# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ventetoulo v. DeWitt

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 511 U.S. 1032

## Text

.
Cypreme Court, U.S.
TLE D

9 31339 FEB 2 21994

No. _ofFick OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of thc United States
October Term, 1993
¢

DONALD VENTETOULO, ACTING DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Petitioner,
VS.

FRED DEWITT,

Respondent.

4

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit

*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

JerFReEY B. PINE
Attorney General of the
State of Rhode Island

ANNIE GOLDBERG*

Assistant Attorney General
72 Pine St.

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400

Attorneys for Petitioner

*Attorney of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

7

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVI*}\%

WHERE A STATE TRIAL JUDGE HAS REDUCE#? A SEN-
TENCE IN VIOLATION OF STATE LAW, ANL* WHERE
THE ILLEGAL RI JUCTION IS LATER CORRECTED
PURSUANT TO A STATE PROCEDURAL RULE PERMIT-
TING CORRECTION OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE “AT
ANY TIME,” DID THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT ERR IN GRANTING
RELIEF PURSUANT “°O 28 U.S.C. § 2254 BASED UPON
THE CONCLUSION THAT THE STATE PRISONER HAD
ACQUIRED A “DUE PROCESS” RIGHT IN HIS ILLE-
GALLY REDUCED SENTENCE?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............ i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED.................. iii
CITATION TO ORINIONS BELOW................. l
oi le age 6) ie ere werrer Serer er reer se 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-
SIONS. TIVO GFP 5s vo k. i008 Crh ds eee erins eres 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE «0. 00 ccccccecreacts cnes 3
Py esd) | Ae Premera ae ears ys a eae 7

A. THE DUE PROCESS RULE ANNOUNCED BY
THE FIRST CIRCUIT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW
AND REPRESENTS SUCH A DEPARTMENT
FROM ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES GOVERN-
ING CORRECTION OF VOID OR ILLEGAL
SENTENCES AS TO CALL FOR REVIEW. ... 9

B. IN OVERTURNING THE IMPOSITION OF A
LEGAL STATE SENTENCE THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS TRANSGRESSED THE
BOUNDS OF PROPER JURISDICTION UNDER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Page
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES:
ice a's dle sn'e.s0 e060 nde Fe bes ba peas 19
een acaveveerescceucees, 1
ee ein eke de¥decedaurebepeer’ 1
NS ice. pve 's wiete «eh 4's a8. e's 1, 4 5, 16, 19, 22
et Es a sve sh cb ae be 6 ov.cencceKeves 3, 11, 20
ee Ss RUD OR BAP ROPER ee Acces cesevdewvcvebers sd
ee Os co resect veeserencenesseaxeh 5
Oh RED, css veces seeveveesvveteuess 5
ee a 0 EE CED ys tev ecacesyesdvendesede 5
Pee Sy Se GUS Bo OO oo vc nerve ecevecesveres 2, 4, 11
Ee a i 2, 14
TE EE MD Sy se ake hts tee eexevecessveaves 1,9
Eo oir 5s ek bso ¥ eso cackaeivieeae ows ]
UNiteD States SUPREME Court Cases:
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963) ........ 1]
Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1946)........... 10
Brecht v. Abrahamson, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1710
ee ey oi ada es § 6s OOLNOO OEE Noe eee 18
Estelle v. McGuire, ___ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991) .... 19
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983)............ 18
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) .............. 21
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)........... 18

United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) ..19, 20

iV

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED — Continued

Unirep Strares Courts oF Arrears CAses:

9 #.2d 95, 101 (Ist Cir.), cert.

Breest v. Helgemoe, 5
eee re 7, 10,

7
denied, 439 U.S. 3

Burns v. United States, 552 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1977) ....

DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1993)... 1

Laycock v. State of New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184 (10tn

Ct) SEs Sau vu ea ORO R TENOR eee ees
Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1975) ....
McNutt v. Schneckloth, 421 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1957) ....

Safrit v. Garrison, 623 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1980) .......

Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) .. 14,

Thompson v. United States, 495 F.2d 1304 (1st Cir.

fe) SS eee ee oe rer rere ee eT SE eee ee

United States v. Adair, 826 F.2d 104 (11th Cir. 1987) ....

United States v. Ames, 743 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1984)

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165 (1985) ere Te eee eee ee

United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520 (9th

| rr errr ee rrr re rere ee

United States v. Becker, 536 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1976)....

United States v. Bentley, 850 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.) cert.

cM RB | Be en ee eae

United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1977) ....

Page

13,

, 7,

11

12

Vv

= i @
Pap.

we

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED — Continued

~~

Page
United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.
prea cree tity Sn REN per eran, sleet. Se ARB). 20
United States v. De Los Santos-Himitola, 924 F.2d
See Ce Ge CE casks sn ek oo eee eee 12

United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .... 12

Llnited States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423 (3d Cir.

Ws Hh cide wines teehee vie 11, 20
United States v. Lewis, 862 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1988)

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032 (1989)... 00... cceccecce: 12
United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981 (4th Cir.

Sa a tara en PEN aay PUPP SEL rey test Pet Digs. - of een (a 13
United States v. Ortega, 859 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1988) .... 13
United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1990)

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990)................ 3, 32
United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.

OT Ba eek ve eels eked Oe de Eee 14
United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1970).... 11
Unitep States District Court Cases:

Clifton v. Beto, 298 F.Supp. 1384 (D.Tex. 1968) ....... 16
DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F.Supp. 580 (D.R.I.

PES «ik ok oe eee ore eee Choe eee 1, 7, 14
Lanier v. Williams, 361 F.Supp. 944 (D.N.C. 1973) .... 15
Sterling v. Maggio, 505 F.Supp. 1111 (D.La. 1981) .... 16

United States ex. rel. Hanrahan v. Bosse, 547 F.Supp.
Fe Biers cael eek Meera tae 21

vi

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED - Continued

Page
RHODE IsLAND CAses:
State v. DeWitt, 423 A.2d 828 (R.I. 1980).............. 4
State v. DeWitt, 557 A.2d 845 (R.I. 1989)............ 1, 6
State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328 (R.I. 1983). .4, 5, 11, 13
OTHER State Cases:
Bonner v. Brock, 610 P.2d 265 (Okl.Cr. 1980) ......... 15
People v. Cavelli, 50 N.Y.2d 919, 431 N.Y.S.2d 450,

Br Pee Se SIMRO) oceania seceesevestererbeees 16
State v. Acuna, 103 N.M. 279, 705 P.2d 685 (1985) .... 14
State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 367 A.2d 1320 (1976) ...7, 8
State v. Delmondo, 67 Haw. 531, 696 P.2d 344 (1985) .... 14
State v. Sheehy, 115 N.H. 175, 337 A.2d 348 (1975) .... 17
OrHeER AUTHORITIES CITED:

Te AAR. GR C19 & Sapp.) ..0 ec entncevesveeeenns 12

:
|
;
|

Now comes Donald Ventetuolo,! Former Acting
Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections
[hereinafter referred to as the State], by his attorneys, and
prays that this Honorable Court issue a Writ pf Certiorari
to review the decision of the United State# Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit entered October +1993.

*

CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of a three-judge panel of the Court of
Appeals is reported as DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st
Cir. 1993), reproduced as Appendix A. The opinion of thé
District Court for the District of Rhode Island is reported
as DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F.Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1992). The
opinion of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island is found in
State v. DeWitt, 557 A.2d 845 (R.I. 1989).

¢

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
entered on October 6, 1993. A petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Reconsideration En Banc was denied
November 22, 1993. The Order Denying Petition is repro-
duced as Appendix B. Jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1257, and 2254, and Sup. Ct. R. 10.1 (a)
and (c).

' The correct spelling of the surname. The caption and
citations retain the spelling maintained by the courts below.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANW STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional issue in this case was decided
under the Due Process clause of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which provides in pertinent part:

No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.

The constitutional application of a state procedural
rule is called into question, R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 35:

The court may correct an illegal sentence at
any time. The court may correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner and it may reduce
any sentence within one hundred twenty (120)
days after the sentence is imposed, or within
one hundred twenty (120) days after receipt by
the court of a mandate of the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island issued upon affirmance of the
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within
one hundred twenty (120) days after receipt by
the court of a mandate or order of the Supreme
Court of the United States issued upon affir-
mance of the judgment, dismissal of the appeal,
or denial of a writ of certiorari. Within twenty
(20) days after the filing of a motion to reduce a
sentence, the attorney general may file a motion
for an increase in said sentence. The court on its
own motion, after the filing of a motion to
reduce a sentence, may increase said sentence.
The court may reduce a sentence, the execution

of which has been suspended, upon revocation
of probation.

Also involved is a Rhode Island Statute, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 12-19-10:

Imprisonment pursuant to a sentence, once
commenced, shall not be subject to suspension
by the superior court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

‘This case presents a decision apparently in conflict
with decisions of other United States courts of appeals
and other state courts, on a question not heretofore
directly addressed by this Honorable Court: whether cor-
rection of an illegal sentence under a state procedural
rule providing, like former Federal Rule 35,? for the cor-
rection of Such “at any time” may violate due process if
the prisoner has already attained his liberty.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, answering the question affirmatively, not only
declares the State’s rule in effect unconstitutional, but in
granting relief, negates a sentence upheld by the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island and orders the release of a state
prisoner according to an estimate of due process never
before recognized by this Court, and in — conflict

2 Until its revision in 1985, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 provided in
pertinent part: “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner

within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence.”
[Emphasis added.]

| | |

with decisions of this Court in cases arising under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.

Frederick DeWitt is a state prisoner sentenced origi-
nally to life imprisonment and concurrent lesser terms for
robbery, arson, and assault with intent to murder. The
convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, State v. DeW
itt. 423 A.2d 828 (R.1. 1980), and thereafter, DeWitt moved
for reduction of his sentence under Rule 35 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Criminal Procedure. The motion was
granted in 1981 and the sentence was reduced by sus-
pending all but fifteen years of the life sentence, with

twenty years’ probation to commence upon release.

DeWitt was by then already serving his sentences,
however; and according to Rhode Island statute, R.I.
Gen. Laws § 12-19-10, “|ijJmprisonment pursuant to a
sentence, once commenced,” is “not . . . subject to suspen-

sion by the superior court.”

The Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure were
adopted after enactment of the statute. That the statutory
prohibition would be taken to limit the power of the
court under Rule 35 was not established until the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island decided State v. O'Rourke,
463 A.2d 1328 (R.1. 1983), two years after the reduction of
sentence in this case. With O'Rourke, the court held that
Rule 35 had no effect on the statute’s meaning or applica-
tion and that § 12-19-10 imposed a restriction “which, by
its plain language, absolutely prohibits suspension of a
sentence of imprisonment once it is commenced.” Id. at
1331 [emphasis added]. Attempt to reduce O’Rourke’s
sentence by suspending half was “invalid because, pur-
suant to § 12-19-10, the trial justice lacked the authority to

eee nen ks

suspend any part of defendant’s sentence once he began

serving the period of imprisonment.” Id. at 1332
[emphasis added]. The court ordered the ruling reducing
O’Rourke’s sentence vacated as “null and void” and
directed that the original senten-e be “reinstated with

credit for time already served.” Id.

O’Rourke’s effect was not widely realized, and DeWitt
continued to be viewed by the Parole Board and correc-
tional staff as eligible for parole on his reduced fifteen-
year sentence, not the original life sentence.* According
to this estimate DeWitt became eligible for parole in
August 1985, but the Parole Board denied his first appli-
cation. One year later, in September 1986, a majority of
the board voted for parole with release date in January
1987. DeWitt was released January 16, 1987, and was
rearrested July 20 of the same year.

On information submitted in the criminal complaints
against DeWitt in the circumstances leading to his arrest,
the Rhode Island Attorney General filed a notice of intent
under state procedural rules to present DeWitt as a viola-
tor of the terms of his probation and to revoke his sus-
pended sentence.* That action was withdrawn when it

> R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-9 provides for parole of “any
prisoner whose sentence is subject to its control, unless such
prisoner be sentenced to imprisonment for life, and unless such
prisoner be confined as an habitual criminal” once he has
served “not less than one-third of the term for which he was
sentenced.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-13 provides for parole eligi-
bility on a life sentence after ten years.

+ R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 32 (f) provides: ” the court shall not
revoke probation or revoke a suspension of sentence or impose
a sentence previously deferred except after a hearing at which

was realized the suspension was invalid under O'Rourke.

The State then moved to correct the illegal sentence. The
motion was granted. DeWitt appealed to the Supreme
Court, claiming among other peirts that it was “funda-
mentally unfair” to allow his ea:’y freedom, “only to
have it taken away due to a misconception which was
nobody’s fault,” and arguing that the mistake should
have been discovered and rectified sooner, or else
allowed to stand, because by then he had developed an
“expectation in the finality of that sentence,” valid or not.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island rejected those
arguments, but remanded the case for reconsideration of
the Rule 35 motion to reduce the life sentence by lawful
means. State v. DeWitt, 557 A.2d 845 (R.I. 1989). The
sentencing justice refused to reduce the life sentence. No
appeal was taken from that decision.

Some twenty months later, DeWitt filed a pro se peti-
tion in the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, seeking habeas corpus relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court initially dismissed the
petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, and a certifi-
cate of probable cause to appeal was denied February 5,
1991. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
and remanded the case March 14, 1991. The District Court

the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to be present
and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed.
The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing.
Prior to the hearing the State shall furnish the defendant and the
court with a written statement specifying the grounds upon
which action is sought under this subdivision.”

directed the Attorney General of Rhode Island to answer

as designated party respondent. A hearing was con-
ducted in May 1992, and the petition was granted Octo-
ber 20, 1992. DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I.
1992). The State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1993). A petition
for rehearing and for hearing en banc was denied
November 22, 1993. App. A. Mandate issued on Novem-
ber 30, 1993.

ARGUMENT

With this case the First Circuit declares as a rule,
what at first it merely mused in Breest v. Helgemoe, 579
F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933 (1978), that

After a substantial period of time, . . . it might
be fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of
due process for a court to alter even an illegal
sentence in a way which frustrates a prisoner’s
expectations. . .

Breest involved a state defendant sentenced to life
imprisonment without certification by the court that the
murder was psycho-sexual in nature, which under state
law carried a mandatory minimum term of forty years;
his minimum sentence as pronounced would have made
him parole-eligible after eighteen. State v. Breest, 116 N.H.
734, 753, 367 A.2d 1320, 1335 (1976). The error was dis-
covered within days and the sentence was corrected with
certification some three weeks later on motion of the
State. Id. Breest attacked the resentencing unsuccessfully
on appeal, Id. at 753-54, 367 A.2d at 1335-36, and then

sought federal habeas corpus relief, 579 F.2d at 97. The
District Court ruled that application of the enhancement
statute “violated neither the double jeopardy nor the ex
post facto clauses” but that due process required a hear-
ing to establish that the murder was in fact psycho-sexual
in nature, a ruling the State did not contest. Id. at 97-98.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the sen-
tence as pronounced was statutorily invalid, id. at 99,
even though Breest “could have been lawfully
imprisoned under a life sentence imposed without refer-
ence to” the statute, because the law imposed a duty to
determine whether the crime was psycho-sexual “and if it
was, to so certify.” Id. at 99-100. The omission “left the
sentence incomplete and .. . potentially more lenient than
the statute permitted.” Id. [footnote omitted].

Although nothing more was required to decide the
case, the First Circuit undertook “[bJjefore leaving this
question” to remark its “concern that the power of a sentenc-
ing court to correct even a statutorily invalid sentence
must be subject to some temporal limit.” Id. at 101.
[Emphasis added.] It found it “need not decide, however,
how long or under what circumstances” a State or sen-
tencing court “constitutionally can wait to enhance an
invalid sentence”, as it found the “short period of time
involved” there clearly “permissible.” Id.

The First Circuit apparently believes it has answered
here, the question it reserved in Breest —- even though in
this case, the original sentence was neither invalid nor
enhanced, but merely reinstated, upon vacatur of a subse-

quent sentence reduced without authority.

A. THE DUE PROCESS RULE ANNOUNCED BY
THE FIRST CIRCUIT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW
AND REPRESENTS SUCH A DEPARTURE
FROM ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES GOVERN-
ING CORRECTION OF VOID OR ILLEGAL
SENTENCES AS TO CALL FOR REVIEW.

Review on Petition for a writ of certiorari will be
granted “only when there are special and important rea-
sons therefor”, as when a United States court .of appeals
has rendered a decision in conflict with that of another on
the same matter, or has decided a federal question in a
way in conflict with a state court of last resort, or has so
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judi-
cial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's
power of supervision. Sup. Ct. R. 10.1 (a).

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit granting habeas corpus relief in this
case not only directly overrules a decision of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island in a matter involving application
of its own procedural rule to correct a void sentence, but
is in conflict as well with its own prior decisions and
those of other United States courts of appeals and other
state courts of last resort respecting the correction of
illegal sentences. The court bases this decision on an
announced standard of due process which it concedes
“cannot be calibrated precisely,” 6 F.3d at 36, “drawing on
considerations mentioned by cases like Breest and sug-
gested by common sense,” Id. at 35, which find no basis
in any other decision of a court of law. The result requires
Rhode Island to release its prisoner based on an illegal
sentence.

10

A void sentence is recognized to be of no legal effect
and to require correction. In Bozza v. United States, 330
U.S. 160 (1946), amendment of a sentence to add “mini-
mum mandatory fines and penalties” required by statute
in addition to imprisonment was attacked as constituting
“double jeopardy forbidden by the Federal Constitution.”
Id. at 165-66. This Court rejected the contention, observ-
ing, “It is well established that a sentence which does not
comply with the letter of the criminal statute which
authorizes it is so erroneous that it may be set aside”, “at
least during the term of court in which the invalid sen-
tence was imposed”, “even though the prisoner had
already served part of his term[.]” Id. at 166. Declared the
Court: “The Constitution does not require that sentencing
should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge
means immunity for the prisoner.” Id. at 166-67.

The First Circuit interpreted Bozza in Thompson v.
United States, 495 F.2d 1304, 1306 (1974), as follows:

The full import of Bozza is that a trial court not
only can alter a statutorily-invalid sentence in a
way which might increase its severity, but must
do so when that statute so provides. [Emphasis
by court.]

Likewise, in Breest, the Court repeated its under-
standing that Bozza “stands for the proposition” stated in
Thompson, adding:

Even after the defendant has commenced to
serve his sentence, that power and that obliga-
tion. continue.

579 F.2d at 99.

1]

Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was adopted to abolish the “term rule” at common law
that left a court “in general without power to set aside or
modify its criminal judgment after the expiration of the
term at which it was entered.” United States v. Welty, 426
F.2d 615, 617 & nn.8 & 9 (3d Cir. 1970) (citing Linited States
v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67-69 (1914), and Heflin v. United
States, 358 U.S. 415, 421 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
Until its revision in 1985, Rule 35 “provide[d] in pertinent
part as follows: ‘The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time.’ ” Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 337
n.4 (1963). [Emphasis added.] Rhode Island’s Rule 35 “is
essentially the same as its federal counterpart,” State v.
O'Rourke, 463 A.2d at 1331, providing for correction of an
illegal sentence “at any time.”

Like other United States courts of appeals,® the First
Circuit has acknowledged the literal effect of the rule in

© See, e.g., United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir.
1990) (“As reflected in former Rule 35(a), under common law a
district court was free at any time to correct sentences when the
judgment was ‘void,’ because these sentences were invalid and
not final dispositions”), cert. denied sub nom. Baron v. United
States, 498 U.S. 943 (1990); United States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d
423, 427 (3d Cir. 1987) (reduced sentence was illegal and “may
be corrected by the district court at any time”); Safrit v. Garrison,
623 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Breest: “It is clear, of
course, that a void or illegal sentence may be corrected, even
though the correction may result in an increase”); Llerena v.
United States, 508 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1975) (when court dis-
covers it has entered a sentence that does not conform to statute,
it has a duty to correct the sentence even though service of
sentence has begun); United States v. Bentley, 850 F.2d 327, 328
(7th Cir.) (nothing prevented district court from correcting ille-
gal sentence under version of Rule 35(a) then in effect, by resen-
tencing), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 970 (1988); Burns v. United States,

12

~

its prior decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Ames, 743 F.2d
46, 47 (1984) (per curiam) (“sentencing court may correct
an ‘illegal sentence’ at any time”), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1165 (1985); United States v. De Los Santos-Himitola, 924
F.2d 380, 382 (1991) (applicable version of Rule 35
empowered district court “ ‘at any time’ to correct ille-
galities in sentences” for offenses committed during cov-
ered period); United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126, 129
(1977) (“A court may always correct an illegal sentence”
[emphasis added]); United States v. Becker, 536 F.2d 471,
472 (1976) (“an ‘illegal sentence’ is correctable by a court
‘at any time’ ”).

552 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1977) (when sentence does not con-
form to statute, “it is a nullity, and, as such, may be corrected at
any time” in such case, “the district court has the duty to set
aside what it had no authority to do and to correct the sentence
so as to comply with the statute, even though service of the
sentence originally imposed has begun and the correct sentence
is regarded to be more onerous”); United States v. Lewis, 862 F.2d
748, 750 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Under Rule 35, the district court can
‘correct an illegal sentence at any time.’ ”), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1032 (1989); Laycock v. State of New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1188
(10th Cir. 1989) (amending sentence to conform to statutory
requirement proper under state law); United States v. Adair, 826
F.2d 1040, 1041 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (sentence illegally
reduced under initial Rule 35 motion properly corrected on
revocation of probation); United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 90
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (on discovering defect, court was free to correct
sentence to extent necessary to bring the sentence into compli-
ance with statute). See also McNutt v. Schneckloth, 241 F.2d 128,
129 (9th Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (agreeing with state supreme
court “that when a sentence has been imposed for which there is
no authority in law, the trial court has the power and the duty to
expunge the void sentence and pronounce legal sentence, when-
ever the defect is discovered.”); Annot., 28 A.L.R.4th 147-74
(1984 & Supp.).

13

In holding otherwise in this case, DeWitt v. Ven-
tetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, the First Circuit has chosen to disregard
Rhode Island’s statute and rule and to pronounce instead
that Rhode Island could not constitutionally correct its
illegal sentence under its rule permitting correction at
any time, because: (1) the State “took no appeal from” the
1981 decision reducing DeWitt’s life sentence, id. at 35; (2)
“there is no sign that Rhode Island had undertaken any
wide-scale program to identify and resentence those
whose earlier sentences were suspended in violation of
O'Rourke”, id.; and (3) the prisoner in this case “was
actually released” and “remained free” for seven months,
until his rearrest, before the suspension was recognized
to be void and was vacated. Id. Though the court
acknowledges “a number of cases including Breest itself”
where a corrected sentence has “been upheld against
constitutional or other challenges,” id. at 34 & n.3, and
though it concedes that, “in principle, there is no differ-
ence between such cases and a case like this one in which
a sentence is reduced and later, finding the reduction to
be unlawful, the court reinstates the original sentence”,
id., the First Circuit pronounces that the correction in
DeWitt’s case “is so unfair that it must be deemed incon-
sistent with fundamental notions of fairness embodied in
the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 35.

While a few courts, state and federal, have ques-
tioned, with the First Circuit, whether it “might” not be
“fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of due process”
in some circumstances, Breest, 579 F.2d at 101, for a court
to alter the status of a prisoner, see United States v. Lun-
dien, 769 F.2d 981, 987 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rico,
902 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ortega,

14

859 F.2d 327, 335 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Villano,
816 F.2d 1448, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987) (Logan, J., concur-
ring); State v. Delmondo, 67 Haw. 531, 533, 696 P.2d 344,
346 (1985); and State v. Acuna, 103 N.M. 279, 281, 705 P.2d
685, 687 (1985), cited in DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F.Supp. at
583; see also United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520,
525 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We note that courts have stated
that enhancement of a sentence after the defendant's
expectations in its length have ‘crystallized’ might be a
denial of due process.”), in none of these cases has a
court overturned the reinstatement of an original, legal,
sentence, on the ground that a prisoner had a due process
right to rely on the subsequent, void, reduction.

Courts considering due process in the context of a
change of status after passage of time have tended to look
for waiver on the part of the government that would bar
resumption of custody. For example, in Shields v. Beto, 370
F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967), habeas corpus was granted after
the Court of Appeals found “more than 28 years of inac-
tion on the part of the State of Texas relative to the
unexpired term” of a defendant extradited to Louisiana
and released without a Texas detainer, who remained at
large from 1944 until 1960 when he was convicted in a
Tennessee federal court and transferred to Texas for trial
of a new felony. Id. at 1004. The court found Texas’s “lack
of interest” in Shields for 28 years “equivalent to a par-

don or commutation of his sentence and a waiver of
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1006. It held Texas therefore “lacked
authority to require Shields to complete service of the
sentences under the old 1933 convictions, which action
constituted a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id.

15

Lanier v. Williams, 361 F.Supp. 944 (D.N.C. 1973),
involved a prisoner mistakenly released in 1967, id. at
948, who remained free and in contact with the local
sheriff for nearly five years before being returned to
custody to complete service of sentences imposed in 1964,
id. at 946. In granting his petition for habeas corpus, the
District Court remarked that “|dl]iligent research” had
“vielded scant authorities on the issues presented”, id. at
947, but adopted “the waiver theory” of Shields v. Beto as
consistent with “the principle that a prisoner cannot be
required to serve his sentence in installments.” Id. Said

the court:

Once the state, through acts or omissions of its
officials, has led a person, through no fault of
his own, to believe that he is free of a prison
sentence, and makes no attempt for a prolonged
period of years to reacquire custody over him,
that person should be able to rely on the state’s
action or inaction and assume that further ser-
vice of the sentence will not be exacted of him.
The state should not later be heard to assert a
right of custody over the person whom it has so
misled, and to permit the state to do so offends
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Id.

Lanier was relied on in Bonner v. Brock, 610 P.2d 265,
267-68 (Okl.Cr. 1980), where “five years passed without
the State’s showing any interest” in enforcing a three-
year sentence that the prisoner believed to have been
concluded pursuant to agreement with the district attor-
ney that a successor sought to nullify. Id. at 267. The court
concluded, “To fimda that the three year prison sentence

16

should be administered at this late date offends notions
of fundamental fairness and due process.” Id.

Courts following that analysis in other cases have
reached a contrary conclusion, depending on the facts. In
Clifton v. Beto, 298 F.Supp. 1384 (D.Tex. 1968), for exam-
ple, the district court distinguished Shields to hold that
although Texas, which in 1946 conditionally pardoned
defendant convicted in 1931 and 1932, had made no effort
to place a detainer against him on being notified in 1947
that he was to begin serving a federal sentence in
Arkansas, its inaction did not constitute a commutation
of sentence or waiver of jurisdiction, and did not render
its insistence in 1964 that he serve the remainder of his
1932 and 1933 sentences violative of due process. 298
F.Supp. at 1388. In affirming, 411 F.2d 1226, 1226 (5th Cir.
1969) (per curiam), the Court of Appeals found the Clifton

“a

facts “materially different” from those of Shields, noting:
“Texas did not surrender [Clifton] to another jurisdiction
and thereafter ‘lose interest in him’. To the contrary,
[Clifton] violated his Texas parole. . . . Thus he, not Texas,
was the efficient, moving cause of the delay now sought
to be invoked.” Id. See also Sterling v. Maggio, 505 F.Supp.
1111, 1113 (D.La. 1981) (mem.) (where prisoner was mis-
takenly released and state regained custody less than 18
months later, state did not waive jurisdiction nor show
such a lack of interest that it would be inconsistent with
fundamental principles of liberty and justice to require
him to serve sentence); People v. Cavelli, 50 N.Y.2d 919,
921, 431 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451, 409 N.E.2d 924, 925 (1980)

(mem.) (while court in certain cases may, as a matter of

due process, lose jurisdiction over a defendant either
because his sentence has been interrupted for a lengthy

17

period or because he has otherwise been subjected to
significant prejudice, it was not unreasonable as a matter
of law to require a defendant inadvertently released to
serve the balance of one-year sentence); State v. Sheehy,
115 N.H. 175, 337 A.2d 348 (1975) (while State cannot,
consistent with fundamental principles of justice pro-
tected by due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, compel a parolee to serve out his sentence after the
State has manifested a gross disinterest in him, defendant
paroled in 1960 with express awareness that parole would
not terminate until 1985 could be required to serve 1945
sentence where facts surrounding parole and subsequent
arrests indicated New Hampshire maintained constant
interest).

The District Court in this case, as the First Circuit
court recognized, 6 F.3d at 34, “relied directly upon the
Due Process Clause as construed by this Court in Breest v.
Helgemoe {citations omitted].” “In Breest,” the court recal-
led, 6 F.3d at 35, “we said that notions of fundamental
fairness do place some temporal limit on later increases
in sentence, [citation omitted,] and the Fourth Circuit, in
Lundien, has endorsed this view.” Id.

The State submits the First Circuit has erred in this
case: (1) in viewing reinstatement of the original sen-
tence, after a void reduction, as a “later increase[] in
sentence”; (2) in interpreting due process in these circum-
stances to bar vacatur of the nullity; and (3) in creating
conflict among the Circuits, based solely on its own deci-
sion in Breest and its view of the Fourth Circuit decision
in Lundien, 769 F.2d at 987, by imposing a “temporal
limit” in this case on the power of a court to vacate a void

or illegal sentence.

ANON ne TN ee

18

B. IN OVERTURNING THE IMPOSITION OF A
LEGAL STATE SENTENCE THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS TRANSGRESSED THE
BOUNDS OF PROPER JURISDICTION
UNDER § 2254.

As this Court has stated, “The role of habeas pro-
ceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional
rights are observed, is secondary and limited.” Brecht v.
Abrahamson, __ U.S. __, __, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993).
As it has also observed, “|A] state rule of law ‘does not
run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another
method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or
to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the
bar.’ ” Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)
(quoting “the remark of Justice Cardozo in Snyder v.
Massachusetts,” 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).

With its decision in this case, the First Circuit has
overturned a life sentence legally imposed by the State of
Rhode Island and affirmed by the State’s highest court,
and has ordered instead, that the prisoner serve a fifteen-
year sentence the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
declared a nullity because of its imposition in violation of

state law.

The First Circuit has decreed this, notwithstanding a
state procedural rule permitting the correction of an ille-
gal sentence “at any time”, because it has concluded that
the correction was not timely for purposes of the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

In reaching this conclusion, the court has disregarded
both the factual findings of the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, and the stated intent of the sentencing judge, and

19

substituted its own view that the prisoner’s early release
on parole and remaining at large for seven months before
his rearrest worked him such prejudice that vacatur of his
illegal suspension was fundamentally unfair.

While it candidly admits to reaching this conclusion
“with diffidence because federal judges have no monop-
oly on wisdom in deciding what is unfair,” 6 F.3d at 36,
and though it acknowledges that no case brought to its
attention has reached the same result, id. at 34-36 & nn.3
& 5, the court expresses “confiden{ce] that this case is
very unusual and that our decision imposes no serious
constraint on state authorities who, unlike federal judges,
have the direct responsibility for the law-enforcement
and prosecutorial tasks at hand.” Id. at 36.

The jurisdiction of a federal court to countermand a
State in matters of state punishment is not broad enough
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to countenance such a result.

This Court has “ ‘defined the category of infractions
that violate “fundamental fairness” very narrowly.’ ”
Estelle v. McGuire, __ U.S. __, __, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482
(1991) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 US. 342, 32
(1990)). It has also held that, “ ‘Beyond the specific guar-
antees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process

Clause has limited operation.’ ” Id.

If this Court could hold, in United States v. DiFran-
cesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980), that a federal defendant
whose sentence is contested by the government under 18
U.S.C. § 3576, “of course, is charged with knowledge of
the statute and its appeal provisions, and has no expecta-
tion of finality in his sentence until the appeal is con-
cluded or the time to appeal has expired” [emphasis

20

added], then it is submitted the defendant in this case
could not have had an expectation of finality in a sen-
tence subject to correction “at any time” if illegal. See
United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“While DiFrancesco did not involve correction of an ille-
gal sentence within the meaning of Rule 35, its rationale,
in the constitutional sense, is applicable here. Defendant is
charged with knowledge that his sentence, if illegally imposed,
is subject to correction under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a).”

[Emphasis added.]})

Clearly this was not the kind of “extreme case” the
State “conceded at oral argument” would implicate the
Due Process Clause, 6 F.3d at 34, as where a defendant
released and allowed to remain at large for years with
nothing but “gross disinterest” by the State was snatched
back unexpectedly to serve an old sentence, see Shields v:
Beto. Nor is it the kind of “exceptional circumstance[]”
referred to by the court in United States v. Guevremont, 829
F.2d 423, 429 n.8 (3d Cir. 1987), “as where the defendant
has already completed service of the illegal sentence.”
The defendant in this case was still under the active
supervision of the Parole Board and was serving twenty
years’ probation imposed by the sentencing judge at the
time of reduction, as the First Circuit court acknowl-
edged. 6 F.3d at 36-37. Nothing in the record supports the
court’s remark that “DeWitt appears to have been singled
out primarily to relieve the state of the trouble of con-
ducting a parole revocation hearing.” Id. at 35. On the
contrary, revocation of parole in Rhode Island is not the
province of the courts, but solely of the Parole Board,
which did in fact revoke DeWitt’s parole. For the First

Circuit to hold that the superior court had no power to

vacate its own illegal fifteen-year sentence, leaving in
place the original, valid, life sentence — an action the
Court of Appeals calls “a judgment unlawfully reimposed
on DeWitt in violation of the Constitution”, id. at 37 — is
clearly to transgress the bounds of jurisdiction granted it
under § 2254. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368
(1983) (Where state supreme court construed its statutes
and recognized intent of its legislature, Court is “bound
to accept” state court’s “construction of that State’s stat-
utes.” “Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of
punishments.” [Footnote omitted.]). See also United States
ex rel. Hanrahan v. Bosse, 547 F.Supp. 718, 720-21 (D.IIIL.
1982) (where habeas corpus petitioner had moved state
trial court to reduce sentence under state statute which
allowed reduction or modification not later than 30 days
after sentence imposed, and state supreme court held
circuit court had power to reduce sentence only within 30
days after actual imposition, which was not stayed by
appeal, petitioner could not escape limitation on federal
court's authority to interpret state law by claiming due

process violation).

————$ $$$ * EE

CONCLUSION

The decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
overrules the State’s court of last resort and conflicts with
prior decisions of this Court and other Circuits in estab-
lishing a “temporal limit” for the correction of an illegal
sentence, based on an unsupported interpretation of the

Due Process Clause as it applies to the States.

The Petition for Certiorari should be granted to

restore the State’s legal sentence, to,resolve this apparent

conflict, and to clarify what latitude is extended to fed-

eral courts in reviewing matters of state sentencing and

procedure by way of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.

Respectfully submitted,

JerrREY B. Pint
Attorney General of the
State of Rhode Island

ANNIE GOLDBERG

Assistant Attorney General
Appellate Division

72 Pine Street

Providence, Rhode Island 02903
(401) 274-4400, x.2289

Attorneys for Petitioner

1A

APPENDIX A

Fred DeWITT, Petitioner, Appellee,
v.
Donald VENTETOULO, Acting Director,
Adult Correctional Institution, et al.,
Respondents, Appellees.

Attorney General of Rhode
Island, Appellant.

No. 93-1002.
United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.
Heard June 11, 1993.
Decided Oct. 6, 1993.

After conviction for robbery, assault with intent to
murder, and arson was affirmed on appeal, 429 A.2d 628,
state court revoked parole and reimposed original life
sentence on ground that early relief suspending all but 15
years of his life sentence was mistaken, 657 A.2d 845.
Petition was then filed for writ of habeas corpus. The
United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, Francis J. Boyle, Chief Judge, 803 F.Supp. 580,
granted writ. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals,
Boudin, Circuit Judge, held that petitioner’s due process
rights were violated when, six years after suspending all
but 15 years of life sentence, state court reimposed origi-
nal life sentence on ground that earlier relief was mis-

taken.

Affirmed.

2A

Annie Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Appellate Div. with
whom Jeffrey B. Pine, Atty. Gen., was on brief for appel-
lant.

David A. Schechter with whom Margaret-Mary Hov-
arth was on brief, for appellee.

Before SELYA, CYR and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges.
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus,
which it stayed pending this appeal, ordering the release
from state imprisonment of Fred E. DeWitt, 603 F.Supp.
580. The basis for the writ was the district court’s deci-
sion that Rhode Island had acted unconstitutionally in
increasing DeWitt’s sentence and reimprisoned him after
his release on parole. We agree with the district court’s

decision and affirm.

I.

The constitutional issue in this case arises under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
some areas, such as search and seizure, due process has
been reduced to detailed and nearly mechanical rules. In
other areas, the precepts are very general, and everything
turns upon the circumstances. The issue here is of this
latter type, and so we begin with a complete account of
the procedural history of this case.

On March 17, 1978, after a trial by jury, DeWitt was
convicted in Rhode Island Superior Court of robbery,
assault with intent to murder, and arson. These menacing
labels do not convey the full measure of De Witt’s evil
conduct. According to testimony given by the victim, a

3A

woman then about 67, DeWitt broke into her home while
carrying a knife, struck her with his hand and with a
hammer, engaged in one brutal act after another, and then
bound and gagged the victim and set fire to her apart-

ment.

The superior court imposed on DeWitt a life sentence
which meant under Rhode Island law that parole was
possible but not for a minimum of 10 years. DeWitt began
serving his sentence in 1978 and in 1980 his conviction
was affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. State v.
DeWitt, 423 A.2d 828 (R.1.1980). Then, in the following
year. DeWitt came to the aid of a prison guard who was
being assaulted by an inmate, and DeWitt later testified
for the state in the prosecution of the inmate. There is
some suggestion. that DeWitt, not surprisingly, may have
suffered at the hands of other inmates on account of his

rescue efforts.

In recognition of these efforts, the superior court on
June 25, 1981, held a hearing and entered an order sus-
pending all but 15 years of DeWitt’s life sentence and
providing that he would be placed on probation for 20
years from the time of his future release, whenever that
occurred.! This shortened the minimum period before
DeWitt could seek parole, but six years remained before
DeWitt’s parole application was granted. In the mean-
time, in mid-1983, the Rhode Island Supreme Court

! This lessened sentence was imposed under Rule 35 of the
Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure which permitted the
court to correct illegal sentences at any time and to reduce
sentences within 120 days of either conviction or receipt of
mandate affirming the conviction.

4A

decided State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328 (R.1.1983), hold-
ing that the superior court could not “suspend” a sen-

tence once a defendant had begun to serve it.?

Between 1983 and 1987, the state apparently made no
effort to have the superior court undo its partial suspen-
sion of DeWitt’s life sentence. Instead DeWitt continued
to serve his sentence, pursued education and training
courses in prison, and applied several times for parole.
Finally, in January 1987, DeWitt was granted parole and
released from prison. We are told by the state that this
occurred about 16 months before the earliest date on
which DeWitt would have been eligible for parole if held
under a life sentence. Thus, despite O'Rourke the prison
and parole authorities continued to treat DeWitt as if the

order suspending his sentence in part was still in force.

During the eight months following his release in
January 1987, DeWitt obtained work, beginning a paint-
ing business and then a siding business. He resumed his
relationship with family members and his girlfriend. He
also rented an apartment but moved out after a disagree-
ment, DeWitt believing that the landlord was billing the
entire building’s utilities to DeWitt’s meter. It was this
latter occurrence that began the chain of events leading to
this appeal. According to DeWitt, he later returned to his
old neighborhood to visit a friend, was invited in by his

2 The court ruled that a state statute, R.I.Gen. Laws
§ 12-19-10, forbad such suspensions and had not been modified
in this regard by Rule 35. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d at 1331. It appears
that the superior court judge in DeWitt’s case was not alone in
assuming, prior to O'Rourke, that a suspension power did exist
under Rule 35.

e
i

5A

former landlord, and was then attacked by the allegedly
drunken landlord and his wife with knives. In the tur-

moil, the landlord and his wife were injured.

The landlord’s version clearly differed, for the state
began criminal proceedings against DeWitt based on the
incident. The state also took steps to re-imprison DeWitt
based on his 1978 conviction, but it did not use the
customary method of seeking to revoke his parole for
violation of the good behavior conditions. Instead, after a
hearing on September 21, 1987, the superior court vacated
its earlier June 1981 order that had suspended in part
DeWitt’s original life sentence; the court’s ruling was that
O’Rourke showed that the original suspension order had
been improper. DeWitt is currently being held in prison

pursuant to that reimposed life sentence.

The rest of the procedural story can be briefly told.
At some point after September 1987 DeWitt was tried on
state charges growing out of the knife incident with his
landlord, and DeWitt was acquitted by the jury. In Janu-
ary 1988, DeWitt made a new motion under Rule 35 to
alter his life sentence. The superior court denied the
motion as untimely. An appeal followed, challenging both
the reimposition of the life sentence and the denial of the
new Rule 35 motion. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
rejected the first challenge, including DeWitt’S express
claim that the reimposed sentence violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause. State v. DeWitt, 657 A.2d 845 (R.I.1989). The
court ruled that the Rule 35 claim was timely, but, on
remand, the superior court denied the Rule 35 motion on

the merits and no appeal was taken.

re

6A

On December 11, 1990, DeWitt filed his habeas peti-
tion in the district court. The district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing, adducing many of the facts set forth
above. On October 20, 1992, the district court issued a
memorandum and order granting the habeas petition.
The district court’s judgment, which is stayed pending
this appeal, was entered on December 10, 1992.

Judge Boyle’s decision granting DeWitt’s habeas peti-
tion relied directly upon the Due Process Clause as con-
strued by this court in Breest v. Helgemos, 579 F.2d 95 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 327, 58 L.Ed.2d 229
(1978). There, this court stated that “the power of a sen-
tencing court to correct [upward] even a statutorily
invalid sentence must be subject to some temporai limit”
and that in some circumstances such a correction “might
be fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of due pro-
cess... . ” Id. at 101. After a careful analyses of the
present facts, Judge Boyle concluded that fundamental
unfairness did exist here, especially given the state’s fail-
ure to take any steps to reimpose the life sentence in the
four years after O’Rourke and prior to DeWitt’s release.
The state then brought this appeal.

II.

There is no surer recipe for confusion than to answer
two different questions at the same time. Thus, in assess-
ing DeWitt’s due process claim, we put to one side for the
moment the fact that DeWitt may have violated the good
behavior conditions attached to his parole. Instead, we
ask whether — assuming arguendo that no parole violation

occurred - the superior court was nevertheless entitled

7A

six years after the event to correct its earlier mistaken
grant of Rule 35 relief and to reimpose the original life

sentence.

The Constitution contains no general rule that pro-
hibits a court from increasing an earlier sentence where
the court finds that it was erroneous and that a higher
sentence was required by law. On the contrary, this has
occurred, and been upheld against constitutional or other
challenges, in a number of cases included Breest itself.>
And in principal, there is no difference between such
cases and a case like this one in which a sentence is
reduced and later, finding the reduction to be unlawful,
the court reinstates the original sentence.

But in law what is true for the usual case is often not
true in the extreme case. Even the state conceded at oral
argument that due process must impose some outer limit
on the power to revise sentences upward after the fact.
We are concerned here not with the substantive grounds
of a state’s decision to reduce or increase a sentence, but
rather with the inherently procedural issue of whether

> See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133-34,
101 S.Ct. 420, 435-36, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). United States v. Rico,
902 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 943, 111
S.Ct. 352, 112 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d
672, 673 (4th Cir. 1989). Lintefield v. Caton, 856 F.2d 344, 348-49
(1st Cir. 1988). United States v. Osage, 859 F.2d 327, 334 (5th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1027, 109 S.Ct. 1157, 103 L.Ed.2d 216
(1989). United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1446, 1458 (10th Cir.
1987). Lerner v. Giff, 751 F.2d 450, 458 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1010, 105 S.Ct. 2709, 86 L.Ed.2d 724 (1985). United States v.
Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 986-87 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1064, 106 S.Ct. 815, 88 L.Ed.2d 789 (1986). Burns v. United States,
552 F.2d 828, 831 (5th Cir. 1977).

KA

and when a state can reopen a matter after a final unap
pealed decision, after a substantial lapse in time during
which the state had actual knowledge of the error, and
after a significant change in circumstances. In short, the

question we face is one Of process

In Breest we said that notions of fundamental fairness
do place some temporal limit on later increases in sen
tence, 579 F.2d at 101, and the Fourth Circuit, in Lundien,
has endorsed this view. 769 F.2d at 987. See also Villano,
$16 F.2d at 1458 (Logan, J. concurring). It is quite true that
the cases following Breest generally found, as did Breest
itself, that the particular upward revision in question did
not violate due process. A convicted defendant does not
automatically acquire a vested interest ina mistakenly
low sentence. Only in the extreme case can a court prop-
erly say that the later upward revision of a sentence,
made to correct an earlier mistake, is so unfair that it
must be deemed inconsistent with fundamental notions
of fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause. Accord

Lundien, 769 F.2d at 987.

In our view, there is no single touchstone for making
this judgment, nor any multi-part formula. Rather, draw-
ing on considerations mentioned by cases like Breest and
suggested by common sense, we think that attention must
be given — our list is not exclusive — to the lapse of time
between the mistake and the attempted increase in sen-
tence, to whether or not the defendant contributed to the
mistake and the reasonableness of his intervening expec-
tations, to the prejudice worked by a later change, and to
the diligence exercised by the state in seeking the change.
To be sure, doctrine should evolve toward yardsticks and
formulas, making law more predictable and reducing the

QA

need for ad hoc decisions by judyes. But that is the end
y juay

point of the journey, and we are at the beginning

We start with the central and singular fact that the
state, which was represented at the hearing in) which
DeWitt’s sentence was suspended in 1983, took no appeal
from that decision, even though an appeal is the ordinary
and expected way in which errors are to be corrected. The
state had a second chance also to correct the error in 1983
after the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in O'Rourke
that the suspension power could not be used after a
prisoner had begun to serve his sentence; once again, the
state made no effort (so far as the record reveals) to apply
to the trial court to undo the suspension of DeWitt’s
sentence error. The process that DeWitt received, there
fore, begins with a remarkable double default by the
state. It is not a matter of the state being estopped; rather,
in deciding what is fundamentally unfair we cannot
ignore the fact that with due diligence the state could
have challenged the suspension long before DeWitt’s

release.

Following the state’s double default, circumstances
changed substantially. In contrast to cases like Breest,
DeWitt not only continued for a number of years in
prison reasonably believing that his sentence had been
reduced, but he was actually released. He remained free
from January 1987 to September 1987 arid laid down new
roots in society, acquiring a job and reestablishing family
ties. Only at this point, did the superior court correct its
original mistake and reimprison him. The lengthy delay
and change of circumstances are not decisive but they

LOA

contribute to the judgment whether due process was
aftorded by the belated reopening.

Finally, due process requires a weighing not only of
the defendant’s interest in finality, but of the state’s inter-
est in correcting error. Yet there is no sign that Rhode
Island has undertaken any wide-scale program to identify
and resentence those whose earlier sentences were sus-
pended in violation of O’Rourke. Rather, DeWitt appears
to have been singled out primarily to relieve the state of
the trouble of conducting a parole revocation hearing.
[he impression is hard to avoid that the resentencing
here primarily serves only to skirt the minimal due pro-
cess obligations that attach to parole revocations, that the
state could conduct such a proceeding at minimal cost,
and that the state’s own self-proclaimed interest in vin-
dicating O'Rourke is limited to this case.

As we have said, there are numerous cases allowing a
sentence to be increased after it was initially imposed in
error. In virtually all that we have discovered, there has
been some distinguishing circumstance that separates
that case from DeWitt’s, for example, because (as is often
true) the defendant was still in prison, or the interval
between the original sentence and its correction was
brief, or because the defendant almost certainly knew or
should have known that an error had been made.4

4 Compare Lerner, 751 F.2d at 458 (mistake corrected after
three years but while defendant still in prison); Cook, 890 F.2d at
674 (mistake corrected after three weeks while defendant await-
ing a report date for community confinement), and Rico, 902
F.2d at 1068-69 mistake — of which defendant must have known
- discovered three days after defendant erroneously sentenced
to time served and released).

L1A

Conversely, we are completely satisfied, as Breest and
Lundieu said in dicta, that due process must in principle
impose an outer limit on the ability to correct a sentence

after the event.

[hus we face here the familiar due process problem
of deciding how much is too much. In concluding that
DeWitt’s case crosses the line, we have taken into account
a range of considerations: the multi-year period between
the suspension and the reimposition of sentence, the rea-
sonableness of DeWitt’s reliance, his release from prison
and formation of new roots, the unusual tardiness of the
State in failing to correct the error from 1983 onward, and
the existence of an alternative parole revocation remedy.
[hese elements cannot be calibrated precisely, nor can
they be taken in isolation. The outcome here is the result

of the combined weight of the elements.

We reach our conclusion with diffidence because fed-
eral judges have no monopoly on wisdom in deciding
what is unfair, and even harsh decisions by state authori-
ties usually raise no constitutional issue. But we are con-
tident that this case is very unusual and that our decision
imposes no serious constraint on state authorities who,
unlike federal judges, have the direct responsibility for
the law-enforcement and prosecutorial tasks at hand. In
sum, this case is the very rare exception to the general
rule that courts can, after sentence, revise sentences

upward to correct errors.

II]

We turn now to Rhode Island’s counter arguments
and, in particular, to the issue we earlier reserved con-
cerning DeWitt’s supposed parole violation. The state has
tought earnestly for its position that the district court
erred in granting the writ, but in our view the arguments
on which the state lays most stress are not very compel-

ling

(he state argues broadly that the original suspension
of DeWitt’s life sentence was a matter of discretion, and
the decision to parole him before the end of his new 15-
year sentence was likewise discretionary. From these
premises the state concludes that DeWitt cannot have an
interest In remaining at large that is protectable under the
Due Process Clause. But it is one thing to say that DeWitt
could not have compelled the suspension of sentence or
the grant of parole; it is quite another to ignore the reality
that the discretion was exercised in his favor and the state

is noW trying to withdraw what it has bestowed.

Rhode Island is not required to give away its prop-
erty but if it gave away its state house as a gift, it is
unlikely it could get it back without paying just compen-
sation to the new owner. More closely on point, the state
is not obliged by the Constitution to parole its prisoners,
but having done so, it is obliged to afford them due
process — what process is due is another matter — when it
revokes paroles. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92
S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The case relied
upon by the state for its discretion argument, Greenhots v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60
L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), involved the very different question

,

ISA

whether the state is obliged to provide due process in

deciding whether to grant parole.

[he state’s main arguments in this case are narrower
and center upon DeWitt’s fight with his former landlord
DeWitt was warned, the state points out, that his parole
could be revoked if he got himself into trouble. That he
was acquitted by a jury of causing the trouble, says the
state, means nothing; the burden of proof in that trial was
beyond a reasonable doubt, while in parole revocation,
state law requires only evidence that would “reasonably
satisfy” the decision-maker that a violation occurred.
Walker v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 274, 243 A.2d 733, 737 (1968)
Quoting from DeWitt’s own testimony about the incident,
the state suggests that DeWitt’s version of the struggle

with the landlord is contradictory and improbable.

[hese arguments remind one of a boxer leading with
his chin. No one doubts that the state couid at the outset
have conducted a proceeding to revoke DeWitt’s parole.
DeWitt’s story that he was attacked without provocation
by the landlord and his wife, both armed with knives, is
one that any parole board lawyer might enjoy testing on
cross-examination. The Constitution has not been read to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a parole
revocation proceeding. E.g., Whitehead v. U.S. Parole Com
mission, 755 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir.1985). If the state
found that DeWitt had misbehaved, it could have surely

cancelled his parole.

But this is not what happened. There has been no
official determination of wrongdoing by DeWitt, and he
has not been returned to prison to serve a 15-year sen-
tence. The state can hardly expect that this court will

oo acini elaine

14A

determine, based on the state’s selection of transcript
excerpts, that DeWitt was at fault. It may well be that
under Rhode Island law the state can still revoke De-
Witt’s parole on account of the knifing incident. We have
no competence to revoke the parole, and no occasion to
consider any federal claims that DeWitt might make
against such a remedy.° But as matters now stand, DeWitt
is being held pursuant to a judgment sentencing him to
life imprisonment, a judgment unlawfully reimposed on

DeWitt in violation of the Constitution.

In the concluding section of its brief, the state asserts
in one sentence that DeWitt’s claim in this court is fore-
closed by his failure to appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court after the superior court on remand denied
his new Rule 36 motion. When that motion was denied,
DeWitt had already presented to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court the due process claim on which we pass
today, and that court had already rejected that claim on
the merits. DeWitt had thus fully exhausted his state
remedies to vindicate his due process claim, and the

state’s exhaustion objection is meritless.

Affirmed.

> Possibly DeWitt would argue that due process precluded
revoking his parole for misconduct after the jury acquittal
However, like most circuits, we have sustained the use of
“acquitted conduct” to increase sentences under the Sentencing
Guidelines, based on the same distinction as to burden of proof
urged by Rhode Island in this case. E.g., United States v. Moor
sola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir.1989)

L5A

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 93-1002.
FRED DEWITT,
Petitioner, Appellee,
.
DONALD VENTETOULO, ACTING DIREC TOR,
ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION. FT. a...

Respondents, Appellees.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISI AND,
Appellant.

Before
sreyer, Chief Judge

forruella, Selya, Cyr, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

ORDER OF THE COURT
Entered: November 22, 1993

[he panel of judges that rendered the decision in this

case having voted to deny the petition for rehearing and

the suggestion for the holding of a rehearing en banc

having been carefully considered by the judges of the

Court in regular active service and a majority of said
judges not having voted to order that the appeal be heard

or reheard by the Court en banc,

a

L6A

It is ordered that the petition for rehearing and the

suggestion for rehearing en banc be denied.
By The Court:

FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO

Clerk

[cc:Mr. Schechter and Ms. Goldberg]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386002_1271%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
