# Opposition Brief — Burchill v. Kish

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 511 U.S. 1006

## Text

No. 93-1311 | OcGhal UF wit CUBS
svaenmeresn ,

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

ROBERT GEORGE BURCHILL,
Petitioner,
versus

DOUGLAS KISH, ef al.,
Respondents.

Petition For a Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Third Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Henry S. Perkin,

Counsel of Record

Lehigh County Department
of Law

Sth & Hamilton Streets

Allentown, PA 18101

(610) 820-3180

Counsel for the
Respondent

County of Lehigh

\\t>

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT WITH
PREJUDICE BASED ON PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO
OBEY A COURT ORDER REQUIRING HIM TO FILE AN
AMENDED COMPLAINT BY A DATE CERTAIN.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...--ecees i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....--+++++eeee85 iil
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE .......-.-. |
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......-+++++eee7%% 2
ARGUMENT ..cccocces seo seeteesenees es 3
COMCLIIGION oo 0 0k 6 HONS eee ee eee 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Glass v. Seaboard C.L.R. Co.,714 F.2d 1107
I Gad & © we ey ©. 66 0 0-00 60 6 ow oe 6
Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1988) ...... 4
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626,
8 L.Ed. 2d 734, 82 S.Ct. 1386 (1962) ............ 3
McConnell v. Medical & Ben. Plan, 778 F.2d 521
TCE Feb ets bcos ce cbc edb bes oe es 6
Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369 (3rd Cir. 1992) ..... 4
NLRB vy. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498,
95 L.Ed. 479. 71 S.Ct. 453 (1951) .............. 3
Shempp v. School District, 184 F.Supp. 381
IS oy. dis a UG o/b o Ove 6 oe 6 0 0's 60s 5
U.S.N. Co. v. American Express Co., 55 F.R.D. 31
NT L's ica dina és ce ereevesecscccece 3
Wiss v. Weinberger, 415 F.Supp. 293
ETE 5 Sh ely bo aie w 466 4.0 0-0 v6 « o's wb 5
RULES
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

. R.Civ.P. 6(e) .
R.Civ.P. 41(b)
R.Civ.P. 59(e)
. R.Civ.P. 60 ..
. Ct. Rule 10.1.

. Ct. Rule 10. 1(a)

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Robert George Burchill, and attorney,
admitted to the practice of law before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, filed a complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that his civil rights were
violated by Respondent County of Lehigh "County
Respondents") and sixteen (16) additional respondents.
Petitioner’s complaint alleged that the County Respondents
violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights during the May 13,
1990 arrest of Petitioner and search of his home.

In response to various motions filed by all of the
respondents, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania (hereinafter the "District Court")
entered an order on February 22, 1993 conditionally dismissing
Petitioner’s complaint subject to his right to file an amended
complaint within 21 days. On March 9, 1993, the District
Court entered an order granting Petitioner’s motion to enlarge
the time for filing an amended complaint. Under the terms of
the March 9, 1993 order:

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint shall be filed within
twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order or this
case will be dismissed with prejudice. NO FURTHER
EXTENSIONS WILL BE PERMITTED.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s amended complaint was to be
filed Sy March 31, 1993, 21 days after the March 9, 1993
order. Petitioner, a practicing attorney, failed to file an
amended complaint within the time period prescribed.
Thereafter, on April 6,1993 the District Court entered an order
dismissing Petitioner's complaint with prejudice as to all
respondents.

Petitioner then filed an appeal to the United States

2

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (hereinafter the "Court
of Appeals"). The Court of Appeals, by order dated November
12, 1993, affirmed the April 6, 1993 judgment of the District
Court. By order dated December 16, 1993, the Court of
Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for rehearing. Petitioner
thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In his petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioner fails to
identify how-the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts
with the decision of another federal court of appeals on the
same matter so as to call for an exercise of this Court’s power
of supervision. See Rule 10.1(a) of the Rules of this Court.
The decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals
are consistent with the judicial interpretations of Fed. R.Civ.P
41(b) which confirm a court’s power to dismiss an action based
on a plaintiff's failure to comply with an order of court.

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to offer any reason
justifying relief from judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60. In
essence, Petitioner's argument is that the rules regarding
computation of time set forth in Fed. R.Civ.P. 6 were not
applied properly. Not only is this argument flawed, such an
issue is not one which involves any “special and important
reasons” justifying the grant of certiorari. Rule 10.1(a) of the
Rules of this Court.

ARGUMENT

4 This Case Does Not Involve Special or Important
Reasons for The Granting of Certiorari

As the Rules of this Court provide, certiorari will be
granted “only when there are special and important reasons

3

therefor". Rule 10.1. The case at bar involves no such reasons
and the decisions of the courts below realistically have no
impact on anyone other than the parties to this suit. This
Court has previously held that certiorari is to be granted only
in cases involving principles, the settlement of which is
important to the public generally rather than to the parties
specifically, and in cases where there is a real conflict of
opinion and authority between courts of appeals. NLRB v.
Pittsburgh S.S. Co.,340 U.S.498, 95 L.Ed. 479, 71 S.Ct. 453
(1951).

In the present case, the decisions below involved the
straightforward application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the very clearly stated directives by the trial
court. Petitioner has identified no decision of any court of
appeals that conflicts with the decisions of the courts below.

Il. ‘Dismissal of Petitioner’s Suit Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) Was Proper

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), where a
plaintiff fails to comply with an order of court, a defendant
may move for dismissal of the action. It is also well settled
that a court may dismiss an action on its own motion where a
plaintiff does not comply with an order of court. Link v.
Wabach R.R., 370 U.S.626,8 L.Ed.2d 734, 82 S.Ct. 1386
(1962); U.S.N. Co. v. American Express Co., 55 F.R.D. 31
(E.D.Pa. 1972). The March 9, 1993 order of the District Court
was clear and self -executing. The order mandated that
Petitioner’s amended complaint be filed within 21 days of the
date of the order or the case would be dismissed with
prejudice. There is no dispute that Petitioner’s amended
complaint was filed beyond this deadline. Petitioner was given
ample opportunity to properly state his claims and file the

necessary pleadings.

A dismissal under Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(b) for failure of a
plaintiff to comply with an order of court is a matter resting
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Such a dismissal
will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.
Hewlett n. Davis, 844 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir.1988). Where, as
here, a litigant flagrantly violates or ignores a court order, a
district court often has no appropriate recourse other than
dismissal. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369 (3rd Cir. 1992).

Ill. Petitioner Did Not Advance Any Basis For Obtaining
Relief From Judgment

Fed. R.Civ.P. 60 sets forth the bases for obtaining
relief from a judgment or order: clerical mistakes; mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud; the judgment is void; the judgment has been
satisfied; any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
Petitioner has not articulated any of these bases. Indeed,
Petitioner filed his motion for relief from judgment on April
21, 1993 with the District Court, and then, before that motion
could be considered, he filed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. As the District Court correctly observed, when
Petitioner filed his appeal he deprived the District Court of
jurisdiction over the case and prevented it from ruling on his
motion for relief from judgment. Shempp v. School District,
184 F.Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1959).

Petitioner’s argument is based upon an erroneous
interpretation of Fed. R.Civ.P. 6 that would presumably allow
his amended complaint to be considered filed in a timely
manner. It is beyond dispute that Petitioner’s amended
complaint was filed with the District Court on April 8,1993,

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ep emcee ane Ne A Se, =. thier aati

5

two days after the order dismissing the case was entered.
Subsection(e) of Fed. R.Civ.P.6 provides that when a party is
required to act within a prescribed period after the service of
notice by mail,3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
Regardless of whether Petitioner chooses to interpret the date
of the District Court’s order as March 9, 1993 or March 11,
1993, his amended complaint was filed beyond the deadline
taking into account the 3-day period set forth in Fed. R.Civ.P.
6(e).

Petitioner claims tHat because his amended complaint
was mailed on April 5,1993, this constitutes timely filing.
Under Fed. R.Civ.P.5(e), "filing with the court” is defined as
the filing of a pleading or other paper with the clerk of court.
Filing does not occur when a pleading or paper is deposited in
the mail; rather, it occurs when the pleading is received by the
clerk of court or the judge, in an appropriate case. Petitioner’s
assertion confuses the service of his amended complaint with
the filing of his amended complaint. Under Fed. R.Civ.P.
5(b), service by mail is complete upon mailing. However, the
same is not true of papers filed by mail. Wiss v. Weinberger,
415 F.Supp.293 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In summary, Petitioner
failed to file a timely amended complaint in violation of a court
order.

The issues raised by the Petitioner involve matters
which were within the sound discretion of the trial court. They
do not involve issues which are of such import as to require
review by the Supreme Court of the United States.

IV. To the Extent That Petitioner’s Motion Is Considered
a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment It was No
Timely Filed |

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) requires that a

6

motion to alter or amend a judgment be served within ten days
after the entry of the judgment. The ten-day time period
contained in this Rule is jurisdictional and cannot be extended
in the discretion of the District Court. See Glass v. Seaboard
C.L.R. Co. ,714 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1983). In the case at bar,
the judgment dismissing the case was entered on April 6, 1993
and Petitioner’s motion was not served until April 17, 1993,
beyond the ten-day deadline. This time limitation is to be
strictly construed. McConnell v. Medical & Ben. Plan, 778
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1985).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari
should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Lehigh County’ Department of
Law

Henry S. Perkin

Lehigh County Courthouse

Sth and Hamilton
Streets

Allentown, PA 18101

(610) 820-3180

home at 2120 Latta Street. Initially, they
checked the said of the home and when they
did not discover anything, they then
proceeded to the front door. The door was
closed, but the officers could see inside the
home by looking through the glass located on
either side of the door. Cpl. Kish could see
inside an area later determined to be the
kitchen, and observed that a light was on as
well as the television. Cpl. Kish then rang
the doorbell, and after doing so observed an
individual, later determined to be the
defendant, come from the kitchen area to the
front door. The door was opened and Cpl.
Kish was confronted by the defendant, who was
wearing a jacket, sun glasses, his hair
appeared wet, and most importantly he was
carrying a gun in his right hand. The gun
was a .357 magnum, which was loaded with five
"jacketed hollow-point bullets".
Additionally, when Officer Rehrig opened the
cylinder, he discovered that directly in line

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with the barrel was a discharged cartridge.

When Cpl. Kish observed the gun, he
immediately shined his flashlight in the
defendant's eyes, yelled "gun" to Officer
Rehrig, and drew his service weapon. The
defendant was ordered to drop his weapon and
when he complied, Cpl. Kish “advised him to
turn and face the wall, drop to his knees,
and put his hands behind his head and
interlock his fingers". The defendant
complied and the officers secured him. Cpl.
Kish also patted him down and in his right
front pants pocket discovered a set of metal
knuckles.

When the defendant was secured, Cpl. Kish
went through the home to look for ‘victims or
other persons. The reason for this action
was the information which brought them to the
home, which included shots and a woman
screaming. His route included the kitchen
area, where he observed on the kitchen table,
in plain view, a jar with green vegetable

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matter, and a Miller Light can rigged for the
smoking of marijana.

Cpl. Kish continued to search for victims
in the basement, and in plain view observed
broken television sets with what appeared to
be bullet holes in each one.

Upon completion of his search for victims
and upon the arrival of the defendant's
parents, defendant was removed from the
residence and taken to a patrol vehicle by
officers of the South Whitehall Police
Department. While the defendant was being
taken to the patrol vehicle, he threatened
the officers and stated "I'm going to kill
all of you".

From 2120 Latta Street the defendant was
taken back to police headquarters, and at
23:24 hours was given his Miranda warnings.
The defendant acknowledged his rights, waived
them, and agreed to speak with Cpl. Kish.
During the interview, he told Cpl. Kish that
he had been drinking all weekend, and that he

A-4

had had approximately two six packs of Miller

Light prior to the officers arriving.

Initially, he told Cpl. Kish that he had not

been shooting his weapon. but later stated

that he was shooting the gun at a pheasant in

the back yard.

He also stated that "he likes

to stand at the top of the steps and shoot

his .357 magnum at the bottom of the steps as

he was watching championship wrestling".

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT GEORGE BURCHILL
Vv.

DOUGLAS KISH, SCOTT R. :
REHRIG, MICHAEL HARBOVE, :
DONALD K. MacCONNELL, :
ARTHUR SPITKO, THOMAS
TOTH, SOUTH WHITEHALL :
POLICE DEPARTMENT, SOUTH:
WHITEHALL TOWNSHIP, :
KELLY WALDRON, ROBERT

L. STEINBERG, LEHIGH

COL. TY DISTRICT ATTyY'sS
OFFICE, LEHIGH COUNTY,
ALLENTOWN HOSPITAL/
HEALTHEAST, DR. PAUL
GROSS, CLYDE R. BOWER, :
JOEN DOE and RICHARD ROE:

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 92-2776

ORDER

AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 1993,

plaintiff Robert George Burchill is

apparently an attorney at law who has filed a

Complaint on May 13, 1992 against fifteen
defendants generally alleging causes of
action under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1988, as well as under
Amendments 4, 5, 6 and 14 of the United
States Constitution. The causes of action
all relate to plaintiff's arrest on May 13,
1990 and subsequent trial and mental health
proceedings. We have before us a number of
motions and responses which we dispose of as
follows:

(1.) Defendant Aller’.own Hospital/
HealthEast, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss filed
September 30, 1992 is GRANTED without
prejudice to plaintiff's right to plead over
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of
this Order. Defendant Allentown Hospital/
HealthEast, Inc.'s Motion to Strike

A-6

ii i

Plaintiff's Answer filed November 16, 1992 is

DENIED AS MOOT.

(2.) Defendant Dr. Paul Gro¢e*s Motion
to Dismiss filed October 5, 1992 is GRANTED
without prejv“ice to plaintiff's sight to
plead over within twenty-one (21) days of the
date of this Order. Defendant Dr. Paul
Gross's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Answer
filed November 5, 1992 is DENIED AS MOOT.

(3.) Defendants Robert L. Steinberg and
Kelly Waldron's Motion for Summary Judgment
and to Dismiss filed October 21, 1992 is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The
motion for summary judgment is DENIED
without prejudice to said defendants’ right
to reassert it, if necessary, when discovery
is complete. The motion to dismiss is
GRANTED without prejudice to plaintiff's
right to plead over within twenty-one (21)
days of the date of this Order.

(4.) Defendant Lehigh County's Motion to
Dismiss filed December 3, 1992 is GRANTED

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without prejudice to plaintiff's right to
plead over within twenty-one (21) days of the

date of this Order.

(5.) Defendant Clyde R. Bower's Motion
to Dismiss filed December 3, 1992 is
GRANTED without prejudice to plaintiff's
right to plead over within twenty-one (21)
days of the date of this Order.

(6.) Defendants Douglas Kish, Scott R.
Rehrig, Michael Harbove, Donald K.
MacConnell, Arthur Spitko, Thomas Toth, South
Whitehall Police Department and South
Whitehall Township's Motion to Dismiss filed
December 28, 1992 is GRANTED without
prejudice to plaintiff's right to plead over,
if he can, within twenty-one (21) days of the
date of this Order.

(7.) Plaintiff's Motion for Relief
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(£) filed January 25,
1993 is DENIED AS MOOT.

We expect and direct that plaintiff
shall and will drop all causes of action

A-8

which are improper or which lack merit, and
file a timely new proper pleading asserting
any remaining causes of action within
twenty-one (21) days of the date of this
order. Any causes of action not reasserted
in an Amended Complaint within twenty-one
(21) days will be deemed dismissed with
prejudice. The Amended Complaint shall be
specific and shall make it clear, in separate
counts, exactly what facts give rise to
exactly what causes of action and exactly
what defendants they are directed against.
When necessary, plaintiff shall also explain
why prior service was proper or timely. In
this regard, we remind plaintiff of the
numerous deficiencies alleged in the
defendants’ briefs and, in particular, we
point out the following.

The general standard for pleading
Section 1983 civil rights claims is a more
stringent one. The requirement is that the
complaint state facts upon which the court

A-9

can weigh the substantiality of the claim.

Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (3rd Cir.

1967); Rotolo v. Burrough of Charleroi, 532

F.2d 920, 922 (3rd Cir. 1976); and LePlant v.

Frazier, 564 F.Supp. 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1983).

Under the standard, a plaintiff must state
the conduct violating his or her civil
rights, when and where the conduct occurred,
and who was responsible. A complaint will be
dismissed if it contains only vague and
conclusive allegations. Boykins v. Ambridge _

Area School District, 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3rd

Cir. 1980); Hall v. Pennsylvania State

Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3rd Cir. 1978).

This standard operates to eliminate frivolous
claims, and to guard the reputations of
public servants who are particularly

susceptible to these claims. United States

v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 206

(3rd Cir. 1980).
If plaintiff's constitutional claims
do have merit, they can be sufficiently
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ee

vindicated by an action under 42 U.S.c.
Section 1983 and there is no need or right to
asset a cause of action directly under the

Constitution. Rogin v. Bensalem, 616 F.2d

680, 686-87 (3rd Cir. 1980); Mahone v.

Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1024 (3rd Cir. 1977);
DiGiovanni v. City of Philadelphia, 481

F.Supp. 1053, 1055-56 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Kedra
v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F.Supp. 652, 679

(E.D. Pa. 1978). We also fail to see at this
point exactly how a direct cause of action
arises under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, 1982 and
1988 (beyond requesting counsel fees). We
direct plaintiff to read these sections
before pleading over. Defendants’ assert
that plaintiff is white and not of the class
protected by Section 1981.

There is no respondeat superior

liability in Section 1983 cases. Hampton v.

Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077,

1082 (3rd Cir. 1976); Monell v. Dept. of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct.

A-11

2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A

complaint filed under 42 U.S.C.A. Section
1983 against a municipality or similar
political subdivision must allege, (1) the
existence of a custom or policy of the
municipality which is of such long standing
as to have force of law, and (2) that one or
more than one of the municipality's employees
violated the plaintiff's civil rights while
acting pursuant to this custom or policy.

See, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978); DiGiovanni v. City

of Philadelphia, 531 F.Supp. 141, 145 (E.D.

Pa. 1982).

Additionally, the complaint must
articulate a full factual basis sufficient to
support the requisite allegations. See,

LePlant v. Frazier, 564 F.Supp. 1095, 1098

(E.D. Pa. 1983), cited in Sambrick v. Borough

of Norristown, 639 F.Supp. 1351 (E.D. Pa.

1986). Plaintiff must show an actual
“affirmative link" between the occurrence of

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police misconduct and the municipal policy or
custom. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371,

96 S.Ct. 598, 604, 46 L.Ed.2d 56 (1976).
Plaintiff is required to plead these elements
with particularity. Rotolo v. Burrough of

Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3rd Cir.

1976). Furthermore, the policy underlying
the more stringent pleading requirement in
Section 1983 claims is even more pronounced
when a municipality is charged with a
violation under the statute. There is a
public interest in protecting local
government's files from overbroad and

irrelevant inquiries. United States v. City

of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 206 (3rd Cir.

1980).

On a more specific note, we also
point out that a prosecutor has an absolute
immunity under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 even if
the prosecutor's "malicious or dishonest
action[s} deprive[]" someone of liberty.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96

A-13

S.Ct. 984, 993, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).
Similarly, all witnesses *: judicial
proceedings are immune from liability under

42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Briscoe v. Lahue,

460 U.S. 325, 334, 345, 103 $.Cct. 1108, 1115,
1120, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Furthermore,
"nothing in the language or legislative
history of Section 1983 proves any
congressional intent to deny binding effect
to a state court judgment or decision when
the state court acting within its proper
jurisdiction has given the parties a full and
fair opportunity to litigate federal

claims." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103,

101 S.Ct. 411, 419, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980);

Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., Inc., 651 F.2d 852,

859 (3rd Cir. 1981).
Lastly, we warn plaintiff, who is
acting as his own lawyer, of the provisions

of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 which provides in relevant

A-14

part:

that the
duties:

(2) that

The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate by
the signer that the signer has read
the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.

An attorney's signature certifies
attorney has satisfied three

(1) that he has read the documents;
he has made a reasonable inquiry;

and (3) that he is not acting in bad faith.

Each duty is independent; the violation of

one triggers Rule 11 sanctions. See 5A

Charles A. Wright & Arthur r. Miller, Federal

Practice

and Procedure Section 1335 (1990).

We will not repeat this warning again, and

will impose substantial monetary or other

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Sanctions for any causes of action in an
Amended Complaint which are brought in bad

faith.

BY THE COURT:

Franklin S. Van Antwerpen,

U.S.D.J./s/

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT G. BURCHILL,
Plaintiff
No. 92-CV-2775
Vv.
Civil Action - Law
DOUGLAS KISH, et al.,
Defendants

ORDER

AND NOW, this 9th day of March, 1992,
upon consideration of plaintiff's Motion to
Enlarge Time, it is hereby ORDERED:
plaintiff's motion is hereby GRANTED.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint shall be filed
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of
this Order or this case will be dismissed

with prejudice. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL

A-16

7 ew gales o>

BE PERMITTED.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Franklin S.
Van Antwerpen J./s/

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANTA

ROBERT GEORGE BURCHILL : CIVIL ACTION
Vv.

DOUGLAS KISH, SCOTT R.
REHRIG, MICHAEL HARBOVE,
DONALD K. MacCONNELL,

ARTHUR SPITKO, THOMAS

TOTH, SOUTH WHITEHALL
POLICE DEPARTMENT, SOUTH
WHITEHALL TOWNSHIP,

KELLY WALDRON, ROBERT

L. STEINBERG, LEHIGH

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTY'S
OFFICE, LEHIGH COUNTY,
ALLENTOWN HOSPITAL / :
HEALTHEAST, DR. PAUL : NO. 92-2776
GROSS, CLYDE R. BOWER, :
JOHN DOE and RICHARD ROE

ORDER

AND NOW, this 5th day of April, 1993, the

Court having previously dismissed all
defendants by an annotated Order of February
22, 1993 with a notation that "any causes of

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action not reasserted in an Amended Complaint

within twenty-one (21) days will be deemed
dismissed with prejudice," and the Court
having issued an Order on March 9, 1993
granting plaintiff's motion to enlarge time,
which Order granted an additivnal twenty-one
(21) day period of time from march 9, 1993
for the filing of an Amended Complaint with
the express notation that "plaintiff's
Amended Complaint shall be filed within
twenty-one (21) days of the date of this
Order or this case will be dismissed with
prejudice," and it appearing that no such
Amended Complaint has been filed, NOW
THEREFORE, the dismissals of February 23,
1993 are hereby deemed to be with prejudice
and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS
TO ALL DEFENDANTS AND CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:

Franklin S. Van Antwerpen,
U.S.D.J./s/

A-18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386002_1245%3A6. Public record. Not legal advice.