# Opposition Brief — United States v. Villegas

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 512 U.S. 1245

## Text

'

ORIGINAL © ORIGINAL

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
98-1572 MAY 31 1994
| OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1993

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

GERONIMO VILLEGAS,
Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

VIVIAN SHEVITZ*

Attorney for Respondent
Geronimo Villegas

19 N. Moger Avenue

Mt. Kisco, New York 10549

(914) 241-1249

*Counsel of Record

JANE SIMKIN SMITH
Of Counsel

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that at
least under the rule of lenity, respondent's conduct -- placing
refuse vials of blood, some contaminated with hepatitis B, which
he had taken home from his blood lab, in the bulkhead at the
apartment complex in which he lived -- was conduct which, though
unsavory and unjustifiable, was not criminally prosecutable under
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311l(a) and § 1319(c), in that
the Act outlaws only "discharges" from "point sources" -- a term
which the Act's language and structure show to refer to fixed
outlets of pollutants at fixed industrial or municipal plants,
not random individual polluters or their personal automcbiles.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..... «
A. The Evidence At Trial
B. Knowing Endangerment . .
C. The Jury Charge ....

D. The Rule 29 Decision .

E. The Court of Appeals' Decision

ARGUMENT: THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

CONCLUSION .. + +«-s-eceeve e

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Paper Institute v. United States Environmental

Protection Administration, 996 F.2d 346,
302 U.S. App. D.C. 80 (D.C. Cir.

Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh,

715 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1983) .

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)

Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 (1979)

1993)

E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) .

Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879)

National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,

693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .

Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)
United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S.

United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,

599 F.3d 368 (10th Cir. 1979)
i

293 (1971)

Page

. 1
. 2
. 4
. 8
9

. so
.« 23
- 39
29

ate af
13-14
e be
34-35
. 27
27, 38
» as
« 27
27, 38
17, 18

18 U.S.C.

§ 1546

Clean Water Act,

EPA Regulations

ew

33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.
s

N.J. Stat.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

33 U.S.C.
1251(b)
Sagan © ¢
1316(c)
1318 ..

1319(c)

1319(c) (2)

1319(c) (3)

1342(f)

1362 (11)
1362 (12)
1362 (13)

1362(14)

122.2 .

403.1 .

420.01 .

433.10.

463.1 .

469.10 .
t

58:10A-6

§ 1251

ii

34

29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Other Authorities:

1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668

1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3668

Environmental Reporter,

19 Env. Rptr.

Environmental Reporter,

19 Env. Rptr. 2573 (April 7,

EPA Office of Water, Officer of Water Regulations
and Standards, Nonpoint Source Guideance (1987)

Senate Report No.

92-414

1908 (January 27,

1989)

iii

1989)

33

16

34

31

20

16

——

In the Supreme Court of the United States \ 2
October Term, 1993 4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner
Vv.

GERONIMO VILLEGAS

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Respondent Geronimo Villegas respectfully submits this Brief
in Opposition to the Petition of the Solicitor General for a writ

of certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arose from the irresponsible conduct of Respondent
Geronimo Villegas in disposing of blood vials, some of which were
contaminated with the hepatitis B virus, in some rocks forming a
bulkhead at the apartment building at which Villegas lived,
adjacent to the Hudson River. Respondent was criminally
prosecuted under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.,
on the theory that a "discharge" of these "pollutants" had

occurred "from" a "point source" into navigable waters.

Partly granting respondent's post-verdict motions,’ Hon.

Edward R. Korman set aside the convictions premised on the so-
called “knowing endangerment" provision of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c) (3), on the ground that respondent was not shown to have
"known" of any danger, much less an “imminent” one, and that
indeed, there was no "imminent" danger. However, the district
court sustained the verdicts on the charges under 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(2), prohibiting "knowing" discharges, but only by
adopting the unprecedented holding that a human being is a "point

source" under the Act.

A. The Evidence At Trial: On two occasions, once before May
1988 and once before September 1988, respondent Villegas, then
part-owner of a blood laboratory, was shown to have placed a
number of vials of blood (including five found to contain blood
infected with the hepatitis B virus) in the bulkhead behind the
condominium complex in New Jersey, which is where Villegas lived.
A maintenance superintendent who noticed the vials in a
container between the rocks of the bulkhead separating the
buildings from the Hudson River testified that the night before
he saw the vials, the water had come "[hjigher" than he had ever
seen it before (Tr. 73, 83), not only covering the rock formation
where he found the vials, but coming “inland a little bit

further" and flooding the parking area (Tr. 73, 79-80).

. After the verdicts, Judge Korman appointed present

counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. The Court of
Appeals continued counsel's appointment on appeal.

2

:

Investigators found some vials in the water in front of the

complex after this discovery.

Some four months earlier, a number of other vials had been
found by school children on a trip to a Staten Island beach.
Fortunately, though some vials had "cracked" (most had, however,
remained sealed with stoppers in plastic containers or ziplock
bags), no one was injured. The schoolgirl-witnesses testified
that they knew that they should not touch the vials, and that
they had not done so.

The vials were traced to Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., of
which respondent Villegas was a 50% owner and in the operation of
which he did non-technical marketing work. Villegas reportedly
stated to investigators that, in around June 1988, after the
lab's refrigerator was filled with vials, he had "filled two
plastic containers and several plastic zip-lock bags with blood
vials and drove them over to where he lived in New Jersey"; then,
"rwjhen he got there to the parking lot, he saw the rocks [and]
placed two containers and the zip-lock bags into the rocks".?

The vials found in September matched this description.
A professor of coastal engineering testified for the

government that Staten Island was a “likely spot for washup" of

2 ——s« (GX8 & Tr.132-33). Villegas stated that he had
disposed of vials on two other occasions as well, but not near
the river. Once, he had put "junk" in the storage room at the
condominium complex, including "a small amount of blood vials and
needles in a plastic bag and I think Corvac tubes" (Tr. 136).
Another time he had put some vials in the garbage can at the
Binghamton health club where he used to run a pro shop (Tr. 137).
He reportedly intended to put the vials in his incinerator on
this occasion, but was attracted to the bulkhead instead.

3

items drifting in the water from the New Jersey area where
Villegas lived. He also stated that water would not often rise
over the bulkhead at that location. Rather, it would take a
"storm surge", which was a "rare occurrence", the prime time for
which is in September as a result of hurricanes or tropical

storms (Tr. 329-30).

B. Knowing Endangerment: One Wayne Pizzuti, the Director of

immunologic laboratory services at the New Jersey Department of
Health, testified that his lab had tested blood in some of the
vials retrieved at the condominium in September 1988, and stated
that five had been positive for hepatitis B (Tr.346-47). Pizzuti
testified that the hepatitis B virus could cause liver damage and
that the infection can be fatal (though one infected can also
recover). He also said that the virus is contagious, and that,
were someone to step on a blood vial containing contaminated
blood, the virus could enter the system (Tr. 339). When asked
whether it would be "possible for someone who is swimming in
water which contains blood that was infected with hepatitis B to
contract hepatitis B", this expert answered that he "imagine[d]"
so. When pressed by the trial judge to explain what he meant by
"imagine", Pizzuti answered that "(i]f circumstances were right,
it could be transmitted that way" -- which meant (upon further

inquiry) that the person who happened to be swimming next to a

vial containing infected blood would have to have "breaks in the

skin or breaks in the mucus membranes so that. . . exposure at
those points then you could contract it that way" (Tr. 339-40).

Though purported to be an expert, Pizzuti did not have a
ready answer to the question as to what effect the elements --
water, air and sun -- would have on the virus (Tr. 351). Nor did
he know even “in general terms" what the effect would be if a
contaminated vial were to fall into the water and break (Tr. 5l-
52). Pizzuti generalized that, if you had a "high enough
concentration of the virus", then it could still be infectious.
He said, however, that there had not been a high concentration in
the vials he had examined (Tr. 355). Pressed by the trial judge,
Pizzuti expressed his belief that it would not be likely to
contract the disease from swimming (Tr. 356).

Another expert, one Dr. Prince, the senior investigator and
the head of the biology lab at New York Blood Center who had also
written 200 papers about hepatitis B (Tr. 360), testified that
hepatitis B could be "self-limited" and result in recovery, but
could also be "quite severe", and on rare occasions could result
in death. Prince confirmed Pizzuti's testimony that permeation
of skin by the virus would cause infection (Tr. 362). Prince
further testified that an extremely small amount of blood on a
piece of glass could cause contamination (Tr. 362).

Though Pizzuti had not known the effect of water on the
virus, Prince testified that the cool river water would tend to

preserve the virus, which is "heat stable" (Tr. 362-63). In

fact, Prince's lab had tested five vials that had been retrieved

from the Staten Island beach area a year after the event (Tr.
367). Though stored in a non-refrigerated, heated area
(presumably by investigators who did not know the virus'
properties), one vial still had tested positive for hepatitis B.
(Tr. 367). Out of the jury's presence, Judge Korman inquired on
the issue at the core of the "knowing endangerment" charges:

THE COURT: .. . Doctor, if three or four or five

vials like -- of the kinds we have been talking about

were dropped in the Hudson River, would you say that

that would place any verson in imminent danger of death

or serious bodily injury?

The witness responded (Tr. 371):
THE WITNESS: If those vials were to land on the

shore and someone were to step on them and puncture

their skin, they would be in danger of infection,

hepatitis B, yes. Those vials that were infected, of

course. They all were not.

The witness concluded, however: "The risk of this happening is
low but it is a risk."

For unknown reasons, Villegas' trial counsel, though thus
made aware of the expert's highly favorable answer, declined to
ask Dr. Prince the same question in the jury's presence (Tr. 372)
-- a factor that prompted District Judge Korman to observe,
during post-verdict Rule 29 argument, that he believed that trial

counsel had been "less then competent in his representation here"

(9/16/91 Tr. 32-33, 96-99) .3

. The district court entertained a motion pursuant to

Rule 29(d) for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, contingent on his denying the Rule 29 motion (see
6/16/91 Tr. 96). In granting Mr. Villegas' Rule 29 motion in
part, the court did not rule on this contingent Rule 29(d)
motion. It did, however, state that, if it was wrong in holding
(continued...)

The remaining proof pertained to whether Villegas "knew" of
the "danger": A niece of Villegas who had worked at the lab
testified that Villegas had worked at other labs previously (Tr.
247). At Plaza, she had seen him almost every day bringing blood
in vials in ziplock bags, which he would put in the refrigerator
or number them with Plaza's lab number (Tr. 247-48). She stated,
however, that the person who would write a number on the vials or
on the request form does not know results of the tests (Tr. 257).

An individual licensed as both a supervisor and technician
by the New York City Department of Health (Tr. 260-62) testified
that there was an assigned area for hepatitis testing, and the
technicians wore a gown and gloves for protection (Tr. 264).
About 35-50% of blood samples at Plaza were tested for hepatitis.
After a hepatitis test, vials were placed in a rack in the lab;
at the end of the day, the rack went into the refrigerator (Tr.
270). Though Villegas would "come and go" in the lab for a few
minutes “here and there", «he supervisor confirmed that Villegas
was "not a technician" (Ir. 271-74).

A part-time pathologist testified that one Dennis Chandra
and respondent Villegas were in charge of the lab (Tr. 278-80)
and identified a Policy and Procedure Manual kept in the Plaza
offices (GX-1l, Tr. 283). The witness identified Chandra, not

respondent, as the chief contact person for Plaza. Chandra

3(...continued)
the evidence insufficient on the "knowing endangerment" counts,
then a new trial would have to be held anyway because the
instructions had been erroneous on the knowing endangerment issue
(Memorandum and Order at 17 n.5, Pet. App. 49a-50a).

7

apparently had a Ph.D. in chemistry (Tr. 285-86). The witness

did not know what Villegas' profession or function was, except

that Villegas neve

carried vials (Tr. 287). After the discovery
of the vials, Villegas purportedly told this witness that "it's
stupid of me to have done that" (Tr. 285).

Although Villegas' trial counsel did not sum up to the jury
using Villegas' statement, that statement included an expression
of this defendant's state of mind that negated an inference that
he "knew" he had endangered others with his conduct. Explaining
why he had disposed of the vials, Villegas said that his
“refrigerator was getting full" and went on to explain: "And
besides, the thing is, it's in the containers and would not harm

nobody, I guess" (GX-8, Tr. 137).

C. The Jury Charge: After extensive consideration, District

Judge Korman declined to instruct the jury in accordance with the

government's position that a human being is a point source.* He

. EPA environmental engineer Durack had testified as a

government witness that it was his job to "determine what the
point sources are and to make sure that they have permits to
control the discharge of pollutants." Durack went on to describe
a point source as any of several types: "There are discharge
pipes. There are vessels which could be a truck, could be a
ship. Or it could be a person or persoiis" (Tr. 184). Though
Durack posited that a “point source" could be a human being, he
conceded that his office had never granted a permit for a human
being to discharge as point source (192): "Not for the person to
put the pollutants in himself, no," he admitted.

District Judge Korman, after struggling with the
concept of "point source", ultimately told the jury to disregard
Durack's testimony about the meaning of a "point source", and
instead charged the jury (see Pet. App. 65a):

(continued...)

decided to tell the jury instead that it could "assume" that "it

was a point source", allowing the defendant to reserve his
objection on the question of law which in any event, as the
district court properly understood, could not be waived because
"rijf it is not a crime, it is not a crime" (Tr. 293; 292-99).

In accordance with this plan, the trial court instructed the jury
that "[r]Jemoving pollutants from a container, and a vehicle is a
container, parked next to a navigable body of water constitutes a

discharge from a point source" (Tr. 470).

D. The Rule 29 Decision: Though Judge Korman was "terribly

troubled" by the government's broad argument that a human being
is a "point source" (9/16/91 Tr. 90), he sustained Villegas’

convictions by determining that a human being is a point source

*(...continued)

Congress chose to distinguish between "point sources"
and "non-point sources" with the specific purpose of
excluding various kinds of pollution runoff, that is,
runoff produced principally by rainfall that cannot be
traced to one polluter. Congress did not intend to
exempt from regulation any activity that emits
pollution from an identifiable point. Congress did not
intend by the term "point source" to distinguish
between a person who drives a truck to the edge of the
Hudson River and dumps blood vials, clearly a point
source, and a person who gets out of a truck, takes the
vials from the truck, walks to the river's edge and
dumps them from his hand. Removing pollutants from a
container, and a vehicle is a container, parked next to
a navigable body of water and physically throwing the
the [sic] pollutant into the water constitutes a
discharge from a point source.

In this respect I ask to you [sic] forget and
disregard the testimony of Patrick Durack on this
issue.

within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. Acknowledging that

the image of a human being is not "conjured up" by the definition

of "point source" -- defined as "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be
discharged", 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) -- Judge Korman nonetheless was

of the view that, where the source of a pollutant is "no mystery"
but is rather identified (Tr. 294), then that source -- even if
it is a human being -- should be considered a "point source" of
pollutants, and that the Act applies to that "discharge". Judge
Korman believed that this result was not inconsistent with the
statute, since the definition of "point source" does not
"exclude" a human being from its ambit. Further assuming -- but
citing no authority to support the assumption -- that Congress
must have meant to include all pollution other than "nonpoint
source" pollution within the criminal prohibitions of the Clean

Water Act (Pet. App. 39a),° Judge Korman determined that it made

. Judge Korman's conclusions in this regard, like

dissenting Circuit Judge Oakes' conclusions, were posited as the
statute's purpose without citation to any legislative history or
other authority that so suggests. Nor are we aware of any
legislative suggestion that Congress' purpose "in specifically
proscribing pollution from a 'point source’ was to ensure that
naturally-induced, random run-off of pollutants would not result
in criminal or civil liability under the Clean Water Act", but
that all other pollution was within the Act, as Judge Korman
construed it (Pet. App. 39a). Congress' purpose was not to
exempt some forms of pollution; it was to regulate some forms of
pollution. Had Congress meant to reach everything except
identified exemptions, it could have said so.

Indeed, Congress never defined "non-point source"
pollution in the statute. Its statement that run-off is not
"point source" pollution merely shows an intent not to regulate
that type of pollution (because it is near impossible to do so),

(continued...)

10

no sense to hold that "'point source' does not encompass the
deliberate discharge of pollutants produced in the course of a
waste-generating activity, merely because a person directly
deposits those pollutants into the water" (Pet. App. 39a-40a).
Thus, said the district court, a human being should be deemed a
"point source" even if that person is only an "intermittent
polluter", since the statute defines a discharge to include "any
addition of a pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source" (Pet. App. 42a, citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)) (emphasis
added by Judge Korman).

In the very next breath, however, Judge Korman somewhat
contradictorily agreed that Congress did not intend the Clean
Water Act to apply to "any addition of a pollutant... froma
[human being]" (Pet. App. 42a) (emphasis added). Trying to
rationalize how the statute could be applied in this case and yet
deemed inapplicable when a person flings a candy wrapper or
urinates into the waters, Judge Korman went on to re-craft the
rule, not found in the Act, by which the term "point source"
should be read

to include any discrete and identifiable conduit --

including a human being -- designated to collect or

discharge pollutants produced in the course of a waste-
generating activity.
(Pet. App. 42a). Judge Korman did not, however, explain what is

meant by "designated" to collect or discharge pollutants; nor did

>(...continued)
but it does not show an intent to include within its definition
of "discrete, discernible conveyance" something like a human
being that just does not fit within the Act's terms.

11

he point to any place in the statute where that limitation, or
the limitation "produced in the course of a waste-generating
activity", might have come from. Nor, indeed, did the court
explain why that definition would in fact exclude a human being
who urinates in the water, given that a human body involves many
"“waste-generating activities" and produces pollutants.

The district court went on to hold that, as to the counts
dealing with the September 1988 discovery of the vials in the
bulkhead, there was also "an independent basis" to hold that
Villegas' conduct was within the Act: Even if a human being were
not a "point source", the rocks forming the bulkhead at the
condominium complex "comes within the definition of that phrase"
(Pet. App. 43a). Alternatively, the district court continued,
"even if the bulkhead does not constitute a 'point source,' the
very containers holding the blood vials" can be deemed a "point
source" because they are also "containers" (id.). Thus, although
the jury was never charged on any of these shifting and novel
theories of criminal liability (a factor that rendered the
convictions unsustainable for reasons stated in the footnote

below)® -- and despite the fact that this "anything-can-be-a-

° At oral argument, District Judge Korman indicated that

the theory he was considering was based on a new way of looking
at the statute and that the "appropriate question" was "[w]hether
pollutants were generated during the course of a continuous waste
generating activity and then deliberately dumped from a discrete
and identifiable point" (9/16/91 Tr. 7). The court concluded
that, because under that theory, the defendant was "generating"
pollutants" and deliberately "dump[ed] them from a discrete and
identifiable point", the defendant could be liable under the Act.

(continued...)

12

conveyance"-type of rationale suggests even more strongly that
the formulation reads out of the statute entirely the concept of
"discernible, confined and discrete conveyance" that is an
element of the definition of "point source" -- the district court

held that these grounds, too, warranted sustaining the charges.’

E. The Court of Appeals' Decision: The Court of Appeals'

majority first held that the district court's "post-verdict
definitional efforts" to arrive at an alternate theory upon which

to sustain the convictions ran afoul of this Court's decision in

*(...continued)

Judge Korman acknowledged that this theory was "not
precisely what [he] charged the jury"; however, he believed that
this shift was not "significant" because "the facts are not
really in dispute here" (9/16/91 Tr. 8). With all respect to
Judge Korman, his belief in this instance is just not in accord
with the principle that an uncharged theory cannot be used to
salvage a criminal conviction. Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,
814 (1971); Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1979)).
As these cases show, when legal theories are not submitted to the
jury, it is inappropriate to later inject them as a basis to
sustain a conviction.

. The district court then went on to grant the Rule 29

motion as to the "knowing endangerment" counts, counts One and
Three. The court held that to satisfy that provision, a
discharge must "actually place another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury", not merely create a
"potential" consequence (Pet. App. 49a). The district court also
held that the defendant must know that such a "high probability"
of danger existed at the time pollutants are discharged into the
waters (id.), and concluded that the evidence did not sustain a
finding that respondent was so aware (Pet. App. 52a). The court
further held that its previous instruction to the jury -- that
some lesser degree of probability would suffice -- was wrong. As
a consequence, the district court concluded that, even if the
appellate court were to disagree that the evidence was
insufficient to show "knowing endangerment", a new trial would be
required at which proper jury instructions are provided (Pet.
App. at 49a-50a n.5).

13

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980) (court may

not affirm conviction on basis of theory not presented to jury).
Since, though the government had argued at trial that a human
being was a point source, the district court, rejecting that
suggestion at the time, took the issue from the jury and charged
that "[rjemoving pollutants froma... vehicle. . . parked
next to a navigable body of water and physically throwing the
pollutant into the water constitutes a discharge from a point
source" (Pet. App. 65a), the Court of Appeals held that there
would be a "serious problem" in upholding the conviction on the
basis that a human being is a point source" (Pet. App. 7a).

The more significant problem, however, said the majority,
was that, as the district court's analytical struggle only
highlighted, "the statute was never designed to address the
random, individual polluter" such as respondent.

The majority first looked to the language and structure of
the Clean Water Act. Although the statute defines "point source"
in nonexclusive terms (as quoted in the footnote below) ,*® the
terms used in the statute neither include a "human being", nor

"conjure up" the image of a human being as the type of

§ 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) defines "point source" as follows:

The term "point source" means any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may
be discharged. The term does not include agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.

14

"discernible . .. conveyance" that Congress meant to target in
enacting the Clean Water Act. Moreover, as the majority aptly
noted, "[{h]jad Congress intended to punish a human being who
polluted navigational waters, it could readily have said: ‘any
person who places pollutants in navigable waters without a permit
is guilty of a crime'" (Pet. App. 8a).

More than simply being a case of an omission of the term
"human being" from the definitional "point source" section of the
statute, the majority agreed that the Clean Water Act as a whole
uses the term "point source" in a way that refers to fixed
industrial plants, and simply does not make sense when applied to
an individual polluter (or his or her personal automobile). The
majority cited as examples 33 U.S.C. § 1311, which refers to the
"owner or operator" of a "point source"; § 1311(e), which
requires that effluent limitations "be applied to all point
sources of discharge"; § 1311(g)(2), which allows an "owner or
operator of a point source" to apply to EPA for modification of
its limitations requirements; § 1342(f), which refers to classes,
categories, types and sizes of point sources; and a host of other
references, all of which make it clear that individual pollution
was not what the statute was meant to cover. "As the statute
stands today," the majority concluded, "the term 'point source'
is comprehensible only if it is held to the context of industrial
and municipal discharges" (Pet. App. 9a).

The majority next noted that, though the purpose of the

Clean Water Act is broad and admirable, the mere declaration of a

15

broad purpose could not substitute for "comprehensible" meaning.
The majority quoted the words of Senator Robert Dole, whose words
in discussing the 1972 amendments to the Act suggested, as did
respondent below, that a human polluter is more akin to "non-
point source pollution", which is not within the meaning of
"discharge" and thus not covered by the Act, than to "point
source" pollution, which is covered by the Act's terms, because
the Act was designed to apply to sources of pollution that
"confine [their] polluting discharge to [a] specific outlet".
Senator Dole's quoted words are:

Most of the problems of agricultural pollution deal

with non-point sources. Very simply, a non-point

source of pollution is one that does not confine its

polluting discharge to one fairly specific outlet, such

as a sewer pipe, a drainage ditch or a conduit; thus a

feedlot would be considered to be a non-point source as
would pesticides and fertilizers.

(S. Rep. No. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3760,
quoted at Pet. App. lla (emphasis added)). The majority found no
suggestion "either in the act itself or in the historv of its
passage" that Congress intended to reach pollution caused by
individuals who "do[] not confine [their] polluting discharge to
one fairly specific outlet".

Finally, looking to case law under the Act, the majority
found that, unlike this case, there was a clear "point source" --
one that fit comfortably within the terms of the definitional
section of the Act, and within an industry targeted by Act as
well -- in the prior criminal cases decided under 33 U.S.C. §

1319(c) (see cases cited at Pet. App. 13a). Noting that, while

16

there may have been "greater flexibility of interpretation" in

civil cases, see Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715

F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983) ("point source" includes bulldozing
equipment discharging dredged materials onto wetland), there is
no room for ambiguity in criminal cases because of the rule of
lenity, the majority also determined that none of the civil cases
-- and not even the broad dicta in one of the earliest civil

cases, United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.3d 368, 373

(10th Cir. 1979), to the effect that the Act embraces "the
broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from
which pollutants might enter the waters" in order to effectuate
the purposes of the act -- provided a sufficient basis to make
the "leap" to including a human being in the statutory language
since such a construction would "do[] violence to the language
and structure of the CWA" (Pet. App. 14a).

So, too, the majority noted, even in the regulations of the
EPA itself -- the agency whose interpretations are entitled to
"deference" -- there was no support for the broad position that
an individual is a "point source" of pollution. Rather, the EPA
regulation (40 C.F.R. § 122.2) provides that "discharge" of a
pollutant includes "discharges through pipes, sewers or other
conveyances owned by a State, municipality, or other person which
do not lead to a treatment works", and does not include "an
addition of pollutants by any ‘indirect discharger'" (Pet. App.
15a). Adopting the government's theory, the majority concluded,

"would effectively read the 'point source' element of the crime

17

ee

out of the statute" (Pet. App. 15a). Because the meaning of
"point source” was thus at least ambiguous, the rule of lenity
prohibited a conviction on these facts.’

Judge Oakes, in dissent, stated that he did not agree that a
person "can never be a point source". Starting with the
proposition that, though the "classic" point source is "something
like a pipe", there were other "discernible, confined and
discrete conveyances" that have also been deemed point sources by
various courts (Pet. App. 19a-2la), Judge Oakes determined "in
short" that the term "point source" "has been broadly construed"
to cover "a wide range of polluting techniques" and that it
should be broadly construed. Apparently recognizing that the Act
was not completely limitless, however, Judge Oakes fashioned his
own formulation for exclusions from the Act's coverage -- which
carried no citation to any provision of the Clean Water Act --
that "polluting techniques" were within the Act

so long as the pollutants involved are not just

humanmade, but reach the navigable waters by human

effort or by leaking from a clear point at which waste

water was collected by human effort.

(Pet. App. 2la). Judge Oakes then determined, with a quotation

to the early Earth Sciences case, supra, 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir.

? The majority determined that, because it was dismissing

the charges for a failure to prove a “point source", the same
defect existed vis-a-vis the "knowing endangerment" counts. The
majority thus did not address the government's claim that the
district court had applied the wrong standard of "knowing
endangerment" or that the evidence had been sufficient to prove
the enhanced offense.

18

1979)*° (certiorari was apparently never sought in Earth

Sciences, and the decision has been criticized), that a "broad
reading" of "point source" along the lines he had just formulated
was “essential to fulfill the mandate of the Clean Water Act".
(Pet. App. 22a, quoting 599 F.2d at 373).

Judge Oakes recognized that the term "point source" must
also be read to "set[{] significant definitional limits on the
reach of the Clean Water Act" (Pet. App. 23a). His reason for
this conclusion was based on what he termed the "assumption" of
most cases and commentators that "all water pollution is either
point source pollution or nonpoint source pollution" (Pet. App.
23a n.2), and the view stemming from that assumption and from the
Act's broad goals that the Act covers all "point source"
pollution and "exempts" only "nonpoint source discharges" (Pet.
App. 23a). Though the Act does not define "nonpoint source",
Judge Oakes offered his suggestion of what that term means,
though again this determination carried no citation to any
provision of the Act. Deviating from the description given by
Senator Dole that "a non-point source of pollution is one that

does not confine its polluting discharge to one fairly specific

= The court in Earth Sciences had expressed the view that
"it contravenes the intent of the [Act] .. . to exempt from
regulation any activity that emits pollution from an identifiable
point".

= Earth Sciences was criticized by the D.C. Court of
Appeals in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 224 U.S. App. D.C.
41, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in which the EPA had taken
contradictory positions.

19

outlet such as a sewer pipe", which the majority had quoted (Pet.
App. lla), Judge Oakes concluded that

Nonpoint source pollution is, generally, runoff: salt

from roads, agricultural chemicals from farmlands, oil

from parking lots, and other substances washed by rain,

in diffuse patterns, over the land and into navigable

waters.

(Pet. App. 23a-24a).

Apparently finding no provision in the Act itself that
supported the view that only the conditions identified by Judge
Oakes as "non-point source" pollution were "exempted" from the
Act, Judge Oakes pointed instead to a publication the EPA: EPA
Office of Water, Officer of Water Regulations and Standards,
Nonpoint Source Guidance 3 (1987) (cited at Pet. App. 24a n.3).
That document, however, defines "nonpoint source pollution" only
with the circular definition that it is pollution "caused by
diffuse sources that are not regulated as point sources".

Judge Oakes nonetheless continued with his analysis by suggesting
that the rationale for treating point and nonpoint sources

differently was that nonpoint sources are "more difficult to

control" (Pet. App. 25a). Because "point sources" are known, and

“= The EPA publication goes on to state that the concept

normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural
and urban runoff, runoff from construction activities,
etc. Such pollution results in the human-made or
human-induced alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological and radiological integrity of water. In
practical terms, nonpoint source pollution does not
result from a discharge at a specific, single location
(such as a single pipe) but generally results from land
runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or
percolation.

20

thus easier to control, the dissenter concluded that Congress

must have meant to control all identifiable sources of pollution
as "point sources".

Judge Oakes acknowledged that respondent's activities "were
not prototypical point source discharges" since respondent could
have disposed of the pollutants on land and "so did not need a
permit or a pipe" (Pet. App. 26a). However, the dissent
concluded, because the discharge "was [supposedly] directly into
the water, and came from an identifiable point", this must be a
"point source" discharge within the Act.

Judge Oakes also opined that it was not necessary "to
determine whether it was Villegas himself who was the point
source, or whether it was his car, the vials, or the bulkhead".
This was because, to Judge Oakes, "the entire stream of Mr.
Villegas' activity functioned as a ‘discrete conveyance' or point
source" (Pet. App. 26a). Just because Congress did not list this
method of disposing of waste in the statute, Judge Oakes said,
that should not mean that the Act should be deemed ambiguous as
to its intent to cover respondent's conduct (id.) Were he to
read the Act any other way, Judge Oakes said, it would "encourage
corporations perfectly capable of abiding by the Clean Water
Act's requirements to ask their employees to stand between the
company trucks and the sea, thereby transforming point source
pollution (dumping from trucks) into nonpoint source pollution"

(Pet. App. 27a).

21

After expressing his views on the matter, Judge Oakes turned
to the majority's counterarguments. Though he "granted" that it
"sounds odd" to read the term "point source" to include a
"person" when it would lead to a statutory statement prohibiting
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a person
by a person", that "oddity" could be cured if one did not
"“assum(e] that the term 'person' means the same thing in both
parts of the sentence, and that in both cases it means what it
means in everyday language”. Judge Oakes' solution was to use
the "first term 'person'" to mean "'a person acting as a point
source'" and the second term “person” to mean a “responsible
party” (Pet. App. 28a-29a).

Judge Oakes went further -- opining that a person "can be
both point and nonpoint sources of pollution" (Pet. App. 28a n.6
(emphasis added)), depending on whether he or she "deposit{[s]
waste directly into water", in which case the person is a "point
source", or “spread[{s] fertilizer on the ground or deposit[s] oil
in a driveway", in which case the person is a non-point source of
pollution.

Judge Oakes admitted that he was "given pause .. . by the
nature of the criminal sanctions" under the Act. Though given

his broad definition, the Act could include "intentionally

throwing a candy wrapper into the ocean" -- which Judge Oakes was
though Congress had probably not intended the Act to cover (Pet.
App. 29a-30a) -- Judge Oakes fashioned his own formulation of the

limitation by "read[ing] the statute as ambiguous as it pertains

22

to individual litterers, as opposed to disposers of industrial
and municipal waste" (Pet. App. 30a).

Judge Oakes concluded that, since there was no "essential"
dispute as to facts, there should be no difficulty in sustaining
the verdict even though the jury did not expressly find guilt
based on Judge Oakes' formulation. Nor, said Judge Oakes, did

the rule of lenity require reversal, because, even though some

human pollution was to be excluded from the Act's coverage, the |
statute was, to him, unambiguous "with respect to an individual
physically disposing of medical wastes, in quantity, directly
into navigable waters, by means of a controllable, discrete

conveyance and court of action" (Pet. App. 3la).

ARGUMENT
THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED
The government seeks a writ of certiorari because of the
supposed "mistake" by the Court of Appeals in deeming the Act's
"breadth" an “ambiguity. Accusing the majority of "creat[ing] a
non-textual requirement" that is "incapable of principled
administration", the government urges review by this Court on the
ground that the Court of Appeals' reading of the Act "conflicts
with the Act's plain language".

Although the government seizes on the statutory word "any"

and argues that, as District Judge Korman and dissenting Judge

Oakes concluded, the use of the term signifies Congress' intent

23

to cover the conduct at issue here,’ the term "any" does not
stand alone: it precedes the phrase "discharge of any
pollutant". While seemingly a broad and encompassing phrase, the
term "discharge" is limited by the statutory definition: "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source". 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Like it or not, the term "point
source" limits the reach of the Clean Water Act. The Court of
Appeals properly interpreted the statute as having not been
intended to cover the random individual pollution caused by
Geronimo Villegas. Indeed, it is the government, as well as
District Judge Korman and dissenting Judge Oakes, who urge a
"non-textual requirement", simply to shoehorn an individual's
pollution into the statute's terms: they would subject an
individual to criminal liability if the source of the pollution
was “industrial waste", but not otherwise. Such a limitation of
the word "pollutant" does not exist in the statute. The Court of
Appeals correctly determined the issue before the Court.

The government claims, however, that the definition of
"point source" is not "susceptible to [the supposedly] narrow
interpretation" given it by the Second Circuit majority, and
further claims that, whether it includes human beings or not, the
term "clear[{ly]" includes respondent's automobile, supposedly

used to transport blood to the bank of the Hudson River (Petition

= As Judge Oakes and District Judge Korman noted, the
phrase "discharge of a pollutant" is defined as "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source". 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12).

24

9-10) since it is a “conveyance”. (See also Petition at ll
(issue whether human "conveyance" is within Act is "not pertinent
to the validity of respondent's conviction" since jury was
charged that "vehicle was the statutory 'conveyance'")).

Notwithstanding the government's argument, even if a
personal automobile could be deemed a "point source" without
doing violence to the statutory language, the conduct would still
not be within the Clean Water Act because respondent took the
vials out of the car before they came anywhere near the navigable
waters. It was respondent, not the vehicle, who "added" the
pollutant to the bulkhead. There was thus no discharge "from"
any point source, as the statute requires.

The term "discharge", again, is thus defined as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source", 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added). Just as the
government claims the word "any" cannot be deemed surplusage, nor
is the word "from" mere surplusage. Indeed, it was the basis of
a holding by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit -- not cited by the government in its
petition” -- that the EPA did not have a duty to require dam

” The government argues that the Second Circuit "cited no
statutory language" calling for an "exception" to liability for
discharges by one's personal vehicle when there is the
“intervention of a human being between that conveyance and the
water" (Petition at 11). The government further suggests in a
footnote (Petition at 11 n.3) that, though the Second Circuit's
analysis “appears to be based on th[{e] assumption" that the Act
requires that the "last chain in the link of conveyances itself
be a ‘point source'", "nothing in the act requires it". Id.

(continued...)

25

operators to apply for certain pollutant discharge permits under
the Act. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156
(D.C. Cir. 1982). The issue in the case was not whether the dams
contributed to pollution: they did. Further, there was no issue
that certain "conveyances" in dams were point sources for some
purposes: the spillways through which water flowed from
reservoirs through the dams had been determined to be "point
sources" by the EPA in the past. 693 F.2d at 165 & n.22.
Instead, the sole issue was whether the water quality changes
that resulted from release of water through the dams constituted
the "discharge of a pollutant" as that term is defined under 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12) such as to require the EPA to regulate dams.
According deference to the EPA's position on the matter, the
Court of Appeals held that the EPA had no duty to regulate dams.
The EPA's position was that the "addition [of a pollutant] from a
point source occurs only if the point source itself physically
introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world" -- that
the "point or nonpoint character of pollution is established when
the pollutant first enters navigable water... ." 693 F.2d at
175. Since in Gorsuch the polluted water passed through the dam

from one body of navigable water (the reservoir) to the other

4#(,...continued)

As discussed in the text above, however, the statute
pertains to additions of pollutants "from" point sources, and the
EPA believes that the Act does require that the "last chain in
the link of conveyances itself [must] be a point source". The
language of the Act would be meaningless if the Act were read as
the government wishes.

26

(the downstream water), the pollutant had not been added "from"
the dam, and it was thus not a "point source".

For the same reasons as in Gorsuch -- under the EPA's
reasonable and judicially approved position -- there was no
discharge "from" Geronimo Villegas' vehicle. Even if one's
personal automobile could otherwise be deemed a "point source",
there was thus no criminal violation of the statute here.

In positing that the automobile is a "point source" and the
conduct a "discharge" within the meaning of the Clean Water Act,
the government -- though acknowledging that "the language
actually enacted by Congress" controls the interpretation of the

statute (Petition at 12, citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,

473 U.S. 479, 495 & n.13 (1985) -- offers a conclusion drawn from
only one word of the statute: "conveyance". That word, however,
is not only limited by words that the government and, indeed,
many prior court decisions have not sufficiently analyzed,
preferring instead to speak of the broad goals of the statute,
but it is given its context and content from the words used by
Congress through the statute, all of which must be read in
conjunction and none of which should be rendered superfluous by a

court's construction of a portion of the statute. See United

States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 301 & n.14 (1971),

quoting Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-116 (1879) ("[A]

statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can

27

be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant") .»
The Court of Appeals' rightly concluded, through a sound

analysis of the statute itself, that the language and structure

= In Campos-Serrano, this Court held that possession of
a counterfeit alien registration receipt card was not an act
punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1546, which criminally punishes one

who "knowingly . . . possesses" any "immigrant or nonimmigrant
visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the
United States". While the INS at the time permitted an alien

registration card to be used for an alien's re-entry into the
United States, it was not a "required" document. This Court,
invoking the rule of lenity, said (citations omitted):

It has long been settled that "penal statutes are to be
construed strictly," .. . and that one "is not to be
subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute
plainly impose it," .. . "When choice has to be made
between two readings of what conduct Congress has made
a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should
have spoken in language that is clear and definite."

- « In § 1546, Congress did speak in "clear and
definite" language. But, taken literally and given its
plain and ordinary meaning, that language does not
impose a criminal penalty for possession of a
counterfeited alien registration receipt card. Alien
registration receipt cards may be used for re-entry by
certain persons into the United States. They are not
required for entry.

* *& &
The language of § 1546 denotes a very special class of
"entry" documents -- documents whose primary raison

d'etre is the facilitation of entry into the country.
The phrase, “required for entry into the United
States," is descriptive of the nature of the documents;
it is not simply an open-ended reference to future
administrative regulations.

The Court's words apply equally in this case. "Point
source" is "descriptive" of an origin of pollutants. Dissenting
Judge Oakes' suggestion that a human being can be a point source
if the pollutants he carries consist of "industrial and municipal
waste" instead of "individual litter[]" merely substitutes Judge
Oakes' predilection of what the statute should have covered for
what it does cover.

28

of the Act as a whole demonstrate that individual pollution was

not what the Clean Water Act was meant to cover. It meant to
regulate some pollution, not to regulate all pollution with only
some exceptions, as district judge Korman, dissenting Judge
Oakes, and the government contend.

Indeed, in enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress
specifically recognized that it is the "primary responsibilit[y]"
of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate water pollution,
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).** Accord, American Paper Institute v.

United States Environmental Protection Agency, 996 F.2d 346, 302

” The respondent caused the pollution from his home in

New Jersey. New Jersey, in fact, commenced a prosecution against
respondent and Plaza Health Laboratories, but dismissed the
criminal case. It was only after the dismissal that the federal
prosecutors took up the torch, so to speak, and tried to cram
this case into the gaps of the Clean Water Act because of their
sense that there should be some criminal punishment. Of course,
the prosecutors, like the judges of the federal courts, are not
legislators. Their sense of outrage is no substitute for a
statute that reaches the conduct at issue.

Nor should the federal authorities worry that the State
cannot protect the waters. New Jersey has a comprehensive code
that regulates and even criminalizes pollution. See N.J. Stat.
58:10A-6 (entitled "Regulation of discharges of pollutants;
permits; exceptions; right of entry; regulation by local agency;
inspections; priority pollutant analysis; public access to
records"). Section "a" of the statute as it stands today makes
it "unlawful for any person to discharge any pollutant, except in
conformity with a valid New Jersey Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit that has been issued by the
commissioner pursuant to this act or a valid National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit issued by the administrator
pursuant to the Federal Act, as the case may be." Whether or not
this provision would have criminalized respondent's conduct at
the time in question, the State is perfectly able to enact
legislation and enforce anti-pollution laws. If the statutes
were not sufficient to cover respondent's conduct at the time,
the remedy is not for the courts to legislate, but to invoke a
legislative cure.

29

U.S. App. D.C. 80 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing "Congress' intent
to cast the states in the featured role" under the Clean Water
Act). Congress' purpose was to place some federal controls on
pollution of the nation's waters: those controls included
regulation of industrial sources of discharges of pollution, and
were accomplished by authorizing the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish limitations
(called “effluent limitations"’’) on "permissible" levels of
discharge of toxic and other pollutants by "sources" to be
identified by the Administrator (with the help of the States) as
"point sources" and categorized.

Congress did not totally prohibit the "discharge" of
"pollutants" -- not even "toxic pollutants"”™ that can cause
great harm to the life and health of the citizenry. Rather, it

expressed as a policy goal the elimination of pollution in the

- "Effluent limitation" means "any restriction

established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates,
and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other
constituents which are discharged from point sources into
navigable waters ... , including schedules of compliance." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(11).

= The term "toxic pollutant" means (33 U.S.C. § 1362(13))

those pollutants .. . including disease-causing agents
which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion,
inhalation, or assimilation into any organism, either
directly from the environment or indirectly by
ingestion through food chains, will, on the basis of
information available to the Administrator, cause
death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer,
genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions ... or
physical deformations in such organisms or their
offspring.

30

)

future,*® provided monies for studies and regulation, and

required "point sources" to obtain permits in order to lawfully
discharge pollutants into the waters. The discharges would have
to comply with whatever limitations were set by the State and
federal governments. There were also reporting and record-
keeping requirements established by the Act.

In framing such a necessary and commendable (though as yet
unachieved) policy, the sense of Congress thus incorporated a
recognition that, while all pollution should be eliminated, every
instance of pollution will not necessarily constitute a violation
of the Clean Water Act. Further, unlicensed instances of
pollution are wrongful only if "discharges" of "pollutants" occur

"from" a “point source" into the "navigable waters".

sad The 1972 Amendments established 1985 as a desired date
for the total elimination of discharges of pollution, and set as
a policy goal that toxic pollutants "in toxic amounts" should be
prohibited. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The goal of elimination has
obviously not been met. Nor has toxic pollution been
significantly controlled. As reported in the 1989 Environmental
Reporter, 19 Env. Rptr. 2573 (April 7, 1989), the National Toxic
Campaign was complaining that over 2000 pounds of toxic
substances were being discharged into the Boston Harbor each day,
and that most of the 1500 companies involved in the discharges
were in compliance with permits and with State regulations.

31

The definition of “point source" in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)”
cannot include everything that could arguably "convey" a
pollutant. If Congress had meant that, it no doubt would have --
and easily could have -- said so clearly. Instead of saying:
"Any person who places pollutants in navigable waters without a
permit is guilty of a crime", what it did say is completely
inconsistent with applying the statute to a human being who
pollutes and shows an intent, as the Second Circuit majority
properly accepted, to regulate industries and industrial waste
from fixed and identified plants. As shown in the footnote

below™ and discussed by the Second Circuit majority (at

20 Again, the definition is:

The term "point source" means any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to,
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may
be discharged. This term does not include agricultural
storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.

= For example, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(f), entitled "Point
source categories", requires the EPA Administrator to
"“establish[] categories of point sources which he determines
shall not be subject to the requirements of subsection (d) of
this section in any State with a program approved pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section", and allows the Administrator to
"distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within any category
of point sources." One wonders how the Administrator would
"distinguish among classes, types, and sizes" of human beings or
personal vehicles.

Likewise, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d) refers to "any point source
the construction of which is commenced after October 18, 1972".
This language also is hardly explainable in terms of an
individual's polluticn. Finally, by way of example, 33 U.S.C. §
1318 provides that the EPA Administrator "shall require the owner
(continued...)

32

Petition 8a-9a), "the term point source is used throughout the
statute, but invariably in sentences referencing industrial or
municipal discharges" and plants".

The legislative history is consistent: Not only does the
Senate Report discuss how the permit system “establishes a direct
link between the federal government and each industrial source
[emphasis added] of discharges into the navigable waters" (1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, at 3675), but there are
numerous other similar references in the historical documents
that cannot be reconciled with a holding that an individual or
his personal automobile should be treated as a "point source".
E.g., U.S. Code Cong., supra, at 3710 (refers to the application
of technology to “industrial point sources"); id. at 3723
(stating that the new "sources" of pollution in twenty-eight
specified industries are to be constructed to meet "no-discharge"
limitations if possible, and then identifying industrial "groups"
such as pulp and paper mills, paperboard industry, meat product
processing, dairy processing, rubber processing, etc.); id. at
3728 (discussing how the "owner" of an “effluent source" should
install monitoring equipment); id. at 3737 (discussing permits,
and indicating that the Act will allow the Administrator to
establish "classes and categories of point sources" for which no

permit-by-permit review will be undertaken); and id. at 3736

71(,...continued)
or operator of a point source" to establish and maintain records,
make reports, install monitoring equipment, and do a variety of
other things that make no sense when applied to an individual who
pollutes.

33

(citing studies that reveal that there are at least 40,000
industrial sources of discharges into the navigable waters). (Oof
course, if every vehicle owned by an individual were counted,
there would be many, many more than 40,000 sources.) Further,
the regulations of the EPA themselves are consistent with the
view that the federal regulation concerns various identified
industries (as noted in the footnote below) and demonstrate the
Agency's understanding that the Act regulates industries, not
individual persons.”

In accord is this Court’s discussion of the Act in E.I. du

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). That case

involved an issue of regulation of "point sources" that existed
on the effective date of the 1972 Clean Water Act, which were to

be subject to certain limitations, and of "new sources" (those to

= E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 469.10 et seg. (Electrical and
electronic components point source category); 40 C.F.R. § 403.1
et seq. (General pretreatment regulations for existing and new
sources of pollution); 40 C.F.R. § 420.01 et seq. (Iron and steel
manufacturing point source category); 40 C.F.R. § 433.10 et seq.
(Metal finishing point source category); 40 C.F.R. § 463.1 et
seg. (Plastics molding and forming point source category).

The EPA has taken other action to show its
understanding that "point sources" intended to be covered are
standing facilities. Thus, as reported in the
Reporter, 19 Env. Rptr. 1908 (January 27, 1989), the EPA proposed
a rule directing States to draw up lists of contaminated
waterways and "sources" as a measure under the 1987 amendments to
the Clean Water Act, which require States to identify waterways
with toxic contamination and to identify sources of that
contamination. Plainly, it was contemplated that the State would
be identifying fixed plants, not movable cars. To the extent
that the definition of "point source" in the statute includes
"rolling stock" or other "conveyances", we suggest that what
Congress meant to cover were conveyances such as railroad
equipment within some "confined" location which is a regular part
of that facility.

34

be constructed later), which under the Act were to be limited
more strictly.”? In the course of the opinion, Justice Stevens
discussed various terms of the Act in a way that makes it plain
that "point sources" involve structures -- such as those
mentioned in the definitional section of the Act -- within some
plant or location that is "confined" -- one of the operative
terms in the definition of "point source". See 430 U.S. at 117
n.4.2* Indeed, Justice Stevens, in his discussion of the
issues, substitutes the term "classes of plants" for "classes of
point sources", thus indicating that a fixed plant is the minimum
required for a “source” to be a "point source".

Obviously, there is no "class" of sources that is defined --
or that could reasonably be defined -- as cars driven to

bulkheads by individuals carrying "pollutants" (a term which

= 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c), quoted at 430 U.S. at 120 n.8,
thus states that

[ajfter the effective date of standards of performance
promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful
for any owner or operator of any new source to operate
such source in violation of any standard of performance
applicable to such source.

The statute obviously does not speak to how one's private vehicle
is "operated", but rather connotes a "facility" and its various
pollution-discharging parts.

as The Court also noted, 430 U.S. at 120, that the
Administrator was directed by the Act to publish within 90 days
"a list of categories of sources discharging pollutants". To the
extent that the statute leaves it to an agency to further define
the meaning of one of its criminal terms, there can be no proper
finding of criminal liability where, as here, the Administrator
has never defined as a "point source", prior to indictment,
whatever entity the indictment alleges as a point source. That
would hardly be notice.

35

includes just about anything other than pure water). The mere
fact that the pollutants carried at one time in the automobile
were traceable to a business and the “source” was thereby in fact
"identified" as a "waste-generating activity" (to use the
limiting principle fashioned by the district court but nowhere
found in the statute) -- or that the individual who polluted was
disposing of “industrial [or] municipal waste" and not "litter"
(to use Judge Oakes' legislative effort) -- does not turn one's
automobile into a "point source". The government's construction
that would include a human being within the Act only at some
times, depending on how one classifies the "waste" he carried to
or near a navigable waterway, is a distinction not made within
the statute itself and one that is at war with the language and
history of the Act. A “point source" is not defined by the
nature of the pollutant.»

Nor does any case cited by the government, or any other case
for that matter, compel a conclusion that Mr. Villegas or his car
can properly be characterized as a "point source". Though the
government argues that the decision below "conflicts with
decisions from other circuits, which have recognized that the

plain language of the Act embraces a broad array of polluting

” To the contrary, the "litter" of human beings is more

like rain runoff -- the prime example of a non-point source --
than a point source. Generally, the source of such litter is not
readily identifiable.

Even if a “litterer" can be identified, with the Act as
it now stands, Congress left it to the States to impose
penalties.

36

conduct that is logically indistinguishable from respondent's
activities" (Petition at 15), the government is wrong: no case
deals with individual pollution or holds an individual or his
personal vehicle a "point source". To the extent that courts --
such as the Court in Earth Sciences, supra, 599 F.2d 368 -- have
employed broad dicta concerning the “breadth" of the term "point
source" because of the goals of the Clean Water Act, the holding
of the case is not entirely inconsistent with this case, because
it does not deal with individual pollution as does this case. No
one comparing the decision in this case with that in Earth
Sciences -- a case in which certiorari was apparently not sought
in this Court and the holding of which has been criticized in any
event -- should be confused by the actual reach of the statute.
One who reads the Second Circuit decision in this case and
compares it to any of a number of prior cases that used broad
dicta but did not adequately analyze the issue, will know that,
to the extent they seek to hold individuals responsible for
pollution, they should go to the State authorities or seek an

amendment of the statute from Congress.”

-” As the Second Circuit majority realized, most of the
prior civil cases do involve "conveyances" in fixed ("confined")
locations, thus giving no basis to reach the conclusion that a
broad construction covers the conduct at issue. E.g., Avoyelles

; , 715 F.2d 879, 922 (5th Cir. 1983)
(bulldozing equipment discharged dredged materials into wetlands
as part of a fixed agricultural activity). To the extent that
the cases suggest a broader reach, they were not decided in a
criminal context, where the rule of lenity applies.

Nor does the Court of Appeals decision suggest, as the
government claims it does (Petition at 16), that "the same
(continued...)

37

Congress may now think that it has the powers to penalize
individual polluters of the waters and may wish to use those
powers, but either it did not think so at the time it enacted the
Clean Water Act, or decided that the States should be responsible
for such pollution. In any event, Congress certainly did not
plainly include conduct such as that of Mr. Villegas in the Act's
coverage; had it wished to do so, it would have, and should have,
stated succinctly: "Any person who pollutes the navigable waters
by placing pollutants in those waters without a permit is guilty
of a crime." This plain forewarning was not given because it was
not what Congress meant to cover when it enacted the "point

source" regulations in the Clean Water Act. See United States v.

Campos-Serrano, supra, 404 U.S. at 299 ("The principle of strict
construction of criminal statutes demands that some determinate
limits be established based upon the actual words of the
statute.") The government's remedy in this case is not with this

Court: it is with Congress.

76(,..continued)
statutory language" should be interpreted "differently depending
on the civil or criminal nature of each particular case". Aside
from the fact that the cases it cites do not support the
proposition that interpretation of the criminal statute should
not be undertaken with less "flexibility", the Court of Appeals'
decision only reflects the fact that, where a statute has
criminal application, as here, the rule of lenity must be invoked
when one reaches a place where two interpretations both make
sense. This, indeed, is the same theory as applies to issues of
whether a court should sustain an agency's own interpretation of
a statute. See Gorsuch, supra, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(upholding EPA's decision that dams were not point sources
because both sides' interpretations were reasonable and the law
requires deference to an agency's determination when that is so).

38

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has no need to take this case. If the
prosecutors are not happy with the result, their remedy is to
seek an amendment of the Act from the Congress of the United
States. A writ of certiorari should not be granted.

Dated: Mt. Kisco, New York
May 31, 1994
VIVIAN SHEVITZ
(Counsel of Record)
| Attorney for Respondent

GERONIMO VILLEGAS

19 N. Moger Avenue

Mt. Kisco, New York 10549

(914) 241-1249

Of Counsel:
Jane Simkin Smith

39

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386005_1355%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
