# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386005_0923%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1999 - **Citation:** 528 U.S. 946 ## Text Supreme Court, U.S. FILED 98 19 42 JUN 4-199 0-0 No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NIKE, INC., Petitioner, Ws WAL-MART STORES, INC. AND HAWE YUE, INC., Respondents. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeais for the Federal Circuit PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI MARK T. BANNER Counsel of Record CHRISTOPHER J. RENK MARC S. COOPERMAN ROBERT S. KATZ JOSEPH P. KRAUSE BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD. 10 S. Wacker Drive Suite 3000 Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 715-1000 Counsel for Petitioner th i ee - . (i) QUESTION PRESENTED The right to disgorge a design patent infringer’s “profits” under Section 289 of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 289) is a cornerstone of the nation’s patent laws. In this case, the Federal Circuit narrowed that right by holding that the express limitation on the recovery of “damages” under Section 287 also limits the disgorgement of an iniringer’s “profits” under Section 289. The Federal Circuit recognized that its statutory interpretation “departs from the plain words of the statute”; is “anomalous”; and rests on a conclusion that “ambiguity has invaded an apparently clear text.” The question presented is: Whether the Federal Circuit improperly departed from the admittedly “plain words” and “clear text” of Section 287 of the Patent Act, when it held that Section 287’s limitation on the recovery of “damages” restricts a design patent owner’s disgorgement of an infringer’s “profits” under Section 289, notwithstanding the long- Standing distinction in the patent laws between “damages” and “profits.” (ii) LIST OF PARTIES All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. Petitioner has no parent companies or non-wholly owned subsidiaries. (iii) TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTION PRESENTED ........................... (i) ctor ‘al COCE CECE (ii) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................... (v) ptt by sotega cecil eee | ed sie ne ed avaccce ccc... | STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............... 2 STATEMENT OF THECASE ........................ 3 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .............. ) I. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Erroneously Abandons The Plain Language of Section 287, and the Long-Recognized Distinction Between I ceo veh ook 9 A. The Plain Meaning Is Supported By This Court’s Precedent, Which the Federal Circuit Failed to Consider or Reconcile ..... . 10 B. The Federal Circuit Erroneously Relied on Ambiguous Legislative History, Rather than the Plain memtmtory Tent... oo scene 13 _ to The Plain Meaning Is Supported By the Statutory Framework .............. 16 D. The Trademark Act’s Sister Statute Confirms the Plain cot, EEC EE rere I8 (Iv) II. The Issue Presented Is Ripe for This Court’s Review .. 19 A. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Will Be the Law of the Land Without Review by This Court ... 19 B. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Raises Important Questions About the Meaning and Scope of this Court’s Related Decision in Aro ........ 20 III. The Federal Circuit’s Ruling Will Have a Significant Adverse Impact on Industries That Rely on Protection of Their Designs From “Knock-Offs” ............. 23 oi bbl. ss PP rrrreTerrrr: Tree rT rrr chia eee 26 (v) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 1997 WL, 83995 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 2... cece ences 20) American Med. Sys. Inc. v. Med.. Eng’g Corp., OF ee Seer Gs POP cure sews ev bas vesuees 1] Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., rg ge 6. | ee or 7,11,15,16,20-23 BFP v. Resolution Trust Co., Pee ey EE nc 350-5 6 oeoc5seeaedee rue 18 Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l Inc., FE A PCIE 606 0 0s-6 haa wakhd da wk eeeee 20 Churchward Int'l Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., Be Fs Gre PO, POUND os 80k veo da He Pde ees 12 Commissioner of Internal Revenue y. Asphalt Prods. Co., ee BA BAT Oe 0 io bn noes Kee ncewe whens 16 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, ee We eee ki is 0k oko se eee 17 Connecticut Nat’! Bank v. Germain, PEP A BEE 6 baie caneciere eee 9,13 Curtis v. Loether, OE Sh eg i SOF ice ea ce 13 Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co.., ae WD. COR CUSED) ois kon cesvvesvaveesvaens tel Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., oe ee er oe erry Freee: 13 General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., ORE Te GON Fk verbo decks veekoueutaeee 20 Mansell v. Mansell, Se a PE orc ee RIA eee 14-16 Ratzlaf v. United States, Be Be Fs rrr es 14 Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, SSO UB GPa Meee 60 Kee ccc ekctvckeeneews 14-15 Tull v. United States, Ga UD. SEZ CISSTE ook cise ec ceudscdtaveveaauess 12 United States v. Gonzalez, Tae alah REOOETD. dekdeactacwessaveecuseuwnas 1S United States v. Wells, Ae Fh. eee ep re er ee 12, 19 Current Statutes EP Rn BLED . oe cccerencideqnaetacvsousveeeen 18, 19 BD Ure © DET occ cc cveeteevedeeece deus shesws eee es 18 Fe OA. OTA ow cee ccedviciticeddeesek denne 15,16,20,21,23 Be RAG BAS! ccc ccveedeccsinduxenet yeysenee (i),2-13,15 16,18-20,23 Be A GA ec ccccsivcegevereVeseunss (i),3-11,16-18,20 BP UN BES cee nccscncvscdesve eee eoavtseweewere™ 25 er A Se cn cnet nceees uth eee eas CRERSEE EROS 18 Previous Statutes ACES 8 PVICTIOUR 6 66ncdckedtixnidss’ Rae 19 MBG SMI oo... .ee sends eee 10 MAS ANB TINT) ooo oo onc oesnsk¥euns seein 11 Bee SE CERES) 5 ccc censanuec dbus Crechaoeeeaen 21 (vii) Other Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents (1998) ............. 22 Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law. 23 5. Legal Stud. 247 (1994) 2.0.0... cc ccccccccee Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) .........0.0.00--.. 15 Todd J. Gilman, Attorney Puts Foot Down About Sneaker Patents; Avia Takes Shoe Pirates to Court to Protect Design, Wash. Post, July 20,1987 ............ 23,25 Thomas J. Hoffmann, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, i, Pe ee eee ues SU Ry Re EONS 5 eu bc bs bb bees od une 15 Mohamed Yusuf M. Mohamed, Unjust Enrichment for Patent Infringement: a Novel Idea?, 4 5, Saas. Pong. L, 123 (999R) oe ckdsiecidccci Given the murky legislative history, perhaps the Federal Circuit should have followed one author’s sarcastic advice that “whenever the legislative history is ambiguous it is permissible to refer to the statute.” Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes, 164 (1975). err | 16 Because the Congressional purpose in amending the Patent Laws in this case is far from clear, the Federal Circuit should have adopted the plain meaning of the statutory language. The Federal Circuit’s failure to do so runs afoul of the very precedent of this Court cited below. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594 (“Given Congress’ mixed purposes, the legislative history does not clearly support Mrs. Mansell’s view that giving effect to the plain and precise language of the statute would thwart the obvious purposes of the Act.”). The Federal Circuit’s decision serves as a highly erroneous example of Statutory construction under which courts can look outside plain language of a statute to find statutory terms that are non-existent. The decision warrants review by this Court. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 120 (1987) ( granting certiorari because the appellate court holding “is in obvious conflict with the plain language of the statute.”’). c. The Plain Meaning Is Supported By The Statutory Framework. 1. The Term “Damages” Should Be Consistently Interpreted Within the Act. Congress codified Sections 284, 287 and 289 all under Chapter 29 (“Remedies For Infringement of Patent, and Other Actions”) of the Patent Laws. In Aro, this Court concluded that “damages” in Section 284 did not include an infringer’s “profits.” To conclude that within the same Chapter, only three sections later at Section 287, Congress intended “damages” to have the exact opposite meaning would pervert the law. Yet, that is precisely whai the Federal Circuit did below. Besides challenging common sense, that result is at odds with a fundamental canon of statutory construction recognized by this Court: 17 The interrelationship and close proximity of these provisions of the statute presents a classic case for application of the “normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1996) (holding that the term “claim” in Section 6512 of 26 U.S.C. had the same meaning as “claim” in Section 651 1(a)). y & Congress Clearly Distinguished Between “Damages” and “Profits” Within the Act. In two sections of Title 35 Congress expressly distinguished between the “additional remedy” of an infringer’s “profit” and a patentee’s “damages.” The first reference of the additional remedy is in Section 289 itself where Congress grants design patent owners the right to recover the “profit” of the infringer. No attempt is made to equate this remedy with “damages” within the Section. Rather, Congress expressly distinguished this “additional” remedy from other remedies such as damages, in the second paragraph of Section 289 where it clarifies that “|n]jothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or impeach any other remedy which an owner of an infringed patent has under the provisions of this title . . . .” (emphasis added). Only seven years ago, in 1992, Congress again confirmed that it intentionally distinguished between “damages” and “profit” within the Patent Act. It added to Chapter 29 a new section to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the Patent Laws. Clarifying the potential extent of liability, Congress listed the remedies that could be obtained against a State: Such remedies include damages, interest, costs, and treble damages under section 284, attorney fees 18 under section 285, and the additional remedy for infringement of design patents under section 289. 35 U.S.C. § 296(b) (emphasis added). App. 72. This most recent statement by Congress makes its intent to differentiate between “damages” and “profit” within the Act unmistakable, and further supports the plain and ordinary construction rejected by the Federal Circuit. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Co., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) (“[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.”). D. The Trademark Act’s Sister Statute Confirms the Plain Meaning. In 1946, not only did Congress amend the Patent Laws, it also turned its attention to the related trademark laws, now codified at Title 15. As remedies for trademark infringement, Congress provided for the recovery of both “defendant's profits” and “any damages sustained by the plaintiff.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1998). More significantly, Congress enacted a sister provision under the Lanham (Trademark) Act to the Section 287 notice provision under the Patent Act, that limits the remedies of a trademark owner. At current Section 1111 of the Lanham Act, Congress stated the consequences to the owner of a registered trademark who did not mark its products with the registered trademark symbol ®: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 22 hereof, a registrant of a mark registered in the Patent Office, may give notice that his mark is registered by displaying with the mark the words "Registered in U. S. Patent and Trademark Office" or "Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off." or the letter R enclosed within a circle, thus ®; and in any suit for infringement under this 19 Act by such a registrant failing to give such notice of registration, no profits and no damages shall be recovered under the provisions of this Act unless the defendant had actual notice of the registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994) (emphasis added).° App. 73. The explicit inclusion of both “profits” and “damages” in the Lanham Act marking statute unquestionably demonstrates what Congress intended in the parallel provision under the Patent Act, Section 287. If Congress meant to require marking of a patent number as a prerequisite to disgorgement of an infringer’s profit, it would have done what it did do in the Lanham Act — make express reference to “profits.” This contemporaneous statute confirms the natural reading of Section 287. It also sounds the death knell to the Federal Circuit’s detour from the plain statutory language. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. at 492 (Relying on Congress’ express inclusion of the term “materiality” in other statutes to confirm the “natural reading” of the statute at issue that did not include “materiality.”). Il. The Issue Presented Is Ripe for Tiiis Court’s Review. A, The Federal Circuit’s Decision Will be the Law of the Land Without Review by This Court. Unlike most cases, there is no possibility that other courts of appeal will reach a different conlusion from the Federal Circuit on the issue presented. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in all patent cases throughout the United States. There is no opportunity for the question ° The text of the predecessor to Section 1111, passed by Congress in 1946, also expressly deciared that “no profits and no damages shall be recovered” in a suit for infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1946). App. 74. 20 to “percolate” among the other circuits. As in this case on remand, all district courts throughout the nation now are bound to follow the dictates of the Federal Circuit’s decision below.’ The nature of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive review of all patent appeals makes its interpretation of Section 287 below a matter of special importance, and worthy of review by this Court. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 89 (1993)(“Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from all United States District Courts in patent litigation, the rule that it applied in this case ... 1S a matter of special importance to the entire Nation” — granting certiorari). B. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Raises Important Questions About the Meaning and Scope of this Court’s Related Decision in Aro. In addition to departing from the plain meaning of Section 287, the Federal Circuit decision also departs from this Court’s decision in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) — the last time this Court addressed the “damages” available to an aggrieved patent owner under Title 35.° In light of the questions raised about Aro by the decision below, it is important for this Court to address the issue presented. ” Indeed, before the Federal Circuit’s decision, a second district court reached the same conclusion that Judge Bryan originally made concerning Section 287. Aerogroup Int’l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 1997 WL 83395, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that Section 287 does not apply to limit disgorgement of an infringer’s profits under Section 289). 5 The only other Supreme Court decision regarding the remedies available under the modern Patent Laws is General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.. 461 U.S. 648 (1983). There, this Court held that prejudgment interest should normally be awarded to a successful patent owner under Section 284. /d. at 657. 21 In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, this Court in Aro first decided the questions there at issue concerning liability for infringement under the Patent Laws. In the final portion of the Aro opinion, Section IV, Justice Brennan turned to the issue of the remedies available to the patent owner in the case although the issue had not been tried or argued below.’ Specifically, the Court considered the meaning of the term “damages” in Section 284, to determine whether it permitted the recovery of the “profits” of the infringer. Justice Harlan did not join in the views expressed in Section IV because he considered the matters dealt with there “not ripe for decision,” rendering that Section a plurality opinion. Aro, 377 U.S. at 502 n.18. The Court addressed the 1946 Amendment to the Patent Laws and its effect on the remedies available. Contrasting the present text of Section 284 to the prior remedial statute.'° the plurality stressed that Section 284 makes reference to only “damages.” The Court concluded that the purpose of the change “was precisely to eliminate the recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of damages only.” Id. By “allowing the recovery of ‘damages’ only,” the congressional purpose had been carried out — the remedy of Section 284, permitting ” Justice Brennan commented on the propriety of Section IV: “It is true that the lower courts have not yet expressly addressed themselves to the damages issue, and that the parties have not argued it here. Nevertheless . . . because expression of our views may obviate the need upon remand for lengthy proceedings before a master in this already over-long litigation, we deem it in the interest of efficient judicial administration to express those views at this time.” Aro, 377 U.S. at 502. '° Prior to 1946, the statutory precursor to Section 284 read: “[U]pon a decree being rendered in any such case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby ... .” R.S. § 4921 (emphasis added). App. 48. 9 the recovery of “damages,” did not permit the recovery of an infringer’s “profits.” Aro, 377 U.S. at 512. Since the 1946 Patent Act and the Aro decision, the vast majority of courts (including the Federal Circuit itself) have followed the plurality opinion. In his leading treatise on Patent Law, Professor Chisum lists lower court decisions concerning the award of an infringer’s profit subsequent to Aro. 7 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 20.02[4]|c] at 20-74, n.36 (1998). Nonetheless. reactions to the plurality’s opinion in Section IV of Aro have been divided. At least one author argues that because Part IV of Aro was unnecessary for the decision of the case, it should be dismissed as “ober dictum.” Thomas J. Hoffmann, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 11 IDEA 89, 104 (1967) (“Part IV should be given the weight accorded the minority opinion in a 5-4 decision.”). Professor Chisum questions the “precedential force” of the Part IV analysis of Aro. Justice Brennan’s statement that the Congressional purpose of the 1946 Act was “clear” and with “no doubt” also “weakens” the opinion according to Professor Chisum, because the plurality’s analysis did not “[consider] the alternative interpretation supported by other portions of the legislative history . .. .” Chisum, supra, § 20.02[4][b] at 20-71."' ‘ Compare Richard L. Stroup, Patentee’s Monetary Recovery From An Infringer, 59J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 362, 372-73 (1977) (“Since the Aro decision. . . the courts have not agreed as to the proper use of an infringer’s profits in the determination of the damage remedy.”); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. Legal Stud. 247, 256 (1994) (“No matter that neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history required this change in the law. As in other cases we shall come to, the Supreme Court found a way to limit the strength of the patent right by limiting its value in infringement litigation.”); and Mohamed Yusuf M. Mohamed. Unjust Enrichment for Patent Infringement: a Novel Idea?, 4 J. Intell. Prop. L.123, 156 (1996) (“Congress did not intend this result. In fact, the very House Report that the Supreme Court cited did not mention an intent to eliminate recovery of the defendant's profits.”); with 23 Whether it should be characterized as dictum, or not, Aro’s discussion of the term “damages” in Section 284 is intimately intertwined with the Federal Circuit’s decision below concerning the meaning of the term “damages” in Section 287. Indeed, the Federal Circuit specifically acknowledged the Aro decision, but came to a conclusion at odds with the plurality Opinion, causing what it characterized as “the anomaly we today observe” — “a rare example wherein a term has a different scope in different provisions of a now-consolidated statute.” App. 17-18. This case presents an opportunity for this Court to speak as a majority and remove any ambiguity resulting from the plurality opinion in Aro. An opinion from this Court giving clear guidance on the meaning of “damages” is warranted not only by the commentary cited above — a definitive statement from this Court will also likely prevent such “anomalies” as the Federal Circuit decision below from recurring in the future. Ill. The Federal Circuit’s Ruling Will Have A Significant Adverse Impact On Industries That Rely on Protection of Their Designs From “Knock-Offs.” Intellectual property piracy is not a new problem. Over ten years ago, in 1987, the International Trade Commission estimated that U.S. business lost between $8 billion and $20 billion a year to look- alikes. Todd J. Gilman, Attorney Puts Foot Down About Sneaker Patents; Avia Takes Shoe Pirates to Court to Protect Design, Wash. Post, July 20, 1987, at F03. More recently, during its passage of the Daniel C. Munson, The Equitable Profits and Reasonable Royalty Remedies--an Economic Connection, 76 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 887, 888 (1994) (“An award based on profits made by the defendant seems precluded by the statutory language. The statutory language speaks only of damages.”’) 24 Anticountefieting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Congress elaborated on the impact of product piracy on society: Today, counterfeit products cost American businesses an estimated $200 billion each year. Counterfeiting is a drain on the American economy, on the Federal treasury, and costs American jobs. S. Rep. No. 104-177, at 1 (1995). Injunctions, often granted or even voluntarily agreed to by putative defendants, do little to prevent future infringement of other products because the profits obtained remain in the hands of the infringer. Often the only effective deterrent to the companies responsible for the piracy is to disgorge the ill-gotten profits made from the infringing sales. In fact, because the infringing products are often identical copies of the patented design, infringement is often uncontested, leaving only the remedy to be determined. By requiring patent owners to mark their products with a patent number as a condition precedent to disgorging an infringer’s profit, the desired deterrent effect on “knock-offs” will be lost. The reality of many consumer product markets, such as footwear, fashion, and electronics,’ is that by the time a design patent finally issues, most of the patentee’s products have already been shipped (without patent numbers). As observed by Michael W. Blommer, the former Executive Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association: - According to the Commerce Department, since 1977, Nike has obtained the fourth most design patents (666) of any company. The other top ten companies are Sharp (927), Canon (843), Motorola (737), Matsushita Electric (Panasonic) (646), IBM (628), Sony (628), Dart Industries (578), Goodyear (557) and Toshiba (557). U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Design Patents, January 1977 -- December 1997: A Technology Assessment and Forecast Report, at B-1, April 1998 [hereinafter Design Patent Report}. 25 In footwear and fashion, items go out of style faster than patents get granted . . . In the area of designs, sometimes the market’s passed you by by the time the patent issues. Manufacturers like Reebok [and Nike], they’re constantly changing the styles of their shoes. They’re going to start selling their shoes while the patent is pending. The knock-off artists are in and out of the market in a year or two. Gilman, supra, at FO3. The data sustain Mr. Blommer’s statements even today. According to the Commerce Department, the average time between filing and issuance of a design patent is about 20 months. Design Patent Report, supra, at 1. In an effort to enhance the protection of its shoe designs, Nike has instituted procedures geared to obtain expedited design patents from the Patent Office. As the Federal Circuit noted in the opinion below, Nike was successful with the design patent at issue — securing its issuance from the Patent Office in slightly over nine months. App. 2. The prompt receipt and enforcement of Nike’s design patent led to the initial record judgment below of $6 million against Respondents. Nike also marked a significant number of its patented shoes with its patent number after issuance of the patent.'* Nike reached “full marking” of its shoes by December 1994 (App. 40), and the infringers’ first sales were not until several months later in April 1995. App. 3. From Nike’s perspective, this case likely exemplifies the highest percentage of marking that Nike could reasonably accomplish. Yet, on remand from the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Marking is not possible until the patent issues — when the patentee learns its patent number from the Patent Office. Indeed, “false marking” is punishable by fine under the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 292. 26 district court below concluded that Nike had not satisfactorily marked its shoes. In accordance with the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the court reduced Nike’s judgment to approximately $1.4 million. If allowed to stand, the decision below limiting a design patent owner to a recovery measured by the infringer’s profit only after the patent owner fully complies with the marking statute will seriously limit the value of design patents, and effectively eliminate the deterrent effect that enforcement actions have on copyists. Because of the adverse impact the Federal Circuit’s decision will have on American industries attempting to ebb the flow of “knock-offs” into the stream of commerce, this Court should grant certiorari. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted to review the decision of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. Respectfully submitted, Mark T. Banner Counsel of Record Christopher J. Renk Marc S. Cooperman Robert S. Katz Joseph P. Krause BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD. 10 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 3000 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 715-1000 Counsel for Petitioner --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386005_0923%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.