# Opposition Brief — Jones v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 513 U.S. 817

## Text

LESTER V. JONES, PETITIONER
v.

UnitTep STATES OF AMERICA

‘ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

. BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPCSITION

2

ai

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Constitution entitles a defendant in a
criminal case to jury instructions defining the term
“reasonable doubt.”

2. Whether the Constitution entitles a defendant in a
criminal case to present argument to the jury con-
cerning the meaning of the term “reasonable doubt.”

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) ...............0000 10
Holland vy. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) 20000000000... 6
Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.), cert.
8 eee 9
United States v. Crockett, 813 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 884 (1987) .............cccccccccssssccsssees 10
United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975) ...................ccccccosese 9
United States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), cert.
EE Ot, Gas. EE IED sncichdcndasesnanacnsiansnnsedonetiakensiy 6, 9
United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988) .....................ceeeeceeees 9
United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994) .0...:...........cccccccscscsssssssssees 8
United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1993) .. 6,9
United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1984) ..... 10
Victor v. Nebraska, 114 8. Ct. 1239 (1994) ................. 6, 7, 8,9
Whiteside v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
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(III)

In the Supreme Court of the Ginited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

No. 93-1961
LESTER V. JONES, PETITIONER
vs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-6a) is
unpublished, but the judgment is noted at 21 F.3d 426
(Table).

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the court of appeals was issued on April
13, 1994. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
June 8, 1994. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

Petitioner, an attorney, was charged with two counts
of willfully attempting to evade income tax, in violation
of 26 U.S.C. 7201, and two counts of willfully filing
fraudulent amended tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
7206(1). Petitioner’s first trial ended in a mistrial when
the jury was unable to reach a verdict. At a second trial
petitioner was convicted on the tax evasion counts and
acquitted on the fraudulent return counts. Petitioner
was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and a fine.’
The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-6a.

1. Between 1982 and- 1984, petitioner operated a
successful law practice in Bel Air, Maryland. Gov’t C.A.
Br. 4; C.A. App. 40-41. Petitioner reported taxabie
income of $51,000 for 1983 and $50,000 for 1984, although
his true taxable income for those years was $164,000 and
$230,000. Gov’t C.A. Br. 9. Petitioner consistently and
accurately informed various financial institutions from
which he was requesting loans that his net annual
income ranged between $150,000 and $200,000. During
the same time period, petitioner spent more than
$410,000 on purchases of a variety of items including
automobiles and condominiums. /d. at 9-10.

In the spring of 1986, the Internal Revenue Service
audited petitioner’s 1984 tax return. Although petitioner
informed the IRS auditor that he had deposited all of his
1983-1984 gross receipts from his law practice into a
single business account, that account actuaily contained
only a portion of petitioner’s fees. Petitioner had also

! Citing the poor health of petitioner’s wife and daughter, the
district court later reduced the sentence. As a result of the court’s
action, petitioner served only six months’ imprisonment. Pet. App.
19a-20a.

3

deposited hundreds of thousands of dollars into various
personal accounts and had failed to report that income on
his tax returns. In addition, petitioner had not reported
all of the income deposited into the business account.
Gov’t C.A. Br. 4-5, 8.2 After the IRS corrected his gross
receipts and taxable income, petitioner owed approxi-
mately $135,000 in additional tax for 1983-1984. Id. at 8-9.

In the fall of 1986, after the IRS’s civil auditor had
referred petitioner’s case to the IRS Criminal Investi-
gatien Division, petitioner filed amended 1983-1984 tax
returns. On those amended returns, petitioner did not
report as gross receipts the full amount of his cash fees
or the proceeds of certain fee checks that he had cashed
but not deposited. Gov’t C.A. Br. 5-6.

2. In March 1991, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging petitioner with attempted tax
evasion for 1983-1984 and with willfully filing false 1983-
1984 amended returns.’ Gov’t C.A. Br. 2; see 26 U.S.C.
7201, 7206(1). Petitioner’s July 1991 trial ended in a
mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Jd.
at 3.

During his retrial, which occurred during a three-
week period in April 1992, petitioner did not dispute the
existence or the amount of his understated income, nor
did he testify or call any witnesses on his own behalf.
His defense, which he presented in both his opening
statement and his closing argument, was that the

2 Petitioner reported gross receipts of $171,200 for 1983 and
$184,500 for 1984. His correct gross receipts for those years were,
respectively, $332,000 and $448,000. Gov’t C.A. Br. 8.

3 Although the government offered substantial evidence
regarding petitioner’s 1982 tax year in order to establish a pattern
of unreported income, the statute of limitations barred any charges
relating to that year. Gov’t C.A. Br. 2 n.1.

4

government had failed to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Pet. 2-3; C.A. App. 34-37, 213-217.
During the court’s charge conference, petitioner
requested that the district court define the term
“reasonable doubt” in its jury instructions. The court
refused to give petitioner’s requested instruction, which
defined “reasonable doubt” largely in terms of a
hesitancy to act in important matters. The court ex-
plained that giving the instruction was prohibited by
existing circuit precedent. In instructing the jury,
however, the court repeatedly stated that petitioner was
presumed innocent and that the government bore the
burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
See C.A. App. 24, 203-210, 224-227, 234, 237-240, 245, 247.
In addition to requesting a jury instruction defining
reasonable doubt, petitioner requested that the district
court allow him to define the term in his closing
argument to the jury. The court stated that petitioner
could present a portion of his proposed definition, to the
effect that “reasonable doubt” did not require the
government to prove “its case to a mathematical
certainty,” but refused to allow him to argue the
remainder, which stated that “reasonable doubt” was
“any concern of the kind that would cause you to hesitate
in the most important of your own personal or family or
business or job situations.” C.A. App. 211. Petitioner
rejected the option offered by the court. Jd. at 212. The
court also allowed petitioner in his closing argument to
explain “reasonable doubt” in “precisely the same
words” as he had used in his opening statement. Jd. at
208. Petitioner presented an extensive closing argu-
ment, in which he repeatedly stressed the presumption of
innocence and the government’s burden of proving his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jd. at 213-217. He also
repeated the gist of a metaphor that he had used during

5

his opening statement, to the effect that “a reasonable
doubt means that * * * if it is anywhere near close, the
Government hasn’t made its case. They have to throw us
out by a mile, to use a baseball metaphor.” Pet. App. 4a-
5a, 42a.

The jury convicted petitioner of the two evasion
counts and acquitted him of the two false filing counts.
The court sentenced petitioner to 18 months’ imprison-
ment and required him to pay a $25,000 fine. Pet. App.
10a-12a.

3. Petitioner appealed, contending that the district
court had erroneously refused to define reasonable doubt
in its jury instructions and had improperly refused to
allow him to argue the meaning of the term in his closing
argument. Pet. C.A. Br. 7-8. Acknowledging that the
court of appeals had previously “ruled against the
position advanced in [his] appeal,” petitioner included a
suggestion for en banc review in his appellate brief. Jd.
at 8-9.

After the court of appeals denied en banc review, see
Pet. App. 7a-8a, a panel affirmed petitioner’s conviction
in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Jd. at la-6a.
Stating that it had “never found a refusal of a party’s
request for a clarifying instruction to be error,” the
court reaffirmed its “longstanding, albeit forgiving,
proscription against any attempts to define reasonable
doubt to jurors.” Jd. at 5a-6a. The court also rejected
petitioner’s contention regarding the limitation placed
on his closing remarks, explaining that the court had
“consistently” allowed district ccurts to prohibit
counsel from defining reasonable doubt in their argu-
ments to the jury. Jd. at 6a.

6

ARGUMENT

1. Although the reasonable doubt standard “is an
ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice
system,” Victor v. Nebraska, 1148. Ct. 1289, 1242 (1994),
this Court has noted that “attempts to explain the,term
‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any
clearer to the minds of the jury,” Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). * For that reason, many
courts of appeals have expressed the view that the
“purposes of having juries may be best served if juries, in
the first instance, bear the responsibility for defining”
reasonable doubt. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d
1551, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Nolasco, 926
F.2d 869, 871-873 (9th Cir.) (citing cases), cert. denied,
1128S. Ct. 111 (1991).

That approach is consistent with this Court’s recent
decision in Victor v. Nebraska, in which the Court
stated:

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a
requirement of due process, but the Constitution
neither prohibits trial courts from defining reason-
able doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of
course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the

4 This case illustrates that point nicely. The instruction
requested by petitioner defined “reasonable doubt” as, inter alia,
“a doubt which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in
a matter of importance in his or her personal life.” C.A. App. 24.
Petitioner contends that the district court’s refusal to give that
instruction was constitutional error. Justice Ginsburg and other
federal jurists, however, have specifically criticized the “hesitate
to act” formulation as unhelpful and confusing to the jury, and
potentially prejudicial to the defendant. See Victor v. Nebraska,
114 S. Ct. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).

7

jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution
does not require that any particular form of words be
used in advising the jury of the government’s burden
of proof. Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions
must correctly convey the concept of reasonable
doubt to the jury.

114 8S. Ct. at 1243 (citations, brackets, and internal
quotation marks omitted).

The court’s jury instructions in petitioner’s case
suffered from no constitutional infirmity. In instructing
the jury, the district court mentioned the reasonable
doubt standard at least 18 times and was careful to
explain that the government bore the burden of proof.
C.A. App. 222-251. The court stated, for example, that:

As a result of the defendant’s plea of not guilty, the
burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a
defendant for the simple reason that the law never
imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case, the
burden or duty of calling any witness or producing
any evidence.

The law presumes the defendant to be innocent of
all charges against him. I therefore instruct you
that the defendant is presumed by you to be innocent
until such time, if ever, you as the jury are satisfied
that the government has proven him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The defendant begins the trial here with a clean
slate. This presumption of innocence alone is
sufficient to acquit a defendant unless you as jurors
are unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

8

of his guilt, after a careful and impartial con-
sideration of all of the evidence in this case. If the
government fails to sustain its burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty.

This presumption was with the defendant when the
trial began and remains with him even now as I speak
to you and will continue with the defendant into your
deliberations unless and until you are convinced that
the government has proven his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Id. at 225-226. The court went on to instruct, inter alia,
that the government was required to establish each
element of petitioner’s charged offenses “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” id. at 227, 237-240, and that the jury
must find petitioner not guilty if it was not convinced of
his guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” after weighing all
the evidence, id. at 227. These instructions correctly
apprised the jury of the government’s burden of proof and
“econve[yed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.”
Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. at 1248.

Nor is this Court’s review warranted to resolve “a
conflict among the federal Courts of Appeals” (Pet. 19)
on whether a definition of reasonable doubt should be
provided when requested by a defendant. Although
various federal courts of appeals and state courts have
given different directions to trial courts within their
jurisdictions regarding whether to define the term
“reasonable doubt” and what verbal formulations to use,”

5 The majority of the federal courts of appeals to consider the
issue have either discouraged defining the term or have left the
matter to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., United States
v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 44 n.1, 45 (4th Cir.) (condemns giving

9

this Court made clear in Victor that the Constitution
does not require that the term be defined or that any
particular formulation be used. 114 S. Ct. at 1243.° Nor
do the differences in the prescribed verbal formulations
among the lower courts call for this Court’s review.
Preferences as to the appropriate language to be used to
define a term such as reasonable doubt—when the
choices are all within constitutionally permissible
bounds—are matters properly left to the individual
choice of the lower appellate courts in the exercise of
their supervisory powers over the trial courts within
their jurisdictions.

2. There is no merit to petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 15)
that the district court refused to permit him to present
“any meaningful argument to the jury on the meaning of

definition but leaves decision to do so with trial court), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d
1551, 1557-1558 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (district court “need not give any
definition of reasonable doubt at all”); United States v. Nolasco,
926 F.2d 869, 872 (9th Cir.) (definition is permissible but not
required) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111 (1991); United
States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987) (instruction
using words “reasonable doubt” without further definition
adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988); Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054,
1060-1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1035 (1987); United
States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 442 (7th Cir. 1974) (trial judge has
option to define), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); cf. Whiteside
v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869, 871-872 (6th Cir.) (using “totality of
circumstances” approach to determine whether failure to define
was constitutional violation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983).

6 Of course, this Court’s decision in Victor does not prevent the
States from requiring, as a matter of their own law, that such an
instruction be given. Nor did the Court forbid district courts to
give such instructions in federal criminal trials; it simply made
clear that instructions of the sort requested by petitioner are not
constitutionally required.

10

the reasonable doubt standard” and thereby abridged his
constitutional rights. The record shows (C.A. App. 213-
217) that, far from being prevented from making his
point, petitioner was permitted to present an extensive
closing argument in which he repeatedly asserted that
the government had failed to overcome his presumption
of innocence by proving his guilt “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Because it is the role of the court, not counsel,
to explain the law to the jury, the district court’s refusal
to allow petitioner to argue his own definition of
reasonable doubt fell well within the court’s broad
discretion to control closing argument in order to
ensure “that [it] d[id] not stray unduly from the mark.”
United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 1984),
quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975);
United States v. Crockett, 813 F.2d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir.)
(no abuse of discretion in trial court’s refusal to allow
defendant to define reasonable doubt in closing argu-
ment), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 834 (1987).

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

DREw S. Days, III
Solicitor General

LORETTA C. ARGRETT
Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT E. LINDSAY

ALAN HECHTKOPF

JANET KAY JONES
Attorneys

AUGUST 1994

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386003_1683%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
