# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Power Engineering Co. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 529 U.S. 1086

## Text

=

_-\\ Supreme Court, 0.8

ay, FILED
991179 DEC - 7 1999
aia OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY,
REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. LILIENTHAL,
Petitioners,
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

On PETITION For Writ OF CERTIORARI
To Tue Unitep STATES CourRT OF APPEALS
For THe TENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

VALERIE MCNAUGHTON *
JOHN J. ZODROW

ZODROW ET AL. P.C.
INDEPENDENCE PLAZA
Suite 1700

1050 SEVENTEENTH STREET
DeNnvER, CO 80265

(303) 572-0700

Counsel for Petitioners

* Counsel of Record

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,
CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether §3008(a) of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §6928(a), allows a Court in a civil
enforcement action to enter a preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering that a defendant obtain financial
assurances from a non-party to guarantee payment for
performance of any final judgment directing a remediation of
environmental contamination.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners

Petitioners Power Engineering Company and Redoubt,
Ltd. do not have any parent companies or non-wholly owned
subsidiaries.

Respondent

The United States of America.

Other Parties

Jack R. Lilienthal is named as a third-party defendant
in the District Court. He was not a party to the District
Court’s mandatory injunctive order that is the subject of this
Petition or the appeal of the District Court’s Order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BS eet 8 os 4s EAI ee i
PAR SiG 0) TH PROCEEUING 2c ce es il
pe ee ey. yo. Ler ater rarer ill
BEE Ae PRUE eee eee ci vense V
I i cag oa oe i l
DIAP omen: OF JURISDICTION ........008.. l

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

eee Oe DOU OS os ka eo ek alee ww ee 2
RUS RUMEEETE GPE AUTRES GAAS ce ecw es +
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 6

A. The Order that PEC Obtain Financial
Assurances Violates Longstanding
Principles of Statutory Construction
Established by this Court Because the
District Court and Court of Appeals
Provided EPA with a Prejudgment
Remedy Not Authorized by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 64 or by
OPTI nc eke ey ears 7

iil

B. The District Court’s Preliminary
Injunction for Financial Assurances is
an Order for Prejudgment Security
Relating to Costs Associated With
Preclosure Remediation of the
PRES CN neti ok is ae a ea es 10

ROUSING ga ss ah eens aig oe Ove Sete enn 12

APPENDIX

Appendix A
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Order
WE No ake koe Oa ee ee ae la

Appendix B
District Court Order - 9/24/98 ........... 23a

Appendix C
District Court Memorandum Opinion and
SR SR ib oe EA eee ek i 3la

Appendix D
District Court Memorandum Opinion and
PONE EI 68k ea el Pa eee are A era ge 75a

Appendix E

6 Code of Colorado Regulations 1007-3
PE Se Re Re 6 ok aw Pek ee 129a

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,

GIF i OPE ECE RONDE OE

DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States,
See Sh ee A 8s ee ew

Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner,
19 F.Supp. 2d 988 (W.D. Mo. 1998),

aff'd. 191 F.3d 894 (8" Cir. 1999) .......

Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal
Employees Local 1263,

SEs ne REE 6 6 8 odie a

Middlesex County Sewage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Assoc..,

Gon Stan RREOE 42 U.S.C. § 6928 provides that the EPA may issue an
order assessing a Civil penalty, bring suit in federal court "for
appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction, "
or both, when it determines that a violation of"any requirement" of
Subtitle C has occurred. Id. at § 6928(a)(1). It further provides that
when a violation of Subtitle C occurs in a state which is authorized
to Carry Out a hazardous waste program, the EPA shall give notice
to the state prior to issuing an order or commencing an action, See
id. at § 6928 (a)(2).

42 U.S.C. § 6934 provides that the EPA may order an
owner or operator of a hazardous waste facility to conduct
monitoring, testing, analysis, and reporting under certain
conditions. See id. at § 6934(a).

42 U.S.C. § 6973 provides that the EPA may bring suit
against a person who has contributed or is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of hazardous waste that presents an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment. See id. at § 6973(a).

The Federal Registers cited contain the EPA's approval of
Colorado's hazardous waste program or revisions thereto. In them,
the EPA states that "Colorado also has primary enforcement
responsibility, although EPA retains the right to conduct inspections
under Section 3007 of RCRA and to take enforcement actions"
under 42 U.S.C. §5 6928, 6934, & 6973. 49 Fed. Reg. 41036,
41037 (1984); see 51 Fed. Reg. 37729, 37730:(1986); 54 Fed.
Reg. 20847, 20848 (1989); 56 Fed. Reg. 21601, 21602 (1991); 59
Fed. Reg. 16568, 16569 (1994).

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Order - 9/8/99

proceedings against Defendants in this case through an
administrative order, the district court assumed the EPA had
"overfile” power under RCRA to bring its own subsequent
enforcement action. See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1146; see
also Bryan S. Miller, Harmonizing RCRA's Enforcement
Provisions: RCRA Overfiling in Light of Harmon Industries
v.

Browner, 5 Envtl. Law. 585,586 (1999) ("Overfiling occurs
when EPA initiates an enforcement action after a state begins
an action on the same matter.").

On appeal, the parties focus their argument only on
whether the EPA may enforce the financial assurance
provisions of the state regulations independently of
compelling compliance with the entire permitting scheme.
Therefore, because the propositions set forth above are not in
dispute in this appeal, we assume without deciding for
purposes of this appeal (1) that the EPA may enforce the
state's hazardous waste regulations, see United States v.
Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Sth Cir. 1996)
("42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) gave EPA the power to enforce the
substance of an approved state's program against private
parties in that state."); and (2) that the EPA may do so even
after the state has taken its own enforcement actions, but see
Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp.2d 988, 994,
996 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (recognizing that EPA could withdraw
state authority or enforce a violation of RCRA "when the state
remains inactive, after giving notice” pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a)(2), but holding that EPA may not overfile under
RCRA after state concludes enforcement action on same
matter); see also Miller, supra, at 593 ("Harmon Industries,
Inc. v. Browner is the first federal court decision that directly

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Order - 9/8/99

addresses the issue of whether EPA may overfile under
RCRA after a state concludes an enforcement action.").‘

Parties

The United States is the plaintiff acting on behalf of
the EPA. PEC is a Colorado corporation located in Denver.
From approximately 1968, PEC has operated a business of
refinishing metal crankshafts, connecting rods, and rod
journals for large diesel engines used in heavy equipment.
Redoubt owns the land and buildings leased to PEC, and thus
is the owner of PEC's facility under Colorado regulations.
Lilienthal is the president of PEC and owns 51% of the
outstanding stock of both PEC and Redoubt. For purposes of
the preliminary injunction motion, Lilienthal agreed that he is
an "owner" and "operator" of PEC and as such subject to any
order entered by the district court directing Defendants to
secure financial assurances.

4 . . . ‘ . .
Unlike Harmon, Marine Shale did not arise in an

overfile context. That is, while the EPA attempted to override a
state enforcement action in Harmon, the EPA proceeded in Marine
Shale in the absence of any clear state enforcement proceedings.
Thus, while Marine Shale spoke to whether the EPA can enforce
State regulations promulgated pursuant to RCRA, it did not address
the issue of whether the EPA can do so once a state has initiated its
own enforcement action. Harmon, on the other hand, spoke to
whether the EPA can overfile extant state enforcement proceedings,
but Harmon does not address whether the EPA may enforce state
implementing regulations in the absence of any state enforcement
effort. In fact, the EPA brought its complaint in Harmon under
federal regulations. See Harmon, 19 F. Supp.2d at 992 n.4.

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Nature of the Case

PEC’'s refurbishing operations produce more than
1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste per month, and the
facility stores more than 6,000 kilograms per month. The
facility generates approximately thirteen different waste
Streams, including arsenic, lead, mercury, and hexavalent
chromium contaminated media. In 1992, Denver Health and
Hospitals ("DHH") contacted the CDPHE concerning a
discharge into the Platte River of high levels of hexavalent
chromium. After investigation, DHH determined that PEC
was the likely sources of the discharge. The CDPHE then
conducted compliance review inspections at PEC in August
and September of 1992, and reported numerous violations of
federal and state regulations governing the treatment, storage,
and disposal of hazardous waste, which the district court set
out at length. In addition, PEC never applied for a permit or
obtained interim status.

Although PEC notified the CDPHE in 1986 that it was
a generator of certain hazardous waste, PEC failed to assess
adequately its generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of
hazardous waste, and the CDPHE did not know the severity
and extent of PEC's noncompliance with the state hazardous
waste program until the August 1992 inspection. As a result
of PEC's illegal storage and disposal of hazardous waste,
groundwater at and under the facility, as well as groundwater
under areas outside the facility, is contaminated with levels of
hexavalent chromium greatly exceeding established toxicity

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Order - 9/8/99

levels.° A plume of chrome contamination extends from the
facility approximately 3,310 feet into the South Platte Valley
Fill Aquifer, which is connected to the South Platte River.

After inspecting PEC's facility again in 1993 and
1994, the CDPHE issued an Initial Compliance Order on June
28, 1994. That order was stayed at PEC's request, while PEC
and the CDPHE held conferences between 1994 and 1996.
The CDPHE then issued a Final Administrative Compliance
Order on June 13, 1996 ("Order"). While complying with
certain requirements of the Order, PEC failed to meet others.
Accordingly, on December 26, 1996, the CDPHE issued an
Administrative Penalty Order assessing civil penalties of
approximately $1,875,000. Defendants did not appeal the
penalty, but neither have they paid any portion of it.

The EPA was displeased with the manner in which the
CDPHE sought to enforce the RCRA regulations. At the
EPA's request, the United States exercised its authority to
seek Defendant's compliance with the state regulations. As
part of its suit, the United States sought a mandatory
preliminary injunction directing Defendants to comply with
the regulations for financial assurances. After a hearing, the
district court granted the preliminary injunction pursuant to
§3008(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6928(a), and Fed. R. Civ. P.
65. Defendants now appeal.

The district court noted that PEC currently is managing
hazardous wastes in compliance with applicable storage regulations.
See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1151.

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Il. DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

We review the grant of a preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion. See Elam Constr., Inc. v. Regional
Trans. Disi., 129 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1363 (1998). Granting a preliminary
injunction is proper where the moving party shows: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the threatened harm
outweighs injury, which the injunction may cause the
opposing party; and (4) the injunction will not be adverse to
the public interest. See Kansas Health Care Assoc., Inc. v.
Kansas Dep't ot Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1542
(10th Cir. 1994). A mandatory preliminary injunction (1.e.,
one that directs a party to act) imposes “an even heavier
burden on [the movant] of showing that the four factors listed
above weigh heavily and compellingly in movant's favor.” Id.
at 1543. We review the underlying issues of law decided by
the district court de novo. See Equifax Servs., Inc. v_ Hitz,
905 F.2d 1355, 1357 (10th Cir. 1990); Tefel v. Reno, No.
98-4616, 1999 WL 496227, at *8 (1th Cir. July 14, 1999)

The district court found all four factors supporting a
preliminary injunction. See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1162-65.
As the government notes, Defendants on appeal do not appear
to challenye the finding of the latter three factors. Rather,
Defendants challenge the applicability of RCRA and state
unplementing regulations, an attack that goes to. the
government's likelihood of success on the merits
Additionally, Defendants raise questions about — the

lla

Order - 9/8/99

appropriateness of a preliminary injunction ordering financial
assurances. We address Defendant's arguments in turn.

A.

Defendants challenge the district court's holding that
PEC currently disposes of hazardous waste, an activity which
would subject it to Colorado's regulations for facilities
treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste ("TSD
facilities"). We agree with the district court

Colorado regulations define a TSD facility as “a
location at which hazardous waste is subjected to treatment,
Storage, or disposal and may include a facility where
hazardous waste is generated.” C_.C_R. § 260.10. Under the
[a] generator [of hazardous waste] who treats,

regulations,
Stores, or disposes of hazardous waste on-site must comply
with the applicable standards and permit requirements set
forth in Parts 264, 265, 266, and Part 100 of these
regulations.” C.C.R. § 262.10 n.2.° C.C.R. § 266 further
provides that its financial assurance requirements “apply to

C.C.R. § 264 sets out the standards for owners and
operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities with permits. C.C.R. § 265 sets out interim status
standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal taciliues who have obtained interim
See C CR

fan ra pall thy uh hy eo ¢ gant ft ;
SULLUS GS Weil 42S UlOSe WHO Have idlieG WO GUO SHO

265.1(b), United States v. Ekco Housewares. Inc., 62 F 3d 806

809 (6th Cir. 1995); PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at L150. CCR. § 266

. } ’ ’ ’ y ’ rise
Sets Out financial assurance requirements. C.C_R. § 100 sets out the

regulations tor permit applicauons

tt
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Order - 9/8/99

owners and operators of all hazardous waste facilities.’
C.C.R. § 266.10(a). RCRA and the state regulations define
"disposal" as

the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,
spiliing, leaking, or placing of any solid or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water
so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or
any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground
waters.

42 U.S.C. § 6903(3); C.C.R. § 260.10.

For substantially the same reasons discussed
thoroughly in the district court's opinion, we find that
Defendants currently are disposing of hazardous wastes
illegally in three ways:

(1) the Facility's air scrubbers dispose a mist
of hexavalent chromium onto Facility soil; (2)
the Facility failed to remediate the soil
contaminated by a yellow/orange liquid that
leaked from air scrubbers down the west side
of the Facility's main building; and (3) the
Facility failed to remediate the three open
waste piles of contaminated soil excavated
from beneath the chrome-plating tanks and the
remaining contaminated soil located beneath
the chrome-plating tanks.

PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1157, 1157-60.

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Order - 9/8/99

Furthermore, we conclude that PEC is subject to
Colorado's financial assurance requirements. By stipulation
before the district court for purposes of the preliminary
injunction motion, the parties agreed that PEC "is and was a
‘generator'" of hazardous waste as defined by RCRA and
Colorado regulations. Thus, PEC "must comply with the
applicable standards and permit requirements" of the
Colorado regulations for generators of hazardous waste who
are TSD facilities, including the financial assurance
requirements of § 266. C.C.R. § 262.10 n.2. Additionally,
those financial assurance requirements “apply to" Redoubt and
Lilienthal as "owners and operators of [al hazardous waste
facilit{y]." C.C.R. § 266.10(a).

We do not find Defendants’ argument to the contrary
persuasive. Defendants contend that, even if they are
disposers of hazardous waste, they are not a disposal facility
and therefore not a TSD facility. Defendants rely on C.C.R.
§ 260.10, which defines a "disposal facility" as a facility "at
which hazardous waste is intentionally placed into or on any
land or water, and at which waste will remain after closure."
Defendants argue that because they intend "to remedy the
contamination of the site while PEC is still a going concern,”
no waste will remain after closure, thereby precluding them
from being a disposal facility by definition.

We find no merit to this argument. Defendants
essentially contend that any generator currently disposing of
hazardous waste on their facility does not have to comply with
regulations for TSD facilities so long as they intend to clean
up the waste before closure. There is no basis in the provision
cited for such a sweeping subjective loophole. As an initial
matter, the intent element in the definition of “disposal

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facility” pertains to whether hazardous waste was
"intentionally placed" on land or water, not whether the
polluter intends the hazardous waste to remain. Cf. United
States v. Allegan Metal Finishing Co., 696 F. Supp. 275, 287
(W.D. Mich. 1988) (refusing to read into 42 U.S.C. §
6925(e), interim status provision for "land disposal facility,"
"a state of mind requirement,” based on the regulatory
definition of "disposal facility,” as to "whether the defendant
intended the waste to remain [after closure]" (quotations
omitted)). As the EPA has indicated, the purpose of the intent
element in the definition of "disposal facility” is "to indicate
the [EPA's] intent that the term does not apply to activities
involving truly accidental discharge of hazardous waste,”
because the EPA posits that "permits logically can only be
required for intentional disposal of hazardous waste.” 45 Fed.
Reg. 33066, 33068 (1980).

Moreover, we need not decide whether PEC is a
"disposal facility.” Unlike "disposal facility,” the definition of
"disposal" does not limit its reference only to those facilities
at Which hazardous waste will remain after closure. Rather,
as noted, "disposal" encompasses "the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid
or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so tat such
solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may
enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged
into any waters.” C.C.R. § 260.10. As a generator of
hazardous waste that engages in its disposal, PEC is a TSD
facility. See C.C.R. § 260.10. Furthermore, as a TSD
facility, PEC must comply with the requirements of C.C.R.
§§ 264, 265, 266, and 100; and as PEC's owner and operator,
Redoubt and Lilienthal must meet the financial assurance
requirements of C.C.R. § 266. See C.C.R. § 260.10 (defining

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PEAS wah pe UT IR RE

ite autiaan olathe we Hewes

Order - 9/8/99

TSD facility to include generators of hazardous waste "at
which hazardous waste is subjected to treatment, storage, or
disposal"); C.C.R. § 262.10 n.2 (generator disposing of
hazardous waste is subject to C.C.R. §§ 264-66 & 100):
C.C.R. § 266. 10(a) (financial assurance provisions of C.C.R.
§ 266 apply to owners and operators of all hazardous waste
facilities). The definition of "disposal facility" on its face does
not negate these regulatory mandates, and Defendants’
argument does not convince us otherwise.

B.

Defendants argue that "financial assurances are part
and parcel of an integrated regulatory scheme governing pre-
operational permitting of a TSD{ facility] which cannot be
severed and applied separately from the balance of the
regulatory scheme." Since the amount of financial assurances
depends on the cost estimates of closure and post-closure of
the TSD facility, and since closure and post-closure plans are
required for a person to obtain a permit, Defendants argue
that the financial assurance requirements come into play only
at the tail end of the regulatory, scheme for permitting. Thus,
Defendants assert that the district court at most could only
require Defendants to (1) secure a permit covering treatment,
storage, or disposal of hazardous waste; or (2) cease its illegal
activities. Defendants conclude that the district court therefore
erred in enjoining compliance with the financial assurance
provisions.

We find Defendants’ argument unsupportable. As an
initial matter, § 3008 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928, authorizes
the EPA to commence an action “for appropriate relief,
including a temporary or permanent injunction," for "any

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requirement" of Subtitle C, and to do so in states that have
authorized hazardous waste programs as long as the EPA
gives prior notice to the state. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1)-(2).
As noted, the district court stated, and neither party
challenges, that the EPA may bring an overfile action under
RCRA to enforce state implementing regulations. Thus, we
turn to whether the EPA may require Defendants to comply
only with Colorado's financial assurance requirements
independent of requiring compliance with the entire
permitting scheme.

Colorado's financial assurance requirements "apply to
owners and operators of all hazardous waste facilities," and
inter alia require "[aJn owner or operator of each facility . .
. [to] establish financial assurances for closure, and if
applicable, post-closure of the facility.” C.C.R. §§ 266. 10(a)
& 266.14 (emphasis added). By their terms, these regulations
apply to all owners and operators of hazardous waste
facilities; they are not limited to permit holders or applicants.
In light of these clear provisions, we do not believe that the
mere fact that the permit application requires a showing of
compliance with the financial assurance provisions somehow
renders these provisions applicable only in the context of
permittine. See C.C.R. § 100.41. Based on the plain language
of the Colorado financial assurance requirements, we
conclude that the EPA's power to enforce Colorado's
regulations includes the power to enforce the financial
assurance requirements independent of requiring a permit. See
United States v. Ekco Housewares. inc., 62 F.2d 806, 809,
812 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding defendant subject to EPA
regulations for financial assurance until final closure is
certified even though defendant never obtained interim status
by applying for permit).

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eee eC uae t

GRADS ina ia

Order - 9/8/99

Defendants’ remaining arguments on this issue do not
dissuade us from our conclusion. Defendants attempt to
buttress their position by arguing that the CDPHE shares their
view that the financial assurance requirements cannot be
enforced separately from the entire permitting scheme. As
support, Defendants state that the "CDPHE has never
required a generator of hazardous waste, such as PEC , who
is illegally treating, storing or disposing of hazardous waste
to provide financial assurances." In a_ related point,
Defendants contend that the CDPHE has only considered PEC
to be a generator of hazardous waste, and has never
considered it also to be a TSD facility "subject to the permit
regulations, including the financial assurance requirements. "

The record belies Defendants’ argument, because
PEC's own environmental manager testified that the CDPHE
told PEC that it was a storage and disposal facility that needed
to obtain a permit pursuant to state regulations. Additionally,
while the CDPHE did not choose to require Defendants to
comply with the financial assurance requirements in its Final
Compliance Order, it believed it "[had] that option."

Rejecting Defendants’ arguments, we hold that the
EPA can enforce the state financial assurance requirements
independent of requiring compliance with permitting.

a

Defendants assert that the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction directing them to provide financial
assurances in the amount of $3,500,000 was “not directed
towards requiring Defendants to obtain financial assurances
for the operation of a TSD[ facility], but was a thinly

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disguised attempt to obtain prejudgment security to enforce
any future judgment of the District Court." In particular,
Defendants assert that the preliminary injunction was "for
costs associated with remediation of existing contamination,
not for remediation of any contamination that may exist if and
when PEC closes its business." Defendants argue that the
preliminary injunction was actually prejudgment security, and
therefore it should be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.
Defendants conclude that the preliminary injunction exceeds
the scope of Rule 64 because "the prejudgment remedies
available to the United States [under Rule 64] are limited to
attachment, receivership, garnishment and sequestration."
Additionally, Defendants contend that the district court erred
in granting the preliminary injunction because "RCRA does
not have a provision providing prejudgment remedies to
secure a future judgment in an enforcement action under §
3008."’

We reject Defencants' arguments at the outset, because
we do not interpret the district court's preliminary injunction
for financial assurances to be an order for prejudgment
security for pre-closure remediation. We recognize that the
district court ordered financial assurances based upon the
costs of remediating the present contamination around the
PEC facility. However, we believe the district court
associated these remediation costs with closure and post-
closure of the facility. First, as a legal matter, the district

’ The United States contends that Defendants did not

properly raise this objection before the district court. We have
examined the record and conclude that Defendants sufficiently
raised the issue below.

19a

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Order - 9/8/99

court directed Defendants "to provide financial assurances in
accordance with 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266." See
PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1165. That the court ordered financial
assurances "in accordance with" C.C.R. § 266 indicates that
the requested assurances will be used for closure and post-
closure costs. Second, as a factual matter, the district court
appeared to assume that closure and post-closure costs for the
facility would include costs for remediating the site in its
Current condition because Defendants have (1) violated
hazardous waste regulations for decades: (2) failed to comply
with the Final Compliance Order of the CDPHE respecting
remediation of its open piles of hazardous waste; (3) failed to
pay the civil penalty assessed by the CDPHE; (4) recently
engaged in a pattern of debt reduction and asset forfeiture;
and (5) threatened bankruptcy or abandonment of the facility
if the federal or state government continues seeking the
facility's compliance with applicable hazardous waste
regulations. See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1157, 1163, 1165.
Therefore, given Defendants’ history of unwillingness to
comply with RCRA and state implementing regulations, we
believe that the district court properly considered remediation
costs for the present contamination in calculating costs
associated with financial assurances necessary, for the
facility's closure or post-closure. Accordingly, we hold that
the district court properly ordered financial assurances for
closure and post-closure of the facility.

D.

Finally, Defendants contend that the district court's
calculation of the $3,500,000 figure for financial assurances
was based on "nothing more than gross and speculative
approximation." Because Defendants never have complied

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with applicable RCRA regulations by providing closure and
post-closure plans, Defendants contend that the absence of
those plans "is fatal to the United States' request for financial
assurances," as such financial assurances "cannut be
calculated without the detailed closure cost estimates required
by the regulations."

We disagree with Defendants’ argument. Even though
PEC does not have closure and post-closure plans pursuant to
C.C.R. § 265, the district court properly based its estimate of
financial assurances on the costs of remediating present
contamination at the site, under the assumption that the
contamination will remain at closure. See supra Part II.C.
Furthermore, the district court based its figure on estimates
from the CDPHE and PEC itself. The CDPHE estimated the
cost to remediate the contaminated soil and groundwater at
between $3,000,000 and $6,000,000. PEC's counsel
estimated that remediation of the site for contaminated soil
would cost $2,300,000, and PEC's hydrologist estimated that
remediation of the groundwater would cost $1,200,000. From
these figures, the district court concluded that the
government's request for financial assurances in the amount
$3,500,000 was a "fair estimate of the costs of remediation,"
and ordered financial assurances in that amount. PEC, 10 F.
Supp.2d at 1154.

We believe the district court's figure was supported by
the evidence, given that the amount of financial assurances
equaled the sum of PEC'’s own remediation estimates
($2,300,000 for site remediation and $1,200,000 for
groundwater remediation), and was within the remediation
estimated provided by the CDPHE ($3,000,000 to
$6,000,000). While Defendants and the government both

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Order - 9/8/99

admit that the estimates were rough rather than exacting,
Defendants in large part were responsible for the inexact
nature of the estimates because of their failure to develop
closure and post-closure cost estimates pursuant to state
regulations. The district court did its best to estimate fairly
closure costs under non-ideal circumstances of Defendants’
creation, and we find the evidence supported the estimate.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing
the mandatory preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to
provide financial assurances in the amount of $3,500,000
pursuant to C.C.R. § 266. The district court's order js
AFFIRMED.

22a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

[Filed September 24, 1998]

Civil Action No. 97-R-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

)
POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, _ )
REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. )
LILIENTHAL, )
Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, )

)

)

)

)

)

)

JACK LILIENTHAL,
Third Party Defendant.

ORDER

Defendants, Power Engineering Company ("Power
Engineering"), Redoubt, Ltd. ("Redoubt"), and Richard J.
Lilienthal (collectively, "defendants"), move for vacatur or

23a

A OR Ls TN

Order 9/24/98

reconsideration of the Memorandum Opinion and Order
entered August 17, 1998. Plaintiff, United States of America
("the United States"), acting on behalf of the Environmental
Protection Agency, object to defendants motion. The motion
is adequately’ briefed and oral argument will not materially
aid its resolution. For the reasons set forth below, I deny, in
part, and grant as confessed, in part, defendants' motion for
vacatur and reconsideration.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By written order entered June 10. 1998 ("the June 10
order"), I directed defendants to “provide financial assurances
in the amount of $3,500.000 pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE
REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all applicable subparts." Defendants
filed a show cause submission on July 10, 1998, explaining
why they had not yet provided financial assurances within the
time afforded by the June 10 order. Defendants appealed the
June 10 order on July 22, 1998. Plaintiff filed an objection to
defendants show cause submission on July 24, 1998. A
hearing was held on August 6, 1998, during which the issue
of this court's continuing jurisdiction was discussed but not
resolved. Accordingly, I directed the Parties to brief the
jurisdictional issue.

On August 7, 1998, the very next day, the United
States moved to vacate the briefing schedule and also moved
for the issuance of an order imposing specific financial
assurance requirements on defendants. In its motion, the
United States argued that this court had jurisdiction to enforce
the June 10 order despite defendants’ appeal of that order. On
August 17, 1998, ten days later. I entered a Memorandum
Opinion and Order ("the August 17 order") vacating the

24a

Order 9/24/98

briefing schedule and directing defendants to provide financial
assurances in the amount of $3,500.000 in the form of a
surety bond guaranteeing payment into a ciosure and/or post-
closure trust fund pursuant to6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3
§ 266.14(f). Defendants did not respond to the United States’
August 7 motion before the August 17 order entered.

On August 31, 1998, defendants moved for vacatur or
reconsideration of the August 17 order. They argued, inter
alia, that vacatur of the briefing schedule and their inability
to file a response to the United States' August 7 motion
deprived them of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Out of an
abundance of caution. I entered an order on September 1,
1998, which order: (1) afforded defendants the opportunity to
file a response to the United States’ August 7 motion: (2) held
in abeyance defendants’ August 31 motion for vacatur or
reconsideration: and (3) stayed the August 17 order until
further order. Defendants filed their response to the United
States’ August 7 motion on September 10, 1998 and the
United States filed a reply on September 17, 1998. The issues
of jurisdiction and vacatur are now fully briefed. I remove the
stay of the August 17 order, subject to the modification set
forth below. An extensive procedural history of this case
appears in the August 17 order.

II. ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
VACATUR AND RECONSIDERATION

Defendants filed their response to the United States’
August 7 motion on September 10, 1998. Defendants argue
that, in light of their appeal of the June 10 order, this court
does not have jurisdiction to impose specific financial

25a

Order 9/24/98

assurance requirements on them. Defendants also contend that
they are unable to provide the specific form of financial
assurance requirement sought by the United States, a surety
bond guaranteeing payment into a closure and/or post-closure
trust fund. I address each argument in turn.

a. Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that the relief sought by the United
States will impermissibly modify the status quo pending
appeal. For the reasons set forth with more particularly inthe
August 17 order. I disagree. Granting the relief requested by
the United States does not materially alter the status of the
case on appeal. The June 10 order from which defendants
appeal directs defendants to "provide financial assurances in
the amount of $3,500.000 pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE
REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all applicable subparts." The August
17 order merely requires defendants to provide financial
assurances in accordance with a specific subpart of §266.
Thus, the August 17 266. Thus, the August 17 order does not
expand the scope of injunctive relief granted in the June 10
order. It is important to note that the status quo pending
appeal derives from the June 10 order, which order requires
defendants to provide financial assurances. The status quo
pending appeal, therefore, is achieved by defendants
providing financial assurances.

Defendants could have complied with the June 10
order by providing any type of financial assurance allowed by
§ 266, including a bond, trust, insurance, or any combination
thereof. Defendants, however, failed to provide any type of
financial assurance. Defendants' show cause submission,
premised on draft trust agreements that proved to be

26a

Order 9/24/98

insufficient, did not bring defendants into compliance with the
June 10 order. This court necessarily retains jurisdiction over
the parties until they comply with the terms of the June 10
order even though defendants appeal from that order. 7yler v.
City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1402 n. 1 (10th Cir.
1997). Accordingly, I reject defendants’ jurisdiction
arguments.

The August 17 order is an appropriate means to
encourage compliance with the June 10 order. See Fed.
R.Civ. P. 62(c) ("When an appeal is taken from an
interlocutory or final judgment granting . . . an injunction, the
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant
an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such
terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the
security, of the rights of the adverse party."). As with all
litigants that appeal an injunctive order, defendants must
either comply with the injunctive order or seek a stay of the
injunctive order. Stay will occur only if defendants post a
supersedeas bond. See, e.g., Fed. R.Civ. P. 62(a), (d). I
deny, therefore, defendants' motion for vacatur or
reconsideration as to the issue of jurisdiction.

b. Defendants' Ability to Post a Surety Bond

As noted above, the August 17 order requires
defendants to obtain financial assurances in the form of a
surety bond in the amount of $3,500.000 that complies with
the provisions of 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266.14(f)
("Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into a Closure and/or
Post Closure Trust Fund"). Defendants contend that the
evidence admitted during the preliminary, injunction hearing
proves they are unable to obtain a surety, bond that complies

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Order 9/24/98

with § 266.14(f). Although I disagree with defendants’
argument, I need not address the issue because the United
States, softening its stance, makes the following concession in
its reply brief:

. the United States is concerned that
enforcement of the August 17, 1998
Memorandum Opinion and Order in its present
form will only provide Defendants with a basis
for further delay. Defendants allege that while
they could provide a form of assurance
acceptable under 6 Colo. Code Regs. 1007-3 §
266, it is impossible for Defendants to do so
by providing a surety bond and standby trust.

* * x

Rather than facilitating further delay by
insisting that the Order be enforced in its
present form, the United States respectfully
Suggests that the August 17 Memorandum
Opinion and Order be amended in part...

(PIf.'s Reply to Defs.' Mot. for Reconsideration at 5.) The
United States then Suggests that I amend the August 17 order
to allow defendants to provide an alternative form of financial
assurance if defendants proposed alternative satisfies all
requirements of § 266 and has been agreed to by the United
States. Supplementation of the August 17 order as suggested
by the United States vitiates al] of defendants’ stated concerns
except their jurisdictional argument. Accordingly,
supplement the August 17 order as Suggested by the United
States. Thus, I grant as confessed defendants’ motion for

28a

Order 9/24/98

vacatur or reconsideration as to the issue of their ability to
post a surety bond.

It is important to note at this juncture that, after much
time and expenditure of resources, the parties are left in a
status quo that does not materially differ from the status quo
immediately after entry of the June 10 order. The June 10
order required defendants to provide financial assurances in
accordance with § 266. The August 17 order, as
supplemented by this order, requires defendants to provide
financial assurances in accordance with § 266.14(f) or, if
agreed to by the United States, any subpart of § 266. Thus,
we have taken two steps forward and almost two steps
backward.

Accordingly, I ORDER that:

(1) defendants’ motion for vacatur- or
reconsideration is DENIED, in part, and
GRANTED as confessed, in part;

(2) the stay of the Memorandum Opinion and
Order entered August 17, 1998 is LIFTED;

(3) the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered
August 17, 1998, which order requires
defendants to provide financial assurances in
the amount of $3,500.000 in the form of a
surety, bond guaranteeing payment into a
closure and/or post-closure trust find pursuant
to 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §
266.14(f), is SUPPLEMENTED as follows:
defendants MAY PROVIDE an alternative

29a

ee

(4)

Order 9/24/98

form of financial assurance if: (i) their
proposed alternative satisfies all requirements
of 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266: (ii)
their proposed alternative has been agreed to
by the United States: and (ili) the defendants
provide to the United States a letter, signed by
an authorized representative of defendants,
indicating why it is impossible for defendants
to comply with the August 17 order and/or
why compliance with the August 17 order
would materially disadvantage defendants
relative to other available financial assurance
requirements; and

defendants SHALL COMPLY with the August
17 order, as supplemented by this order,
within twenty days or show good cause as to
why they have not achieved such compliance.

Dated: September 24, 1998 in Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

/s/
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

30a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Lewis T. Babcock, Judge
[Filed August 17, 1998]

Civil Action No. 97-B-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

.

)

)

)

)

)
POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, _ )
REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. )
LILIENTHAL, )
Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, — )

)

)

)

)

)

)

ws

JACK LILIENTHAL,
Third Party Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Babcock, J.

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ae Se ee ee eas re ae

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

Plaintiff, United States of America ("the United
States"), acting on behalf of the Environmental Protection
Agency, moves for the issuance of an order requiring
defendants, Power Engineering Company ("Power
Engineering"), Redoubt, Ltd. ("Redoubt"), and Richard J.
Lilienthal (collectively, "defendants"), to obtain financial
assurances in the form of a surety, bond that satisfies state
regulations adopted by the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment, found at 6 COLO. CODE REGS.
1007-3 § 266.14(f). The United States also moves to vacate
the established briefing schedule regarding the jurisdictional
issue raised at the August 6, 1998 hearing. The United States’
motion is adequately briefed and oral argument will not
materially aid its resolution. For the reasons set forth below,
I grant the United States' motion.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The United States commenced this action on August 1,
1997, alleging eight claims: (1) treatment of hazardous waste
without a permit or interim Status, (2) disposal of hazardous
waste without a permit or interim Status; (3) shipment of
hazardous waste to an un-permitted facility; (4) improper
container management; (5) storage of hazardous waste without
a permit or interim status; (6) failure to provide employee
training; (7) failure to have a hazardous waste contingency
plan; and (8) illegal operations (failure to have a groundwater
monitoring program, failure to have a closure plan, failure to
minimize releases of hazardous waste, and failure to obtain
and provide financial assurances for closure and post-closure).
The United States also alleges that Power Engineering has
failed to comply with a CDPHE Administrative Compliance

32a

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Order. Subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1997).

The United States filed a motion for preliminary
injunction on January 16, 1998, requesting issuance of an
order requiring defendants to comply with Colorado
hazardous waste regulations. These regulations require
owners and operators of all hazardous waste facilities to
document that they have secured the resources required to
close their facilities in an appropriate and safe manner, and to
pay third-party claims that mav arise from facility, operations.
A preliminary injunction hearing was held beginning May 11,
1998. On June 10, 1998, I issued a Memorandum Opinion
and Order ("the June 10 order") granting the United States'
motion for preliminary, injunction. The June 10 order directs
defendants to provide financial assurances in the amount of
$3,500,000 or show cause why they have not provided such
financial assurances within thirty days.

Defendants filed a "Show Cause Submission" on July
10, 1998 that states defendants were in the process of
finalizing trust arrangements and that the trust would be
finalized within ten business days. Three draft trust
agreements were attached to defendants' Show Cause
Submission. These three draft trust agreements indicated that
defendants intended the following properties to constitute the
res of the trust: (1) Richard Lilienthal's undivided one-half
interest in real property located in Eagle County, Colorado
(current estimated value of $1,200,000.00); (2) real property
owned by Redoubt, Ltd. on which the Power Engineering
facility operates (current estimated value $0.00; stated value
in draft trust agreement of $2,000,000.00); and (3) 9,340

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Shares of UNUM stock owned by Power Engineering (current
estimated value $520,000.00).

The United States filed a response to defendants’ Show
Cause Submission on July 24, 1998, objecting on four
grounds. First, the United States argued that defendants’
Proposed trusts do not provide for joint and several liability
because each trust has a separate grantor. The United States
contended that one trust, rather than three separate trusts,
Should exist. Second, the United States argued that defendants
impermissibly altered the trust agreement language required
by Colorado regulations. Colorado regulations state:
"Payments made to the Trustee shall consist of cash or
securities acceptable to the Trustee." 6 COLO. CODS REGS.
1007-3 §§ 266.14(a) and 266. 18(a)(1). The draft trust
agreements impermissibly state:

Contributions of Property. made to the Trustee
for the Fund may consist of the property set
forth in the District Court's Order and other
preperty, acceptable to the Trustee.

(Ex. A to Def.'s Show Cause Submission at 2.) The United
States contends that, because the June 10 order requires
defendants to "provide financial assurance in the amount of
$3,500,000 pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §
266 and all applicable subparts," any trust must consist of
cash or securities and not real property, to ensure liquidity,
and | revent the diminishment of the trust res by subsequent
impairment, such as tax liens. A letter from one of the
bankers contacted by defendants also indicates that Norwest
Bank would only establish a trust or escrow fund to hold
assets "in liquid form." (Ltr. from Martinez of Norwest Bank

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

of 7/20/98, Ex. A to Plf.'s Resp. to Def.'s Show Cause
Submission. )

Third, the United States argued that two of the three
properties proposed as trust res are inadequate. The United
States contended that Richard Lilienthal's undivided one-half
interest in real property located in Eagle County, Colorado
(current estimated value of $1,200,000), is subject to a
restrictive covenant regarding conveyance and has already
been quitclaimed to Richard Lilienthal's wife. Defendants
disputed this contention. The United States also contended
that the property owned by Redoubt on which the Power
Engineering facility operates is worthless until remediated.
Thus, the only proposed res acceptable to the United States is
the stock owned by Power Engineering.

Fourth, the United States objected to other language of
the draft trust agreements. Defendants modified the trust
language, mandated by 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § §
266. 14(a) and 266. 18(a)(1), regarding payment of remediation
costs out of trust assets. The proposed trust agreements give
defendants more power over trust assets than envisioned by
Colorado regulations. In summary., the United States objects
to defendants’ failure to comply with the June 10 order,
attempt to fund the proposed trusts with real property, instead
of cash or securities, attempt to provide real property that has
an impaired value, and proposal to modify, the trust
agreement in a manner that allows defendants to authorize or
prohibit payments from the trust assets. The United States did
not move for contempt, but averred that the question of
contempt "is one for the Court to determine." (PIf.'s Resp. to
Def.'s Show Cause Submission at 9.)

35a

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Defendants filed a supplement to their show cause
submission on July 27, 1998. Defendants contended that
Norwest Bank did not disclose its objection to acting as
Trustee of a trust funded by real property until July 20, 1998.
Since receipt of the letter from Norwest Bank, Defendants
allege that they have contacted eleven "companies" regarding
the trust arrangement "previously . . . discussed with Norwest
Bank." (Def.'s Supp. at 2.)

A siatus conference was held on August 6, 1998 to
address defendants’ compliance with the June 10 order. At the
commencement of the hearing, I raised the issue of whether
defendants’ Notice of Appeal, filed July 22, 1998, divested
this court of jurisdiction to enforce the June 10 order. Neither
the United States nor defendants were prepared to argue this
issue. Thus, I established a briefing schedule that would have
concluded on September 11, 1998.

Also during the status conference, the issues raised by
defendants' Show Cause Submission and the United States'
objections were addressed. | indicated that the United States’
objections to the form of (rusts proposed by defendants were
valid. The June 10 order requires compliance with Colorado
regulations and defendants' Proposed trusts ignore many of
important trust features mandated by these regulations, such
as the type of res and powers of the grantor. I also noted that
the United States’ concerns regarding the property used to
fund the trusts had merit. Clearly, Redoubt's land is not worth
$2,000,000. The very. purpose of financial assurances is to
ensure that liquid assets exist to pay for remediation if
defendants ignore their remediation responsibility. Although
Redoubt's contaminated land may be valuable if remediated,

36a

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

the land surely does not constitute a valid financial assurance
in its unremediated state.

Lastly, I noted at the August 6 status conference that
the June 10 order is broadly worded. Nowhere does the June
10 order require defendants to provide financial assurances in
the form of a trust funded by property discussed in that order.
Rather, the June 10 order requires defendants to "provide
financial assurance in the amount of $3,500,000 pursuant to
6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all applicable
subparts." (Ord. of 6/10/98 at 46.) While I necessarily
discussed defendants’ personal and real property in the June
10 order, I did so only in assessing whether defendants had
the ability to provide financial assurances. The order merely
States:

[Power Engineering's] readily available cash
of $800,000, when combined with Lilienthal's
directly owned assets of $1,400,000, could be
placed in a trust fund with a present value of
$2,200,000. Defendants could borrow the
remaining $1,300,000, obtaining an insurance
policy for that fixed amount.

(Ord. of 6/10/98 at 25-26 (emphasis added)). I found that the
evidence presented at the injunction hearing illustrated
defendants’ ability to provide financial assurances, but the
June 10 order neither requires nor precludes defendants from
funding a trust or other form of financial assurance with the
property discussed in that order. Thus, defendants could have
complied with the mandatory injunction by providing financial
assurance comprised of insurance, bonds, trusts, or any
combination thereof.

37a

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

On August 7, 1998, one day after the status conference
and outside the established briefing schedule, the United
States filed a "Motion to Vacate the Briefing Schedule and
Impose Financial Assurance Requirements." In its motion, the
United States addresses the jurisdictional issue at length and
concludes that this court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce
the June 10 order notwithstanding defendant's notice of
appeal. In light of defendants' insufficient trust proposal, the
United States also moves for issuance of an order requiring
defendants to obtain financial assurances in the form of a bond
that complies with 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §
266. 14(f) (Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into a Closure
and/or Post Closure Trust Fund). As of today's date,
defendants have not filed a response to the United States'
August 7, 1998 motion.

II. CONTINUING JURISDICTION

Generally, a party's filing of a notice of appeal divests
the district court of jurisdiction. Stewart y. Donges, 915 F.2d
572, 574-576 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "[T]he
filing of a notice of appeal, whether from a true final
judgment or from a decision within the collateral Order
exception, ‘is an event of jurisdictional significance--it confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district
court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in
the appeal." Stewart, 915 F.2d at 575 (quoting Griggs y.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)).
The principle of jurisdictional transfer is not, however,
absolute. No transfer occurs if the appeal is taken from a non-
appealable order, Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146.
1148 (10th Cir. 1991), or if the district court certifies that the

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

appeal is frivolous, forfeited, or dilatory. Stewart, 915 F.2d
at 577.

Further, appeals from interlocutory, orders granting or
denying injunctive relief present special considerations.
Interlocutory, appellate review of a preliminary, injunction
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) will not divest the
district court of its jurisdiction to act on the merits of the case
pending appeal. State of Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.,
916 F.2d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted);
Wright, Miller & Kane. Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
2d § 3921.2. Rule 62 provides, in relevant part:

Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment.

(a) Automatic Stay; Exceptions--Injunctions,
Receiverships, and Patent Accountings. Except
as Stated herein, no execution shall issue upon
a judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for
its enforcement until the expiration of 10 days
after its entry. Unless otherwise ordered by the

action for an injunction or in a receivership
action, Or a judgment or order directing an
accounting in an action for infringement of
letters patent, shall not_be stayed during the
period after its entry and until an appeal is

taken or during the pendency of an appeal. The

pendency of an appeal.

Fed. R. Civ. P

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

* a

(c) Injunction Pending Appeal. When an
appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final
judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an
injunction, the court in its discretion may
Suspend, modify, restore, or grant an
injunction during the pendency of the appeal
upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it
considers proper for the security of the rights
of the adverse Party.

(d) Stay Upon Appeal. When an appeal is
taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas
bond may _ obtain a4 Stay subject to the
exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of this
rule. The bond may be given at or after the
time of filing the notice of appeal or of
procuring the order allowing the appeal, as the
case may be. The stay is effective when the
Supersedeas bond is approved by the court.

Application for a stay of the judgment or order
Of a district court pending appeal, or for
approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an
order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting an injunction during the pendency of
an appeal must ordinarily be made in the first
instance in the district court. A motion for

40a

. 62 (emphasis added). Rule 8 further provides:

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

such relief may be made to the court of appeals
or to a judge thereof, but the motion shall
show that application to the district court for
the relief sought is not practicable, or that the
district court has denied an application, or has
failed to afford the relief which the applicant
requested, with the reasons given by the
district court for its action.

F.R.A.P. 8(a).

Although the language of Rule 62(c) appears to afford
district courts extensive authority to grant injunctive relief
pending appeal, courts addressing the issue have construed the
rule more narrowly. Several circuits have held that the district
court may not alter the injunction once an appeal has been
filed except to maintain the status quo of the parties pending
the appeal. See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp.,
869 F.2d 817, 820 (Sth Cir. 1989); Flynt Distributing Co.,
Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984);
Lewis v. Tobacco Workers’ Int'l Union, 577 F.2d 1135 (4th
Cir. 1978); State of New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm
'n, 550 F.2d 745, 758-759 (2d Cir. 1977); Ideal Toy Corp. v.
Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623,625 (2d Cir. 1962). This
narrow interpretation of Rule 62(c) derives from Sayco Doll,
which involved a motion to vacate an injunction based on new
evidence brought before the district court while the validity of
the injunction was on appeal to the Second Circuit, which
held:

Once the appeal is taken, . . . jurisdiction
passes to the appellate court. Thereafter the
appellant is not usually entitled as of right to

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

present new evidence or argument to the trial
court, which in the exercise of a sound
discretion will exercise jurisdiction only to
preserve the status quo as of the time of
appeal. Appellant's proper procedure is then to
request leave of the court of appeals to proceed
in the lower court. He need not even dismiss
his appeal, for we have always been ready to
suspend proceedings while new matter was
introduced below. But absent permission of the
appellate court to reopen, sound judicial

administration demands that unless the judge is

Satisfied that his order was erroneous he shall

use his power under Rule 62(c) only to

preserve the status of the case as it sits before

the court of appeals.

Sayco Doll, 302 F.2d at 625 (citation omitted).

More recently, in Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern
Corporation, supra, the district court granted the plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the
defendants from filing lawsuits challenging a tender offer in
other jurisdictions. After the defendants appealed the
preliminary injunction order, the trial court dissolved the
injunction based on newly discovered evidence. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, concluding that Rule 62(c) did not allow- the
district court to dissolve the injunction and eliminate the
appeal. Coastal, 869 F.2d at 820. According to the Fifth
Circuit, "the powers of the district court Over an injunction
pending appeal should be limited to maintaining the status quo
and ought not to extend to the point that the district court can

42a

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

divest the court of appeals from jurisdiction while the issue is
before us on appeal.” /d.

Two circuits have concluded that, in some
circumstances, the district court may alter the status quo by
modifying an injunction during the pendency of an appeal. See
Board of Educ. of St. Louis v. State of Missouri, 936 F.2d
993, 996 (8th Cir. 1991) (district court's ongoing supervision
of integration of vocational educational programs requires it
to retain the broadest discretion possible); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d
Cir. 1989) (district court may alter status quo pursuant to
Rule 62(c) if alteration "preserves the integrity" of the
appeal). See also Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507,
513 (6th Cir. 1992) (declining to rule on issue). In Ortho, the
plaintiff sought a modification of an injunction while an
appeal was pending. The Third Circuit, like the Second and
Fifth Circuits, held that Rule 62(c), though purporting to
convey extensive authority to the district courts, did not
permit a district court unlimited authority to modify a
preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit, however, adopted
a less narrow construction, holding that Rule 62(c) authorized
the district court to take any of the listed actions as long as
such action "preserv[ed] the integrity of the proceedings in-the
court of appeals." Ortho, 887 F.2d at 464. Since the
modification requested by the plaintiff would impose
additional requirements on the defendant, the district court
concluded that the motion to modify transgressed the "status
quo” limitation. On appeal, the Third Circuit implicitly agreed
that the modification would alter the status quo, but concluded
that the modification would preserve the integrity of the
appeal by protecting the rights of the plaintiff, which rights
were jeopardized in a manner not anticipated by the original

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

injunction. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the

modification was within the authority provided by Rule 62(c)
even though it altered the status quo.

The Tenth Circuit came closest to addressing this issue

in Chief Freight Lines Co. y. Local Union No. 886, 514 F.2d
572 (10th Cir. 1975), in which an employer commenced an
action in district court to enjoin a union from striking. On
February 27, 1974, the district court judge announced orally
in Open court that he would enter an order granting the
preliminary injunction; the union filed a notice of appeal on
March 29, 1974. Id. at 578. On April 9 and 10, 1974, the
district court heard further evidence and oral argument. The
district court judge then entered detailed written findings and
conclusions together with an injunctive order on April 10,
1974. Id. The union filed a second notice of appeal on April
17, 1994. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district
court judge "intended to, and did on Februar
announce orally his conclusion to grant the preliminary
injunction, but that he did not enter the preliminary injunction
until April 10." /d. Thus. the Tenth Circuit deemed the
written injunctive order of April 10 as the order from which
an appeal was taken. Chief Freight Lines, however, does not
mention Rule 62(c) or Sayco Doll. While one commentator
suggests that Chief Freight Lines implies the Tenth Circuit
would follow the majority rule, see, e.g., Wright, Miller &
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 3921.2 pn.
28, I am not convinced that Chief Freight Lines provides
guidance for the particular issue presented here
conclude that the
Circuit.

y 27, merely

. Thus, |
issue is one of first impression in this

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

The two predominant formulas are articulated by
Coastal and Ortho. Coastal requires maintenance of the status
quo as of the time of appeal, and Ortho speaks of preserving
the integrity, of the appeal. The difference is subtle. Ortho
recognizes, and Coastal fails to recognize, that the status quo
itself may cause one of the parties irreparable injury and
thereby threaten the appeal. Ortho, 882 F.2d at 814. Under
such circumstances, it may be necessary to alter the status quo
to prevent the injury and preserve the appeal. /d. The two
formulas, however, have much more in common than in
conflict. Regardless of the precise formula used, it is clear
that any injunctive action taken pursuant to Rule 62(c) "must
be designed to aid the appeal and, accordingly, may not
materially alter the status of the case on appeal." A. Ides, The
Authority of a Federal District Court to Proceed After a
Notice of Appeal Has Been Filed, 143 F.R.D. 307, 321-322
(1992). Where, as here, modification of the injunction would
not materially alter the status of the case on appeal, either
paradigm allows the district court to modify, the injunction
pursuant to Rule 62(c). Thus, I need not decide between the
subtly different formulas.

As noted above, the June 10 order requires defendants
to "provide financial assurance in the amount of $3,500,000
pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all
applicable subparts." (Ord. of 6/10/98 at 46.) Defendants
could have complied with the June 10 order by providing any
type of financial assurance allowed by § 266, including a
bond, trust, insurance, or any combination thereof. In light of
defendants’ insufficient trust proposal, however, the United
States now moves for issuance of an order requiring
defendants to provide a specific form of financial assurance
allowed by § 266, a "Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

a Closure and/or Post Closure Trust Fund." See 6 COLO.
CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266.14(f). The United States’ motion
can be characterized as either a motion to enforce the June 10
order or as a request for modification of the order. As noted
above, the United States does not raise the issue of contempt.
Nor does the United States seek to re-litigate any of the issues
presented at the injunction hearing.

If construed as a motion to enforce the June 10 order,
this court has continuing jurisdiction to address the United
States' motion. See Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d
1400, 1402 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1997) (district court necessarily
retained jurisdiction over parties until they complied with the
terms of injunctive order even though injunctive order
appealed). If construed as a motion to modify the June 10
order, jurisdiction also exists. The requested modification, if
granted, does not materially alter the status of the appeal. Nor
would granting the modification deprive or otherwise affect
the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit over the appeal.

As no risk of interference exists, I conclude that this
court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States' motion to
enforce or modify, the injunction. I also conclude that this
court retains jurisdiction to proceed with the action on the
merits. See State of Colorado y. [darado Mining Co., 916
F.2d at 1490. Lastly, I conclude that the June 10 order, as an
interlocutory., order granting mandatory, injunctive relief, is
not automatically stayed by defendant's notice of appeal. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 62(a): Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2904. Thus, the June 10 order
remains in effect. Contrary to the United States' assertion
(PIf.'s Mot. Vacate Sched. at 4, 8), the order need not be
"restored." Accordingly, I address the merits of the United

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

States' motion. I also vacate my previous order, entered in
open court on August 6, 1998, establishing a briefing
schedule regarding the issue of continuing jurisdiction.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES' MOTION
TO ENFORCE OR MODIFY

The United States requests the issuance of an order
directing defendants to obtain financial assurances in the form
of a surety bond in the amount of $3,500,000 that complies
with the provisions of 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §
266.14(f) ("Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into a Closure
and/or Post Closure Trust Fund"). Considering the
insufficiency and insecurity of defendants’ proposed trust
arrangement, the delay in compliance with the June 10 order
caused thereby, and defendants’ failure to respond adequately
to the insufficiencies raised by the United States in its
response to defendants' Show Cause Submission, I grant the
United States' motion. Requiring defendants to provide
financial assurance in the form of a proper surety bond will
likely avoid further delay, provide clarity of purpose, and
does not alter the status of the appeal.

Additionally, I attach to this order the documents
attached to the United States' motion as Attachments A, B,
and C. "Attachment A" describes the United States’
requirements for the surety bond and standby trust to be
obtained by defendants. "Attachment B" is a proposed draft
of the surety bond instrument. "Attachment C" is a proposed
draft of the standby trust agreement. I find and conclude that
the stated requirements and the proposed drafts are reasonable
and fair. The stated requirements and the proposed drafts also
appear to comply with 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

266.14(f). Accordingly, the surety bond and standby trust
created by defendants shall comply with the requirements
Stated in the attachments and 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3
§ 266. 14(f). Further, the final drafts of the bond instrument
and the standby trust agreement shall mimic the proposed
drafts. The United States and defendants may, by stipulation,
vary these requirements and terms. Such stipulation must be
approved by the court.

Accordingly, I ORDER that:

(1) the briefing schedule regarding continuing
jurisdiction, established in open court on
August 6, 1998, is VACATED;

(2) the hearing set for October 2, 1998 at 3:30
p.m. is VACATED: and

(3) defendants SHALL PROVIDE | financial
assurances in the amount of $3,500,000 in the
form of a surety, bond guaranteeing payment
into a closure and/or post-closure trust fund
pursuant to6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 {}
266.14(f);

(4) the surety bond and Standby trust shall comply,
as set forth above with more particularity, with
Attachments A, B, and C to this order;

(5) plaintiff and defendants may vary the
requirements and terms of Attachments A,B,
and C only by stipulation after approval by the
court; and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

(6) defendants shall so comply within twenty Gays
or show good cause as to why they have not
achieved such compliance.

Dated: August 17, 1998 in Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

/s/
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

—

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

ATTACHMENT A A

With respect to the surety bond:

¥.

The Defendants must obtain a Surety bond ("the
bond") which conforms to the requirements of the
Order and must submit the bond to EPA within Pa.
days after the effective date of the Order.

The wording in the bond must be identical to the
wording in the bond format provided in Attachment B.

The bond must be effective as of the
submit the bond to EPA. The sure
the bond and any co-sureties must

day Defendants
ty company issuing
, at 4 Minimum, be
among those listed as acceptable sureties on Federal
bonds in Circular 570 of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. If the surety is using reinsurance, a
Treasury reinsurance form must be submitted with the
bond of within 45 days thereafter. If co-sureties are
being used, the Original bond must reflect that fact.

The Defendants must also establish a standby trust
fund as provided in 6 CCR 1007-3 §§ 266.14(f) and
266.14(a) ("Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into
a Closure and/or Post Closure Trust Fund"
“Closure and/or Post Closure Trust Fund"),
that the trust shall run to the benefit of EPA.
the terms of the bond, all Payments made thereunder
shell be deposited by the surety directly into the
standby trust fund in accordance with the instructions
from EPA. Defendants shall submit an originally
signed duplicate of the trust agreement to EPA with

and
except
Under

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

the surety bond on the same day the trust agreement is
fully executed. Only one standby trust shall be
executed, although all

defendants may be grantors.

The bond must guarantee that Defendants will:

(i) Fund the standby trust in an amount equal to
the penal sum of the bond prior to the
beginning of final closure of the facility; or

(11) Fund the standby trust fund in an amount equal
to the penal sum within 15 days after an order
to begin closure is issued by CDPHE, EPA, or
a State court or other court of competent
jurisdiction; or

(iii) Provide alternate financial assurance as
provided in 6 CCR 1007-3 § 266, Subpart A,
and obtain EPA's written approval of the
assurance provided, within 90 days after
receipt by both Defendants and EPA of a
notice of cancellation of the bond from the
surety.

The penal amount of the bond must be three million
five hundred thousand U.S. dollars (US
$3 500,000.00) or more.

Under the terms of the bond, the surety may cancel
the bond by sending notice of cancellation by certified
mail to Defendants and to EPA. Cancellation may not
occur, however, during the 120 days beginning on the

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

date of receipt of the notice of cancellation by both

Defendants and EPA, as evidenced by the return
receipts.

Defendants may cancel the bond if EPA has given
prior written consent based on its receipt of evidence

of alternate financial assurance as specified in6 CCR
1007-3 § 266, Subpart A.

With respect to the standby trust:

3

nN

Defendants must submit an originally signed duplicate

of the trust agreement to EPA within days after
the effective date of the Court's order.

The trustee must be an entity which has the authority
fo act as a trustee and whose trust Operations are
regulated and examined by a Federal or State agency.

The wording of the trust agreement must be identical
to the wording specified in Attachment C. Schedule A
of the trust agreement must be updated within 60 days
after a change in the amount of the current closure
and/or post-closure cost estimate covered by the
agreement.

Whenever the current closure and/or post-closure cost
estimate changes, Defendants must compare the new
Cost estimate with the trustee's most recent annual
valuation of the trust fund. If the value of the fund is
less than the amount of the new estimate, Defendants,
Within 60 days after the change in the cost estimate.
must either deposit an amount into the fund SO that its

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he

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

value after this deposit at least equals the amount of

the current closure and/or post-closure cost estimate,

or obtain other financial assurance as specified in this
section to cover the difference.

If the value of the trust fund is greater than the current
amount of the current closure and/or post-closure cost
estimate, Defendants may submit a written request to
EPA for the release of the amount in excess of the
current closure and/or post-closure cost estimate.

If Defendants substitute other financial assurance as
specified in Section 266 for all or part of the trust
fund, they may submit a written request to EPA for
release of the amount in excess of the $3,500,000.00
covered by the trust fund less closure or post-closure
costs already paid by the trust fund.

Within 60 days after receiving a request from
Defendants for release of funds as specified in
paragraphs 5 or 6 above, EPA will instruct the trustee
to release to Defendants such funds as EPA specifies
in writing.

Closure and post-closure care reimbursements:

(1) After beginning partial or final closure,
Defendants or another person authorized to
conduct partial or final closure may request
reimbursements for partial or final closure
expenditures by submitting itemized bills to
EPA. Defendants may request reimbursements
for partial closure only if sufficient funds are

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

remaining in the trust fund to cover the
maximum costs of closing the facility over its
remaining operating life. Within 60 days after
receiving bills for Partial or final closure
activities, EPA will instruct the trustee to
make reimbursements in those amounts as
EPA specifies in writing, if EPA determines
that the partial or final closure expenditures
are in accordance with the approved closure
plan, or otherwise justified. If EPA has reason
to believe that the maximum cost of closure
over the remaining life of the facility will be
Significantly greater than the value of the trust
fund, it may withhold reimbursements of such
amounts as it deems prudent until it
determines, in accordance with 266. 14(1) that
Defendants are no longer required to maintain
financial assurance for final Closure of the
facility. IF EPA does not instruct the trustee to
make such reimbursements, it will provide
Defendants with a detailed written statement of
reasons.

During the period of post-closure care, EPA
may approve a release of funds if Defendants
demonstrate to EPA that the value of the trust
fund exceeds the remaining cost of post-
closure care.

Defendants or any other person authorized to
conduct post-closure care may request
reimbursements — for post-closure care
expenditures by submitting itemized bill to

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

EPA. Within 60 days after receiving bills for
post-closure care activities, EPA will instruct
the trustee to make reimbursements in those
amounts as EPA specifies in writing, if EPA
determines that the post-closure care
expenditures are in accordance with the
approved post-closure plan or otherwise
justified. If EPA does not instruct the trustee
to make such reimbursements, it will provide
Defendants with a detailed written statement of

reasons.
9. EPA will agree to termination of the trust when:
(1) Defendants substitute alternate financial

assurance as specified in 6 CCR 1007-3 § 266,
Subpart A; or

(11) EPA releases Defendants from _ the
requirements of Section 266 in accordance
with
6 CCR 1007-3 § 266.14(1).

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

ATTACHMENT B
FINANCIAL GUARANTEE BOND

Date bond executed:

Effective date:

Principal: [Legal name and business
address of owner or operator]

Type of organization: [Insert "individual", "joint
venture”, "partnership", or

"Corporation" ]

State of incorporation:

Surety(ies): [Name(s) and business address(es) ]
EPA ID No.: COD007060999

Power Engineering Company

2525 Delaware Street

Denver, Colorado
Remediation Amount: US $3,500,000.00

Total penal sum of bond: US $3,500,000.00

Surety's bond number:

Know All Persons By These Presents, That we, the Principal
and Surety(ies) hereto are firmly bound to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") inthe above penal
sum for the payment of which we bind ourselves, our heirs,

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

executors, administrators, successors, and assigns jointly and
severally; provided that, where the Surety(les) are
corporations acting as co-sureties, we, the Sureties, bind
ourselves in such sum "jointly and severally; only for the
purpose of allowing a joint action or action against any or all
of us, and for all other purposes each Surety binds itself,
jointly and severally with the Principal, for the payment of
such sum only as is set forth opposite the name of such
Surety, but if no limit of liability is indicated, the limit of
liability shall be the full amount of the penal sum.

Whereas said Principal is required, under the Colorado
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, to have a permit
Or interim status in order to own or operate each hazardous
waste management facility identified above, and

Whereas said Principal is required to provide financial
assurance for closure, or closure and post-closure care, as a
condition of the permit or interim status, and

Whereas said Principal shall establish a standby trust fund as
is required when a surety bond is used to provide such
financial assurance, unless an alternate mechanism has been
established by the State of Colorado to directly receive
monies.

Now, Therefore, the conditions of the obligation are such that
if the Principal shall faithfully, before the beginning of final
closure of each facility identified above, fund the standby trust
fund in the amount(s) identified above for the facility.

Or, if the Principal shall fund the standby trust fund in such
amount(s) within 15 days after an order to begin closure is

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

issued by the Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment ("the Department") or EPA or a U.S. district
court or other court of competent jurisdictior.,

Or, if the Principal shall provide alternate financial assurance,
as specified in these regulations and obtain EPA's written
approval of such assurance, within 90 days after the date
notice of cancellation is received by both the Principal and
EPA from the Surety(ies), then this obligation shall be null
and void, otherwise it is to remain in full force and effect.

The Surety(ies) shall become liable on this bond obligation
only when the Principal has failed to fulfill the conditions
described above. Upon notification by EPA that the Principal
has failed to perform as guaranteed by this bind, the
Surety(ies) shall place funds in the amount guaranteed for the
facility(ies) into the Standby trust fund as directed by EPA.

The liability of the Surety(ies) shall not be discharged by any
Payment or succession of payments hereunder, unless and
until such payment or payments shall amount in the aggregate
to the penal sum of the bond, but in no event shall the

obligation of the Surety(ies) hereunder exceed the amount of
said penal sum.

The Surety(ies) may cancel the bond by sending notice of
cancellation by certified mail to the Principal and to EPA.

provided, however, that cancellation shall not occur during

the 120 days beginning on the date of receipt of the notice of
cancellation by both the Principal and EPA
the return receipts.

, as evidenced by

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

The Principal may terminate this bond by sending written
notice to the Surety(ies), provided, however, that no such
notice shall become effective until the Surety(ies) receive(s)
written authorization for termination of the bond by EPA.

In Witness Whereof, the Principal and Surety(ies) have
executed this Financial Guarantee Bond and have affixed their
seals on the date set forth above.

The persons whose signatures appear below hereby certify
that they are authorized to execute this surety bond on behalf
of the Principal and Surety(ies) and that the wording of this
surety bond is identical to the wording specified in 6 CCR
1007-3 § 266. 18(f) as such regulations were constituted on the
date this bond was executed, with the exception of the
substitution of EPA for the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98
Principal
[Signature(s)]
[Name(s)]
[ Title(s)]
[Corporate seal]
Corporate Surety(ies)
{Name and address]

State of incorporation:

Liability limit: _

[Signature(s)]
[Name(s) and Title(s)]

[Corporate seal]

[For every co-surety, provide signature(s), corporate seal, and
other information in the same manner as for Surety above. ]

Bond premium:

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

ATTACHMENT C

TRUST AGREEMENT

Trust Agreement, the "Agreement", entered into as of [date]
by and between [name of the owner or operator], a [name of
State][insert "corporation", "partnership", "association", or
"proprietorship"], the "Grantor", and [name of Corporate
trustee], [insert "incorporated in the State of Colorado" or "a
national bank"], the "Trustee."

Whereas, the Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management
Division, a regulatory Agency of the State of Colorado, has
established certain regulations applicable to the Grantor,
requiring that an owner or operator of a hazardous waste
management facility shall provide assurance that funds will be
available when needed for closure and/or post-closure care of
the facility,

Whereas, the Grantor has elected to establish a trust to
provide all or a pan of such financial assurance for the
facilities identified herein,

Whereas, the Grantor, acting through its duly authorized
officers, has selected the Trustee to be the trustee under this

Agreement, and the Trustee is willing to act as trustee,

Now, Therefore, the Grantor and the Trustee agree as
follows:

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Section 1. Definitions.
As used in this Agreement:

(a) The term "Grantor" means the owner or operator
who enters into this Agreement and any successors or
assigns of the Grantor.

(b) The term "Trustee" means the Trustee who enters
into this Agreement and any successor Trustee.

Section 2: Identification of Facilities and Cost Estimates.

This Agreement pertains to the facilities and cost estimates
identified on attached Schedule A [on Schedule A, for each
facility list the EPA Identification Number, name, address,
and the current closure and/or post-closure cost estimates, or
portions thereof, for which financial assurance js
demonstrated by this Agreement].

Section 3. Establishment ef Fund.

The Grantor and the Trustee hereby establish a trust fund, the
"Fund", for the benefit of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA"). The Grantor and the Trustee
intend that no third party have access to the Fund except as
herein provided. The Fund is established initially as consisting
of the property which is acceptable to the Trustee, described
in Schedule B attached hereto. Such property and any other
property subsequently transferred to the Trustee is referred to
as the Fund, together with all earnings and profits thereon,
less any payments or distributions made by the Trustee
pursuant to this Agreement. The Fund shall be held by the

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Trustee, In Trust, as hereinafter provided. The Trustee shall
not be responsible nor shall it undertake any responsibility for
the amount or adequacy of, nor any duty to-collect from the
Grantor, any payments necessary to discharge any liabilities
of the Granior established by EPA.

Section 4. Payment for Closure and Post-Closure Care.

The Trustee shall make payments from the Fund as EPA shall
direct, in writing, to provide for the payment of the costs of
closure and/or post-closure care of the facilities covered by
this Agreement. The Trustee shall reimburse the Grantor or
other persons specified by EPA from the Fund for closure and
post-closure expenditures in such amount as EPA shall direct
in writing. In addition, the Trustee shall refund to the Grantor
such amounts as EPA specifies in writing. Upon refund, such
funds shall no longer constitute part of the Fund as defined
herein.

Section 5. Payment Comprising the Fund.

Payments made to the Trustee for the Fund shall consist of
cash or securities acceptable to the Trustee.

Section 6. Trustee Management.

The Trustee shall invest and reinvest the principal and income
of the Fund and keep the Fund invested as a single fund,
without distinction between principal and income, in
accordance with general investment policies and guidelines
which the Grantor may communicate in writing to the Trustee
from time to time, subject, however, to the provisions of this
Section. In investing, reinvesting, exchanging, selling, and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

managing the Fund, the Trustee shall discharge his/her duties
with respect to the trust fund solely in the interest of the
beneficiary and with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing which persons of
prudence, acting in a like Capacity and familiar with such
matters, would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims: EXCEPT THAT:

(i) Securities or other obligations of Grantor, or any other
Owner Or operator of the facilities, or any of their affiliates as
defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 80a-2.(a), shall not be acquired or held, unless
they are securities or other obligations of the Federal or a
State government:

(ii) The Trustee is authorized to invest the Fund in time or
demand deposits of the Trustee, to the extent insured by an
agency of the Federal or State government; and

(iii) The Trustee is authorized to hold cash awaiting
investment or distribution uninvested for a reasonable time
and without liability for the payment of interest thereon.

Section 7. Commingling and Investment.
The Trustee is express authorized in its discretion:

(a) To transfer from time to time any or all of the assets of the
Fund to any common, commingled, or collective trust fund
created by the Trustee in which the Fund is eligible to
Participate, subject to all of the provisions thereof, to be
commingled with the assets of other trusts participating
therein; and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

(b) To purchase shares in any investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1
et seg., including one which may be created, managed,
underwritten, or to which investment advice is rendered or the
shares of which are sold by the Trustee. The Trustee may vote
such shares in its discretion.

Section 8. Express Powers of Trustee.

Without in any way limiting the powers and discretions
conferred upon the Trustee by the other provision of this
Agreement or by law, the Trustee is expressly authorized and
empowered:

(a) To sell, exchange, convey, transfer, or otherwise
dispose of any property held by it, by public or private
sale. No person dealing with the Trustee shall be
bound to see to the application of the purchase money
or to inquire into the validity or expediency of any
such sale or other disposition;

(b) To make, execute, acknowledge, and deliver any
and all documents of transfer and conveyance and any
and all other instruments that may be necessary or-
appropriate to carry out the powers herein granted;

(c) To register any securities held in the Fund in its
own name or in the name of a nominee and to hold
any security in bearer form or in book entry, or to
combine certificates representing such securities with
certificates of the same issue held by the Trustee in
other fiduciary capacities, or to deposit or arrange for
the deposit of such securities in a qualified central

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

depository even though, when so deposited, such
securities may be merged and held in bulk in the name
of the nominee of such depository with other securities
deposited therein by another person, or to deposit or
arrange for the deposit of any securities issued by the
United States Government, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, with a Federal Reserve bank,
but the books and records of the Trustee shall at all
times show that all such securities are part of the
Fund;

(d) To deposit any cash in the Fund in interest-
beating accounts maintained or Savings
certificates issued by the Trustee, in its
separate Corporate capacity, or in any other
banking institution affiliated with the Trustee,
to the extent insured by an agency of the
Federal or State government: and

(¢) To compromise or otherwise adjust all
claims in favor of or against the Fund.

Section 9. Taxes and Expenses.

All taxes of any kind that may be assessed or levied against or
in respect of the Fund and all brokerage commissions incurred
by the Fund shall be paid from the Fund. All other expenses
incurred by the Trustee in connection with the administration
of this Trust, including fees for legal services rendered to the
Trustee, the compensation of the Trustee to the extent not
paid directly by the Grantor, and all other proper charges and
disbursements of the Trustee shall be paid from the Fund.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Section 10. Annual Valuation.

The Trustee shall annually, at least 30 days prior to the
anniversary date of establishment of the Fund, furnish to the
Grantor and to EPA a statement confirming the value of the
Trust. Any securities in the Fund shall be valued at market
value as of no more than 60 days prior to the anniversary sate
of establishment of the Fund. The failure of the Grantor to
object in writing to the Trustee within 90 days after the
statement has been furnished to the Grantor and EPA shall
constitute a conclusively binding assent by the Grantor,
barring the Grantor from asserting any claim or liability
against the Trustee with respect to matters disclosed in the
statement.

Section 11. Advice of Counsel.

The Trustee may from time to time consult with counsel, who
may be counsel to the Grantor, with respect to any question
arising as to the construction of this Agreement or any action
to be taken hereunder. The Trustee shall be fuily protected, to
the extent permitted by law, in acting upon the advice of
counsel.

Section 12. Trustee Compensation.
The Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for
its services as agreed upon in writing from time to time

with the Grantor.

Section 13. Successor Trustee.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

The Trustee may resign or the Grantor may replace the
Trustee, but such resignation or replacement shall not be
effective until the Grantor has appointed a successor trustee
and this successor accepts the appointment. The successor
trustee shall have the same powers and duties as those
conferred upon the Trustee hereunder. Upon the successor
trustee's acceptance of the appointment, the Trustee shall
assign, transfer and pay over to the successor trustee the funds
and properties then constituting the Fund. If for any reason
the Grantor cannot or does not act in the event of the
resignation of the Trustee, the Trustee may apply to a court
of competent jurisdiction for the appointment of a successor
trustee or for instructions. The successor trustee shall specify
the date on which it assumes the administration of the trust in
writing sent to the Grantor, EPA, and the present Trustee by

certified mail 10 days before such change becomes effective.

Any expenses incurred by the Trustee as a result of any of the

acts contemplated by this Section shall be paid as provided in
Section 9.

Section 14, Instructions to the Trustee.

All orders, requests, and instructions by the Grantor to the
Trustee shall be in writing, signed by such persons as are
designated in the attached Exhibit A or such other designees
as the Grantor may designate by amendment to Exhibit A.
The Trustee shall be fully protected in acting without inquiry
in accordance with the Grantor's orders, requests, and
instructions. All orders, requests, and instructions by EPA to
the Trustee shall be in writing, signed by the EPA Regional
Administrator or his/her designees, and the Trustee shall act
and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with such
orders, requests, and instructions. The Trustee shall have the

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right to assume, in the absence of written notice to the
contrary, that no event constituting a change or a termination
of the authority of any person to act on behalf of the Grantor
or EPA hereunder has occurred. The Trustee shall have no
duty to act in the absence of such orders, requests, and
instructions from the Grantor and/or EPA, except as provided
for herein.

Section 15. Notice of Nonpayment.
[Deleted]
Section 16. Standby Trust Exemptions.

Unless this trust fund is fumed pursuant to the requirements
of Part 266 of the Colorado Hazardous Waste Regulations 6
CCR 1007-3, as mended, updating of Schedule A hereto as
current closure or post-closure costs shall not be required, nor
shall annual valuations under Section 10 be required.

Section 17. Amendment of Agreement.

This Agreement may be amended by an instrument in writing
executed by the Grantor, the Trustee, and EPA, or by the
Trustee and EPA if the Grantor ceases to exist.

Section 18. Irrevocability and Termination.

Subject to the right of the parties to amend this Agreement as
provided in Section 16, this Trust shall be irrevocable and
shall continue until terminated at the written agreement of the
Grantor, the Trustee and EPA, or by the Trustee and EPA, if
the Grantor ceases to exist. Upon termination of the Trust, all

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

remaining trust property, less final trust administration
expenses, shall be delivered to the Grantors.

Section 19, Immunity and Indemnification.

The Trustee shall not incur personal liability of any nature in
connection with any act or omission, made in good faith, in
the administration of this Trust, or in carrying out any
directions by the Grantor or EPA issued in accordance with
this Agreement. The Trustee Shall be indemnified and saved
harmless by the Grantor or from the Trust Fund. or both,
from and against any personal liability to which the Trustee
may be subjected by reason of any act or conduct in its
Official capacity, including all expenses reasonably incurred
in its defense in the event the Grantor falls to provide such
defense.

Section 20. Choice of Law.

This Agreement shall be administered, construed, and
enforced according to the laws of the State of Colorado.

Section 21. Interpretation.

As used in this Agreement. words in the singular include the
plural and words in the plural include the singular. The
descriptive headings for each Section of this Agreement shall
not affect the interpretation or the legal efficacy of this
Agreement.

In Witness Whereof the parties have caused this Agreement to
be executed by their respective officers duly authorized and

their corporate seals to be here unto affixed and attested as of

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

the date first above written: The parties below certify that the
wording of this Agreement ts identical to the wording
specified in § 266.18(a)(1) as such regulations were
corstituted on the date first above written, with the exception
of the substitution of EPA tor the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment and the deletion of Section 15
(Notice of Nonpayment)

[Signature of Grantor]
[Title]
[Seal]

Attest: [Signature of Attestor]
[Tithe]

[Signature of Trustee]
[Name of Trustee]
[Title]

[Seal]

Attest: [Signature of Attestor]
[Title]

Tila

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

State of ee ae eek

County of

On this [date], before me personally came [owner or operator |
lo me known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and
say that she/he resides at [address], that she/he is [title] of
[corporation], the corporation described it. and) which
executed the above instrument; that she/he knows the seal of
said Corporation; that the seal affixed to such instrument is
such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the
Board of Directors of said corporation

, and that she/he signed
her/his name thereto by like order,

[Signature of Notary Public]

Memorandum Opinvon & Order - 8/17/98

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Civil Case No. 97-B-1654

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing
order was served on August 17, 1998, by:

(X) delivery to:

Linda Surbaugh
Assistant U. S. Attorney

Magistrate Judge O. Edward Schlatter

(X) depositing the same in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, addressed to:

John N. Moscato

Environmental Enforcement Section
Environment & Natural

Resources Division

United States Department of Justice
999 13th Street, Suite 945

Denver, CO 80202

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

John F. McBride, Esq.

John J. Zodrow, Esq.

Zodrow Et Al. P.C.
Independence Plaza, Suite 1700
1050 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80265

Thomas E. Sitz

Enforcement Attorney

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region VIII

999 18th Street, Suite 500

Denver, CO 80202

John L. Watson, Esq.

Freeborn & Peters

950 Seventeenth Street. Suite 2600
Denver, CO 80202-2826

/s/
Deputy Clerk

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APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

[Filed June 10, 1998]

Civil Action No. 97-B-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintff,

)

)

)

)

)
POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, _ )
REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. )
LILIENTHAL, )
Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, — )

)

)

)

)

)

)

JACK LILIENTHAL,
Third Party Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plainutf, the United States of America (the "United
States"), acting on behalf of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (the "EPA”), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

65 and section 3008(a)(1) of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
6928(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997), seeks a preliminary
injunction directing the defendants, Power Engineering
Company ("PEC"), Redoubt, Ltd. ("Redoubt"), and Richard
Lilienthal ("Lilienthal"), to comply with state regulations
adopted by the Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment (the "CDPHE"), found at 6 COLO. CODE
REGS. 1007-3 § 266. These regulations require owners and
operators of all hazardous waste facilities to document that
they have secured the resources required to close their
facilities in an appropriate and safe manner, and to pay third-
party claims that may arise from its operations.

The United States commenced this action on August 1,
1997, alleging eight claims: (1) treatment of hazardous waste
without a permit or interim status; (2) disposal of hazardous
waste without a permit or interim status; (3) shipment of
hazardous waste to an un-permitted facility; (4) improper
container management; (5) storage of hazardous waste without
a permit or interim status; (6) failure to provide employee
training; (7) failure to have a hazardous waste contingency
plan; and (8) illegal operations (failure to have a groundwater
monitoring program, failure to have a closure plan, failure to
minimize releases of hazardous waste, and failure to obtain
and provide financial assurances for closure and post-closure).
The United States also alleges that Power Engineering has
failed to comply with CDPHE's Administrative Compliance
Order.

As discussed on the record, this is an “overfile"

action, indicating that the EPA is displeased with the manner
in which the CDPHE has sought enforcement of federal and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

State regulations. The United States, therefore, at the request
of the EPA, exercises its authority to seek defendants’
compliance with Colorado hazardous waste regulations.
Subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1994) and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1391 (b), 1391(c), and 1395(a). A hearing was held beginning
May 11, 1998. Based on the evidence presented and for the
reasons set forth below, I grant the United States’ motion for
preliminary injunction.

1. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY GUIDELINES

RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute
designed to protect the public health and environment by
ensuring the proper handling of solid and hazardous wastes.
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a). RCRA regulates the generation,
treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of solid and
hazardous wastes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925. This
comprehensive regulatory scheme is frequently described as
"cradle-to-grave" oversight. See Sierra Club v. United States
Dept. of Energy, 770 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D.Colo. 1991); see
also H. R. Rep. No. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.

Hazardous waste is tracked and regulated from the
point of generation, through storage, transportation, and
treatment, and to the point of ultimate disposal. The intent of
this regulatory scheme is to minimize the potential for public
health and environmental problems resulting from improper
management of hazardous waste. The potential for public
health and environmental problems, including hazards
associated with fire, explosion, direct contact, and
contamination of air, surface water, and groundwater

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resulting from inadequate management is well-documented.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491, at 17-24 (1976), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6254-6261 (documenting
hazardous waste tragedies in several states).

Owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities
must establish and maintain financial assurances for proper
closure and, if necessary, post-closure care of the facility, as
well as liability insurance for bodily injury and property
damage to third parties resulting from sudden and accidental
occurrences at the facility. 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §
266; 40 C.F.R. § 265. These financial responsibility,
requirements ensure that funds are available for proper
closure and, if necessary, post-closure care of the facility.

As enacted in 1976, RCRA required two types of
hazardous waste facilities to provide financial assurances: (1)
those with final operating permits; and (2) those with "interim
Status" that had applied for final operating permits. Congress
ceemed it impractical to halt all hazardous waste activity,
pending the issuance of permits. Congress, therefore, created
interim status, allowing the EPA to treat existing facilities
with pending permit applications as having been issued a
permit. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(1); United States v. T& § Brass
and Bronze Works, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 314, 316 (D.S.C.)
aff'd in part vacated in part, 865 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1988).

A facility in existence on November 19, 1980 could
obtain interim status by noticing the EPA of its activities and
submitting a Part A permit application. 42 U.S.C. §
6925(e)(1); 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.1(b), 270.10(e). The Part A
application contains information concerning the nature of the
applicant's business, a scale drawing, photographs and a

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topographic map of the facility, a description of its hazardous
waste management processes and the design capacity of these
processes, a specification of the types and quantities of
hazardous wastes processed, stored, or disposed of at the
facility, as well as information regarding permits or
construction approvals. 40 C.F.R. § 270.14. A facility
operating pursuant to interim status is limited to the types of
wastes and procedures specified in the Part A application and
the facility must comply with the operating standards of 40
C.F.R. § 265, which include the provision of financial
assurances.

In 1984, primarily because of widespread industry
noncompliance, Congress amended RCRA to provide that all
interim status facilities would lose their interim status unless
they certified by November 8, 1985, that they complied with
all applicable groundwater monitoring and financial
responsibility requirements. Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984, P. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) (Supp. II 1984). Upon
losing interim status, the facility must have immediately
ceased its hazardous waste management operations and,
within fifteen days, submitted a closure plan for approval by
the state or the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a); 40 C.F.R. §
265.112(d)(3)(i). The facility must have begun final closure
within ninety days of approval of that closure plan and
achieved closure within 18 days of approval of the closure
plan, unless the state or the EPA allowed an extension of the
closure period. 40 C.F.R. § 265.113.

Closure of a hazardous waste facility must be
performed in a manner that:

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

(a) Minimizes the need for
further maintenance, and

(b) Controls, minimizes or
eliminates, to the extent
necessary to protect human
health and the environment,
post-closure escape of
hazardous waste, hazardous
constituents, leachate,
contaminated run-off, or
hazardous waste decomposition
products to the ground or
surface waters or to the
atmosphere, and

(c) Complies with the closure
requirements of [other
regulations promulgated under
RCRA].

40 C.F.R. § 265.111. Even after closure has been completed,
the owner or operator may be required to maintain post-
closure care of the facility, for a period of thirty years. 40
C.F.R. § 265.117. Thus, RCRA provides for extensive
regulation of a hazardous waste facility long after the facility
has stopped operating. See American Iron & Steel Institute vy.’
EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C.Cir. 1989) ("While invariably
described as a 'cradle-to-grave' system, [RCRA] in fact
reaches. . . well beyond the grave.").

In an effort to secure enforcement of RCRA's
provisions to the fullest extent possible, Congress conferred
enforcement power upon the EPA, as well as federally
authorized state agencies and United States citizens. RCRA

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allows states to implement their own programs in lieu of the
federal program if the state's program is "equivalent to” and
"consistent with" the federal program and provides for
"adequate enforcement of compliance." 42 U.S.C. {} 6926(b).

The EPA delegated to the State of Colorado
authorization to operate a federally authorized hazardous
waste program. See, generally, 49 Fed. Reg. 41036 (Oct. 19,
1984); 54 Fed. Reg. 20847 (May 15, 1989); 56 Fed. Reg.
21601 (May 10, 1991). Colorado has promulgated
regulations. pursuant to the Colorado Hazardous Waste
Management Act ("CHWMA"), C.R.S. 9 25-15-302(2) and
(3), that specifically govern generators of hazardous waste
and the operation and maintenance of hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 6 COLO. CODE
REGS. 1007-3 §§ 262, 264-268. Any action taken by the
State of Colorado pursuant to its federally authorized
hazardous waste program "shall have the same force and
effect as action taken by the [EPA]." 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d).

The EPA, however, retains the right to bring
enforcement actions compelling compliance with Colorado's
hazardous waste regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6934, and
6973; accord 49 Fed. Reg. 41036 (Oct. 19, 1984); 51 Fed.
Reg. 37729 (Oct. 26, 1986); 54 Fed. Reg. 20847 (May 12,
1989); 56 Fed. Reg. 21601 (May 10, 1991); 59 Fed. Reg.
16568 (April 7, 1994). Whenever the EPA determines that a
violation of RCRA has occurred, the EPA “. . may
commence a civil action in the United States district court in
the district in which the violation occurred for appropriate
relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction.” 42
U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1).

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS

Because a preliminary, injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, "the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal."
SCFCILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th
Cir. 1991). Preliminary injunctions that preserve the status
quo pending a trial on the merits are known as "prohibitory"
injunctions. Injunctions that disturb the status quo, by
requiring some affirmative act, are denominated "mandatory"
injunctions. Because mandatory, injunctions are more
burdensome than prohibitory, injunctions, the plaintiff must
demonstrate entitlement to the injunction by compelling
evidence. Visa, 936 F.2d at 1099. This heightened evidentiary
burden must also be met when the issuance of the injunction
would provide the plaintiff with substantially all the relief that
would be available following success on the merits. Phillip v.
Fairfield Univ., 118 F.3d 131,133 (2d Cir. 1997).

A court passing judgment ona motion for preliminary,
injunction considers whether plaintiff establishes that: (1) it
will suffer irreparable injury unless an injunction is issued; (2)
its threatened injury outweighs any harm the proposed
injunction may cause to the opposing party; (3) it will likely
prevail on the merits of the litigation; and (4) an injunction,
if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.
Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States
Dept. of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted); accord Visa, 936 F.2d at 1098; United
States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc., 883
F.2d 886, 888-889 (10th Cir. 1989).

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

Normally, the most important equitable factor is
irreparable harm. When a case is brought pursuant to an
environmental or public health statute, however, the primary
focus shifts from irreparable harm to concern for the general
public interest. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
313 (1982); accord Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337-338 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v.
Amoco Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1159, 1171 (D.Wyo. 1998)
(citations omitted). A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief,
however, still must demonstrate irreparable harm in the
absence of express Congressional intent to the contrary.
Wilson, 989 F. Supp. at 1171 (citing Romero-Barcelo, 456
U.S. at 312). Based on these established standards, I will
apply the traditional equitable factors, as modified for RCRA,
and weigh more heavily the general public's interest in the
issuance of the injunction. Because the United States seeks a
mandatory injunction, however, it bears the burden of
showing that the four factors, when balanced, weigh
compellingly in its favor.

Il]. FINDINGS OF FACT

The following findings of fact are based upon the
stipulations of the parties and the evidence presented at the
hearing. These findings of fact apply only to the United
States’ motion for preliminary injunction.

Both PEC and Redoubt are Colorado corporations.
PEC operates a metal refinishing business located at 2525
South Delaware Street in Denver, Colorado ("the Facility").
Redoubt owns the land and buildings leased to PEC.
Lilienthal is the president of PEC and owns 51% of the
outstanding stock of both PEC and Redoubt. The Lilienthal

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

Family Trust owns the remaining minority, interests of both
PEC and Redoubt. Lilienthal js now, and has been, involved
in making management decisions for PEC and Redoubt,
including decisions regarding environmental compliance.
(Stip. 44 6-9.)

PEC's business consists primarily of refinishing metal
crankshafts, connecting rods, and rod journals for large diesel
engines used in heavy equipment. PEC's meta] refinishing
process includes stripping, preparation of the surface for
refinishing, and chrome-plating. As a result of PECs
operations, the Facility produces more than 1,000 kilograms
per month and stores more than 6,000 kilograms per month
of"hazardous waste" as that term is defined by 6 COLO.
CODE RETS. 1007-3 § 261.3. The Facility generates
approximately thirteen different “waste streams" including,
but not limited to, arsenic, lead, mercury, and hexavalent
chromium contaminated media that exceed established
regulatory toxicity, standards. Hexavalent chromium is a
corrosive hazardous waste and known carcinogen.
CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICTIONARY at 249 (10th ed.
1981).

In 1992, Denver Health and Hospitals contacted the
CDPHE concerning a discharge into the Platte River of high
levels of hexavalent chromium. Denver Health and Hospitals
had investigated all of the businesses in the area and
determined that PEC was the likely source of that discharge
The CDPHE then conducted compliance review inspections
at the Facility on August 3, 1992, September 3-4, 1992,
September 25, 1992, February 23, 1993, and March 10,
1993. (Stip. € 18; Ex. Tat 15-16.) During these inspections,
the CDPHE inspector observed and reported numerous

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

violations of Federal and Colorado regulations governing
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. The
inspector communicated the nature of these violations to
PEC's representative. (Ex. 1 at 101, 110-111,130-131,132-
134, and 139-140.) As a result of these inspections, the
CDPHE prepared "Notice of Inspection" reports, signed by
the CDPHE inspector and PEC's representative. Based on the
stipulations and evidence from the hearing, I find that PEC is
guilty of numerous violations of Colorado hazardous waste
regulations. While many of the violations occurred in the
past, some violations continue.

a. Illegal Treatment, Disposal, and Storage of
Hazardous Waste

PEC has never filed a Part A notification, a Part B
permit application, received an EPA or State of Colorado
permit, Or attained interim status for the treatment, storage,
or disposai of hazardous waste. (Stip. § 42.) Michael Hansen,
PEC's Environmental Manager, testified that, after the
CDPHE informed PEC in 1993 that its storage and disposal
of hazardous waste without a permit violated federal and state
regulations, "We looked up part B and saw that was too much
for us to do." PEC concedes, however, that it engaged in
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.

a Treatment
On August 3, 1992, a CDPHE inspector notified PEC
that its placement of electrostripping and plating waste into an
evaporation trait and an annealing oven at the Facility

constituted treatment of hazardous waste without obtaining a
permit or Interim Status from the EPA or the State of

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

Colorado. PEC utilized the evaporation unit (Exs. 11-12) and
the annealing oven to "de-water" and recover chrome waste.
(Stip. 44 20-22.) Approximately thirty-days after the August
3, 1992 inspection, PEC closed the evaporation unit pursuant
to a plan submitted to and approved by the CDPHE. (Stip. ¢
66.) The annealing oven, however, was not closed pursuant
to a closure plan submitted to and approved by the CDPHE.
Rather, the annealing oven was dismantled and sold for scrap
metal by PEC in 1992. The evidence Shows that, when PEC
closed its annealing oven and evaporator in 1992, it ceased
"treatment" of hazardous waste as that term is defined by 6
COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 260.10. The United States
concedes that, based on the limited information available from
its files and a site review conducted on April 2, 1998, PEC is
not currently treating waste. (Stip. 67.)

ra Disposal

From 1978 to 1992, hazardous waste leaked into the
soil beneath the Facility's 17 chrome-plating tanks. (Stip. §
26; Exs. 3, 4.) The plating tanks are located inside the
Facility's main building. As Originally installed and used, the
plating tanks were composed of steel with PVC lining,
Situated on a floor of earth and timber or within a concrete
pit. Beginning in 1985 and concluding in 1994, PEC installed
additional containment structures underneath the plating tanks.

During installation of these additional containment
structures, PEC excavated some, but not all, of the soil
beneath plating tanks. Although PEC 'knew that the soil was
discolored by chrome contamination, PEC did not investigate
the precise toxicity of the soil or ascertain the quantity of
contaminated soil. PEC placed some of the excavated soil into

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

three open waste piles on land adjacent to the Facility'’s main
building. (Answer 4 24; Stip. § 27; Exs. 7-10.) Two of the
piles exist on land owned by Redoubt and the third pile was
placed on adjacent land owned by the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad. These three waste piles remain there
today. (Answer § 24; Stip. ¢ 27.) PEC placed the remainder
of excavated soil into fifty-five gallon drums (Ex. 16), which
PEC eventually shipped to a permitted waste disposal facility
in 1993.

PEC utilizes "air scrubbers," also known as “air
misters,” installed in 1978, to draw air from above the plating
baths located inside the Facility's main building. The air-
cleansing proces

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386004_0864%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
