# Transcript of Record — Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Transcript of Record
- **Published:** January 1, 1916
- **Citation:** 239 U.S. 595

## Text

(24,824)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1915.

No. 541.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
, v8.
JAMES T. HORTON.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH

CAROLINA.
INDEX

: Original. Print
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INDEX,

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Order overruling motions to set avide verdict and for new
UREA OA sid RUE Chas oe ae WEE NOS % 0:60.46 oom ewes ee
Defendant's statement of case on appeal..............066-
PUGS OL PMO Es BEORTOMR s ciis-tcc cc cecssees sede
James T. Horton (recalled).............

CSG es RE SP = 2 gre aera era

el TE Sie is hie Kee bak 6 dbo s odie eeinne

ee MS ne 8k ae ”

The Court refused to give this instruction, and the defendant
excepts.

glass when he knew there was no guard glass on it and that it was
angerous to use the water glass in that condition, you will answer
the first issue “No.”

The Court refused to give this instruction, and the defendant
excepts,

Exception No. 49.

22. If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff could have
performed his duties in operating the engine o using the gauge
cocks for the purpose of telling how much water was in the boiler,
and he continued to use the water glass without the guard glass,
you will answer the first issue “No,”

The Court refused to give this instruction, and the defendant
excepts.

Exception No. 50.

23. If you find from the evidence that the guard glass was in
its proper place on the engine when the plaintiff started on his
tun on the morning of July 27, 1910, and that the defendant had
no knowledge of the absence of such guard, and it was plaintiff's
duty to make note of the absence of the guard glass in writing

on his work report and he failed to do so, and you further

176 find that defendant’s failure to have knowledge of the ab-
sence of the guard glass was due solely to defendant’s reliance

upon the performance of plaintiff's duty to make report in writing,
of the absence of the guard glass, the Court instructs you that there
been no negligence on the part of the defendant, and you will

answer the first issue “No,”
WINSTON & BIGGS,
MURRAY ALLEN,
Attorneys for Defendant.

an

114 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

Judge's Charge.

The Court charged the jury as follows:

Now, gentlemen of the Jury, this is an action instituted by the
plaintiff under the Federal Statute, which we lawyers, in order
to designate it, cail the Federal Lmployers’ Liability Statute.

That statute provides that a person seeking relief under it may
institute his suit either in the Federal Court or in the State court at
his pleasure, but when it is instituted in the State court, the State
court is governed by the law as laid down by the Federal Courts.
In other words, we try it in this court exactly in the same manner as
if it were tried in the Federal Court, and we are bound by the Fed-
eral decisions applicable to this particular statute.

I deem it my duty to tell you in order that you may see the
necessity of it that in this particular case the Supreme Court of
North Carolina and the Supreme Court of the United States do not
agree upon what rules of law are applicable to this particular case,
but we are compelled to accept as the law, and it is the law that
which is laid down in this particular case by the Supreme Court
of the United States.

I shall endeavor as near as in my power to apply to this case the
rules of law which have been laid down in this particular case by
the Supreme Court of the United States.

There was a denial of the right of the plaintiff in the first
177 _ instance to bring this action under the Federal Statute, be
cause it was denied that the injured employee was actually
engaged in iuterstate commerce. That has been gotten out of the
way, and is not at issue, it having been admitted in open court. that
the employee at the time of the alleged injury was engaged in inter-
state commerce within the meaning of the act, and that, therefore,
this suit is properly triable in this case under that act, but it must
be tried in accordance with that act and in accordance with the in-
terpretation by the Supreme Court of the United States and not in
accordance with the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

In that decision, and I will charge you about that later, the Su-
preme Court of the United States holds, now holds that under the
statute assumption of risk is a defense to an action of this character.

In North Carolina that is not so, but it is so in this case. The
Supreme Court of the United States has said so, and when established
by the defendant who alleges it, it is an absolute bar to recovery
under this statute. So that much is settled.

Prior to the last Legislature, when a man was guilty of con-
tributory negligence under the North Carolina law, and it was s0
found by a jury by the preponderance of evidence, that prevented
him from recovery at all. That was also a bar. But under the
Federal Statute, it is not a bar to a recovery, but as the statute says,
contributory negligence shall not bar recovery but the damages shall
be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of the negli-
gence attributahle to such employee. In other words, it does away
with the absolute bar, but the damages shall be diminished in pro-

SEABYARD AIR LINE RAILWAY YS, JAMES T. PORTON, 115

eyery to the negligence attributable to the plaintiff, if there should
any, if you find any.

With these general remarks, I am going to try as nearly as possible
to charge you exactly what the § upreme Court of the United States

has said is the law applicable to this particular case.
178 They have held that the common law rule of negligence
and the common law duty imposed upon the common carrier
is the rule applicable in this case,

(They, as I understand the decision, and as T charge you the de-
cision is, hold it is not the duty of the railroad company, not an abso-
lute duty that the railroad company owes to a servant to furnish an
absolutely safe place, or absolutely safe and secure tools and appli-
ances and equipment with which to do his work, but that the rule is
that the railroad company shall exercise ordinary care and prudence
to the end that—I want to use the exact languace—to the end that
the tools and appliances of the work may be safe for the workman.
The Supreme Court of the United States says that the common law
rule is that an emplover is not a guarantor of the safety of the place
of work or of the machinery and appliances of the work, The extent
of its duty to its employees is to see that ordinarv care and prudence
are exercised, to the end that the place in which the work is to be
performed and the tools and appliances of the work may be safe for
the workmen.

It is the duty of the employer to exercise due care in respect to pro-
viding a safe place of work. and suitable and safe appliances for the
work.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses defendant excepts. i

Exception No. 51, i

That is the exact language which I have read vou from the report \
of the Supreme Court of the United States in this particular case,
and I charge you that that is the duty which is owed by the defend.
ant to the plaintiff in this action.

I will try to take them up separately end try to apply these prin-
ciples to the issues, which will be submitted by consent of all parties, 5
all of the attorneys on both sides, which arise on the pleadings, which
are four in number.
The first issue is, Was the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the }

defendant as alleged in the complaint? et :
179 The burden upon that issue is upon the plaintiff to satisfy

you by the preponderance of the evidence or the greater ;
weight of the evidence of the truth of that allegation. That is simply,
was the plaintiff, was Mr. Horton, injured, you know what that ”
means, a word of ordinary meaning, by the necligence of the de- }
fendant, the railroad company, as alleged in the complaint. j

The allegations of negligence in the complaint are as follows, and ;
upon which he relies for recoverv in this action ; that in disregard of |
its duty, the defendant negligently furnished to the plaintiff a loco-
motive engine with which to draw the aforesaid loaded cars, which
was negligently and carelessly equipped with a water glass that was
not modern in its make, was unsafe for use, and that was of an in-
ferior grade and quality, which water glass was known to the defend-

,
;
SORRELL? GAIT EL LR LIRR AE APE TIE! AOE, |

77

116 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

ant not to be modern in its make and unsafe for use and of inferior
grade and quality, and that the said water glass was imperfect in
several particulars, which were also known to the defendant.

A jury in trying to discharge its duty conscientiously perhaps, if
permitted, would ask the question, What do you mean by negligence,
and in order that there may be no mistake as to what I say negligence
is, I will ask you to listen to this. (Negligence is the omission to do
what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done
under the circumstances of the situation; or doing what a reasonable
= man under the existing circumstances would not have done.

hat is negligence. )

To the foregoine charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 52.

(And it becomes actionable when it is the proximate cause of the
injury, either when it is the direct cause thereof, or when the injury
is the natural and probable consequences of the act, and when in the
exercise of ordinary care, an ordinarily prudent person would have

foreseen that such consequences would likely be produced
180 thereby. It is not every negligence that is actionable, but T
repeat, it becomes actionable when it is the proximate cause
of the injury, either when it is the direct cause thereof, or when the
injury is the natural and probable consequence of the act, an.1 when
in the exercise of ordinary care, an ordinarily prudent person would
have for-seen that such consequences would likely be produced
thereby. )

To the foregoing charge in pare-theses, defendant excepts.

Fxception No. 53.

That definition is in simple language, and would be understood
by the ordinary layman, except the words “proximate cause,” and in
order that you may understand that, exactly what proximate cause
means, I will read you a definition:

(The law is, that if the act is one which the party ought in the
exercise of ordinary care to have anticipated was liable to result in
injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately result
ing from it, although he could not anticipate the particular injury
that did happen. Consequences which flow in unbroken sequence,
without an intervening cause, from the original negligent act are nat
ural and proximate, and for such consequences the original wrong
doer is responsible. even though he could not have for-seen the par
ticular result which did follow.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 54.

(The first requisite of proximate cause is the doing or omitting to
do an act which a person of ordinary prudence could foresee might
naturally or probably produce the injury, and second that it did
actually produce it.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 55.
181 In this case the plaintiff contends that you ought to find
from this evidence by its greater weight that the railroad com-
pany did not exercise ordinary care in providing him a safe place
to work, and safe tools and appliances with which to do the work;

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON. 117

that they negligently, and when IT sav “negligent” I mean it as
applied to the definition I have given, that they negligently furnished
him an engine which did not have a shield to the water glass, and that
by reason of this, without any other intervening cause, that the glass
exploded and his eye was injured, and that a man of ordinary pru-
dence could have foreseen that that would likely have resulted from
such condition on their part, and that their conduct in this particular

water glass, that it did furnish it with the guard, ane when it fur-
nished it to the plaintiff it Was properly and safely equipped for use,
and that it was in proper condition, and if it had been allowed to
remain as it was, it would have prevented the injury, and that they

any notice of its defect, and that there was no breach of duty on their
part in failing to keep it in repair, as they contend that they had
ho notice and were given no notice by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff replying says that he did give notice, and that they

promised to repair, and acting upon that promise he went along

What do you say about it, gentlemen? The burden is upon the
plaintiff to satisfy vou by the creater weight of the evidence that the
defendant was negligent, and that that negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury.

Unless the plaintiff has so satisfied you by the greater weight of
the evidence, you will answ-r th- first is-ne “No,” and if you answer

first issue “No,” you need not answer any of the other
issues,
182 (If you find from the evidence that the guard glass was in
its proper place on the engine when the plaintiff started on his
run on the morning of July 27, 1910, and that the defendant had no
nowl-dge of the absence of such a glass, and it was the plaintiff’s
duty to make a note of the absence of the glass in writing on his
work report, and he failed to do so, and you further find that the de-
fendant’s failure to have knowledge of the absence of the guard glass
was due solely to the plaintiff's failure to make the report in writing
of the absence of the guard glass, the Court instructs you that there
has been no negligence on the part of the defendant, and you will
answer the first issue et
To the forecoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.
Exception No. 56.
As I have already said, if you answer the first issue “No,” you need
hot answer the others, but if you answer it “Yes,” then you will pro-
ceed to consider the second. ;
Now, gentlemen, the fact that T charge you on all of the issues does
hot mean that I. think one way or the other about how you ought to
answer an issue. If I had an opinion about it, it would be wrong for
me to express it to you. You have to try the case and not myself, so
the fact T charge you upon the second issue does not mean that I
ink you ought to answer the first issue “Yes” or “No,” but I charge
you on all of the issues in order that you may have the law applicable
of the issues, and so you shall not construe the fact that I charge

118 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Vs. JAMES T. HORTON.

you upon all of the issues as any indication as to how I think they
ought to be answered. You shall not construe anything I say to
you as how I think they should be answered, but you should answer
them as you fivd the facts to be from the evidence by its greater
weight, and you should answer them first in the order in which they
come, because if you answer the first issue “No,” that ends it, but if
you answer it “Yes,” then it is your duty to proceed to consider the
second issue,
183 The second issue is, If so, did plaintiff assume the risk of
injury? ‘Therefore, if you answer the first issue “Yes,” then
you proceed to the second issue, Did plaintiff assume the risk of
injury.

There is a distinction between contributory negligence and assump-

tion of risk, so that you define the difference between them in this
way:
(Contributory negligence is a want of ordinary care upon the part
of a person injured by the actionable negligence of another, com-
bining and concurring with that negligence and contributing to the
injury as a proximate cause thereof. without which the injury would
not have occurred.)

To the forevoing charge in parentneses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 57.

(Contributory negligence arises when the plaintiff as well as de-
fendant has done some act negligently or has omitted through negli-
gence to do some act, which it was their respective duty to do, and
this combined negligence produces the injury.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 58.

(The Supreme Court in passing upon this particular case says, and
it is the law so far as this case is concerned:

The distinction between contributory negligence and assumption
of risk is simple. Contributory negligence involves the notion of
come fault or breach of duty on the part of some employee, and since
it is ordinarily his duty to take some precaution for his own safety
when engaged in a hazardous occupation, contributory negligence
is sometimes defined as failure to use such eare for his safety as an
ordinarily prudent employee under similar circumstances would use.

On the other hand, assumption of risk, even though the risk be

obvious, may be free from any suggestion of fault or negli-
184 gence on the part of the employee. The risk may be present

notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable care on the part
of the employee. )

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 59.

(Some employments are necessarily fraught with danger to the
workman, danger that must be and is confronted in the line of his
duty. Such dangers as are normally and necessarily incident to the
occupation are presumably taken into account in fixing the rate 0
wages, and a workman of mature years is taken to assume risks of this
sort, whether he is actually aware of them or not. )

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 60.

-

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Vs, JAMES T. HORTON. 119

(But risks of another sort, not naturally incident to the occupa-
tion, may arise out of the failure of the employer, the defendant in
this case, to exercise due care with respect to providing a safe place
of work and suitable and safe appliances for the work,

These risks, the latter risks, the employee is not treated as assum-
ing until he becomes aware of the defect or disrepair, and of the risk
arising from it, unless defect and risk alike are so obvious that an
ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances would have ob-
served and appreciated them.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No, 61.

(When an employee does know of the defect, and appreciates the
risk that is attributable to it, then if he continues in the employment

without objection, or without obtaining from his employer or
185 his representative an assurance that the defect will be rem-

edied, the employee assumes the risk even though it arises
out of the mas’er’s breach of duty.)

To the foregoing charge in parenthesis, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 62.

(If, however, there be a promise of reparation, even during such
time as may be reasonably required for its performance, or until
the particular time specified for its performance, the employee rely-
ing upon the promise does not assume the risk unless at least the
danger be so imminent that no ordinarily prudent man under the
circumstances would rely upon such promise. )

To the foregoing charge in parenthesis, defendant excepts,

Exception No. 63.

Gentlemen, I have read to you from the decision in this particular
case, and that is the law, and the distinction between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. These are the definitions of con-
tributory negligence which you shall observe in determining this
case. That is the law.

The Court charges you that the statute of North Carolina, Re-
visal Section 2546, abolishing assumption of risk as a defense to an
action brought against a railroad company by one of its emp!oyvees,
has no application in this case, and if you find that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of injury from the explosion of the water glass, you
will answer the second issue “Yes.” Of course, bearing in mind the
definition of assumption of risk that I have already given” you.

If the jury shall find by a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff appreciated the risk incident to the use of the gauge glass
without the glass, and that he reported the absence of the guard glass
and was given a promise to repair, the Court charges you that under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act the burden of proof is on the

plaintiff to satisfy you by a preponderance of the evidence that
186 he was induced to continue in the employment of his reliance

upon the fulfillment of the promise, and if plaintiff has failed
0 so satisfy you, you will answer the second issue Yes.

Generally, the burder of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk is upon the defendant. The burden of the first issue is
upon the plaintiff. (The burden of the second issue is upon the
defendant, and the burden of wae third issue is upon the defend-

—_— mM SSNI ADDERS A Soe MOD Seta PP APSO AAD TN 9 *
aa a eL ha i : ;

120 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

ant, and the defendant should offer you evidence to sustain the
plea of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 64.

I say this because this particular prayer is directed at a par-
ticular state of facts which are in that particular praver. (If you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintif€ appreci-
ated the risk incident to the use of the gauge glass without the
guard glass, the Court instructs you that under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act, he assumed the risk and you will answer
the second issue Yes, unless the plaintiff has satisfied you by a pre
ponderance of the evidence that he reported the absence of the
guard glass and was given a promise of repair and that he was
induced by such promise to continue in the employment. That is,
relying on that promise he continued to use that engine.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 65.

If you find that the plaintiff appreciated the danger from the use
of the water gauge without the guard glass, the Court charges you
that the burden is upon the plaintiff to satisfy you by a preporider-
ance of evidence that a promise of repair was given by some agent
of the defendant authorized to make it, and that his reliance upon

the promise was the inducing motive for his consenting to
187 subject himself to the danger, and if he has failed to do so,
you will answer the second issue Yes.

If you find that the plaintiff appreciated the risk and that a rea-
sonably prudent man would not have continued to use the water
gauge in the absence of the guard glass, the Court instructs you that
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the plaintiff assumed
the risk, and you will answer the second issue “Yes.” _ i ts

The right of the plaintiff to recover damages in this action is to
be determined by the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Lia-
bility Act, enacted by Congress at the session of 1908, and the
Court charges you that if you find by a preponderance of evidence
that the water glass on the engine on which the plaintiff was em-
ployed was not provided with a guard glass and the condition of
the water glass was open and obvious and was fully known to the
plaintiff, and he continued to use such water glass with such knowl-
edge and without objection, and that he knew the risk incident
thereto, then the Court charges you that the plaintiff voluntarily
assumed the risk incident to such use, and you will answer the
issue Yes.
ag ck find by the greater weight of the evidence that the water
glass was defective and that the plaintiff knew of the condition
of the water glass on the engine and appreciated the danger incl
dent to its use and that there was open to him a safe way of oper
ating said engine by using the gauge cocks and that he voluntarily
used the water glass in operating the engine, the Court charges
you that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from the use of
the water glass and you will answer the second issue Yes.

If you answer the first issue Yes, then the Court charges you

7

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES 1. HORTON, 121

that if you find by the preponderance of the evidence that the
absence of the guard glass and water gauge was open and obvious
and was fully known to the plaintiff and he continued to use the

said glass with such knowledge and that the plaintiff re-
188 ported the defect and was given a promise to repair, and

you further ‘find that the plaintiff knew and appreciated the
danger incident thereto, and that the danger was so obvious that

es.

(If you answer the first issue “Yes,” then the Court charges you
that under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, if you find that
the plaintiff appreciated the risk incident to the use of the water
gauge without the guard glass, and you should further find that
the plaintiff told the defendant’s round house foreman that the
guard glass was gone and was given a promise of repair, yet if you
should find that the time reasonably required for the performance
of this promise had expired at the time of the explosion of the

you answer the second’ issue Yes, that he assumed the risk
incident to his injury, the burden being upon the defendant to
satisfy you of that by the greater weight of the evidence, you need
not ans\ver the third and fourth issues, )
To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendants excepts.
Exception No. 66.
Because that would be a bar to the recovery under the decision
of the United States Supreme Court, but if you answer the second
issue No, then it is your duty to proceed to answer the third issue.
Gentlemen, the third issue is this, Did the plaintiff by his own
negligence contribute to his injury?
have in a measure gone over that on the other issues, charging
you and giving you a definition upon the issue of assumption of
risk.
189 The defendant says that you ought to find from this evi-
dence that the plaintiff knew when he was leaving Johnson
Street on the 27th of Jnly, or soon after he left, upon his own
evidence, that this guard glass was gone; that he knew the purpose
for which it was there; that he had been an engineer for a num-
ber of years, and that he knew the risk, and that you ought to find
that he assumed the risk that was incident, that he knew it was
liable to explode at any time and injure him, and that he volun-
larily, without any promise on anybody’s part, with a perfectly safe
way ‘open to operate the engine with the gauge cocks, that he vol-
untarily assumed to run the engine with this water glass in this
known, obvious, defective condition, which was liable to burst at
any time, and if you find that he, therefore, assumed the risk,
and if you find-that no reasonably prudent man would have con.
tinued to run it in that condition, but that he would have shut off

16—541

122 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

the water glass and run the engine without it, then he assumed
the risk that was incident thereto.

The plaintiff on the other hand says that you should not so find.
That even should you find that the guard glass was gone, that this
water glass did not burst with any degree of frequency, that any
reasonable man under the existing circumstances of the situation
would have gone and used it; that it was only a few years ago when
they were using engines all over the country without this guard
glass, and that there was no known visible danger, but that he could
not have appreciated that it was liable to break and that he did
report it as soon as he had an opportunity upon his next trip to the
round house foreman and was givén a promise of repair, and
relying upon this promise, the danger not being so obvious that a
man of ordinary prudence would not have done it, he continued to
run it with the promise of repair, and that an ordinarily prudent
engineer would have gone like he did, and that he is not guilty
of contributory negligence or assumption of risk, but that the con-

dition was brought about by the negligence of the defendant,
190 = and that an ordinarily prudent man would have come to the

conclusion under the existing circumstances of the situation
that it would not be liable to produce injury to him during the time
he was asked to run the engine, while in this condition, under
promise of repair.

(The burden is upon the defendant to satisfy you that the plain-
tiff assumed the risk which resulted in his injury.)

To the foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 67.

Bear in mind the definition of risk I have read to you, and say
under the circumstances whether he assumed it. A man can assume
a risk that is normally incident to his employment; he can assume
a risk under certain circumstances, and when I say he assumed a
risk. I tell you to bear in mind the definition I have given you.

(The burden is upon the defendant to satisfy vou by the greater
weight of the evidence on the second issue that the plaintiff did
assume the risk of his injury. If it has so satisfied you by the
preponderance of evidence, you will answer the issue Yes, and
unless they have so satisfied you, you will answer it No.)

To the forecoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 68.

If you answer the second issue Yes, you need not answer the
others, but if you answer it No, then you will go to the next issues.

The defendant contends that the plaintiff, that is, Mr. Horton,
should have cut off the water glass, cut it out or shut it off, and
used the gauge cocks, which the defendant contends is a perfectly
safe and prudent way to do it.

The plaintiff contends that an ordinarily prudent man would
have run like he did, and that an ordinarily prudent man would
have done as he did, and that there is no negligence attributable

to his conduct, but his conduct was that of an ordinarily
191 prudent man, but the defendant contending that it is the
conduct of a careless man, and that a man who has no reg

for his safety.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Vs, JAMES T. HORTON, 128

others, but if you answer it No, that ends the case.

One more instruction on contributory negligence which I have
been requested to give.

If you answer the first issue Yes and the second issue No, and if
you find by the greater weight of evidence that the plaintiff knew
of the condition of the water glass on the engine and that he
could have shut off the glass and operated his engine with safety
by using the gauge cocks on the said engine, and that the plaintiff
with such knowledge failed to shut off the glass and use the gauge
cocks, then the Court charges you that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence and you will answer the third issue Yes,

Now that brings us to the consideration of the fourth issue,
What damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover?

This case, on account of the Federal Statute, in a measure
changes the ordinary manner of ascertaining damages, hecause in
the statute itself this language is used. I mean in the statute under
which this action is brought this language is used:

“That in all actions hereafter brought against any such com-
mon carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions
of this act to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee,
or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that
the employee, the plaintiff, may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery—bar means entirely defeat
recovery—but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence atrtibutable to such’ em-

lovee.”

: So vour estimate of damages are to be controlled to some extent,

depending in extent upon the amount of negligence attributable to
the employee as to how you answer the third issue,

192 If you answer the third issue No, that he did not con-
tribute to his injury, the measure of damages is as follows:

(The rule is that where the plaintiff has been injured by the
negligent conduct of the defendant, he is entitled to recover dam-
ages for past and prospective loss resulting from defendant’s negli-
gent act, and this may embrace indemnity for actual expense in-
curred, in nursing, medical attention, loss of time, loss of ability
to perform mental or physical labor, or capacity to earn money,
and actual suffering of body or mind which are the immediate and
hecessary consequences of his injury. You will consider bodily
pain and suffering occasioned by the Injury, if any resulted from
said injury, and in case you find that the plaintiff has not vet
recovered from said injury, or that he has been permanently dis-
abled, then you will take such facts and circumstances into con-
sideration in estimating the damages, to which vou may add such
amount in your sound discretion that you may think from the
evidence will be compensation for the injuries that are purely and
Plainly the consequences of the injury complained of. That is

the rule.
To a foregoing charge in parentheses, defendant excepts.

Exception No. 69.

aM

rT

124 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

If you find that he was guilty of contributory negligence, the
same rule applies, except that you should diminish that amount
in proportion as you find negligence attributable to the plaintiff,

I will use the exact language of the statute: “The fact that the
employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such
employee,” Mr. Horton, the plaintiff in this instance.

That is the rule, if he is guilty of contributory negligence, then

you shall diminish that amount in proportion to the amount
193 of negligence you attribute to the employee. Of course, if

you find no negligence, you do not diminish it, but if you
do find contributory negligence, you do diminish it in that pro-
portion which I have just explained to vou.

Again, the fact that I charge you upon the question of damages
does not mean that I think the plaintiff ought to have a cent, or
any specific amount, or the whole amount. If I intimated to you
any opinion about it, it would be wrong, and either side would
object, but, gentlemen, you: are to try the fact, and I want to say
to you again that nothing I have said to you will have any effect
as to whether any fact has or has not been established.

Upon the question of damages, the plaintiff contends that prior
to this time he was reasonably making from $165 to $190 a month,
and that by reason of this injury he suffered intensely for a great
many weeks, and that he was compelled to remain idle, and even
then when he could get employment he could only earn about $17
a week, and later up to $20, and now up to $25 a week, and that
now, as he contends on account of the condition left by this injury
he is not now able to perform the duties of an engineer, and that
he can not secure employment in the occupation of a locomotive
engineer, and the position he has is not near so remunerative, and
by reason of all of these facts and circumstances, and on account
of the fact that he has been forced to remain idle, and has suffered
pain and inconvenience, which is the direct result of this injury,
he is entitled to a large amount of damages. The amount fixed
in the complaint is $50,000, the amount in evidence not being
fixed at any particular sum. It is not necessary for me to fix it,
gentlemen, as that is a matter entirely for you.

The defendant, on the other hand, on the question of damages,
says that the damages if any are slight, and that they have shown
you prior to this injury, in 1905, he had in his eye at that time the
particular injury from which he is suffering now, and that they

are not responsible for it, and that the defect to his vision is
194 due to that injury and not any injury which happened in

1910, and that they have shown this to you by Dr. Battle,
who made an examination at that time, and that they are not liable,
if at all, except for the temporary injury which healed of itself in a
week or ten days. And the defendant further contends that if you
find all of these issues against them, that they are only liable for
this temporary injury, and that it would be a small amount of
money.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS, JAMES T. HORTON. 125

So, gentlemen, in this particular case it becomes important for

en to determing by the greater weight of the evidence. The
urden is upon the plaintiff to satisfy you by the greater weight of
the evidence that the injury he is now suffering from was due to
this particular alleged negligence at that particular time in 1910.
He cannot recover for any defect of vision or injury that he has
| or had, or which he is suffering from now, which he had prior to
| that time.

If vou find that the defect in his vision, if you find that there is a
| defect, is due to that scar, and you further find that there was this
_ sear there back in 1905, from the evidence, and that his defect in
vision is due to that, you can not allow him one cent for that in
this case,

All you can allow for is such damages as followed from the negli-
gent act of the defendant, at the time alleged in 1910, if you do
find that the defendant was negligent on the 4th day of August.
So it becomes important for vou to determine that.

The burden is on the plaintiff when you get to estimating dam-
ages. The fact that—but I have charged you as to that. On this
question of damages, the plaintiff asserts on the one hand that his
vision was all right in 1910, and that he had no defect. and that
his eye sight was sufficient to run an engine, and that he was given
an engine, and that he did run it for years and years, and that. now
he cannot do it.

It is contended by the defendant that he has exactly the same

vision now that he had when he was running that engine,
195 and that by his own statement on cross-examination he has

said to you that he could run an engine just as well now
and as good as anybody in the country if he could get employ-
ment.

The defendant claims that he meant mechanically he could, but
on account of the defect in his vision he cannot get employment.

The burden is upon the plaintiff to show you by the greater
weight of the evidence that he was injured and that the injury
was the result of the particular act complained of. If there is any
defect in his vision which was caused by anything prior to the 4th
of August, 1910, or caused by anything except the particular act
complained of, the plaintiff cannot recover. ss)

Now, gentlemen, I do not know of any more important position
or higher duty than when a jury is called upon to assess damages.
It is a difficult proposition.

After all, gentlemen, it is what you say from the evidence, in
your good common sense and judgment based upon the evidence,
what sum will compensate the plaintiff for the injury which he
has received as a direct result of the negligence of the defendant
and not from any other source. Nothing should be given hecause it
isa railroad and nothing should be deducted because it is a railroad.
It should be treated as if one individual was liable to another in.
dividual. F

Nothing shall be given because the laintiff has not succeeded in
getting employment with the Seaboard since the injury. You can-
hot take that into consideration. You may consider that fact in

“y

passing upon the question as to the extent of his damages, whether
or not he can now run an engine, but a railroad company has the
right at any time to employ or dismiss its employees without being
liable in this case to any of them, and without giving reasons, and
that fact shall not affect you in arriving at the damages.

As I said to you, I do not know of any higher duty you are called

upon to perform than in assessing damages, because it is
196 what sum you say in your good, common sense, based upon

the evidence, is a fair, just, honest, full compensation for
the injury which the plaintiff received as a direct result of the
negligence of the defendant, not one cent more or one cent less,
When you get to that issue, if you get to it, you will answer that
issue in dollars and cents.

Now, gentlemen, the plaintiff alleges that he was injured by the
negligent act of the defendant on August 4, 1910. Of course, he
could not recover for any injury received prior to that time, | mean
any injury to his eye, in this particular case, but he can only recover
for the injury received which was directly caused by the negligent
act of this defendant, He could recover for that.

To make it plain. If when I was a child I took an axe and cut
off this finger, or cut off half of this finger, or two-thirds of this
finger, and later the railroad company, through its negligent act,
cut off the other third, I could recover damages on account of this
one-third, but I could not recover for the two-thirds heretofore cut
off. I am not using these fingers to illustrate to you or to intimate
to you or to influence you in arriving at your verdict. I am just
illustrating if there was an additional injury, I can recover for that
injury, but I can not recover for any injury which already existed.

I have read to you a definition of negligence, expense and nursing.
There is no evidence of expense and nursing, I believe, except his
$10.65 doctor’s bill. That is the general rule I have laid down.
Of course, if there is no evidence to fit the particular thing, you will
not consider it, but if there is evidence, of course, you will apply it.

Take the case, gentlemen, and say what you find.

I will repeat, if you answer the first issue No, that ends the case
and you will return your verdict, but if you answer the first issue
“Yes,” then vou will go to the second issue. If you answer the first

issue “Yes” and the second issue “Yes,” then you return your
197 verdict, but if you answer the first issue “Yes” and the second

issue “No,” then you proceed to answer the third and fourth
issues.

Take the case, gentlemen.

126 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS, JAMES T. HORTON.

The jury for their verdict answered the issues as follows:

1. Was the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendant
as alleged in the complaint?

Answer: ‘“Yes,”

2. If so, did plaintiff assume the risk of injury?

Answer: “No.”

8. Did plaintiff by his own negligence contribute to his injury?

Answer: No.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Vs, JAMES T. HORTON, 127

4. What damages, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover?

Answer: $4,500.

Upon the coming in of the verdict the defendant moved for judg-
ment non obstante veredicto. Motion overruled and defendant ex-
cepts. Exception No. 70,

The defendant moves to set the verdict aside because the amount
of damages awarded is excessive. Motion overruled and defendant
excepts. Exception No. 71,

The defendant moves to set the verdict aside as against the weight
of the evidence. Motion overruled and defendant excepts. Excep-
tion No, 72,

The defendant moves for a new trial for errors occurring during
the trial and errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence, in
overruling defendant’s motion for judgment of nonsuit and in the
Court’s charge to the jury and in the Court’s refusal to give defend-
ant’s requests for instruction, Motion overruled and defendant ex-
cepts. Exception No. 73,

The Court signed judgment as appears in the record.

To the judgment signed by the Court, defendant excepts. Excep-
tion No. 74,

The defendant in open court appeals to the Supreme Court, No-
tice of appeal given in open court and further notice waived. Under-

taking on appeal fixed at $50,
198 By consent defendant is allowed 60 days to file and serve
statement of case on appeal and plaintiff is allowed 60 days
thereafter to serve counter-statement or exception.

At the term of court at which this action was tried and judgment
signed therein, the defendant, Seaboard Air Line Railway, filed a
motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence, as follows:

Nortu CAROLINA,
Wake County:

In the Superior Court, September Term, 1914.
(Title of Cause.)
Motion for New Trial for Newly Discovered Evidence.

To the Honorable H. W. Whedbee, Judge Superior Court:

The petition and motion of the defendant in the above entitled
cause respectfully shows:

1. That the plaintiff in this action brought suit for the recovery
of damages for injury to his right eye alleged to have been caused
by the explosion of water glass, while employed on defendant’s rail-
road as engineer.

2. That defendant denied that the injury complained of was due
to the explosion of said water glass and set up as a defense that
Plaintiff's eye was injured prior to the time alleged in the complaint,
and that the defective vision of plaintiff is due to the scar left there

y an old injury,

=

3. That defendant offered evidence of Dr. Battle, who testified
that he examined plaintiff's eyes in 1905, nearly five years before
the alieged injury, and found the vision in plaintifl’s right eye,
which he alleges was injured, to be 20-70, which is the condition
of vision in said eye, found to exist by Dr. Horton, who examined
plaintiff’s eyes in 1912, after the date of the alleged injury.

4, That the plaintiff testified and offered evidence of Dr. Goodwin
to prove that his eyesight in his right eye was normal prior to date

of the alleged injury and that he had never received an
199 injury to the said eye prior to that time, and the plaintiff
vigorously denied that the said eye had ever been injured
except at the time alleged.
5. That the jury found the issues in favor of plaintiff and awarded
him $4,500.

6. That the defendant had no evidence that the plaintiff’s eye
had been injured by being struck with a knife in the hands of
one of his brothers when he was a boy, and had been unable after
having exercised due diligence to secure such evidence.

7. That after the trial of the action and during this term of
Court, the defendant was appraised for the first time of the fact
that the plaintiff's eye had been injured when he was a boy by a
knife striking him in the eye, and the defendant received informa-
tion through its counsel that C. E. Barrow had stated that he remem-
bered the time the plaintiff received the said injury to his eye; that
he knew the said eye had been in a damaged condition since that
time, and that the said injury was due to plaintiff’s eye being struck
by a knife in the hands of one of his brothers.

8. That thereupon one of defendant’s counsel consulted said C. E.
Barrow about the matter, and he stated to defendant’s counsel the
facts in this connection which appear in an affidavit attached hereto,

9. That the said C. E. Barrow if sworn to testify in this case, as
he will be subpeenaed to do so, he will testify to the facts as set forth
in said affidavit of defendant’s counsel, Murray Allen.

10. That the said evidence is probably true.

11. That the said evidence is competent, material and relevant.

12. That the defendant had no knowledge of the existence of this
testimony prior to the trial or during the trial of this action, and did
not secure such information until after judgment had been rendered.

13. That the said evidence is not merely cumulative.
200 14. That the said evidence does not tend only to contradict
a former witness or to impeach or discredit him.

15. That it is of such a nature as to show that on another trial a
different result will probably be reached and that the right will
probably prevail.

16. That after making the statements as set forth in the affidavit
of Murray Allen, the said C. E. Barrow stated that the facts were
true and that he would make an affidavit, setting forth said facts,
although he would not like to do so on account of his relations with
James T. Horton, but subsequently and on the same day the said
C. E. Barrow said that he would not make an affidavit, but he did
not deny the truth of the statement.

128 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS, JAMES T. HORTON,

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Ys. JAMES T. HORTON. 129

Wherefore, your petitioner prays that the verdict and judgment
in this case be set aside and a new trial awarded in order that the
defendant may have an opportunity to present the said newly-
discovered evidence to the jury, and the defendant prays that the
Court may have the said C. E. Barrow brought before the Court and
examined upon oath as to the facts set forth in the affidavit of
Murray Allen.

(Signed ) WINSTON & BIGGS,
MURRAY ALLEN,
Attorneys for 8. A. L. R’y.

L. M. Calvert being duly sworn says that he is agent for the
defendant, Seaboard Air Line Railway at Raleigh, N. C.; that he
has read the foregoing petition and that the facts set forth in said
petition are true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters
stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters he
believes it to be true.

(Signed) L. M. CALVERT.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of October, 1914,
(Signed) C.A.GOSNEY, | SEAL, |

Notary Public.
My commission expires 29th day of January, 1914,
201 A ffidavit.

Nortu Carona,
Wake County:

In the Superior Court.
(Title of Cause, )

Murray Allen, being duly sworn, says that he is attorney for the
defendant, Seaboard Air Line Railway in above action, which was
tried at September Term, 1914, of Wake Superior Court; that after
judgment was rendered against the defendant in said action, afliant
was informed that C. E. Barrow had stated that he remembered that
James T. Horton received an injury to his eye when he was a boy

—

130 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON,

remembers distinctly that the said Horton’s eye was injured when
he was a boy; that the said eye had been injured ever since that
time; that he saw his injured eye at the time and that it is the same
eye he now claims to have been injured by the railroad; that he was
told by Horton at the time that his eye was hurt by a knife striking
it; that the knife was in the hands of one of his brothers and struck
him in the eye while they were tusseling; that he would not like to
have anything to do with Horton’s suit because they did not speak

to each other, and because of his connection with the family,
202 but that the statement he had made was true and he could go

testify, if called upon to do so and that he would make an
affidavit to that effect.

That subsequently the said Barrow called affiant on the telephone
and said he would not make the affidavit, that he preferred not to
have anything to do with the case. Affiant further says that the
said C, E. Barrow will, if subpeenaed as a witness, give the evidence
as contained in his statement to affiant; that it is probably true;
that it is competent, material and relevant; that there has been
no laches and that the defendant used due diligence to procure
this testimony prior to the trial of this action; that the evidence
is not merely cumulative; that it does not tend only to contradict
a former witness, or to impeach or discredit him; and that this
evidence is of such a nature that on another trial a different result
will probably be reached and that the right will prevail.

(Signed) MURRAY ALLEN.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 8th day of October,

1914.
(Signed) C. A. GOSNEY, [seat.]
Notary Public.

My commission expires 29th day of January, 1916.

Upon consideration of the foregoing motion and affidavit, the
Court enters the following order.

Order.
Nortu CAROLINA,
Wake County:

In the Superior Court, September Term, 1914.
(Title of Cause. )

This cause coming on to be heard at this term, upon the motion,
supported by affidavit to set aside the verdict and judgment en-
tered at this term on the ground of newly discovered evidence and

the same being considered and the Court being of opinion
203 that the proposed newly discovered evidence if true is merely
cumulative, it is now ordered and adjudged by the Court
that the said motion be and is hereby denied.
(Signed) H. W. WHEDBEF,
Presiding Judge.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY V8. JAMES T, HORTON, 131

To this order defendant excepts.
(Signed) H. W. WHEDBER,
Mai Presiding Judge.
This is Exception No. 75.

Exceptions Grouped and Assignments of Error.

Nortu Carontna,
Wake County:

(Title of Cause.)

The defendant, Seaboard Air Line Railway, appellant, groups
its exceptions and assigns error as follows:

1. For that the court admitted the following testimony of plain-
tiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception :

“I told Powie Matthews that the guard glass was gone, and asked
if he had any of them. He was the day roundhouse foreman and
he said no, they did not have any here.”

This is defendant’s Exception No. 1.

2. For that the Court permitted plaintiff, J. T. Horton, over
defendant’s objection and exception to testify that defendant’s
roundhouse foreman told him, “) 0, they did not have any (guard
glasses) here (in Raleigh).”

This is defendant’s Exception No. 2.

3. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of plain-
tiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception:

Q. What did you say to Powhatan Matthews?

Objection by defendant.

204 By the Court:

To any statement as to the water glass, the defendant objects,
Objection overruled. Defendant excepts.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 3.

4. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of the
plaintiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant's objection and exception.

Q. State to the jury why you'ran that engine out on the second
trip without the guard glass in, Mr. Horton.

A. Because I was promised I would have a guard glass when I
returned, Mr. Matthews told me, and I was told to run her and I
had to do it.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 4,

5. For that the Court referring to the answer that the foregoing
question, made the following statement and admitted testimony
of plaintiff, J. T. Horton, as follows:

by the Court: Strike out what he was promised by Matthews,
that part of it is stricken out, as that was a conclusion. You can
say I ran it because of the conversation I had with Matthews.

A. That is right. MEATS ;

By the Court: All of the answer is stricken out and T will per-

__ SSeS eeAaio LTE LORI

a him to say I ran it on account of the conversation with Mat-
ews.
Objection by defendant. Objection overruled. Defendant ex-
cepts.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 5.

6. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of plain-
tiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception:

Q. I will ask you this question: State to the jury whether you
in your present condition in respect to the sight of your right eye
are able or capable to operate a locomotive engine?

A. No.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 6.

7. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of
205 ~—piaintiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and ex-
ception:

Q. Why?

o On account of the condition of my right eye, impaired eye
sight.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 7.

8. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of plain-
tiff. J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception:

Q. What reply did they make to you, if anv?

Objection by defendant.

By the Court: It is not a question of the reply, but whether he
could secure employment.

By Mr. Douglass: State, Mr. Horton, if you failed to get em-
ployment with the Seaboard Air Line Railway on account of the
condition of you- eye sight.

Objection by defendant. Objection overruled. Exception.

A. Yes.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 8.

9. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of plain-
tiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception:

Q. You said something about handing in a large list of repairs
to be done to the engine on the day before this injury to your eye?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they do the work?

A. Not a bit of it. I believe they did open the sand pipes.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 9.

10. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of plait
tiff, J..T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception:

Q. Was it your duty under the rules of this company to put
the missing gauge glass on that work report?
A. All that is necessary is to get a requisition and put it in.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 10.
206 11. For that the Court admitted the following testimony
of plaintiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and
exception : :

Q. Was that a repair withing the rule requiring it to be m
writing?

A. No, it is a supply.

132 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON. 193

This is defendant’s Exception No. 11.

12. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of
plaintiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception:
Q. = there any rule requiring a written report for a supply?

A. No.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 12.

13. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of plain-
tiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant's objection and exception:

Q. I ask you if it was a proper thing for an engineer to do?

Objection by the defendant.

Q. Compare to the jury, if you can, the danger or safety of
running an engine with the water glass closed and with the gauge
cocks, depending upon the gauge cocks, and running without a
shield on the water glass?

Objection by the defendant. Objection sustained for the reason
that this has been over on both the direct and cross examinations,

By Mr. Simms: Does your Honor understand that it is in the
record that it is more dangerous to attempt to run it with the gauge
cocks than with the water glass?

By the Court: Yes, he said that, because they would stop up.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 13.

14. For that the Court admitted the following testimony of plain-

tiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception :
207 Q. The Court says you may explain why you told Mr.

Burrus you did not report that guard glass for reasons best
known to yourself.

A. He asked me why I did not put it on my work report and
the reason was because I had been to some one higher than him
and he said he did not have any. Mr. Matthews was higher than—
over Mr. Burrus.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 14.

15. For that the Court refused to strike out the foregoing evi-
dence upon defendant’s motion.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 15.

16. For that the Court permitted the plaintiff, James T. Horton,
to be recalled and testify as follows: Page

Q. State to the jury what you meant in your cross examination
by saying that you could run an engine as good as vou ever could?

A. T meant I knew as much about an engine mechanically as T
ever did, but I could not see to run it.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 16.

17. For that the Court admitted the following testimony by
plaintiff's witness, Dr. W. C. Horton, over defendant’s objection
and exception : tale

Q. When he went up there for examination, he told you how
his eye got hurt? : ;

A. I think he did. I don’t remember what he said, but it seems
to me it was an explosion of some kind—I am not sure about that.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 17. 4

18. For that the Court admitted the following testimony by
J. A. Massey, a witness for the plaintiff, over the defendant’s ob-

jection and exception:

134 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS, JAMES T. HORTON.

I think I know what the custom and practice was when supplies
were needed by engineers on their engines,

Q. What was it?

A. The man in the store room furnished the supplies upon requi-

sition. The requisition was brought to him, and it had
208 either to be signed by the Master Mechanic, General Fore
man or the Foreman.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 18.

19. For that the Court overruled defendant’s motion for judg-
ment of nonsuit at the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence. :

This is defendant’s Exception No. 19.

20. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness, Pow-
hatan Matthews:

Q. How would that have been supplied if there was no guard
glass in stock?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 20.

21. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness, Pow-
hatan Matthews:

What could have been done?

This is defendant’s Exception ¥o. 21.

22. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following — asked defendant’s witness, Powhatan Mat
thews :

Q. Are the water gauge and water cocks part of the engine that
should be inspected by the engineer?

This is defendant’s Exception No, 22.

23. For that the Court, over defendant's objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness, Pow-
hatan Matthews:

Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Horton to run his engine like she was
and you would send to Portsmouth and get a guard glass for the
Buckner gauge?

A. I don’t remember telling him that.

2. Would you not know whether you told him that or not?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 23.

24. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness, D. K.

* Wright:
209 Q. Did you ever operate an engine that had no gauge
glass on it?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 24.

25. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness, D. K.
Wright:

Q. If anything should happen to the gauge glass, what is the
duty of the engineer?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 25. :

26. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,

SEABNARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES 7. PORTON, 135

= the following question asked defendant’s witness, W. S.
urrus :

Q. If an engineer is employed or discharged by the Seaboard,
what officer has control of it?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 26.

27. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness, W. S.
Burrus:

Q. Would the notice of the dismissal of an engineer come
through your office?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 27.

28. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness, W. §.
Burrus:

Q. Had Mr. Horton’s employment as an engineer ceased ?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 28.

29. For that the Court, over defendant’’s objection and excep-
| tion, excluded the following question asked defendant’s witness,
W. S. Burrus:

Q. When did you request Mr. Horton to return his pass and
other property of the Seaboard Air Line Railway, if you did?

By the Court: You want to show a certain date?

By Mr. Allen: The defendant proposed to prove by this witness

that he did not take up the plaintiff’s annual pass, issued to
210 him as engineer, and the other property belonging to the

railroad company, until after suit was brought by the plain-
tiff against the Seaboard Air Line Railway.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 29.

30, For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
excluded the following question asked defendant's witness, W. §.
Burrus:

‘ Q. When an engineer ceases to be connected with the Seaboard
Air Line Railway, is he required to turn over his pass and the other
property of the railroad to the railroad?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 30.

31. For that the Court, over the defendant’s objection and excep-
tion, admitted the following testimony of plaintiff’s witness, Dr.
A. W. Goodwin:

Q. If the jury should find from the evidence that Mr. Horton has
only 20-70 sight in one eye and normal in the other, would he in
your opinion be suitable for a railroad engineer’s duties?

By the Court: In the first place, the question is whether the doctor
has any opinion. Have you an opinion satisfactory to yourself
about it?

A. Well, I would think in a deformity in the eye—I would im-
agine that was a deformity more than a disease, that is simply an
opinion—I would think in a deformity in the eye would (any de-
formity) unfit him for the engineer’s service and in testing I did not
find any. I would not like to express an opinion, but from a general
ogy standpoint, I am not an eye specialist, I would think he was
unnht.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 31.

—«

136 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

32. For that the Court e~cluded the following question asked the
plaintiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception :

Q. I understand from you whatever Mr. Benton or Mr. Burrus or
Mr. Hopkins or Mr. Matthews testified to differently from your recol-
lection is not true?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 32.

33. For that the Court excluded the following question
211 ~— asked the plaintiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection
and exception:

Q. You say that what Mr. Hopkins said contrary to what you said
is not true?

This is defendant’s Exception No. 33.

34. For that the Court excluded the following question asked the
plaintiff, J. T. Horton, over defendant’s objection and exception:

Q. Didn’t I understand you to say what Mr. Hopkins said was
not true?

By the Court: I do not think that is the way to examine a witness.
I think you may direct his attention to any particular thing and ask
if that happened.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 34.

35. For that the Court refused upon motion of the defendant, to
strike out the following evidence of plaintiff’s witness, Ernest Horton,
overruled defendant’s objection sont exception.

Q. What would be the proper thing to do, or would it be the proper
thing in the event there was no guard glass on the water gauge to
shut off the water glass and run the engine with the gauge cocks?

A. I ran an engine over there for four years and I never shut the
glass off.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 35.

26. For that the Court overruled defendant’s motion for judgment
of nonsuit at the conclusion of all the evidence.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 36.

37. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:

1. The Court charges you that if you believe the evidence, the
plaintiff was not injured by any negligence on the part of the defend-
ant, and you will answer the first issue, No.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 37.

38. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and ex-
212 ception, refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested
by the defendant:

2. The Court charges you that if you believe the evidence, the
plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from the explosion of the water
glass, and you will answer the second issue, Yes.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 38.

39. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:

8. If you do not answer the second issue, Yes, then the Court
charges you that if you believe the evidence, the plaintiff by his own
negligence contributed to his injury. and you will answer the third
issue, Yes.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 39.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON, 137

5. The Court instructs you that upon all the evidence in this case
the absence of the guard glass and the risk incident to the use of the

glass to defendant’s foreman and the foreman gave him a promise to
repair, a reasonable time for the performance of such promise had
expired, and plaintiff assumed the risk of injury and you will answer
the second issue, Yes,
This is defendant’s Exception 40.
41. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:
6. The Court instructs you that upon all the evidence in this case,
if plaintiff reported the absence of the guard glass to defendant’s
foreman and was given a promise of repair, the danger was so immi-
nent that no ordinarily prudent man, under the circumstances
213 would have relied upon such promise, and plaintiff assumed
the risk of injury, and you will answer the second issue, Yes,
This is defendant’s Exception No. 41.
42. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:
7. The Court instructs you that upon all the evidence in this case,
if plaintiff reported the absence of the guard glass to defendant’s

This is defendant’s Exception No. 42.
43. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:
8. The Court instructs you that the absence of the guard glass and
the risk incident thereto were so obvious that an ordinarily prudent
person would have observed and appreciated them, and you will

44, For that the Court, over defendant's objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:
9. If you find that the plaintiff reported the absence of the guard
glass and was given a promise of repair, if you also find by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence that no ordinarily prudent man under
the circumstances would rely upon such promise, the Court instructs
you to answer the second issue as to assumption of risk, Yes.
This is defendant’s Exception No. 44.
45. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
modified defendant’s request for instruction No. 11, by add-
214 ing at the end thereof, “That is, relying on that promise, he
continued to use the engine,” as follows:

18—541

—

138 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON,

11. If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff
appreciated the risk incident to the use of the gauge glass without
guard glass, the Court instructs you that under the Federal Em.
ployers’ Liability Act, he assumed the risk and you will answer the
second issue, Yes, unless the plaintiff has satisfied you by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he reported the absence of the guard
glass and was given a promise of repair, and that he was induced by
such promise to continue in the employment.

The Court modified the instruction by adding at the end thereof:
“That is, relying on that promise, he continued to use the engine.”

This is defendant’s Exception No. 45.

46. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by defendant:

13. If you answer the first issue Yes, then the Court charges you
that under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, if you find that the
plaintiff appreciated the risk incident to the use of the water gauge
without the guard glass, and you should further find that the plain-
tiff told the defendant’s roundhouse foreman that the guard glass
was gone and was given a promise of repair, the time reasonably re-
quired for the performance had expired at the time of the explosion
of the water glass and you will answer the second issue, Yes.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 46.

47. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:

18. If you answer the first issue Yes, and if you find by the greater
weight of the evidence that the plaintiff appreciated the danger inci-
dent to the use of the water glass without the guard glass and that he

could have shut off the glass, and operated his engine with
215 safety by using the gauge cocks on his engine and that the
plaintiff with such knowledge failed to shut off the glass and
use the gauge cocks, then the Court charges you that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of injury, and you will answer the second issue, Yes.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 47.

48. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refuced to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:

20. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, J. T. Horton, to
show that the water glass was defective and that the defendant knew
of the defect, and unless you so find by the greater weight of the evi-
dence, you will answer the first issue, No.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 48.

49. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:

21. If you find from the evidence that the engine could have been
operated in safety by cutting off the water glass and using the gauge
cocks, and that the plaintiff continued to use the water glass when
he knew there was no guard glass on it and that it was dangerous to
use the water glass in that condition, you will answer the first
issue, No.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 49.

50. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
refused to instruct the jury as follows, as requested by the defendant:

22. If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff could have

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Ys, JAMES T. HORTON, 139

performed his duties in operating the engine by using the gauge
cocks for the purpose of telling how much water was in the boiler,

will answer the first issue, No,
This is Defendant’s Exception No. 50,
51. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
instructed the jury as follows:
ey, as I understand the decision, and as I charge you
216 ‘the decision is, hold it is not the duty of the railroad com-
pany, not an absolute duty that the railroad company owes to
a servant to furnish an absolutely safe place, or absolutely safe and
secure tools and appliances and equipment with which to do his work,
but that the rule is that the railroad company shall exercise ordinary
care and prudence to the end that—I want to use the exact lan-

of the work may be safe for the workman.
It is the duty of the employer to exercise due care in respect to
providing a safe place of work, and suitable and safe appliances for

This is Defendant’s Exception No, 51.

52. For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

Negligence is the omission to do what a reasonable and prudent

in the exercise of ordinary care, an ordinarily prudent person would
_ foreseen that such consequence would likely produced
ereby,
This is Defendant’s Exception No. 53.
54, For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
fendant, instructed the jury as follows:
The law is, that if the act is one which the party ought in the exer-

140 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

cise of ordinary care to have anticipated was liable to result in injury
to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from
it, although he could not anticipate the particular injury that did
happen. Consequences which flow in unbroken sequence, without
an intervening cause from the original negligent act are natural and
proximate, and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is re
sponsible, even though he could not have for-seen the particular re-
sult which did follow.

This is Defendant’s Exception No. 54.

55. For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

The first requisite of proximate cause is the doing or omitting to
do an act which a person of ordinary prudence could foresee might
naturally or probably produce the injury, and second that it did
actually produce it.

This is Defendant’s Exception No, 55.

56. For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

If you find from the evidence that the guard glass was in its proper
place on the engine when the plaintiff started on his run on the
morning of July 27, 1910, and that the defendant had no knowledge
of the absence of such a glass, and it was the plaintiff's duty to make

a note of the absence of the glass in writing on his work re-
218 _ port, and he failed to do so, and you further find that the de

fendant’s failure to have knowledge of the absence of the
guard glass was due solely to the plaintiff's failure to make the re
port in writing of the absence of the guard glass, the Court instructs
you that there has been no negligence on the part of the defendant,
and you will answer the first issue, No.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 56.

57. For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

Contributory negligence is a want of ordinary care upon the
of a person injured by the actionable negligence of another, combin-
ing and concurring with that negligence and contributing — the the
injury as a proximate cause thereof, without which the injury would
not have occurred.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 57.

58. For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

Contributory negligence arises when the plaintiff as well as defend-
ant has done some act negligently or has omitted through negli-
gence to do some act, which it was their respective duty to do, and
this combined negligence produces the injury.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 58.

59. For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

_ The Supreme Court in passing upon this particular case says, and
it is the law so far as this case is concerned :

_ The distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of
risk is simple. Contributory negligence involves the notion of some

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS, JAMES T. HORTON. 141

fault or breach of duty on the part of some employee, and sirice it is
ordinarily his duty to take some precaution for his own safety when
engaged in a hazardous occupation, contributory negligence is some-
times defined as failure to use such care for his safety as an ordinarily
prudent employee under similar circumstances would use,
On the other hand, assumption of risk, even though the
219 risk be obvious, may be free from any suggestion of fault or
negligence on the any of the employee. The risk may be
present notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable care on the
part of the employee.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 59. ,

60. For that the Court, over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

Some employments are necessarily fraught with danger to the
workman, danger that must be and is confronted in the line of his
duty. Such dangers as are normally and necessarily incident to the
occupation are presumably taken into account in fixing the rate of
wages, and a workman of mature years is taken to assume risks of
this sort, whether he is actually aware of them or not.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 60.

61. For that the Court over the objection and exception of the
defendant, instructed the jury as follows:

But risks of another sort not naturally incident to the occupation,
may arise out of the failure of the employer, the defendant in this
case, to exercise due care with respect to providing a safe place of
work and suitable and safe appliances for the work.

These risks, the latter risks, the employee is not treated as assum-
ing until he becomes aware of the defect or disrepair, and of the
risk arising from it, unless defect and risk alike are so obvious that

an pt prudent person under the circumstances would have
observed and appreciated them.

This is defendant’s Exception No, 61. __
62. For that the Court over the objection and exception of the
defendant instructed the jury as follows:
When an employee does know of the defect, and appreciates the
risk that is attributable to it, then if he continues in the employment
without objection, or without obtaining from his employer or his
representative an assurance that the defect will be remedied,
220 the employee assumes the risk, even though it arises out of
the master’s breach of duty.
This is defendant’s Exception No. 62.
63. For that the Court over the objection and
defendant instructed the jury as follows:
_ If, however, there be a promise of reparation, even during such
time as may be reasonably required for its performance, or until the
particular time specified for its performance, the employee relying
upon the promise does not assume the risk unless at least the danger
so imminent that no ordinarily prudent man under the cireum-
stances would rely upon such promise.
This is defendant’s Exception No. 63,

exception of the

i,

142 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

64. For that the Court over the objection and exception of the
defendant instructed the jury as follows:

The burden of the second issue is upon the defendant, and the
burden of the third issue is upon the defendant, and the defendant
should offer you evidence to sustain the plea of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk.

This is defendant’s Exception No, 64.

65. For that the Court over defendant’s objection and exception
modified the following request of defendant for special instruction, by
adding at the end thereof, the following words, that is, relying on
that promise he continued to use that engine.

If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
appreciated the risk incident to the use of the gauge glass without
the guard glass, the Court instructs you that under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act, he assumed the risk and you will answer
the second issue Yes, unless the plaintiff has satisfied you by a pre
ponderance of the evidence that he reported the absence of the
guard glass and was given a promise of repair and that he was in-
duced by such promise to continue in the employment. That is,
relying on that promise he continued to use that engine.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 65.
221 651%. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and
exception, instructed the jury as follows:

“If you answer the first issue ‘Yes,’ then the Court charges you
that under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, if you find that
the plaintiff appreciated the risk incident to the use of the water
gauge without the guard glass, and you should further find that the
plaintiff told the defendant’s ronal house foreman that the guard
glass was gone and was given a promise of repair, yet you should
find that the time reasonably required for the performance of this
promise had expired at the time of the explosion of the water glass,
you will answer the second issue ‘Yes.’ ”

This is defendant’s Exception No. 65%.

66. For that the Court over defendant’s objection and exception
instructed the jury as follows:

If you answer the second issue Yes, that he assumed the risk inci-
dent to his injury, the burden being upon the defendant to satisfy
you of that by the greater weight of the evidence, you need not
answer the third and fourth issues.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 66.

67. For that the Court over defendant’s objection and exception,
instructed the jury as follows:

The burden is upon the defendant to satisfy you that the plaintif
assumed the risk which resulted in his injury.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 67.

_ 68. For that the Court, over defendant’s objection and exception,
instructed the jury as follows:

The burden is upon the defendant to satisfy you by the greater
weight of the evidence on the second issue that the plaintiff did
assume the risk of his injury. If it has so satisfied you by the pre

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON, 143

ponderance of the evidence, you will answer the issue Yes, and unless
they have so satisfied you, you will answer it No.

This is defendant’s Exception No, 68.

69. For that the Court over defendant’s objection and exception

instructed the jury as follows:
222 The rule is that where the plaintiff has been injured by the

negligent conduct of the defendant, he is entitled to recover
damages for past and prospective loss resulting from defendant’s neg-
ligent act, and this may embrace indemnity for actual expense in-
curred, in nursing, medical attention, loss of time, loss of money and
actual suffering of body or mind, which are the immediate and
necessary consequence of his injury. You will consider bodily pain
and suffering occasioned by the injury, if any resulted from said
injury, and in case you find that the plaintiff has not yet recovered
from said injury, or that he has been permanently disabled, then
you will take such facts and circumstances into consideration in
estimating the damages, to which you may add such amount in your
sound discretion as that you may think from the evidence will be
compensation for the injuries that are purely and plainly the conse-
quences of the injury complained of. That is the rule.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 69.

70. For that the Court refused defendant’s motion for judgment
non obstante veredicto.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 70.

71. For that the Court refused defendant’s motion to set the ver-
dict aside because the amount awarded is excessive,

This is defendant’s exception No. 71.

72. For that the Court refused defendant’s motion to set the ver-
dict aside as against the weight of the evidence

This is defendant’s Exception No. 72.

73. For that the Court refused defendant’s motion for a new
trial for errors occurring during the trial and errors in the admission
and exclusion of the evidence, in over-uling defendant’s motion for
honsuit and in the Court’s charge to the jury and in the Court’s
refusal to give defendant’s request for instruction.

This is defendant’s Exception No. 73.

74. For be og the Court signed judgment as appears in the

record,
223 This is defendant’s Exception No. 74.
75. For that the Court denied the defendant’s motion for
‘new trial for the newly discovered evidence of C. E. Barrow, who

ton’s home, near Youngsville, N. C., twenty-five or thirty
that he remembers distinctly that the said Horton’s e

144 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

striking it; that the knife was in the hands of one of his brothers
and struck him in the eye while they were tusseling.
This is defendant’s Exception No, 75.
MURRAY ALLEN,
Attorney for Defendant.

The foregoing is tendered by the defendant as its statement of case

on appeal.
MURRAY ALLEN,
Attorney for Defendant.

Service of the foregoing statement of case on appeal is hereby
accepted, copy of same having been received, this 5th day of Decem-

ber, 1914.
DOUGLASS & DOUGLASS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

The foregoing is agreed upon as case on appeal to the Supreme
Court.
This — day of February, 1915.
DOUGLASS & DOUGLASS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
MURRAY ALLEN,
Attorney for Defendant.

224 Clerk’s Certificate.

I, Millard Mial, Clerk of the Superior Court of Wake County,
North Carolina, do certify that the foregoing contains a full, true
and correct transcript of the record in an action lately pending in
said court between James T. Horton, plaintiff, and Seaboard Air
Line Railway, defendant.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court, at office in Raleigh, this — day of February,
1915,

[SBAL. ] MILLARD MIAL,
Clerk Superior Court.

225 Docket Entries.

Appeal docketed March 5, 1915.

Argued April 8, 1915.

Opinion by Clarke, C. J., May 12, 1915, and concurring opinion
— J., and dissenting opinion by Brown, J., May 12, 1915,
as follows:

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Vs, JAMES 7. HORTON, 145

226 North Carolina Supreme Court, Spring Term, 1915.
#257, Wake.

James T, Horton
v.
SEABOARD AIR LINE Rattway.

Appeal by Defendant from Whedbee, J., at September Term, 1914,

Douglass & Douglass, R. N. Simms and W. B. Snow for Plaintiff.
Murray Allen for Defendant.

Crark, C. J.:

This is an action for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff,
while an engineer in defendant's employment, by the explosion of a
water glass on the defendant's locomotive, impairing the sight of
the plaintiff’s right eye. The case was first here 157 N.C, 146, when
a new trial was awarded. It was here again 162 N.C, 424 and upon
writ of error, it was then heard in the U. §. Supreme Court 233 U.S.
492, and the writ being sustained the case was remanded to the lower
Court where, as we think upon a review of the record, it has been
tried strictly in conformity with that opinion of the U. §. Supreme
Court.

The argument of the defendant seeks to put the plaintiff in this
predicament, that if the likelihood of injury from an explosion of
the glass was not apparent, then the defendant was not guilty of
negligence, But, on the other hand, if such defect was apparent
then the plaintiff assumed the risk and is equally barred from re-
covering damages.

But that was not the ruling of the U. S, Supreme Court, as we
understand it. That Court held “When the employee knows of a
defect in the appliances used by him and appreciates the resulting

ger and continues in the employment without objection, or with-
out obtaining from the employer an assurance of reparation, he as-
‘umes the risk even tho’ it may arise from the employer’s breach of
duty. But where there is promise of reparation by the employer,
the continuing on duty b the employee does not amount to assump-
tion of risk, unless the danger be so imminent that no ordinarily
prudent man would rel on such promise,”

The plaintiff testified.

here was evidence, from which the jury could find that while
the absence of the guard glass was a defect causing danger to the

146 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

on service after reporting the defect and receiving assurance that it
would be repaired. The Court properly told the jury that “risks not
naturally incident to the occupation may arise out of the failure of
the employer, the defendant’ in this case, to exercise due care with
respect to providing a safe place of work and suitable and safe ap-
pliances for the work. These latter risks, the employee is not treated
as assumiag until he becomes aware of the defect or disrepair or of
the risk arising from it unless the defect and risk alike are so obvious
that an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstance would have
observed and appreciated them.”

The Court further charged “When an employee does know of the
defect and appreciates the risk that is attributable to it, then if he
continues in the employment without objection, or without obtain-
ing from his employer or representative the assurance that the defect
will be remedied, the employee assumes the risk, even tho’ it arises
out of the master’s breach of duty. If, however, there be a promise
of reparation, even during such time as may be reasonably required
for its performance or until the particular time specified in such per-
formance, the employee relying upon the promise does not assume
the risk, unless at least the danger be so imminent that no ordinarily
prudent man would rely upon such promise.”

The defendant excepted to the above instructions but we think it
is strictly in accordance with the decision of the U, S. Supreme
Court in this case, and that upon the evidence the jury were au-
thorized to find, as they did in response to the second issue, that the
plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury.

There are numerous other exceptions but this case has been 90
fully considered in every aspect of the law and the facts have been
so fully set forth on the two former appeals in this Court and also
upon consideration of the writ of error in the U, 8. Supreme Court
that it would be work of supererogation to go over the same ground
a fourth time.

The very careful and learned Judge who tried this case below
seems to have fully comprehended and to have closely and carefully
followed the decision of the U. 8. Supreme Court upon the points on
which that Court gave a new trial, and we find no error in his rul-
in

gs.
The only other exception that we need refer to is the refusal by
the Court below of the motion for a new trial for newly dis
228 covered testimony. Such refusal was discretionary with the
Court, and is not reviewable here. It is true the Judge stated
that the newly discovered testimony, if true was merely cumulative.
But that does not justify us in reversing his judgment denying the
motion for a new trial.

The defendant’s cause has been very fully and ably presented but
we find nothing that would justify us in setting aside the verdict
and judgment. The Court and jury had the benefit of all the light |
that could be shed upon this controversy, from every angle, by this
Court and the U. S. Supreme Court and seem to have faithfully fol
lowed the views of the Court of highest resort where it differed from

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON. 147

the views of this Court, and in other respects to have followed the
well settled decisions of this tribunal.

No Error,
229 #257, Wake.
Horton
v.
Rartway Co.

WALKER, J. (concurring) :

The facts, as now presented, are not materially different from
those before us on the former appeal. There was then a motion to
nonsuit, which was passed by the Supreme Court of the United
States without comment. It was hardly necessary to order a new
trial for error in the charge, if, upon the whole case, the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover by reason of the assumption of risk. It
is, therefore, to be fairly, if not necessarily inferred, from the re-
fusal to nonsuit, that there was, at least, some phase of the evidence
that carried the case to the jury. The motion to nonsuit was entitled
to first consideration, as if ‘decided favorably to the defendant
(plaintiff in error) it fully and finally disposed of the case, and the
other questions raised by the assignments of error would, therefore,
have become immaterial. But if this were not so, the motion should
not now be allowed. It is true that the water guage was “liable to ex-
plode,” but an explosion was not so imminent as to require that
Horton should quit the service of defendant, when he had been
promised that the glass guage would be repaired. A prudent man
would probably take such a risk, and it was for the jury to say
whether he would. He did not continue his work for any unreason-
able length of time, but only for a very short time, and the question
of assumption of risk or contributory negligence was eminently a
proper one for the jury. Nor can it be said that plaintiff’s failure
to use the three guage cocks on the head of the boiler, was negligence,
as matter of law. He testified that they could be used and sometimes
were used for the purpose of guaging the quantity of water in the
boiler or to ascertain its level, but that they are not altogether re-
liable or accurate, for he said that they would guage somewhere

near the quantity of water, but wili not give the perfect level.
230 He stated that an engine can be run without a water-glass

and with guage cocks, if the latter will stay open, but that
‘they are liable to become clogged and are easily stopped up by mud
or sediment from the water. To give his language: “Yes, you can
operate an engine without a water guage, and with the guage cocks,
but not as well. You cannot keep these cocks open. They are liable
to stop up, but a water glass has got so much bigger opening here
than the guage cock. They are the safest thing ai all, as they do
hot stop up like guage cocks, like all of the guage cocks I have seen.”
He further stated that the mud could not be blown out, if the guage
cocks are packed with it. He said much more in regard to this

kneels

148

SAS DSSS AS See Pee MERE SES PREP

SS SS Re BPRS TAS 2 ae

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS, JAMES Tt. HORTON.

feature of the case, but the above references to his testimony are
sufficient to demonstrate that the case was one for the jury on the
uestion of assumption of risk or contributory negligence. A mo-
tion to nonsuit, or a request for a peremptory instruction to find for
the defendant, requires that the evidence should receive the most
favorable construction for the plaintiff, and, under our rule, the
evidence only that sustains his cause of action should be considered,
because the jury might adopt it and reject all the unfavorable tes-
timony. “It is well settled that, on a motion to nonsuit or to dismiss
under the statute, which is like a demurrer to evidence, the Court
is not permitted to pass upon the weight of the evidence, but the evi-
dence must be accepted as true and construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and every fact which it tends to prove must
be taken as established, as the jury, if the case had been submitted
to them, might have found those facts upon the testimony.” Brit
tain v. Westall, 135 N. C., 492, citing Purnell v. Railroad Co., 122
N. C. 832; Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 131 N. C. 163. More recent
cases, affirming the principle, are Freeman v. Brown, 151 N. C. 111;
Morton v. Lumber Co., 152 N. ©. 54; Johnston v. Railroad Co.,
163 N. C. 431; Lloyd v. Railroad Co., 166 N. C. 24; Trust Co. v.
Bank, Ibid. 112. The rule of the Federal courts, as to the
231 ~=right of the judge to suggest what the verdict should be,
does not apply to a case tried in the State court, even where
the cause of action is given by a Federal statute like the Employers’
Liability Act. The power to advise the jury as to their verdict, is
not equivalent to the right to direct a verdict or to nonsuit, or to dis-
miss the action. Congress having conferred concurrent jurisdiction
on the State courts in such cases, did not undertake, if it had the
power to do so, to regulate the procedure and practice in those courts.
The plaintiff might elect to sue in the State court, and if he did so
elect, it was, of course, intended that the suit should be tried accord-
ing to the local practice and procedure. Fleming v. Railroad Co.
160 N. C., 196. It would be anomalous to try a case in the State
court according to a procedure foreign to its jurisdiction. We take
it, therefore, that on motion to nonsuit, the evidence with reference
to its probative force and its construction, must be considered with
due regard to our practice, as it relates to the remedy. Florida v.
Anderson, 91 U. S. 657. And this is clearly so where there is no
rule on the same subject prescribed by Act of Congress creating the
right, or where the State rule does not conflict with any such law.
Re Fisk, 113 U.S. 713. The same is the rule as to evidence, Ryan ¥.
Windley, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 66; as to a discontinuance, Coffee v.
Planters Bank, 13 How. (U. S.) 183; as to what is a material var-’
ance, L. & L. & G. Insurance Co. v. Gunther, 116 U. S. 113, an
of course, as to the construction of pleadings upon the question
their sufficiency, Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U. S. 200. Many other
examples might be stated, which would illustrate to what a great
extent the highest Wederal court has gone in conforming the prac
tice, pleadings, forms and modes of proceedings, as near as ma
be, to those of the State courts, both under the federal statutes
under the general rule applicable to such questions, Tf, therefore,

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Ys, JAMES T. HORTON. 149

request for a special instruction to the effect that, if the jury be-
lieved the evidence, they should answer the issue as to assumption

engine and a dangerous one, was not left to the plaintiff. Both
methods were dangerous. The glass water guage was safer, in one
respect, than the guage cocks, because it recorded the height of the
water in the boiler more accurately and was more likely to prevent
an explosion of the boiler, while it presented an element of danger
itself because of the absence of the guard glass, and the guage cocks
were dangerous because they did not guage the quantity of water
in the boiler with accuracy, and having a smal] tube and being of a
different construction, they were liable to be stopped up by mud
and sediment in the water. The jury only could decide what a man
of ordinary prudence would have done in the circumstances.

v

to decide, in the conflict of testimony. Some extracts from the tes-
timony will, I think, fully sustain these views:

The plaintiff, Jas. T. Horton, testified: “I told Powie Matthews
that the guard glass was gone, and asked him if he had any of them.
He was the day roundhouse foreman, and he said, No, they did

not have any here, [ told him the guard glass to the water

told that it would be repaired, was certainly a question for the jury

Powatan Matthews testified: “I was asked the question as to

wherher Mr. Horton reported the absence of that glass, and said, T
do not remember, and I do not. That is as far as T go and is as far

ing of that nature, or oil cans, from the storeroom, I would tell
the foreman T did not have it. It was customary to send the fire-

them in stock.’
J. A. Massey testified: “T had charge of the storeroom. * * *

150 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

I know who applied for them (guard-glasses) the engineers did.
They would apply to the master mechanic, general foreman or the
foreman. The glass in the Buckner Glass was a supply. I did not
have any Buckner water guard-glasses in stock down there on
August 4, 1910. I did not have any between July 27th and August
the 4th. * * * If the engineer wanted a lamp, or flag or a
torch or torpedoes or a piece of glass to drop into one of these guards,
he would report it to the master mechanic or the general foreman,
or the foreman, and ask him for a requisition for whatever article
he wanted and bring that requisition to the storeroom and he would
get that directly and not through the written report of the engineer
for repairs.”
This evidence shows that defendant had notice that the
234 guard-glass was missing; that plaintiff had exercised care and
diligence in restoring it, and that he had complied with the
rules of the company. The plaintiff testified: “I did not say with
pressure on that tube in the glass case that the water-glass is liable
to explode at any time. No, that is not so. I have run those a year
without their exploding. * * * No, I did not know if it did
explode without the guard glass that it would be liable to hurt the
engineer as I have seen lots of them explode without hurting the
engineer. * * * Yes, you can operate an engine without a
water guage, with water cocks, but not as well, as you cannot keep
these cocks open. They are liable to stop up. But a water glass has
got so much bigger opening here than the guaze cock. They are
the safest things at all, as they do not stop up like the guage cocks,
like all of the guage cocks I have seen. * * * I did not attempt
to cut it off. I needed it. I did not attempt to run my engine with-
out it.’

Srnest Horton, on this point, testified: “It may last a day, a week,
a month, or a year and it may last an hour or shorter. * * *
Would it be the proper thing, in the event there was no guard glass
on the water guage, to shut off the water glass and run the engine
with a guage cock? Answer: The proper way, in my opinion,
would be to run with the water glass turned on. * * * What
is the proper and safe thing to do? Answer: The proper way, in
my opinion, would be to run with the water glass turned on.
* * * T have not had one (guage glass) to explode with me in
the last year to my knowledge. * * * In case it does not leak,
I do not shut if off.”

Edgar W. Barbee; witness for defendant, testified: “Yes, it is
true that engineers on the Seaboard run their engines out with the
water glass, without cutting it off, with the guard-glass missing, prior
to the time Mr. Horton was injured.”

From this and much testimony of the same character, it is ap-

parent that not only one, but many trips might be safely
235 made with a water guage unprotected by a guard glass or
shield. A pregnant circumstance, which was in evidence and
for the jury’s consideration, was the fact that the fireman, W. S.
Benton, a witness introduced by the defendant, testified that he knew
that the guard glass was broxen, that in fact he was the man who

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY V8. JAMES T. HORTON. 151

broke it, as he started out on the first tr'p with the plaintiff, and that
he did not call it to his attention, and that he sat directly in front
of the water-guage during the entire trip to Aberdeen and the re-
turn trip from Aberdeen to Raleigh. That he made the second

the return from the third trip to Aberdeen, and that he did all of
this without thinking of being hurt.

These quotations from the testimony are made at random. A
careful examination of it will disclose that there was a conflict of
testimony upon the material issues which, of course, takes the case
to the jury.

236 No, 257.

James T. Horton
vs,
SEABoaRD Arr LIND Raltway,

Brown, J., dissenting :

I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the Court
in this case. The decision of the United States Supreme Court

,
assumed the risk of injury from the defective water glass. ‘That
question was not passed upon, and if it had been, upon the facts
as then presented, that would not prevent a consideration of the
question upon this appeal when the facts showing assumption of
risk are much stronger.

The United States Supreme Court reversed our judgment and
remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with
their opinion.

Mr. Justice Pitney states the law of this case as follows:

“When the employee does know of the defect, and appreciates
the risk that is attributable to it, then if he continues in the em-
ployment without objection, or without obtaining from the em-
ployer or his representative an assurance that the defect will be
remedied, the employee assumes the risk, even though it arise out
of the master’s breach of duty. If, however, there be a promise
of reparation, then during such time as may be reasonably ri uired
for its performance, or until the particular time, specified or its
performance, the employee, rel ing upon the promise, does not
assume the risk unless at. least the danger be so imminent that no
ordinarily prudent man under the circumstances would rely upon
such promise.” Seaboard Air Line Railway vs. Horton, 233 U. §,
492.

Applying this rule to the undisputed evidence, I am of opinion
that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury and is not entitled to
recover. ‘ ‘ ;

Plaintiff was operating an engine equipped with a Buckner water

152 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

glass, which is so constructed that a thick guard glass is placed
over the front of the water glass to protect the engineer from
237 injury in the event the inner glass should explode. The

_ . engine was also equipped with another method of deter-
mining the amount of water in the boiler, that is by means of
guage cocks placed on the head of the boiler. Plaintiff made
the first trip from Raleigh to Aberdeen on July 27th, returning in
the evening of July 28th, and he was returning from the third
trip to Aberdeen when he sustained the injury to his eye by the
explosion of the water glass, on August 4th. It required two days
to make the round trip.

On the morning plaintiff was called to take this engine for the
first trip to Aberdeen, he noticed before leaving Raleigh that there
was no shield or guard on the water glass. Without making com-
plaint of the condition of the glass, plaintiff made the trip to
Aberdeen and return. Upon his arrival in Raleigh at the end of
his round trip, he made a written report of the condition of his
engine upon forms provided for that purpose, and in accordance
with the defendant’s requirements he placed the report on file in
the round house or put it in a box there for that purpose. This,
according to the plaintiff’s evidence, was the way provided by the
company for procuring repairs. Plaintiff, and a number of de-
fendant’s witnesses, said that these work reports were required to
be in writing, that they were filed and distributed among the work-
men for the purpose of making the required repairs. It appears
in evidence that plaintiff made a written report on this engine at
the return of each round trip, and noted every defect in his engine
except the absence of the guard glass.

On August 4th, whiie engaged in shifting cars at Apex, N. C.,
the water glass exploded and injured his eye. Immediately after
the explosion plaintifi cut off the guage glass at top and bottom, and
the engine was operated to Raleigh with the guage cocks as the
means of determining the amount of water in the boiler.

The guard glass referred to as part of the Buckner equip-
238 ment is a thick piece of glass one or two inches wide, and
eight or nine inches long, with a thickness of about one half
of an inch. Plaintiff testified that the piece of glass in front of the
tube is to prevent the flying glass from hitting the engineer in case
the inner tube should burst; that the insertion of this glass will
prevent flying glass from striking the engineer or other persons in
the cab if the tube explodes. In answer to questions on cross exam-
ination, plaintiff testified: “Yes, it is dangerous to run it (the
engine) without a guard glass. You see the tube might explode.
The guard glass is put there to prevent the explosion of the inner
tube injuring the engineer. The purpose of the guard glass is to
make it safe for the engineer to operate his engine with the Buck-
ner water gauge.” Plaintiff further testified that at the time of the
accident the steam pressure in the unprotected g'ass tube in the
Buckner gauge was 200 pounds, and that it was liable to explode
at any time. He said: “I knew that with that guard glass out that
the tube was liable to explode with the 200 pounds pressure on It

meas

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY Ys. JAMES T. HORTON, 153

I knew that it was liable to explode, but I could not tell when.”
At the time of his injury, plaintiff was sitting on the left hand
side of the cab, facing the glass which was within a few feet of his
face.- He said: “I was going to cross over on the fireman’s side to
see the conductor, whether he was ready to couple up, and that put
me directly facing the glass, with my eye directly opposite that
slit,” and while in this position the explosion occurred, Plaintiff
gave an estimate of the dimensions of the inner tube as follows:
“12 or 14 inches long and about three-eight-s of an inch thick,
and one-half inch in diameter.”

Plaintiff described the method of gauging the water in the boiler
by the three gauge cocks and said that Benton, his fireman, brought

the engine in from Apex to Raleigh using the gauge cocks
239 — to tell how much water he had in the boiler. This was im-

mediately after the accident. He said that he did not cut
out the water gauge and use the gauge cocks on any of the three
trips he made with this engine; that he did not attempt to run
the engine without the water gauge glass. On a former occasion a
water glass exploded and injured plaintiff’s eye, while he was em-
ployed on one of defendant’s engines.

Ernest Horton, plaintiff’s witness, testified: “The water glass and
gauge cocks are right upon the head of the boiler, right at hand,
and he has to use them in running his engine, not constantly
though. They are there all the time for his use. By turning
those three gauge cocks you can gauge somewhere near about the
water in the boiler, but you cannot tell the perfect level. The
guard glass on the Buckner water gauge is to prevent the glass from
spattering in your face when the inner tube bursts that comes out
with the water and steam. This glass is put in there to prevent
the glass from spattering out in case that glass bursts.”

Dave Campbell, an engineer of ten years’ experience, testified
that an engineer can operate an engine in safety by the use of the

uge cocks; that if his water glass guard is missing, it would be
fis duty to cut out the glass and use the gauge cocks, Ele said:
“It is very dangerous to use the Buckner water gauge without the
guard glass, because it has a tendency to throw the glass in a cer-
tain direction if it explodes. That glass tube on the Buckner water
gauge is liable to explode. I have shut off the water gauge and
tun on the gauge cocks many a time.” Lewis Archer testified for
the defendant that he has been in the railroad business since 1882;
that he is familiar with the construction and operation of the
Buckner water glass. “It is a safe water glass with the guard glass
in place. With the guard glass out of place, it is one of the most

dangerous things you could have on an engine, on account
240 of that slot; when the glass breaks, it throws the glass out of
that one place. You can operate an engine without a water
gauge with safety, by using the gauge cocks. I consider that the
safest plan of operation.” staat

In my opinion the only conclusion to be drawn from this evi-
dence is that no man of ordinary prudence would have continued
& work in the face of so great and so imminent a danger. The

20—541

154 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

defendant moved for judgment of nonsuit at the conclusion of
the evidence and requested the court to instruct the jury that if
they believed the evidence they would answer the issue of assump.
tion of risk “Yes.” This has the effect of a request to withdraw
the case from the jury.

It is said to be well settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States that it is the duty of the trial court to withdraw a case from
the jury where the evidence is undisputed, or is so conclusive that
the court, in the exercise of its discretion, must set aside a verdict
returned in opposition to it. Randall v. Railroad, 109 U. S., 478,
Railroad v. Converse, 139 U. S., 469. This rule has been applied
by the Court in an action involving the defense of assumption of
risk, where it appeared from plaintiff’s evidence that he assumed
the risk. Butler v. Frazee, 211 U. S., 459.

In the ease of District of Columbia v. McElligott, 117 U. S. 622,
the United States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine which,
in my judgment, sustains the defendant’s right to an instruction
that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. In that case the plaintiff,
who was in the employ of the district, was injured while at work
on a bank of gravel. The evidence tended to show that he dis
covered that there was danger of the bank caving in, and went to
the supervisor for more men to do the work, and for one man to

watch the bank, and that he received the information that
241 such assistance would be sent. Before the assistance ar
rived the bank caved in, causing his injury. The court said:

“Assuming that the District might be responsible under some
circumstances for injuries resulting from the negligence of its su-
pervisor, it certainly would not be liable if the danger which the
plaintiff apprehended from the beginning was so manifest as to
prevent a reasonably prudent man from risking it upon a promise
or assurance by the proper authority that the cause from which
the peril arose would be removed. * * * If he failed to exer
cise such care; if he ex himself to dangers that were so threat
ening or obvious as likely to cause injury at any moment—he
would, notwithstanding any ve or assurances of the District
supervisor of the character alleged, be guilty of such contributo
negligence as would defeat his claim for —— so received.
Roccia v. Coal Co., 121 Fed. 451; Attleton v. Mfg. Co., 5 Ga. A
779; Railroad v. Watson, 114 Ind. In Alteriac v. Coal Co., 1 1
Ala., 435, it is held that, “Where a miner of many years’ exper
ience saw a pot or bell-shaped rock in the roof of a mine, and knew
that it was more or less disconnected and liable to fall without
warning at any moment, and after telling his superior of it,
that he would not work without timbers, but who returned to the
work under the pot or bell-shaped rock on being told to do so, and
on the promise that the timber would be sent at once, assumed
risk incident to his return and work thereunder.” In Erdman ¥.
Steel Co., 59 Wis. 6, the Wisconsin Supreme Court holds that: “Aa
experienced servant cannot recover if he continues, even for al
hour or two, to encounter the obvious and immediate danger
using a cracked saw to cut steel plates.” In the case of McAndrews

[an 8 request for instruction that
aintiff was guilty of contributory negligence should have been
given. This is a question of law when the facts a is

» With the guage
n v. Furniture

not discuss. What I have written presents
questions,

243 Supreme Court of North Carolina, February Term, 1915.

No. 257.

James T. Horton

SEABOARD Ain Lowe Rattway.
Wake County.

Judgment.

This cause came on to be argued upon the transcript of the rec:
ord from the Superior Court of Wake County:

Upon consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion that there
is no error in the record and proceedings of said Superior Court.

It is therefore, considered and adjudged by the Court here, that
the opinion of the Court, as delivered by the Honorable Walter
Clark, Chief Justice, be certified to the said Superior Court, to the
intent that the judgment be affirmed.

And it is considered and adjudged further, that the defendant
and surety do pay the costs of the appeal in this Court incurred,

wit, the sum of Eighteen 60/100 dollars ($18.60), and execu-
tion issue therefor,

A AE ARBRE SAO A a RRL RINSE EIEIO TED

156 SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY VS. JAMES T. HORTON.

244 Supreme Court or Nortu CAROLINA, 88:

I, J. L. Seawell, Clerk of the Supreme Court of North Carolit
do hereby certify the foregoing to be a full, true and perfect cop
of the record and proceedings in the case of James T. Horton
Seaboard Air Line Railway as the same now appear from th
originals on file in my office. ;

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affix
pag of said Court at office in Raleigh, N. C., this 28th day of Jur
1915.

[Seal of the Supreme Court of the State of North
Carolina. |

J. L. SEAWELL,

Clerk of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. ~

Endorsed on cover: File No. 24,824. North Carolina Supremi
Court. Term No. 541. Seaboard Air Line Railway, plaintiff i
error, vs. James T. Horton. Filed July 6th, 1915. File
24,824.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States.
OCTOBER TERM, 1915

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY,
Plaintiff in Error,
v. No.541
JAMES T. HORTON,
Defendant in Error.

On Writ of Error to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF IN ERROR ON THE
MERITS.

SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE.
Status of the case 1
Statement of the case 2
Specifications of error 8
Sufficiency of evidence to be submitted to the jury to be
determined in accordance with rule in Federal Courts 26
Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury as matter of law... 28
Burden of proof on issue of assumption of risk... 40
Requested instructions on issue of assumption of risk
which trial court refused 42
Palintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as matter
of law 44
Trial c

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386003_0043%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
