# Opposition Brief — Tamburello v. Comm-Tract Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1996
- **Citation:** 517 U.S. 1222

## Text

he Supreme Court, iS.
‘ ¥. + =
APR 24 1996
No. 95-1615 .
In The —_

Supreme Court of the United States

*
October Term, 1995

VINCENT R. TAMBURELLO,
Petitioner,
vs.

COMM-TRACT CORPORATION, JOHN F. POLMONARI,
EDWARD MENARD and STEVEN DICKIE,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TIMOTHY P. VAN DYCK
Counsel of Record
JOSHUA L. DITELBERG
EDWARDS & ANGELL
Attorneys for Respondents
101 Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
(617) 439-4444

8036

ez (800) 3 APPEAL * (800) 5 APPEAL « (800) BRIEF 21
AZ enices, inc

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the First Circuit was correct in affirming the
District Court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s RICO claims as being
preempted by the National Labor Relations Board’s primary
jurisdiction to adjudicate labor disputes, where Petitioner’s
claims were premised entirely on allegations of retaliation for
Petitioner’s activities as a union steward?

II. Whether the First Circuit was correct in affirming the
District Court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act claim as being preempted by the National Labor
Relations Board’s primary jurisdiction to adjudicate labor
disputes, where Petitioner’s claim was premised entirely on
allegations cf retaliation for Petitioner’s activities as a union
steward?

ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Supreme Court Rules, Comm-
Tract Corporation advises the Court that it has no parent
company, no corporate subsidiaries and no affiliates.

'
'
:

lil

PARTIES BELOW

The proceedings below were a civil action commenced by
plaintiff Vincent R. Tamburello. Defendants below, and
respondents here, are Comm-Tract Corporation, John F.
Polmonari, Edward Menard and Steven Dickie.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved ...... l
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Reasons for Denying the Writ. .........cccccccccces +
I. Review of Question I is inappropriate, given the
absence of a significant conflict among the federal
courts created by the First Circuit’s decision. .. 4
II. In view of the First Circuit’s correct application of
settled principles of law, review of Question II is
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Vv

Contents

Page
TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach

Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.274(1971) ...... 4,7,8
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp.,393 Mass. 819,473 N.E.

PAGED -F diva caw eVes pene s o554 obtaee came 11
Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S.491 (1983) ............... 9
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc., Local

Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989) ................. 8
Brennan v. Chestnut, 973 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1992) ..... 6
Brown v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc.,680 F. Supp. 1212

ERA SEE cia ob tiwkd na daas kane nea eeswoeks 6
Butchers’ Union, Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv. Inc., 631 F.

mec Ben take. OOK, BOG) nag nis ccden scenes 6
Chaulk v. MCAD, 70 F.3d 1361 (1st Cir. 1995) ........ 8

Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters,421
eR it, on) Pe ree Re ere rk et Hearn ee 5, 6,7

Hood v. Smith Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Ky.
LPR D ans seciink's 6's ced SURRCA OUbe Cok Wel bw 6

vi

Contents
Page
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S.72 (1982) ..... 6
Lingle v. Magic Chef, Norge Div., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) . 10
Local 926, IUOE, AFL-CIO v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983)
beaccecweadsbesdbsVédaets bORN ONSEN LONE aS EeES 9,10
Mann v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 848 F. Supp. 990(S.D. Fla.
RODS) «ois vb Ss4 0060d45id0400408Rn ROR AESE 6
McDonough v. Gencorp, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 368 (S.D. Ill.
SDNY si cuca vavenbeddhesdans ReMemescaeekeeen 6
MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of
Am., 685 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ........... 6
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959) vv sccvdccadueeeeths ogedies tee 4,7,8,9,10
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180(1978)
WEVTTETTTEL Ty re re 9
Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distributing Co.,961 F.2d651
(7a Cis, ISGEE ch Seed odwitevdseveakeees ~.eonees 6,7
Thierren v. Hamilton, 849 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1994) |
6s 6 edbb bbe Rees 060446444 CORES AREER ee 11 |
United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert.
dented, 460 U.S. IGE CTSSS) 6 cv bi ae ce cceec celia 6,7

remreeremertiniatiaeeaiiiiiiiminliiiililiiaailiuiiitilii

vii

Contents

Page
United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981) ae
SE SIUC STRERUETD ccccccccesescceuss 4,8,10
Statutes Cited:
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Contents

United States Constitution Cited:

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1
OPINIONS BELOW

Tamburello v. Comm-Tract Corp., et al., No. 93-11946-Z
(D. Mass. 1995).

Tamburello v. Comm-Tract Corp., et al., 67 F.3d 973 (1st
Cir. 1995).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

(i) The Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit which Petitioner seeks to have reviewed by this
Court issued on October 2, 1995.

(ii) Norehearings were requested by Petitioner.

(iii) No cross-petitions for writ of certiorari have been
filed.

(iv) Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Article VI, § 2; 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961; 18 U.S.C. § 1962; 29 U.S.C. § 15/; 29 U.S.C. § 158;
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H, 111.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner, Vincent R. Tamburello (“Tamburello”), was
employed by Comm-Tract Corporation (“Comm-Tract”) in
Massachusetts from April, 1988 to May 10, 1993. He, like all
members of his bargaining unit, was subject to the terms of a

cia

2

collective bargaining agreement between Comm-Tract and the
Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 4340 (the
“Union”). He became a union steward in July, 1991. Soon
afterwards, three Comm-Tract officers, John F. Polmonari
(“Polmonari”), Edward Menard (“Menard”), and Steven Dickie
(“Dickie”) (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) allegedly
began retaliating against Tamburello solely because of his union
steward status. (See Appendix to Petition at 2a-3a, 17a).

Tamburello alleged that the Individual Defendants engaged
in the following instances of retaliation: replacing Tamburello
with less experienced workers, thereby preventing him from
being eligible for extra lead pay; giving him menial job
assignments; reassigning Tamburello to jobs requiring him to
travel long distances; withholding Tamburello’s personnel file
from him; taking Tamburello off projects to deny him overtime
pay; forcing Tamburello to take a vacation or face termination of
his employment; taking his company vehicle away; and making
anti-union statements and threats to him. Tamburello contended
that such acts were designed to force him to resign from Comm-
Tract. (/d. at 3a, 19a).

Tamburello did not file a grievance under the collective
bargaining agreement until October, 1992 (after he had stepped
down as union steward), nor did he complain to any Union
official before then. At no time did he file a charge with the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) claiming an unfair
labor practice had been committed against him. Tamburello
resigned from Comm-Tract on May 10, 1993.

In September, 1993, Tamburello brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asserting:
(i) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d) (1988)
by the Individual Defendants, predicated upon alleged extortion

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3

as defined in the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Counts I and II);
(ii) a breach of the collective bargaining agreement by Comm-
Tract premised upon 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), i.e., § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)(Count III); a
violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 12, § 111 (1988) (Count IV); and (iv) common law
tortious interference with contractual relations (Count V). (See
Appendix to Petition at 3a, 17a-18a). After an initial motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim was filed on behalf of all
Defendants, Tamburello amended his complaint as of right on
December 22, 1993. Thereafter, all Defendants again moved to
dismiss.

The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in
its entirety on February 17, 1995, dismissed the amended
complaint, and entered judgment for Defendants on all counts.
(Id. at 16a, 21a). The District Court concluded that the NLRB’s
primary jurisdiction over matters arguably within the scope of
§§ 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)
preempted Counts I, II, IV, and V of the amended complaint. (/d.
at 18a-20a). With respect to Count III, the District Court held that
Tamburello did not “refer to any particular provision of the
collective bargaining agreement that he claims was breached nor

[did] he specify the nature of such breach.” (/d. at21a).

On March 16, 1995, Tamburello filed a notice of appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. He did
not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of Counts III and V of
the Amended Complaint. (/d. at 3a n. 1). On October 2, 1995,
after argument, the First Circuit issued a written opinion and
affirmed the judgment of the District Court. (Jd. at 15a).

4
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I.

REVIEW OF QUESTION I IS INAPPROPRIATE,
GIVEN THE ABSENCE OFA SIGNIFICANT CONFLICT
AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS CREATED BY THE
FIRST CIRCUIT’S DECISION.

The decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to Counts
I and II of Tamburello’s Amended Complaint (i.e., Question I)
does not warrant review by this Court. The First Circuit held that
Tamburello’s RICO claims were preempted by the NLRB’s
primary jurisdiction over arguable unfair labor practices
(“Garmon preemption”). (See Appendix to Petition at 4a - 13a).

In so holding, the First Circuit applied principles set forth in
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959), and its progeny. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n oj Street
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
276 (1971); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-180 (1967). The
Garmon Court held that “[w]Jhen an activity is arguably subject
to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as federal courts
must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the
danger of state interference with nationat policy is to be‘averted.”
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245. (See Appendix to Petition at 4a). The
First Circuit agreed with the District Court that Tamburello’s
allegations, if true, would constitute unfair labor practices
prohibited by the NLRA. (/d. at 6a). Accordingly, Tamburello’s
RICO claims were properly dismissed in accordance with
Garmon preemption. (/d. at 10a).

The First Circuit described three “generally recognized
exceptions to the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction,” and concluded
that Tamburello’s RICO claims came within none of them. (/d. at

5

6a - 7a). The first exception is “where Congress has expressly
carved out an exception to the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.”
(Id. at 6a). As the First Circuit noted, Congress did notcarve out
any such exception with respect to Hobbs Act extortion, as
alleged by Tamburello. To the contrary, “the only labor-related
‘racketeering’ activity expressly listed as predicates to liability
under RICO are actions concerning restrictions of payments and
loans to labor organizations, or those relating to embezzlement
from labor funds.” (/d.) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C); 29
U.S.C. §§ 185, 501(c)). The second exception, when regulated
activity is grounded in “interests so deeply rooted in local
feeling” that the states are not deprived of the ability to act, did
not apply to Tamburello’s RICO claims, because it does not
concern itself with the relationship between two federal laws
(i.e., RICO and the NLRA) (/d. at 7a). Tamburello does not take
issue with the First Circuit's formulation or application of this
exception.

The third exception “holds that the NLRB’s exclusive
jurisdiction does not apply if the regulated activity is merely a
peripheral or collateral concern of the labor laws.” (/d.). This
exception was explained by this Court in Connell Construction
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975)
(“[T]he federal courts may decide labor law questions that
emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent
federal remedies[.]”). Here, the First Circuit determined that
“the unfair labor practice issues implicated by Tamburello’s
complaint are not merely collateral to his RICO claims”;
accordingly, the First Circuit concluded that this exception did
not apply. (Appendix to Petition at 9a) (footnote omitted).

Tamburello contends that this Court “has never squarely
addressed” the issue created by the third exception, “namely
whether RICO, a federal criminal statute with an express civil
remedy, can be gutted by another federal statute, the NLRA[.]”

6

(Petition at 4-5). Tamburello is incorrect. This Court addressed
the relationship between the NLRA and other federal laws
regulating labor-related activities in Connell. The Connell
doctrine has been applied by this Court in Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 85 (1982), and by numerous lower federal
courts. Further, there is no significant difference among the
federal courts in assessing the particular relationship between
RICO and the NLRA requiring this Court’s attention.

As the First Circuit accurately stated, “several federal
courts take the position that courts must defer to the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB if the underlying conduct of the RICO
claim is wrongful only by virtue of, or reference to, the labor
laws.” (Appendix to Petition at 7a - 8a). See, e.g., Brennan v.
Chestnut, 973 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 1992); Talbot v. Robert
Matthews Distributing Co., 961 F.2d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 1992);
Mann v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 848 F. Supp. 990, 993 (S.D. Fla.
1994); McDonough v. Gencorp, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 368, 370(S.D.
Ill. 1990); MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine
Workers of Am., 685 F. Supp. 1370, 1378 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Brown
v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 1212, 1224-1225
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Butchers’ Union, Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv. Inc.,
631 F. Supp. 1001, 1011 (E.D. Cal. 1986). See also Hood v. Smith
Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1274, 1287 (W.D. Ky. 1991)(noting
’ that “any jurisdictional conflict between the NLRA and RICO is
merely illusory.”). These courts consistently took this position
regardless of whether they concluded, on the facts before them,
that preemption was appropriate.

Further, the cases Tamburello himself relies upon are not at
all inconsistent with this position given the facts confronting
those courts. In United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 923-924
(3rd. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983), the RICO
predicate acts included obstruction of justice, and mail fraud in
a scheme to secure higher profits. In United States v. Thordarson,

C—O —

7

646 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), the RICO predicate acts
included the use of explosives to damage vehicles during a
strike, and arson.' Such acts are wrongful without reference to
federal labor law, unlike those acts which Tamburello alleged
were committed by the Individual Defendants. (See Appendix to
Petition at 9a-10a.). See also Talbot, 961 F.2d at 662
(distinguishing Boffa on such grounds).

Tamburello also asserts that the First Circuit’s decision
dismissing his RICO counts as preempted by the NLRB’s
primary jurisdiction is in error because “the constitutional
doctrine of preemption obviously deals with federal/state
conflicts rather than with federal/federal conflicts of applicable
law.” (Petition at 5). This argument deserves little attention. In
describing the relationship between RICO and the NLRA, the
First Circuit used the term, “preemption.” (See Appendix to
Petition at 5a). This nomenclature is consistent with that used by
most other federal courts that have considered the issue. See,
e.g., Talbot, 961 F.2d at 659. Indeed, this Court has referred to the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB as “preemp([ting] state and
federal jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected
or prohibited by the [NLRA].” Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 276.
(emphasis added). Quite simply, as the First Circuit recognized,
the Garmon doctrine of NLRB primary jurisdiction which “was
' Originally concerned only with federal supremacy over
conflicting state laws ... has been extended to cover the
relationship between the NLRA and other federal statutes.”
(Appendix to Petition at 5a n. 2) (citing Connell, supra)
(emphasis in original). |

Tamburello’s other argument regarding Question I also is
without merit. Tamburello asserts that “when a breach of the

1. They also included conversion of union funds in violation of 29 U.S.C. §
501(c) which was one of the two labor-related “racketeering” activities expressly listed
as a predicate to RICO liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C).

8

Union’s Duty of Fair Representation (“DFR”) is alleged. . .
resort to the federal courts in such instances is proper and the
NLRA therefore is no impediment to the same.” (Petition at 6)
(citing Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc., Local
Union No. 6,493 U.S. 67 (1989) and Vaca, supra). Tamburello,
however, did not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of Count
III of the Amended Complaint. (See Appendix to Petition at 3an.
1). Accordingly, he “ha[d] no viable duty of fair representation
claim before the [Court of Appeals.]” (Jd. at 13a). Further,
Tamburello’s RICO counts were not “hybrid” breach of contract/
breach of DFR claims brought under § 301 of the LMRA. To the
extent that Breininger and Vaca furnish an exception to Garmon
preemption, itis only with respect to such claims. (/d.).

The Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the dismissal of
Tamburello’s RICO counts is sound. Congress, through the
passage of the NLRA, sought to “create a uniform, nationwide
body of labor law interpreted by acentralized expert agency —
the [NLRB].” (Appendix to Petition at 5a). Over several
decades, this Court has crafted a broad doctrine of NLRB
primary jurisdiction over labor controversies, making it clear
that artful pleading cannot displace the NLRB’s function in
settling labor disputes. See, e.g., Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 292 (“It
is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of
governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern”).
If theories such as Tamburello’s RICO counts are permitted to
elude NLRB preemption, the NLRB’s role as chief arbiter of
labor disputes will be severely compromised; “there are few
unfair labor practices which could not be similarly repackaged.”
Chaulk v. MCAD, 70 F.3d 1361, 1370 (1st Cir. 1995). This would
create a “system of labor dispute adjudication parallel to the
NLRB ... leaving the state and federal courts to grapple
piecemeal with issues Congress intended primarily for NLRB
resolution.” Jd. Accordingly, the First Circuit’s decision below
does not require review by this Court.

9
II.

IN VIEW OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S CORREC?
APPLICATION OF SETTLED PRINCIPLES OF LAW,
REVIEW OF QUESTION IIIS UNWARRANTED.

The First Circuit’s decision with respect to Count IV of
Tamburello’s Amended Complaint (i.e., Question IT) likewise
does notcall for review by this Court. The First Circuit held that
Garmon preemption required dismissal of Tamburello’s
Massachusetts Civil Rights Actclaim. (See Appendix to Petition
at 13a- 15a). Inso holding, it agreed with the District Court that
Respondents’ alleged conduct did not fall within the “local
interests” exception to Garmon preemption. One of the
prerequisites of this exception is that “the controversy presented
to the state court” be different from “that which could have been,
but was not, presented to the [NLRB].” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 197 (1978). The First Circuit noted
that the controversy raised by Tamburello’s Massachusetts Civil
Rights Actclaim was “identical” to that which would be heard by
the NLRB. (See Appendix to Petition at 15a). Accordingly, it
relied upon Garmon and Sears, Roebuck in concluding that
preemption was appropriate. (/d.).

The First Circuit’s decision is correct.and does not warrant
review by this Court. In his Petition, Tamburello asserts that it “is
in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court,” although he
cites no such decisions. (Petition at 6). This is not surprising. The
Garmon preemption doctrine is well-settled law, and the First
Circuit properly applied Sears, Roebuck to Tamburello’s claim
under the state civil rights statute. See, e.g., Belknap v. Hale, 463
U.S. 491,510 (1983) (citing Sears with approval); Local 926,

10

IUOE, AFL-CIO v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 681 (1983) (same).?

Tamburello confuses Garmon preemption with preemption
of state-law actions by § 301 of the LMRA. In this regard,
Tamburello asserts that his claim “could be resolved without
resort to interpretation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.” (Petition at 7). Apparently, he makes such an
assertion because this Court has held that if a “state-law claim
can be resolved without interpreting the [collective bargaining]
agreement itself,” it is not preempted by § 301. Lingle v. Magic
Chef, Norge Div., 486 U.S. 399, 409-410 (1988). This has
nothing to do with Garmon preemption, i.e., diminishing
“significant risk of state interference with the unfair labor
practice [jurisdiction] of the NLRB.” (Appendix to Petition at
15a). Section 301 preempts state-law claims involving “[s]uits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization. . .or between any such labor organizations,” i.e.,
the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. However, Tamburello’s claim under Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 12 §11I was not to enforce rights arising under the
collective bargaining agreement; it was to obtain a statutory

2. Tamburello further asserts that the First Circuit’ s decision affirming the
dismissal of Count IV of the Amended Complaint is in error because “a breach of
the Union’s DRF [sic] was properly alleged.” (Petition at 7). This is irrelevant to
the instant consideration of Garmon preemption. The duty of fair representation
inheres in a union; a breach of such duty is a predicate to employer liability only in
a breach of contract action arising under § 301 of the LMRA. See, e.g., Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-193 (1967). Tamburello’s Massachusetts Civil Rights
Act claim was not such an action.

il

remedy akin to that available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).°
Accordingly, the scope of § 301 preemption is irrelevant to
dismissal of Count IV of Tamburello’s Amended Complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

TIMOTHY P. VAN DYCK
Counsel of Record
JOSHUA L. DITELBERG
EDWARDS & ANGELL
Attorneys for Respondents
101 Federal Street
Boston, MA02110

(617) 439-4444

3. Tamburello characterizes the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act as “in
essence a state version of the Hobbs Act, but with an express civil remedy.”
(Petition at 6). This ignores what the Massachusetts courts and the federal courts
construing the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act have said with respect to the
statute’s purpose. See, e.g., Thierren v. Hamilton, 849 F. Supp. 110, 115(D. Mass.
1994) (“[t]he Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111, and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are parallel statutes.”); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393
Mass. 819, 822-23, 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (1985). Regardless, it is clear that the
statute is not intended to vindicate rights grounded in contract, as Tamburello
implicitly acknowledges.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386004_1702%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.