# Opposition Brief — City of Portland v. Northwest Environmental Advocates

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1996
- **Citation:** 518 U.S. 1018

## Text

No. 95-1732

I a -

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Hnited States
October Term, 1995

CITY OF PORTLAND
Petitioner,

v.

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,
a non-profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION

Craig N. Johnston

Associate Professor of Law
Lewis & Clark Law School
10015 S.W. Terwilliger Blvd.
Portland, OR 97219
Counsel of Record for
Respondents

David A. Bledsoe

Perkins Coie

1211 SW Fifth Avenue
Portland, OR 97204-1002
(503) 727-2000

Co-Counsel for Respondents

May 23, 1996

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Clean Water Act ((CWA” or “Act’) authorize
citizens to enforce narrative (non-quantified) permit
conditions?

ll
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES
The parties are correctly identified in the caption. Craig

N. Johnston is counsel of record for both respondents. David
A. Bledsoe of Perkins Coie is also counsel for respondents.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED 0.0.0. ooooocccccssssseeee Poe. ra
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES ................... eee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES |... | iV
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

L THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IS
FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CLEAN
WATER ACT AND THE DECISIONS OF
PRUE RIED csseccxncssoviesedcosaseovscesesns. 3

A. The Clean Water Act Authorizes
Both Numeric and Narrative

Effluent Limitations . 5
B. Congress Has Granted the
Federal Courts Jurisdiction to
Enforce Narrative, Water Quality-
Based Permit Conditions ........ g
te The Permit Shield Doctrine
Supports the Enforceability of All
Permit Conditions ............... , 14
I. JEFFERSON COUNTY SUPPORTS THE
NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION ................ 15
Iu CONCLUSION ...... 19

APPENDICES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Paper Institute, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 996 F.2d 346 (CADC
| SEVER eM oy A Rectan AMDOE BN Eke meno ok Me AE 6, 10-11

Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 105-107

Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (CA2 1993) ...00000..000000.... 9

Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984). .........0.000.00... 7, 10

Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) 00.0... 4

District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854,
Bae) eR Sa RR go ue

E.]. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
US. 112, UBB QE CISTI co ooccsssscceecsvsencecescnessnsese: ll

Municipal Authority of the Borough of St.
Mary’s v. U.S.E.P.A., 945 F.2d 67, 71 (CA3

Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of
Portland, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals No.

Vv

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United
States Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842 (CA9

a. aaa 24 4 ,,

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 78
(CA3 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018
(1991)... -

PUD No. | of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology, US. __,114§
Ct. 1900 (1994)........

Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (CA9 1978)

Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Administrator
of the U.S.E.P.A., 836 F.2d 1482, 1484-85
(CAS 1988) ...

United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F 2d 822,
839-40 (CA7 1977)

United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (CA2 1984)

United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., slip

opinion, Civ. Act. No. C 78-0567 (N.D. Cal
1990) .....

Statutes

33 U.S.C. § 1311

my

4, 15-18

vi

MUSE SION. cc 7
ATER CTI og ee 13
RT SA ec 15
WES 6 ee ee ee 3
MUA thee... ee 14
Bee A ao ee 3
Re 8 oe ee ea 10
33 U.S.C. § 1365) ..nccccccccccsseccesseescsscessssesessssessssseseessessesseeee 10
ORS 183.484(2). ..ccccccccccccsccosssesessveceseeeee irintannaam en

Regulations and Rules

54 Fed. Reg, 23868, 2387] ...cc..cccccscccscssssesseesssevesesseevvveeveveee V1

40 CER. § 122.4) ooccccccccccssssssssecssessssssseeseeseee Soadinnstuel 8
4O CER. § 122.44(d).oo0-o-ococcccccccccsssssssessesssssssssseeveeeseee oe
4O CER. § 131.11(0)(2) coccccccccccccccsececccsssecessee “nese 1
Other Authorities

Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, S.Rep. No. 414, 92nd
Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1972
CFM PRG, Dy SIP waciide cickiserbccccsdetinessinnans seagstons ae

No. 95-1732

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

CITY OF PORTLAND
Petitioner,

v.

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,
a non-profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION

Respondents Northwest Environmental Advocates and
Nina Bell (collectively “NWEA”) respectfully urge this Court
to deny the petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in the case of Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of
Portland, No. 92-35044. The Court of Appeals’ opinion is
reported at 56 F.3d 979 (1995) (“NWEA IT” ) and is reproduced
in the Appendix to the petition at App-34. For the convenience
of the Court, all citations to the opinion will be to the opinion
attached to the petition.

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner City of Portland (‘Portland’) annually
discharges hundreds of millions of gallons of diluted raw
sewage from its combined sewage and stormwater collection
system into the Willamette River and the Columbia Slough;
these ‘combined sewer overflow” (“CSO”) discharges cause
severe violations of water quality standards.

The relevant permits in this case have at all times
prohibited discharges that violate water quality standards.
Specifically, Portland’s 1984 National Pollutant Discharge
Elirnination System (“NPDES”) Permit provided as follows:

Notwithstanding the effluent limitations
established by this permit, no wastes
shall be discharged and no activities
shall be conducted which will violate
water quality standards as adopted in
OAR 340-41-455 except in the
following defined mixing zone: The
mixing zone shall consist of a 100 foot
radius from the point of discharge.

Portland’s 1991 Permit contains two separate provisions
(one for each basin) regarding water quality standard
compliance for the CSO discharges. Both provisions provide
that:

No wastes shall be discharged and no
activities shall be conducted which
violate Water Quality Standards as
adopted in OAR 340-41-445.

ac aaa acai

3

The issue in this case involves the enforceability of these
permit conditions. Most NPDES permits, like Portland’s,
contain no other mechanism for ensuring compliance with
water quality standards. !

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

L THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IS FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT
AND THE DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS

This is a plain meaning case. As the Ninth Circuit noted,
‘{t]he plain language of [the Clean Water Act] CWA § 505
[33 U.S.C. § 1365] authorizes citizens to enforce all permit
conditions.” NWEA II, Petition at App-49. Section 505 does
this by authorizing citizens to bring suit against persons
alleged to be in violation of any ‘effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter.” The term “effluent standard or
limitation” is used as a term of art in § 505. The term is
defined in § 505(f), and includes “a permit or condition
thereof issued under section 1342 of this title...” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(f(6).2 Because § 402 cf the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342,

' The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
has indicated its belief that all permits issued in Oregon, Arizona and
California contain identical or similar prohibitions. Brief of the
Environmental Protection Agency Supporting [Respondents’] Petition
for Rehearing (“EPA Brief’), App-26. While EPA does not indicate
how many of these permits also contain numeric, water quality-based
permit conditions, most do not.

2 This definition distinguishes the term “effluent standard or
limitation” from the more limited term “effluent limitation,” which is
defined separately at 33 USC § 1362(11). See, infra, pp. 7-8

4

establishes the NPDES permit program, the clear language of
§ 505(£(6) provides that citizens may enforce NPDES permit
conditions in citizen suits under § 505.3

This plain meaning must control absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary. Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980). In this case, the legislative history
underscores the plain meaning of § 50S(f)(6). Most
significantly, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, the Senate Report
accompanying the passage of the CWA in 1972 explained in
unmistakable terms that “in addition to violations of section
301 (a) [33 U.S.C. § 1311, Effluent Limitations], ciuzens are
granted authority to bring enforcement actions for violation of
...@ny condition of any permit issued under section 402.”
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
S.Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747 (emphasis added); see also NWEA
IT, Petition at App-51.

Moreover, as also noted by the Ninth Circuit, the case law
provides ample support for the court’s interpretation of the
effect of § 505(f)(6). NWEA II, Petition at App-52. We will
address PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology, _US.__, 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994)
(Jefferson County) below. At this point we note only that
numerous courts have held that § 505(f)(6) grants citizens an
unqualified power to enforce any and all NPDES permit
conditions. See NWEA II, Petition at App-52-56 (and cases

3 The Environmental Protection Agency agrees with the Ninth
Circutt’s view of the plain meaning of § 505(f)(6). EPA Brief, App-23.

Pe a i ade

5

cited therein); see also United States v. Louisiana-Pacific
Corp., slip opinion, Civ. Act. No. C 78-0567 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(reproduced in the Appendix at App-28-34) (granting the
Environmental Protection Agency (‘EPA’) the right to
enforce the same type of permit condition at issue in this case).

Notwithstanding the clear statutory language, legislative
history and case law, Portland argues that the CWA excepts
from the realm of enforceable permit conditions narrative
conditions that require compliance with water quality
standards. Portland does not identify any textual basis for this
exception. Instead, it raises three arguments in urging the
Court to grant its petition in this case. First, Portland argues
that allowing for the enforcement of these narrative conditions
would be inconsistent with the Act’s differentiation between
effluent limitations and water quality standards. Petition at 9-
10. Second, Portland maintains that allowing for the
enforcement of these conditions would constitute an
unwarranted extension of federal jurisdiction. Petition at 11-
17. Finally, Portland contends that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
abrogates the permit shield doctrine. Petition at 17-20.

NWEA will address each of these arguments in tum. We
will then address the effect of Jefferson County.

A. The Clean Water Act Authorizes Both
Numeric and Narrative Effluent Limitations

Portland argues that the permit conditions at issue in this
case are not true “effluent limitations,” and that therefore they
should not be enforceable. This argument fails to consider two
threshold issues. First, as noted above, § 505(f)(6) specifically
defines enforceable effluent standards and limitations in
citizen suits to include all permit conditions. As noted by the

6

Ninth Circuit, in applying this language ‘Several courts have
held that citizens groups may seek to enforce many kinds of
permit conditions besides effluent limitations.” NWEA II,
Petition at App-56 and cases cited therein.

Second, citizen suits are not the proper forum for
determining the validity or appropriateness of permit
conditions. It is well established that only state courts may
review the validity of state-issued NPDES permits. See Shell
Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (CA9 1978); District of
Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 863 (CADC 1980);
American Paper Institute, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 890 F.2d 869,
875 (CA7 1989); and Municipal Authority of the Borough of
St. Mary’s v. U.S.E.PA., 945 F.2d 67, 71 (CA3 1991).
Moreover, the time for such challenges is at the point of
permit issuance. Under Oregon law, permits must be
challenged, if at all, within 60 days of issuance. ORS
183.484(2).4 By failing to challenge the permit at the point of
issuance, Portland lost “forever the nght to do so.” Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn
Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 78 (CA3 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1018 (1991) (involving a state-issued permit); see also
Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Administrator of the
U.S.E.P.A., 836 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (CAS 1988) (EPA-issued

permit).

4 See also 33 USC § 1369(b)(1) and (2) (limiting challenges to
EPA-issued NPDES permits to those filed in the appropriate Federal
judicial district within 120 days of permit issuance, and specifically
precluding the review of such conditions in enforcement actions).

7

Even if one were to assume the appropriateness of this
inquiry, however, Portland misapprehends the concept of
“effluent limitations.” Section 502(11) of the CWA defines
the phrase ‘effluent limitation” to mean “ any restriction
established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates,
and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other
constituents ... including schedules of compliance.” 33
U'S.C. § 1362(11) (emphasis added). This definition is broad
enough to include narrative limitations. EPA has long
construed it so, both in its permitting regulations and in the
issuance of permits containing conditions just like those at
issue in this case.’ EPA’s long-standing view is entitled to
deference from this Court. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984).

The CWA contemplates two types of effluent limitations.
First, § 301 requires the establishment of effluent limitations
requiring compliance with specified technology-based
requirements. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) and (2)(A).
Second, § 301(b)(1)(C) requires that all discharges meet more
stringent limitations where necessary to comply with water
quality standards.” It is the latter requirement that is at issue in
this case. EPA’s regulations confirm that limitations to assure
compliance with water quality standards are proper by

> See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(2) (1994): and United States Steel
Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 839-40 (CA7 1977) (upholding a similar
condition).

6 See also EPA Brief, App-23-24.

7 See also Section 402(b), 33 USC § 1342(b), which requires
the issuance of permits that ensure compliance with § 301.

8

precluding the issuance of any permit where its conditions
cannot ensure compliance with water quality standards. 40
C.F.R. § 122.4(d). Further, 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) expands on
this requirement by mandating that each permit control the
discharge of pollutants that would cause, have the reasonable
potential to cause, or contribute to the violation of any water
quality standard. Thus, both the CWA and EPA’s regulations
mandate that NPDES permits compel compliance with water
quality standards. See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S.
91, 105-107 (1992) (upholding EPA’s interpretation that
NPDES permits must ensure compliance with the water
quality standards of downstream states).

The permit conditions at issue in this case serve precisely
the purpose of assuring compliance with water quality
standards. The fact that they do so through a narrative
prohibition does not render them illegal or unenforceable. As
noted by EPA, ‘{nJothing in section 301 or elsewhere in the
Act requires that such effluent limitations or permit conditions
be expressed solely as end-of-pipe limitations.” Bnef of the
Environmental Protection Agency Supporting [NWEA’s]
Petition for Rehearing (EPA Bnef), pp. 10-11. To the
contrary, “any restriction” is permissible. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(11) (emphasis added).

In United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 839-
40 (CA7 1977) (U.S. Steel’), the Seventh Circuit addressed a
timely-filed challenge to a permit condition just like those at
issue in this case. In U.S. Steel, the relevant condition
precluded the discharger from causing the affected waters to
violate Indiana’s water quality standards for temperature.
Noting that it knew of no other way to implement
temperature-based standards, the Court of Appeals concluded

OS POM ALR RACES A te IIE a 2 Salt SAI BN AE sain

9

that “[b]ecause of the convenience of temperature limits,
thermal water quality standards do not need to be ‘translated’
in order to become applicable to an individual discharger as
effluent limitations.” Jd. at 840 fn. 27.

B. Congress Has Granted the Federal Courts
Jurisdiction to Enforce Narrative, Water
Quality-Based Permit Conditions

The CWA, its legislative history, and the relevant case
law all indicate that § 505 grants citizens the authority to
enforce any and all NPDES permit conditions, as noted above.
Portland would have the Court create an unexpressed
exception to § 505(f(6) precluding the enforcement of
narrative permit conditions. Portland relies chiefly on four
cases, all of which are inapposite.

First, Portland asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
conflicts with Aflantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (CA2 1993), which held
that § 505 does not authorize citizens to enforce state-:mposed
permit conditions that are beyond the scope of the CWA.
Kodak is in no way inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion. There is no credible argument to be made that
conditions requiring compliance with water quality standards
are beyond the scope of the CWA. The CWA and EPA’s
regulations expressly require such conditions. See, supra at pp.
5-8. Indeed, EPA utilizes permit conditions just like those at
issue here. See U.S. Steel, 556 F.2d at 839-40. Further, EPA
filed an amicus brief before the Ninth Circuit in this case
supporting the establishment and enforceability of narrative,
water quality-based permit conditions. EPA Brief, App-18-19,
22-27.

10

Portland next argues that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion ;
conflicts with United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (CA2 1984). Hooker involved the |
question whether citizens may intervene in actions brought by
EPA, pursuant to § 504(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a),
to abate ‘imminent and substantial endangerment{s].” The
Court of Appeals began with the correct assumption that the
citizens could intervene only if they could have initiated the
action themselves under § 505. Hooker, 749 F.2d at 978; see
also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). In finding that the citizens could not
have initiated the action themselves, however, the Second
Circuit expressly relied on the fact that § 505(f) does not
mecorporate the “imminent and substantial endangerment”
authority within the definition of enforceable ‘effluent
standard[s] and limitation[s].” Hooker, 749 F.2d at 979.
Hooker is clearly distinguishable from this case; here NWEA
seeks to enforce permit conditions, which are expressly listed
in § 505(f)(6) as being enforceable through citizen suits.

pane Nee anh i Pa a te toes

Third, Portland cites American Paper Institute, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 996 F.2d 346 (CADC
1993) (“API’’), as allegedly indicating “that the intent of the
Clean Water Act is to enforce water quality standards in
citizen suits only through the effluent limitations established in
each permit - not the wholesale incorporation of ‘generic
standards’ relating to water quality.” Petition at 15-16. This
characterization is inaccurate. APJ involved a challenge to an
EPA regulation requiring that NPDES permit writers translate
narrative criteria addressing chemical pollutants (e.g., “ho
toxics in toxic amounts’) into chemical-specific effluent
limits. 996 F.2d at 350. Applying Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Court of Appeals upheld the rule as a reasonable

|
ee

1]

means of assuring that NPDES permits ensure compliance
with water quality standards. AP/, 996 F.2d at 351.

API at most stands for the proposition that EPA, as a
matter of regulatory discretion, may require that permit-issuers
translate certain narrative water quality criteria into chemical-
specific limits in the permit issuance process. To date, EPA
has chosen to assert this authority only with respect to
chemical pollutants to implement the national water quality-
based toxics control program. 54 Fed. Reg. 23868, 23871
(June 2, 1989). While both EPA and the Court of Appeals
may view chemical-specific limits, where feasible, as the best
means of implementing narrative criteria (and NWEA agrees),
neither EPA nor the Court of Appeals suggests that this is the
only lawful way through which water quality standards may be
implemented. EPA’s amicus curiae brief in this case
specifically supports the enforceability of narrative, water
quality-based permit conditions. EPA Brief, App-22-27

There is good reason why EPA has not established an
across-the-board requirement mandating numeric, end-of-pipe
limits in all cases. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, “certain
water quality standards cannot be expressed quantitatively,
such as those that apply in this case to bacterial pollution,
aesthetic conditions, and objectionable matter (scum, oily
sleek, foul odors, and floating solids)” NWEA II, Petition at
App-57 (citations omitted). EPA’s regulations explicitly
contemplate the establishment of narrative criteria. 40 C.F.R.
§ 131.11(6)(2). If narrative permit conditions were
unenforceable, many of these standards would be rendered
meaningless. There is simply no indication that Congress
intended such a result.

12

The need for narrative effluent limitations is particularly
strong in the CSO context, where the inability to control the
amount of flow that is discharged during storm events makes
it infeasible to establish numeric, end-of-pipe limitations to
implement even numeric water quality criteria. The Ninth
Circuit explained this dynamic in the following terms:

... Because the number and volume of
overflow events from CSO systems are
caused primarily by uncontrollable
events--i.e., the amount of stormwater
entering the system--regulators have no
ready way of determining what portion
of the flow in a given discharge event is
sewage and what portion is rainwater.
Without this information, it is
impossible to determine the level at
which to set a numeric concentration-
based permit limit in order to ensure
that the gross amount of pollution
discharged will not violate water
quality standards.

NWEA IL, Petition at App-59. As evidenced by the permit
conditions in this case, in these circumstances permit-issuers
rely on narrative permit conditions to ensure that the water
quality-based requirements of the statute are met.* These
conditions must be given meaning in the enforcement process.

8 See also US Steel, 556 F.2d at 839-40 (CA7 1977)
(recognizing that permit issuers may simply incorporate water quality

13

Finally, Portland cites Oregon Natural Resources Council
v. United States Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842 (CA9 1987), for
the proposition that it is not the water quality standards
themselves that are enforceable under § 301(b)(1)C) [33
U.S.C. § 1311(6(1(C)], but the permit conditions necessary
to meet those standards. Petition at 16. NWEA agrees. See
also NWEA II, Petition at App-56-57, n.11. However, in this
case, unlike Oregon, NWEA is seeking to enforce permit
conditions. As EPA has noted:

EPA concurs with the premise that the
Statute does not require permittees to
comply with water quality standards
“directly,” or in the absence of a permit
condition imposing such a requirement
However, the permit at issue here
contains such a condition. Thus, the
principle set forth in the Oregon case is
inapposite to the question of whether a
permit expressly prohibiting discharges
that violate state standards is valid and
enforceable by citizens

EPA Brief, App-24.

Thus, all four of the cases cited by Portland are simply red
herrings. There is no conflict among the circuits, or within the
Ninth Circuit, that pertains to this action

standards into permit conditions where end-of-pipe limits are
infeasible)

vo

a4

C. The Permit Shield Doctrine Supports the
Enforceability of All Permit Conditions

Section 402(k) of the CWA establishes the bedrock
principle that, with minor exceptions, permittees are to be
judged by the standards of the permits under which their
discharges are authorized. Specifically,

Compliance with a permit issued
pursuant to this section shall be deemed
compliance, for purposes of sections
1319 and 1365 of this title, with
sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and
1343 of this title, except any standard
imposed under section 1317 of this title
for a toxic pollutant injurious to human
health...

33 U.S.C. § 1342(k). The effect of this provision is simple:
the permit is the measuring stick against which a permittee’s
compliance status is to be determined. By contrast, permittees
are not to be judged according to requirements that were
omitted from their permits or were promulgated after their
permits were issued. E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977). In short, compliance with the
permit is what matters.

NWEA seeks only to have Portland judged by the
standards of its permits--nothing more and nothing less. This
notion is fully consistent with § 402(k). In this case, each of
the relevant permits contains a clear provision requiring that
all discharges conform with water quality standards. The 1991
permit contains two separate water quality-based conditions
(one for each basin) specifically relating to the CSO

15

discharges. Portland seeks to turn § 402(k) on its head,
however, by arguing that it somehow shields Portland from
complying with these conditions. Portland wants the permit
shield doctrine to make the permit mean less than what it says.
The Court should not condone this blatant rewriting of
§ 402(k) and the relevant permits.

Portland’s reliance on EPA’s “permit as a shield” policy
is misplaced. The provisions that Portland quotes state a
principle not applicable to this case: that the permit shield
applies where a permittee has identified pollutants present in
its discharge stream for which the permit-issuer ultimately
declines to establish limitations. Petition at 18-19. That
principle simply has no bearing where, as here, the
authorization of relevant discharges is expressly conditioned
on the requirement that they not cause water quality standard
violations.

IL JEFFERSON COUNTY SUPPORTS THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S DECISION

The Ninth Circuit characterized PUD No. | of Jefferson
County v. Washington Department of Ecology, _— US.
, 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994), as holding that the CWA
“allows States to enforce the broad narrative criteria contained
in water quality standards.” NWEA II, Petition at App-52.
Portland objects to the Ninth Circuit’s characterization,
arguing that Jefferson County stands only for the proposition
that States may condition water quality certifications under
§ 401 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, on requirements relating
to the maintenance of stream flow where necessary to protect
“designated uses.” Petition at 20-21. Portland also stresses
Judge Kleinfeld’s language from his dissenting opinion in
NWEA II to the effect that Jefferson County “does not involve

a

16

a citizens’ suit, says nothing about citizens’ suits, and implied
nothing about citizens’ suits.” Jd at 20 (quoting from NWEA
II, Petition at App-62 (Kleinfeld dissenting)). NWEA agrees
that Jefferson County involved a state’s enforcement of
designated uses under § 401, and also that it did not directly
speak to citizen enforcement under § 505. Nonetheless, the
decision is relevant to the case at bar.

In Jefferson County, the petitioners argued that designated
uses are too vague to be enforceable under § 401 of the Act.
After first noting that “EPA has not interpreted § 303 to
require the States to protect designated uses exclusively
through enforcement of numerical criteria[],” this Court
addressed the vagueness argument in the following terms:

Petitioners also appear to argue that use
requirements are too open-ended, and
that the Act only contemplates
enforcement of the more specific and
objective “criteria” But this argument
is belied by the open-ended nature of
the criteria themselves. . . .

.. . We think petitioners’ attempt to
distinguish between uses and criteria
loses much of its force in light of the
fact that the Act permits enforcement of
broad, narrative criteria based on, for
example, “aesthetics.”

Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1911 (emphasis added). This
Court further noted the impact that the petitioners’
interpretation would have on the implementation of the Act:

17

Requiring the States to enforce only the
criteria component of their water
quality standards would in essence
require the States to study to a level of
great specificity each individual surface
water to ensure that the cmritena
applicable to that water are sufficiently
detailed and individualized to fully
protect the water’s designated uses.
Given that there is no textual support
for imposing this requirement, we are
loath to attribute to Congress an intent
to impose this heavy regulatory burden
on the States.

Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1912

The thrust of Portland’s argument in this case is very
similar to that advanced by the petitioners in Jefferson County
— i.e., that narrative permit conditions requiring compliance
with water quality standards are too vague to be enforceable
As the Ninth Circuit noted, however, “interpreting § 505 to
exclude citizen suit enforcement of water quality standards
that are not translated into quantitative limitations” would
“immunize the entire body of qualitative regulations from an
important enforcement tool.” NWEA ILI, Petition at App-58

Jn Jefferson County, this Court indicated its reluctance to
interpret the CWA in a manner that would frustrate the
achievement of its water quality-based requirements. 114 S
Ct. at 1912. The Ninth Circuit did not view itself as bound by
the Jefferson County decision; it expressly recognized that the
two cases involved different statutory dynamics. NWEA II,
Petition at App-55. Instead, the Ninth Circuit simply applied

18

the reasoning of Jefferson County to the similar issues
presented in this case. After noting the difficulties both of
establishing numeric, end-of-pipe limits to ensure compliance
with narrative criteria and even of implementing numeric
criteria where it is infeasible to control the amount of flow, the
Ninth Circuit properly concluded that the teaching of Jefferson
County counseled a similar result in the case before it. This
Court should support that decision.?

° To the extent that Portland seeks to distinguish Jefferson
County because it involved State and not citizen enforcement, it is
enough to point out that nothing in either the CWA or its legislative
history suggests that citizens are to be more limited than EPA or the
states with respect to the types of permit conditions they are entitled to
enforce. Compare § 309(d} (allowing EPA to seek civil penalties for
violation of permit conditions) and § 505(f)(6) (authorizing citizens to
enforce permit conditions); see also NWEA II, Petition at 55 (noting
that citizens may enforce the same permit conditions that States may
enforce).

19
Ii CONCLUSION

For these reasons, NWEA respectfully requests that the
Court deny Portland’s wnt of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of May, 1996.
Respectfully submitted,

Craig N. Johnston

Associate Professor of Law
Lewis & Clark Law School
10015 S.W. Terwilliger Blvd.
Portland, OR 97219
Counsel of Record for NWEA

David A. Bledsoe

Perkins Coie

Suite 1500, Pacwest Center
1211 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Portland, OR 97204-1002
Counsel for NWEA

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS

So SF ec asia steal cidonece Petitioner’s Appendix 93
So ries RU Se ela a aiistircnsseresacseesse Appendix 1
Sa Tia, Oe Rec scecncesaticesGeciiees Petitioner’s Appendix 151
Ft WF Ries AE ie cianessereessecoserseesse Appendix 6
Bd Reo Beate pisanee rs cctisccrsennssese esses Appendix 7
SF LS. Bks SB pease cssahckseoles lniniens Petitioner’s Appendix 170
SCPE, BS Ti Mass ats esarinscscsesees. Appendix 8
BO CER. © Er sl reerstespievicserness....... Appendix 9
gee AO Bo go Bae Appendix !0
CORE i er sessicesscncss.......... Appendix 11
Brief of the Environmental Protection Agency

Supporting the Petition for

Rehearing/Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc...... Appendix 12

United States of America v. Louisiana Pacific,
slip opinion, Civ. Act. No. C78-0567 (N.D.

APP-]

§ 1341. Certification

(a) | Compliance with applicable requirements;
application; procedures; license suspension

(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to
conduct any activity including, but not limited to, the
construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing
or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the
discharge originates or will originate, or, if appropriate, from
the interstate water pollution control agency having
jurisdiction over the navigable waters at the point where the
discharge originates or will onginate, that any such discharge
will comply with the applicable provisions of sections 1311,
1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title. In the case of any
such activity for which there is not an applicable effluent
limitation or other limitation under sections 1311(b) and 1312
of this title, and there is not an applicable standard under
sections 1316 and 1317 of this title, the State shall so certify,
except that any such certification shall not be deemed to satisfy
section 1371(c) of this title. Such State or interstate agency
shall establish procedures for public notice in the case of all
applications for certification by it and, to the extent it deems
appropniate, procedures for public hearings in connection with
specific applications. In any case where a State or interstate
agency has no authority to give such a certification, such
certification shall be from the Administrator. If the State,
interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case may be, fails or
refuses to act on a request for certification, within a reasonable.
period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after receipt
of such request, the certification requirements of this
subsection shall be waived with respect to such Federal
application. No license or permit shall be granted until the
certification required by this section has been obtained or has
been waived as provided in the preceding sentence. No

APP-2

license or permit shall be granted if certification has been
denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Administrator, as
the case may be.

(2) Upon receipt of such application and certification the
licensing or permitting agency shall immediately notify the
Administrator of such application and certification. Whenever
such a discharge may affect, as determined by the
Administrator, the quality of the waters of any other State, the
Administrator within thirty days of the date of notice of
application for such Federal license or permit shall so notify
such other State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the
applicant. If, within sixty days after receipt of such
notification, such other State determines that such discharge
will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate any water
quality requirement in such State, and within such sixty-day
period notifies the Administrator and the licensing or
permitting agency in writing of its objection to the issuance of
such license or permit and requests a public hearing on such
objection, the licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a
hearing. The Administrator shall at such hearing submit his
evaluation and recommendations with respect to any such
objection to the licensing or permitting agency. Such agency,
based upon the recommendations of such State, the
Administrator, and upon any additional evidence, if any,
presented to the agency at the hearing, shall condition such
license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to insure
compliance with applicable water quality requirements. If the
imposition of conditions cannot insure such compliance such
agency shall not issue such license or permit.

(3) The certification obtained pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this subsection with respect to the construction of any facility
shall fulfill the requirements of this subsection with respect to
certification in connection with any other Federal license or
permit required for the operation of such facility unless, after
notice to the certifying State, agency, or Administrator, as the

APP-3

case may be, which shall be given by the Federal agency to
whom application is made for such operating license or
permit, the State, or if appropriate, the interstate agency or the
Administrator, notifies such agency within sixty days after
receipt of such notice that there is no longer reasonable
assurance that there will be compliance with the applicable
provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of
this title because of changes since the construction license or
permit certification was issued in (A) the construction or
operation of the facility, (B) the characteristics of the waters
into which such discharge is made, (C) the water quality
criteria applicable to such waters or (D) applicable effluent
limitations or other requirements. This paragraph shall be
inapplicable in any case where the applicant for such operating
license or permit has failed to provide the certifying State, or,
if appropnate, the interstate agency or the Administrator, with
notice of any proposed changes in the construction or
operation of the facility with respect to which a construction
license or permit has been granted, which changes may result
in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or 1317 of this
title.

(4) Prior to the initial operation of any federally licensed
or permitted facility or activity which may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters and with respect to which
a certification has been obtained pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this subsection, which facility or activity is not subject to a
Federal operating license or permit, the licensee or permittee
shall provide an opportunity for such certifying State, or, if
appropnate, the interstate agency or the Administrator to
review the manner in which the facility or activity shall be
operated or conducted for the purposes of assuring that
applicable effluent limitations or other limitations or other
applicable water quality requirements will not be violated.
Upon notification by the certifying State, or if appropriate, the
interstate agency or the Administrator that the operation of any
such federally licensed or permitted facility or activity will

APP-4

violate applicable effluent limitations or other limitations or
other water quality requirements such Federal agency may,
after public hearing, suspend such license or permit. If such
license or permit is suspended, it shall remain suspended until
notification is received from the certifying State, agency, or
Administrator, as the case may be, that there is reasonable
assurance that such facility or activity will not violate the
applicable provisions of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or
1317 of this title.

(5) Any Federal license or permit with respect to which a
certification has been obtained under paragraph (1) of this
subsection may be suspended or revoked by the Federal
agency issuing such license or permit upon the entering of a
judgment under this chapter that such facility or activity has
been operated in violation of the applicable provisions of
section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or 1317 of this title.

(6) Except with respect to a permit issued under section
1342 of this title, in any case where actual construction of a
facility has been lawfully commenced prior to April 3, 1970,
no certification shall be required under this subsection for a
license or permit issued after April 3, 1970, to operate such
facility, except that any such license or permit issued without
certification shall terminate April 3, 1973, unless prior to such
termination date the person having such license or permit
submits to the Federal agency which issued such license or
permit a certification and otherwise meets the requirements of
this section.

(b) Compliance with other provisions of law
setting applicable water quality requirements

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
authority of any department or agency pursuant to any other
provision of law to require compliance with any applicable
water quality requirements. The Administrator shall, upon the

APP-5

request of any Federal department or agency, or State or
interstate agency, or applicant, provide, for the purpose of this
section, any relevant information on applicable effluent
limitations, or other limitations, standards, regulations, or
requirements, or water quality criteria, and shall, when
requested by any such department or agency or State or
interstate agency, or applicant, comment on any methods to
comply with such limitations, standards, regulations,
requirements, or criteria.

(c) Authority of Secretary of Army to permit use
of spoil disposal areas by Federal licensees or
permittees

In order to implement the provisions of this section, the
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers,
is authorized, if he deems it to be in the public interest, to
permit the use of spoil disposal areas under his jurisdiction by
Federal licensees or permittees, and to make an appropriate
charge for such use. Moneys received from such licensees or
permittees shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous
receipts.

(d) Limitations and monitoring requirements of
certification

Any certification provided under this section shall set
forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and
monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant
for a Federal license or permit will comply with any applicable
effluent limitations and other limitations, under section 1311
or 1312 of this title, standard of performance under section
1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent standard, or
pretreatment standard under section 1317 of this title, and with
any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in
such certification, and shall become a condition on any
Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this
section.

ee ee ae ee Pe eS oe

oe See ee eee ee

APP-6

UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 33
SECTION 1362

Section 1362. Definitions

** *

(11) The term ‘effluent limitation” means any restriction
established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates,
and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other
constituents which are discharged from point sources into
navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the
ocean, including schedules of compliance

APP-7

UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 33
SECTION 1364

Section 1364. Emergency powers
(a) Emergency powers

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the
Administrator upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source
or combination of sources is presenting an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the
welfare of persons where such endangerment is to the
livelihood of such persons, such as inability to market
shellfish, may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the
appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person
causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the
discharge of pollutants causing or contributing to such
pollution or to take such other action as may be necessary.

APP-8

40 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
SECTION 122.4(d)

Section 122.4. Prohibitions (applicable to State NPDES
programs, see § 123.25)

No permit may be issued

“* *

(d) When the imposition of conditions cannot ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of
all affected States;

APP-9

40 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
SECTION 122.44 (d)(1){i)

Section 122.44(d)(1)(i).

(d) Water quality standards and State requirements: any
requirements in addition to or more stringent than
promulgated effluent limitations guidelines or standards under
sections 301, 304, 306, 307, 318 and 405 of CWA necessary
to:

(1) Achieve water quality standards established under
section 303 of the CWA, including State narrative cnteria for
water quality.

(i) Limitations must control all pollutants or pollutant
parameters (either conventional, nonconventional, or toxic
pollutants) which the Director determines are or may be
discharged at a level which will cause, have the reasonable
potential to cause, or contribute to an excursion above any
State water quality standard, including State narrative criteria
for water quality.

APP-10

40 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
SECTION 131.11(b)(2)

Section 131.11(b)(2) Cntena

(b) Form of criteria) In establishing criteria, States
should:

** *

(2) Establish narrative criteria or criteria based upon
biomonitoring methods where numerical criterial cannot be
established or to supplement numerical criteria.

APP-11
OREGON REVISED STATUTES

Section 183.484(2)

***

(2) Petitions for review shall be filed within 60 days only
following the date the order is served, or if a petition for
reconsideration or rehearing has been filed, then within 60
days only following the date the order denying such petition is
served. If the agency does not otherwise act, a petition for
rehearing or reconsideration shall be deemed denied the 60th
day following the date the petition was filed, and in such case
petition for judicial review shall be filed within 60 days only
following such date. Date of service shall be the date on
which the agency delivered or mailed its order in accordance
with ORS 183.470.

Docket No. 92-35044
——ESESEEEaEaEEEEEEEEEESSE=ESESESSSSS

In the

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,
a Non-Profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,

Appellants,

v.
CITY OF PORTLAND,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY SUPPORTING THE PETITION FOR
REHEARING/ SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC

a LT — a an 2
-— —— — ———— —— —-

LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Acting Assistant Attorney
General

alll

APP-13

PETER R. STEENLAND,
JR.
CATHERINE M.
FLANAGAN

eee Attorneys, Department of
Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
(202) 514-1442

APP-14

Docket No. 92-35044
——$—$——— —

In the

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,
a Non-Profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,

Appellants,
Vv.
CITY OF PORTLAND,

Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY SUPPORTING THE PETITION FOR
REHEARING/ SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC

Pursuant to Rules 35 and 40 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Rule 35 of this Court, the United
States of America submits this memorandum in support of
appellant's Petition For Rehearing With Suggestion For
Rehearing En Banc of the decision (Addendum I hereto),
issued on December 10, 1993 by a panel consisting of Circuit
Judges Kleinfeld and Pregerson and District Judge Ingram.

APP-15

We express a belief that this appeal involves a question of
exceptional importance: may citizens enforce a condition in a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("the Act") that
requires the permittee to ensure that discharges do not cause
receiving waters to violate state water quality standards?

The United States has a direct interest in the development
of the law regarding citizen enforcement of the Act because
citizens play a crucial role in Clean Water Act enforcement.
The panel decision hinged upon the panel's conclusion that
permit conditions prohibiting discharges that violate water
quality standards can be enforced by citizens only if they are
expressed as end-of-the-pipe effluent limitations. EPA and
states commonly include permit conditions prohibiting
discharges that cause violations of state water quality
standards using language similar to that employed here,
particularly when regulating stormwater discharges or
combined sewer and stormwater overflows ("CSOs’).
Because citizen enforcement provides a crucial supplement to
state and federal enforcement, the panel decision threatens to
undermine severely an important source for enforcement of a
proper, commonly used permit condition.

STATUTORY SCHEME

The Clean Water Act, also known as the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 et seq., is a
comprehensive statute designed "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integnty of the Nation's
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

The Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from any
point source into the nation's waters unless the discharge
complies with the Act's requirements. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),
1362(12). For most dischargers, compliance is achieved by
obtaining and adhering to the terms of an NPDES permit

APP-16

pursuant to section 402 of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. See
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd,
426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).

Because Congress intended that "states should play the
leading role in implementing the NPDES [program],"
American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 873 (7th Cir.
1989) (footnote omitted), EPA has granted 40 states, including
Oregon, authority to issue NPDES permits. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b). In authorized states, NPDES permits are issued by
the appropriate state agency, subject to EPA review. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(d). A final state-issued permit is subject to
judicial review in state court, with the state, not EPA,
defending the permit decision and terms. See American Paper
Inst. v. EPA, 890 F.2d at 874-75. Under Oregon law, NPDES
permits must be challenged within 60 days of issuance. Or.
Rev. Stat. § 183.484(2) (1991).

NPDES permits must include conditions ensuring that the
discharge complies with the substantive provisions of the Act.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(aX(2). In particular, all NPDES permits
must contain the more stringent of: (1) technology-based
effluent limitations which reflect the pollution reduction
achievable based on several levels of pollution control or
process changes, without reference to the effect on the
receiving water, or (2) effluent limitations representing that
level of control necessary to ensure that the receiving waters
attain and maintain state water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(b), 1313(c).

Technology-based effluent limitations are usually based
upon guidelines promulgated by EPA, and are restrictions on
the quantities, rates, and concentrations of specified pollutants.
See 33 US.C. §1311, 1314. The guidelines, and the
corresponding effluent limitations, are based upon the leveis
of control that can be achieved by application of the best

a

APP-17

available technology economically achievabie, and define
permissible levels of discharges.!° 33 U.S.C. § 1311.

Water quality standards under the Act consist of two
principal elements: (1) a designated "use"! of waters
consistent with the goals of the Act as set forth in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(aX(2); see 40 CFR. § 130.3; and (2) "criteria"
specifying the amounts of various pollutants that may be
present in those waters without impairing the designated uses,
expressed in numerical concentration limits or in narrative
form. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). States are also required to
adopt an antidegradation policy which, among other things,
mandates that existing uses of waters be maintained, as well as
the level of water quality necessary to maintain those existing
uses. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6

States are required by section 303 to adopt water quality
standards, subject to EPA approval. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3).
If a state does not adopt a water quality standard, EPA is
required to adopt such standards for the state. Id. In
accordance with this provision, Oregon has adopted water
quality standards applicable to the waters and pollutants that
are the subject of the citizen suit.

Water quality-based permit effluent limitations are unlike
technology-based effluent limitations in that they are
formulated without regard to technological capacity to restrict
harmful discharges. Water quality-based effluent limitations

10 While effluent limitation guidelines and corresponding effluent
limitations generally are expressed as numeric concentrations of specific
pollutants, such guidelines may also include narrative restrictions. See,
e.g. 40 C.F.R. § 435.13 note 4; amendment to § 435.13, 58 Fed. Reg.
12506 (March 4, 1993).

1! Designated uses of the water may include, for example, public |
water supply, recreation, propagation of fish, and agriculture.

APP-18

are designed to ensure that the discharge will not cause or
contribute to violations of state standards. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(1(C). As with technology-based effluent
limitations, two types of water quality based limitations may
be written into permits. The first type contains numeric
limitations on the quantities, rates, and concentrations of
specified substances that are discharged, and is generally
expressed using end-of-the-pipe limitations.

The second type provides narrative limitations. One
common example of this type of limitation is a condition
prohibiting discharges that cause or contribute to violations of
state water quality standards.'2 The permit condition at issue
in this appeal falls within this latter category.

The Act authorizes citizen plaintiffs to enforce permit
conditions. The citizen suit provision, section 505, provides
that citizen plaintiffs may enforce "an effluent standard or
limitation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). This section defines
"effluent standard or limitation" as, inter alia, "a permit or
condition thereof issued under section 1342." 33 U.SC.

§ 1365(a)(1) and (£6).

The enforcement section of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d),
authorizes imposition of civil penalties for violations of "any
permit condition or limitation" implementing the Act's
substantive provisions. The Act defines "effluent limitation"

12 EPA's NPDES permitting regulations recognize that effluent
limitations need not be either numeric or end-of-pipe limitations. See.
e.g. 40 CFR 122.44(k) (authorizing permit conditions relating to the
use of best management practices in addition to, or in lieu of, numeric
limitations); 40 CFR 440 (addressing best management practices for
mines). Best management practices include, for example, operating
procedures or practices to control plant site runoff, spillage or leaks that
would pollute surface waters. 40 CFR § 122.2.

m] ,

APP-19

as “any restriction established by a State or the Administrator"
on quantities, discharge rates and concentrations of a pollutant
discharged into a water of the United States. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(11).

STATEMENT

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Summary.

From 1984 to August 1991, the City of Portland ("the
City") operated a sewage treatment plant under an Oregon
NPDES permit issued in 1984. Northwest Environmental
Advocates et al. v. City of Portland, No. 91-339-PA, slip op. at
4 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 3991) ("opinion below"). The City’s
antiquated sewage and stormwater systems were combined
and regularly discharged storm water and sewage from
approximately forty overflow outlets into the Willamette River
and Columbia Slough, a tributary of the Willamette River. Id.
at 2-3. In 1990, the City began to negotiate with the State
concerning the permit that would replace the expiring 1984
permit. Id. at 4. The State sought to include a schedule in the
new permit by which the City would eliminate the combined
sewer overflows, (CSOs), but the City complained that it
could not accomplish this in the five-year time period
contemplated by the permit. Id. In August 1991, the State and
the City finalized a stipulation under which the City would
have twenty years to eliminate the CSOs. Id. at 5.

In March 1991, while the negotiations were pending, the
citizens group, Northwest Environmental Advocates and its
executive director, Nina Bell ("the citizens"), brought this suit
under the Act's citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. The
citizens’ complaint alleged that the 1984 permit covered only
discharges from the City's sewage treatment plant, not from
the CSOs, and the CSOs were thus unpermitted discharges.
Id. at 5. The citizens also alleged that even if the CSOs were

vX—ee SSeS. ae

eee

al ES i EO eigen ee A IE PRLS OE

APP-20

covered by the 1984 permit, that permit contained a condition
prohibiting the discharges from violating state water quality
standards, and this condition was violated. Id. at 12-13.!% The
citizens argued that the citizen suit provision, section 505(a),
authorizes citizen plaintiffs to enforce permits or conditions
thereof. Id. at 15. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) and (f)(6).

The district court interpreted the City's permit and held
that the City’s CSO discharges were authorized by the 1984
permit. Decision below at 12. The court also held that
although the 1984 permit referred to the Oregon water quality
standards, it did not incorporate an enforceable condition
because the "mere reference to water quality standards" in a
permit does constitute an effluent standard or limitation for
purposes of section 505. Id. at 15-16

The Ninth Circuit's panel decision upheld as "not clearly
erroneous" the district court's first holding that the permit
covered the CSOs. Panel Opinion ("Opinion") at 13915. The
panel also affirmed the district court's holding that the citizens
could not enforce the permit's requirement that discharges not
violate water quality standards, concluding that because the
citizens did not allege that the City violated end-of-pipe
limitations designed to achieve water quality standards, the
citizens lacked standing under section 505. Id. at 13920. The
panel stated that "it is the duty of the permit-issuing authority
to include in the permit end-of-pipe effluent limitations that
will ensure that water quality standards are met.” Id. at 13920
(emphasis in original). In making the statement that end-of-
pipe limitations are required, the panel did not rely upon

13 The 1984 permit stated “notwithstanding the effluent
limitations established by this permit, no wastes shall be discharged and
no activities shall be conducted which will violate Water Quality
Standards of Oregon. Id. at 14.

~~ ai

APP-21

explicit statutory language.'4 Indeed, the panel noted that
section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, the citizen suit provision,
provides that citizens may enforce "an effluent standard or
limitation," and that the section broadly defines "effluent
standard or limitation" as, inter alia, "a permit or condition
thereof issued under section 1342." Opinion at 13919-20,
(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) and (f)(6)). However, the panel
relied upon legislative history to disregard this statutory
language, claiming that Congress did not intend the "limitless
grant of jurisdiction" connoted by section 1365. Opinion at
13921-24.

As the panel noted, legislative history reveals that before
the 1972 amendments to the Act, the statute did not require
permits or mandate any effluent limitations, end-of-pipe or
otherwise, but rather relied solely upon enforcement of state
water quality standards. Id. Because enforcement of water
quality standards was "almost non-existent," Congress
developed the current approach whereby technology-based
effluent limitations are written into easily enforced permits.
Id. The panel emphasized that because Congress viewed
effluent limitations in permits as superior to the pre-1972
enforcement scheme, it must not have intended to allow
citizen enforcement of permit conditions prohibiting
discharges in violation of state standards in the absence of
end-of-pipe limitations. Id. at 13921-25.

14 As the panel noted, its opinion was the first court of appeals
decision addressing the enforceability of a permit condition requiring
that the permittee's discharges not violate state standards. Opinion at
13917.

ARGUMENT

A. Permit Conditions Based Upon the Effect Discharges
May Have Upon Receiving Waters Are Valid and
Enforceable by Citizens.

a Underlying the panel's holding that the permit
condition is unenforceable by citizens was the conclusion that
permit writers must incorporate end-of-pipe limitations. Id. at
13920. The plain language of the Act demonstrates that the
Portland permit condition, expressed in terms of the effect that
discharges may have upon receiving water, is a legal,
enforceable effluent limitation.

Section 301(b)(1)(C) mandates that point sources be
subject to effluent limitations necessary to ensure that state
water quality standards are not violated. 33 USC.
§ 1311(b)(1)(C); See Trustees of Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d
549, 557 (9th Cir. 1984). Section 402 authorizes states and
EPA to issue permits insuring compliance with section 301,
33 U.S.C. § 1311. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.!5 Nothing in section
301 or elsewhere in the Act requires that such effluent
limitations or permit conditions be expressed solely as end-of-
pipe limitations.

15 As the panel noted, section 402 authorizes permits ensuring
compliance with 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318 and
1343. Slip op. at 13920. However, the panel inaccurately cited section
402(b\(1((C) and 402(b)(2)(A) for this proposition; it is section
402(b)(1)(A) that requires that state permits ensure compliance with
sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and 1343. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(1)(A). Section 402(b)(2)(A) requires that state permits
ensure compliance with section 1318. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(2)A).
Section 402(a)(1) sets forth this requirement for permits that EPA
issues. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).

APP-23

Moreover, the citizen suit provision, section 505,
authorizes citizens to enforce “effluent limitations" and
provides a definition for that term as it is used within that
section. This definition provides that "effluent limitation" is a
"permit or condition thereof issued under section 1342 of this
title, which is in effect under this chapter." 33 U.S.C.
1365(f(6). Because this section unequivocally authorizes
citizens to enforce conditions in permits issued by states or
EPA pursuant to section 402, the panel was incorrect in
holding that the citizens could not enforce the condition.

The conclusion that Congress did not intend to restrict
effluent limitations to end-of-pipe limitations is confirmed by
the definition of "effluent limitation" found in section 502(1 1),
33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(11). This definition governs the use of the
term "effluent limitation" as generally used in the Act. The
definition states that "effluent limitation" means:

any restriction established by a State or
the Administrator on quantities, rates,
and concentrations of chemical,
physical, biological, and _ other
constituents which are discharged from
point sources into navigable waters, the
waters of the contiguous zone, or the
ocean, including schedules of
compliance.

33 US.C. § 1362(11). This definition encompasses any
restriction upon the nature of permitted discharges, and
therefore encompasses conditions based upon the discharge's
effect upon receiving waters. The requirement in Portland's
permit that discharges not violate state standards restricts whet
the City may discharge, and expresses that restriction in term
of the effect the discharges have upon receiving waters. Thus,
the permit condition constitutes a restriction under section
502(11).

APP-24

The panel opinion failed to address this clear statutory
evidence. Rather, the opinion summarized these statutory
provisions, and then set forth the whole of the panel's analysis
of these provisions:

None of these sections, however,
require [sic] that a permittee directly
comply with water quality standards.
Rather, it is the duty of the permit-
issuing authority to include in the
permit end-of-pipe effluent limitations
that will ensure that water quality
standards are met. See Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. United States
Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9th
Cir. 1987).

Opinion at 13920 (emphasis in original). The Oregon case
cited by the panel held that water quality standards are not
imposed in the absence of a permit condition. Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. United States Forest Service, 834 F.2d
at 850. EPA concurs with the premise that the statute does not
require permittees to comply with water quality standards
"directly," or in the absence of a permit condition imposing
such a requirement. However, the permit at issue here contains
such a condition. Thus, the principle set forth in the Oregon
case is inapposite to the question of whether a permit
expressly prohibiting discharges that violate state standards 1s
valid and enforceable by citizens. None of the statutory
provisions considered by the panel support the conclusion that
a permit is not enforceable by ‘citizens unless it incorporates
end-of-pipe limitations.

Moreover, the last time the Act was amended, Congress
gave increasing prominence to state water quality standards
In 1987 Congress amended section 303(cK2¥") to require
states to adopt numeric criteria for certain toxic pollutants that

APP-25

are expected to impede attainment of state standards. Water
Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 308(d), 101 Stat.
39. See also page 3, supra. Congress also amended section
304 to require that states (1) identify water bodies that are not
expected to attain state water quality standards due to
discharges of toxic pollutants and (2) develop strategies for
reducing the discharge of the relevant toxic pollutants. Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 308(a), 101 Stat. 39; see 33 U.S.C. 1314(1). The
Act thus casts state standards in a central role, and provides
broad authority for states to impose and citizens to enforce
permit conditions that implement those standards. !¢

b. In light of clear statutory language, the panel need not
have considered legislative history. In re Perroton, 958 F.2d
889, 893 (9th Cir. 1992) ("If the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete and that
language controls absent rare and _ exceptional
circumstances."). However, the panel also erred in its
assessment of the legislative history; the panel read into the
history an ambiguity which cannot fairly be found, and then
relied upon that ambiguity to disregard clear statutory

language.

The panel opinion recognized that when amending the
Act Congress sought to employ end-of-pipe limitations in
order to\enhance the pre-1972 system of enforcement of water

16 Additionally, it was improper for the district court to have
reviewed the validity of the permit condition because there is no federal
judicial review of any aspect of state-issued permits. See American
Paper Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1989);
District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 862-63 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Outboard Marine, 702 F.
Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Under state law governing issuance of
the state permit, NPDES permittees must challenge permits within 60
days of issuance. Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.484(2) (1991).

yn ainsi

APP-26

quality standards. Opinion at 13921-22. The panel stated that
the legislative history is ambiguous, and supports both sides of
the argument conceming whether citizens may enforce the
permit condition at issue. Id. However, the panel concluded
that because Congress viewed end-of-pipe limitations as
superior, it intended to preclude citizen enforcement of state
standards in the absence of such limitations. Id. at 13921-24.

Yet it cannot be assumed absent express congressional
direction that Congress intended that end-of-pipe limitations
become the exclusive means by which water quality standards
may be achieved. As Judge Pregerson noted in his dissenting
opinion, legislative history does not support the interpretation
that Congress intended to restrict citizen enforcement to end-
of-pipe limitations. Opinion at 13927 (emphasis in original).
Indeed, the panel does not point to any legislative history so
indicating. The history upon which the majority relies reflects
Congress’ intent to, in Judge Pregerson words, ‘improve
enforcement, not to supplant the old system.” Id.

Legislative history is consistent with the broad language
in sections 402 and 502 concerning permit limitations that
may be used to achieve state standards. See pages 10-12,
supra. Similarly, the desire to enhance enforcement revealed in
legislative history is reflected in the section 1365(f)(6)
mandate that citizens may enforce any such permit condition.
Id. The panel improperly failed to give effect to the Act's clear
language.

The practical implications of the panel opinion are severe.
It is EPA's understanding that all NPDES permits in the state
of Oregon contain the condition at issue here, and all permits
issued by Anzona and California contain similar prohibitions
against exceeding water quality standards. Because citizen
enforcement of NPDES permits provides an_ essential
supplement to governmental enforcement, the panel opinion

APP-27

threatens to greatly hinder Clean Water Act regulation in those

three states.

For the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ Petition for
Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc should be

granted.

Respectfully Submitted,

Lois Schiffer

Acting Assistant Attorney
General

Environment and Natural
Resources Division

/s/

Peter J. Steenland,
Catherine M. Flanagan
Attorneys, Department of
Justice

APP-28

Nos. C 78-0567 MHP and C 89-1738 MHP

In the

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Vv.
LOUISIANA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,

Defendant

SURFRIDER FOUNDATION,
Plaintiff,
Vv.

LOUISIANA-PACIFIC CORPORATION and
SIMPSON PAPER COMPANY,

Defendants.

OPINION

APP-29

Defendants, Simpson Paper Company ("Simpson") and
Louisiana-Pacific Corporation ("“L-P") (collectively, "the
Mills" or "the Companies"), discharge effluent into the Pacific
Ocean under National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permits issued on July13, 1987 by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") Regional
Administrator pursuant to section 301(m) of the Clean Water
Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m)(1)(F). Plaintiffs, the United States
and the Surfrider Foundation, allege that defendants have
consistently violated the limits for chronic toxicity set under
those permits and seek, inter alia, injunctive relief and
penalties for the violations. The parties are now before the
court on defendants’ motion to dismiss certain claims in the
Amended Complaint in Intervention and the Amended
Supplemental Complaint. Having considered the papers
submitted and the arguments of the parties, for the following
reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants’
motion.

BACKGROUND

The background of the underlying action is set out fully in
this court's order of June 14, 1990 and will not be repeated
here. The parties have now come to the court on defendants'
motion to dismiss claims of the amended complaints which
were filed earlier this year.

Defendants present three issues for the court's
consideration: (1) whether plaintiffs can seek enforcement of
certain permit conditions based on alleged violations of
receiving water limitations; (2) whether plaintiffs can be
redressed for violations of an administrative order prior to the
time the order was issued; and (3) whether plaintiffs can

APP-30

compel compliance with a discharge limitation whose status 1s
unclear at present.!7

DISCUSSION
A. Violations of Water Quality Standards

Defendants argue that the penalties sought by plaintiffs
for violations of effluent limitations exceed the scope of
section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs argue that
defendants’ resistance is in fact a protest of a permit condition
and, as such, defendants are barred from raising the issue in
this court because they have not exhausted their administrative
remedies. Defendants counter that, whether or not they
exhausted their administrative remedies, the penalties sought
by the government are outside the purview of the statute,
therefore depriving this court of jurisdiction to hear those
claims.

The court would only be deprived of jurisdiction if
section 309 did not provide for imposition of penalties for
violations of water quality standards. On its face, section 309
states that civil penalties may be imposed for violations of "any
permit condition or limitation....". 33 USC. 1319(d)
(emphasis added). As the water quality standards at issue have
been explicitly stated in defendants!’ NPDES permit, there is
nothing to suggest that they are not exactly the type of
conditions to which section 309 refers.

17 Specifically, defendants want the court to dismiss the seventh,
eighth, ninth and tenth claims for relief in the Amended Complaint in
Intervention against Simpson Paper Company and paragraph 25 of the
second claim, as well as the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh claims for
relief in the Amended Supplemental Complaint against Louisiana-
Pacific Corporation.

APP-3]

Defendants' attempt to create a distinction between
contesting permit conditions and contesting the enforcement
of conditions in their permit is unavailing. If defendants
believed that these standards were impermissibly vague and
therefore unenforceable, they could have appealed them to the
EPA.

Nor is defendants’ citation to 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(d)
persuasive. Although this section does suggest that permit
water quality standards for continuous discharges should be
reduced to numerical limitations if practicable, a determination
of whether said standards should have been reduced rather
than stated in narrative terms is properly addressed to the
agency during the permit stage. The sole question now before
the court on the narrative conditions is whether plaintiff can
establish with sufficient scientific accuracy that the conditions
have been violated. This is a matter of proof and the subject of
expert testimony.

Finally, the cases and statutes cited by defendants do not
support their proposition that narrative standards cannot be
enforced in addition to numerical limitations. See, e.g., EPA
v. Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12
("Water quality standards are retained as a supplementary
basis for effluent limitations"); Sierra Club v. Union Oil of
California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987) (same),
vacated on other grounds, 485 U.S. 931 (1988); Trustees for
Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 557 (9th Cir. 1984) (numerical
limitations needed in addition to water quality standards where
water quality standards must be translated); Oregon Natural
Resource Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842, 849

(9th Cir. 1987) (no NPDES permit). Accordingly, defendants’
motion to dismiss these claims 1s denied.

APP-32
B. Violations of EPA Order

The United States has asserted that during the period
October 1987 to November 19, 1988, defendants violated an
EPA order requiring defendants to monitor the chronic toxicity
of their discharges using a certain sea urchin protocol.
However, plaintiffs have now conceded that because the EPA
order was not entered until September 20, 1988, they are not
entitled to relief for alleged violations which occurred prior to
the entry of the order. Therefore, the United States has
stipulated that its tenth claim for relief in the Amended
Complaint in Intervention against Simpson and its eleventh
claim for relief in the Amended Supplemental Complaint
against L-P may be dismissed to the extent that plaintiffs seek
penalties for the period from October 1987 to September 20,
1988. Accordingly, those claims are DISMISSED except as
to the period beginning September 20, 1988

a Water Treatment Plant Limitations

The Amended Supplemental Complaint against L-P
charges the company with violating "the limit on total
suspended solids applicable to its water treatment works." See
Amended Supp. Cmplt. at par.25. L-P's NPDES permit
required L-P to remove seventy five percent of the total
suspended solids taken into its water treatment plant before
discharging the wastewater into the Pacific Ocean. However,
the permit also provided that if L-P's request for an exception
then pending in front of the State Water Resources Control
Board's were granted, the alternative limit chosen would
automatically apply.

On November 17, 1987 L-P's request for an exception
was approved. The State Water Resources Control Board's
resolution deleted the removal requirement without imposing
an alternative limit. Defendant argues, therefore, that there 1s

APP-33

currently no requirement to be enforced and that the
Government's second claim for relief should be dismissed. !*

As both parties note, however, in response to citizen
group challenges of the exemption provision, the EPA Chief
Judicial Officer found the automatic exemption provision to
be "a troublesome feature of the permits that allows
circumvention of applicable public participation procedures"
legislated in 40 C.F.R. part 124. See Ex. F. to Smith Dec.

Furthermore, L-P has filed a request for clarification of
the Chief Judicial Officer's ruling and, in response to the
ruling, EPA Region 9 has initiated permit modification
proceedings. L-P's request questions whether the intent of the
Chief Judicial Officer's Order was to invalidate the automatic
modification provision from the date it was issued, hence
prohibiting it from coming into effect.

The Chief Judicial Officer's response should clanfy for
which periods of time the removal requirement has been in
effect. Accordingly, the court denies defendants’ motion to
dismiss the second claim without prejudice to renew it after
the Chief Judicial Officer responds to the request for
clarification.

CONCLUSION

As set out above, the court GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART defendants’ motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [SEP 26, 1990] /s/

18 Defendants’ severability argument raised in their reply brief is
completely unpersuasive.

;
2

APP-34

MARILYN HALL PATEL
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386004_1805%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
