# Amicus Curiae Brief — In re USAir, Inc.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386004_1218%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1996
- **Citation:** 519 U.S. 806

## Text

29 16 2

Docket No. 96-157

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

In Re: USAir, Inc.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MOTION OF AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS
CURIAE AND BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

LOUISE B. COBBS*

HAIGHT, GARDNER, POOR & HAVENS
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 4400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Tel: (202) 496-2700

*Counsel of Record for the
Amicus Curiae

August 29, 1996

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

No. 96-157

In Re: USAir, Inc.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MOTION OF AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHIBITION

The Air Transport Association of America ("ATA") hereby
respectfully moves for leave to file the attached brief amicus curiae
in this case.

The ATA has notified all other parties to this action and has
received the following responses to its request for consent to file
this brief amicus curiae: Petitioner, USAir, Inc. has consented;
David Rapoport, Rapoport & Kupets Law Offices, has objected on
behalf of plaintiffs below; and no other party has responded.

The ATA is a non-profit unincorporated association of
federally-certificated air carriers providing scheduled and charter
passenger and cargo air transportation. ATA represents the

2

interests of U.S. airlines’ that account for more than 95 percent
of domestic passenger and cargo traffic. Its principal function is
to represent the interests of the U.S. commercial airline industry
before the United States Congress, federal agencies, state
legislatures, and before federal and state courts. ATA works
closely with federal agencies concerned with aviation safety and
provides a forum in which airlines can discuss and encourage
safety initiatives through industry working groups. ATA has filed
numerous amicus briefs in federal and state court proceedings
concerning a wide variety of issues of interest to its members,
including an amicus brief in the court below.

In the court below, Petitioners and ATA argued for
application of the self-critical analysis privilege to protect from
disclosure certain internal airline safety reports. The ATA as
amicus is uniquely ab’e to describe the significant effect on the
airline industry’s safety programs if the decision of the court below
is allowed to stand. The Court has consistently allowed industry
associations, including, e.g., the ATA, to file briefs as amicus
curiae. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, _ U.S.__, 115
S.Ct. 817 (1995); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent,
Michigan, 510 U.S. 355 (1994).

Millions of passengers justifiably rely on ATA’s member
airlines, whose excellent safety record is due in part to internal
safety review mechanisms that the self-critical analysis privilege is
designed to protect and foster. The self-critical analysis privilege
has been applied by many courts, primarily trial courts in

' ATA’s members are: Alaska Airlines,Inc.; Aloha Airlines, Inc.; America
West Airlines, Inc.; American Airlines, Inc.; American Trans Air, Inc;
Continental Airlines, Inc.; Delta Air Lines, Inc.; DHL World Airways, Inc.;
Evergreen International Aviation, Inc.; Federal Express Corp.; Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc.; Kiwi International Airlines, Inc.; Midwest Express Airlines, Inc.;
Northwest Airlines, Inc.; Polar Air Cargo, Inc.; Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc.;
Southwest Airlines Co.; Trans World Airlines, Inc.; United Airlines, Inc.; United
Parcel Service Co.; and USAir, Inc. Associate members are: Air Canada;
Canadian Airlines International; and KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines.

5 A AER BT

3

interlocutory orders addressing discovery disputes. The federal
courts of appeals have also recognized the privilege, but have
disagreed on its elements and have applied it in an uneven,
inconsistent, and unpredictable manner, including the court below.
Further, the decision of the court below ignored the criteria set
forth in this Court’s decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, _US. _,
116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996).

The lack of clarity in the federal courts of appeals regarding
the scope and application of the privilege has a serious chilling
effect on airlines’ ability to engage in full and frank internal safety
analyses. In ATA’s view, not only does Petitioner raise an
important question of federal law worthy of this Court’s
consideration, but the chilling effect of the lower courts’ disarray
on the scope of the self-critical analysis privilege provides an
additional compelling reason for this Court’s review.

Accordingly, ATA seeks the Court’s permission to file this
brief amicus curiae to demonstrate that the self-critical analysis
privilege is crucial to fostering meaningful internal safety reviews
that benefit the travelling public. Failure to recognize and apply
the privilege to internal airline safety audits and reviews is
contrary to public policy and is inconsistent with Congressional
and Federal Aviation Administration policies protecting safety data.
Further, failure to so apply the privilege will have a substantial
chilling effect on the frankness and completeness of such reviews.

4

WHEREFORE, ATA respectfully requests leave to file the
attached brief.

Respectfully submitted,

LOUISE B. COBBS*

HAIGHT, GARDNER, POOR & HAVENS
2000 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 4400
Washington, DC 20006-1812

(202) 496-2700

* Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae
Air Transport Association of America

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does the failure of the court below to follow the criteria set
forth in Jaffee and Upjohn for applying a privilege add to judicial
confusion regarding the self-critical analysis privilege and ignore
compelling public policies protecting airline safety reviews?

2. Does the public policy of and the public interest in fostering
airline safety compel the protection from discovery of internal
airline documents analyzing airline operations under the self-
critical analysis privilege?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)
DURST eee PUN CTIA © o'6. 6: a's S oodiecn bth aces i
TREES A GROWER c.5-0. 0 0 o'5 5 8 6 EA eo ROE ii
SARS IE RESTORE 6 be ee Bie bee ds ee iv
IEA EI 53.650 5 8 ON ES Pe wee 1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................ “
ADIIUMENE. 6.50 63% CAS CECE Eee ee 5

I. THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO FOLLOW
PRINCIPLES RECENTLY SET FORTH BY THIS
COURT, ADDED TO JUDICIAL CONFUSION,
AND FAILED TO RECOGNIZE STATUTORY
PUBL. FUER. e COs 6 bee bce see 5

A. The Court Below Failed to Follow This
Court’s Decision in Jaffee in Applying the
Self-Critical Analysis Privilege ......... 5

B. The Failure of the Court Below to Follow
Jaffee Adds to the Confusion in the Lower
Courts About the Scope and Application of the
Self-Critical Analysis Privilege ......... 9

C. Protection of Aijrline Internal Safety
Investigations from Disclosure is a Matter of
Compelling Public Policy ........... 12

oer

II. AIRLINEINTERNALSAFETY INVESTIGATIONS
CLEARLY FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE ... 14

A. Airline Internal Safety Investigations Are
Conducted to Improve Airline Procedures and
PO ea os bd eed eee 14

B. Airline Internal Safety Investigations are
Intended to Remain Confidential to Preserve
the Free Flow of Ideas ............. 15

C. Permitting Discovery of Airline Internal Safety
Investigations will Significantly Curtail the
Flow of Information and Will Diminish Their
WE Ae ss eed oe a ees Oe 15

Ill. BOTH CONGRESS AND THE FAA INTENDED
TO INSULATE SAFETY-RELATED
INFORMATION FROM LITIGATION ...... 16

A. Congress Mandated the Protection of Aviation
Safety-Related Information .......... 16

B. The FAA Strongly Encourages and Protects
Internal Audits and Safety Reviews ..... 18

et Re es Te eer aaa aa See, ae ar ae ca ge 20

FR Gy pa ae Sa kes Rb ee oe ees Al

iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
CASES

ASARCO, Inc. v. NLRB, 805 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1986) 8, 11, 12
Banks v. Lockheed Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971) .. 13
Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1992)..... 13

Bredice v. Doctors Hospital Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249
(D.D.C. 1970), aff’d without opinion, 479 F.2d 920

GPA Rae ae ee eS CASES 2 ks 8,9, 12
Brem v. Decarlo, 162 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1995) ....... 10
Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993) ..... 14 |
Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297
IN cle 50s VIER RE SS ree es bes 9 !
Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423
ie oe ioe ae 9, 10, 11
i
Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145 |
Le CSP ale eek ici ew bs ce ewe 10, 11
FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ... 10, 11

First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465
ia Ma Anak oo a eee re 8 OR Se dis 10

Granger v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507
es ll ED ek ae a eC eee 10

TS

Vv

In re Crazy Eddie Security Litigation,

pe OS oe SN A. ae 13
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386

I eel eat ia Wiss o gos eva e 6 wees ea 9, 11
In re United States, 864 F.2d 1153 (Sth Cir. 1989)........ 9

Jaffee v. Redmond, _U.S._, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996)... 3, 5,6

Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) ...... 13

Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518
ie SM ae binky Ghee ae aon aed S, £1, 12, 13

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. EEOC, 922 F. Supp. 235
er Pee Pe ee 11

O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) .. 11

Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522
II 6 oc got oro oe tes i eee eee 11, 12, 13

Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfield, 564 F.2d 663
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978)....... 10

Richards v. Maine Cent. R.R., 21 F.R.D. 590
ROPERS See Te en 12

Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610
I I ong hs ee are wis oo o.'2 5, 6

Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119
be REE Sane 8,9, 12

vi

United States ex rel Falsetti v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,

SIS F. Supp. S06 GUD. Fie. T90G) «on ke eee a ws 11
University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) ........ 7
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) ... 2, 6,8
Warren v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,

SPO FG, Se Gris BU as bo eee eV sO 10

STATUTES

FP itis © ORIN 6 64 5 SN ee oo OA ee kes 11, 15, 19
op eS Serr er rae re eee ek. ees 9
RE Eg 3 Ure a ear mopar ey ge ae 9
OP as hc UWA ate a Wes ee hee been 17
Parnes ORO hose bob bea be chee eases 17
Oe Bees Es 0k 00s cae 5 6 we ewan eee 2, 16
Us CONE kas a es ES a ee 2, 16
Oe aes UTNE 6 5 00 ba oa eae en ee 3, 16, 17

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Order of Judge Anderson, Oct 25, 1995, In re Air Crash at
Charlotte North Carolina on July 2, 1994,

ok ee eer er a ee ee a 5
H.R. 3159, 104th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1996)............. 17
H.R. 3536, 104th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1996)............. 17

Ty Ameer

Vii

S.1994, 104th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1996)............... 17

A Call for the Development of Prototype(s) for a
Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN),
Oe Wars WO, BUM cs Sc ec cc eee 18, 19

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Advisory Circular (AC) 120-56 ............. 11, 15, 19

Robert J. Busch, Comment, Stimulating Corporate Self-Regulation
-- The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic
Preferentialism or Pragmatic Panacea, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 597
RRR at pr che aes A ge ia Nis eh hea 6, 9, 13

Flight Safety Foundation, News, FSF Chairs Aviation Industry
Data-sharing Task Force, Feb. 13, 1996 ............. 18

1 MICHAEL H GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE
ace tp-oe Lise qs, AOE OE eR Pe eee 5

William B. Johnson, Annotation, Discoverability of Traffic
Accident Reports and Derivative Information, 84 A.L.R.4th 15
Ce ra em a 556 re ok eae bet te be ake os eis 13

David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis,
25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113 (1988) ................ 13

National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization: Joint
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation, Subcomm. on
Railroads of the House Comm. on Trans. and Infrastructure, 104th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 39 (1996) (Statement of Jim Hall, Chairman,
aaa ath Os ward oa RA Sea ke Shack 17, 18

Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1983) .............. Pe

Vili

NTSB Comparison of U.S. Transportation Fatalities - Year 1994
we. Four: Tare Cee. 3h Te oak kok Re l

John F.X. Peloso, The Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis:
Protecting the Public by Protecting the Confidentiality of Internal
Investigations in the Securities Industry, 18 SEC. REG. L.J.

SAP EE ke ks Re ee eee 13

Paul B. Taylor, Encouraging Product Safety Testing by Applying
the Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis When Punitive Damages are
Sought, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Yy, 769 (1993) ...... 13

23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Supp. 1996) ............. 8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

No. 96-157
In Re: USAir, Inc.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

INTRODUCTION

Public policy has demanded that aviation safety be minutely
scrutinized ever since airplanes began carrying passengers. Today,
more than ever, aviation safety is on everyone’s mind. Despite the
fact that the U.S. aviation industry is the safest in the world, and
is considerably safer than traveling by automobile’, aviation safety
is a constant topic of public debate. It is also a constant topic of
private internal analysis and discussion at U.S. airlines.

Understanding the causes of accidents and other incidents is
the primary objective of airlines’ internal safety reviews and
audits. Only free and frank discussion and investigation of

' According to National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") estimates,
there were 41,700 highway fatalities in 1995 whereas there were only 177
fatalities in involving U.S. airlines, including commuter airlines. NTSB
Comparison of U.S. Transportation Fatalities -Year 1994 vs. Year 1995 (Dec.
31, 1995).

2

accidents, incidents, trends, and procedures without apprehension
about whether such investigations will later become the focus of
discovery, can serve the public policy goals expressed in the
Transportation Laws. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1) (mandating
safety as the Department of Transportation’s highest priority in air
commerce); 49 U.S.C. § 44701(c) (requiring the FAA to regulate
in a way to reduce or eliminate accidents). The privilege against
disclosure of self-critical analysis should be applied to airlines’
internal safety reviews in recognition and support of the important
legislative and human goal of airline safety.

The U.S. aviation industry’s safety record is neither
accidental nor routine. Indeed, the industry’s safety record is due,
in large part, to policies set independently at each airline that
require and encourage employees to vigilantly assess day-to-day
operational safety for inconsistencies. The ability of airline
management to solicit and obtain frank information regarding an
airline’s operational safety, and suggestions to improve that safety,
is the linchpin of the industry’s enviable record.” Just as there is
nothing routine about safety, there is nothing routine about airline
internal safety reviews. The airlines’ highest management demand
not only consistent internal safety investigations but also special
investigations into particular matters that may be of concern.

Among federal and state courts that have had to address the
self-critical analysis privilege, there is considerable confusion and
conflict as to the privilege’s scope and application. As this Court
stated in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981):

An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.

? Aircraft manufacturers have similar quality assurance and review programs
that solicit safety-related suggestions.

3

In light of this Court’s ruling only last term in Jaffee, v. Redmond,
__U.S.__, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996), this observation is particularly
apropos. The failure of the court below to follow the rationale
articulated in Jaffee infects this issue with the uncertainty
condemned in Upjohn and jeopardizes the ability of airlines to
maintain and improve airline safety.

The Court should not allow the present state of disarray to
continue. The parameters of the self-critical analysis privilege,
over which state and federal courts disagree, presents a compelling
issue which this Court should settle under FED. R. Evip. 501.
This issue is especially compelling because of the importance of
this privilege to promoting practices and procedures in the U.S.
airline industry intended to maintain and improve safety. The
prevailing confusion and conflict is inconsistent with the kind of
candid, thorough, and systematic safety reviews necessary to
ensure that air carriers satisfy their "duty . . . to provide service
with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest."
49 U.S.C. § 44701(d)(1)(A).

The first part of this brief discusses the failure of the court
below to follow Jaffee, the courts’ confusion about the scope and
application of the self-critical analysis privilege, and the history of
the privilege. The second and third parts discuss the applicability
of the privilege in the aviation context and the statutory and
regulatory support for the privilege, respectively.

4
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The ATA is a non-profit unincorporated association of
federally-certificated air carriers providing scheduled and charter
passenger and cargo air transportation. ATA represents the
interests of U.S. airlines’ that account for more than 95 percent
of domestic passenger and cargo traffic. Its principal function is
to represent the interests of the U.S. commercial airline industry
before the United States Congress, federal agencies, state
legislatures, and before federal and state courts. ATA works
closely with federal agencies concerned with aviation safety and
provides a forum in which airlines can discuss and encourage
safety initiatives through industry working groups. ATA has filed
numerous amicus briefs in federal and state court proceedings
concerning a wide variety of issues of interest to its members,
including an amicus brief in the court below.

3 ATA’s members are: Alaska Airlines,Inc.; Aloha Airlines, Inc.; America
West Airlines, Inc.; American Airlines, Inc.; American Trans Air, Inc;
Continental Airlines, Inc.; Delta Air Lines, Inc.; DHL World Airways, Inc.;
Evergreen International Aviation, Inc.; Federal Express Corp.; Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc.; Kiwi International Airlines, Inc.; Midwest Express Airlines, Inc.;
Northwest Airlines, Inc.; Polar Air Cargo, Inc.; Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc.;
Southwest Airlines Co.; Trans World Airlines, Inc.; United Airlines, Inc.; United
Parcel Service Co.; and USAir, Inc. Associate members are: Air Canada;
Canadian Airlines International; and KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines.

5
ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO FOLLOW
PRINCIPLES RECENTLY SET FORTH BY THIS
COURT, ADDED TO JUDICIAL CONFUSION, AND
FAILED TO RECOGNIZE STATUTORY PUBLIC
POLICY GOALS

A. The Court Below Failed to Follow This Court’s Decision in
Jaffee in Applying the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

Only last term, in Jaffee v. Redmond, _U.S._, 116 S.Ct.
1923 (1996), this Court recognized the existence of a new
psychotherapist-patient privilege under FED. R. Evip. 501 and
reaffirmed that Congressional intent in drafting Rule 501 was for
the "federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of
testimonial privileges’". Id. at _, 116 S.Ct. at 1928 (citations
omitted). This Court looked to several factors in deciding that

* Jaffee was brought under federal question jurisdiction and hence federal
common law applied to the privilege under FED. R. Evip. 501. In the instant
litigation, federal jurisdiction arose initially out of diversity, although USAir has
consistently raised federal preemption as an affirmative defense. While the
general rule would be to apply state privilege in diversity cases, “where state and
federal issues are commingled . . . [cJourts that have confronted this issue in the
context of the discoverability of evidence have uniformly held that the federal law
of privilege governs even where the evidence sought might be relevant to a
pendant state claim.” 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 501.1, at 511 n.8 (4th ed. 1996). Hence, as in Jaffee, this Court
can and should address the federal common law privilege of self-critical analysis
under Rule 501.

Because of the confusion about the parameters of the self-critical analysis
privilege, federal courts, including the district court below, have looked beyond
their own jurisprudence for a clear doctrinal rule. See Order of Judge Anderson,
Oct 25, 1995, In re Air Crash at Charlotte North Carolina on July 2, 1994
(M.D.L. No. 1041) at 4-5 (Appendix A to USAir’s Petition) (looking to a number
of federal appellate and district court decisions rather than North Carolina or
South Carolina state law for jurisprudential guidance in applying the self-critical
analysis privilege); Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 611-12 (W.D.

6

the privilege described in Jaffee "’promotes sufficiently important
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence... .”" Id.
(citations omitted). Among the factors that counselled for
recognition of the new privilege was that psychotherapy "depends
upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is
willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears." Jd. That rationale is consistent with
Upjohn, where the Court recognized the "Hobson’s choice" facing
corporate counsel absent a privilege.°

The Jaffee test for the recognition of a privilege is four-fold:
(1) The communication must "depend upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust . . . to make a frank and complete disclosure
of facts..." Jaffee, U.S. at __, 116 S.Ct. at 1928; (2) The
privilege must serve a public interest such as the "transcendent
public good" of mental or physical health of the citizenry. /d. at
__, 116 S.Ct. at 1929; (3) The public benefits of non-disclosure
must outweigh the evidentiary benefit of disclosure so that
important communications will not be chilled; and (4) The general
support of such privilege in the legislative and judicial
communities.

Mich. 1989) (looking to federal jurisprudence in diversity case absent precedent
under Michigan law).

> Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391. See also Robert J. Busch, Comment, Stimulating
Corporate Self-Regulation - The Corporate Self-Evaluative Priviledge:
Paradigmatic Preferentialism or Pragmatic Panacea, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 597,
599-600 (1993) [hereinafter Busch, Comment] (noting that corporations are faced
with “discordant stimuli” with regulators and consumers calling for "aggressive
self-policing” but with “perverse” countervailing incentives that chill such
efforts).

7

Airlines’ internal safety audits and investigations meet all of
the criteria for application of the self-critical analysis privilege.®

1. Airlines, because they depend so heavily upon the actions
of many individual employees for safe operations, must create an
“atmosphere of confidence and trust” in order to obtain "frank and
complete disclosure of facts" to maintain operational safety and
avoid accidents. Airline employees, whether they are investigating
an accident, a routine operational procedure, or being interviewed
about areas of safety that have attracted the interest of airline
management, must be free of the fear that their words and thoughts
will be used against the company or themselves in litigation at a
later date. Without the privilege, both investigators and
interviewees cannot be expected to commit to paper "minor"
problems or deficiencies before they become "major" ones, thus
depriving airline managements of vital safety-related information
and the opportunity to address potential safety issues early and
efficiently. Not having this kind of information flow available has
been referred to as a "dual chilling effect" because not only does
disclosure discourage airlines and their safety personnel from
investigating and documenting discrepancies, but also because
individual employees may be less willing to come forward with
candid information. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1091-93 (1983) ("Harvard
Note"). The same dilemma led the Court to reject the “control
group test" of privilege in Upjohn.

2. Maintaining and improving aviation safety is clearly a
"transcendent public good.”

° The ultimate balancing of interests for applying self-critical analysis in the
context of aviation safety is closely analogous to the balancing of interests with
respect to the psychotherapist privilege in Jaffee. This interpretation would in no
way be inconsistent with University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), where
the crux of the Court’s decision not to recognize a new privilege protecting
academic peer review was based on the fact that the public benefit of creating
such a privilege was outweighed by the “great, if not compelling, governmental
interest” in “ferreting out” invidious discrimination. Jd. at 193.

8

3. In the context of aviation accident litigation, the only
reason to discover self-critical analysis is the pursuit of punitive
damages because liability is not generally an issue. Punitive
damages have never been sustained in such a context. The value of
producing such self-critical documents, even assuming they show
procedural anomalies, is minimal in comparison with the chilling
effect on airline employees discussed above. In Upjohn, the Court
allayed concerns about burdening discovery by distinguishing
between actual facts an employee would have to disclose and the
privileged communications. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96.
Similarly, the self-critical analysis privilege does not hinder
discovery of particular facts or access to individuals but protects
those documents or meetings relating to safety evaluation and
potential areas for change to procedures. See Lloyd v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 521-22 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (strictly
limiting scope of questioning regarding aircraft manufacturer’s list
of problem products and prohibiting any discovery relating to
meetings designed to "review, analyze, and evaluate operation for
continued self-improvement” of products).

4. While application of the self-critical analysis privilege to
airline safety audits and investigations is apparently an issue of
first impression, both the courts and federal and state legislatures
have supported the privilege in analogous safety fields. See, e.g.,
ASARCO, Inc. v. NLRB, 805 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th Cir. 1986);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131-33 (Sth Cir.
1968). In addition, virtually every state has adopted the privilege
for "medical review boards", another "public safety" area. See 23
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5431, 428-442 (Supp. 1996)
(summarizing the statutory "medical review" privileges state by
state). These privileges are largely synonymous with and have the
same origin as the self-critical analysis privilege. See Bredice v.

9

Doctors Hospital Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
aff'd without opinion, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C.Cir. 1973).’

By failing to apply the standards enunciated in Jaffee to this
case, the court below also failed to follow this Court’s clear intent
to shield documents meeting the criteria set forth in Jaffee.

B. The Failure of the Court Below to Follow Jaffee Adds to
the Confusion in the Lower Courts About the Scope and
Application of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

The tests enunciated by various circuits and by numerous
district courts has led to a patchwork of rules ill-defining the scope
and application of the self-critical analysis privilege. As a result,
the courts themselves recognize that they are in disarray.*

The federal courts of appeals have either enunciated differing
rules of application or declined to rule at all. Thus, in the Fifth
Circuit, companies may protect "full and candid evaluations of the
cause of accidents . . ." Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d
119, 131 (Sth Cir. 1968), but in the Ninth Circuit, a similar report
may not be shielded See Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises,
Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992) ("routine pre-accident

7 Support for applying the self-critical analysis privilege in aviation can be
found in Federal law regulating air transportation. See infra Part Ill. Cf. In re
United States, 864 F.2d 1153 (Sth Cir. 1989) (granting mandamus to protect from
disclosure medical quality assurance records in accordance with 10 U.S.C. §
1102); 38 U.S.C. § 5705(a) (codifying the protected status of quality assurance
programs within the Veteran’s Administration hospital system).

5 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Md. 1994)
(noting that "[t}he Supreme Court and the circuit courts have neither definitively
denied the existence of [the self-critical analysis] . . . privilege, nor accepted it
and defined its scope"); Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D.
297, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (remarking on “inconsistencies in the district court
opinions and the Supreme Courts’ failure to [explicitly] recognize the [self-critical
analysis] privilege . . ."); Busch, Comment, supra, at 607-12 (discussing the
inconsistent application of the privilege).

10

safety reviews are not protected... ."). In the D.C. Circuit, the
privilege may be applied in cases involving public health or safety,
First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465, 467 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (noting that the self-critical analysis privilege "has been
found only in limited cases involving areas of public health . . . or
public safety”); whereas the Sixth Circuit focused on the requestor.
FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that the self-evaluative privilege does not apply where
documents are sought by or subpoenaed by government agencies);
and the Fourth Circuit in one case focused on whether the reports
were prepared for "internal use" only. See Reynolds Metals Co.
v. Rumsfield, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 995 (1978).

The Dowling case, the latest circuit court decision to address
the self-critical analysis privilege in depth, adopted a three-prong
test enunciated in a 1983 Harvard Law Review article,’ but also
considered the voluntary or involuntary nature of disclosures, the
intended use of the documents, and whether the documents were
generated prior to or following an accident. Dowling, 971 F.2d at
425-27. Even in Dowling, however, the court wavered about
whether it was fair to mandate production of documents the litigant
was required by the government to prepare. Jd. at 426-27.

* Harvard Note, supra, at 1086 (drawing these three criteria from then-
existing case law). The three prongs are:

First, the information must result from a critical self-analysis
undertaken by the party seeking protection; Second, the public must
have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the type of
information sought; finally, the information must be of the type whose
flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed.

Id. Seealso Bremv. Decarlo, 162 F.R.D. 94, 101 (D. Md. 1995); Etienne v.
Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 147 (E.D. Va. 1993); Granger v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (under state law
privilege). See also Warren v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 896 F. Supp.
540, 541 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (stating similar criteria to the test enunciated in Brem).

11

Other courts have added to, modified, or ignored the three
prong self-critical analysis test discussed above, focusing, inter alia
on: (1) distinctions between subjective and objective factual
information in documents sought to be protected’®; (2) finding
post-accident investigations warrant more protection than pre-
accident safety reviews''; (3) the voluntary or involuntary nature
of disclosure to the government’; (4) whether the government is
the party seeking the information; and the type of data sought
to be protected."

© See O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

'! See United States ex rel Falsetti v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 915 F.
Supp. 308 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (distinguishing Dowling where a pre-accident safety
review was not within the privilege from Reichold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, 157
F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994) where a retrospective self-assessment of
environmental damage was privileged). In the aviation context, the notion that
pre-accident evaluations are not as protected as post-accident evaluations is
equivalent to saying airlines should not attempt to improve safety before an
accident.

" Compare Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426-27 (noting “It may be unfair for a court
to require a party to turn over to an opposing litigant self-damning assessments
that the government has required it to prepare.) with Etienne v. Mitre Corp. 146
F.R.D. 145, 148 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("Because such reports and studies are
produced involuntarily, there is no reasonable expectation . . . that such material
will remain confidential.”). Cf. FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-56 (Appendix
D to USAir’s Petition) (exempting records voluntarily submitted to the FAA from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. EEOC, 922 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding
that internal adverse impact analysis studies voluntarily turned over to the EEOC
at EEOC’s request could not be disclosed by the EEOC).

3 See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that the self-evaluative privilege does not apply where documents are
sought by or subpoenaed by government agencies); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 388 (D. Md. 1994).

4 See ASARCO, Inc. v. NLRB, 805 F.2d 194, 199 (6th Cir. 1986)
(protecting internal safety analysis containing opinions and recommendations but
not pictures taken following accident); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D.

12

The court below has added to this confusion by concluding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and by failing to
give the trial court clear instructions to protect the disputed
documents.

C. Protection of Airline Internal Safety Investigations from
Disclosure is a Matter of Compelling Public Policy

The genesis of the self-critical analysis privilege lies in the
areas of health and safety. Although Bredice v. Doctors Hospital
Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 479
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973), holding that "self analysis" by a
medical review committee was privileged, is often considered the
first enunciation of the self-critical analysis privilege, that case was
predated by cases holding that documents prepared during accident
investigations were privileged. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham,
403 F.2d 119, 131 (Sth Cir. 1968) (prohibiting discovery of
portions of post-accident reports prepared by claims agents for the
railroad, because: "[FJear of discovery might deter [the railroad]
from seeking full and candid evaluations of the cause of accidents
and the proper disposition of claims"); O’Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38
F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Richards v. Maine Cent. R.R., 21
F.R.D. 590 (D. Me. 1957).

Since the 1970s, courts have found that the underlying balance
of interests has weighed in favor of the self-critical analysis
privilege where the information sought to be protected deals with
health or safety issues. See ASARCO, Inc. v. NLRB, 805 F.2d
194, 199-200 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding privileged a "self-critical
report" prepared by company after mining accident); Reichhold
Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla.
1994) ("[t]he public interest in allowing individuals and
corporations to candidly assess their compliance with

518, 521-22 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (differentiating between lists identifying problem
products to which limited protection applied and actual minutes or records of
internal safety meeeting that were fully privileged).

\\ << <i AW aaa

13

environmental regulations ’promotes sufficiently important interests
to outweigh’ the interest of opposing private litigants . . .");
Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992) ("[I]t is
not realistic to expect candid expressions of opinion or suggested
changes in policies, procedures, or processes knowing that such
statements or suggestions may very well be used against colleagues
and employees in subsequent litigation."); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 520-22 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (prohibiting
discovery related to self-improvement meetings held by aircraft
manufacturer). In the health field, protection of medical review
boards is well-recognized and has been codified in virtually every
state. Reichold, 157 F.R.D. at 525.

The scope and application of the self-critical analysis privilege
has raised debate in academic writings, with many commenters
calling for clear guidance.’ Further, the self-critical analysis
privilege has teem applied in many areas outside health and safety
where the policy justifications for the privilege are considerably
different. See Banks v. Lockheed Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (employment discrimination); Jn re Crazy Eddie Security
Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (internal
reviews of accounting procedures); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College,
552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977)
(academic peer review).

'S See Paul B. Taylor, Encouraging Product Safety Testing by Applying the
Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis When Punitive Damages are Sought, 16 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’ Y, 769 (1993); Busch, Comment, supra; John F.X. Peloso, The
Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis: Protecting the Public by Protecting the
Confidentiality of Internal Investigations in the Securities Industry, 18 SEC. REG.
L.J. 229 (1990); David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical
Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113 (1988); Harvard Note, supra; see also
William B. Johnson, Annotation, Discoverability of Traffic Accident Reports and
Derivative Information, 84 A.L.R.4th 15, § 13 (1987) (discussing application of
the self-critical analysis privilege to traffic accident reports).

14

As discussed in Part III, none of these latter applications is the
product of a more compelling public policy than airline safety."

Il. AIRLINE INTERNAL SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS
CLEARLY FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SELF-
CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE

The rationale for the application of the self-critical analysis
privilege is strongest in the health and safety fields, including
aviation safety. Self-critical analysis by airlines meets all of the
criteria usually enunciated by the courts, including this Court in
Jaffee.

A. Airline Internal Safety Investigations Are Conducted to
Improve Airline Procedures and Products

Notwithstanding comprehensive safety oversight by the FAA,
airlines are, of course, primarily responsible for aviation safety.
Airlines use internal audits, reviews, and investigations, among
various other means, to continuously improve not only the safety
of individuals within the system but also the system itself, in
addition to being encouraged by the highest levels of government,
internal reviews and analyses are a function demanded by the
highest levels of airline management to identify anomalies within
the system. Self-critical analysis is sometimes performed by
internal airline auditors and, sometimes, by outside consultants,
but its objective is always the same: improved safety for the
travelling public.

'6 There is possibly one other industry that is as highly regulated as aviation -
the nuclear power industry. The comprehensive regulatory schemes mandated
by Congress for both of these industries is the result of Congress’s concern for
public health and safety. Cf. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993) (holding that information
generated as part of a voluntary safety information sharing system and voluntarily
disclosed to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") could not be disclosed
by the NRC to third parties).

15

B. Airline Internal Safety Investigations are Intended to
Remain Confidential to Preserve the Free Flow of Ideas

Because of the sensitivity of the information developed by
internal safety investigations, airlines do not expect the results of
their safety reviews to be published. Rather, the information,
analysis, and recommendations developed during such reviews are
used to improve an airline’s safety performance, usually under the
direction of a company-wide safety officer who reports directly to
the company’s president or chief executive officer. As noted
below, even when an airline uncovers suspected violations of the
FAA’s regulations and communicates its findings to the FAA, the
FAA considers the communication to be confidential information
that cannot be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act."

C. Permitting Discovery of Airline Internal Safety
Investigations Will Significantly Curtail the Flow of
Information and Will Diminish Their Value

There is significant value in having the results of internal
safety reviews in writing. Airlines are large organizations and
formal communication of these analyses is essential if they are to
be effective. Moreover, future generations of airline management
need to be able to learn from their predecessors. However, if
reports of airline internal audits and investigations were to be
divulged in the context of law suits, where otherwise constructive
ideas and recommendations may assume the aspect of hobgoblins
coming back to haunt the airline, frank discussion of observations
and incisive analysis of safety matters would come to a virtual end,
at least in writing, much to the detriment of airline programs
intended to improve safety.

7 See FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-56 (Appendix D to USAir’s
Petition) (exempting records voluntarily submitted to the FAA from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)).

16

The issue before the Court should not be confused with
questions of liability or the availability of monetary awards in
aviation accidents. ijirlines already have strong incentives,
including (but certainly not limited to) judicially-awarded damages
and the potential of FAA certificate action and penalty
proceedings, to conduct the safest possible operations. When put
in the context of the airline industry, withholding self-critical
documents, whether generated by the airline or by an outside
consultant, is not an attempt to deprive plaintiffs of information,
but rather an attempt to further overriding statutory and public
policy goals that should and must supersede individual goals.
Forcing disclosure of internal safety documents will hinder, not
advance, that public policy goal and, ultimately, the safety of the
air transportation system.

This Court should recognize that compelling public policy
considerations dictate that such information should not be disclosed
in this litigation, especially since the factual data underlying an
airline’s analysis can be obtained elsewhere, can be analyzed by
plaintiffs’ experts, and can form the basis of those experts’
opinions.

Ill. BOTH CONGRESS AND THE FAA INTENDED TO
INSULATE SAFETY-RELATED INFORMATION FROM
LITIGATION

A. Congress Mandated the Protection of Aviation Safety-
Related Information

Airline safety is one of the most heavily-regulated endeavors
in the nation. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is directed
by statute to consider "maintaining safety as the highest priority in
air commerce” even when addressing economic decisions, 49
U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1). The FAA, the agency with primary
jurisdiction over airline safety, is obliged to regulate airlines "in a
way that best tends to reduce or eliminate the possibility or
recurrence of accidents in air transportation." 49 U.S.C. §
44701(c). And, as noted above, airlines have a duty to operate

17

with the "highest possible degree of safety in the public interest."
49 U.S.C. § 44701(d).

A clear example in aviation that the lack of protection chills
free and frank discussion of safety issues arises in the context of
the reluctance of airlines to share information relating to past
performance of pilots with other airlines."* As a result, Congress
is considering several bills, such as H.R. 3536, 104th Cong. 2d.
Sess. (1996), the "Airline Pilot Hiring and Safety Act," and Title
VII of the "Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of
1996," S.1994, 104th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1996), to discourage suits
and encourage sharing of pilot information between airlines.

Similarly, in establishing the NTSB, the independent agency
charged with investigating aviation tragedies such as the one that
is the subject of this litigation, the Congress anticipated that
litigants might wish to use the NTSB’s analysis, findings, and
recommendations for purposes that were not safety-related.
Accordingly, the Congress provided that:

No part of a report of the Board, related to an accident
or an investigation of an accident, may be admitted into
evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting
from a matter mentioned in the report.

49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (emphasis added). There are even more
stringent restrictions on the discovery and use of cockpit voice
recorder tapes and transcripts in litigation. See 49 U.S.C. §
1154(a). The House of Representatives recently passed H.R.
3159, 104th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1996), that would prohibit any
agency from disclosing safety-related information voluntarily
submitted to the NTSB in order to specifically encourage sharing
of safety data by airlines. See National Transportation Safety

'* Following a 1994 accident, the NTSB recommended that the FAA require
airlines to share pilot training and performance information, with due
consideration to privacy concerns.

18

Board Reauthorization: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Aviation, Subcomm. on Railroads of the House Comm. on Trans.
and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 2d. Sess. 39, 50 (1996)
(Statement of Jim Hall, Chairman NTSB) ("This proposed
amendment would cure private sector concern and permit agency
access to information not now readily available to it.")

Although Congress left the specifics of aviation safety
oversight to the FAA, Congressional policy is clear, consistent,
and contrary to the use of safety-related investigative materials in
litigation arising out of aviation accidents. This Court should do
no less.

B. The FAA Strongly Encourages Internal Safety Audits and
Reviews

Government regulators cannot monitor every flight or look
over every employee’s shoulder, a fact that is recognized both by
the FAA and the airlines. For example, with FAA support the
aviation industry is planning to share safety data with a test-bed
Flight Operations Quality Assurance program. As the Chairman
of the Flight Safety Foundation states:

We believe strongly that nonpunitive safety-data
programs are excellent accident-prevention tools... .
But we must assure the industry that these data will
remain confidential and will not be used in legal actions,
and that individual privacy will be protected. ... .
Confidentiality, data security and the potential for
punitive and legal actions are among the industry’s top
concerns in establishing a widespread data exchange.

Flight Safety Foundation, News, FSF Chairs Aviation Industry
Data-sharing Task Force, Feb. 13, 1996.

The FAA, in proposing to implement a Global Analysis and
Information Network (GAIN) to encourage sharing of safety data
has also recognized the need for "adequate safeguards . . . to

19

protect the security and confidentiality concerns of the information
providers... ." A Call for the Development of Prototype(s) for
a Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN), 61 Fed. Reg.
21522, 21523-524 (1996). The FAA gives several examples of
how effective data-sharing arrangements in other countries solved
critical safety problems before accidents occurred."

The FAA encourages airlines to perform internal safety audits
and reviews, to improve their safety and systems as a result of
their internal findings, and to report any suspected lapses to the
FAA without jeopardy of FAA enforcement action, imposition of
civil penalties, or disclosure to third parties under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, because disclosure of such
reports would both:

(1) impair the Government’s ability to collect similar
information in the future, and (2) cause harm to an
"identifiable" governmental interest.

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-56, p. 7. While AC 120-56
applies, by its terms, only to suspected instances in which an
airline may not have complied with the FAA’s regulations, the
principle stated in the Advisory Circular (as well as in a similar
Advisory Circular directed to the aviation manufacturing
community and in policy statements by the U.S. Secretary of
Transportation and the FAA Administrator) is crystal clear: There
is an overriding governmental interest in airlines’ engaging in
internal investigations of their safety performance without the
threat of punishment by the FAA or discovery by third parties for
use in litigation.

'S For example, data analysis found that an airline’s pilots were frequently
disregarding ground proximity warnings due to a high false alarm rate and led to
software fixes to reduce false alarms. Jd. at 21524. Data analysis also disclosed
that a particular type of aircraft was developing cracks due to hard landings
where no post-landing inspections were required, leading to mandatory
inspections following such landings. Jd.

20

Allowing the court below to compel disclosure of airline
internal safety analyses is directly contrary to a strong public
policy expressed by Congress in adopting the comprehensive
aviation safety regulatory scheme of the transportation laws and is
directly contrary to the implementation of those laws by the agency
designated by Congress to establish such policies. This Court
should adopt the good judgment of the federal agency with primary
jurisdiction over airline safety, the FAA, and refuse to allow the
court below to compel disclosure of the documents sought by
plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Honorable Court should grant
USAir’s Petition for a Writ of Prohibition.

Respectfully submitted,

LOUISE B. COBBS*

HAIGHT, GARDNER, POOR & HAVENS
2000 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 4400
Washington, DC 20006-1812

(202) 496-2700

* Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae
Air Transport Association of America

Al

APPENDIX A

5 U.S.C. § 552. Public information; agency rules,

(b)

opinions, orders, records, and proceedings
This section does not apply to matters that are -

(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

*~_ xe xe kK *

10 U.S.C. § 1102. Confidentiality of medical quality

(a)

(b)

assurance records: qualified immunity for
participants

Confidentiality of records. Medical quality assurance
records created by or for the Department of Defense as
part of a medical quality assurance program are
confidential and privileged. Such records may not be
disclosed to any person or entity, except as provided in
subsection (c).

Prohibition on disclosure and testimony.

(1) No part of any medical quality assurance record
described in subsection (a) may be subject to discovery
or admitted into evidence in any judicial or
administrative proceeding, except as provided in
subsection (c).

(2) A person who reviews or creates medical quality
assurance records for the Department of Defense or who
participates in any proceeding that reviews or creates
such records may not be permitted or required to testify
in any judicial or administrative proceeding with respect
to such records or with respect to any finding,
recommendation, evaluation, opinion, or action taken by

A2

such person or body in connection with such records
except as provided in this section.

** * *k * *

38 U.S.C. § 5705. Confidentiality of medical quality
assurance records

(a) Records and documents created by the Department as part
of a medical quality assurance program (other than reports
submitted pursuant to section 7311(g) of this title) are
confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed to any
person or entity except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.

x** kek kK &

49 U.S.C. § 1154. Discovery and use of cockpit voice
and other material

(a) Transcripts and recordings.

(1) Except as provided by this subsection, a party in a
judicial proceeding may not use discovery to obtain -

(A) any part of a cockpit voice recorder transcript that
the National Transportation Safety Board has not made
available to the public under section 1114(c) of this title;
and

(B) a cockpit voice recorder recording.

(2) (A) Except as provided in paragraph (4)(A) of this
subsection, a court may allow discovery by a party of a
cockpit voice recorder transcript if, after an in camera
review of the transcript, the court decides that -

A3

(i) the part of the transcript made available to the
public under section 1114(c) of this title does not
provide the party with sufficient information for
the party to receive a fair trial; and

(ii) discovery of additional parts of the transcript
is necessary to provide the party with sufficient
information for the party to receive a fair trial.

(B) A court may allow discovery, or require production
for an in camera review, of a cockpit voice recorder
transcript that the Board has not made available under
section 1114(c) of this title only if the cockpit voice
recorder recording is not available.

(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4)(A) of this subsection,
a court may allow discovery by a party of a cockpit voice
recorder recording if, after an in camera review of the
recording, the court decides that -

(4)

(A) the parts of the transcript made available to the
public under section 1114(c) of this title and to the party
through discovery under paragraph (2) of this subsection
do not provide the party with sufficient information for
the party to receive a fair trial; and

(B) discovery of the cockpit voice recorder recording is
necessary to provide the party with sufficient information
for the party to receive a fair trial.

(A) When a court allows discovery in a judicial
proceeding of a part of a cockpit voice recorder
transcript not made available to the public under section
1114(c) of this title or a cockpit voice recorder
recording, the court shall issue a protective order -

(i) to limit the use of the part of the transcript or
the recording to the judicial proceeding; and

A4

(ii) to prohibit dissemination of the part of the
transcript or the recording to any person that does
not need access to the part of the transcript or the
recording for the proceeding.

(B) A court may allow a part of a cockpit voice recorder
transcript not made available to the public under section
1114(c) of this title or a cockpit voice recorder recording
to be admitted into evidence in a judicial proceeding,
only if the court places the part of the transcript or the
recording under seal to prevent the use of the part of the
transcript or the recording for purposes other than for the
proceeding.

(5) This subsection does not prevent the Board from referring
at any time to cockpit voice recorder information in making
safety recommendations.

(b) Reports.

No part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an
investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence or
used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter
mentioned in the report.

49 U.S.C. § 40101. Policy

(a) Economic regulation.-In carrying out subpart II of tais
part and those provisions of subpart IV applicable in carrying
out subpart II, the Secretary of Transportation shall consider
the following matters, among others, as being in the public
interest and consistent with public convenience and necessity:

(1) assigning and maintaining safety as the highest
priority in air commerce.

x~x ene &*

AS

49 U.S.C. § 44701. General requirements

(c) Reducing and eliminating accidents. The Administrator
shall carry out this chapter in a way that best tends to reduce
| or eliminate the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air
transportation. However, the Administrator is not required to
give preference either to air transportation or to other air
commerce in carrying out this chapter.

(d) Considerations and classification of regulations and
standards. --When prescribing a regulation or standard under
subsection (a) or (b) of this section or any of sections 44702-
44716 of this title, the Administrator shall--

(1) Consider--

(A) the duty of an air carrier to provide service
with the highest possible degree of safety in the
public interest; and

(B) differences between air transportation and
other air commerce; and

(2) classify a regulation or standard appropriate to the
differences between air transportation and other air
commerce.

~_* eke &

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386004_1218%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
