# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pacific Railroad, 117 S. Ct. 44 (1996) (No. 96-44)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1996

## Text

FIL P
) 96 44 JUL 219%

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the Huited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT H. WHEELER KENNETH W. STARR

OPPENHEIMER WOLFF & Counsel of Record
DONNELLY DONALD G. KEMPF, JR.

Two Prudential Plaza CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

180 North Stetson Avenue KIRKLAND & ELLIS

45th Floor 655 Fifteenth Street

Chicago, Illinois 60601 Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-5000

Counsel for Petitioner CMC
Heartland Partners

ray 2, 1996

QUESTION PRESENTED

This case presents an important and recurring question of
federal bankruptcy law on which the circuits are sharply
divided: does a federal bankruptcy “claim” based on state law
arise at the time when the conduct underlying the claim occurs,
or at the time when state law creates a cause of action imposing
liability for that conduct?

(i)

scam ii ai

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, CMC Heartland Partners, was appellant below.
Respondent, Union Pacific Railroad Company, was appellee
below.

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, petitioner notes that it is
a Delaware general partnership with two general partners: (1)
Heartland Partners, L.P., which owns 99.99% of the
partnership, and (2) Milwaukee Land Company, which owns
01% of the partnership. Heartland Partners, L.P. is a publicly-
held Delaware limited partnership, whose general partner is
Milwaukee Land Company. Milwaukee Land Company is a
publicly-held Delaware corporation.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
CRRPEE RUT PUMMIUEEERD ce sicccesecsesesccvvcewus i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .... cece cence ii
TEER MED PRS EEMEEEED ces cccccccrcseusveceeses Vv
i ere Sa Sone sis chev akeensere trees ]
a SS hae ey oe TON Iwo we 0 6+ eb sha ]
PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ...........-. ]
STATEMENT OF THECASE 2. w ccc ccc ccc ccc ccccess 2

A. Union Pacific Purchases the Tacoma Railyard..... 2
B. The Bankruptcy Reorganization Is Completed ..... 3

C. The First Round of Litigation.................. 4
D. The Second Round of Litigation ............... 6
REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............-- 7

THE CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED AS TO THE POINT IN
TIME AT WHICH A FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY “CLAIM”

BASED ON STATE LAW ARISES .............-.--.- 7
A. The Federal Bankruptcy Laws Broadly Define
af BE i STRESS a PR en Pr Se anc One 7

B. A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises at the Time
the Relevant Conduct Occurs, Not at the Time State
Law Creates Liability Based On Such Conduct .... 8

C. The Circuits Are Divided As To The Point In Time
At Which A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises . . 13

EE nc Cswsscddinscvevitosciaunsb sons 15

si

iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page:

Cases:
Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co.,

68 B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ...------+++++> 10
Grady v. 1 H. Robins Co.,

839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,

487 U.S. 1260 (1988) ....----- eee eee eee 9,11, 13, 14
In re Amfesco Inds., Inc.,

81 B.R. 777 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ...---.---+-->- 15
In re Baldwin-United Corp.,

48 B.R. 901 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) ....-----+---- 10
In re Black,

70 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) ....-------+---> 10
In re Chateaugay Corp.,

53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

116 S. Ct. 298 (1995) .. 2... cece cece tree eeeeees 13
Inre Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,

974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992) .....--- eee ee eeee rece 8
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,

3 F.3d 200 (1993) .....-- eee eee reece reece passim
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,

78 F.3d 285 (1996) ....--- eee eee eee eee eeeee passim
In re Cybermech, Inc.,

13 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 1994) ....... 02 eee errr reer 8
In re Edge,

60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) ...-..-. 10, 11, 13

In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.,
184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) ..-------+++> 14

In re Food Barn Stores, Inc.,
175 B.R. 723 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) .......... 10, 14

In re Frenville Co.,
744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
ee a SEE oo Wedd bids 0 beavckie saan 13,14

In re Grynberg,
143 B.R. 574 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990),

aff'd, 966 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1992) ............ 11,14

In re Jensen,
127 B.R. 27 (9th Cir. BAP 1991), aff'd,
Fw tg. Le E.R eres 9, 10, 13

In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ............ 10, 11

In re Penn Central Transp. Co.,
944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,

A rere rer rr eS 13
In re Piper Aircraft Corp.,

Se ae BATE CAs BOTS tcc ccccntancessen 9, 13
In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp.,

106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,

Fe a RTD + hanks bale sewetansevadcesecs 8

In re Transp. Sys. Int'l, Inc.,
110 B.R. 888 (D. Minn. 1990),

aff'd, 930 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991) ................ 11
In re Waterman S.S. Corp.,

141 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ......... 8,10, 11
In re Yanks,

49 B.R. 56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) ................ 10
In re Zelis,

es AD od wh hades ene wenn 10

Johnson v. Home State Bank,
gk OB i) | err rrrr reer yyy ero Pees: 8

vi

Kokoszka v. Belford,

417 USS. 642 (1974) 20... . cece rece cece eee eens 7
Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp.,

18 F.3d 1268 (Sth Cir. 1994) .......-- eee reece eee 11
New York v. Feiring,

313 U.S. 283 (1941) 2... 2. cece eee reece ee eeeee 11
Ohio v. Kovacs,

469 U.S. 274 (1985)... 0. . cece eee e ener renee 8
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Davenport,

495 U.S. 552 (1990) ......- eee eee reece eee tenes 8

Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert.denied,

474 US. 864 (1985) .. 0... cece ee eee tenes 11
Stellwagen v. Clum,

245 U.S. 605 (1918) ...... cece eee erect e neces 7
Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,

236 U.S. 549 (1915)... cee cece eee tener eens 7
Statutes:
11 U.S.C. § 35 (repealed 1978) .....------eeeeeereeee 7
11 U.S.C. § 101(4{(A) .- 60 ee ee eee eee eee eee eeee 8
11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B) ..-- eee eee eee eter rete 8
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) .....--- eee eee cr cceeeeneceeccees 1
11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (repealed 1978) ....--------+++++- 1,8
11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 11410)... eee eee ee eee eee 7
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ....-- eee e eer cece ecccceererees 1
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 ef seg. .. 6-6. cree eee terete passim
U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 2, cl.4 2.2... eee eee cere eee: 11

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48 (1985) ......-cccsseneveceess 6

iii ll

vii
Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48 (1985) .............20 ee eens 6
WHEEL, PET, GAGE © TUMOR EDOED ponccccneecrcnvsencs 6
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.105D et seg. ............. passim

Other:

Case Note, In Re Jensen: Demonstrating the Need
for Supreme Court Resolution of the Conflict
Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code,
9 J. Land Use & Envil. L. 179 (1994) .............. 14

Comment, Through the Looking Glass: A Comparison
of Covered Persons, Defenses, and Lic bility under
CERCLA and the Washington State Model Toxic Control
Act of 1988 (Initiative 97, 1988 General Election),
ae a: Ec A EUS foe ccawesevnevesn xs’ 12

The Federalist No. 42 (James Madison) (Clinton
PED eos kot hacks dx Radagactvewsees 11

Harvey R. Miller et al., Representing the Secured
Creditor In Chapter 11 Cases, in Formulation
and Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plans Under the
Bankruptcy Code (PLI Com. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. A4-4457, 1994) ........ 14

Arlene E. Mirsky et al., The Interface Between
Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46 Bus.
SNE ash Gabon Cebaws ba teak essd bees 10

Pe ee Te eee Te

Viii

Karynne G. Popper & Alison N. Zim, The Bottomless
Pit: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial Consistency
In the Application of CERCLA In Bankruptcy Proceedings
(PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.

AA4AS3, 1994) 2. cc cccccccccccccvesescccvccses 14

Steven E. Sherman, Environmental Issues Facing
High-Tech Companies In Chapter 11 Proceedings,
in Computer Law (Sept. 1994) ......-2022+ee scenes 14

CMC Heartland Partners respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The two opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit are reported at 78 F.3d 285 (1996), and 3 F.3d 200
(1993), and are reprinted at Appendix (“App.”) la-18a and
19a-34a respectively.

The District Court’s unreported order consummating the
Milwaukee Road bankruptcy is reprinted at App. 65a-74a. The
District Court’s first order upholding respondent’s post-
discharge state-law claim against petitioner is reported at 1992
WL 316321, and reprinted at App. 37a-46a. The District
Court’s second order upholding that claim is reported at 1994
WL 722053, and reprinted at App. 47a-64a.

JURISDICTION

The most recent judgment of the Court of Appeals was
entered on February 28, 1996. CMC Heartland Partners filed
a timely Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc, which was denied on April 3, 1996. App. 35a-36a.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 defined a “claim” as, inter alia,
“debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated, securities (other
than stock and option warrants to subscribe to stock), liens, or
other interests of whatever character.” 11 U.S.C. § 205(b)

(repealed 1978).

The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 defines a “claim” as, inter
alia, a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a dispute over liability for an environ-
mental clean-up of a former railyard located in Tacoma, Wash-
ington. The property was owned from the early years of this
century by the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railroad Company (“Milwaukee Road”). App. at 24a. Like
many other railroads, the Milwaukee Road fell into financial
straits in the 1960s and 70s. The company filed a petition for
bankruptcy reorganization on December 19, 1977, in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. /d. at 23a.

A. Union Pacific Purchases the Tacoma Railyard

As part of the reorganization process, the bankruptcy trustee
placed the Milwaukee Road’s Tacoma railyard on the market.
On March 28, 1980, respondent Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany agreed to purchase the property. The purchase agreement
included a clause by which the bankruptcy trustee and the
Milwaukee Road agreed to indemnify Union Pacific and its
subsidiaries “against any and all claims, damages, liabilities,
losses or demands whatsoever, and expenses in connection
therewith, including reasonable fees of outside counsel, regard-
less of the source or nature thereof, arising out of the operation
of the Properties prior to March 12, 1980.” App. at 23a. The
bankruptcy court authorized the purchase, and the trustee con-
veyed the property by quitclaim deed on December 19, 1980.
Id. at 24a.

Union Pacific was under no illusion that the Tacoma railyard
was in a pristine state. To the contrary, Union Pacific engin-
eers who inspected the property in April 1980 observed (among
other things): “[The d]iesel fueling area is oil saturated and will
probably require removal of surface oil as well as contaminated
dirt. Apparently, this covers quite a large area and may require
extensive clean-up.” Jd. at 25a. Thus, it came as no surprise
when the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) in October 1981 designated the entire Commencement
Bay and the Nearshore Tideflats area (including the Tacoma

ee ee

3

railyard) as a federal Superfund site. See id.' Finally, in
January 1982, an environmental study commissioned by the
Washington State Department of Ecology concluded (among
other things) that many hazardous materials had been spilled at
the railyard and that accordingly “the soils at this site are
possibly permeated with toxic compounds.” /d. at 26a.?

B. The Bankruptcy Reorganization Is Completed

By 1985, the District Court was winding up the Milwaukee
Road bankruptcy reorganization. On July 12, 1985, the Court
confirmed a comprehensive reorganization plan. The plan
required all post-petition claims (i.e., claims against the
Milwaukee Road arising after the bankruptcy petition was
filed) to be filed on or before the “claims bar date” of
September 10, 1985. After that date, all further post-petition
claims against the bankruptcy trustee, the Milwaukee Road,
and the latter’s successors and assigns would be barred in
perpetuity unless “based on facts that are unknown, undis-
closed and unasserted” as of that date. App. at 24a (emphasis
added).

Union Pacific actively participated in the Milwaukee Road
bankruptcy proceedings, filing several claims against the
bankruptcy estate and negotiating with the trustee. App. at
24a, 38a. Accordingly, Union Pacific and its legal counsel
were on the official service list for the reorganization, and
received notice of the claims bar dates, notice of the hearings
regarding the reorganization plan, and a copy of that plan.
However, notwithstanding the manifest environmental
contamination at the Tacoma railyard, Union Pacific filed no

' Indeed, the EPA characterized the Tacoma site as one of the ten most
hazardous in the country—a characterization widely reported in the local
and national media. See id. at 25a.

? Although Union Pacific officials later denied any knowledge of this
study, the District Court specifically found that “this information was
available had they sought it out.” App. at 43a.

4

claims against the bankruptcy estate relating to any such
contamination.

On November 12, 1985, the District Court entered an order
consummating the bankruptcy and discharging all further
claims against the bankruptcy trustee, the Milwaukee Road,
and the latter’s successors and assigns. See App. at 70a. The
order also enjoined all persons from asserting claims that had
been discharged. See id. at 73a-74a. The Court expressly
retained jurisdiction to enforce that injunction. See id. at 71a.

C. The First Round of Litigation

In April 1989, the EPA notified Union Pacific that it was
potentially liable for environmental cleanup costs at the
Tacoma railyard under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601 et seg. (“CERCLA”). App. at 27a. In October 1990,
the Washington State Department of Ecology notified Union
Pacific that it was also potentially liable for such costs under a
state-law analogue to CERCLA, the Washington State Model
Toxics Control Act, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.105D ef seq.
(“MTCA”), which had been enacted the previous year. See id.

On September 9, 1991—nearly two and a half years after
receiving the EPA notification—Union Pacific served upon
petitioner CMC Heartland Partners (“CMC”), successor in
interest to the Milwaukee Road, a letter demanding settlement
negotiations regarding liability for the clean-up costs at the
Tacoma railyard. Notwithstanding the Milwaukee Road’s
1985 bankruptcy discharge, Union Pacific asserted that CMC
was liable for environmental clean-up costs at the Tacoma
railyard under both CERCLA and the MTCA.

On November 13, 1991, CMC invoked the District Court’s
retained jurisdiction over the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy by
filing a motion to enjoin Union Pacific’s claims. Those claims,
CMC noted, could and should have been asserted during the

5

bankruptcy proceeding.’ The District Court agreed with CMC
with respect to the federal CERCLA claims, but disagreed with
respect to the state-law MTCA claims. See App. at 37a-46a.
The Court first held that Union Pacific had at least constructive
knowledge of its CERCLA claims before the bar date, and thus
was barred thereafter from asserting those claims against CMC.
Sez id. at 43a-44a. But the Court then held tha: Union Pacific
had no similar knowledge with respect to its MTCA claims,
because the MTCA was not enacted until 1989, four years affer
the claims bar date. See id. at 44a-45a.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. See App. at 19a -34a. The Court first affirmed the
District Court’s conclusion that Union Pacific’s CERCLA
claims were barred because Union Pacific had at least
constructive knowledge of those claims before the bar date but
had not filed a contingent claim against the bankruptcy estate.
See id. at 28a-33a.‘

The Seventh Circuit then vacated the District Court’s
conclusion that Union Pacific’s claims under the Washington
MTCA were not barred because the statute was not enacted
until after the claims bar date. See id. at 33a-34a. The relevant
inquiry, the Seventh Circuit asserted, was not when the statute
was enacted, but whether the type of liability it imposed
“existed under predecessor statutes prior to the bar dates, and
whether Union Pacific consequently had a contingent claim for
environmental cleanup costs under Washington statutes in
effect before the bar dates.” Jd at 34a. Accordingly, the
Seventh Circuit remanded for the District Court to determine
“what liabilities under the [MTCA] existed [at the time of

> Union Pacific subsequently filed a lawsuit in the district court for the
Western District of Washington, seeking a declaratory judgment and
contribution and asserting claims under the MTCA and CERCLA. See App.
at 27a-28a. That action has been stayed pending resolution of this case.

* Indeed, the Seventh Circuit noted that “on the basis of the record before
it, the [District] [C]ourt could have found actual knowledge as well” as
constructive knowledge of the potential CERCLA claims. App. at 31a.

6

discharge] by virtue of Washington state statutes then in
effect.” Id.

D. The Second Round of Litigation

On remand, the District Court assigned the case to a
magistrate judge, who compared the MTCA to three
Washington statutes that had existed prior to the bar date: (1)
the Water Pollution Control Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48
(1985), (2) the Hazardous Waste Management Act, Wash. Rev.
Code § 70.105 (1985), and (3) the nuisance statute, Wash. Rev.
Code § 7.48 (1985). The magistrate judge concluded that none
of these statutes imposed the same liability as that created by
the MTCA. The District Court considered the parties’
objections to the magistrate judge’s recommended order and,
after minor modifications, ratified that order. See App. at 47a-
64a.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the District Court
had properly concluded that the liability created by the MTCA
was a “new” liability distinct from any liability that existed
under Washington law at the iume of the bar date in 1985. See
App. at 9a-17a.5

* The Seventh Circuit also noted that, while this litigation was pending,
Union Pacific sold the railyard to the Port of Tacoma. Union Pacific sought
to substitute the Port as the party prosecuting the case, but the Court of
Appeals refused to allow the substitution. See App. at 4a.

7

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED AS TO THE POINT
IN TIME AT WHICH A FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY
“CLAIM” BASED ON STATE LAW ARISES.

A. The Federal Bankruptcy Laws Broadly Define
“Claims”

As Judge Aldisert noted below, this case presents “the
important question” that arises “here and in other judicial
circuits” of “whether debtors in bankruptcy who are charged
with pollution in the past can be held liable for cleanup costs of
hazardous waste at their former business sites.” App. at 20a.
Resolution of that question implicates the most fundamental
principles underlying the federal bankruptcy laws.

Those laws serve two core purposes: (1) to ensure an
equitable settlement of debts among a bankrupt’s creditors, and
(2) thereafter to give the bankrupt a “fresh start” freed from
those debts. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-
46 (1974); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918);
Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-
55 (1915). The bankruptcy laws seek to achieve both these
purposes by providing for a comprehensive settlement of the
bankrupt’s debts followed by a binding discharge of those
debts. In order for this procedure to succeed, it is imperative
that all debts be settled during the bankruptcy proceeding.
Permitting creditors to pursue collection of those debts after
that proceeding would not only undermine the fairness of the
distribution but also jeopardize the bankrupt’s ability to make
a “fresh start.”

Accordingly, the bankruptcy laws require creditors to
present all “claims” against a bankrupt during the bankruptcy
proceeding or lose those claims forever. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 727(b), 1141(d); see also former 11 U.S.C. § 35 (repealed
1978). In addition, the bankruptcy laws broadly define the
term “claim” to ensure that all conceivable liabilities are
presented for orderly resolution during a pending bankruptcy

-

8

proceeding. See, e.g., Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S.
78, 83 (1991); Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469
U.S. 274, 279 (1985). A “claim” includes all potential debts,
no matter how remote or contingent. See, e.g., In re Cyber-
mech, Inc., 13 F.3d 818, 821 (4th Cir. 1994); Jn re Radio-
Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F.2d 22, 22-27 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940).° Indeed, the breadth of that term
can hardly be overstated. The courts have described it not only
as “broad” and “very broad,” but as “extremely broad,” “could
not be broader,” “broadest possible,” “all-encompassing,” and
“sufficiently broad to cover any possible obligation.” Jn re
Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (collecting
definitions).

B. A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises at the Time
the Relevant Conduct Occurs, Not at the Time State
Law Creates Liability Based On Such Conduct.

The acknowledged breadth of the statutory term “claim”
informs, but does not directly answer, the question at issue
here: when does a state-law “claim” arise for purposes of the
federal bankruptcy laws? To the extent that Union Pacific’s
claims against CMC arose before the Milwaukee Road’s
bankruptcy discharge, those claims are barred.

* Because the Milwaukee Road filed for bankruptcy before the enactment
of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, this case is governed by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Both statutes broadly define the term “claim” to
include wholly contingent obligations of the sort at issue here. The Seventh
Circuit’s resolution of this case, accordingly, in no way turned on any
perceived distinction between the 1898 and 1978 bankruptcy statutes. See
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775, 781 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“Just as Section 77 of the 1898 Act broadly defines claims, the
new Bankruptcy Code also broadly defines claims. Compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(b) (repealed 1978) and 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) and (B) (enacted
1978).”).

9

To determine the point in time at which Union Pacific’s
claim under the Washington MTCA arose, the Seventh Circuit
focused on the point in time at which state law created the
relevant legal liability. While rejecting the mechanical
suggestion that, for purposes of federal bankruptcy law, a
“claim” under the MTCA could not arise before the enactment
of that statute, see App. at 34a, the Court focused the inquiry
on the existence of other state statutes that imposed the same
liability, see id. Therefore, in the first round of this litigation,
the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for the District Court to
determine “what liabilities under the [MTCA] existed [at the
time of discharge] by virtue of Washington state statutes then
in effect.” Jd. The District Court subsequently concluded that
no other state statute had imposed that same liability, see id. at
56a-64a, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that conclusion, see
id. at 9a-17a. Because Union Pacific’s MTCA claim did not
arise until the enactment of that statute in 1989, the Seventh
Circuit held, it could not have been discharged during the 1985
bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 3a, 7a, 9a-10a, 17a.

The Seventh Circuit violated federal law and policy by
looking to state law to determine when a “claim” arose for
federal bankruptcy purposes. The Seventh Circuit’s underlying
premise—that a “claim” based on state law cannot arise until
state law officially creates the specific liability on which the
claim is based—is incorrect. The question of when a federal
bankruptcy “claim” arises is a federal question to be resolved
by reference to the text, structure, and purposes of the federal
bankruptcy laws. As at least three other circuits have held, the
determination of when a “claim” arises cannot be left to turn on
the vagaries of state law. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft Corp.,
58 F.3d 1573, 1576 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Jn re Jensen, 995
F.2d 925, 929-30 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1993); Grady v. A.H. Robins
Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S.

10

1260 (1988).’ These circuits, unlike the Seventh Circuit,
accordingly recognize that “a claim can exist even though the
holder of that claim may have no present cause of action
against the debtor” under state law. Arlene E. Mirsky et al.,
The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws,
46 Bus. Law. 623, 652 (1991).

Thus, in determining when a “claim” arises for purposes of
the federal bankruptcy laws, “[m]ost courts have focused on the
time when the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred .. . .
With respect to claims under state and federal environmental
laws, this usually means the time at which the contamination
or violation occurred.” Id. at 651-52 (emphasis added). The
relevant inquiry, in other words, focuses on the underlying
conduct at issue rather than the legal consequences or label a
state attaches to that conduct. Because “[c]laims in bankruptcy
arise from the debtor’s conduct,” Jn re Zelis, 66 F.3d 205, 209
(9th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 32-33 (9th
Cir. BAP 1991)), “[a] ‘claim’ arises at the moment when acts
giving rise to the alleged liability are performed.” Jn re
Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (internal quotation marks added).* See also In re Johns-

” Many district courts sitting in bankruptcy have also held that “for federal
bankruptcy purposes, a prepetition ‘claim’ may well encompass a cause of
action that, under state law, was not cognizable until after the bankruptcy
petition was filed.” Jn re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also In re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 175 B.R. 723, 728-
31 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 556
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Black, 70 B.R. 645, 647-51 (Bankr. D. Utah
1986); Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 68 B.R. 495, 497-98
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 704-05 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1986); Jn re Yanks, 49 B.R. 56, 57-59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); Jn re
Baldwin-United Corp., 48 B.R. 901, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).

* This focus on the underlying conduct is also reflected in the bankruptcy
reorganization plan in this case, which barred all post-discharge contribution
or indemnity claims “based on facts that are unknown, undisclosed and
unasserted” as of the bar date. App. at 24a (quoting Plan of Reorganization
§ 11.2) (emphasis added).

11

Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Jn
re Transp. Sys. Int’l, Inc., 110 B.R. 888, 394 (D. Minn. 1990),
aff'd, 930 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Grynberg, 143 B.R.
574, 576 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 966 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.
1992). The point at which state law recognizes a cause of
action imposing liability for that conduct is immaterial.”

That approach is consistent with the broad federal
bankruptcy definition of “claim.” By holding that a “claim”
cannot arise until state law creates the specific liability on
which it is based, the Seventh Circuit has opened the door for
state law to create “new” post-discharge liabilities based on
pre-discharge conduct. The power to impose such liabilities,
of course, is the power to undermine the “Uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States” that
Congress has enacted pursuant to its express constitutional
power. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 4. Cf New York v.
Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 285 (1941) (federal bankrutpcy statute
“[iJntended to be nationwide in its application” and not
“controlled or varied by the particular characterization by local
law”). By allowing the States to create new “claims” after a
federal bankruptcy discharge, the Seventh Circuit has
jeopardized the fundamental predictability and stability of the
uniform federal bankruptcy laws.'®

® Indeed, some courts have held that a “claim” arises at the time the debtor
engages in the conduct on which the claim is based even where that conduct
does not result in any evident injury until later. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H.
Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260
(1988): Jn re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992);
In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 701-02 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). But see
Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1275-77 (Sth Cir. 1994);
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.),
cert.denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).

'° See also The Federalist No. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy
is SO intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent
so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed

(continued...)

12

This case offers a compelling example of the danger.
Although the Milwaukee Road went into bankruptcy almost
twenty years ago, and had its debts discharged over ten years
ago, the Seventh Circuit has now allowed a creditor to file a
potentially enormous claim against its successor-in-interest,
petitioner CMC Heartland Partners, which has never been
involved in the railroad business at all. (Petitioner is in the
business of real estate management and development.) The
eight-year duration of the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy
proceedings (from 1977 to 1985) underscores the careful
attention given to discharging the Milwaukee Road’s debts in
an orderly, equitable, and comprehensive manner. Union
Pacific could easily have preserved any and all claims involv-
ing environmental contamination at the Tacoma railyard,
regardless of the legal basis of liability, by simply filing during
the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy proceeding a bare-bones proof
of claim parroting the contractual indemnification language in
the 1980 purchase agreement. Having failed to do so, Union
Pacific should not be allowed to frustrate the “fresh start”
provided by the 1985 discharge.

The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that Union Pacific’s
MTCA claim is not barred, moreover, is especially peculiar in
light of the fact that the MTCA is closely modeled on
CERCLA. See App. at 7a, 10a-11a; see generally Comment,
Through the Looking Glass: A Comparison of Covered
Persons, Defenses, and Liability under CERCLA and the
Washington State Model Toxic Control Act of 1988 (Initiative
97, 1988 General Election), 25 Gonz. L. Rev. 253, 254 (1990).
What the Seventh Circuit gave with one hand, then, it took
away with the other: it allowed Union Pacific to bring under
state law the CERCLA claim that it was barred from bringing
under federal law. That result makes no sense. Union Pacific
clearly knew (or should have known) of the need to file a

'° (...continued)
into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn
into question.”’)

ee

AA Cn VUE te Wd Ot EE MS FOR

ee

13

contingent claim based on the contamination at the Tacoma
railyard during the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy proceedings.
A State cannot circumvent the federal bankruptcy laws by
simply purporting to attach new, cumulative, or duplicative
legal consequences to conduct that occurred before a federal
bankruptcy discharge."

C. The Circuits Are Divided As To The Point In Time
At Which A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises.

The Seventh Circuit is not the first circuit to fall into the
error of holding that the point at which a federal bankruptcy
“claim” arises is to be determined by reference to state law.
The Third Circuit has made the same mistake, holding that the
point at which a “claim” arises for purposes of the federal
bankruptcy laws turns on the point at which a cause of action
accrues under state law regardless of when the events
underlying the claim occurred. See In re Frenville Co., 744
F.2d 332, 335-36 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985). That approach, like the Seventh Circuit’s approach in
this case, “confuse[s] the existence of a present right of action
or access to the courts with the existence of a ‘claim’ for
bankruptcy purposes.” Jn re Edge, 60 B.R. at 704. The
Frenville Court’s reliance on state law to determine the point
at which a federal bankruptcy claim arises has been expressly
rejected by three other circuits. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft
Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1995); In re Jensen,
995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co.,

'' The same analysis does not necessarily apply where federal law
purports to impose a new post-discharge liability. Congress, unlike the
States, enjoys power to impose new liabilities inconsistent with the federal
bankruptcy laws—assuming that such liabilities are not unconstitutionally
retroactive. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 298 (1995); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944
F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992). Thus,
whereas the federal bankruptcy laws must be reconciled with inconsistent
federal enactments, those laws trump inconsistent state enactments outright.

14

839 F.2d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260
(1988).”

The confusion engendered by Frenville and exacerbated by
the opinions below creates substantial difficulties for the
companies considering reorganization and the courts that must
assist them. Determining, for example, when environmental
claims arise under the bankruptcy laws and thus whether such
“claims can be discharged or survive as a liability of the
reorganized company can be determinative of whether there
can be a successful reorganization.” Steven E. Sherman,
Environmental Issues Facing High-Tech Companies In
Chapter 11 Proceedings, in Computer Law (Sept. 1994).
“Given the importance of this issue and the emerging conflicts
among the circuits, it would be surprising if this issue is not
soon addressed by the Supreme Court.” Jd.”

Both the Third and Seventh Circuits, in sum, have
erroneously “replace[d] the federal definition of ‘claim’ .. .

'? Many courts have recognized the split in authority. See, e.g., In re
Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910, 923 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995)
(“Frenville’s reliance upon state law has been rightly criticized by other
courts as being inconsistent with the intended breadth and scope of the
statute and seems to have been rejected in all circuits save its place of
origin.””); Jn re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 175 B.R. 723, 730 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1994) (“The Frenville decision has been criticized or rejected by many
courts.”); In re Grynberg, 143 B.R. 574, 577 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (“[T}he
Frenville decision has been discredited and is generally not followed outside
of the Third Circuit.”).

> Other commentators and bankruptcy practictioners have also noted the
need for clarification of the confusion. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller et ai.,
Representing the Secured Creditor In Chapter 11 Cases, in Formulation
and Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plans Under the Bankruptcy Code (PLI
Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4457, 1994);
Karynne G. Popper & Alison N. Zim, The Bottomless Pit: The Struggle to
Achieve Judicial Consistency In the Application of CERCLA In Bankruptcy
Proceedings (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-
4453, 1994); Case Note, In Re Jensen: Demonstrating the Need for Supreme
Court Resolution of the Conflict Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy
Code, 9 J. Land Use & Envil. L. 179, 190 (1994).

15

with the narrower state concept of ‘cause of action[.]’” Jn re
Amfesco Inds., inc., 81 B.R. 777, 782 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
The significance of that error cannot be overstated. Those two
circuits now allow state law to circumvent federal bankruptcy
law at will by creating new liabilities based on pre-discharge
conduct.

The resulting parade of horribles is far from speculative: it
is manifest in this very case. The Seventh Circuit has allowed
the State of Washington, years after the discharge of the
Milwaukee Road’s debts, to impose on petitioner significant
new liability based wholly on pre-discharge events. The
federal bankruptcy laws neither authorize nor tolerate that
result.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari
should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT H. WHEELER KENNETH W. STARR
OPPENHEIMER WOLFF & Counsel of Record
DONNELLY DONALD G. KEMPF , IR.
Two Prudential Plaza CHRISTOPHER LANDAU
180 North Stetson Avenue KIRKLAND & ELLIS
45th Floor 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Chicago, Illinois 60601 Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20005

Counsel for Petitioner CMC
Heartland Partners

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY,
Debtor.

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,
Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 95-1412, 95-2986

Argued Jan. 4, 1996.
Decided Feb. 28, 1996.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
Denied April 3, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, No. 77 B 8999;
George W. Lindberg, Judge.

Robert H. Wheeler (argued), Mark Leipold,
Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Raymond H. Groble, III (argued), Ross & Hardies,
Chicago, IL, for Appellee.

Jerold S. Solovy, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for
Debtor.

2a

Before ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS,
Circuit Judges.

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Like the Energizer Bunny, litigation growing out of the
Milwaukee Road’s bankruptcy proceedings keeps going and
going and going. Today, we issue another opinion—to be
added to more than a dozen others—in a case stemming from
the reorganization of the railroad which began in 1977.

The Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad
Company, better known as the Milwaukee Road, came to the
end of the line in 1977 when it petitioned for reorganization
pursuant to § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, formerly 11
U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978). The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois served as the
reorganization court.

In accordance with procedures under the Bankruptcy
Act, the reorganization court established deadlines, or bar
dates, for the filing of claims against Milwaukee Road, the
estate, and its trustee. The first bar date was September 10,
1985, which established the deadline for all post-petition
claims (claims arising against Milwaukee Road during the
period of reorganization). Notice of this bar date was sent to
all known creditors and published in The Wall Street Journal.

On November 12, 1985, the reorganization court
entered a consummation order. This order Secame effective on
November 25, 1985, the consummation date. The consumma-
tion order set forth a new bar date of December 26, 1985, for
claims that arose between the prior September 10 bar date and
the November 25 consummation date. This order bars and
forever discharges all untimely claims against the trustee, the
Milwaukee Road, and its successors and assigns.

The question we face, for the second time, is whether
certain claims of the Union Pacific Railroad are among those
properly barred by the reorganization court. The claims arise

eae al

hibae bai ibe ict aia Bile ata be teks

3a

out of an environmental cleanup of a railyard located within the
Commencement Bay/Nearshore Tideflats Superfund site in
Tacoma, Washington. Union Pacific purchased the land from
the Milwaukee Road in 1980 and, as the owner of the land (at
least the owner at the time the appeal was filed but more about
that later), faces liability for the cleanup. It filed claims for the
cleanup against CMC Heartland Partners, successor-in-interest
to the Milwaukee Road, under both the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 ef seg., and the Model Toxics
Control Act of the State of Washington, Wash.Rev.Code Ch.
70.105D.010 et seq.

We first encountered the question in 1993. A brief
review of our decision in Jn re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific RR., 3 F.3d 200 (7th Cir.1993), will set the stage for
our analysis of the present appeal.

We noted that the situation required us to attempt to
reconcile conflicting goals of laws that deal with environmental
cleanups and those of the bankruptcy code designed to give
debtors a “fresh start.” In that context we determined that
claims subject to the claims bar included “contingent claims.”
In the context of CERCLA, a contingent claim exists, we said,
when a party potentially liable for response costs under the Act
can tie a debtor to a “known release of a hazardous substance.”
At 202. Under that formulation we determined that Union
Pacific’s CERCLA claim was barred.

However, the Washington state Model Act became
effective in 1989, four years after the bar date. We joined other
courts, e.g., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit—Jn re
Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (1991), cert. den. 503
U.S. 906 (1992)—in concluding that claims based on a statute
enacted after the discharge date are not barred.

That was not the end of the issue. CMC argued that
two Washington statutes, the Water Pollution Control Act,
Wash.Rev.Code Ch. 90.48, and the Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Act, Wash.Rev.Code Ch. 70.105, which existed prior to

4a

the bar date, provided the same or similar relief as the Model
Act and thus barred the claim. We remanded the case to the
reorganization court for a determination “as to what liabilities
under the Model Act existed in 1985 by virtue of Washington
state statutes then in effect.”

On remand, the district court did an admirably thorough
job. Judge George W. Lindberg referred the issue to
Magistrate Judge W. Thomas Rosemond, Jr., who compared
the Model Act to those two statutes and a third, which CMC
added to the mix after remand, the Washington nuisances
statute, Wash. Rev.Code Ch. 7.48.140. Judge Rosemond
issued a recommendation that the claim not be barred. Judge
Lindberg considered objections to the recommendation and,
with minor modifications, also concluded that the claim was
not barred—that Union Pacific was not subject to the same
liability for cleanup of the railyard under prior Washington
statutes as it was under the Model Act and, therefore, its claim
for contribution from CMC did not exist prior to the enactment
of the Model Act. CMC appeals that decision as well as a later
decision on its Rule 60 motion in the district court based on
newly discovered evidence.

In addition, because Union Pacific sold the land to the
Port of Tacoma during the pendency of the appeal, Union
Pacific seeks to substitute the Port as the party prosecuting this
case. We decline to substitute parties. This appeal will pro-
ceed with the original cast. Given the outcome of this appeal
and the agreement between Union Pacific and the Port, we find
that there is no reason to order substitution.

As to the appeal itself, our standard of review in the
many Milwaukee Road cases was set out some time ago:
Because the district court’s entry of an injunction in this case
was both a bankruptcy decision and an interpretation of its
prior consummation order, we review the court’s decision to
bar [the creditor’s] claims for abuse of discretion. Nonetheless,
in applying the abuse of discretion standard, we do not give
equal deference to every aspect of a court’s decision. The

‘. Pisa VRS a tisk, PARP Lacie

Sear io id seeing

Aelia eae

mnt MAC Bh ON Lo 0M

Sa

abuse of discretion standard is used to evaluate the reorganiza-
tion court’s application of the facts to the appropriate legal
standard, and the factual findings and legal conclusions under-
lying such decisions are evaluated under the clearly erroneous
and de novo standards, respectively. In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 779-80 (7th
Cir., 1992). The decision on the Rule 60 motion is subject to
considerably more deference. It is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.

The railyard in Tacoma was owned and used by the
Milwaukee Road from the early years of this century. In 1980,
Union Pacific, with the authorization of the reorganization
court, purchased the Tacoma site from the trustee and later
assigned it to a wholly owned subsidiary, the Oregon-
Washington Railroad and Navigation Co. The purchase agree-
ment contained an indemnification clause for claims arising out
of the operation of the property prior to March 12, 1980.

After purchasing the site, Union Pacific removed
existing structures and let the land stand vacant. In 1980,
Union Pacific’s own inspection of the property revealed that
the area of the site used for diesel fueling was saturated with oil
which, along with contaminated dirt, would probably have to
be removed.

The railyard is in a highly industrial area. In October
1981, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
placed the area on the Agency’s National Priority List. The
Superfund site was described as one of the ten most hazardous
sites in the country. In 1982 the State of Washington commis-
sioned an environmental study of the railyard, and the EPA
investigated the site in 1985.

Union Pacific also owned other property within the
Superfund site and had dealings with the EPA in connection
with two of them. One was an abandoned railway tunnel. The
EPA notified Union Pacific in 1982 that it was a potentially
responsible party for the cleanup of that site. Later, however,

6a

the EPA determined that the tunnel was not the source of
contamination and discontinued its investigation.

The other site was Union Pacific’s Tacoma fueling
facility. The Department of Ecology of the State of Washing-
ton investigated oil contamination in the City of Tacoma
waterway in 1982 and, under Washington’s Water Pollution
Control Act, directed Union Pacific to take remedial action.
Union Pacific commissioned a groundwater investigation.
Although the investigation revealed no groundwater contamin-
ation, Union Pacific, with state approval, removed the top foot
of soil at the facility.

Then in 1990, Union Pacific decided to sell the railyard
and, in preparation for the sale, commissioned an environ-
mental audit. The audit, completed in June 1990 by a company
called Applied Geotechnology, found subsurface contamina-
tion of the soil by petroleum hydrocarbons. The audit also
identified potential contamination from metals and solvents.
As required by law, Union Pacific notified both the EPA and
the State of Washington of these findings.

The State notified Union Pacific that it was potentially
liable for cleanup of the site under the Model Act. The EPA
notified the company that it was also a potentially responsible
party under CERCLA. Union Pacific and the State entered into
an agreement for remediation of contamination at the railyard.

It was then, on September 9, 1991, that Union Pacific
served CMC with a demand for settlement negotiations regard-
ing the cleanup. CMC filed a motion in the reorganization
court to enjoin Union Pacific, under the consummation order,
from asserting any claims arising out of the cleanup of the
railyard. Union Pacific filed a complaint in the Western Dis-
trict of Washington for contribution under CERCLA and the
Model Act.

This summary brings us to the issue at hand. Should
the claim under the Washington Model Act be barred? We
have previously noted that Union Pacific’s CERCLA claim is

> il rd ae CRN tae Late

j
4
|
3

7a

barred. In fact, in 1996, as we look back at the situation, it
seems surprising, if not shocking, that Union Pacific did not
file a contingent CERCLA claim. Also from our 1996 vantage
point, it is perhaps less surprising, but nevertheless worthy of
notice, that Union Pacific did not file a contingent claim under
any possibly relevant existing state statute.

But questions regarding whether the existence of claims
under prior statutes bars a claim now under the Model Act can
only be fairly answered by viewing the world from a 1985
perspective, not from our perspective in 1996. We must resist
the temptation to use 20-20 hindsight.

What was the 1985 perspective? It can best be under-
stood by a brief glance at the history of CERCLA, which is,
after all, the inspiration for Washington’s Model Toxics Con-
trol Act. CERCLA is the source of our current understanding
that owners as owners can be responsible for cleanup costs.

CERCLA became effective on December 11, 1980, ten
months after Union Pacific purchased the railyard. Tremen-
dous changes in environmental law have occurred in the 15
years since the passage of the Act. One commentator has said
that with one possible exception, CERCLA “stands alone as a
conspicuous example of legislative consequence outdistancing
even the boldest imagination of its sponsors.”' He points out
that looking back in 1985, Congress could believe that
CERCLA was aimed at a relatively limited problem and that
cleanup was a relatively inexpensive affair involving scraping
off some soil.’

And, in fact, CERCLA was a sleeper at first. It was
widely thought to be a short-range law; it had a self-destruct

provision of September 30, 1985. Prior to reauthorization in
1986, it had accomplished long-term total cleanup of only 14

' William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law, at 685 (2d ed. 1994).

? Id.

8a

sites.? Furthermore, the political climate was not conducive to
bold environmental initiatives. The EPA administrator
appointed in 1981 was reluctant to use the full authority
provided by the Act. She and other top administrators wanted
to limit the program to five years, and they minimized the
extent of hazardous waste problems.‘

With the full power of CERCLA not yet fully
understood or acknowledged, it was unlikely that states would
assume that their existing, traditional environmental statutes
could provide the kind of relief that CERCLA would
eventually be seen to provide. In fact, states were unsure of
what their powers were. On March 10, 1986, four months after
the bar date in this case, the Supreme Court struck down a New
Jersey state cleanup tax law on the grounds that CERCLA
preempted that particular type of state action. Exxon Corp. v.
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). In 1986, Congress repealed the
section on which the Court relied, and it is now, as we stated in
our prior decision in this case, quite clear that CERCLA does
not preempt state action. See also Burlington Northern R.R. v.
Time Oil Co., 738 F.Supp. 1339 (W.D.Wash.1990).

The expansion of the influence of CERCLA came
primarily as a result of the 1986 reauthorization bill, the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA). A look at a few things SARA added to the law will
show what was missing in the original bill. SARA expanded
the types of costs which could be recovered from responsible
parties. These now include virtually every conceivable
expense, including health assessments and health effects
studies, and interest from the date that payment is demanded.
See § 9607(a)(4)(D). It provided specifically for actions for
contribution. See § 9613(f). It dealt with the unanswered

> Superfund II: A New Mandate, Environment Reporter, Vol. 17, No. 42
(Feb. 13, 1987), at 3.

* Environment Reporter, at 10.

9a

question as to how clean is clean. It provided for explicit
cleanup standards, stating that remedial actions which
permanently reduce toxics are to be preferred over remedial
actions which do not involve permanent reduction. See
§ 9621(b). Significantly for the present case, SARA also gave
the states the right to substantial and meaningful involvement
in cleanup efforts. § 9621(f).

Early case law also shows the way courts were feeling
their way toward the strong CERCLA that now exists. In 1983,
courts were struggling with the causation issue. In United
States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326 (E.D.Pa.1983), the court
considered whether the Act required traditional proof that a
defendant caused the harm. Only after much discussion did the
court determine that the Act imposed liability on certain
persons, without proof that their specific waste caused the
necessity for a cleanup. As late as 1985, in State of New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.1985), the court
was stiil considering arguments that CERCLA applied only to
the entity which was the owner of the property at the time of
the discharge and that there must be a showing of causation.
The court ultimately rejected both contentions, holding that
CERCLA “unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current
owner of a facility from which there is a release or threat of
release, without regard to causation.” At 1044. The court
stated a proposition used as a starting point today, but it was
not always so.

Given this historical context in 1985, did Union Pacific
have a contingent claim, based on the three existing
Washington statutes, which would bar its claim based on
Washington’s 1989 Model Act? Today, CMC asks us to inter-
pret the statutes creatively to say that Union Pacific would have
known in 1985 that it, as owner, might have been held
responsible for allowing seepage, identifiable as from the
railyard, that anyone would know must have gotten into the
ground water and that therefore it could be ordered to
remediate the site permanently. Was such an interpretation of
the Washington statutes within the realm of possibility in 1985,

10a

or would Union Pacific have been considered almost frivolous
for filing with the bankruptcy court a claim for contribution
based on such potential liability? For that matter, is such an
interpretation possible today?

We have reviewed de novo the conclusions of the
district court regarding these issues and conclude that the court
was correct. The Washington statutes did not provide the com-
prehensive liability or remedy found in the Model Act.

The Washington Model Act was the result of a
statewide initiative. The bill, which became effective on
March 1, 1989, as we said, is modeled after CERCLA/SARA
but in some ways seems even clearer. For instance, CERCLA
lists covered persons as the “owner and operator” of a
hazardous waste site. That phrase prompted litigation in which
arguments were made regarding whether to be a covered
person one had to be both an owner and an operator or whether
“and” actually meant “or” in that context. See, e.g., United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573
(D.Md.1986). The Model Act stated clearly that covered per-
sons included the “owner or operator.” § 70.105D.040(1 (a).
With narrow exceptions, the Model Act imposes strict liability
on an owner of property based merely on ownership without
regard to what actions the owner took on the property to cause
pollution. The owner of the site is a person potentially
responsible for the cleanup, whether or not it caused the
pollution. The Act also recognizes the difficulty of identifying
with precision the parties responsible for hazardous waste sites,
and thus it permits joint and several liability. § 70.105D.010
(4).

The Washington statutes existing in 1985, which we
will soon discuss, often impose liability—sometimes strict
liability—on the owner of a property. However, strict liability
attaches based on an owner’s activities at the site. The statutes
are grounded in a traditional version of strict liability; that is,
strict liability as a theory of recovery based on the idea that a
defendant engaged in some kind of activity which exposed

2 ia ios

CS i DL Se BE OES cet ym ne Ne Nae Te SEK Sah, ht dO AL ahs pea ce

lla

others to a risk of harm and that the activity justified allocating
the risk to the defendant, even though he acted with reasonable
care—that is, it is not necessary to prove negligence. See
Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts 653 (1984).

Liability under the existing statutes would require
difficult matters of proof. Union Pacific took some actions at
the site—removing structures, etc. Looking back, CMC urges
us to say that the Department of Ecology could have attempted
to prove that Union Pacific’s actions—taken arguably to clean
up the site—actually disrupted the land and caused pollution.
Being realistic, we have to recognize how highly unlikely that
is. Furthermore, the proof of harm would involve showing that
the petroleum hydrocarbons from the railyard did, in fact, seep
into the waters of the state. It is easy to look back and say,
“Well, of course, they must have,” but such speculation does
not proof make. A remote possibility of liability under the
existing statutes should not bar a claim under the Model Act.

In addition, enforcement provisions of the Model Act
are like those in CERCLA, not those that traditionally existed.
The Model Act has as its purpose the protection of each
person’s “fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful
environment.” § 70.105D.010(1). To ensure that cleanup is
accomplished, it, like CERCLA, has strong enforcement
provisions. After determining that “remedial action is in the
public interest” the state can “issue orders requiring potentially
liable persons to provide the remedial action.” Refusal to
conduct the cleanup can result in draconian penalties. A
person who claims to have been improperly required to take
remedial action must take the action first and contest the order
with the department or in court later. See § 70.105D.050. The
Model Act is, like CERCLA, a statute under which—as we
pointed out in another Milwaukee Road case—persons
needlessly told to clean up may recover costs only after they
have done so: “In the meantime they must get the lead
out”—or the petroleum hydrocarbons. Jn re CMC Heartland
Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir.1992).

12a

Having made our generalizations, we tum to a
discussion of the individual Washington statutes.

The Water Pollution Control Act, Wash.Rev.Code
§ 90.48.080, provides: Discharge of polluting matter in
waters prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person to
throw, drain, run, or otherwise discharge into any of the waters
of this state, or to cause, permit or suffer to be thrown, run,
drained, allowed to seep or otherwise discharged into such
waters any organic or inorganic matter that shall cause or tend
to cause pollution of such waters according to the
determination of the commission, as provided for in this
chapter. CMC argued in the district court, as it does here, that
the Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) is a strict liability
statute which could apply in this case because the pollutants on
the railyard likely “seep” into the waters of the state. The
district court properly rejected the notion that this statute
provided a contingent claim which would bar a claim based on
the Model Act.

CMC seeks comfort in a 1992 decision of the
Washington Pollution Control Hearings Board which held that
the WPCA imposes strict liability and, in fact, that liability
may be imposed on the landowner. Nordevan v. State of
Washington, Dep’t of Ecology, 1992 WL 172977 (1992).
Unfortunately for CMC, a look at the facts in Nordevan shows
how different that situation is from that at the railyard.

Nordevan is a company which buys, clears, and
prepares land for sale to developers. The land in question was
on a steep slope with a creek running through it. Nordevan
obtained various permits and began clearing the land. And, of
course, as the board specifically found, it rains a lot in
Washington. There were clear, obvious, and serious erosion
problems which muddied the creek. The sophistication
required to establish this violation is far less than would be
necessary to establish the pollution of groundwater from the
Union Pacific site. In imposing liability on Nordevan, the -
board stated that the Water Pollution Control Act was a strict

PT eRe Re eS ITE ee Pe ee

.

¥
f
\
.

l3a

liability statute. Nordevan had “drained, suffered or caused the
discharges into the waters of the state” and was therefore
strictly liable.

Further, Nordevan had allowed a utility company a
limited utility easement. In what CMC argues is an imposition
of liability on an owner as owner, the board said that
Nordevan, as the owner of the property, “remained responsible
for the discharge of potential pollution.” We disagree with
CMC’s interpretation.

The manner in which liability attached to the owner in
Nordevan is similar to the liability on the owner in Sea Farms,
Inc. v. Foster & Marshall Realty, Inc., 42 Wash.App. 308, 711
P.2d 1049 (1985). There the court considered oyster beds
“negligently damaged by the construction of a marina...” Sea
Farms sued both the developer and the project engineer of the
marina. The owner of the land attempted to pass off its liability
onto the general contractor. That it was not permitted to do.
The duty to comply with the permit which had been issued to
the owner to build the marina was nondelegable. The owner’s
motion for summary judgment was denied because it had a
duty not to pollute its own waters, as well as those of others:
“Thus the duty to refrain from acts which will pollute waters on
another’s land may not be delegated to an independent contrac-
tor.” At 312, 711 P.2d 1049.

In both Sea Farms and Nordevan, the owner is
responsible for pollution done on its land by those acting with
its knowledge and permission. It is a far cry from Union
Pacific being held liable for pollution caused by the Milwaukee
Road during a half century before Union Pacific bought the
land.

In addition, although the WPCA prohibits permitting
any polluting matter to seep into the waters, and although it
would perhaps be possible to show that the pollutants from the
railyard have seeped into the groundwater, the proof required
to sustain that claim as to the railyard could be formidable.
The statute would seem to require that one prove that the

l4a

pollutants which exist in the groundwater—or any other
water—came from the railyard. The railyard is located in an
area of bountiful sources of pollutants. The proof on this point
would be considerably more than what is required under the
Model Act.

Finally, after defying the orders of the Department of
Ecology to control the erosion, Nordevan was fined $15,000,
with $5,000 of that amount suspended on the condition that it
not violate the law for two years. In short, Union Pacific did
not face the same threat of liability and thus did not possess the
same claim for contribution under the WPCA as it did once the
Model Act went into effect.

The Washington Hazardous Waste Management Act,
Wash.Rev.Code § 70.105.050, is even less helpful to CMC. It
provides that: No person shall dispose of designated extremely
hazardous wastes at any disposal site in the state other than the
disposal site established and approved for such purpose under
provisions of this chapter, except when such wastes are going
to a processing facility which will result in the waste being
reclaimed, treated, detoxified, neutralized, or otherwise pro-
cessed to remove its harmful properties or characteristics. “Dis-
pose or disposal” is defined as “the discarding or abandoning
of hazardous wastes or the treatment, decontamination, or
recycling of such wastes once they have been discarded or
abandoned.” § 70.105.010(4). It is not necessary to say much
more about a potential Union Pacific claim under this statute
than that the district court was right to reject the argument that
one might have existed.

The statute refers clearly to those who dispose of waste
at disposal sites, not to those who own land on which wastes
were allowed to gather by a previous owner. Union Pacific
would not have had occasion to be concerned about a potential
claim under this statute. CMC does not provide us with any
cases in which liability has been established in similar circum-

stances.

lSa

Finally, we turn to Washington’s nuisance statute. The
Statute is not a model of efficiency. Several sections of the Act
could conceivably be argued to be applicable to this case.
Section 7.48.010 defines actionable nuisances: The obstruction
of any highway or the closing of the channel of any stream
used for boating or rafting logs, lumber or timber, or whatever
is injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction in the free use of property, so as to essentially
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of the life and
property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action for damages
and other and further relief.

Section 7.48.120 defines nuisance: Nuisance consists in
unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, which
act or omission either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort,
repose, health or safety of others, offends decency, or unlaw-
fully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or render
dangerous for passage, any lake or navigable river, bay, stream,
canal or basin, or any public park, Square, street or highway;
or in any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the
use of property. Then § 7.48.130 defines public nuisance: A
public nuisance is one which affects equally the rights of an
entire community or neighborhood, although the extent of the
damage may be unequal. Section 7.48.150 says everything in
7.48.130 is a private nuisance. If all that was not enough,
§ 7.48.140 enumerates public nuisances. Subsection (2) is the
one argued to be relevant: To throw or deposit any offal or
other offensive matter, or the carcass of any dead animal, in
any watercourse, stream, lake, pond, spring, well, or common
sewer, street, or public highway, or in any manner to corrupt or
render unwholesome or impure the water of any such spring,
stream, pond, lake, or well, to the injury or prejudice of
others[.] The statute provides for abatement of the nuisance.
See § 7.48.250.

What seems clear from a simple reading of the statutes
is that parlaying a claim based on those statutes into something
approaching that arising from the Model Act would be more
than an uphill battle.

(a

l6a

In 1985, the Supreme Court of Washington discussed
a private nuisance action on certification from the District
Court for the Western District of Washington. The discussion
sheds light on the nature of a nuisance action. A nuisance
action required a “substantial and unreasonable interference
with [the] use and enjoyment of” one’s property. Bradley v.
American Smelting and Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 709
P.2d 782 (1985). We could not say with confidence that
Washington courts would interpret that requirement suffi-
ciently broadly to allow a claim regarding the railyard. It is, as
we have noted, located in a highly industrial area, identified as
a Superfund site. The railyard could hardly affect the rights of
the “neighborhood.” See § 7.48.130. Union Pacific could as
easily have a claim against other property owners within the
site. And while the entire site could be alleged to affect the
rights of the “entire community” (id.), it would be hard to
single out Union Pacific and would be a formidable challenge
to sue all of the property owners within the site.

CMC calls our attention to Miotke v. City of Spokane,
101 Wash.2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984), which involved a
determination that a violation of the WPCA can support a claim
for nuisance. Of course, before there can be a nuisance under
this theory, there must be a finding of a violation of the WPCA,
which we have just discussed as it relates to this case. In
Miotke, the city, in violation of a waste discharge permit,
discharged 100 million gallons of raw sewage into a river,
which was at a relatively low flow. The sewage went down-
stream to a lake on which several persons had constructed lake
homes. The lake became a putrid mess. It is true—and not
surprising—that a claim for nuisance was found to exist on
these facts. Even so, the court noted that the litigation was
“protracted and complex.” 678 P.2d at 806. How much more
difficult would it be to show a violation in the present case?

Furthermore, because of the railyard’s location, there
are many other sources of pollution. In order to obtain relief
from Union Pacific under a nuisance theory, the state would be
required to identify pollution which could be traced to Union

eee eee ee Ne

17a

Pacific. See Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wash.2d 38, 253 P.2d 427
(1953); Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wash.2d 482, 418 P.2d 741
(1966). That is different in kind from a showing that there is

hazardous waste on property of which the defendant is the
owner.

CMC urges us to superimpose the Model Act on the
nuisance statute and find that the nuisance statute provides
some of the relief set out in the Model Act. As a practical
matter, it does not. For all these reasons, we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that Washington statutes
existing in 1985 did not form the basis for the filing, by Union
Pacific, of a contingent claim in the Milwaukee Road
bankruptcy proceeding.

CMC also has appealed the denial of its Rule 60 motion
in which it claimed that new evidence required relief from the
judgment.

CMC is entitled to relief from the district court’s final
judgment only if it can present “newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(2). In order to prevail on its motion,
CMC must meet the following prerequisites: 1. The evidence
was discovered following trial; 2. Due diligence on the part of
the movant to discover the new evidence is shown or may be
inferred; 3. The evidence is not merely cumulative or impeach-
ing; 4. The evidence is material; and 5. The evidence is such
that a new trial would probably produce a new result. If any of
these prerequisites are not met, CMC cannot prevail on its
motion.

The denial of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion will not be
overturned unless the district court abused its discretion.
McKnight v. United States Steel Corp., 726 F.2d 333, 335 (7th
Cir.1984). To establish an abuse of discretion, CMC must
show that no reasonable person could agree with the court; if
reasonable persons could disagree as to the propriety of the

18a

court’s action there is no abuse of discretion. Lee v. Village of
River Forest, 936 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.1991).

The newly discovered evidence was a November 1994
feasibility study regarding environmental cleanup of the site;
a November 1994 letter from the Washington State Department
of Ecology to the Port allegedly indicating that the department
could direct a cleanup of the site under prior statutes; the sale
agreement between Union Pacific and the Port of Tacoma, in
which the Port agrees to indemnify Union Pacific from claims
under any environmental laws; and an excerpt from an April
1993 hydrogeologic characterization report prepared by a
Union Pacific subsidiary.

Conveniently, the newly discovered documents
allegedly showed that contrary to the district court’s ruling,
affirmative acts on Union Pacific’s part were not required
before cleanup liability attached, and even if they were, Union
Pacific had engaged in such acts. It was not an abuse of
discretion for the court to find that this evidence was not new
or, to the extent it was new, that it was not material and would
not have changed the underlying decision. We agree with the
district court and furthermore find that the newly discovered
evidence would not have changed the analysis in our de novo
review of the underlying decision.

The decisions of the district court are AFFIRMED.

19a

APPENDIX B

ised acciebaiaaeionls

} UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY,

Debtor.

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,

sgn Read ge oe ee

Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

| UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,
Defendant-A ppellee, Cross-Appellant.
| Nos. 92-3713, 92-3790.

June 8, 1993.
Decided Aug. 18, 1993.

Raymond H. Groble, II (argued), Ross & Hardies,
Chicago, IL, for Union Pacific R. Co.

ha. nical Ne aes ht

20a

Michael D. Dabertin, Robert Wheeler (argued),
Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Chicago, IL, for CMC
Heartland Partners.

James M. Amend, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Michael
L. Gesas, Gesas, Pilati & Gesas, Chicago, IL, for Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co.

Before COFFEY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and
ALDISERT, Senior Circuit Judge.”

ALDISERT, Senior Circuit Judge.

We attempt again to reconcile the conflicting goals of
environmental cleanup and a “fresh start” for bankruptcy deb-
tors.

Presented in these cases, here and in other judicial
circuits, is the important question whether debtors in bank-
ruptcy who are charged with pollution in the past can be held
liable for cleanup costs of hazardous waste at their former
business sites.' Generally, demands for contribution and reim-
bursement are made after bankruptcy proceedings are either in
advanced stages or have been completed; in these cases the
debtors generally assert that the demands are too late because
they were made subsequent to bar dates for claims fixed by the
bankruptcy courts.

The interface of environmental cleanup laws and
federal bankruptcy statutes is never tidy; jurisprudentially, it
is somewhat grubby. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (“CERCLA”) and similar state laws, like
Washington's Model Toxics Control Act, Wash.Rev.Code ch.

” Ruggero J. Aldisert, of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

! See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.1993); In re Chateaugay Corp.,
944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.1991); Jn re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397
(N.D.Tex.1992); United States v. Union Scrap & Metal, 123 B.R. 831
(D.Minn.1990); Jn re Edge, 60 B.R. 690 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1986).

2la

70.105D (“the Model Act”), effective March 1, 1989, and
predecessor statutes seek to protect public health and the
environment by facilitating the cleanup of environmental con-
tamination and imposing costs on the parties responsible for the
pollution. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330, and its predecessors were designed to give a
debtor a fresh start by discharging as many of its debts as
possible. The tension between these fundamental aspects of
our national policy is profound.

The Supreme Court has indicated that, if possible, these
two conflicting objectives should be reconciled. Méidlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494, 505-06 (1986); see Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 280-82
(1985); see also In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 404
(N.D.Tex.1992) (“It is not a question of which statute should
be accorded primacy over the other, but rather what interaction
between the two statutes serves most faithfully the policy
objectives embodied in the two separate enactments of Con-
gress”). The very difficult issue present in cases involving this
fundamental conflict—including the case before us—is: When
does a “claim” as defined by the Bankruptcy Act for recovery
of cleanup costs arise?

I.

The bankruptcy petition in this case was filed under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Section 77(b) of that act, former 11
U.S.C. § 205(b) (repealed 1978), provided: “The term ‘claims’
includes debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated, securities
(other than stock and option warrants to subscribe to stock),
liens, or other interests of whatever character.” See City of
New York v. New York, N.H. & H. RR. 344 U.S. 293, 295 n.
4 (1953). The current version of the code sets out the broad
reach of the term in greater detail. “Claim” means:

(A) right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured,

22a

or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable reme-
dy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a night to payment, whether or not
such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, un-
matured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured.

11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

When a kindred contention was previously before us in
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 974
F.2d 775 (7th Cir.1992) (hereinafter Chicago J), we announced
a possible formulation of when a contingent claim arose:

[W]hen a potential CERCLA claimant can tie
the bankruptcy debtor to a known release of a
hazardous substance which the potential claim-
ant knows will lead to CERCLA response costs,
and when this potential claimant has, in fact,
conducted tests with regard to this contamina-
tion problem, then this potential claimant has,
at least, a contingent CERCLA claim under
Section 77.

Id. at 786. Our formulation has been cited with approval by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Jn re Jensen, 995 F.2d
925 (9th Cir.1993).

We have cross appeals filed by Union Pacific Railroad
and by CMC Heartland Partners, the successor in interest to the
debtor, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad
(hereinafter “the Milwaukee Road”). Our task is to determine
whether the district court properly applied our definition of a
contingent claim to that submitted by Union Pacific Railroad
for contribution and indemnity. Union Pacific purchased the
property at issue from the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy trustee
by agreement dated March 28, 1980. The agreement included
a clause by which the bankruptcy trustee and the Milwaukee
Road agreed to indemnify Union Pacific and its subsidiaries—

———————eeeeeeeeee———————————eeEeEeonor

Cee i ar Cae Bo temoe Cree SS eo oes ie) ieee Seema laren ar teat

23a

against any and all claims, damages, liabilities, losses or
demands whatsoever, and expenses in connection therewith,
including reasonable fees of outside counsel, regardless of the
source or nature thereof, arising out of the operation of the
Properties prior to March 12, 1980. App. at 49.

Union Pacific now faces liability under state and federal
law for cleanup of pollution on the property and seeks to
enforce the indemnification clause against CMC. CMC
responds that any claims for cleanup costs were discharged in
the bankruptcy proceedings.

In these cross appeals, we must consider (1) whether
the district court was correct in holding that Union Pacific’s
claim for indemnification of its liability under federal law arose
before the discharge and thus was barred; and (2) whether the
district court was correct in holding that Union Pacific’s claim
for indemnification of its liability under state law arose after
the discharge and thus was not barred.

Jurisdiction was proper in the trial court based on 28
U.S.C. § 1334. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. The appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

We hold that the district court properly held that Union’

Pacific’s claim under CERCLA was barred. To the extent that
the district court further held that Union Pacific’s claim under
the Washington Model Toxic Control Act was not barred, we
vacate that portion of the judgment and remand with a direction
that the district court first determine what liabilities under the
Model Act, if any, were imposed under previous Washington
statutes, and then decide what, if any, specific cleanup liabili-
ties under previous state statutes were discharged because no
claims were timely presented to the bankruptcy court.

IL.

The Milwaukee Road petitioned for reorganization on
December 19, 1977, under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of

24a

1898, which was then in effect. Union Pacific was a creditor
and participated in the bankruptcy proceedings.

On July 12, 1985, the district court entered Order No.
832, which confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan. The
order set a bar date of September 10, 1985, for all post-petition
claims. Claims arising after September 10 but before the con-
summation date of November 25, 1985, were required to be
filed by December 26, 1985. Under Section 11.2 of the plan,
the bar dates apply to—all claims, including claims for
contribution and indemnity existing as of the Confirmation
Date [July 12, 1985] and Consummation Date [November 25,
1985], respectively. The bar dates provided in section 11.1,
however, do not apply to claims for contribution or indemnity
based on facts that are unknown, undisclosed and unasserted as
of the Confirmation Date and Consummation Date, respec-
tively. App. at 23. The court subsequently entered Order No.
866 on November 12, 1985 (“the consummation order”), which
discharged all claims against the Milwaukee Road and its
successors and assigns, including CMC, unless those claims
had been timely filed. The order also enjoined all persons from
asserting claims that had been discharged.

The property giving rise to Union Pacific’s claim is a
former railyard in Tacoma, Washington (“the railyard”), which
had been owned by the Milwaukee Road from the early years
of this century. The railyard is located within the Commence-
ment Bay/Nearshore Tideflats Superfund site in Tacoma,
Washington (“the Superfund site”), a site whose charac-
terization, remediation and funding were described in
numerous national and regional newspapers as early as 1981.
The bankruptcy trustee conveyed it to Union Pacific by quit-
claim deed, and it was subsequently assigned to the Oregon-
Washington Railroad and Navigation Co., a wholly owned
subsidiary of Union Pacific. The transfer was authorized by
the reorganization court and took place on December 19, 1980.

Union Pacific removed the existing structures on the
railyard, and it thereafter stood vacant. By April 1980, Union

SS a a ea Le Se »

25a

Pacific engineers had inspected the site and reported their
results in an internal memorandum to Roland Haacke, the
company’s district engineer. The memorandum included this
statement: Diesel fueling area is oil saturated and will probably
require removal of surface oil as well as contaminated dirt.
Apparently, this covers quite a large area and may require
extensive clean-up. Rec. 4, Ex. J-1. Haacke testified that he
made several personal inspections of the railyard and observed
oil or grease on the ground in the shop area, the roundhouse
area and the diesel fueling area. Union Pacific contends that
the inspections by Haacke and others gave no indication of any
subsurface contamination but revealed only surface contamina-
tion.

Meanwhile, hazardous wastes in the area around the
railyard came to the attention of the Environmental Protection
Agency. EPA placed Commencement Bay and the Nearshore
Tideflats on the Interim Priority List in October 1981. In this
same highly publicized announcement, EPA described the
Superfund site as one of the ten most hazardous sites in the
country. Local and national media reported these develop-
ments. Rec. 3, Ex. H; see also Wallace Turner, Tacoma Pollu-
tion on “10 Worst” List, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, § 1, at 35.
The Union Pacific railyard is entirely within the Superfund site.
The proposed inclusion of the Commencement Bay/Nearshore
Tideflats area on the first National Priorities List (NPL) was
published in the Federal Register. Amendment to National Oil
and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan; The Nation
Priorities List, 47 Fed.Reg. 58476 (1982) (proposed Dec. 30,
1982). The site eventually was included on the first NPL,
which was issued in September 1983.

The state of Washington commissioned an environ-
mental study of the railyard, focusing on its historical use. The
study, by Dames & Moore, was completed in January 1982 and
included these findings: During the history of the railyard,
many spills of compounds occurred on site, including oil and
other compounds transported by rail. Spills were not cleaned
up, and the materials were allowed to seep into the ground. The

26a

railroad also cleaned out their rail cars. It was reported that
during the late 1950s the material was dumped on site and
allowed to disperse into the soil and seep into the waterways.
In 1960, the railroad was required to collect copper sulfite and
other toxic materials dry and dispose of them on land. Runoff
from this site enters the Milwaukee Waterway. This evaluation
of the site indicates that the soils at this site are possibly
permeated with toxic compounds. Recently, there has been
some grading and the tracks were pulled up. This may have
resulted in covering the permeated soils with a thin layer of dirt
or exposing the contaminated soils to the environment. Rec. 4,
Ex. G, at 50. The Dames & Moore study was delivered to the
Washington Department of Ecology. Union Pacific states that
it did not receive a copy of the study and was not aware of its
contents.

Union Pacific owned other property within the Super-
fund site and had dealings with EPA and the st..te in connection
with two of these properties. EPA found contamination in the
vicinity of an abandoned railway tunnel owned by Union
Pacific and notified Union Pacific in early 1982 that it was a
potentially responsible party. However, EPA determined that
the tunnel was not the source of the contamination and discon-
tinued its investigations. Union Pacific interpreted this to mean
that it would not be required to participate in the cleanup of the
Superfund site.

The state’s ecology department also contacted Union
Pacific about oil contamination that occurred in the City of
Tacoma waterway on February 16, 1982. The source of the
spill was determined to be Union Pacific’s Tacoma fueling
facility, located several miles from the railyard with which the
present case is concerned. Under the state’s Water Pollution
Control Act, Union Pacific was required to take remedial
action and then commissioned a groundwater investigation.
Although the investigation revealed no groundwater contamin-
ation, Union Pacific proposed to remove the top one-foot of
soil at the facility to “eliminate the possibility of any diesel fuel

27a

in such soil reaching the storm drains or groundwater.” The
soil was removed, and the state approved this action.

Finally, in August 1985, several months before the bar
dates, EPA completed a Remedial Investigation of the Super-
fund site. This investigation contained a reference to environ-
mental contamination at the railyard: Milwaukee Railroad was
located on the south shore of Sitcum Waterway until 1980.
According to Dames & Moore (1982), numerous solid and
liquid spills have occurred in this area. The contents of these
spills are unknown and the associated potential for release of
contaminants to Sitcum Waterway from the spills and railway
operations cannot be evaluated. Union Pacific Br. at 10.

Union Pacific later decided to sell the railyard and com-
missioned an environmental audit that was completed by
Applied Geotechnology on June 29, 1990, and disclosed
subsurface contamination consisting primarily of petroleum
hydrocarbons. The audit also identified potential contamina-
tion from metals and solvents. Union Pacific notified both
EPA and the state of these findings but contends that it did not
know of any subsurface contamination prior to this environ-
mental audit.

The state ecology department notified Union Pacific on
October 16, 1990, that the railroad was potentially liable under
the Washington Model Act. Union Pacific and the state then
entered into an agreement on July 31, 1990, providing for
remediation of contamination at the railyard under the act.
CMC asserts also that on April 24, 1989, EPA notified Union
Pacific that it was a potentially responsible party under
CERCLA and thus could be liable for cleanup costs at the
railyard.

Union Pacific served CMC on September 9, 1991, with
a demand for settlement negotiations concerning cleanup of the
railyard. CMC filed a motion in the district court for the
Northern District of Illinois to enjoin Union Pacific, pursuant
to the consummation order, from asserting any claims arising
out of the purchase of the railyard. Union Pacific subsequently

28a

filed a complaint in the district court for the Western District
of Washington, seeking declaratory judgment and contribution
and asserting claims under the Model Act and CERCLA.

III.

After reviewing the facts, the district court for the
Northern District of Illinois considered whether Union Pacific
knew of its potential liability under CERCLA and the Model
Act before September 10, 1985, the bar date for post-petition
claims. Jn re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., No. 77 B 8999,
1992 WL 316321 (N.D.IIl. Oct. 21, 1992) (hereinafter
“D.Ct.Op.”). The court concluded that Union Pacific had
constructive knowledge of its CERCLA claim by the bar date
and identified several facts that supported its determination:
The Commencement Bay and Nearshore Tideflats area was
identified in 1981 as one of the most contaminated places in the
country. D.Ct.Op. at 7. The railyard is included in this area.
Union Pacific officials denied that they knew of the 1982
Dames & Moore report, but “this information was available
had they sought it out.” Jd. EPA’s notice to Union Pacific in
1982 concerning possible contamination from the railway
tunnel “was direct notice to Union Pacific that there were
environmental investigations occurring in the Commencement
Bay Area.” Jd. Union Pacific knew in 1982 of spills at its
Tacoma fueling facility, which made the railroad liable for
cleanup costs under state law. Jd. Union Pacific’s own engin-
eers had inspected the railyard in 1980 and noted that the site
“may require extensive cleanup.” Jd. at 8. The court stated:
While Union Pacific may not have had actual knowledge of
hazardous waste contamination at the railyard, the facts reveal
there was enough information present at the time that the bar
dates went into effect that Union Pacific should have been
aware of its potential liability. ... The presence of a number
of environmental investigations by state and federal authorities
in the Commencement Bay area should have reasonably alerted
Union Pacific to the possibility of environmental contamination
of an area that was already found to be oil saturated. Enough
factual information exists to give Union Pacific constructive

29a

knowledge of a CERCLA claim at the time of the bar dates. Jd.
at 7, 8.

The district court then tumed to Union Pacific’s claim
for indemnity of costs relating to the Model Act and held that
this claim was not barred. The court noted that the consumma-
tion order was filed in 1985, before the Model Act took effect
on March 1, 1989. The court concluded, “Union Pacific could
not possibly have known of its liability under a statute that was
not in existence until four years after the bar dates were estab-
lished for filing claims against the Milwaukee Road.” Jd. at 9
(citing Jn re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 167-68
(3d Cir.1991) (CERCLA claim was not discharged in bank-
ruptcy when consummation order was entered before CERCLA
was enacted), cert. denied sub nom. Penn Central Corp. v.
United States, US. __, 112 S.Ct. 1262 (1992)). The court
also rejected CMC’s implicit argument that CERCLA pre-
empted state law remedies for hazardous waste contamination.
Id. at 8.

IV.

Union Pacific argues that the district court erred in
determining that Union Pacific had constructive knowledge of
its CERCLA liability before the consummation date. CMC
argues that the district court erred in determining that Union
Pacific could not have known of its state law liabilities until
after the consummation order was filed; it asserts that the
Model Act did not create new duties but merely recodified
existing duties under the state’s Water Pollution Control Act,
Wash.Rev.Code ch. 90.48, and Hazardous Waste Management
Act, Wash.Rev.Code ch. 70.105, and accompanying regula-
tions, Wash.Admin.Code ch. 173-303.

We described the standard of review in Chicago I:
Because the district court’s entry of an injunction in this case
was both a bankruptcy decision and an interpretation of its
prior consummation order, we review the court’s decision to
bar [the creditor’s] claims for abuse of discretion. Nonetheless,
in applying the abuse of discretion standard, we do not give

30a

equal deference to every aspect of a court’s decision. The
abuse of discretion standard is used to evaluate the reorganiza-
tion court’s application of the facts to the appropriate legal
standard, and the factual findings and legal conclusions under-
lying such decisions are evaluated under the clearly erroneous
and de novo standards, respectively. 974 F.2d at 779-80.

V.

Our analysis must begin with the definition of a “claim”
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. We have recognized that
Section 77(b) of the Act “broadly defines claims to include
‘debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated ... or other interests
of whatever character.” Chicago I, 974 F.2d at 780 (quoting
former 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (repealed 1978)).

Union Pacific argues that it did not have sufficient
knowledge of its CERCLA liability prior to the consummation
date to require it to file a proof of claim. In Chicago /, the
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT)
purchased property from the bankruptcy trustee in 1984. The
state’s Department of Ecology determined by June or July 1985
that the site was contaminated as a result of a 1979 derailment
and spill of copper ore. In August 1985, the Department of
Ecology notified WSDOT of the problem and indicated that
some tests had been completed and further testing would be
necessary. Soil samples were taken in October 1985, and test
results were returned in November.

WSDOT did not file a proof of claim before the second
bar date of December 26, 1985. The state subsequently sought
to recover cleanup costs incurred under CERCLA. The district
court held that the claim was barred, and we affirmed.

As previously set forth in detail in Part III, the district
court in the present case listed five significant facts indicating
that Union Pacific had sufficient knowledge of its potential
liability under CERCLA to require it to file a proof of claim.
In summary, the court found that the railyard was included in
a Superfund site; the Dames & Moore report described contam-

3la

ination at the railyard, a report described by the district court
as information that was available to Union Pacific “had they
sought it out”; Union Pacific knew of EPA investigations in the
area; it knew of its liability under state law for contamination
at the Tacoma fueling facility; and its own engineers had noted
that the railyard might require extensive cleanup. The court
held that Union Pacific had constructive knowledge of its
CERCLA claim.

Union Pacific presents a number of counterarguments
that essentially challenge the district court’s factual finding of
constructive knowledge. It argues that it did not anticipate
CERCLA liability because petroleum is specifically exempted
from coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (“The term {‘hazardous
substance’] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or
any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed
or designated as a hazardous substance. ...”). But see 50 Fed.
Reg. 13,460 (April 4, 1985) (commentary to final rulemaking)
(“EPA does not consider materials such as waste oil to which
listed CERCLA substances have been added to be within the
petroleum exclusion.”).

Although the district court determined that “Union
Pacific may not have had actual knowledge of hazardous waste
containes at the railyard,” on the basis of the record before it,
the court could have found actual knowledge as well. The
April 1, 1980 in-house engineers’ memorandum, prepared
shortly after the purchase agreement was entered into, stated
that a portion of the railyard “will probably require removal of
surface oil as well as contaminated dirt. Apparently, this
covers quite a large area and may require extensive clean-up.”
Although at oral argument, Union Pacific explained that this
memorandum “pertained solely to surface spills,” its district
engineer had testified to seeing “oil on the surface, grease or
oil, fuel” on the site. One does not need an engineering degree
to conclude that grease, oil and fuel left standing for a long
period of time have the capacity to seep into the subsurface of
soil. This was five years before the bar date.

32a

In any event, the district court did not err in finding
constructive knowledge. With EPA conducting a massive
investigation of one of the ten most hazardous sites in the
country, in which the railyard was located, Union Pacific
cannot now argue that it did not know of potential
environmental claims regarding the railyard. Our national
environmental policy does not permit a commercial landowner
in a tainted area to put on blinders or attempt an “ostrich
defense.”

We are satisfied that the district court’s determination
that Union Pacific had constructive knowledge of the facts
summarized above was not clearly erroneous. From this we
conclude that when such knowledge was imputed to Union
Pacific, it became “a potential CERCLA claimant [who could]
tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release of a hazardous
substance.” Chicago I, 974 F.2d at 786. We also conclude that
on the basis of the Dames & Moore study, the April 1980
inspection of the railyard by Union Pacific engineers, the
personal inspections by district engineer Haacke, the public
characterization by the EPA of the Commencement Bay area
as one of the ten most hazardous sites in the country and other
evidence, it can be said, paraphrasing Chicago I, that Union
Pacific was a potential claimant that had, in fact, made
inspections of the site and observed contamination and had
available similar information from other sources, and therefore
Union Pacific had at least a contingent CERCLA claim under
Section 77. See id. We conclude further that Union Pacific
had this contingent CERCLA claim substantially in advance of
the bankruptcy court’s bar dates of September 10, 1985 and
December 26, 1985.

We hold, therefore, that the district court did not abuse
its discretion to bar Union Pacific’s CERCLA claims.

, |

33a

In so deciding, we are not pursuing “mechanical juris
prudence” in the sense condemned by Roscoe Pound? by
requiring fealty to bar dates set by bankruptcy judges. We are
not vaunting the national bankruptcy policy over environmental
concerns. If anything, we are acknowledging the importance
of facilitating the cleanup of environmental contamination by
placing upon property owners—whether longtime owners or
new purchasers—the obligation of performing an environ-
mental audit as early as possible. It is not too much to require
a timely examination under any circumstances, but where a
present Owner expects reimbursement from a predecessor in
interest, any delay may preclude relief, because of the interven-
tion of a statute of limitations, or as here, the interposition of
dates barring claims imposed by bankruptcy courts.

VI.

We now turn to CMC’s appeal challenging the district
court’s determination that Union Pacific’s claim under the
Model Toxics Control Act was not barred, because the Model
Act did not go into effect until after the 1985 bar dates. CMC
acknowledges that the Model Act went into effect after the bar
dates and that several courts have held that claims based on a
Statute enacted after discharge in bankruptcy are not barred.
E.g., Penn Central, 944 F.2d at 168. CMC distinguishes these
cases by asserting, “Union Pacific was aware of existing liabili-
ties to the United States and the State of Washington for
clean-up of the Railyard Site, under both CERCLA and
existing Washington State statutes.” CMC Br. at 24. CMC
relies on the state Water Pollution Control Act,
Wash.Rev.Code ch. 90.48, and on the Hazardous Waste
Management Act, Wash.Rev.Code ch. 70.105, with its
accompanying regulations, Wash.Admin.Code. ch. 173-303.
These enactments were in effect in 1985, prior to the adoption
of the Model Act. Union Pacific vigorously argues that it had

* Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum.L.Rev. 605 (1908),
reprinted in part in Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 304 (1976).

34a

no liability under the laws existing in 1985 and that the Model
Act imposed an entirely new species of liability.

We will not meet the question at this time as to what
liabilities under the Model Act existed in 1985 by virtue of
Washington state statutes then in effect. The district court did
not make findings in this respect, and we will remand these
proceedings to that court to make this determination in the first
instance.

It is suggested that upon remand the parties assist the
court by preparing a section-by-section comparison of the
Model Act with previously enacted relevant state statutes.
Such an analysis could indicate whether a particular type of
liability under the Model Act existed under predecessor statutes
prior to the bar dates, and whether Union Pacific consequently
had a contingent claim for environmental cleanup costs under
Washington statutes in effect before the bar dates.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part
and VACATED in part and the cause REMANDED for further
proceedings in accordance with the foregoing.

35a

APPENDIX C

ra eed anata ames GD

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

April 3, 1996
Before
Hon. Ilana Diamond Rovner, Circuit Judge
Hon. Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge
Hon. Terence T. Evans, Circuit Judge
Nos. 95-1412 & 95-2986
In the Matter of:
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL &
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
Debtor.
CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,
Defendant-Appellee.

36a

ORDER

On March 13, 1996, CMC Heartland Partners filed a
petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc.
All the judges on the original panel have voted to deny the
petition, and none of the active judges have requested a vote on
the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The petition is therefore
DENIED.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
N. D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

In the Matter of

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL &
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Debtor.

No. 77 B 8999.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LINDBERG, District Judge.

This case arises out of the sale in bankruptcy of a
railyard in the State of Washington. The purchaser, Union
Pacific Railroad Co. (“Union Pacific” , commenced suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
against the reorganized corporation, CMC Heartland Partners
(“CMC”), for clean-up and response costs incurred under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 USC §§ 9601 et seq. (“CERCLA”) and the
Washington Model Toxic Control Act, RCW 70.105D.010
—70.105D.921 (“MTCA”), and for indemnification under the
terms of the sale agreement. CMC has moved to enjoin Union
Pacific from prosecuting its claims. The court determines that
Union Pacific is enjoined from bringing any CERCLA claim

38a

against CMC with respect to the railyard site. This court will
not enjoin Union Pacific from bringing any potential claims
under the MTCA.

FACTS

On December 19, 1977, the Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (“Milwaukee Road”)
petitioned for reorganization pursuant to section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, formerly 11 USC § 205. This court
served as the reorganization court throughout the reorganiza-
tion proceedings. In accordance with section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rule 8-401, the reorganization
court established bar dates for the filing of claims against
Milwaukee Road, the Estate and its trustee. Order No. 832
provided that all post-petition claims, that is, claims arising
against or obligations incurred by Milwaukee Road during the
reorganization proceedings, were to be filed on or before
September 10, 1985. Order No. 832 also confirmed the Trus-
tee's Modified 1985 Plan of Reorganization that defined the
kinds of claims to which the bar dates apply. Order No. 866,
the Consummation Order, which was entered by the reorgani-
zation court on November 12, 1985 and which became
effective on November 25, 1985, barred and discharged all
claims against the Trustee, the Debtor, and its assigns and
successors including CMC, except as provided for in the
bankruptcy plan. Order No. 866 also enjoined all persons from
attempting to prosecute or assert claims that had been dis-
charged in the bankruptcy proceeding. This court retained
jurisdiction to enforce that injunction.

Union Pacific actively participated in the Milwaukee
Road reorganization proceedings and had actual notice of the
bar dates. Several Union Pacific officers and legal counsel
were on the official service list for the reorganization. Counsel
for Union Pacific also participated in the reorganization
approval plan process.

In March 1980, Union Pacific purchased approximately
100 miles of railroad right-of-way and various railyard

a

39a

properties in Washington and Idaho from the Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy of Milwaukee Road. One of these railyards was the
former Milwaukee Road yard in Tacoma, Washington. As part
of the purchase agreement Union Pacific bargained for and
received indemnification from the trustee as follows:

The Trustee and the Milwaukee Road agree to
indemnify and save harmless Union Pacific, its
lessors subsidiaries and/or affiliates and their
respective officers, agents and employees,
against any and all claims, damages, liabilities,
lawsuits or demands whatsoever, and expenses
in connection therewith, including reasonable
fees of outside counsel, regardless of the source
or nature thereof, arising out of the operations
of the properties prior to March 12, 1980; or
arising out of the ownership of the properties at
anytime, or the operation or use thereof, by the
Milwaukee Road after March 12, 1980, and
prior to the date of Closing. . . .

This covenant of indemnity shall remain in full
force notwithstanding the consummation of the
transactions contemplated in this Agreement.

On October 21, 1981, the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) published its National Priorities List (“NPL”)
which indicated that the Commencement Bay/Nearshore
Tideflats (“Commencement Bay”) area, which encompassed
the railyard site, was one of the ten worst hazardous waste sites
in the country. This listing was published in the Federal
Register on December 30, 1982. The events surrounding the
listing and remediation of the site were subsequently discussed
in numerous national and regional newspapers. See “EPA
Names 115 Worst Toxic Waste Dump Sites in U.S.,” the
Washington Post § 1, pg. A4, October 24, 1981; “Tacoma
Pollution in Top 10,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, October 24.
1981. The Department of Ecology (“DOE”) contracted with a
private company, Dames & Moore, to study aspects of the

40a

contamination of the Commencement Bay area. In January of
1982, Dames & Moore published its “Historic Land Use
Survey of the Tacoma Tide Flats,” in which it identified 117
historical sources of contamination in the Sitcum Waterway,
including the railyard site. The Dames & Moore study
describes the history of the railyard site:

During the history of the railyard, many spills
of compounds occurred on site, including oil
and other compounds transported by rail. Spills
were not cleaned up, and the materials were
allowed to seep into the ground.

The railroad also cleaned out their rail cars. It
was reported that during the late 1950’s the
material was dumped on site and allowed to
disperse into the soil and seep in the waterways.
In 1960, the railroad was required to collect
copper sulfite and other toxic materials dry and
dispose of them on land. Runoff from this site
enters the Milwaukee Waterway. This evalua-
tion of the site indicates that the soils at this site
are possibly permeated with toxic compounds.
Recently, there has been some grading and the
tracks were pulled up. This may have resulted
in covering the permeated soils with a thin layer
of dirt or exposing the contaminated soils to the
environment.

In September 1983, the EPA published its first official
National Priorities List (“NPL”) of 406 hazardous waste sites
throughout the country. Included on that list was the Com-
mencement Bay site. In October 1984, the DOE listed the
railyard site in its “Monthly Status Report, Commencement
Bay Cleanup Sites” for suspected soil and groundwater con-
tamination for past spills.

In August 1985, the DOE and EPA issued a Remedial
Investigation (RI). The RJ, which relied in part on the Dames

4la

& Moore information, noted that numerous solid and liquid
spills had occurred in the area.

Union Pacific’s own fueling facilities in Tacoma were
investigated by the DOE in 1982. As a result of this investi-
gation, Union Pacific agreed to remove the top level of
oil-contaminated soil at the facility to prevent groundwater
contamination. Union Pacific was also in direct contact with
the EPA concerning potential environmental contamination at
an abandoned railroad tunnel.

As the result of a title dispute with the Puyallup Native
American Tribe, the railyard stood vacant. Union Pacific's
only action with regard to the railyard was to remove the
existing structures and clean up the surface of the yard. During
the time that the railyard stood vacant, some of Union Pacific's
employees became aware of contamination of portions of the
railyard’s surface by petroleum wastes. In an internal memo-
randum, a Union Pacific division engineer noted that:

Diesel fueling area is oil saturated and will
probably require removal of surface oil as well
as contaminated dirt. Apparently, this covers
quite a large area and may require extensive
clean-up.

The Engineering Department at Union Pacific was responsible
for inspection and for environmental cleanup, either
performing the work in house or hiring a private contractor.

In preparation for the sale of the railyard, Union Pacific
commissioned an environmental audit of the site. The audit
was completed by Applied Geotechnology on June 29, 1990.
The audit discovered subsurface contamination consisting pri-
marily of petroleum hydrocarbons but also identified potential
contamination from metals and solvents as well. Union
Pacific, as required by law, notified the DOE and the EPA of
the results of this assessment.

Based on this information, the DOE notified Union
Pacific on October 16, 1990 that it was a Potentially Liable

42a

Party (“PLP’’) with respect to environmental contamination of
the railyard. On July 31, 1991, Union Pacific entered into an
agreement with the DOE for remediation of the railyard under
the provisions of the Washington Model Toxic Control Act
(“MTCA”).

In a letter dated September 9, 1991, Union Pacific
requested CMC, the reorganized Milwaukee Road corporation,
to enter into settlement negotiations with Union Pacific con-
cerning the clean-up and response costs to be incurred. CMC
responded to the letter by filing this action and requesting the
court to enforce the consummation order and enjoin Union
Pacific from prosecuting any claims against CMC arising out
of Union Pacific's purchase of the railyard. CMC asserts that
these claims were not brought before the bar date and were
therefore discharged in the reorganization. Not long after
CMC filed its motion in this court, Union Pacific filed a
complaint against CMC in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington asserting declaratory judg-
ment, CERCLA, MTCA and contribution claims.

DISCUSSION

Order No. 866 of the reorganization court includes a
provision which enjoins all “Entities” from prosecuting, pursu-
ing or attempting to institute any suit, action or proceeding
against CMC by reason of any obligations incurred by the
Debtor of the Trustee except the obligations imposed upon or
required to be assumed by CMC by the reorganization plan.
This court must now determine whether Union Pacific’s claims
were required to be assumed by CMC by the reorganization
plan. Section 11.2 of the reorganization plan bars all claims
“including claims for contribution or indemnity existing as of
the Confirmation Date and the Consummation Date, respec-
tively. The bar dates provided in section 11.1, however, do not
apply to claims for contribution or indemnity based on facts
that are unknown, undisclosed or unasserted as of the Confirm-
ation Date and Consummation Date respectively.”

43a

Union Pacific does not deny its involvement in the
reorganization proceedings, nor does it deny that it had actual
notice of the Confirmation and Consummation Dates. Union
Pacific contends, however, that its potential CERCLA claim
was unknown at the time of the reorganization proceedings and
that, because the MTCA was enacted in 1989, claims arising
from this statute were unknowable before the 1985 bar dates.
Union Pacific claims that it is entitled to indemnity and contri-
bution because its claims fall under the above-mentioned
exception to the bankruptcy bars in section 11.2 of the
reorganization plan.

While Union Pacific may not have had actual
knowledge of hazardous waste contamination at the railyard,
the facts reveal there was enough information present at the
time that the bar dates went into effect that Union Pacific
should have been aware of its potential liability. The Com-
mencement Bay area, which included the railyard, was listed
nationally in the Federal Register as one of the most contamin-
ated areas in America. In addition to this, numerous national
and regional newspapers ran stories about hazardous waste
contamination at the Commencement Bay area. The railyard
was listed as a potential source of environmental contamination
in the 1982 Dames & Moore study and in the 1985 DOE Reme-
dial Investigation. While Union Pacific denies that it was
aware of either the Dames & Moore study or the Remedial
Investigation, this information was available had they sought
it out.

In 1982, Union Pacific was informed by the EPA of its
potential CERCLA liability for contamination at an old railroad
tunnel that it owned in the Commencement Bay area. While
this investigation showed no hazardous release from the tunnel,
this was direct notice to Union Pacific that there were environ-
mental investigations occurring in the Commencement Bay
area.

Union Pacific also knew of an environmental investi ga-
tion for spills at its own nearby fueling facilities in Tacoma.

As a result of the investigation into their Tacoma railyard by
the DOE, Union Pacific agreed to remove the top layer of soil
on that facility. Union Pacific argues that because the investi-
gation at this facility did not show any groundwater contamina-
tion it may give rise to the inference that such would be the
case at the similar Milwaukee Road railyard site. This is a very
naive and dangerous inference.

At the railyard site itself, Union Pacific workers noticed
oil wastes present on the surface and concluded that because of
this contamination, the site “may require extensive clean-up.”
Union Pacific did, in fact, remove the existing structures on the
land and cleaned the surface of the site.

The presence of a number of environmental investiga-
tions by state and federal authorities in the Commencement
Bay area should have reasonably alerted Union Pacific to the
possibility of environmental contamination of an area that was
already found to be oil saturated. Enough factual information
exists to give Union Pacific constructive knowledge of a
CERCLA claim at the time of the bar dates. Knowledge of
CERCLA liability before the consummation date bars Union
Pacific from asserting any claims under CERCLA against
CMC. See Jn the Matter of: Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pacific Railroad Co., No. 91-2172 slip op. (7th Cir. Aug. 18,
1992).

Union Pacific’s MTCA claim, however, is not barred
by the bankruptcy reorganization. CMC argues that since
Union Pacific could have brought a CERCLA claim before the
bar dates and did not, it should be barred from bringing a
similar state law claim although the state statute was not in
effect at the time of the reorganization. CMC cites no law in
support of its argument. CMC seems to be implicitly arguing
CERCLA preemption of Union Pacific's state law claims.
More precisely, CMC wants this court to rule that a contingent
CERCLA claim preempts a state law claim that has yet to come
into existence. CERCLA, however, is very clear that States
can enact and enforce statutes that provide additional liability

45a

or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous
substances within such state, and that these laws are
independent of CERCLA to the extent that they do not allow
for double compensation for removal costs or damages. 42
USC §§ 9614(a), 9614(b).

The MTCA had not been enacted by the State of
Washington at the time the consummation order was entered.
Union Pacific could not possibly have known of its liability
under a statute that was not in existence until four years after
the bar dates were established for filing claims against the
Milwaukee Road. See Jn the Matter of Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991) (CERCLA claim was
not discharged in bankruptcy when the consummation order
was entered before CERCLA was enacted). Even though the
MTCA claim may be similar to the barred CERCLA claim,
CMC cites no authority to support barring Union Pacific from
prosecuting this claim.

CMC also asserts that a settlement agreement entered
into by both Union Pacific and CMC in 1991 releases it from
its liability to Union Pacific. The settlement agreement deals
primarily with the partitioning of land involved in a claim filed
by Union Pacific. The agreement contains the following broad
language which is the basis for CMC's argument:

CMC and UP release and discharge each other
from any and all claims raised, or which could
have been raised, against each other arising out
of the matters, transactions, occurrences or
events involved in the Litigation or in the
Reorganization Proceedings;

It does not appear that either party had any intention of includ-
ing potential but unasserted environmental claims when it
negotiated this settlement. By its own terms, the settlement
agreement is governed by Washington law, which provides that
the intent of the contracting parties should be determined by
looking at the contract as a whole. Stender v. Twin City Foods,
Inc., 510 P.2d 221 (1973). The agreement provides that the

46a

parties intended to settle only claims and counter-claims that
had been asserted in litigation in the State of Washington and
in the reorganization proceedings in this court. Union Pacific’s
MTCA claims, which were unasserted at the time of the settle-
ment and had nothing to do with the partitioning of the land,
are not released by that agreement.

ORDERED: Pursuant to Order No. 866 of this court,
Union Pacific is enjoined from asserting or attempting to
prosecute any claims under 42 USC §§ 9601- 9675, (CERCLA)
for indemnity or contribution against CMC. Union Pacific is
not enjoined from pursuing its claims for indemnity or contri-
bution under the Washington Model Toxic Control Act, RCW
70.105D.010—70.105D.921 (MTCA).

George W. Lindberg
United States District Judge

D

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386004_1114%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
