contracts, rather
than, as appellant maintains, upon the finding of the
government in issuing patent. We do not believe that
the patent proceedings have any place in the case at all.
A proper determination of the issues involves merely
the construction of contracts between private citizens
and the responsibilties and obligations flowing there-
from. The Secretary of the Interior has not attempted
to construe these contracts.

The fifth subdivision of appellant’s first specification
of error (brief 23) points out wherein certain decisions
of the Circuit Court, upon the question of whether or not
the determination of the Secretary of the Interior in
issuing patent to the state concludes the issues now
before this court, are conflicting. A discussion of a
large number of these cases must necessarily be made
in answering both the second and fifth parts of appel-
lant’s argument, beginning on pages 14 and 23, respec-
tively, of its brief. Therefore, these two points will be
discussed jointly.

The following decisions dealing directly or indirectly

with this point have been rendered by the federal District
and Circuit Courts whose decisions are now before this

15

court for review, and by the supreme court of the state
of Idaho: j

Caldwell v Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W.
Co., 225 Fed. 584 (D. C.);

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Cald-
well, 242 Fed. 177 (C. C. A.);

Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. 356
(C. C. A.);

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Alex-
ander, 260 Fed. 270 (D. C.)

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Davis,
267 Fed. 382 (C. C. A.);

Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water Co. v Martens,
271 Fed. 428 (C. C. A.);

Idaho Irr. Co. v Gooding (instant case), 285 Fed.
453 (C. C. A..)

.
,

State v Twin Falls-Salmon River Land & Water
Company, 166 Pac. (Ida.) 220 (on rehearing) ;

State v Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 217 Pae.
Ida.) 252; and,

Boley v Twin Falls Canal Co., 217 Pace. (Ida.)
258-62.

We admit that a complete and entirely satisfactory
explanation can not be made of these various decisions.
However, when the opinions are carefully studied and
it is noted that the issues involved are so varied and the
relief sought so different, it is not surprising that the
decisions do not seem to be entirely harmonious. We
do not believe that the decisions conflict fatally or in-
expliciably.

The three Caldwell decisions were rendered in one
and the same case. A Carey Act project was authorized
in excess of 80,000 acres, and contracts for 73,000 acres

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16

were actually entered into with the settlers. Alleging
that the water supply was wholly inadequate and only
sufficient for 30,000 acres the plaintiffs prayed that all
contracts subsequent to the first 30,000 acres be can-
celled, that the company and its trustees be enjoined
from enforcing collection of the contracts, that a receiver
be appointed to take charge of the project and that
the company be enjoined from selling further contracts.
At the time of filing suit patent had not issued, The
Distiret court did not attempt to make a final deter-
mination of the case, because the proper parties were
not before it, but the District Court did order that the
company should be restrained from selling further water
contracts (225 Fed. 601). It is interesting to note that
the injunctional relief is the approximate relief asked for
in the instant case. The Circuit Court affirmed the
District Court as to the injunctional feature of the case
in the following words (242 Fed. 191):

“| and in view of the fact, shown by the
record and which is here undisputed, that the con-
struction company has already sold water rights
far beyond the available supply of water, we are
also of the opinion that the court below was entirely
right in enjoining it from making any further sales.”

When this Caldwell case was again before the Circuit
Court the injunction was again affirmed, witness the
following language appearing on page 367 (272nd Fed.);

‘We accordingly direct that an order be entered
that the decree of the District Court be reversed
save and except as to the injunctional provisions
thereof, .. .

It is apparent that as to the injunctional features there
is no lack of harmony in the Caldwell decisions and all
of these decisions unquestionably support the District
Court’s decision in the instant case, because the only

Jelaebt ee BENE Re ay A we

17

relief sought in the instant ease is the injunction (36-7).
We believe that all of the decisions agree upon this
matter.

As to whether or not the issuance of patent con-
elusively and finally determined that an adequate supply
of water is available, and coneludes the issues of this
ease, the District Court said (144-5):

‘To the contention that the plaintiff are concluded
by the patent proceedings in the General Land
Office, it is sufficient to respond that they were not
parties to the proceedings, and are. not bound
thereby. They hold contracts imposing upon them
heavy obligations, and in turn conferring upon them
valuable rights. It would be shocking to hold that
these rights could be taken away or substantially
impaired by a finding of fact or conclusion of law
(we are not advised which) made by an adminis-
trative officer in an ex parte proceeding in which
they did not have an opprtunity to be heard.’’

And upon the same question the Circuit Court said
(679):

“They (defendants-appellants) contend that. the
Secretary of the Interior, when he issued a patent
to the state, determined, as a matter of fact, that
the water supply was sufficient for the reclamation
of the irrigable portion of the 117,677.24 acres of
land conveyed to the state, and that such deter-
mination binds this court in this case. We cannot
accept that view of the law as applicable to this
controversy. This suit is upon a contract between
the parties. Neither the United States nor the
Secretary of the Interior is a party to this action.
It is true the State of Idaho, the trustee of the tract
of land conveyed by the Secretary of the Interior,
isanintervener, But the state is here, not in support
of the defendant’s claim that the Secretary of the
Interior has determined that the available water

Oy ars ae ea

PEN,

18

supply, as now ascertained, is sufficient for the
whole tract; nor is it here even as a neutral, On
the contrary, the state is here to say, and to urge
upon the court that the a railable supply of water,
as now ascertained, is not sufficient, and that further
sales of water rights for the project should be
enjoined.

“This action of the state does not aid us in
determining the legal question now under consider-
ation, nor does it determine for this court the fact
that the outstanding issue of water stock of the
Big Wood River Reservoir & Canal Company has
exhausted the available water supply for this
project; but it tends to prove the fact, and is pe-
suasive official action on the part of the state that
the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of
the Interior should not be extended by the court to
questions not clearly and distinetly within his ad-
ministrative authority and jurisdiction.

In effect. the state agrees with this court in Twin
Falls Oakley Land & Water Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed.
948, 433, where this court, speaking through Judge

Hunt, said:

‘© ‘We believe that, in a proceeding to ascertain
whether patents should issue, the finding by the
land department upon the question whether the
supply is ample is conclusive for the purpose of
issuing patent; but that is far from ruling that it
is conclusive upon the question whether the plain-
tiff construction company has provided water at the
rate of 1.5 acre-feet per acre as required by its
contract with the settler. That is a matter which
the Land Department has not undertaken to pas
upon, and could not.’

‘‘We see no reason for changing our opinion 0!
that question.”’

Upon this question the supreme court of Idaho had

— Bi Deng A LAOS tl LRN
SORIA pte tar hen ewe CE

19

the following to say, in the recent case of Boley v. Twin
Falls Canal Company, 217 Pae. 258, quoting from page
262: ,

“It is urged on behalf of respondent that the
state having procured patent from the government
for the lands purchased by respondent, it holds these
lands in trust for subsequent purchasers; that it
obtained patent to the same by reason of having
represented to the government that it had provided
sufficient water in a substantial canal system to
reclaim such lands, and not having offered to re-
convey, or given notice of the withdrawal of such
lands from further settlement, it is an act of bad
faith on the part of the state to refuse water for
their reclamation, We do not think that this result
follows, for as appears from the record in State and
Rayl v. Twin Falls Salmon River L. & W. Co., 30
Idaho, 41, 166 Pae, 220, Caldwell v. Twin Falls
Salmon River, Ete., Co., (D. C.) 225 Fed. 584, and
Twin Falls Salmon River, ete., Co. vy. Caldwell, 242
Fed. 177, 155 C. C. A. 17, it is apparent that both
tle state and the government have been led into
error with regard to the available water supply for
a particular segregation, and that the practice has
heen for such lands to be released to the government
and opened for settlement under some other pro-
vision of the. federal land law. But whatever may
he said with regard to an error by the state and
the government to patenting to the state a greater
amount of lands than ean actually be reclaimed
under a given system, neither the government nor
the state should insist on depriving prior settlers
who have located upon this segregation, spent a
large amount in improving their lands and bringing
them to a high state of cultivation, of the amount
of water necessary to reclaim such lands, such water
not being in excess of the amount to which the
granting clauses in their deeds of conveyance en-
titled them to receive. ****** No further sale should

et

20

be 2ilowed when it would result in diminishing the
prior settler’s right to less than the maximum
amount which they have purchased, that amount
being necessary for the successful irrigation of their
lands.”’

The foregoing decisions do not reveal any conflicts,
nor even inconsistencies. But these quoted decisions do
show the interpretation which the courts have placed
upon the question under consideration. This question
was fairly raised in these cases and the determinations
made are authoritative.

At pages 23 et seq. of their brief counsel for appellant
point out instances in which it is claimed the decisions of
the Cireuit Court are in conflict with its decisions in the
instant case and in the Martens case, supra. The thiree
following cases are cited in this connection:

Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. 356-65-7;
Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Caldwell, 242 Fed. 177-199;
Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. 382-9.

In the Davis ease the object of the suit was to prevent
the state officials from relinquishing certain segregated
lands back to the government. That is, the suit involved
the question of the issuance of the patent to the state.
The Martens and other cases quoted from above do not
have to do with similar issues, The relief sought in the
Caldwell case is difficult to describe in a few words, but
is summarized to some extent by the Cireuit Court in its
last decision therein, at page 361 of the 272 Fed, reporter.
Furthermore, the Caldwell case has never been finally
determined, but it was sent back to the Distriet Cour
with instructions that new pleadings be drawn, ne¥
parties be brought in, ete. (272 Fed. 367-8). As best
we can determine, the purpose, or at least one of the

ie Pt eth Hen AA Pie Noel) A) Com I tie MONO SiR Lah ar Os Maal) aT alae

21

purposes, in both the Davis and the Caldwell cases was
to determine what lands should be patented. In other
words, those actions affected the patent and land titles;
while the instant action affects, not the land title or
the patent, but the contractual relation between the
construction company and the settlers, under written
contracts. Therefore, when the relief sought and the
issues are considered we do not believe that there is
any serious conflict in the decisions of the Cireuit Court.
The contractual rights and responsibilities of the
parties to this action were not submitted to the Secretary
of the Interior and he has never attempted to determine
the same. The Secretary’s determination that there was
ample water furnished to justify the issuance of patent
to the state does not mean that the construction company
has complied with its contracts with the appellees and
their fellow-settlers. The Secretary may have determined

that only a comparatively small amount of water was

necessary to warrant the issuance of patent; but this

most certainly does not prevent the construction company

and the settlers from agreeing among themselves as to

what amount of water is necessary for the irrigation of

the land so patented. And if the construction company

and the settlers make such an agreement it is a matter

as between them privately and about which the Secretary

has never been in the least concerned. In an unpublished

opinion filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern

Division of Idaho May 5, 1923, Judge Dietrich thus

tersely summarizes this situation:

ee

i -_ —- |S |

ce eo FS or

: whatever view may be taken in the
patent proceedings by the Secretary of the Interior
or Commissioner of the General Land Office touching
the sufficiency or insufficiency of the water supply
to warrant the issuance of patent, it still devolves

22

upon the courts to entertain and independently to
adjudicate controversies such as the one here
presented. Briefly to amplify: In the one case the
question is between the state and the government,
an inquiry whether the state has complied with
certain statutory requirements, without respect to
the obligations the promoting company may have
assumed toward the settlers. And in the other, as
already suggested, we have only questions of con-
tract rights between private individuals who have
chosen to enter into certain agreements conferring
and imposing reciprocal rights and obligations.”

The title of the case just quoted from is, Common-
wealth Trust Co. of Pittsburg v. Glavin. The purpose of
the suit was the same as that in the Martens case, namely,
an action brought by the assignee of the construction
company against a settler for the foreclosure of a water
contract, the settler being in default upon his contract
payments. The only difference in the two cases is that
they arose upon different Carey Act projects in the State
of Idaho.

Wherever in this brief the statement is made that a
settler is entitled to his contract amount of water, or
where a similar statement is made, what is meant is that
a settler is entitled to the contract amount of lis water,
provided that amount is necessary for the beneficial
irrigation of his land. JudgeDietrich found the latter
amount to be 2%4 acre feet (149). This is less than the
contract amount by far, but the trial court had in mind
the following Idaho statutory provisions upon this
question:

“| | The amount of water. so alloted shall
never be in excess of the amount actually used for
beneficial purposes for which such right is claimed.”
C. 8. 7033.

Oe ee en a a A ee

23

‘‘No person entitled to the use of water from any
such diteh or canal, must, under any circumstances,
use more water than good husbandry requires for
the crop or crops that he cultivates; . . ’’C. S. 5640.
Upon this point also, State v. Twin Falls-Salmon River
Land & Water Co., 166 Pae. (Ida.) 220-233,

The third subdivision of appellant’s first specification
of error presents the argument that

‘“‘The reasoning of the Cireuit Court of Appeals is
fallacious beeause it assumed that the Company
could contract to apply the entire water supply to
a smaller acreage than the land officials had deter-
mined the water supply was sufficient to reclaim.
The state had no authority to reapportion the water
supply.’’ Appeilant’s brief, page 19.

In other words, the water rights of the construction
company must be sold to and distributed for use upon
the entire irrigable portion of the patented area, and
none other. Counsel can not consistently urge this
proposition, because their client has already sold several
thousand shares of such water for use upon other lands
than those described in the patent. See Ex. 11, at page
2 of this brief, and Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water
Co, v. Martens, 271 Fed, 428-32, par. 4. The contract
between the construction company and the state also
clearly shows that it was not the real intention of the
contracting parties that the water should be scattered
out over more land than the dictates of good husbandry
and the needs of the lands warranted, witness the fol-
lowing language therefrom:

“The second party (Idaho Irrigation Company)
stipulates and agrees that to the extent of the
capacity of the irrigation works and to the extent
of its water rights, it will, as rapidly as lands are

E
i
i
¥
z,

open for entry and settlement, sell, or contract to
sell, water rights or shares for land to be filed upon
to qualified entrymen, (50) ....

‘‘But in no ease shall water rights or shares he
dedicated to any of the lands aforementioned or sold
beyond the carrying capacity of the said canal
system or in excess of the appropriation of wate as
hereinbefore mentioned.’’ (54)

In this connection it is also important to note that it
is unlawful for a Carey Act construction company to
sell water in excess of its appropriation. Sees. 3065 &
5636, Ida. Comp. Stats. Full text of these sections is
contained at pages 28 et seq. of cross-appellants brief
herein). Another reason which renders this position of
counsels’ inconsistent is that the appellant has alleged
in its answer that when it has sold shares representing
the total water appropriated

‘« | |. then and in that event, the said Idaho Iri-
gation Company should make no further sales of
water rights by means of selling and issuing shares
of stock in the said Big Wood River Reservoir &
Canal Company, Limited.’’ (114)

These citations would seem to refute counsels’ theory
and establish the proposition that the entire water appro-
priated by a Carey Act construction company does not
necessarily have to be sold for use upon the entire
patented area, but may be sold for use upon other lands
and for use upon a lesser acreage than that patented.
See par. 18 of state contract (84); and also the following
excerpt from the case of State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166
Pac. (Ida.) 220-9:

“The West and Weaver cases do not hold that

where the water supply is inadequate, it must be
divided up so as to make it impossible to reclaim

—_

the land in the project. Those decisions have no
appliction to the case at bar. It was not the in-
tention of the framers of the Constitution nor of the
several irrigation acts of the legislature to have the
public waters of the state so distributed as not to
properly irrigate the agricultural lands for which
they may be appropriated, and thus make a failure
of the proper reclamation of our arid lands.’’

25

Witness Harris states this proposition thusly (399):

“If it (the water) is spread over so large an area
that the farmers can only get part of what they
need, it is impossible for them to prosper, we get
discontented farmers, farmers who are not good
citizens hecause of the lack of content, and we have
an undesirable condition, . .. the idea being that
there is no particular advantage in having a great
number of people, if those people are not prosperous,
if they are not able to make a living, and are not
contented :”’

The Distriet Court states the same idea in these words,
in the Caldwell ease, 225 Fed. 596:

‘Better four prosperous farmers than five who
are unsuccessful because of the uncertainty in the
water supply, and better four farms uniformly fruit-
ful than five upon which failure is ever imminent,
and to which it is bound to come on the average
one year in five.’’

The fourth subdivision of appellant’s first specifi-
cation of error deals with the effect of the decision of
the Cireuit Court and, as we interpret the argument, it
is claimed that the decision is erroneous because it would
permit a part of the water to be detached from the land
which the issuance of patent had automatically made
such water appurtenant to permanently. To support
this theory they cite sees, 3018 and 3019 Ida. Comp.
Stats. In Idaho there is no longer any question but that

26

water, which has become appurtenant to specific land,
can thereafter be sold and conveyed and separated from
said land, just as a tree, building or any other appur-
tenance to real property may be. This question is
thoroughly briefed at pages 33 et seq. of cross-appellants’
brief in this cause. There the two Idaho cases of Bennett
v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 150 Pac. 336-40, and Sanderson y,
Salmon River Canal Co., 199 Pac. 999-1002, and other
authorities, are cited and quoted. These authorities
show beyond doubt that it is permissible and proper to
transfer water from one tract of land to other lands,
in Idaho.
At page 29 of its brief appellant states that at least
one of the appellees, the state, took part in the patent
proceedings and is bound thereby. The state in dealing
with the Carey Act projects acts by virtue of its sover-
eignty and not in the capacity of a private owner, State
y. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pac. (Ida.) 220-33 (679-0).
Appellant’s Second Specification of Error

Appellant contends that the water rights sold by the
construction company should be construed in harmony
with all the provisions of the Carey Act, and that this
means that each purchaser only acquires a proportionate
interest in the total water right of the company, rather
than a definite amount. Appellant further claims that
the amount was specified in the contracts merely for
the purpose of establishing a maximum. This theory
has been unsuccessfully advanced in practically every
case of the same general nature for a number of years
To date every court has unhesitatingly decided this point
against appellant’s contention. During the current year
the supreme court of Idaho, in the case of State v. Twin
Falls Land & Water Co., 217 Pac. 252-6, stated the law
upon this matter as follows:

‘It cannot be presumed that the present users of
water under this system, when they acquired their
rights to its use, intended or understood that they
were to receive only an indefinite fractional part of
this original appropriation of 3000 second feet,
instead of the definite, specifie quantity mentioned
in the granting clause of their contracts. Such
meaning is clearly contrary to the language used.
If the state, which subject only to the limitations of
law had plenary power to fix the terms and con-
ditions of these contracts between the construction
company and the settler, intended that he should
have only a fractional, indefinite, and uncertain
amount of this appropriation that might remain
after all subsequent purchasers of lands lying within
the exterior boundaries of the segregation had been
granted similar rights, it should have made this
condition of the contract clear and unequivocal.
Instead of doing so, it was made to read as above
stated... ..

“The state land board is without authority to
authorize a construction company to sell settlers
under a Carey Act project an indefinite, fractional
water right, but is required to limit such sales to the
amount of water available from the company’s ap-
priation which can be seasonably delivered by the
proposed system.’’

The case just quoted from and the Boley case, which
is reported in the same volume at page 258, are of
unusual interest and importance upon many of the issues
before this court now, and we request the court to
consider both of these decisions in detail. With this
in mind we will not oceupy space in this brief with
statement of the facts of said cases. For further author-
ities disapproving the proportionate share theory see
the following cases:

28

Boley v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 217 Pace. (Ida)
258-62;

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pac. (Ida.) 220-
9-232;

Caldwell v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 225 Fed. (DC)
584-91;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Caldwell, 242 Fed. (CCA)
177-93;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. (CCA)
428-31;

Sees. 2998 and 3064, Ida. Comp. Stats.

Therefore, if a settler under this project acquired a
definite and positive amount of water by his contract,
then when sufficient contracts have been issued to absorb
the water right of the construction company, clearly no
further sales should be made, because as each sale is
made after that time the water rights of the prior pur-
chasers would be proportionately diminished and le
would be deprived of a vested, contractual and valuabie
right. It should be remembered that the purpose of the
present action was not to cut off vested rights, as is the
situation in some of the reported cases, but its sole
purpose is to prevent further rights accruing. ‘‘It is
one thing to prevent any more righits vesting, in order to
avoid a hardship to those whose rights have already
vested, and it is another thing to wipe out riglits which
have already vested through the issuance of contracis
and the use of the water.’’? Sanderson v. Salmon River
Canal Company, 200 Pac. (Ida.) 341-3.

In this connection appellant takes the position (brief
p. 40-1) that the provisions in the contract providing for
the installation of a system of rotation shows that the
company was not obligated to deliver a definite amount
of water. This same question was raised in the Caldwell

Ne AA ruil a Sh tae er Raced

29

ease, so often referred to. In that case the District Court
concluded that these provisions had to do with the
‘‘method of delivery,’’ rather than the ‘‘extent of the
right.’’ 225 Fed. 598. The Cireuit Court agreed with the
District Court upon this matter. 242 Fed. 193 and 4.

The evidence shows that the rotation system can only
be used to a limited extent between the smaller owners
(349); where a larger head of water is used by the
rotation system the waste is greater, (376); the soil will
be injured (417); and upon several of the tracts the
canals and ditches are not constructed large enough to
permit the practical adaptation of the rotation system
(373-4).

Under this specification of error, and at other points
of its brief, appellant contends that the action of the
District Court in enjoining further sales deprives the
construction company of its contemplated lien upon all
the patented area, and thereby prevents the company
from being remunerated for its work. As the construction
company contended in the Cireuit Court, the action of
the District Court deprives the construction company
and its assignees of the lien on some 13,000 acres of land.
To this contention we make the brief reply that a Carey
Act construction company is not entitled to a lien until
it has made permanently available to the settlers suffie-
ient water to reasonably irrigate the land and render it
productive; it is not sufficient that the land may be
reclaimed :

Childs v. Neitzel, 141 Pac. (Ida.) 77-85;
Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. (CCA) 382-7;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v Alexander, 260 Fed. (D. C.)
270-5;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. (CCA)
428-33;

To the general statement made by appellant’s counsel
numerous time, that the one and only purpose of the
Carey Act is the reclamation of the land, and that all
contracts and court decisions must be interpreted in that
light, we do not take any exception. However, we do
desire to add to this statement by stating that it is the
intent and purpose of the state and national Carey Act
and all proceedings thereunder that the desert lands
shall be ‘‘thoroughly reelaimed,’’ reclaimed in such
manner as to enable them to produce ordinary agricul-
tural crops.

“The purpose of the Carey Act of Congress and
of our legislative enactments accepting for Idaho
its benefits is the reclamation and irrigation of
desert lands in a manner and to an extent that will
make them productive and valuable for agricultural
purposes.”’

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pae. (Ida.) 220-51,

The best available authority for our position upon
this question is that of common sense and _ practical
thought. To say to a settler, who holds a written con-
tract providing that he shall have a definite amount of
water, that he shall not in fact receive that defimte
amount of water nor even euough thereof to thoroughly
irrigate his lands, but that as a matter of law he is only
entitled to receive a proportionate interest of such water
as is available, would be equivalent to advising the
settler that he had no water right at all. Or at best
he would only be getting an uncertain and chimerical
proportion in an unknown quantity.

It is generally known that many settlers on western
projects are former residents of the east,who buy without
personal knowledge of the water and conditions existing,
but in reliance upon the representations and agreements

E_ —_—— —

eT

of the construction company. If a construction company

is not limited in its sales by the amount of water on

hand and is not required to deliver to its purchasers
| any definite amount of water under the prescribed con-
| tracts, it could continue indefinitely with sales to unwary
purchasers. Every purchaser under a Carey Act has
| equal priority of right with the other purchasers. If
appellant’s theories are upheld a state of affairs could
be arrived at, and not in the far distant future, whereby
the appellees and their co-settlers would not have enough
water to irrigate one-tenth of the land they now have
under cultivation. Certainly no such fraudulent and
unfair results are contemplated by the various Carey Act
enactments.

Under this specification of error, and at page 43 of its
brief, appellant quotes from the case of State v. Twin
Falls ete. Co., 121 Pae. (Ida.) 1039-50, which quotation
apparently tends te support the ‘‘proportionate share
theory.”’ This court dismissed the appeal from that
decision for want of jurisdiction. See 59 Law Ed. 427.
However, the case has recently been discussed by the
supreme court of Idaho in two instances, and, so far as
it holds that the proportionate share theory applies to
situations like that now in hand, it has been effectively
overruled,

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 217 Pac. (Ida.) 252-7;

Boley v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 217 Pace. (Ida.)
258-61.

Appellant’s Third Specification of Error

This specification claims that the Secretary of the
Interior has determined that the water supply was ample
to irrigate the patented area and because of this deter-
mination neither the state nor its Commissioner of
Reclamation can reapportion that water supply to a

31

smaller acreage. Appellant states that there was no law
in existence at the time the lands were patented author-
izing the state officers to limit the area for which water
rights might be sold, and points out that sec. 3004 C. 5.
was not enacted until after the issuance of the patent.
In making this statement counsel apparently overlook
the provisions of secs. 3065 and 5636 C. S., both of whieh
were in force prior to the issuance of the patent. (Full
text of these two sections may be found at pages 28-9
of cross-appellants’ brief in this cause). These two
sections apply to all persons, officers and corporations.
Sec, 3004 merely points out a method of procedure
whereby the law as represented by said sections 5636 and
3065 may be made more effective.
Further, said sec. 3004 does not impair the obligation
of appellant’s contract, as its counsel assert. As here-
tofore pointed out, the contract in question specifically
limits the sale of water and water contracts by the
Idaho Irrigation Company ‘‘to the extent of the capacity
of the irrigation works and to the extent of its water
rights.’’ (72). See also last part of paragraph eight of
the same contract (76). Under this contract the appel-
lant did not have the legal right to sell more water than
it actually had title to, therefrom section 3004 did not
deprive appellant of any right under the contract. In
this connection counsel asserts (brief, 45) that to permit
this power to be in a state officer in effect transfers
the administration of the public lands from the goverl-
ment to the state officials. The answer to that is, that
the purpose of this action is merely to control the water,
and there is no conscious effort or desire to in any Way
control or hamper the free and unlimited sale and dis
position of land titles. The prayer of the complaint
directed toward the water only. As to the water, it is

§3

only proper and lawful that the state officials should
have absolute control. The federal and state courts
recognize this.

‘The relation of the federal government to the
state government in the reclamation of desert lands
arises out of the fact that the federal government
owns the lands, and Congress is invested by the
constitution with the power of disposing of the
same, while the state has been given jurisdiction to
provide for the appropriation and beneficial use of
the waters of the state which necessarily includes
a use for the reclamation of such lands.”’

Twin Falls ete. Co., v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. (CCA)

356-7.

“The provision of C. 8. No. 5556, which declares
all the waters of the state, when flowing in their
natural channels, including the waters of all springs
and lakes within the boundaries of the state, to be
the property of the state, being in harmony with
article 15, No. 1, of the constitution, this right of
tlle state was recognized by the act of Congress
admitting the state into the Union, which thereby
confirmed this provision of the constitution the
people of the state had formed, and consented to
such appropriation by the state. Farm Investment
Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258, 50 L. R. A.
747, 87 Am. St. Rep. 918.”’

Short v. Praisewater, 208 Pac. (Ida.) 844-7.

Under these authorities it must be clear that the State
of Idaho is absolutely the owner of all the waters within
its boundaries, which flow in their natural channels. In
fact title to the public waters never leaves the state
completely, because

‘All rights to the use of water acquired under
this chapter or otherwise shall be lost and aban-
doned by a failure for the term of five years to apply

34

it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated,

and when any right to the use of water shall be lost
through nonuse or abandonment such rights to such
water shall revert to the state and be again subject

to appropriation under this chapter. . . .”’ See, 5582,
Comp. Stats. Idaho.
Counsel place some reliance upon the two Idaho cases
of Furbee v. Alexander, 176 Pac. 97 and Evans v. Swend-
sen, 200 Pac. 136. It will be noted that the decisions in
these cases turn upon the point that the applicant in each
case had complied with all the laws and the board had
no authority to determine any matters other than the
qualifications of an entryman, The facts and issues in
the instant case are so entirely different that we can not
see how the cited cases are authoritative upon any poiut.

Appellant’s Fourth Specification of Error

By this specification appellants assert that the ap-
pellees are not in a court of equity with clean hands
and are therefore not entitled to relief. Practically all
of appellant’s argument upon this point is directed
against the appellee, the State of Idaho, and it is
claimed that, since the state officials have ap
proved the patent proceedings, they should not now
be permitted to assert that there is an inadequate
that the State of Idaho is only in this case incidentally.
The records will show that the Attorney General of Idaho
did not file a brief in the Cireuit Court, and the writer's
information is that he does not intend to do so in this
court. This action was instituted and is being prosecuted
by the bona fide settlers and contract holders under the
Idaho Irrigation Company project, and the questions
involved should be determined with this fact in mind.
If the public officers of the State of Idaho have inad-
vertently reported an adequate supply of water and

a SE a a a a a

35

recommended the issuance of the patent, that fact should
not deprive the appellees of their contract rights with
the construction company. The contracts of the settlers
which form the basis of the present action are not that
the State of Idaho will furnish such contract holders with
certain water, but the contracts are that the appellant
Idaho Irrigation Company will do so. Any conclusions
or findings of state officials prior to the execution of said
contracts can not legally affect the obligations and rights
afforded by the contracts.

‘* ... The report of that official (state engineer)
eannot be held to have been information upon which
plaintiff entered into the contract. The State of
Idaho made no representations to the original pro-
jectors in reliance upon which they were induced to
enter upon a project pursuant to the Carey Act.”

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. (CCA) 382-9,

It is undoubtedly true that either the settlers or the
construction company will suffer a considerable loss
because of the outcome of the enterprise. Naturally appel-
lant contends that the settlers should bear the loss, and
visa versa, Admitting for the sake of argument only that
appellant and appellees are equally innocent of wrong
doing and improper motives; and likewise admitting that
the state and government officials, in approving the
project and issuing patent, were of the opinion that the
same was feasible; nevertheless it is true beyond question
that the construction company and its promoters made
the first error. The first step in organizing such a project
is the proposal for the segregation made by the construe-
tion company to the state. Sec, 2998 et seq. C. S. Idaho.
Isn’t it only natural to assume that before making this
proposal and before undertaking such an investment that

the construction company made an investigation of the
water supply and all surrounding conditions?

“It was primarily the irrigation company that
erred in its judgment. But as it made the contracts
with the settlers, who relied upon the ability of the
company to live up to its contracts, and who have
obligated themselves to make deferred payments,
results must be reached upon a recognition of the
contractual relations.’’

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. (CCA)
428-32.

In this connection see also the quotation from Childs
vy. Neitzel, 141 Pac. (Ida.) 77-81, contained in cross-
appellants’ brief at pages 46-7, As pointed out in these
decisions, the settlers are not in a position to send engi-
neers into the field to investigate the water supply and
the feasibility of the project, but on the other hand the
settler depends, as he has a right to do, on the ability
of the construction company to make the contract amount
of water available within one-half mile of the settler’s
land. It is a matter of common knowledge that many of
these Carey Act settlers are residents of distant localities
and are thoroughly unfamiliar with the conditions on
western irrigated sections. Appellant has not pointed out
that the settlers are not in this court with clean hands.
These appellees’ hands are clean and there is no reason
why they shcald not nave a good standing in this court.

Appellant further insists that, since the settlers bought
their lands from the State of Idaho, they are the mere
assignees of the state and stand in the same position as
the state with reference to the water supply; that the
state officials found that there was ample water and
neither the state nor the settlers can say otherwise nov.
The answer to this contention is a brief one. Appellees
did not buy the water from the state, and the sale of the

37

water is all that .they are seeking to have enjoined
Appellees purchased their lands from one party and their
water rights from another, and even though there might
have been some equities attached to the land purchases
(which we do not admit), certainly the water purchases
were made in such manner as to be free from any taint
attached to the state’s tilte to the lands.

Appellant’s Fifth Specification of Error

It is claimed that it would be contrary to public policy
to enforce specifie performance of the settlers’ contracts.
It is placing too narrow a construction upon the relief
asked in this cause to denominate it ‘‘specifie perform-
anee.’’ Assuming that the trial court’s findings are any-
thing like correct it is very apparent that the appellees
will not nearly receive the amount of water called for in
their contracts. If this is true they are certainly not get-
ting specifie performance. In fact the District Court’s
decree only allows the settlers a little more than one-half
the amount of water the construction company agreed
that they should have, The remedy sought by appellees
is the only practical one available. At any rate no better
method of procedure has been suggested.

At page 57 of its brief appellant contends that it is
the reeognized policy of the government that the ‘‘dis-
tribution of the water supply available for irrigation’’
was intended to be left in the hands of the federal of-
ficials. We believe that we have shown the contrary to
be the case. See pages 33 et seq, of this brief. We
do not believe that the cases counsel cite upon this propo-
sition support their views, because the cases cited deal
largely with land matters, and not irrigation matters.

Preventing the sale of further rights does not increase
the water rights of appellees, because they have an in-

“7

adequate right, even if the District Court’s decree is
affirmed. And if the Circuit Court’s decree is permitted
to stand their rights will be far below what the District
Court determined they should have for the production of
agricultural crops, and will be very far below the contract
amounts. On the other hand, every share of water that
is sold by the construction company after the available
supply is exhausted necessarily diminishes the water right
of every settler on the project, and thereby impairs the
obligation of the contract between the settlers and the
construction company. If the construction company has
already sold its appropriation it ‘‘would be to ignore
both the spirit and the leter of the contract between the
state and the company’’ to permit it to sell further shares,
State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pae. (Ida.) 220-9.

Appellant’s Sixth Specification of Error

Under this specification appellant argues that the
District Court erred in determining the amount of water
available and the amount required for reclamation, and
that in fact the amount available is ample for more lands
than the acreage fixed by the court.

By this specification we believe apellant raises the one
and only real issue worthy of consideration by this court.
We are sincere in this statement, and our reason therefor
is as follows: By their answer herein the appelant and
the trustee appellants

‘« Admit that under and by virtue of the terms of
the said contracts, Exhibits ‘‘C’’ and ‘*D,”’ when the
said Idaho Irrigation Company, Limited, had in truth
and in fact sold shares in said company which should
and did represent the actual amount of water avail-
able and appropriated, and when said sale of shares
should equal the carrying capacity of said irrigation
system, then and in that event, the said Idaho Irn-

38

aaah ~ , - : oii

wa

gation Company should make no further sales of
water rights by means of selling and issuing shares
of stock in the said Big Wood River Reservoir and
Canal Company, Limited.’’ (114).

Exhibits ‘‘C’’ and ‘‘D”’ are the contract and supple-
mental contract between the State of Idaho and the
construction company. In other words, this is an un-
equivocal and unreserved admission by appellant that it
should not sell more water rights than it has water to
supply. This takes every other issue out of the case and
only leaves it for the court to determine whether or not
the construction company has as a matter of fact sold
its entire available supply of water. The District Court
said:

39

‘*But there is no necessity for finding, and hence
I do not attempt to determine, the exact amount of
water available for defendant’s use. It is sufficient
to know that with the duty hereinbefore recognized
the supply is and will be insufficient to meet the
demands of the outstanding contracts, exclusive of
those involved in this suit, and I have no hesitation
in so finding. Accordingly, the prayer of the com-
plaint wil! be granted.’’ (151)

The Cireuit Court said:

‘The evidence submitted by the defendants tends
to establish the fact that not only has the water
supply for this project been exhausted by the sales
of shares already sold of water stock, but that the
available water supply has been very much over-
sold. (676) .....

‘We are of the opinion that the evidence supports
the findings contained in the opinion of the court,
and that the findings and conclusions of law support
on decree. The decree is accordingly affirmed.”’

683) :

= A edad

The situation then is, that the construction company
and its trustees (all the original defendants) have
admitted that if and when the available supply has been
sold they should sell no more water (669); both the
District and Cireuit courts have found that said con-
struction company and its trustees have more than sold
the available supply; this finding was made upon
conflicting evidence. It will be noted that the Cireuit
Court bases its finding upon this point upon ‘‘the
evidence submitted by the defendants.’’ Therefore,
unless appellant can show that this finding is not sup-
ported by the evidence, we urgently insist that the
decree of the District Court must be affirmed. We will
briefly review the evidence submitted upon this phase
of the case.

From our study of the record of this case we conclude
that there were two classes of evidence submitted to the
court upon this question: The first class being repre-
sented by plaintiffs’ exhibit 3 (248), plaintiffs’ exhibit 1
(243), plaintiffs’ exhibit 9 (305), and interveners’
exhibit 1 (430); while the second class of evidence upon
this matter is represented by plaintiffs’ exhibit 10 (370),
defendants’ exhibit 13 (572) and defendants’ exhibit 14
(573).

Neither the District nor the Cireuit Court seems to
have given a great deal of weight to the exhibits named
in the first class. In this respect there is no question
but that the courts acted judiciously. This evidence
was submitted largely by the appellees, but the appellees
were not in possession of the records of the construction
company and, until the trial was well under way and
subpoenas duces tecum had been employed they wer
unable to get the records of the company. This first

class of evidence, and the exhibits named as such, did

41
not constitute data and evidence sufficient for the pur-
poses of this case for the following reasons:

First: These exhibits included the total run-off of the
entire watershed, or the total inflow into the reservoir

(243), and as shown in our statement of the case (page
1 et seq. of this brief) the total inflow into the
reservoir was not available for distribution to the
settlers under the Idaho Irrigation Company system. A
great deal of appellant’s argument upon this point is
based upon this fallacious assumption, namely, that the
total run-off of the entire watershed was available for
use to the purchasers of the construction ccmpany. Such
is far from the fact.

Second: These exhibits included a large quantity of
water which ran over the spillway during seasons of
high water and was wasted into Snake river. There was
not even an approximate record of this wasted water
available. (253, 259, 293, 294, 306 and 575).

Third: These exhibits included a large amount of
water that escaped from the system and became waste
at the Thorpe place. Record of this amount was available
to the court for only a few months during the entire
period of years covered by the exhibits. (301-2).

Third: These exhibits included the amounts of water
that went to supply the flood rights and later users, of
which there was no record at all. (259).

Fourth: These exhibits included the waters belonging
to the ‘‘old rights’? (241, 254 and 258, also see said
exhibits). These rights approximated 100,000 acre feet.

Fifth: These exhibits included the canal loss of 30
per cent (264, 279, 150 and 416).

Sixth: These exhibits included the river loss of 100
acre feet per day. The statutory irrigation period in
Idaho is from April 1 to November 1 (674). Twin Falls

42

ete. Co. v. Lind, 94 Pac. (Ida.) 348-51. This river loss
is not included in the canal loss (279).

Seventh: These exhibits included the reservoir losses
from seepage and evaporation, amounting to 12,500 acre
feet (272).

Eighth: Some of these exhibits include waters that
waste through the Little Wood River. The flow of this
river can be utilized for only a portion of the year by
the users under this project (241-3, 250 and 430).

On the other hand, the other exhibits named under the
second class tended to show the actual amount of water
for use by the settlers upon the project of the Idaho
Irrigation Company. As shown from the remarks of the
District Court 271-2, and the statements contained in
its opinion (149-0), it is easily apparent that the District
Court considered defendants’ exhibits 13 and 14 and
plaintiffs’ exhibit 10 as constituting the most dependable
evidence from which to determine the amount of water
available to the appellees. And the record also makes it
clear that the Cireuit Court was of the same opinion
(674-5).

Considering plaintiffs’ exhibit 10 and defendants’
exhibits 13 and 14 as being the best evidence of the
actual amount of water available for use by the appellees
and their fellow-settlers, was the District Court in error
in finding that the water supply has already been over-
sold? As to plaintiffs’ exhibit 10, it will be noted that
the information contained on this chart was taken from
the records of the Idaho Irrigation Company for the
years 1911 to 1917, inclusive, and from the records of
the reclamation office for the year 1918-19 (369). An
average of these reservoir storings, as enumerated it
figures at pages 369-0 of the record, is 163,222 acre feet.
When this amount undergoes the canal and river losses,

- | al —Te -_- wr ,

43

etc., it certainly will not show that there was more water
available to the settlers under this project than the trial
court found, to-wit, 122,849 acre feet. Defendants’
exhibits 13 and 14 (572-3) show the amount of water
available at the heads of the main canals, and at the
farmers’ headgates, respectively. The difference shows
the amount of waste and loss (574, 150 and 675).

The District Court seems to have taken the average
of said exhibit 14 (150) as the basis for its conclusion.
The average is 122,849, rather than 122,817 acre feet.
Appellants objection to this is put in these words
(brief 67):

‘The trial court, however, ignored all evidence of
water available and based its decision on the water
delivered, treating the two as synonymous.’’

And in support of this proposition appellant seeks to
show that in the early years of the project there was
an over-abundance of water, and that settlers were fur-
nished more water than really necessary, a great deal
was permitted to go to waste, ete. The record does not
prove this situation to us. Mr. Kays the vice-president
and general manager of the construction company tes-
tifies that this situation existed to a certain extent prior
to and including the season of 1913, but that since that
time, except for one flood season, the practice has not
been followed (559-0). On the contrary, the record
shows that the reservoir was completely drained and
the water shut off to the settlers under the Idaho Irri-
gation Company project on August 3, 1918, (295-435)
and on July 29, 1919, (295-435). When it is remembered
that the statutory irrigation season in Idaho extends
to November 1 it is very clear that the company was
not burdened with an over-supply that should have been
wasted down the river or given to settlers in excessive

44

amounts for those two years. This showing certainly
disproves appellant’s theory upon this matter. It is also
of interest to note that at the time of the trial, February
23, 1920, the reservoir was again dry (150). These facts
would justify the court in determining that the amount
delivered and the amount available is oftentimes synon-
ymous. The reservoir was also emptied in 1911 and in
1915 (435). In other words the reservoir has beea
drained five out of nine seasons, This being true, we
cannot see that the District Court assumed an improper
criterion when he decreed that the project must not be
increased beyond its then extent.

The amount that the court found to be available for
actual use by the appellees finds further support in the
testimony of witness Baer. Mr. Baer, a civil engineer
in the employ of the state reclamation service and thor-
oughly familiar with the project in question (261), tes
tified that

‘¢ |. the amount of water that would reach the
farmers’ headgates after deducting all losses, would
be 123,760 acre feet.’’ (279)

In discussing the acreage (brief 61 et seq) counsel
conclude that all the ‘‘sold acreage’’ will never be in
cultivation, and that allowance should be made for road-
ways, waste, ete. In the first pace, the construction
company does not issue shares for waste and nol-
irrigable land; and in the second place, in determining
the duty of water, the amount to be furnished, ete., the
construction company in making its contracts, and the
court in rendering its decree, took into consideration
the fact that every tract has to employ a certain amount
of land for roads, homes and the like (149). These
matters are too elementary and well known to deserve
further discussion.

45

Upon thought it must also be understood that all the
land for which water was purchased could not be put
under cultivation in the first few years, because it takes
a great deal of money and hard labor to transform a
sagebrush desert into an alfalfa field, and the average
settler is not financially or physically able to reclaim
all of his purchase within the first year or two. But
with the passing of years this land for which water has
been purchased will be gradually reclaimed until the
amount under cultivation will be practically equivalent
to the amount sold, that is, if the water can be had.
We believe that it would be manifestly unjust and unfair
for a court to accept apellant’s view and fix the acreage
upon the assumption that some of the land for which
water has been sold will not be cultivated. In the natural
course of events this land will be reclaimed and it is
surely entitled to its water. Is it reasonable that the
construction company should contend otherwise?
Appellant states (brief 64) that appellees pleaded
that there was water for 70,000 acres, and the intimation
is that the court should not have fixed a smaller acreage,
and that apellees are not in a position to ask that a
smaller acreage be fixed. Appellant quotes from para-
graph 20 of the complaint (31), but it will be noted that
the portion of this paragraph which appellant quotes
was stricken out. These lines were drawn through this
portion of the paragraph during the trial. Afterwards,
upon stipulation of counsel it was agreed that the
pleadings should be deemed amended to conform to the
proof (580), and in conformity with this stipulation, and
in order to make the record clear, the court entered its
order amending the last fifteen lines of said paragraph
20 to conform to the proof (98). We do not believe that
it is unreasonable to permit this nature of amendment

46

in eases similar to that at issue, for the plaintiffs did
not have the records and figures at their disposal in
preparing the complaint. True, the court’s order was
not made and entered until after the decree, but this
was merely a ministerial act and the date is not of great
importance, provided the order is substantiated by the
proofs in the case. At any rate, appellants are not in
a position to object to the amendment to conform to the
proof in this case as it was done upon stipulation had
with their counsel (580).

Appellant objects that the court did not give the
construction company credit for the increased storage
capacity effected by raising the spillway in 1917 (67-8).
This spillway was built in 1917, yet the record shows
that the reservoir was drained on August 3, 1918, (295
and 435), again on July 29, 1919, (439), and was dry
February 23, 1920, (150). Evidently the court would
not have been justified in concluding that this spillway
helped the situation materially. We believe that all of
the evidence was considered by the District Court. The
witness Baer, in fixing the amount available at the
farmers’ headgates at the figure of 123,760 acre feet, did
consider the increased storage capacity of the reservoir
(279).

Appellant occupies a couple of pages in an attempt
to show that the District Court should not have taken
the average for all the years covered in the exhibits in
determining the general average. In support of this
the case of Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 is cited.
But counsel conclude this portion of their argument by
saying: That the method outlined in the cited case
‘‘would not materially change the results as to the water
supply’’ (brief 73). According to our computation the
appelication of the method in the cited eases would alter

0Uwe - ~w a | .

47

the figure the District Court fixed as an average two-
fifths of one per cent. This is hardly material enough
to support an objection upon appeal!

LOSSES

Appellant maintains that the transmission loss, which
the District Court considered as being in excess of 35
per cent (150), should not have been fixed above 30
per cent (brief 74-5). A number of witnesses did fix
the canal loss at 30 per cent and one witness fixed the
loss at 30 to 35 per cent (416) but these estimates do not
take into consideration the river loss (279), which it is
agreed amounts to 100 acre feet per day (283). As the
irrigation season extends from April 1 to November 1
(see page 41 this brief) this river loss would amount
to 21,400 acre feet each season, which would materially
increase the percentage of loss. Further, the District
Court stated the percentage of loss was determined from
the records furnished by the construction company (150),
From a comparison of defendants’ exhibits 13 and 14
(972-3) it is easy to know that there is a tremendous
system loss. It was only proper for the District Court
to have considered this fact in fixing the acreage.

DUTY OF WATER

The trial court found that the duty of water on the
project should be fixed at 24 acre feet (149). Appellants
now claim that it should have been fixed at 2 acre feet
(brief 78). We do not understand how counsel are in

a position to make this assertion. By their answer ap-
pellants (113)

‘Admit that the certificates of stock in the Big
Wood River Reservoir and Canal Company, Limited,
entitle the purchaser thereof to receive one-eightieth

(1-80) of one cubic foot of water per second of time
per acre.’’

5 . 7
ne ae ‘ ” / VO 7 ae
si Sa ie Rt, De Meoses . oo ae

48

If water is delivered to the settlers at the rate specified
in said certificates they would get approximately 5
acre feet (674), rather than the 2%4 which the District
Court limited them to. In view of this admission in
appellants’ answer they certainly are not in a position
to contend that the duty fixed by the District Court be
changed. The settlers have been awarded a great deal
less than appellants admitted they are entitled to and
counsel should be content with this result.

We do not believe that the duty of water as fixed by
other courts in other cases can be of material assistance
in this case. To show this, and also to show that the
project in question requires an unusual amount of water,
we point out the following high points of the evidence
touching this matter:

Senator F. R. Gooding, who has been familiar with
the whole tract since 1889 by virtue of his having heen
a stockman and operating as such over this territory,
gives a good resume of the whole situation, at pages
339 to 357, inclusive, of the record. Water will not
stand in pot holes or low places on the tract, but goes
right down through the soil, through fissures in the
underlying formation of lava strata and disappears
entirely (287). The same is true on the Dietrich tract,

“T have attempted to hold water in reservoirs on
my place it goes down in the ground. I have got
a couple of pot holes on my place, but the water
won’t last only two or three days. The water goes
right down.’’ (308)

On the Richfield tract the same porous condition of
the underlying lava bed exists. A farmer built a cistern
fourteen feet in depth and placed a two-inch drain pipe
in the bottom, and ke states that the wind comes Up
through this pipe, and there are three or four other

i

cisterns in the neighborhood in the same condition (318).

Another witness speaking of the North Gooding tract
states,

‘The lava is cracked and full of fissures. To the
best of my knowledge the substrata of lava on that
tract has fissures, cracks or crevices or caves in
it.’’ (359)

Also speaking of the North Gooding tract it is said:

‘*However, there is on another farm I own a single
hole, not where water stands, but a regular cave,
where a man could go into. There is an air current
that comes through that melts the snow during the
entire winter when there is any snow on the ground.
And again there is a suction in that. Sometimes the
air comes up and again the air goes down.”’ (330)

The South Gooding tract is likewise sandy (322),
potholes will not hold water more than a day or two
(824), and ponds and cisterns will not hold water (325).

Speaking of the North Shoshone tract a witness states:

“It is commonly known as lava ash, with quite
a bit of lava float and lava outcrop. .... (358).

The foregoing extracts alone will readily convince this
court that the tract is a subnormal one in a good many
respects. The conditions exsiting upon this project cer-
tainly warranted the two lower courts in stating that,

“Clearly, the conditions upon the project are not
favorable to a high duty of water. In point of
topography, the lands are comparatively rough, and
in many places reefs of rock project above the
surface. As a consequence the surface runoff is
necessarily above normal. And there is also greater
loss in transmission, owing to the increased length
of service ditches on the farm. The soil is of very
uneven depth, and as a consequence the unavoidable
loss from deep percolation is above normal, and this

50

loss cannot be recovered, because the water escapes
through a substratum of fractured rock to unknown
depths. On portions of the tract the soil is of fair
texture, upon others it is coarse and sandy. The
rainfall is almost negligible, and high winds
prevail.”’ (678)

The District Court stated that under present con-
ditions three acre feet, delivered at the times when same
is needed, is probably sufficient, but not more than
sufficient on the average, for the land actually irrigated.
However, anticipating that the system could be improved
and certain losses checked the court fixed the duty at
934 acre feet (149). It is therefore apparent that the
District Court has taken into consideration the actual
situation, and has given the appellants the benefit of
the possibility of the improvement of the system. The
evidence in the record certainly supports the District
Court’s finding upon this point. The trial court has
made a finding based upon conflicting evidence. This
finding can not be set aside upon the showing made.

Appeliant bitterly assails the action of the lower courts
in refusing to consider the expert testimony upon the
question of ihe duty of water. Taking these experts
one by one, what does the record show their qualifi-
cations to be so far as the project under consideration
is concerned:

Plaintiffs’ expert witness Harris has been in many
schools and is familiar with many irrigation projects,
but as to the present project he can only say that he is
‘somewhat familiar’’ therewith (382). He fixes the
duty at 442 acre feet (398).

Plaintiffs’ expert witness Tallman shows better quali-
fications than the other experts, as he has made exper
iments on most of the projects in Southern Idaho (411).

51

He states that the losses are greater on the Idaho Irri-
gation Company project than on the other projects
because of the peculiar and unfavorable lava formations
(414). His opinion is that the duty of water should be
fixed at 4 or 4% acre feet (417).

Defendants’ expert witness Thom fixed the duty at
two acre feet (553), but admits that the ‘‘foundation’’
for his opinion was experiments conducted at Pullman,
Washington, (558).

Defendants’ expert witness Widstoe likewise fixes the
duty at two acre feet (498), but upon cross examination
admits that most of his experiments were conducted at
Cache Valley, Utah (509).

Defendants’ expert witness Bark places the duty at
2'2 aere feet on the land (528), but his experiments
were made upon ideal conditions (542) and at an ex-
periment station (526).

Defendan »’ farmer witness Hayward resides on the
Salmon River tract (565) and does not appear to have
had any experience on the tract under consideration.

In addition to the above the record contains the
testimony of witness Badley upon this point. Badley
is an engineer of considerable experience (289), and was
employed by the farmers on the Idaho Irrigation Com-
pany project for five years thereby becoming familiar
with the entire project (371). He states that

“Where the farmers were getting their full five-
eighths of an inch of water at their headgates, in
some instances they were getting a fairly good crop.
In other instances . . .

“In my opinion as an irrigation engineer, and
based on my knowledge of this project, the land on
that project can not be watered efficiently and ef-
fectually for the purpose of producing ordinary

52

agricultural crops with a less amount of water than
five-eights of an inch.’’ (374-5)

In other words, plaintiffs’ witnesses have testified as
to a duty varying from 4 to 9514; while defendants’
witnesses have varied from 2 to 24%. The court in fixing
9%, has apparently leaned toward the testimony of defen-
dants’ witnesses. At any rate, there is a serious conflict
in this testimony, and, under the rule of law too old to
require repetition, this finding of the District Court is
conclusive upon appellate courts.

CONCLUSION

By combining defendants’ exhibit 10, 13 and 14 the
Cireuit Court arrived at the following figures (679):

Average amount of water delivered at main
canal headgates for years 1911 to 1919,

SMCHIGIVE ..n<ccececeseveveeeecoresesssenenserorernevnnengensnennense 200,08
Average same period at farmers’ headgates.......... 122.850
Average acreage in cultivation same period.......... 34,291
Average per acre in acre feet... 3,839

The District Court’s decree fixes the acreage in the
project at approximately 76,000 acres. That is, more
than double the acreage used in the above estimates. If
this acreage of 76,000 is used with said average amount
of water it is easily aparent that the duty of water will
be very seriously, if not fatally, affected; passing the
serious question of whether or not there is enough water
to permit the project to reasonably exist under the
District Court’s decree. By reference to defendants’
exhibit 10 (564) it will be noted that the cultivated
acreage has materially increased since 1917; jumping
from 39,121 acres in 1917 to 56,564 acres in 1919. These
facts explain why the reservoir was drained before the
ends of the seasons in 1918 and 1919 (435), and explain
why it was dry at the time of trial (150). Upon this

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‘ showing isn’t there reasonable ground for alarm by the
appellees as to what the result will be when the full
76,000 acres are in cultivation. If some of these 76,000
acres were not in cultivation at the time of the trial and
therefore were not demanding their water, this fact
eannot effect the outcome of this action. In the natural
course of events all of said 76,000 acres will be in eulti-
vation, and all thereof is entitled to its water under the
Court’s decree just as unquestionably as if it had been
demanding and using the water at the time of the trial.
If the Cirenit Court’s decree, allowing 5322.26 ad-
ditional acres to be sold, is upheld there is no question
but that the rights of the appellees will be seriously
impaired, if not effectively destroyed in some instances.
In view of the whole record and the authorities cited
in this brief, it is respectfully submitted that equity and
justice can only be subserved by an affirmance of the
decree of the Distriet Court. While this relief will not
place the appellees in nearly so favorable a position as
they are entitled to be in under the terms of their
contracts with appellant, and will not even assure them
of receiving an amount approaching the amount the
Distriet Court has found they should have to enable their
lands to produce ordinary agricultural crops, yet it is
the fullest relief that this court ean afford.
Respectfully submitted,
W. G. BiSSELL,
BRANCH BIRD,
Gooding, Idaho.
KARL PAINE,
Beise, Idaho.

Solicitors for Appellees.

APPENDIX

The following appendix includes so much of the state
statutes cited in this brief, as is deemed necessary for
the court’s full information, in accordance with rule 21
of the rules of this court.

Section 1, Article 15, Constitution of Idaho. Use of
waters a public use. The use of all waters now appro
priated, or that may hereafter be appropriated for sale,
rental or distribution; also of all water originally appro-
priated for private use, but which after such appro
priation has heretofore been, or may hereafter be soll,
rented, or distributed, is hereby declared to be a pubile
use, and subject to the regulation and control of the
state in the manner prescribed by law.

Section 2998. Proposals to construct irrigation works.
Any person, company of persons, association or incor:
porated company, constructing, having constructed or
desiring to construct, ditches, canals, or other irrigation
works to reclaim land under the provisions of this
chapter shall file with the department of reclamation a
request for the selection, on behalf of the state, by the
department, of the land to be reclaimed, designating said
land by legal subdivisions.

This request shall be accompanied by a proposal to
construct the ditch, canal or other irrigation works nee
essary for the complete reclamation of the land asked
to be selected. The proposal shall be prepared in aceord-
ance with the rules of the department of reclamation
of Idaho and with the regulations of the department of
the interior; and shall be accompanied by the certificate
of the department of reclamation that application for
permit to appropriate water has been filed in its office,

together with the department’s report thereon. It shall
state the source of water supply, the location and dimen-
sions of the proposed works, the estimated cost thereof,
the price and terms per acre at which perpetual water
rights will be sold to settlers on the land to be reclaimed,
said perpetual rights to embrace a proportionate interest
in the canal or other irrigation works, together with all
the rights and franchises attached thereto, * * * *
Section 3004. Contract for Construction, (See record
671-2 for portion of this section applicable).

Section 3064. Water contracts and deeds, All econ-
tracts and deeds for the sale of water rights shall be of
the form approved by the department of reclamation, as
provided in section 3063, and all such contracts or deeds
shall be numbered plainly and consecutively; and it shall
he the duty of the owner of such irrigation works to file
for record in the proper county recorder’s office all such
contracts or deeds, or duplicate copies thereof, in the
order in which the same are issued to purchasers,

Section 3065, Penalties for unauthorized sale of water
rights. Any pretended deed, contract or other instru-
ment conveying or pretending to convey water rights
in such irrigation works prior to the filing of such cer-
tifieate in the county recorder’s office or in excess of
the water rights or amount of water authorized to be
sold by the department, as shown by the certificate or
certificates so issued and filed for record, shall be abso-
lutely null and void, and the owner of such irrigation
works, or those claiming to he the owner thereof and
the officers, agents and representatives of any such
owner or claimant or those claiming to be the officers,
agents or representatives of any such owner or claimant,
who shall make or attempt to make any deed, contract,
or agreement relative to the sale of water rights in such

56

irrigation works, or for the furnishing of water there-
from, prior to the filing of such certificate, or in
excess of the capacity of such irrigation works, as
shown by the certificate or certificates of the
department of reclamation, or who shall violate any of
the provisions of section 3064, shall be jointly, severally
and personally liable upon and for all such contracts and
agreements and for any and all damages, directly or
indirectly sustained by the purchasers of water rights or
interests in such irrigation works, through the failure
of such owner or claimant, or of the officers, agents or
representatives of such owner or claimant or of those
claiming to be the officers, agents or representatives of
such owner or claimant, to comply with the provisions
of this chapter, and in addition thereto, every such
owner, claimant, officer, agent or representative shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not less
than $100 nor more than $300, or by imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.

Section 5556. Nature of property in water. Water
being essential to the industrial prosperity of the state,
and all agricultural development throughout the greater
portion of the state depending upon its just appor
tionment to, and economical use by, those making a bene-
ficial application of the same, its control shall be in the
state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard
all the various interests involved. All the waters of the
state, when flowing in their natural channels, including
the waters of all natural springs and lakes within the
boundaries of the state are declared to be the property
of the state, whose duty it shall be to supervise theif
appropriation and allotment to those diverting the same
therefrom for any beneficial purpose, and the right to

57

the use of any of the waters of the state for useful or
beneficial purposes is recognized and confirmed; and the
right to the use of any of the public waters which have
heretofore been or may hereafter be allotted or bene-
ficially applied, shall not be considered as being a prop-
erty right in itself, but such right shall become the
complement of, or one of the appurtenances of, the land
or other thing to which, through necessity, said water
is being applied; and the right to continue the use of any
such water shall never be denied or prevented from any
other cause than the failure on the part of the user
thereoof to pay the ordinary charges or assessments
which may be made to cover the expenses for the
delivery of such water.

Section 5582. Change of place of use: Appeal from
department’s decision. All rights to the use of water
acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost
and abandoned by a failure for the term of five years
to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appro-

pated, and when any right to the use of water shall

be lost through nonuse or abandonment such rights to
such water shall revert to the state and be again subject

to appropriation under this chapter: * * * *

Section 5636. Company to furnish water on demand.

Any person, company or corporation owning or con-

trolling any canal or irrigation works for the distribution

of water under a sale or rental thereof, shall furnish

water to any person or persons owning or controlling

any land under such canal or irrigation works for the

purpose of irrigating such land or for domestic purposes,

upon a proper demand being made and _ reasonable

security being given for the payment thereof: Provided,

that no person, company or corporation shall contract

to deliver more water than such person, company or

corporation has a title to, by reason of having complied

58

with the laws in regard to the appropriation of the
public waters of this state.

Section 5640. Liability for waste of water. No person
entitled to the use of water from any such ditch or canal,
must, under any circumstances, use more water than
good husbandry requires for the crop or crops that he
cultivates; and any person using an excess of water, is
liable to the owner of such ditch or canal for the value
of such excess; and in addition thereto, is liable for all
damages sustained by any other person, who would have
been entitled to the use of such excess water, as fixed
by this section.

Section 7033. Decreed rights appurtenant to land, In
alloting the waters of any stream by the district court
according to the rights and priorities of those using
such waters, such allotment shall be made to the use to
which such water is beneficially applied, and when such
water is used for irrigation, the right confirmed by such
decree or allotment shall be appurtenant to and become
a part of the land which is irrigated by such water, and
such right will pass with the conveyance of such land,
and such decree shall describe the land to which such
water shall become so appurtenant. The amount of
water so alloted shall never be in excess of the amount
actually used for beneficial purposes for which such

right is claimed. ** °°

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386006_0061%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
