# Opposition Brief — Mt. Hope Asphalt Corp. v. Zagata

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386003_0992%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 525 U.S. 1041

## Text

(4) No. 98-595 F L E DB
IN THE NOV 6 - 1996

Supreme Court of the Ur ited States"

October Term 1998

MT.HOPE ASPHALT CORP., a/k/a MOUNT HOPE ASPHALT CORP., and
BARBARA PETROSKY, as Executrix of the Estate of Frank Petrosky,

Petitioners,
-V .*

MICHAEL ZAGATA, Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation and the NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE
DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DENNIS C. VACCO
Attorney General of the State of New York

BARBARA G. BILLETT Attorney for Respondents

Solicitor General 120 Broadway

New York, NY 10271

JOHN W. MCCONNELL (212) 416-8484

Deputy Solicitor General
NORMAN SPIEGEL*
JOHN GIBSON

Assistant Attorneys General
Of Counsel

*Counsel of Record

THE REPORTER COMPANY, Printers and Publishers, Inc.
181 Delaware Street, Walton, NY 13856—800-252-7181

(4875 — 1998)
Printed on Recycled Paper

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether certiorari should be granted to examine petitioners'
claims that the State's issuance of a temporary operating license
for asphalt production using contaminated soil from certain New
York oil spills violated the Commerce and Equal Protection
(lauses, where: (1) petitioners voluntarily proposed such terms
to address the regulators' environmental concerns over the
quality of its production process and to obtain a temporary
operating permit; (2) the State does not impose such source
restrictions on license applicants by statute, regulation, or
policy; (3) petitioners' permanent license application was
ultimately denied on other grounds, including falsification of
records and use of undocumented contaminated soil; and (4)
petitioners' constitutional challenge to the terms of the tempo-
rary license was first raised four years after its issuance and
following its expiration.

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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Ontnions Beha 6.6.35 cise ed Ss CARRE eee b ae eee 2
Jurisdiction 6d Sisk he dain a ee he sone wks eee bes 2
Counterstatemiont OF Gre Cate ook cies cere vestesdivees 2

ARGUMENT

IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUT-
IONAL ISSUE OR ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
DECISION OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEAL, NO REASON EXISTS FOR THE GRANT OF A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN THIS MATTER ............. 5

Concehee 66 5 ee ees inn 8 4 eee oe hs 9

Moe we tS ee ee oe ee po Be OF ae tS x
= 5

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
Bitondo v. State of New York, 182 A.D.2d 948 (3rd nies

Brey Orit Fier er eee eee eee ee 7
C.&A. Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.

ED. cnc cdcadanvesaasebersrneas innate 6
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ............. 6
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ............--. 6
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1985) ............-+4-- 8
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1969) ...... 7,8
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1984) ..............-. 7
United States Constitution
Commerce CHSC nic cc ccc ccc ccc ccccccccees 5, 7,8
Equal Protection Clause ...........6+eeeeeeeeeeees 5,8
United States Statutes
Teese ene pedecorsaceceseses 5

New York Statutes and Regulations

Civil Practice Law and Rules §214 ............-.-4-- 7
PE Souda ea vases oes 5

No. 98-595
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1998

MT.HOPE ASPHALT CORP., a/k/a MOUNT HOPE
ASPHALT CORP., and BARBARA PETROSKY, as Executrix
of the Estate of Frank Petrosky,

Petitioners,

MICHAEL ZAGATA, Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation and the NEW
YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION,

Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT,

APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

Respondents adopt the statement of opinions below set
forth in the petition for a writ of certiorari (Pet. 1).'

JURISDICTION

Respondents adopt the statement of jurisdiction set forth
in the petition for a writ certiorari (Pet. 1).

Counterstatement of the Case

A. Issuance ofa Temporary Air Emissions Permit and the
Denial of Permanent Operating Permit

In August 1990, petitioner Mt. Hope Asphalt Corp., a
manufacturer of asphalt, sought authorization from respondent
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
("NYSDEC") to utilize petroleum contaminated soil ("PCS") as
an aggregate to produce asphalt at its facility in Calverton, New
York (AT1379, 1485). PCS is scil contaminated with virgin
petroleum and no other hazardous substances, typically the
result of accidental spills trom fuel trucks or leakage at gasoline
stations. Previously, Mt. Hope's production process, and all
other asphalt production permitted in New York State, employed
virgin petroleum and clean soil.

Petitioners’ proposal raised a number of significant public
health and environmental concerns: it is quite difficult to

' Numbers in parentheses preceded by "Pet." refer to pages in the petition
for a writ of certiorari in No. 98-595. Numbers in parentheses preceded by
"A" and "AT" refer respectively to pages in Appellants’ Appendix and the
Administrative Transcript submitted to the Appellate Division.

3

distinguish PCS from soils contaminated with waste oil and
other hazardous substances; heating soil contaminated with
hazardous substances during the production of asphalt could
release harmful products into the ambient air; storage of such
contaminated soil at the Mt. Hope facility could threaten the
underlying aquifer system, a sole source of drinking water,
without proper controls, the proposed operation could become
a means for the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes.

Aware of the environmental concerns and desirous of
addressing them in an economically feasible manner, Mt. Hope
proposed that it employ only PCS removed from certain spill
sites within New York State, assigned a NYSDEC Spill Number
and made the subject of a spill report. By this means, NYSDEC
could more easily assure that the PCS was contaminated only
with virgin petroleum and no other contaminants (AT104-105,
AT1525-1527, 1550, A240). Characterizing this restriction as a
"self-imposed condition," Mt. Hope inserted it into its permit
application to NYSDEC (A243, "Overview".

In August 1991, NYSDEC issued a one-year interim air
permit, including the PCS limitation, allowing Mt. Hope to test
the manufacturing process including its pollution control
technology. As part of its one year interim permit, Mt. Hope was
required to maintain and submit quarterly a log of all PCS
deliveries received at the facility (A317-331).

In June 1992, Mt. Hope requested both a one-month
extension of its permit and a permit modification that would
allow it to utilize PCS from New Jersey during the one-month
period (A335, AT1455). NYSDEC granted the extension, but
because Mt. Hope proposed no means by which NYSDEC could
confirm that the New Jersey PCS was contaminated solely by
virgin petroleum and not by other hazardous substances, the
agency did not modify the permit (A338). Mt. Hope did not
object to or otherwise challenge this determination.

4

In January 1993, NYSDEC issued an administrative
consent order allowing Mt. Hope to continue its operations on
a temporary basis pending consideration of its application for a
permanent operating permit. (A156-170).

Thereafter, NYSDEC became award that Mt. Hope
maintained false logs, submitted false reports, fabricated
NYSDEC spill numbers, and utilized PCS unauthorized under
its temporary operating permit on thirty-six occasions between
November 1991 and September 1992. On September 15, 1993,
NYSDEC denied Mt. Hope's application for a permanent
operating permit, withdrew Mt. Hope's temporary operating
authority, and, shortly thereafter, sought civil penalties for this
malfeasance.

Following an eleven-day administrative hearing and the
issuance of a sixty-three page hearing report, the Commissioner
of NYSDEC accepted an administrative law judge's
recommendations and determined, inter alia, that Mt. Hope: (1)
received and processed 36 shipments of contaminated soil from
sites in New Jersey totaling some eighty-eight thousand tons; (2)
falsified records by inserting in its Log Book fabricated
NYSDEC Spill Numbers for each of those shipments; and (3)
submitted a falsified laboratory report with respect to the
contaminates in the PCS used at its facility. Based on these and
other findings, the Commissioner determined that Mt. Hope and
its President Frank Petrosky were "unsuitable and unfit" to hold
NYSDEC permits, denied their permit application for a
certificate to operate, and assessed $73,400 in civil penalties
against Mt. Hope.

5
B. The Proceeding and Action in State Court -

On November 2, 1995, petitioners commenced a
proceeding and action before New York State Supreme Court,
Nassau County, asserting claims under, inter alia, the
Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and seeking to set aside the Commissioner's
determination and remove the self-imposed PCS permit
restriction. Following removal of the matter to the Appellate
Division, Second Department, pursuant to New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules §7804(g), that court upheld the
Commissioner's determination in a Decision and Judgment
dated March 16, 1998. The Appellate Division found that the
Commissioner's determination was supported by substantial
evidence in the record and that petitioners' other contentions,
implicitly including their fully briefed Commerce Clause and
equal protection claims, were "without merit" (Pet. la-3a).

The New York State Court of Appeals denied petitioners’
motion for leave to appeal by order dated July 9, 1998. (Pet.
124a). Mt. Hope subsequently filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari which was docketed by this Court on October 8, 1998.

ARGUMENT

IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE OR ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION OF
THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE DECISIONS OF THIS
COURT OR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL, NO
REASON EXISTS FOR THE GRANT OF A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI IN THIS MATTER

The petition for certiorari should be denied because it fails
to raise a substantial constitutional issue worthy of this Court's
review and raises no conflict between the decision of the
Appellate Division and the holdings of this Court or other

6

Federal courts. On the contrary, the Commissioner's
determination in the instant matter, subsequently confirmed by
the Appellate Division, correctly denied petitioners’ permit
application on ground which petitioners have conveniently
failed to address in their petition -- that Mt. Hope had falsified
records, failed to disclose the source of its production materials,
and demonstrated unsuitability to conduct the activities
authorized under the permit (Pet. 7a-11a). Moreover, the PCS
limitation here challenged was originally proposed by petitioners
to advance their own purposes, was set forth in a temporary
permit which has long expired, and had a negligible effect on
interstate commerce. Finally, petitioners' constitutional claims
are barred by relevant statutes of limitations.

The record in this matter clearly demonstrates that the
permit requirement calling for Mt. Hope to utilize PCS only
from sites assigned a NYSDEC Spill Number, inserted at
petitioners' written request and characterized by petitioners in
their permit application as a "self-imposed condition" (A239,
243, 249, 259), was designed to address the State's concern that
only soil contaminated with virgin petroleum and no other
hazardous substances be utilized in petitioners’ asphalt
production process (AT 1452-1454). Such a business decision by
an experienced corporation, designed to minimize its costs of
ascertaining and demonstrating the quality of its materials,
represents a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of any
conceivable claim to use of out-of-state material and raises no
constitutional concerns. See, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
468-69 (1938) (circumstances evidencing an "intentional
relinquishment of a known right or privilege" constitute waiver);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).

Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 8), this case does
not involve flow control laws comparable to those in C. & A.
Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown; nor does it involve
discrimination against environmentally sensitive materials

7

originating beyond a state's borders (Pet. 12). New York State
has neither statute nor regulation nor policy prohibiting the
importation of out-of-state PCS. Nor does the State bar use of
out-of-state PCS in asphalt production. Indeed, petitioners
concede that New York has granted at least one permit for PCS
originating in New Jersey (Pet. 18-19) -- provided that the
source of the PCS had been inspected by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection. As long as the.
permittee could reasonably show that the PCS contained only
virgin petroleum and was not contaminated by other hazardous
substances, its use might be permissible without regard to its
state of origin.

In any event, petitioners' Commerce Clause and equal
protection challenges to NYSDEC's issuance of the August 1991
permit, raised for the first time at the commencement of this
proceeding and action in Novemter 1995, were time-barred
under even the longest state law statute of limitations
conceivably applicable to such claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S.-261 (1984) ("most appropriate" period of limitations
provided by state law must be applied in Section 1983 actions),
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 214 (three year
statute of limitations to recover damages for injury to property);
see also, New York Environmental Conservation Law §19-
0511(2)(b) (60-day statute of limitations for challenges to permit
conditions); Bitondo v. State of New York, 182 A.D.2d 948, 950-
51 (3d Dept. 1992)(same).

Moreover, the PCS limitation contained in petitioners’
temporary license imposed, at the very worst, a small and
incidental burden on interstate commerce that is unworthy of
this Court's review. It is well established that the Commerce
Clause is not violated by a restriction which serves an important
public health purpose and poses a relatively small incidental
burden on interstate commerce. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1969). This Court has consistently recognized

8

that "the States retain authority under their general police
powers to regulate matters of ‘legitimate local concern,' even
though interstate commerce may be affected." Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 138 (1985) (citation omitted). State regulations
that "burden" interstate transactions only incidentally raise
Commerce Clause concerns solely if such burdens are "clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., at 142. In the instant matter, the self-
imposed limitation on use of in-state PCS, intended by a single
manufacturer to allow that State to ascertain the quality of their
production materials, had a minimal effect on commerce and a
substantial public benefit, and presents no matter of
constitutional concern. Significantly, there is nothing in the
record to suggest even remotely that NYSDEC would have been
indisposed to adopt any alternative effective method of assuring
PCS quality.

Finally, petitioners have conceded explicitly that the
record in this matter does not support their claim under the
Equal Protection Clause (Pet. 5, 16). Indeed, evidence in the
record demonstrates that the State treated Mt. Hope in the same
manner as other similarly situated asphalt producers: granting
permits to the extent that the permittee could reasonable show
that the PCS was not contaminated with other hazardous
substances.

In sum, the agency determination in this matter, and the
Appellate Division holding confirming that determination, were
eminently correct in all respects; petitioners' constitutional
claims were properly dismissed; and this matter raises no issues
worthy of this Court's review.

CONCLUSION

The Petition For a Writ of Certiorari Should Be
Denied.

Dated: New York, New York
November 6, 1998

Respectfully submitted,

DENNIS C. VACCO
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for Respondents

BARBARA G. BILLETT
Solicitor General

JOHN W. MCCONNELL
Deputy Solicitor General

NORMAN SPIEGEL*

JOHN GIBSON
Assistant Attorneys General
of Counsel

*Counsel of Record

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386003_0992%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
