# Opposition Brief — Abuan v. General Electric Co.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386005_1668%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 510 U.S. 1116

## Text

t E sranty C8 Vs U8
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No. 93-992 | a
In THE | orrie Ob THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

BARTOLOME E. ABUAN, et al.,
7 Petitioners,
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and
MONSANTO COMPANY,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Unitcd States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STEVEN R. KUNEY CHARLES F’. PREUSS
Counsel of Record Counsel of Record
MARK A. GRANNIS VERNON I. ZVOLEFF
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY PREUSS WALKER & SHANAGHER
725 Twelfth Street, N.W. 595 Market Street
Washington, D.C. 20005 San Francisco, California 94105
(202) 484-5000 (415) 978-2600
JOHN E. MOORE J. BRADLEY KLEMM
MooreE, CHING, BOERTZEL KLEMM, BLAIR, STERLING
& LAWLER & JOHNSON
Suite 400, GCIC Building 1008 Pacific News Building
414 West Soledad Avenue 238 Archbishop F.C. Flores St.
Agana, Guam 96910 Agana, Guam 96910
(671) 472-8868/9/0 (671) 477-7858
Attorneys for Respondent Attorneys for Respondent
General Electric Company Monsanto Company
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WILSON - Eras PRINTING Co.,. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the law of Guam, the plaintiffs sub-
mitted evidence of sufficient exposure to a toxic substance
to prevent summary judgment against them on their com-
mon-law claims for increased risk of future injury and for
future medical monitoring?

(i)

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ii
RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

Pursuant to rule 29.1 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Respondents General Electric
Company and Monsanto Company hereby identify all
parent companies and subsidiaries (except wholly-owned
subsidiaries) that have issued shares to the public.

General Electric Company has no parent corporation.
General Electric Company has a number of subsidiaries in
the United States and elsewhere, but only a limited num-
ber of these subsidiaries have any outstanding equity or
debt securities that are publicly held. These are: GECC
Financial Corporation; General Electric Capital Corpora-
tion (formerly General Electric Credit Corporation); Gen-
eral Electric Capital Canada, Inc.; General Electric Credit
International, N.V.; General Electric Capital Services,
Inc. (formerly General Electric Financial Services, Inc.);
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.; and CAMCO, Inc. (Can-
ada). The public holdings of GECC Financial Corpora-
tion, General Electric Capital Canada, Inc., General Elec-
tric Credit International, N.V., General Electric Capital
Services. Inc., and Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. are
limited to debt seuurities. General Electric Company
itself has common stock and debt securities that are pub-
licly traded.

Monsanto Company has no publicly-owned parent com-
pany. The following five Monsanto Company subsidiaries
have issued shares to the public: Southwell Technologies,
Inc.: the Macneal-Schwendler Corp.; Micro General Corp.;
Dura Pharmaceuticals; and Microfluidics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ....................

I. THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WAS STRICTLY EVIDENTIARY, AND IS
THEREFORE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THIS
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II. THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT USUALLY
SUPPORT CERTIORARI ARE ABSENT
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(iii)

Page

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iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page
Abuan v. General Electric Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th
> 2 ee . Leveeeee-PASSIM

Brown v. Monsanto Co. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litigation), 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight,

ee casiniseaivenbliogmenanens 3,4
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113
> |: a_i slsaids 4
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.
got Fn eee cad 8
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925)... 3
RULE
a kc:
TREATISE

R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, and K. Geller,
Supreme Court Practice (7th ed. 1993) .

or

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

No. 93-992

BARTOLOME E. ABUAN, et al.,
. Petitioners,
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and
MONSANTO COMPANY,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT'

This case arises out of the pressurized release on May
25, 1987 of about eight gallons of liquid polychlorinated
biphenyls—“PCBs”—from the junction box of a forty-
year-old electric transformer at the Piti Power Plant on
the Navy base on Guam. The incident itself was relatively
unremarkable: no one was injured at the time of the
release, and no one has sustained any injuries subsequent
to that date as a result.

1In lieu of a “Statement of the Case,” Respondents adopt the
statement of facts contained in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit.
Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993).

2

The petitioners in this Court (hereafter referred to as
the plaintiffs) sought and received public funds from the
Legislature of Guam to finance litigation against the
United States Navy (whom the plaintiffs believed had
failed to adhere to proper procedures in conducting the
clean-up), General Electric (the manufacturer of the
transformer), and Monsanto Company (the manufacturer
of the PCBs).* Yet after more than two years of blood
tests, expert reports, and other discovery, they still could
not provide legally sufficient evidence that a single person
had, as a result of the incident, received a dose of PCBs
sufficient to require future medical monitoring or create
an increased risk of future illness or injury. The District
Court so held, and the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed.
Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993).

The plaintiffs apparently want the Supreme Court of
the United States to repeat this sifting of evidence, but
that is not a proper task for this Court. Moreover, none
of the factors that make certiorari appropriate, listed in
Supreme Court Rule 10.1, are present in this case. Ac-
cordingly, the petition should be denied.

I. THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT WAS
STRICTLY EVIDENTIARY, AND IS THEREFORE
INAPPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT’S REVIEW.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment on the first of two grounds offered by
the District Court: that the plaintiffs had failed to intro-
duce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that any plaintiff
had been exposed to a level of PCBs that could possibly
cause the future health effects for which the plaintiffs were
trying to recover in advance.* Thus, granting a writ of

* The U.S. Navy was sued separately, in a case captioned Figueroa
v. United States, following the denial of the plaintiffs’ administra-
tive claims.

3 The District Court also held that summary judgment was appro-
priate because the plaintiffs had failed to prove any present, physi-

3

certiorari would require this Court to sift the evidence
already reviewed by both lower courts in order to deter-
mine whether they erred in finding that the plaintiffs’
evidence failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
That is rarely an appropriate task for this Court’s atten-
tion. Indeed, this Court has stated that it will not usually
grant certiorari for this purpose, and there is no com-
pelling reason to depart from that longstanding practice
here. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220,
227 (1925). “A court of law, such as this Court is,
rather than a court for the correction of errors in fact
finding, cannot undertake to review concurrent findings
of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very
obvious and exceptional show of error.” Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275
(1949).

Il. THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT USUALLY SUP-
PORT CERTIORARI ARE ABSENT HERE.

Rule 10.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States sets forth the considerations this Court
weighs in granting or denying certiorari. From among
these considerations, the plaintiffs have suggested that the
decision of the Ninth Circuit “conflicts directly with other
courts of appeals on the same issues, prior decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States as well as the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
16. However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision creates none of

cal injury, and such proof was essential under the common law of
Guam. The Ninth Circuit did not address this ground for summary
judgment because it found the evidence would be insufficient even
if the plaintiffs were permitted to proceed in the absence of present,
physical injury. Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 331 n.3
(9th Cir. 1933). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
also held that the plaintiffs had failed to submit evidence sufficient
to invoke Guam’s Toxic Substances Exposure Compensation Act,
but the plaintiffs do not seek review of that portion of the case in
this Court.

4

these conflicts; indeed, it does not involve any question of
federal law.

The plaintiffs’ petition is not entirely clear about the
source of the supposed conflict with other federal courts
of appeals, but the most prominent candidate is Brown
v. Monsanto Co. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation),
916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom.
General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 961 (1991). See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23-26. Yet Paoli con-
cerned the admissibility of expert testimony, not its suffi-
ciency. This distinction is crucial. In moving for sum-
mary judgment below, the defendants did not even ad-
dress admissibility. Instead, we pointed out that the
plaintiffs’ own experts steadfastly refused to relate the level
of each plaintiff's alleged exposure to any meaningful
standard, thus rendering the testimony insufficient under
the substantive law even if it were admissible. After re-
viewing the testimony, the Ninth Circuit agreed, and it
even cited Paoli before concluding that the evidence in
this case “failed to meet the Paoli significance standard.”
3 F.3d at 334-35."

For the very same reason, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
does not conflict with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), the only decision
of this Court cited by the plaintiffs. This case simply does
not involve the admissibility of expert testimony. Like-
wise, there is no conflict with rules 702 or 703 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which are nowhere referenced
in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not decide any important
question of federal law. Rather, the Ninth Circuit applied
the common law of Guam, and acknowledged that it was

4To the extent that the supposed conflict is between the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion here and the opinions of other courts of appeals
in other cases alleging exposure to toxic substances, any differences
among the circuits merely reflect differences in the substantive tort
law of the jurisdictions whose law was being applied by the federal

courts.

5

doing so in the absence of any reported Guam cases on
point. 3 F.3d at 332. Nothing in the plaintiffs’ petition
suggests that the lower courts’ interpretations of Guam
law were legally erroneous in any respect, or that the
lower courts stubbornly refused to defer to local lav;
those courts simply failed to incorporate the plaintiffs’
policy preferences into the substantive law of Guam.
Where local law is itself uncertain, this Court has been
strongly reluctant to review the reasonable interpretations
reached by the intermediate federal appellate courts. See
R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN, S. SHAPIRO, AND K. GELLER,
SUPREME CourRT PRACTICE 183 (7th ed. 1993).

CONCLUSION

The sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence under the
common law of Guam is a fact-intensive question; it is a
question of local tort law; and it is a question which the
Ninth Circuit resolved correctly and in a manner that
was in no way inconsistent with decisions of this Court
or the courts of appeals. In short, it is not an appropri-
ate question for this Court’s attention. The writ should
be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES F.. PREUSS
Counsel of Record

STEVEN R. KUNEY
Counsel of Record

MARK A, GRANNIS
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 434-5000

JOHN E. MOORE
Moore, CHING, BOERTZEL
& LAWLER

Suite 400, GCIC Building
114 West Soledad Avenue
Agana, Guam 96910
(671) 472-8868/9/0
Attorneys for Respondent

General Electric Company

Dated: February 17, 1994

VERNON I. ZVOLEFF

PREUSS WALKER & SHANAGHER
595 Market Street

San Francisco, California 94105
(415) 978-2600

J. BRADLEY KLEMM
KLEMM, BLAIR, STERLING
& JOHNSON
1008 Pacific News Building
238 Archbishop F.C. Flores St.
Agana, Guam 96910
(671) 477-7858
Attorneys for Respondent
Monsanto Company

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386005_1668%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
