# Opposition Brief — Louisiana ex rel. Ieyoub v. CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1996
- **Citation:** 519 U.S. 964

## Text

No. 96-316 |

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

STATE OF LOUISIANA, EX REL. RICHARD P. IEYOUB,
Attorney General,
Petitioner,
vi

CIGNA HEALTHPLAN OF LOUISIANA, INC. and
CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

HARRY N. MAZADOORIAN DONALD T. BLISS

EDWARD P. POTANKA ROBERT N. ECCLES

CIGNA HEALTHCARE OF (COUNSEL OF RECORD)
LOUISIANA, INC. O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP

900 Cottage Grove Road 555 Thirteenth Street, NW

Hartford, CT 06152 Washington, DC 20004

(860) 726-6451 (202) 383-5300

RAYMOND J. SALASSI, JR. Counsel for Respondents

HARRY S. HARDIN III

JONES, WALKER, WAECHTER,
POITEVENT, CARRERE & DENEGRE LLP
201 St. Charles Avenue

New Orleans, LA 70170

(504) 582-8000

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

l. Whether the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States bars respondents’ suit to
obtain prospective relief to prevent a state official from
violating the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution by enforcing a state law that is preempted by a federal
Statute.

2. Whether the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, ef
seq., preempts a State statute that prohibits employee welfare
benefit plans from providing benefits through selective
networks of medical providers.

.
°
tore

ll

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of this Court,
respondents state the following: Respondent CIGNA
Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. (now renamed CIGNA
HealthCare of Louisiana, Inc.) is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of CIGNA Health Corp., which is a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of Connecticut General Corporation, which is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of CIGNA Holdings, Inc., which is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of CIGNA Corporation, a publicly
held corporation. CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. has
no subsidiaries.

Respondent Connecticut General Life Insurance
Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Connecticut
General Corporation, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
CIGNA Holdings, Inc., which is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of CIGNA Corporation, a publicly held corporation.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company has no
subsidiaries in which outside persons might have an interest.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .....
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .......... ii
EN i ccc cesses ill
pet OF Ge iy) 8 ey) iV

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
SS oes Re ow kln sb l

I. This Court Should Deny Certiorari on the
Eleventh Amendment Question ..........

~]

II. This Court Should Grant Certiorari on the
ERISA Preemption Question ............ 11

EE ee 24

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim

Health Care, inc. and Prudential Insurance Co. of Am.,
No. 96-10084-MEL (D. Mass. filed
SS: eer eee eee re e 16

Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.,
Got Wah See SEE 6 ck Rha eee 6

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala. v. Nielsen,
917 F. Supp. 1532 (N.D. Ala. 1996) ........ 17

California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc. (No. 95-789),
cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. Apr. 15, ,
ee 6. da eee Ae eee ae wae ae 11

Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho,
42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3672
(U.S. Apr. 15, 1996) (No. 94-1474) ....... 10

Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc..,
S56 F.26 8670 Oe Gai ESSE) 6 bce cs Sea e ss 4

DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S.,
ib mw EF -yee, fo oe. Serene errnee 23

District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade,
ae Ub. tae GaPeee 6 88 Oka he ew eee 19

|

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page

Donovan v. Dillingham,

688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) ........... 19
Ex parte Young,

Se tes ROe COO kk a Se alee a 7-10
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,

Cn we. Se iw ease Oi ok Se 3
Green v. Mansour,

Oe es Oe Ce sia cA eh Oia wks 9
Insurance Bd. Under Social Insurance Plan of
Bethlehem Steel Corp v. Muir,

Sip Fae Oe EC. POE) be i ee cee 23
Jones v. Louisiana ex rel. Bd. of Trustees,

A F-28108 Ga Ce: 2089) oc ek ne 9
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,

STL ARG. Fae Cee Sikes 3 Ber 11
Napoletano v. CIGNA HealthCare of Conn., Inc.,

680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996) ........ 5, 18, 20-22

New York State Conference of Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co..,
RED. Oh. BOTS foe a ek sc. 3-5, 11, 18-22

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page

NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Div. of Amax, Inc.,

See Sas en REED bk be es oe eS 19
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,

en See Oe ETD 6A a 5 64 Se ee ea Od 23
Scheuer v. Rhodes,

BE Sts SERENE coh Sat iwises®eteys 8
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

Se hs es Re aE hb ok oe re ACR 2, 7, 9-10
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc..,

Ee Shes OF RAED 68k 8 CR ROS UKE SOR 8, 11

Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Mgmt.,
995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1003 (1993) ...4, 17, 22, 23

Texas Pharmacy Ass’n v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Am..,
907 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Tex. 1995) ..... 17, 22

Tingle v. Pacific Mutual Insurance Co.,
Be ee Ee ee 23

Unite,’ ¥¢-od & Commercial Workers & Employers Az.
Health « Welfare Trust v. Pacyga,
Sol F.26 1157 Gt Ce. 19GB) nc ke Ke Ree es 23

ee eee

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page
Statutes
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.
Bue Fie 2 oe gl rrr 19
§ Sida), 29 U.S.C. § iid) .......... 11, 22

§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1114(6)(2)(A) . . 11, 22

Louisiana Health Care Cost Control Act,

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2201, et seg. ... 3, 18, 19
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,

Re Foe OM OF eras Oe eee 12
Health Maintenance Organization Act,

N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4400, et seg. (1995)... 12
Ala. Code § 27-45-3 (Supp. 1994) ............ 15

Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-114(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) 15
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-471 (West 1982) ..... 15

Sooke SS eee ere ry rer eee 20, 21

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 408.706 (West Supp. 1995) ..... 15
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 33-20-16 (1976) ........... 15
Idaho Code § 41-3937 (Supp. 1995) ........... 15
215 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/370h (West 1993) .... 15

Ind. Code Ann. § 27-8-11-3(b)-(c) (Michie 1994) . 15-16

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-110

(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1994) ............. 16
1994 Mass. Acts 60, §§ 148-49, 241 .......... 16
Soe DU, SUE See eh Wl SS 16
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-83-3 (1994) ............ 16

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-B:12(V) (Supp. 1994) .. 16

1994 N.J. Laws SB 886/AB 1221 ............ 16
N.C. Gon. Stat. § SO-31<37 €2996) 2 we cee 16
N.D. Cent. Code § 38.2-4209(B)-(D) (1994) ...... 16

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1742.09(B)(2)
CARDO IONE s 64S + EES OR A FES 16

WA Re Nit ah Ute

mR ae ea eed ee a ee

La Sa deste

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
Page
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3634 (West Supp. 1994-95) 16
S.D. Codified Laws § 58-18-37 (Michie 1990)... .. 16

Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 20A-14(g)(h) (West 1996) . 16

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-617 (1991) .......... 16
Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-3407 (Michie Supp. 1996) ... 16
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 628.36 (West 1995).......... 16
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-22-503(a)(1)

(Renee Oe Foe Nia SEs eK 16
Miscellaneous

Any Willing Provider Laws: Regulating the Health Care
Provider’s Contractual Relationship with the Insurance
Company, The Health Lawyer: The ABA Forum on
Se AA 8 Ce en a we A ee eae eRe 16

Atkinson & Co., Cost Impact of "Any Willing Provider”
Se ee 5. sb. Fs $e RES Se 14

Jesselyn Alicia Brown, ERISA and State Health Care Re-
form: Roadblock or Scapegoat?, 13 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev.
MO SI 8 eNO Kae eR ee 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Brief of Petitioner, Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho v.
Idaho (No. 94-1474) filed May 30, 1996 ........ 10

Anthony J. Dennis, Potential Anticompetitive Effects of
Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses in Managed Care
and Health Insurance Contracts, 4 Ann. Health L. 71
0 SP re rr on a ee eee 14

Employee Benefit Research Institute Education and Re-
search Fund, EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits (3d ed.
PPP T CRTC Cee he eee Ta 5

Gary A. Francesconi, ERJSA Preemption of "Any Willing
Provider" Laws -- An Essential Step Toward National
Health Care Reform, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 227 (1995) 6, 14

Group Health Ass’n of America, State Managed Care
Legislative Resource (1996) .........0000008% 16

Douglas A. Hastings, et al., eds., Fundamentals of Health
di. | EPSP ETUECETE Eee CT 6, 12, 14

Karen A. Jordan, Managed Competition and Limited
Choice of Previders: Countering Negative Perceptions
Through a Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physi-
Clans, 27 Agta. BR. L.3. STS (IFS) wwe ccc awe. 14

Bruce D. Platt, Dispelling the Negative Myths of Managed
Care, 23 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 489 (1995) ........ 14

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page

U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Resources Div..
Managed Health Care: Effect on Employers’ Costs Diffi-
cult to Measure (GAO/HRD-94-3) (1993) . 5-6, 12, 14-15

U.S. General Accounting Office, Health, Education, and
Human Services Div., Employer-Based Health Plans:
Issues, Trends, and Challenges Posed by ERISA (GAO
ED CE sno a sow Sd ba Gem's 5, 6

Wyatt Co., Cost Analysis of State Legislative Mandates on
Six Managed Health Care Practices (1991) ....... 14

No. 96-316

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1995

STATE OF LOUISIANA, EX REL. RICHARD P. [EYOUB,
Attorney General,
Petitioner,

CIGNA HEALTHPLAN OF LOUISIANA, INC. and
CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This Court should deny the petition for certiorari to
the extent that it presents the question whether the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States bars this
action. The district court rejected petitioner’s assertion of an
Eleventh Amendment defense as “patently without merit."
(Pet. 23a n.2.) The Court of Appeals agreed with that
assessment, finding it “well established that the federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear suits against state officials

where, as here, the plaintiffs seek only prospective declarato-
ry or injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of
federal law." (Pet. 3a n.1.) The Court of Appeals also
correctly decided that this Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), did not alter
this conclusion. (Pet. 4a n.1.) Because the decision below
is squarely supported by this Court’s precedent, no reason
exists for this Court to review the Eleventh Amendment
question.

Although they prevailed below, respondents nonethe-
less urge this Court to grant the petition for certiorari limited
to the question of whether Louisiana’s “any willing provider"
statute is preempted by ERISA. The specific preemption
question presented is one that this Court has not addressed
and as to which the lower courts are divided. It is of funda-
mental importance not only to petitioner and officials of
other states and to respondents and other entities that offer
managed health care coverage, but also to sponsors and
participants of ERISA plans that are increasingly subjected
to state regulation of the type that ERISA’s preemption
provision was designed to avoid.

Respondents administer for ERISA-regulated employ-
ee benefit plans, many of which operate in multiple states,
a network of selectively contracted medical providers, such
as physicians. The Louisiana statute at issue directly
prohibits respondents and their employee benefit plan
customers from using a selective provider network in that
state. It provides, both by its express terms and its neces-
sary effect, that an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan or
other "group purchaser" may not, regardless of the plan’s

provisions, provide health care benefits through a provider
network unless that network is open to any and all providers
willing to contract on the network’s terms and conditions.
See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2202(5)(c) (1992). Although
the Court of Appeals correctly held this statute preempted as
applied to ERISA-covered employee benefit plans, the
pervasive and recurring nature of this question, its nation-
wide impact, and the conflict in legal analysis among the
lower courts warrant the grant of certiorari.

ERISA’s preemption provision represents a congres-
sional judgment that employee benefit plans should be free
to develop their own uniform benefit and administrative
structures instead of being subject to a “patchwork scheme
of regulation." Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1, 11 (1987). In New York State Conference of Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. aan
S. Ct. 1671 (1995) ("Travelers"), this Court held that a state
Statute that did not directly regulate ERISA-covered employ-
ee benefit plans but merely had the "indirect economic influ-
ence” of raising the costs borne by such plans was not
preempted by ERISA. The Court left undisturbed, however,
its longstanding precedent that ERISA preempts state laws
directly affecting the structure and administration of employ-
ee benefit plans. Although the court below correctly recog-
nized that Travelers had not altered the preemption analysis
as to such laws, other courts have reached inconsistent
conclusions and results. Review by this Court is necessary
to resolve whether a state any willing provider statute that
prohibits employee benefit plans from offering benefits
through limited provider networks is preempted by ERISA.

Despite the intense public debate over issues of
health care costs and delivery, Congress has not modified
ERISA’s preemptive effect or generally amended ERISA to
restrict plan sponsors’ freedom in health plan design but has
continued "to allow the free marketplace to work out such
competitive, cost effective, medical expense reducing
structures as may evolve." Davidowitz v. Delta Dentai Plan
of Cal., Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1481 (9th Cir. 1991). Increas-
ingly, however, state regulation has sought impermissibly to
encroach on the operation of employee benefit plans by,
among other things, prohibiting or restricting managed care
features that are integral to the plans’ design. The fact that
Louisiana’s “any willing provider" statute is one of many
such statutes underscores the nationwide scope of the clash
between ERISA’s protection of the freedom of employee
benefit plans to structure their own benefit programs and
many states’ efforts to restrict that freedom.

Not surprisingly, this conflict between regulatory
schemes has already led to substantial litigation that has
produced judicial decisions with divergent analyses and
results. As the petition notes, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has issued a decision reaching a result
inconsistent with the decision below and upholding a
Virginia any willing provider statute against a challenge
based on ERISA preemption. See Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp.
v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1003 (1993). Moreover, some courts have
read this Court’s decision in Travelers as altering the
preemption analysis and reopening the question of whether
ERISA preempts state laws that directly affect the structure
and administration of employee benefit plans. The court

below held that Travelers did not affect preemption of the
Louisiana statute. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has,
however, employed a very different analysis of Travelers in
concluding that ERISA does not preempt claims that one of
respondents’ affiliates had violated a state law regulating
PPO contracting practices. See Napoletano v. CIGNA
HealthCare of Conn., Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996).

Resolution of the question presented is urgently
needed because of its broad and nationwide impact on health
care benefits received by the majority of American workers
and their families. An estimated 114 million Americans
receive health care benefits through employee welfare benefit
plans subject to ERISA.' In response to the spiraling cost
of health care, employers and unions that sponsor such
ERISA plans have frequently incorporated "managed care"
features into their plan design.” In contrast to a traditional
fee-for-service or indemnity plan that reimburses all or a
portion of the fee charged by a medical service provider,
"managed care" seeks to integrate the benefit and delivery
aspects of health care so as to provide quality health care at

' See U.S. General Accounting Office, Health, Education, and
Human Services Div., Employer-Based Health Plans: Issues,
Trends, and Challenges Posed by ERISA (GAO/HEHS-95-167)
(1995) ("1995 GAO Report") at 2, 45. See also Employee Benefit
Research Institute Education and Research Fund, EBR/ Databook
on Employee Benefits (3d ed. 1995) at Table 8.8.

* See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Resources
Div., Managed Health Care: Effect on Employers’ Costs Difficult
to Measure (GAO/HRD-94-3) (1993) ("1993 GAO Report") at 3-4
(discussing the growth of managed care since 1980).

an affordable cost. Among the most frequently used
managed care programs are network-based programs, such
as preferred provider organizations ("PPOs") and health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs") of the type offered by
respondents here.* So prevalent have these types of pro-
grams become that recent statistics show that they are
available to upwards of 90 million persons who are partici-
pants or beneficiaries in ERISA welfare plans.°

Absent review by this Court, litigation over ERISA
preemption and any willing provider laws will only increase,
and the conflicts among the lower courts will likely only
deepen.® Without this Court’s resolution of the issue,

* See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332,
339 n.7 (1982) (discussing the difference between traditional
health insurance plans and managed care programs); 1993 GAO
Report at 23-31 (discussing key elements of managed care).

* See 1993 GAO Report at 6-12; see also Douglas A. Has-
tings, et al., eds., Fundamentals of Health Law 258-260 (1995).

* See 1993 GAO Report at 5-7; see also 1995 GAO Report at
20 n.39 (reflecting that in 1994, nearly two-thirds of individuals
with employer-based insurance were enrolled in network-based

managed care).

* Legal commentators have also noted the unanswered nature
of the question presented here. See, e.g., Jesselyn Alicia Brown,
ERISA and State Health Care Reform: Roadblock or Scapegoat?,
13 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 339, 380-81 (1995) (discussing uncer-
tainties regarding preemption of any willing provider laws by
ERISA); Gary A. Francesconi, ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing
Provider" Laws -- An Essential Step Toward National Health Care
Reform, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 227 (1995) (same).

employee benefit plans will be free to adopt limited provider
networks in some states but not in others, and ERISA’s goal
of promoting uniform national regulation of such plans will
remain elusive. This case presents this important issue in a
summary judgment context and on a record of undisputed
material facts. Accordingly, respondents urge the Court to
grant certiorari limited to the question of ERISA preemption.

I. This Court Should Deny Certiorari on the Eleventh
Amendment Question

There is no conflict in authority requiring resolution
by this Court as to the Eleventh Amendment question
presented by petitioner. To the contrary, it is well settled
that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions to enjoin
State officials like petitioner from enforcing state laws that
are preempted by federal law. As the district court and the
Court of Appeals both held, such actions for prospective
relief against state officials have long been allowed under the
doctrine established in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Just last term, this Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.16 (1996), affirmed the
vitality of this doctrine in cases like this one, Stating that "an
individual may obtain injunctive relief under Ex parte Young
in order to remedy a state officer’s ongoing violation of
federal law.”

In Ex parte Young, the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits against state officers to enjoin
them from violating federal law, reasoning that a state
officer who (as here) seeks to enforce an unconstitutional

Statute is stripped of his official or representative character.
209 U.S. at 159-60; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 237 (1974). Following Ex parte Young, federal courts
have routinely entertained suits against state officials seeking
prospectively to prevent those officials from enforcing state
laws that violate the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Most notably, the Court unanimously applied this rule to
ERISA preemption suits in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85 (1983). There, the Court held that the Ex parte
Young doctrine empowered plaintiffs to sue to enjoin state
regulation that was preempted by ERISA, stating that "[iJt is
beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits
to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights."
Id. at 96 n.14.’

Contrary to petitioner’s argument that this case is
"dissimilar{ ]" from cases involving "traditional Ex parte
Young analysis," Pet. 25, this is precisely the type of action
encompassed by the Ex parte Young doctrine. Respondents
sued the Attorney General of Louisiana, who is responsible
for enforcing the any willing provider law,* and who was

7 As Shaw makes clear, petitioner is plainly wrong in his
contention that Ex parte Young applies only if the state official!
seeks to enforce "a criminal statute with intimidating provisions
and penalties." (See Pet. 27.)

® Petitioner argues this suit is barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment because it was purportedly brought against Louisiana itself.
(Pet. 7.) However, as both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals noted, the body of respondents’ complaint makes clear
that the only defendant in the suit is the Attorney General of
Louisiana, rendering this argument meritless. (Pet. 23a n.2 (citing

eT

acting to enforce that law against respondents. Because the
Louisiana statute is preempted by ERISA, the Attorney
General’s efforts to enforce it violated the Supremacy
Clause. Respondents’ action to enjoin the Attorney General
from acting in violation of the Supremacy Clause falls
precisely within the realm of actions permitted under Ex
parte Young. As this Court stated in Green v. Mansour, 474
U.S. 64, 68 (1985), "the availability of prospective relief of
the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Suprem-
acy Clause." Thus, contrary to petitioner’s protestations,
there was nothing "novel" in the Court of Appeals’ applica-
tion of Ex parte Young to this case, and there is no reason to
review or reverse its decision.

Petitioner’s reliance on Seminole Tribe is equally
misplaced, since Seminole Tribe does not affect Ex parte
Young’s application here. In Seminole Tribe, the Court held
that Congress lacked the authority under the Indian Com-
merce Clause to abrogate Florida’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suit, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32, an issue irrelevant
to this case. In so holding, the Court stressed that it was not
disturbing the traditional Ex parte Young cause of action,
Stating that "an individual can bring suit against a state
officer in order to ensure that the officer’s conduct is in
compliance with federal law." Jd. at 1131 n.14: see also id.
at 1131 n.16.

While Seminole Tribe also held that Congress could
not have intended to permit suits against state officials for

Jones v. Louisiana ex rel. Bd. of Trustees, 764 F.2d 1183, 1185-
86 (Sth Cir. 1985)); Pet. 3 n.1.).

10

prospective relief where it had "prescribed a detailed remedi-
al scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right," id. at 1132, those circumstances are not
present here. As the Court of Appeals noted, respondents do
not seek to invoke any remedial scheme involving enforce-
ment against a State. (Pet. 4a n.1.) Rather, respondents
seek to prevent petitioner from violating the Supremacy
Clause by encroaching on legal terrain that Congress has
deemed exclusively the province of federal law.

In short, the decision of the Court of Appeals that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action is fully
consistent with this Court’s decisions, and there is no
conflict in authority among the circuit courts requiring
resolution by this Court. Accordingly, to the extent it seeks
review of this question, the petition should be denied.®

* In Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3672 (U.S. Apr. 15,
1996) (No. 94-1474), a tribe sued to establish its purported right,
under an Executive Order ratified by Congress, to land to which
Idaho also claimed title. The Ninth Circuit held that the tribe
could sue Idaho officials under Ex parte Young for relief establish-
ing its rights to those lands. Jd. at 1251-52. Even if this Court
reversed that ruling, it would not alter the analysis in this case.
Unlike Coeur D’Alene, this case involves efforts to enjoin a state
official from violating the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, Idaho
recognized in its brief that Ex parte Young applies to cases like
this one, arguing that there (unlike here) "[t]he injunctive relief
that the Tribe seeks is not tailored to enforcement of allegedly
unconstitutional state statutes by state officers." Br. of Pet., No.
94-1474 at § (D(c)(1) (filed May 30, 1996).

11

II. This Court Should Grant Certiorari on the ERISA
Preemption Question

1. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides, with certain
exceptions, that the provisions of ERISA

Shall supersede any and ali State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employ-
ee benefit plan.

29 U.S.C. § 1114(a). One of the relevant exceptions is
contained in ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) which provides generally
that the broad preemptive effect of § 514(a) shall not apply
to "any law of any State which regulates insurance." This
Court has construed both of these provisions many times,
see, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 463 U.S. 85 (1983)
("relate to" clause) and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (insurance "savings"
clause), and most recently in its interpretation of the "relate
to” clause in Travelers.

The question presented here, which has not previous-
ly been addressed by this Court, is whether, in light of
Travelers, a state statute may, as Louisiana’s any willing
provider statute does, directly regulate the structure and
administration of ERISA-covered employee benefit plans."

© Respondents recognize that this Court has pending before it
another case involving ERISA’s preemption provision. See
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement vy. Dillingham
Constr. N.A., Inc. (No. 95-789), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3689
(U.S. Apr. 15, 1996). The preemption issue in that case,
however, arises in a far different context and may well be resolved
on grounds that would not affect the analysis or result in this case.

12

The Court of Appeals faithfully followed this Court’s
decisions in holding that Louisiana’s any willing provider
statute was preempted because it “relate[s] to" ERISA-
governed employee benefit plans and is not saved from
preemption as a law “which regulates insurance." (Pet. 10a-
lla, 15a.) Review by this Court is nonetheless warranted
because of the national importance of the preemption
question presented and the conflict and disarray among the
lower courts over that issue.

2. Managed care programs such as those offered by
respondents and affected by the Louisiana statute arose in
response to marketplace demands from employee benefit plan
sponsors for alternatives to indemnity programs that could
control health care costs while assuring quality and ac-
cess.’ Generally speaking, managed care is a process by
which the parties responsible for paying for health care
services intervene in the health care delivery process in
various ways in order to reduce the costs of such care and
improve the quality of such care."

“\ See 1993 GAO Report at 2-6. HMOs and other managed
care organizations have also been vigorously encouraged by both
federal and state legislation. See, e.g., Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e, et seg.; Health
Maintenance Organization Act, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4400, er
seg. (1995). See also 1993 GAO Report at 7 n.7 (discussing
impact of legislation on the rapid growth of managed care);
Douglas A. Hastings, et al., eds., Fundamentals of Health Law
252 (1995).

® Jd. at 245.

13

One popular method utilized by many insurers and
other managed care organizations, including respondents, is
to offer care through "preferred provider" panels or net-
works, referred to as PPOs." PPOs selectively contract
with physicians, hospitals, and others to obtain services for
PPO participants at a discounted rate from normal charges.
The preferred providers also agree to comply with various
quality and utilization management requirements. In turn,
the PPO will limit the size of its provider panel and will
include incentives to its participants to encourage them to
obtain care through the preferred provider panel. The
expectation is that most participants will choose to utilize the
provider network, resulting in a greater volume of patients
for these providers. Increased patient volume, in turn,
provides an incentive to the preferred providers to discount
their fees. Similar networks are used to operate HMOs, in

° Respondents offer a variety of health care coverages and
administrative services to employee benefit plans. Respondent
CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. is a licensed HMO that
provides prepaid health care coverages to its subscribers through
a network of selectively contracted medical providers, such as
physicians. This provider network is offered to health care
consumers both directly and through employee benefit plans,
insurers, and other groups. (Pet. 6a.) Respondent Connecticut
General Life Insurance Company is a licensed insurer that makes
this network available to employee benefit plans, both on a fully
insured basis and for use by self-funded or non-insured plans to
which it provides administrative services. (Id.)

14

which the network is frequently the exclusive vehicle for
obtaining prepaid care."

Limiting the size of the provider network is key to its
success. Providers are willing to discount their charges in
light of the prospect of a high volume of referrals from the
network and prompt payment from a single source. By
limiting the number of providers, the network administrator
is able to establish and monitor quality controls and to avoid
the excess costs of dealing with an unlimited number of
providers.'* These quality and cost advantages directly

“ Hastings, et al., Fundamentals of Health Law at 245, 248;
1993 GAO Report at 6-10.

'S See 1993 GAO Report at 9-10; Anthony J. Dennis, Potential
Anticompetitive Effects of Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses
in Managed Care and Health Insurance Contracts, 4 Ann. Health
L. 71, 72 (1995) (discussing economics of provider panels); Bruce
D. Platt, Dispelling the Negative Myths of Managed Care, 23 Fla.
St. U.L. Rev. 489, 499 (1995) ("‘Any Willing Provider’ legisla-
tion defeats the entire concept of managed care"); Karen A.
Jordan, Managed Competition and Limited Choice of Providers:
Countering Negative Perceptions Through a Responsibility to
Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 875, 915
(1995); Atkinson & Co., Cost Impact of "Any Willing Provider"
Legislation (1994) (cost for a typical independent practice
association would rise by forty-three percent under an any willing
provider mandate); Wyatt Co., Cost Analysis of State Legislative
Mandates on Six Managed Health Care Practices 3 (1991). The
Federal Trade Commission has also recognized the detrimental
effects of any willing provider laws on competition and has issued
opinion letters urging states to discontinue laws that prohibit insur-
ers from maintaining cost effective preferred provider arrange-
ments. See Gary A. Francesconi, ERISA Preemption of "Any

15

benefit employee benefit plans that contract with the network
to provide benefits to employees and their families. Depend-
ing on a plan’s design, networks can provide either an
exclusive or optional form of benefit delivery for an employ-
ee benefit plan, and network benefits can be provided
through an insurance policy or an administrative-services-
only basis to self-funded or non-insured plans.

As of 1992, the GAO found that over half of all
private employers provided network-based managed care to
their employees, covering 90 million persons.'* Despite the
growth and spread of network-based health care, the ability
of respondents and their competitors to make high quality
and low cost provider panels available to employee benefit
plans is threatened by the proliferation of “any willing
provider" statutes similar to the statute at issue in this action.
Although the judgment in this case prevents enforcement of
the Louisiana statute against respondents as applied to
employee benefit plans, 25 other states have some type of
any willing provider law on their books.'” Therefore, al-

Willing Provider" Laws -- An Essential Step Toward National
Health Care Reform, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 227, 262 n.159, 265
(1995) (collecting citations to FTC letters).

"© See 1993 GAO Report at 5-7.

See Ala. Code § 27-45-3 (Supp. 1994); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 23-79-114(b) (Michie Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 38-471 (West 1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 7301 (Supp.
1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 408.706 (West Supp. 1995); Ga. Code
Ann. §§ 33-20-16 (1976); Idaho Code § 41-3937 (Supp. 1995):
215 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/370h (West 1993); Ind. Code Ann.

16

though respondents can now maintain limited provider
networks in Louisiana, they or their affiliates in other states
must still contend with similar laws in these states. States
continue to enact any willing provider laws,'* and both
states and private parties continue to bring suit to enforce
laws already on the books.’® Indeed, prior to instituting

§ 27-8-11-3(b)-(c) (Michie 1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-
110 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1994); 1994 Mass. Acts 60, §§ 148-49,
241; 1994 Minn. Laws 2927; Miss. Code Ann. § 41-83-3 (1994);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-B:12(V) (Supp. 1994); 1994 N_J.
Laws SB 886/AB 1221; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-51-37 (1994); N.D.
Cent. Code § 38.2-4209(B)-(D) (1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1742.09(B)(2) (Anderson 1996); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3634
(West Supp. 1994-95); S.D. Codified Laws § 58-18-37 (Michie
1990); Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 20A-14(g)(h) (West 1996); Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-617 (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-3407
(Michie Supp. 1996); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 628.36 (West 1995);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-22-503(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1995). These
do not include variations such as “price differential laws," which
govern the difference in the allowable reimbursement for use of
out-of-network services, and “due process laws," which mandate
that health plans follow certain procedures in selecting and
deselecting providers. See Any Willing Provider Laws: Regulating
the Health Care Provider’s Contractual Relationship with the
Insurance Company, The Health Lawyer: The ABA Forum on
Health Law 7 (1994-95).

'® See Group Health Ass’n of America, State Managed Care
Legislative Resource (1996).

'? See, e.g., American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim
Health Care, Inc. and Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 96-10084-
MEL (D. Mass. filed Jan. 17, 1996) (suit by pharmacies alleging
violation of Massachusetts any willing pharmacy law).

17

this action, respondents were sued by a physician under the
Louisiana law and were threatened with actions by the
petitioner Attorney General as well as by other private
parties. (Pet. 7a.)”°

3. Litigation over whether ERISA preempts any willing
provider laws has produced divergent and conflicting results.
At least one decision has, like the decision of the Court of
Appeals in this case, held that ERISA preempts the state
statute. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala. v. Nielsen.
917 F. Supp. 1532 (N.D. Ala. 1996). Others have held that
the state statute was not preempted because it was saved as
a law “which regulates insurance" even though it "relate[s]
to" employee benefit plans. See Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp.
v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1003 (1993): Texas Pharmacy Ass’n v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 907 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Tex.
1995). A recent decision from the Connecticut Supreme
Court holds that causes of action to enforce a Connecticut
Statute that prohibits a provider network from excluding

* Moreover, any willing provider statutes are merely illustra-
tive of the proliferation of statutes regulating managed care
practices that has occurred in the mid-1990s. States have recently
enacted a multitude of provisions regulating the delivery of health
care benefits which -- similar to any willing provider laws — have
the effect of mandating the structure of benefits provided by
employee benefit plans. For example, "direct access" laws require
closed-panel health plans to permit participants to bypass network
gatekeeper requirements and access the services of certain
specialists. "Freedom of choice" laws require closed-panel health
plans to offer or reimburse out-of-network services.

18

willing providers based on criteria that have not been
publicly filed are not preempted because they do not "relate
to" employee benefit plans. See Napoletano v. CIGNA
HealthCare of Conn., Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996).
Absent review and further guidance from this Court,
employee benefit plans will be subject not to the uniform
nationwide regulation mandated by ERISA, but to the patch-
work of state regulation that ERISA’s preemption provision
was designed to prevent.

4. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the
Louisiana statute "relate[s] to” ERISA-covered employee
benefit plans on two separate bases. Nonetheless, there is
disagreement and conflict in the lower courts about the
meaning and application of the "relate to" test after this
Court’s decision in Travelers.

a. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the
Louisiana statute “relate[s] to" employee benefit plans
because it directly refers to them and includes them within
its regulatory ambit. As the Court of Appeals noted, the
Louisiana statute specifically prohibits exclusion from the
PPO of any “licensed provider...who agrees to the terms and
conditions of the preferred provider contract." (Pet. 10a.)
PPOs are defined in the statute as "contractual...agreements
between a provider or providers and a group purchaser or
purchasers to provide for alternative rates of payment." La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2202(5)(a). A "group purchaser,” in
turn, is defined in language that directly encompasses
employee benefit plans, as including:

[e]ntities which contract for the benefit of
their...employees, or members such as...Taft-

19

Hartley trusts, or employers who establish or
participate in self funded trusts or programs.

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2202(3)(a). Employers or employ-
e€ associations which contract to provide health care "for the
benefit of their...employees or members" thereby establish
“employee welfare benefit plans" subject to ERISA. See
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); see also Donovan y.
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371-73 (11th Cir. 1982). The
Louisiana statute’s application to ERISA plans is made even
more explicit by its reference to "Taft-Hartley trusts"”' as
well as to “employers who establish...self funded trusts or
programs." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2202(3)(a). Given its
express application to ERISA-covered employee benefit
plans, the Louisiana statute "relate[s] to” such plans for
preemption purposes “on that basis alone." See District of
Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130
(1992).

b. The Court of Appeals also correctly held that the
Louisiana statute "“relate[s] to" ERISA plans because it
prohibits an employee benefit plan from being structured to
deliver benefits through a limited provider network. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals carefully
considered the impact of this Court’s decision in Travelers.
In Travelers, this Court reviewed a New York statute that
imposed surcharges on hospital bills payable through
commercial insurance but not on bills payable by Blue Cross

*! See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Div. of Amax, Inc., 453 U.S.
322, 334 (1981) (noting the applicability of ERISA to trust funds
established to comply with the Taft-Hartley Act).

20

or Blue Shield. 115 S. Ct. at 1674-75. The Court held that
the statute did not "relate to" employee benefit plans because
it had only the “indirect economic effect" on the plans of
raising the cost of commercial insurance and giving them an
incentive to obtain coverage through Blue Cross. /d. at
1679. The Court noted that the New York statute merely
"influenced a plan’s shopping decision" but did not “man-
dat[e] employee benefit structures" or "bind plan administra-
tors to any particular choice." Jd. Recognizing, in contrast,
that the Louisiana statute "specifically mandates that certain
benefits available to ERISA plans must be constructed in a
particular manner,” the Court of Appeals correctly decided
that the “limited Travelers holding...leaves undisturbed our
conclusion that Louisiana’s Any Willing Provider statute is
preempted by ERISA." (Pet. 13a.)

5. A far different reading of Travelers has, however,
been adopted by other courts. Nowhere is this conflict more
evident than in a recent decision of the Connecticut Supreme
Court that relied on Travelers to resolve the preemption issue
adversely to respondents’ Connecticut affiliate. See Napol-
etano v. CIGNA HealthCare of Connecticut, Inc., 680 A.2d
127 (Conn. 1996). Napoletano (and a companion case ad-
dressed in the same opinion, Hollis v. CIGNA HealthCare of
Connecticut, Inc.) involved a Connecticut statute, 1994
Conn. Pub. Acts 235, titled "An Act Concerning Managed
Care." The Connecticut statute requires a preferred provider
network to file with a state commission and make available
to a provider “the general criteria for its selection or
termination of health care providers” to the extent that such
criteria are not proprietary or of a competitive nature. If the
criteria have not been publicly filed, a network "may not

21

reject or terminate" a provider from participating in the
network based on those criteria "until the provider has been
informed of the criteria that his practice fails to meet." 680
A.2d at 131 n.3, quoting 1994 Conn. Pub. Acts 235(e)(2).

Plaintiffs in Napoletano sued one of respondents’
Connecticut affiliates, a network administrator, alleging
various statutory and common law causes of action, includ-
ing an action for violation of the Connecticut managed care
Statute. Jd. at 132. Reversing a trial court decision that
these causes of action were preempted by ERISA, the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the claims were not
preempted because they sought to "enforce," not modify, the
terms of an employee benefit plan. Jd. at 136.

In reaching this conclusion, the Connecticut Supreme
Court extensively discussed this Court’s opinion in Travelers
which it characterized as having "indicated a retreat from
preemption.” Jd. at 140 n.22. Citing to Travelers, the court
reasoned that any “costs and burdens upon the benefit plans"
were insufficient to trigger preemption because "the Supreme
Court has concluded that indirect costs and benefits do not
result in preemption." Jd. at 143 n.26. Similarly, citing
post-Travelers authority from federal courts of appeal, the
court reasoned that “although a successful claim...under the
Connecticut statute would in effect require that CIGNA
continue to employ the plaintiff physicians, such a result
would not have an impermissible or burdensome effect on
the administration of the plan." Jd. at 144.

The conflict in analysis between Napoletano and the
Court of Appeals’ decision in this case goes beyond their
disagreement over whether Travelers was intended by this

22

Court to "indicate[ ] a retreat from preemption." The Court
of Appeals in this case held that the State of Louisiana
simply could not permissibly regulate employee benefit plans
and their administration. The Connecticut Supreme Court,
in contrast, concluded that Travelers has sufficiently changed
the preemption landscape that it is permissible for a state to
regulate a plan’s administration as long as that regulation is
not, in a court’s view, "burdensome." Jd. The two analyses
cannot be reconciled. Rather, they squarely conflict over
whether, after Travelers, state regulation may directly
regulate plan structure and administration.

7. The conflict in the preemption analysis among the
lower courts is not limited to the "relate to" prong of ERISA
§ 514(a) but extends also to whether, or under what test, an
any willing provider law may be "saved" from preemption
under ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) as a law “which regulates
insurance.” While the Court of Appeals in this case held
that the Louisiana statute was not saved on this basis, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite
result in Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Health
Management, 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1003 (1993), as to Virginia’s any willing provider
statute. Similarly, a district court in the Fifth Circuit has
followed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to hold that a Texas
Statute applicable to pharmacies was saved as a law "which
regulates insurance.” Texas Pharmacy Ass’n v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 907 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Tex. 1995).

These decisions conflict in the way they analyze
ERISA’s insurance saving clause. This Court has held that
a determination of whether a state law “regulates insurance"

————————————O

23

for purposes of ERISA preemption should be made by
considering a “common-sense” definition of insurance
regulation plus an analysis of the three factors used to
determine what constitutes "the business of insurance" under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1987). The court below --
following its own precedent that a law is not saved from
ERISA preemption unless it satisfies both the common-sense
definition of insurance regulation and each of the three
McCarran-Ferguson factors -- found it unnecessary to
analyze anything other than the third factor since the
Louisiana statute “obviously is not limited to entities within
the insurance industry." (Pet. 14a & n.51, quoting Tingle v.
Pacific Mutual Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 105, 108 (Sth Cir. 1993).)
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Stuart Circle,
however -- following its precedent that none of these factors
is determinative -- reached the Opposite result. Because
decisions in the circuits are in conflict over how to analyze
ERISA’s insurance savings clause,” review by this Court
is appropriate to resolve this conflict also.

8. Review by this Court is especially urgent because of
the widespread use of managed care by ERISA-covered
employee benefit plans throughout the country. Unless the

” Compare DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the
U.S., 920 F.2d 457, 468-70 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring each factor
to be met) with Insurance Bd. Under Soc. Ins. Plan of Bethlehem
Steel Corp v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408, 411 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1987);
United Food & Comm. Workers & Employers Az. Health &
Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that no one factor is dispositive).

24

preemption question presented here is resolved by this Court,
employee benefit plans will be faced with the prospect of
either litigating over this preemption issue in multiple
jurisdictions or simply foregoing implementation of managed
care features such as limited provider networks, especially
on a uniform nationwide basis. This case presents a clearcut
example of a state statute that interferes with the design and
administration of employee benefit plans and an undisputed
factual record on which the preemption issue can be re-
solved. Accordingly, respondents urge the Court to grant
the petition as to this issue and resolve this issue without
waiting for the conflict in the lower courts to continue to
fester.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
the petition limited to the first question presented involving
ERISA preemption.

25

Respectfully submitted,

DONALD T. BLIss

ROBERT N. ECCLEs
(Counsel of Record)

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 383-5300

HARRY N. MAZADOORIAN

EDWARD P. POTANKA

CIGNA HEALTHCARE OF LOUISIANA, INC.
900 Cottage Grove Road

Hartford, CT 06152

(860) 726-6451

RAYMOND J. SALASSI, JR.

HARRY S. HARDIN III

JONES, WALKER, WAECHTER, POITEVENT, CARRERE &
DENEGRE LLP

Place St. Charles

201 St. Charles Avenue

New Orleans, LA 70170

(504) 582-8000

Counsel for Respondents

September 30, 1996

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386004_1367%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.