# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Allen v. California > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386003_1674%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1994 - **Citation:** 513 U.S. 817 ## Text Supreme Court, rr court, U8 93195 2 may 1 2 199 NWOFIRE-OF THE CLERK IN THE ; SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE October Term, 1994 RALPH G. ALLEN Petitioner, Vv. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT; or in the alternative, TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND APPENDIX RALPH G. ALLEN 13325 Sproule Avenue Sylmar, California 91342 (818) 362-0878 Petitioner, in his proper person. l QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Do the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require criminal scienter, i.e., "willfulness" be read into California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 19401(a)? 2. California Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 19401(a) contains both a criminal and civil offense, identical in nature. Is Section 19401(a) unconstitutional because it fails to attach a higher degree of delinquency, guilt or culpability to the criminal offense contained therein, so as to distinguish the civil offense from the criminal offense? 3. Does the lack or inadequacy of regulations promulgated by the Franchise Tax Board deny Allen due process and fair notice under the law? 1. The style of this case as shown on the front cover of this Petition contains the name of all parties to this cause. ————————————————— «ts TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW i TABLE OF CONTENTS il TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv OPINIONS BELOW 1 JURISDICTION 2 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ’ STANDARD OF REVIEW 7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 19401 7 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 19401, POST 1984 AMENDMENT 9 WILLFULNESS MUST BE READ INTO SECTION 19401(a), AS IT IS A CRIME UNKNOWN TO THE COMMON LAW, AND HENCE NOT A STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE 10 THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT A CRIME HAS TWO ELEMENTS, AN ACT AND MENS REA (INTENT) 11 FAILING TO FILE TAX RETURNS IS NOT A REGULATORY OR PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSE FALLING WITHIN THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 13 ——s mm Mh. THE CALIFORNIA APPELLATE COURT LEFT OPEN THE QUESTION WHETHER SECTION 19401(a) WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ATTACH A HIGHER DEGREE OF DELINQUENCY, GUILT OR CULPABILITY TO THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE CONTAINED THEREIN, SO AS TO DISTINGUISH THE CIVIL OFFENSE FROM THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE 14 ALLEN WAS NOT GIVEN NOTICE BY STATUTE OR REGULATION AS TO WHAT RETURN HE WAS | REQUIRED TO FILE, OR WHAT INFORMATION HE WAS REQUIRED TO SUPPLY 16 CONCLUSION 18 ens - iv- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASE CITATIONS Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620 (1955) Y Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) 13 Boyce Motor Lines Inc. v. U.S., 96 L.Ed. 374, 97 L.Ed. 203 (1951) 4 Brooks v. Oakland 160 C. 423, 117 P.433 (1911) 7 California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz 416 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1494 (1974) 5,17 Cheek v. United States, hi 5 aoe S.Ct. 604 (1991) 4 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58, L.Ed.2d. 596 (1979) 5 Coleman v. Thompson $01 U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed. 2d 640 7 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 4 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, _US.__, 112S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed. 2d 391 (1992) 10 Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., US , 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed. 2d 379 (1992) 9 Estate of Rath, 10 C.2d 399, 75 P.2d 509 9 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed.2d. 447 (1965) 5 -V- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972) 4,15 Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980) 11 Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d. 362 (1982) 4 Holdridge v. United States 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960) 11 James v. U.S.. 366 U.S. 213, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 6 L.Ed.2d. 246 (1961) ~) Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) 5 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d. 228 5 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) 4,13 Los Angeles v. Jones 13 C.2d 554, 90 P.2d 802 9 Michigan v. Long 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1201 (1983) 7 Momnisse.te v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L-Ed. 288 (1952) 4,10,11,12 New York Central and Hudson River Raiiroad Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909) 13 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d. 110 (1972) 5 People v. Allen, 20 Cal.App. 846 (Dist. 2, 1993) 1,5,6,10 - Vi - People v. Jones, 149 Cal. App.3d Supp. 41, 197 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1983) People v. Kuhn, 216 C.A. 2d 956, 31 C.R. 253, (1963) People v. Singer 115 C.A.3d. Supp. 11, 171 C.R. 587 (1980) Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 30 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930 (1910) Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 87 L. Ed. 298 (1943) State v. Campbell, 536 P. 2d 105 (Alaska 1975) State v. Collova, 255 N.W. 2d 581 (1977) State v. Dried Milk Products Co-op., 16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N.W. 2d 412 (1962) U.S. v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S.Ct. 189, 97 L.Ed. 200 (1952) U.S. v. Hicks, 947 F.2d. 1356 (9th. Cir. 1991) United States v. A. P. Trucking Company, 358 U.S. 121 (1958) United States v. Balint 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922) United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943) United States v. Freed 401 U.S. 601, 28 L.Ed. 2d 356 (1971) 6 11,13 - Vii - United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 29 L.Ed. 2d 178 (1971) 13 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) 13 United States v. Reynolds 235 U.S. 133, 35 S.Ct. 86, 59 L.Ed. 162 (1914) 7 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Company, 438 U.S. 422 (1978) 4,11 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) 13 United States v. Wilson __US.____, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 LEd. 2d 593 (1992) 9 United States v. Wul 758 F.2d 1121 (1985) 10 Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 63 S.Ct. 561 (1943) 16 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) 5,15 Wright v. Georgia, 373 US. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10, L.Ed.2d. 349 (1963) 5 STATUTES 28 U.S. C., Section 1257 California Stats. 1935 ch. 329 pp. 1090 California Stats 1943 ch. 659 California Stats 1984 ch. 1490 "Ss wr So California Stats 1993 ch. 31, Sec. 24 (SB 3) - Vill - California Revenue and Taxation Code: Division 2, Part 10, Chapter 17 16,17 Section 18401 17 Section 18431 17 Section 19253 16 Section 19401 in passim Section 19401(a) in passim Section 19401(b) 8 Section 19401(c) 8,9 Section 19701 9 MISCELLANEOUS California Constitution: Article XIII 14 Article XIII, Sec. 26 (a) 7 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, c. X (2d Ed.1960) 11 Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401 (1958) 11 LaFave & Scott Criminal Law, 218-223 (1927) 11 Logic & Potential of a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis. L.Rev. 1201 11 Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 (1955) 11 icant Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933) Supreme Court Rule 13.1 United States Constitution: Article V Article XIV PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Ralph G. Allen, (herein "Allen"), hereby petitions this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to the California Supreme Court, or in the alternative to the California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Three. OPINIONS BELOW The Appellate Division of the California Superior Court affirming Allen’s conviction in the Municipal Court, in and for the Poe of Los Angeles was entered on February 23, 1993, was not | Sepomeci see People v. Allen Super. Ct. No. BR 30748. The unpublished opinion of the Superior Court appears in the Appendix at - 1 -. Petition for reconsideration or certification to the Second District Court of Appeals was timely filed and on March 18, 1993 the Superior Court certified the appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals. On March 31, 1993 the District Court of Appeals accepted certification and ordered transfer of the case for further hearing and decision. The District Court of Appeals’ decision affirming Allen’s conviction in the California Municipal Court, was entered on November 29, 1993, and was a published decision; See, People v. Allen, 20 Cal.App. 846 (Dist. 2, 1993). That published opinion of the District Court of Appeals appears in the Appendix at - 7 -. Petition for rehearing was timely filed, but was denied December 17, 1993. Request for review to the California Supreme Court was timely filed, but was denied by the Supreme Court on March 2, 1994. The denial by the California Supreme Court Appears in the Appendix at - 21 -. ahs JURISDICTION The opinion and judgment sought to be reviewed by this petition was denied review by the California Supreme Court on March 2, 1994. Accordingly, this petition 1s timely pursuant to Rule 13.1. of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of this Court regarding this petition is established pursuant to Title 28, U.S. Code, Section 1257. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Article V of the Bill of Rights, states in pertinent part: No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; Article XIV of the Bill of Rights, states in pertinent part: No State shall .. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. STATUTES California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 19401: "Failure to file return or making false return; Penalty; Misdemeanor Any person who does any of the following is liable for a penalty of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000): (a) With or without intent to evade any requirement of this part or any lawful requirement of the Franchise Tax Board under this part, fails to file any return or to supply any mo information required under this part, or who, with o1 without such intent, makes, renders, signs or verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent information. (b) Aids, abets, advises, encourages, or counsels any individual to evade the tax imposed by this part by not filing any return or supplying any information required under this part, or, by making, rendering, signing, or verifying any false or fraudulent return or statement, or by supplying false information. (c) Under this part, is required to pay any estimated tax or tax, who willfully fails to pay that estimated tax or tax, at the time or times required by law or regulations. The penalty shall be recovered in the name of the people in any court of competent jurisdiction. Counsel for the Franchise Tax Board may, upon request of the district attorney or other prosecuting attorney, assist the prosecuting attorney in presenting the law or facts to recover the penalty at the trial of a criminal proceeding for violation of this section. The person is also guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be fined not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) or be imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both, at the discretion of the court, together with costs of investigation and prosecution." STATEMENT OF THE CASE Allen was charged by complaint filed on November 15, 1990 charging three (3) counts of failing to file a California tax return pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code Section 19401(a) * for the years 1985, 1986 and 1987. On July 25, 1992 Allen received a jury trial. Prior to trial Allen moved the Court to instruct the jury that 1. All references to statutes will be to the California Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise stated. a "willfulness" was an element of Section 19401(a), and requested a jury instruction to that effect, instead of interpreting Section 19401(a) as a strict liability statute, requiring no general or specific intent. The Court refused to issue the requested jury instruction, and instructed the jury that intent was not an element of the offense. The Defendant timely objected to the Trial Court’s instruction. The jury found Allen guilty on all counts on July 26, 1991. On August 9, 1991 Allen rejected probation and was sentenced to 210 days on each count to be served consecutively in the County Jail. In the appellate courts, Allen argued, inter alia, that his conviction was constitutionally infirm for the following reasons: First, Allen argued that Section 19401(a) was wrongly interpreted as a strict liability statute which relieved the prosecution from the burden of proving criminal intent, i.e., "willfulness," which denied Allen due process and equal protection of the law; Cheek v. United States, U.S. ,111S.Ct. 604, (1991); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Company, 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). : The existence of a mens rea is the rule, not the exception, in criminal statutes. Any criminal statute omitting intent is subject to and within the scope of constitutional review, because intent serves to relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning. See, Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322; U.S. v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S.Ct. 189, 97 L.Ed. 200, (1952); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494-495, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d. 362, (1982), [civil standard]; Boyce Motor Lines Inc. v. U.S., 96 L.Ed. 374, 97 L.Ed. 203, (1951), {regulatory standard]; Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). Second, Allen argued that Section 19401(a) is unconstitutional as it fails to set a higher standard of guilt or culpability to distinguish the civil offense from the criminal offense, which would give notice to the public what conduct will trigger application and enforcement of the criminal offense, rather than the civil offense. Grayned ae v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, (1972); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 87 L. Ed. 298, (1943); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095, (1927). e Section’s failure to so distinguish the criminal offense from the civil offense allows unconstitutional arbitrary and discriminatory applications of Section 19401(a). Kolender v. Lawson, 461 S. 352, 357-358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909, (1983); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S.Ct. 675 58, L.Ed.2d. 596, (1979); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 US. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d. 110, (1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed.2d. 447,(1965); Wnght v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240 10, L.Ed.2d. 349, (1963); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 30 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930, (1910). Next, Allen argued that in the absence of regulations required to be promulgated by the California Franchise Tax Board he is not given sufficient notice as to what constitutes a return or what information is required to be supplied to the California Franchise Tax Board so as to avoid criminal prosecution under Section 19401(a), and is thus denied due process. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d. 228; California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz 416 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, (1974); U.S. v. Hicks, 947 F.2d. 1356, 1360, (9th. Cir. 1991). REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT In the areas of law discussed above, as well as relevant sub-parts, California Courts have consistently rejected or mis-interpreted the rulings and holdings of this Court. Additionally, California Courts have created conflicts between their own decisions, which the California Supreme Court refuses to address. California Courts have adopted the legal posture that California State tax statutes are regulatory in nature or public welfare offenses which fall under the "police powers” of the state. It is contended, by the California Courts, that since tax statutes are of this nature, violation thereof invokes punishment through a criminal and civil strict liability statute which requires no showing of criminal intent. People v. Allen, 20 Cal.App. 846 (Dist. 2, 1993); adie People v. Kuhn, 216 C.A. 2d 956, 31 C.R. 253, (1963); People v. Jones, 149 Cal. App.3d a . 41, 197 Cal. Rptr. 273, (1983); cf. People v. Singer 11 CA 3d. Supp. 11, 171 C.R. 587, (1980), (requiring scienter to be read into criminal tax statute which is silent on the matter of mens rea.) Additionally, in People v. Allen, 20 Cal.App. 846 (Dist. 2, 1993), the California Appellate Court found that the burden of proof required to be met by the a in a criminal case, (guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), as opposed to the burden the prosecution must carry in a civil case, (preponderance of the evidence) was the correct standard to judge Allen’s guilt and therefore, the jury instructions were proper. However, the "standard-of-proof" theory and the jury instructions thereon, relied upon by the District Court ot Appeal, is not dispositive of Allen’s question, To Wit: Is Section 19401(a) unconstitutional because it fails to attach a higher degree of delinquency, guilt or culpability to the criminal offense contained therein, so as to distinguish the civil offense from the criminal offense? Section 19401(a), as this Court has consistently taught, is unconstitutionally vague as it offends the ca notion of "fair play" and adequate notice as it entirely fails to distinguish the criminal offense from the civil offense, both offenses which are contained within Section 19401(a). Finally, the district court of appeal found in the Allen case that all California tax statutes are self-executing, and hence, regulations are not required to impleinent the Statute and give adequate legal notice to the public as to what is required of the people, despite the statutory directive of the California legislature, and again, contrary to this Court’s teachings. California courts must be brought into line with this Court’s notions of due process, equal protection under the law, and what constitutes fair and adequate notice under the law. California’s conflicting position with this Court’s holdings cannot continue to co-exist as the Citizens of California have a right to uniformity of the law so they can fairly distinguish what conduct the law prohibits. For these reasons Certiorari should be granted. STANDARD OF REVIEW The applicable standard of review for this petition is derived from federal decisional law, construing Federal Constitutional principles. Michigan v. Long 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1201, 1214, (1983) ; Coleman v. Thompson 501 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557, 115 L.Ed. 2d 640, 659. hes Questions involving the interpretation of state or federal law, under the federal constitution, are settled by the United States Supreme Court, and its decisions will bind the courts of California. United States v. Reynolds 235 U.S. 133, 35 S.Ct. 86, 90, 59 L.Ed. 162, 168, (1914); Brooks v. Oakland 160 C. 423, 427, 117 P.433, (1911). LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 19401 The first Personal Income Tax Law was introduced as Assembly Bill #1182, January 25, 1935, approved by the Governor on June 13, 1935. It was placed under the California Constitution Article XIII, Sec. 26 (a), adopted November 05, 1974. The Personal Income Tax Act of 1935 was subsequently repealed. ~ In 1943 it was re-enacted, at which time it clearly denoted that Segtion 19401 entailed a civil penalty and a criminal penalty. During the years 1943 through 1983 Section 19401 read substantially as follows: "Any person who, with or without intent to evade any requirement of this part or any lawful requirement of the Franchise Tax Board under this part, fails to file any return or to supply any information required under this part, or who with or without such intent, 2. California Stats. 1935 ch. 329 pp. 1090 3. California Stats 1943 ch. 659. 4. California Stats 1943, Ch. 659 pp. 2412. - = makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent information, is liable for a penalty of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). The penalty shall be recovered by the Attorney General or the counsel for the Franchise Tax Board in the name of the people by action in any court of competent jurisdiction." Thus, the legislature clearly imposed a civil penalty and authorized the Attorney General or other counsel to recover the same in a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the legislature did not stop at this point, but continued on to say that: "The person is also guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be fined not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both, at the discretion of the court." The criminal penalty was raised to $5,000 in 1983. > The Legislature further provided for recovery of costs of investigation and prosecution. ” Additionally, as amended, the prohibitions or omissions contained within former 19401 are now contained within 19401 subsection (a). All the offensive conduct described in the 1984 amended Section 19401(a), is virtually the same conduct included in former Section 19401. Section 19401(a), (b) and (c) are all subject to a civil penalty of $5,000. ’ Like the pre-1984 amended Section 19401, the 1984 amended Section 19401(a) contains no element of scienter. Section 19401(b) appears to be a specific intent offense requiring affirmative acts on 5. California Stats 1983 Ch. 1102. 6. California Stats 1984 ch. 1490 7. California Stats 1984 ch. 1490. sta -9- the part of the actor, e.g. "Aids, abets, advises, encourages or counsels any individual to evade the tax.." Revenue and Taxation Code Section 19401(c) is a specific intent offense, i.e., “willfully fails to pay." The last paragraph of Section 19401(c) reads, "The person is also guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be fined not to exceed five thousand do'lars ($5,000) or be imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both, at the discretion of the court, together with costs of investigation and prosecution." Section 19401, along with its gubsections, was repealed, effective January 1, 1994, © and is now found under California Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 19701. The full text of Section 19701 appears in Appendix at - 22 -. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 19401, POST 1984 AMENDMENT. The California Appellate Court incorrectly found that since the legislature did not change the language of Section 19401 in its 1984 amendment, after the Kuhn decision, that fact in itself, was evidence that the legislature intended Section 19401 to be a strict liability Statute. Tax statutes are to be strictly construed against gee authority, Los Angeles v. Jones 13 C.2d 554, 61, 90 P.2d 802, though the interpretation of tax statutes in all cases, must be reasonable. James v. U.S., 366 U.S. 213, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 6 L.Ed.2d. 246 (1961); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, (1955); Estate of Rath, 10 C.2d 399, 75 P.2d 509. The usual rule of statutory construction calls for the courts to scrutinize the words of the statute. United States v. Wilson US. , 112 S.Ct. 1351, 1354-55, 117 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1992). Those are the words that the court is required to effectuate. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., US. , 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594-98, 120 L.Ed. 2d 379 (1992). Courts are constrained to follow the plain -10- meaning of the words of a statute, and need not look to \egisiative history where their meaning is clear on their face. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, US. 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149-50, 117 L.Ed. 2d 391 (1992). If a Statute speaks with ow & to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning is finished, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Allen pointed out the fact that when Section 19401 was amended in 1984 that the legislature completely reconstructed it. The legislature broke Section 19401 down into three subsections - a, b, and c- arguably attaching criminal penalties only to subsection c for willful failure to pay estimated taxes. Hence, the legislature did indeed change the construction and lan nguage of 19401 after the Auhn decision; said amendment reflecting that only willful failure to pay over a tax was a misdemeanor. If that is the case, 19401(a) defining only a civil offense, would be constitutionally permissible. However, the California Appellate Courts remain firm in their findings that Section 19401(a) is both a criminal and civil, strict liability offense, requiring no