# Opposition Brief — Balcor Film Investors v. Eckstein

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386003_0819%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 510 U.S. 1073

## Text

¢) [| BIQKED

No. 94-897 DEC 17 1993 fev |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcrosBEer TERM, 1993

BALCOR FILM INVESTORS, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.

ROBERT ECKSTEIN and SYLVIA ECKSTEIN, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

GeorcE P. KERSTEN Rosin F. ZwWERLING
E. CAMPION KERSTEN Counsel of Record
KERSTEN & MCKINNON, Rosert S. SCHACHTER
S.C. HiLiary SOBEL
231 West Wisconsin Avenue ZWERLING, SCHACHTER
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203 & ZWERLING
(414) 271-0054 767 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 223-3900

Attorneys for Respondents
(For Further Appearances See Reverse Side of Cover)

MICHAEL S. GLASSMAN
KATHLEEN L. CLEMENS
GLASSMAN AND CLEMENS,

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
3200 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90010
(213) 389-9623

Jerry H. FRIEDLAND

GALANIS, FRIEDLAND & POLLACK, S.C.
2 Plaza East, Suite 560

330 East Kilbourn Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

(414) 271-5400

Attorneys for Respondents

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Was the Seventh Circuit correct that its choice of law
rules permitted the application of the statute of limitations in
the Central District of California to actions for violations of
section 10(b) to Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, an action
transferred from the Central District of California to the
Eastern District of Wisconsin?

a Was the Seventh Circuit correct in following its own
decision in McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452 (7th
Cir. 1992) in holding the principles of retroactivity in the
Seventh Circuit as of June 19, 1991 permitted choice of
forum to constitute "reliance" on a prior limitations period?

a oe
TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF
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I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
IN THE ECKSTEIN ACTION IS NOT

APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW .......... 3
A. The Seventh Circuit Applied Its
Own Choice of Law Rules ............. 3

B. The Seventh Circuit Choice of Law
Rules Directed the Court to Van Dusen
SNA ae es Ran a frame, ne 4
= The Seventh Circuit Discussion Of
Section 27A Does Not Merit Review
yt eee Co ae ee ee 8

II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
THE MAJESKI ACTION IS NOT APPROPRIATE
FOR REVIEW ...... Pe ea fre, 9

CALA AMID 6s 6 eS ee eee 11

- ili -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc..

918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990) ......... 3, 4
DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,

662 U.S. 151 (1983) ww a 2, 3, 6
Ferens v. John Deere Co.,

474 U.S. 576,

PID D.C. S26 CID Ser es Ae ee
In re Korean Air Disaster of September ], 1983,

829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ..... ye
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.

Gilbertson,

_. US. _, 121 S. G. 2773, 115 L. Bt.

eS oe ee ee ee ree i A

McCool v. Strata Oil Co..
972 F.2d 1452 (7th Cir. 1992) .... 1,3,9,10

Menowitz v. Brown,
991 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993) ......... 1,3

Robert Eckstein, et al. v. Balcor Film
Investors, et al,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [Current] (CCH) $ 97,712
(7th Cir. Aug. 20,1993) ........... 1,3

-1V-

Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., —
908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied.

ano. 4% geev Geel) 4s wd, ne 3, 4
Van Dusen v. Barrack

376 U.S. 612 (1984) ........... 2,4, 5,7

STATUTES
IS U.S.C. §10() 2... Passim
SP 8 tl 7! A a eee Passim
OP rs ED ho wd vw ch wee 4
SOU SL. $1406 nw cece. 4
MISCELLANEOUS

Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers
Within The Federal Jurisdiction System,
93 Yale L.J. 677, 708-09 (1984) ...... 4,7

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Summary

The Seventh Circuit decision’ of which review is
sought deals solely with the law "in [that] jurisdiction" -- .e.,
Seventh Circuit law as of June 19, 1991, relating to §10(b)
limitations periods, choice of law and retroactivity. The
questions at issue are esoteric and unlikely to recur.
Moreover, the answers to these questions are not dispositive
of the instant controversy.

No intolerable conflict exists between Balcor and
Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993). Each
court applied the law of its Circuit -- the law of the transferee
court -- as "the jurisdiction" under §27A, to determine the
applicable statute of limitations. Each court, the Seventh
Circuit in Balcor and the Second Circuit in Menowitz, applied
its choice of law rules to guide its determination. Any
"conflict" is in the result only and therefore is tolerable
because it arises only due to the differing choice of law rules
in those circuits. Furthermore, there are both legal and
factual distinctions between the Balcor and Menowitz
opinions which render any "conflict" unimportant and
unworthy of Supreme Court review.

_With regard to the Eckstein action’, Seventh Circuit

' Robert Eckstein, et al. v. Balcor Film Investors, et al., Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. [Current] (CCH) 497,712 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 1993) ("Balcor").

2 There are two related cases to which the petition addressed itself:
Robert Eckstein and Sylvia Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, et al. (the
"Eckstein action") and Majeski v. Balcor Film Investors, et al. (the
"Majeski action").

choice of laws rules directed the court to Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1984) and Ferens v. John Deere Co..
494 U.S. 576, 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). The court then
applied Van Dusen and Ferens to reach the conclusion that
the transferor forum supplied the statute of limitations.
Neither the holding in De/Costello v. Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) nor Jn re Korean Air
Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1987) precludes the application of the Van Dusen and Ferens
principles.

The sole question in the Majeski action is whether the
Seventh Circuit properly followed its own law relating to its
well-established test for retroactivity, which Majeski clearly
satisfies. The Majeski action being timely, the litigation
against the Petitioners will continue. Moreover, even without
a §10(b) claim, the same underlying facts would be tried in
one forum or another under Majeski's breach of fiduciary
duty claim.

All issues in these cases cannot be resolved by the
grant of the petition because the Seventh Circuit remanded
both cases. Thus, no final resolution of the issues will result
from this Court's review.

This Court should deny review of the matters
presented in the petition.

i
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
IN THE ECKSTEIN ACTION IS NOT
APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW

A. The Seventh Circuit Applied Its Own Choice of
Law Rules

In its decision (App. 8), the Seventh Circuit pointed
out that §27A recognizes a "non-uniform" practice of
determining the appropriate statute of limitations in a §10(b)
case. It characterized §27A by stating: "[s]ection 27A
recognizes that different circuits had taken different
approaches to the appropriate statute of limitations in suits
under §10(b), and it codifies this fractured nature of federal
law for cases filed before June 20, 1991." App. 8. The
Seventh Circuit thus looked to its own law prior to Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind. Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, _ U.S. _
111 S. Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) to determine the
proper statute of limitations to apply to the Eckstein action.
Specifically, it looked to its choice of law principles and
analogized the situation to one where the laws of two states
presented two different limitations period. App. 7-9.

Contrary to the Petitioners’ portrayal, the Seventh
Circuit did not state that: "[s]ection 27A requires a transferee
court to apply the law of the transferor forum." Rather, the
court stated: "The district in which the court that decides the
case sits must be 'the jurisdiction’ for purposes of §27A", as
Menowitz stated.

Menowitz, in deciding under §27A whether its pre-
Lampf limitations period’ could be applied to a §1407
transferred case, considered "whether Second Circuit doctrine
directs application of the Eleventh Circuit limitations rule to
such a transferred claim." Each circuit court looked to its
own doctrine as of June 19, 1991, to determine the
appropriate limitations period "provided by the laws
applicable in [its] jurisdiction,” pursuant to §27A. Thus,
there is no intolerable conflict between Balcor and Menowitz.

B. The Seventh Circuit Choice of Law Rules Directed
the Court to Van Dusen and Ferens

The Eckstein action was initially commenced on
February 10, 1989 in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. At that time, the statute of
limitations applicable to §10(b) actions in both the Central
District of California and the Eastern District of Wisconsin
was three (3) years from discovery. Indeed, it was not until
one and one-half years of active litigation (and one year after
the transfer of the Eckstein action) that the Seventh Circuit
announced a new statute of limitations in Short v. Belleville
Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991). Thus, the potential effect of the
transfer of Eckstein -- more than a mere change of location -
- did not arise until long after the transfer had been ordered.*

> Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
* On the other hand, the Menowitz court addressed the issue of
which statute of limitations applied to an action commenced and
transferred to a district court in the Second Circuit after the Second
Circuit adopted its new statute of limitations in Ceres.

In deciding which statute of limitations to apply to the
Eckstein action. the court looked to the law of the Seventh
Circuit, including its choice of law rules. Those rules direct
the application of Van Dusen and Ferens

This Court held in Van Dusen and again in Ferens
that a transfer of venue from one district court to a district
court within another circuit

should be regarded as a federal judicial
housekeeping measure, dealing with the
placement of litigation in the federal courts
and generally intended, on the basis ol
convenience and fairness, simply to authorize
a change of courtrooms

Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636-37 (emphasis added); see also
Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1279, 1281

Petitioners rely heavily upon De/Costello and Korean
Air, claiming that those cases eroded Van Dusen. However,
Petitioners ignore that this Court, in Ferens (decided after
both De/Costello and Korean Air), reaffirmed the principles
of Van Dusen.

DelCostello fails to offer support for Petitioners’
conclusion that the Seventh Circuit erred. De/Costello stated:
"that our holding today should not be taken as a departure
from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for
federal causes of action, in labor law or elsewhere." /d at
171. The footnote upon which Petitioners re!y goes further
than the mere snippet they provide to this Court; it states:

Since Erie, no decision of this Court has held
or suggested that the Act requires borrowing

S

State law to fill gaps in federal substantive
statutes. Of course, we have continued since
Erie to apply state limitations periods to many
federal causes of action....

* * *

We do not suggest that the Erie
doctrine is wholly irrelevant to all federal
causes of action. On the contrary, where
Congress directly or impliedly directs the
courts to look to state law to fill in details of
federal law, Erie will ordinarily provide the
framework for doing so. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 159-161 n.13. Therefore, it is
inaccurate to suggest that De/Costello abrogated Van Dusen.

Notably, in De/Costello, this Court was not
confronted with circumstances presented in Van Dusen, in
Ferens or here. However, this Court, both before
DelCostello (in Van Dusen) and after DelCostello (in
Ferens), recognized the likelihood of the Balcor issue arising
(relating to the Eckstein action) when it declared:

The possibilities suggested by the plaintiffs’
argument illustrate the difficulties that would
arise if a change of venue, granted at the
motion of a defendant, were to result in a
change of law.... /JJn other cases the
transferee forum might have a shorter statute
of limitations... In such cases a defendant's
motion to transfer could be tantamount to a
motion to dismiss.

a

Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 629-30 (emphasis added). See also,
Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1281. Accord: Marcus, Conflicts
Among Circuits and Transfers Within The Federal
Jurisdiction System, 93 Yale L. J. 677, 708-09 (1984).

Petitioners also erroneously contend that Korean Air
mandates the rejection of Van Dusen as the applicable
standard in the circumstances presented in Eckstein.
Petitioners misunderstand both the nature of the Korean Air
decision and the concept of a "federal question" for purposes
of determining which statute of limitations applies to
Eckstein, the Ninth Circuit (as the transferor court) or the
Seventh Circuit (as the transferee court).

In Korean Air, the court was concerned with the
consolidation of litigation commenced in five different district
courts, representing four different circuits, arising out of a
disaster occurring over international waters. The court
addressed the quagmire presented by the possible application
of multiple interpretations of the law under which the actions
were commenced, the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Agreement. Korean Air, 829 F.2d at 1174. Given that these
international agreements have the force of federal statutes in
the United States and that the matter involved no state laws,
the Korean Air court concluded that because there would be
one interpretation of those agreements, it could, as well as
any other court, determine the issues. /d at 1175-76.

The circumstances of Korean Air cannot, however, be
analogized to §10(b) statute of limitations issues in the era
preceding Lampf when no "unitary federal law" existed. In
pre-Lampf securities litigation, most federal district courts
looked to the state cause of action most analogous to §10(b)
and borrowed its statute of limitations, Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at
2785-86, to assess the timeliness of the action.

a

The issue before the District Court, and again before
the Seventh Circuit, was not the interpretation of a federal
statute. Rather, it was confronted with determining the
proper statute of limitations by which to evaluate the
timeliness of the Eckstein action. Pursuant to Seventh Circuit
choice of law rules, this Court's decisions in Van Dusen and
Ferens require the District Court to apply the statute of
limitations applicable in the transferor court. Thus, this
Court should not review the Seventh Circuit's application of
its choice of law rules.

_ tees The Seventh Circuit Discussion Of Section 27A
Does Not Merit Review By The Court

The issue, if any exists, regarding the interpretation
of §27A, is of limited import since the statute was enacted as
a stop gap measure of limited duration. The number of cases
still pending to which the interpretation of §27A may apply
is limited. The circumstances present in Eckstein, a pre-
Lampf case commenced in one jurisdiction and transferred to
another, further narrow the field of cases on which the
resolution of such an "issue" would have an effect. Indeed,
it would relate only to: (a) §10(b) cases which (b) were
commenced on or before June 19, 1991, where (c) there is
a difference in two limitations periods.

Therefore, the review of the Seventh Circuit opinion
as to §27A will have a limited effect on a circumscribed
group of §10(b) cases, those filed on or before June 19, 1991
and transferred from one court to another. Therefore, there
is no need for this Court to determine the “interplay”
between §27A and §1404(a), as Petitioners claim.

_9.

Il.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
THE MAJESKI ACTION IS NOT APPROPRIATE
FOR REVIEW

The petition's challenge to Balcor as it relates to the
Majeski action is limited to one paragraph. Petition at 14.
There. the Petitioners question whether the reliance (on the
earlier limitations period) proffered by the Majeski plaintiffs
(choice of forum) was sufficient under Seventh Circuit law
("including principles of retroactivity”) as of June 19, 1991

The Petitioners argued in the court below that
"reliance" on an earlier limitations period must consist in
postponement of the filing of the action in the belief that the
longer (earlier) limitations period was available. This
argument is repeated by Petitioners here (Petition at 14),
asserting it is "obvious" a choice of forum cannot suffice as
reliance because “it does not represent any detrimental
change of position as to the timing of the lawsuit." Id

That is incorrect. In this context, the Petitioners’
when-versus-where argument is a distinction without a
difference: "where" determines how much time a litigant has
(the limitations period for filing the action); "when"
determines how much time a litigant takes. Either question
satisfies the Petitioner's artificial requirement that "reliance"
must relate to timing. The Seventh Circuit's McCool
decision had already rejected the Petitioners’ argument and
specifically found that selection of a forum does satisfy the
reliance requirement. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1459.

Just as the McCoo! plaintiffs relied on the selection of
a forum (federal v. state), so did the Majeski plaintiffs
(selecting the Seventh Circuit over the Ninth Circuit), a move

-10- -

the Mayeski plaintiffs "presumably would not have made had
they anticipated their federal claims would be time-barred"
under Seventh Circuit law. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1459. The
controlling concern in McCool, as in the Chevron Oil
decision it follows, is whether inequity results from
retroactive application of a shortened limitations period to an
action that was timely when commenced. The inequity is as
great whether the reliance is in choosing where or when to
file.

Petitioners argue that “every plaintiff could say ‘If I
had known what the future would bring in this jurisdiction,
I would have sued somewhere else'." Petition at 14. Not
every §10(b) plaintiff had a choice of forums; but if one did.
making the choice may have involved detrimental reliance.
The reliance admitted by the petitioners as sufficing is subject
to the same comment: while not every §10(b) plaintiff had
the option of delaying the filing under the then prevailing
limitations period, those that had the option and did delay,
can say: “If I had known what the future would bring in this
jurisdiction, I would have filed earlier."

The Seventh Circuit clearly followed its own well-
established principles of retroactivity. There is no reason for
this Court to review its ruling.

=-]1 -

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully
request that the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin F. Zwerling

Counsel of Record

Robert S. Schachter

Hillary Sobel

ZWERLING, SCHACHTER &
ZWERLING

767 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10017

(212) 223-3900

George P. Kersten

E. Campion Kersten

KERSTEN & MCKINNON, S.C.
231 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53203

(414) 271-0054

Michael S. Glassman

Kathleen L. Clemens

GLASSMAN AND CLEMENS,
A Professional Corporation

3200 Wilshire Blvd.

Los Angeles, CA 90010

(213) 389-9623

se

Jerry H. Friedland

GALANIS, FRIEDLAND &
POLLACK, S.C

Two Plaza East, Suite 560

330 East Kilbourn Avenue

Milwaukee, WI 53202

(414) 271-5400

Attorneys for Respondents

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386003_0819%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
