# Appendix — Turner v. LaMarca

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 510 U.S. 1164

## Text

| Srene ¥ 7

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993
.

R. V. Turner, individually in his former capacity as
Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institution,
Chester Lambdin, in his official capacity as
Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institution,

Petitioners,
V.

Anthony LaMarca, Martin Saunders and Edwin Johnson,

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

and David Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb,
Ron Durrance, and Billy Joe Harper, individually,

Respondents.
—

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiora:i To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit
+

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
7

MicHaet B. Davis
Counsel of Record

PAXTON, Crow, BRAGG, SMITH &
Keyser, P.A.

Suite 500

1615 Forum Place

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

(407) 684-2121

Rospert A. BUTTERWORTH
Attorney General
SARALYN NEMSER
Assistant Attorney General
Suite 505 — South
4000 Hollywood Boulevard
Hollywood, FL 33031
(305) 985-4788

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

N

10.

INDEX
Page

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals, Elev-
enth Circuit, July 7, 1993....................... Al

Judgment, United States Court of Appeals, Elev-
enth Circuit, July 7, 1993..................... A53

Order of Magistrate, United States District
Court, Southern District of Florida, November
25, 1985 (denying demand for jury trial)....... A55

Order, United States District Court, Southern
District of Florida, December 2, 1985 (affirming
Magistrate’s denial of an? fe PR pret & A57

Order On Report And Recommendation of Mag-
istrate, United States District Court, Southern
District of Florida, June 4, 1987 (with Report and
Recommendation incorporated).............,.. A59

Order, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Circuit, October 18, 1988 (dismissing first appeal
Wee Pe oso A234

Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law,
United States District Court, Southern District of
Florida, Pe ER cose A236

Final Judgment, United States District Court
Southern District of Florida, April 30, 1990... A263

Order, United States District Court, Southern
District of Florida, September 21, 1987 (denying
post-trial motions to Phase I determination). . A269

Order on Petition For Rehearing, United States
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, October 4,
veige iE RL TOT PE eae nS A272

11.

13.

il

IN DE X —- Continued
Page

Order on Petition For Rehearing And Sugges-

tion of Rehearing En Banc, United States Court
of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit)................. A274

Appellants’ Petition For Rehearing, August 13,
1993 (directed to decision of the Court of

Appeals, Eleventh Circuit). .......00.e0cecees: A276
United States Constitution, Amendments
Asticte ViRb csc caccwe te wie ee ee ee A289
Artictes ATV, Secthow F occ uun ot tease A289

42 U.S.C. § 1008.33.05 eee A289

Al

Anthony LaMARCA, Martin Saunders and
Edwin Johnson, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and David
Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb, Ron
Durrance, Wayne Epprecht, Michael Gordon
and Billy Joe Harper, individually, Plaintiffs-
Appellees,

Vv.

R.V. TURNER, individually in his former
capacity as Superintendent of Glades Correc-
tional Institution, Chester Lambdin, in his
official capacity as Superintendent of Glades
Correctional Institution, Defendants-Appel-
lants.

No. 90-5909.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit

July 7, 1993.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit
Judge, and WILLIAMS,’ Senior Circuit Judge.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge.

This is a suit brought by ten present and former
inmates of Glades Correctional Institution (GCI), a Flor-
ida prison. They seek individually, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988), money damages for cruel and unusual punish-
ment they allege they suffered because of the deliberate
indifference of a former superintendent of the institution,
Randall Turner. The plaintiffs still housed at GCI also

* Honorable Jerre S. Williams, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

A 2

seek an injunction, on behalf of all present and future
inmates at the prison, against the current superintendent,
Chester Lambdin, to correct certain allegedly unconstitu-
tional conditions of confinement.

After the parties joined issue (on the plaintiffs’ third
amended complaint), the district court, having denied
Turner’s demand for a jury trial, tried the ten damages
claims and entered judgment for eight of them.! Turner
appealed, but we dismissed the appeal for want of a final
judgment as the district court had not disposed of the still
pending claim for injunctive relief. LaMarca v. Turner, 861
F.2d 724 (11th Cir.1988) (Table) (the first appeal). After
our order dismissing the appeal reached the district
court, Turner moved the court to reopen the record on the
plaintiffs’ damages claims so that he could introduce
some additional evidence on the issue of liability. The
court, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to revisit
those claims, denied the motion. The court then turned to
the claim for injunctive relief.

After hearing five days of testimony relating to the
current conditions of confinement, the court identified
several areas of concern that “require[d its] attention.”
Although the challenged prison conditions had improved
considerably, the court concluded that injunctive relief
was necessary. The court’s final judgment therefore
granted injunctive relief and the money damages previ-
ously awarded, along with attorney’s fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The instant appeal is from that final

' As we explain in the text infra, a magistrate judge actually
heard the claims; the district court disposed of them after con-
sidering de novo the former’s report and recommendation.

A 3

judgment. Turner appeals the damages awards; Lambdin
appeals the injunction.

We now vacate all of the damages awards and
remand them for further proceedings. We do so as to five
of the appellees because the court should have honored
Turner’s demand for a jury trial. As to the three remain-
ing appellees, the court applied the wrong legal standard
for Eighth Amendment damages liability and, moreover,
erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction (following
dismissal of the first appeal) to reopen the record and
entertain the evidence Turner proffered in defense of the
damages claims. Finally, we vacate in part the injunction
against Lambdin and remand the matter of equitable
relief for further proceedings.

Part I of this opinion outlines the case’s procedural
history and describes the facts underlying the damages
claims and the claim for injunctive relief. Part II rejects
Turner’s arguement that the plaintiffs failed to present
sufficient evidence to prevail, but holds that the district
court applied the wrong legal standard for Eighth
Amendment liability for money damages. Part III
addresses the district court’s grant of injunctive relief.
Part IV considers Turner’s Seventh Amendment jury
demand. Finally, part V reviews Turner’s attacks on the
trial court’s treatment of his motions to continue and to

augment the trial record.

A 4

I.
A.

On May 14, 1982, Anthony LaMarca, then an inmate at
GCI, filed a handwritten pro se complaint in the district court
stating that he had “been countlessly approached, threatened
with physical violence and assaulted by other inmates at
[GCI] because [he] refused to participate in homosexual
activities, or pay protection to be left alone.”? He alleged that
“a severe lack of protection” existed at GCI and that “the
institution seem[ed] unable or unwilling to handle the situa-
tion.” On September 21, 1983, LaMarca, having obtained
counsel, filed an amended complaint adding three other GCI
prisoners as plaintiffs, Martin Saunders, Edwin Johnson, and
Henry Rosenbaum.* Each prisoner sought damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and, as class representatives, “injunctive relief
for all . . . present and future inmates of GCI.”4 On

2 A more detailed exposition of the facts supporting the
plaintiffs’ damages claims is set out in the magistrate judge’s
Report and Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F.Supp. 647, 667-717 (S.D.Fla.1987),
which the district court reviewed de novo and adopted in all
relevant parts, see id. at 650-667. The court’s subsequent order
granting injunctive relief was not published.

’ The court later severed Rosenbaum’s claim, and it is not
before us.

* On April 13, 1984, the district court certified a class of “all
those persons who are or will be incarcerated at the Glades
Correctional Institution located in Belle Glade Florida.” See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), (b)(2).

A5

November 2, 1983, the defendants, Turner and Lambdin,
filed their answer to the first amended complaint.°

On August 26, 1985, more than a year and half after
the defendants answered the first amended complaint,
the plaintiffs moved the court to amend the complaint a
second time, adding seven plaintiffs, David Aldred, Steve
H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb, Ron Durrance, Wayne
Epprecht, Michael Gordon, and Keith Harris. Each
alleged that he was assaulted while an inmate at GCI, and
sought damages against Turner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The defendants objected to the joinder of these addi-
tional plaintiffs, claiming that the joinder would unrea-
sonably burden their preparation for trial which was then
set for November 4, 1985. Nevertheless, the magistrate
judge who was to hear the case granted plaintiffs’ motion
to amend.® The defendants immediately requested a con-
tinuance of the trial, arguing that in light of the presence
of the seven new plaintiffs, they required at least ninety
days for additional discovery and trial preparation. The
magistrate judge granted the defendants a one-month
continuance, resetting the trial for December 2, 1985, on

5 Actually, Turner answered the first amended complaint.
Lambdin was not made a defendant until he became superinten-
dent of GCI in December 1985. For convenience we refer to
Lambdin throughout the opinion as the defendant for the
injunctive relief claim.

6 The district court had referred the case to a magistrate
judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all claims and to
prepare a report and recommendation. See $.D.Fla.Mag.J.R. 1(f).
We refer to this hearing as the “trial” or the “damages trial.”

A 6

November 8, 1985, the defendants filed a demand for jury
trial “of all issues so triable.”7

On November 13, 1985, Turner and Lambdin
requested another continuance, claiming that they could
not complete discovery and prepare for trial by the
December 2 trial date. Two days later, before the court
could act on the motion, the plaintiffs moved the court
for leave ‘o file a third amended complaint, adding
another plaintiff, Billy Joe Harper, who sought damages
against Turner, and dropping Harris from the suit. The
court referred both motions to the magistrate judge. On
November 28, the magistrate judge gave the plaintiffs
leave to amend, but refused to grant the defendants a
continuance or a jury trial. The defendants, pursuant to
S.D.Fla.Mag.J.R. 4(a), immediately appealed the magis-
trate judge’s rulings to the district court. On December 2,
the court affirmed these rulings and the trial began.

To summarize, on December 2, the case proceeded to
trial on the allegations of the third amended complaint.
This complaint stated section 1983 claims for damages
against Turner, individually, by LaMarca, Saunders, and
Johnson (the original plaintiffs), and Aldred, Bronson,
Cobb, Durrance, Epprecht, Gordon, and Harper (the new

7 The defendants made their jury demand, but did not
answer the second amended complaint. Their failure to file an
answer became unimportant when, as the following text indi-
cates, the plaintiffs obtained leave to file a third amended com-
plaint. Because the parties, below and on appeal, have assumed
that the original jury demand was timely as to the third
amended complaint, we do not address whether the demand
actually was timely.

A 7

plaintiffs). The original plaintiffs also served as represen-
tatives for purposes of the class action claim for injunc-
tive relief against Lambdin in his official capacity as
superintendent of GCI.

B.

The magistrate judge, operating under
S.D.Fla.Mag.J.R. 1(f), commenced the bench trial. At the
plaintiffs’ request, the magistrate judge bifurcated the
proceeding, indefinitely postponing consideration of the
claim for injunctive relief. The trial, therefore, considered
only the damages claims against Turner. The following is
a brief statement of the facts the court found.®

The inmate assaults complained of occurred between
1981 and 1984, during Turner’s tenure as superintendent.
GCI had four dorms (“A”, “B”, “C”, “D”).9 The A and D
dorms each had two wings containing three rows of
twenty bunk beds. The B and C dorms were smaller, but
also had bunk beds arranged in three rows. Each dorm
had a shower, located at one end of the building, and a
“wicket,” or cage, located in the center of the dorm, that
provided officers with a vantage point from which to
observe the inmates. A guard’s view from the wicket into
the interior of the dorm and the shower area was

8 We recite the facts explicitly found by the magistrate
judge and adopted by the district court. We also recite facts that
we consider to have been implicitly found, because they were
not in dispute. Since we must vacate and remand the money
judgments for the plaintiffs, the district court's findings of fact
will not be binding in the subsequent proceedings in this case.

® GCI also had an “honor” dorm not relevant in this case.

A 8

obstructed by sheets and towels the inmates hung from
their bunk beds, the placement of bunk beds next to the
isles leading to the shower area, and opaque glass on the
shower door. While officers were supposed to patrol the
interiors of the dorms regularly, they did not.

The prison also maintained cells for disciplinary,
administrative, and protective confinements. This special
detention suffered from substandard conditions. The cells
lacked adequate ventilation, had poor lighting, and were
infested with roaches and vermin. Prisoners were
allowed little or no exercise, only three showers a week,
no canteen privileges, and only limited use of the law
library. Inmates in the general population could gain
access to the confinement area by crawling under a
poorly maintained fence or with the permission of the
guard in charge of the area. These confinements, there-
fore, failed to insulate inmates from their tormentors.
Finally, an inordinate number of inmates requested pro-
tective confinement, leading to overcrowding and indi-
cating that a serious problem existed in the general
population. The court found that the conditions in protec-
tive confinement were substandard, and therefore dis-
couraged inmates from remaining in this potential
safehaven.

Turner, in a July 16, 1981 letter to his superior,
described the prevailing atmosphere at GCI: “On an
almost daily basis I feel that our security staff is simply
being tolerated by the inmate population rather than
being in control of the operation of the institution.”
LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 673. The presence of contraband
(weapons, alcohol, and drugs), corruption of GCI’s staff,

A9

inmate violence, and homosexual activity were accepted
as part of prison life.

While a minimal level of contraband may be an
unavoidable aspect of prison life, excessive quantities of
contraband flowed freely into and within the prison.
Prison officials made “little or no effort . . . to control
illicit activity at GCI, resulting in readily-available con-
traband.” Id. at 657. Inmates carried knives and openly
used drugs. The contraband problem was compounded
by staff corruption, as prison officials contributed to, and
apparently profited from, the contraband, and utilized
prisoners to “control” and punish other prisoners.

GCl’s staff permitted regular, unsupervised showings
of hard-core pornographic movies. As Dr. Swanson, an
expert witness for the plaintiffs, testified, these movies
“would only serve to maximize the possibility of sexual
and other violence.” Indicative of this observation, dur-
ing the movies, “[s]ounds of inmates screaming and cry-
ing could be heard.”

When alerted to specific dangers, prison staff often
looked the other way rather than protect inmates. Rather
than offer to help, the staff suggested that the inmates
deal with their problems “like men,” that is, use physical
force against the aggressive inmate.'°

Several management problems persisted during
Turner’s tenure as superintendent: low morale among the

10 The acceptance of this condition might be best illustrated
by LaMarca’s story (taken as credible by the district court) that
when he asked a guard for protection, the guard gave him a
knife.

A 10

prison’s staff, high employee turnover (leading to a less
experienced staff), high vacancy rates for staff positions,
and inadequate supervision of employees.!! As Turner
confirmed, these problems had a direct effect on GCI’s
ability to maintain security. Certain of the prison’s stan-
dard operating procedures were insufficient to protect
prisoner safety. For example, the procedures for investi-
gating rapes, to the extent such procedures existed, were
not followed; some of the reported incidents were not
investigated at all. The lack of such procedures created an
atmosphere of tolerance of rape which enhanced the risk
that incidents would occur. id., at 678 (finding an atmo-
sphere where “inmates could rape other vulnerable
inmates without concern of being the detected or
deterred”).

Aggression was commonplace and exacerbated by
the readily available contraband and an excessively per-
missive atmosphere. While underfunding, overcrowding,
and a lack of security personnel no doubt contributed to
these problems, Turner could have controlled the permis-
sive atmosphere through proper supervision and could

'l In a survey, when GCI’s staff were asked, “ ‘Did you
receive instructions or guidelines on the responsibilities and
supervisory functions of your job when you became super-
visor?,’ they answered with a ‘resounding no.’ ” Id. at 674. The
Department of Corrections, Office of Inspector General
observed that “we fail to understand and appreciate laxity, in
some instances, the disregard for established procedures.” Id.
The court found that when staff engaged in egregious conduct,
“so gross that immediate action should have been taken.”
Turner did not act. Id. at 675. This “underscore[d] the day-to-
day operation of GCI with its staff not controlled by Superinten-
dent Turner.” Id. at 677.

A ll

have remedied the contraband problems with inexpen-

sive modifications to the prison’s procedures and physi-

cal plant. In sum, as the court concluded, “Turner’s

overall laxity in managing and controlling his staff”

directly contribute to an unconstitutional condition of -
confinement at GCI consisting of an undeterred atmo-

sphere of violence. Id. at 662, 684.

For purposes of this appeal, the appellants concede
the credibility of the plaintiffs’ accounts of the alleged
assaults. A group of inmates, one brandishing a bush ax,

~~ made an unsuccessful attempt sexually to assault
LaMarca in a dorm. Inmates raped Saunders in a small
bathroom adjacent to the confinement area; he reported
the incident but officials did not investigate and refused
his request for a medical examination. Inmates repeatedly
attacked Johnson while he was in protective confinement.
Inmates raped Aldred and Durrance in shower areas.
Aldred reported the incident to an officer, but there was
no investigation. Bronson was sexually assaulted with the
handle of a baseball bat on GCI’s recreation field. Cobb
was stabbed by an inmate who, because of his coopera-
tion with guards in conducting illicit activities, was pro-
tected.

af

On January 8, 1986, after the parties had filed pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and had
argued them before the magistrate judge, the magistrate
judge issued a 135-page “Report and Recommendation”
recommending a specific damages award for each of the
ten plaintiffs. The district court reviewed the magistrate

A 12

judge’s report de novo, see Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988); S.D.Fla.Magis.J.R. 4(b), and
adopted his recommendations in all relevant detail as to
eight of the plaintiffs.'12 The court entered judgment
accordingly on June 4, 1987.}%

As noted earlier, although the district court had nei-
ther addressed nor disposed of the claim for injunctive
relief, Turner appealed to this court. We dismissed the
appeal for want of a final judgment and returned the case
to the district court for further proceedings on that claim.

D.

On the first day of trial before the district court on
the claim for injunctive relief, David M. Lipman, counsel
for the inmate class, conceded that the atmosphere at GCI
had changed “in such a manner that as to [many] condi-
tions and practices, [the class] no longer [sought] injunc-
tive relief.”'4 Although the district court observed that

12 The court concluded, however, that two plaintiffs,
Epprecht and Gordon, had not proven that Turner’s deliberate
indifference to their need for safety caused their injuries.
LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 665. Epprecht and Gordon have not
appealed.

‘3 The court granted monetary awards to Anthony
LaMarca, $9,000, Edwin Johnson, $13,000, Eddie Cobb, $6,500,
and Martin Saunders, David Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Ron
Durrance, and Billy Joe Harper, each $30,000. LaMarca, 662
F.Supp. at 667, 715.

'4 Lipman was still concerned about the adequacy of the
security GCI’s staff was providing the inmates, the conditions
surrounding the protective confinement cells, the ready avail-
ability of counseling for inmates who had been raped, and the
presence of contraband, in particular weapons and drugs.

NNN

A 13

Superintendent Lambdin “appears to be a dedicated pub-
lic servant,” and that physical conditions at GCI were
“generally satisfactory,” the court found “ample room for
improvement in the conditions at GCI.” In the court’s
view, the superintendent and his staff still did not take
the threat of inmate violence seriously enough. In partic-
ular, they failed to ensure that GCI’s policies designed to
protect prisoners, including regular security patrols, were
properly carried out. Finally, the court concluded that
GCl’s failure to make adequate psychological counseling
available to rape victims constituted cruel and unusual
punishment because it constituted deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need.!5 See generally Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

Concluding that Lambdin had not shown that “the
wrongs of the past could not reasonably be expected to
recur,” the court ordered injunctive relief. On October 6,
1990, the court entered a final judgment (1) providing
such relief, (2) incorporating by reference the judgment it
had entered on June 4, 1987, which awarded eight of the
plaintiffs money damages against Turner, and (3) award-
ing the plaintiffs attorney’s fees.

If.

Turner challenges the court’s determination that he
was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ safety in

'S The court cited as evidence of GCI’s indifference to this
medical need the testimony of GCI’s staff psychiatrist, who
stated that in his 15 years on the staff he had never been consul-
ted regarding an inmate who had been sexually assaulted.

sehreneearee eat

A 14

violation of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
He asserts that the plaintiffs failed to make out a case of
liability against him — in particular, he claims that the
evidence does not support the district court’s findings of
fact — and that the court applied the wrong legal standard
in determining liability. We conclude that although the
record contains sufficient evidence upon which the dis-
trict court could find liability, the court failed to make
certain essential findings of fact and erred in its legal
analysis. Consequently, we return this case to the district
court for further consideration.

In subpart A, we review the elements necessary to
establish Turner’s liability for money damages under sec-
tion 1983 and the sufficiency of the evidence presented as
to each element. We review the evidence presented at
trial in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d
251 (1986). Because we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient as to each element, in subpart B we address
Turner’s specific challenges to the legal standard the
district court employed. As discussed in part IV, Turner
was entitled to a jury trial as to the new plaintiffs’ claims;
we, therefore, only review these challenges in the context
of the original plaintiffs’ claims.

A.

The plaintiffs claim that Turner failed to provide
them with reasonable protection from prison violence in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs do not
argue that Turner knew of specific threats to their safety.

—————

A 15

Rather, they argue that Turner failed to ensure their pro-
tection from the general danger arising from a prison
environment that both stimulated and condoned vio-
lence. This theory of liability creates substantial, but, as
we shall see, not insurmountable obstacles to the plain-
tiffs’ claims.

To prevail on their Eighth Amendment claim for
damages brought under section 1983, the plaintiffs must
prove three elements:'® (1) a condition of confinement
that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering, Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69
L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), (2) the defendant’s “deliberate indif-
ference” to that condition, Wilson v. Seiter, __. U.S. __,
111 S.Ct. 2321, 2327, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), and (3)
causation, Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1389-90 (11th
Cir.1982).!7 For our purposes, the Eighth Amendment
defines the contours of the first two elements and section
1983 delimits the third.

1.

First, the condition must have inflicted unnecessary
pain or suffering upon the prisoner. This objective stan-
dard “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,

© Section 1983, upon which this action is based, also
requires that the defendant act “under color of state law.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This element is not at issue in this case.

'7 The Supreme Court recently confirmed that the first two
elements of an Eighth Amendment claim, the “objective” and
“subjective” elements, must both be satisfied. See Hudson v.
McMillian, __ U.S. __, __, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999-1000, 117 L.Ed.2d
156 (1992).

a

A 16

civilized standards, humanity, and decency ... ,’” but
must be balanced against competing penological goals.
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 102, 97 S.Ct. at 290 (quoting Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.1968)). The evidence
presented at trial of an unjustified constant and unrea-
sonable exposure to violence at GCI, as described in part
I.B., clearly satisfies this standard. Zatler v. Wainwright,
802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir.1986); Williams, 689 F.2d at
1376; see Wilson, __ U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2326-27; Jones
v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir.) (“When prison
officials have failed to control or separate prisoners who
endanger the physical safety of other prisoners and the
level of violence has become so high . . . it constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment... . ”), cert. dismissed, 453
U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 27, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981), and over-
ruled on other grounds by International Woodworkers of Am.
v. Champion Intern. Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986);'®
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1308-10 (5th Cir.1974).

y J

Second, the plaintiffs must show the defendant's
deliberate indifference to the condition. The Supreme
Court recently held that the Eighth Amendment contains
a subjective component: whether the defendant wantonly
permitted the constitutionally infirm condition to persist.
Wilson, __ U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2323; see also Gamble,
429 US. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291. In prison condition cases,

18 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
October 1, 1981.

A 17

“deliberate indifference” constitutes wantonness. Wilson,
__ Us. a0 .... 133 Sh at gaa,

To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must
knowingly or recklessly disregard an inmate’s basic
needs so that knowledge can be inferred. Duckworth v.
Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). Because the
Eighth Amendment requires a subjective standard, to
demonstrate an official’s deliberate indifference, a plain-
tiff must prove that the official possessed knowledge both
of the infirm condition and of the means to cure that
condition, “so that a conscious, culpable refusal to pre-
vent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's fail-
ure to prevent it.” Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 653. Thus, if an
official attempts to remedy a constitutionally deficient
prison condition, but fails in that endeavor, he cannot be
deliberately indifferent unless he knows of, but disre-
gards, an appropriate and sufficient alternative.!*

19 The Seventh Circuit in McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344
(7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 1265, 117
L.Ed.2d 493 (1992), noted a difference between “when [a state]
acts because of [an] effect,” in which case the state intends a
consequence, and “when it acts in spite of an effect,” in which
case the state lacks the requisite intent. Id. at 344 (citing Person-
nel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, 60
L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). If such a standard were applicable to Eighth
Amendment claims, the burden upon plaintiffs would become
even more formidable. Yet, the requisite intent for deliberate
indifference is unlike that for demonstrating a legislature’s dis-
criminatory intent under equal protection jurisprudence, as in
Feeney. The McGill court’s approach apparently provides offi-
cials a safe refuge from liability, much like a bystander is pro-
vided at common law. By doing so, the McGill court overlooks
the significance of an official’s duty not to impose cruel and

|

A 18

In this case, the plaintiffs presented incident reports,
internal staff reports, and reports by external investiga-
tors each supporting a finding that Turner knew that an
unreasonable risk of violence existed at GCI and knew of
alternative means that would have brought that risk to
within constitutional norms.?° For example, a January 30,
1980 Palm Beach County Grand Jury Presentment identi-
fied evidence of “lax security precautions,” and recom-
mended procedural changes in light of “accusations of
drugs, alcohol, and other contraband, gambling, theft,
confiscation, and payoffs among the inmates and person-
nel of GCI.” Similarly, and external management review
of GCI conducted from August 26 to 29, 1980, concluded
that “[t]he assault trend, both inmate on inmate and

unusual punishment upon prisoners — a duty firmly established
in the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. A
state —- and similarly its officials —- can be deliberately indifferent
if it acts in spite of a condition violating the objective prong
described above unless such actions are justified by countervail-
ing penological objectives.

20 Turner testified as to additional sources through which
he gained knowledge of the conditions at GCI. These included
monthly meetings with key staff members, attendance at
monthly meetings of each department, regular meetings with
prisoner organizations, and his general practice of wandering
through the prison compound.

Turner argues that the district court relied on notice created
through telephone conversations between Turner and Saunders’
mother. See LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 696. These conversations
arguably showed general indifference on Turners’ part toward
inmates. Yet, because the conversations occurred after the
alleged incidents, they were not relevant to Turner’s pre-assault
knowledge of unsafe conditions at the prison and were only
marginally relevant to his alleged indifference to prisoner safety
at the time of the alleged incidents.

=“

A 19

inmate on staff, from July 1979, through June 1980, has
increased.” Finally, Turner’s July 16, 1981 letter to his
superiors evidenced his knowledge of a lack of

control of the operation of the institution. .
Many of the officers that we have assigned to
very sensitive security posts are so inex-
perienced or else have so little capability in this
business that they simply do not realize the
seriousness of dealing with the type of person-
nel that we are receiving.

The plaintiffs’ evidence painted a dark picture of life
at GCI; a picture that would be apparent to any knowl-
edgeable observer, and certainly to an official in Turner’s
position.*! An inference can be drawn from this evidence
that Turner did know that GCI failed to provide inmates
with reasonable protection from violence.

Mere knowledge of the infirm conditions persisting
at GCI does not establish deliberate indifference. The
plaintiffs must also demonstrate that, with knowledge of
the infirm conditions, Turner knowingly or recklessly

2? In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76, 96 S.Ct. 598, 606, 46
L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim based on pervasive unconstitutional police prac-
tices. “[T]he Court disapproved the imposition of liability for
the officials’ failure to act in the face of a statistical pattern of
police misconduct absent proof that the supervisory defendants
had ‘direct [] responsibility for the actions’ of those police officers
who had engaged in this misconduct.” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1381
(quoting Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375-76, 96 S.Ct. at 606). In this case,
the trial court did not rely solely on statistical patterns. More-
over, Turner’s supervisory role and the insular character of
prison communities provided strong support for the court’s
conclusion that Turner must have known of these conditions.

A 20

declined to take actions that would have improved the
conditions.

Turner points to evidence of his actions to improve
safety conditions at GCI to illustrate his affirmative
efforts to improve the conditions of the confinement
there. Turner testified that he attempted to secure addi-
tional funds, make improvements to GCI’s physical plant,
expand recruitment efforts, and institute policies that
would have reduced the risk of violence if his staff had
followed them.?? Turner argues that he was unable to
ameliorate further the unsafe conditions at GCI; he did all
he could within the budgetary constraints he faced, and,
therefore, was not deliberately indifferent.

22 Turner generally improved GCI’s physical plant, mod-
ernized the prison’s infirmary, decreased staff overtime,
increased the number of confinement cells, and made a signifi-
cant effort to document incidents at GCI (an effort necessary to
proper management and safety). He also appeared before state
legislative committees, wrote letters to Secretary Wainwright of
the Department of Corrections, and identified the problems at
GCI in his monthly reports.

Turner also appears to have made substantial efforts to
improve recruiting of staff, a critical problem for GCI during
Turner’s tenure as superintendent. He testified that he sought to
increase salaries (and was minimally successful), acquired a van
for staff car-pooling from more distant locations (reducing the
staff’s transportation expenses), appeared at high school career
days, and set up a program with the Florida State Employment
Service. To control contraband, he attempted to utilize mari-
juana-sniffing dogs, but this proved ineffective in light of the
confusing effluvium at GCI. The evidence does not indicate
whether Turner intended that these actions resolve GCI’s prob-
lem with prisoner safety.

eB

A 21

In rebuttal, the plaintiffs presented evidence (1) that
Turner failed to ensure that his direct subordinates fol-
lowed the policies he established, and (2) of specific, low-
cost actions that Turner could have taken and that his
successors successfully undertook. This evidence sup-
ports a finding that Turner knowingly “failled] ade-
quately to supervise correctional officers up to the
iccttenant levell,] result[ing] in corruption and incompe-
t-Ace among the officers and a lack of reasonable protec-
tion of inmates.” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 665; see Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir.1991) (suggesting
that inadequate staffing may rise to deliberate indif-
ference as to prisoner safety (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639
F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir.1980, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101
S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981)); cf. Jordan v. Gardner, 986
F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc) (“It is simply not
enough to say .. . that [the official] gave the issue a great
deal of thought. The ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’
necessary to find deliberate indifference has more mean-
ing than that.”).

Determining whether Turner otherwise lacked the
means to correct GCI’s failure adequately to protect
inmates requires a more detailed analysis. In Williams, we
held that an official “may not escape liability solely
because of the legislature’s failure to appropriate
requested [and necessary] funds.” 689 F.2d at 1387.23
Where, as here, the lack of funds contributed to the
condition, the plaintiffs must “demonstrate that a particu-
lar defendant [nevertheless] had the capability (authority

** In Wilson, the Court declined to address the applicability
of an insufficient funds defense. ___. U.S. at__, 111 S.Ct. at 2327.

A 22

and means) to provide adequate security and did not do
so.” Id. at 1389.

To circumvent Turner’s “insufficient funds defense,”
the plaintiffs presented evidence of Turner’s capacity,
within budgetary constraints, to improve prison safety.
We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs’ evi-
dence supports the findings that Turner could have, but
did not, take steps to minimize at least the following
problems at GCI:

(1) improper and inadequate staff training... ,
(2) a staff out of control who did not report
rapes, assaults, and illegal activities up through
the chain of command, (3) [Turner’s] failure to
supervise staff and administer measures which
would “minimize the chance of error and maxi-
mize the full satisfaction of constitutional pro-
tection,” in (i) not stationing officers to patrol
throughout the dormitories, particularly at
night, and leave the wicket cage, and in (ii)
permitting the obscuring of vision of the officers
in the wicket by allowing inmates to hang
sheets ..., (4) [Turner’s] shocking failure to
employ any standard procedure to investigate
incidents of alleged rapes, [(5)] [Turner’s] fail-
ure to provide inmate movement controls thus
reducing the casual egress and ingress of
aggressive assailant wolves within the open dor-
mitories, and [(6)] [Turner’s] failure to transfer
know|[n] assailants or inmates who should have
been known to be assailants out of GCI.

LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 708 (citations omitted).

Consideration of such evidence comes perilously
close to second-guessing the difficult choices that prison

A 23

officials must face and of improperly extending deliber-
ate indifference standards to mere “inadvertence or
error(s] in good faith.” Wilson, ___ U.S. at ii Un ee
2324 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct.
1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). Nevertheless, such
evidence is probative of the means available to Turner
and must be considered. This evidence directly addresses
the question of whether monetary restraints frustrated
Turner’s good faith efforts, or whether he knowingly or
recklessly disregarded solutions within his means.24
While much of the record indicates that Turner did make
good faith efforts to resolve the dilemmas facing GCI,25
the evidence does support the plaintiffs’ position that
Turner recklessly disregarded the necessary means to
protect inmate safety.

a

Third, section 1983 “requires proof of an affirmative
causal connection between the actions taken by a particu-
lar person ‘under color of state law’ and the constitu-
tional deprivation.” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1380 (citing
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 U.S. 658, 692, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); Redman v. County

24 The district court did not address this point, and, there-
fore, did not determine whether Turner knew of, or recklessly
disregarded, the solution suggested by the plaintiffs. On
remand, the district court must reconsider whether Turner was
deliberately indifferent to prisoner safety at the time of each
incident for which an award of money damages is sought.

*° For example, Turner’s July 16, 1981 letter suggests a deep
concern for, and helplessness regarding, the state of affairs at
GCI.

A 24

of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc)
(requiring an act or omission causing the constitutional
deprivation), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 972, 117
L.Ed.2d 137 (1992). Section 1983 thus focuses our inquiry
on whether an official’s acts or omissions were the cause
—not merely a contributing factor — of the constitutionally
infirm condition.

“A causal connection may be established by proving
that the official was personally involved in the acts that
resulted in the constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wain-
wright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.1986). Because the
analysis focuses on the defendant’s conduct, the doctrine
of respondeat superior does not apply. Whether a defendant
actually controls, or fails properly to supervise a subordi-
nate, however, may prove to be relevant inquiries. See
Rizzo, 423 U.S. 375-76, 96 S.Ct. at 606.

If a plaintiff establishes a causal link between the
defendant’s acts or omissions and the infirm condition,
the defendant is “precluded from contending that the
unconstitutional condition was not at least a proximate
cause of .. . injuries” that arose from that condition.
Williams, 689 F.2d at 1389. This is not to say that a plain-
tiff need not show a causal link between the constitu-
tionally infirm condition and the alleged injuries. Rather,
the finding that a prison condition offends the Eighth
Amendment presupposes the distinct likelihood that the
harm threatened will result. The wrong in Eighth Amend-
ment cases is the deliberate indifference to a constitu-
tionally infirm condition; that wrong must, in turn, have
been the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, here

the injuries brought about by the assaults.

A 25

In Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 187, 121 L.Ed.2d 131 (1992),
the Sixth Circuit addressed causation under section 1983
arising from allegations of “systematic deficiencies” in a
Prison’s protection of inmates similar to those in the
instant case. The plaintiff presented evidence of over-
crowding, dark cells, insufficient staff, lack of mental and
physical evaluations, and inadequate surveillance. Id. at
550. Additionally, a penological expert testifying for the
plaintiff concluded that there was a pattern of violence
among inmates at the prison and that because of the
plaintiff's slight build and mental disability, prison offi-
cials should have placed him in protective custody. Id. at
549. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to show
causation, the Sixth Circuit concluded “that more is
required than [a] naked assertion that the assault would
not have occurred but for the offensive conditions. To
hold otherwise would effectively transform the causality
requirement from a substantive element of proof into one
of pleading.” Id. at 550. In this case, the plaintiffs pre-
sented evidence to support their allegations that Turner
“was in a position to take steps that could have averted”
the alleged unconstitutional condition at GCI, “but,
through [deliberate] indifference, [he] failed to do so.”
Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384.

The plaintiffs presented evidence supporting five
conditions of confinement that were under Turner’s con-
trol and that together created an unconstitutional risk of
violence at GCI: (1) a “prevalence of .. . weapons” at GCI,
(2) the lack of adequate patrols, (3) the lack of adequate
reporting procedures for rapes and assaults, (4) the pres-
ence of “obvious and rampant indicia of homosexual

A 26

activity,” (5) a lack of supervision of officers leading to
corruption and incompetence. LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at
664-65. The evidence supports the plaintiffs’ assertion
that Turner could have brought GCI within constitutional
norms through more diligent supervision of his officers,
by establishing and enforcing rules and procedures to
eliminate specific sources of danger to prisoners, and
through low-cost modifications to GCI’s physical plant.
in particular, Turner could have taken significant steps to
eliminate the highly permissive atmosphere at GCI both
as to officers shirking their duties and as to prisoners
engaging in extortion, harassment, sexual activity, and
sexual and other assaults.

As we discussed in part II.A.2., the evidence strongly
supports a finding that, even within the constraints he
faced, Turner had the means substantially to improve
prisoner safety at GCI. This evidence also supports find-
ings that Turner knew that the actions he undertook
would be insufficient to provide inmates with reasonable
protection from violence, and that other means were
available to him which he nevertheless disregarded. Such
evidence provides the necessary causal link between
Turner and the infirm conditions at GCI.

Finally, the evidence shows a link between the
unconstitutional conditions and the plaintiffs’ injuries.
The record supports the district court’s finding “that due
to [their] very nature as acts of violence, the rapes that
occurred are not isolated incidents of sexual conduct, but
rather flow directly from the lawless prison conditions at
GCI. .. . [These conditions created] the background and
climate which . . . preordained homosexual rapes and
other inmate assault[s].” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 687. The

A 27

evidence thus permits a finding of a causal link between
the objectively intolerable conditions at GCI and the
plaintiffs’ injuries.

B.

Having determined that the plaintiffs presented suffi-
cient evidence to establish liability on their damages
claims against Turner, we turn to Turner’s specific chal-
lenges to the legal standard the district court employed in
assessing liability. Turner contends that the district court
clearly erred in its analysis of (1) his deliberate indif-
ference to the constitutionally infirm injury producing
conditions, and (2) causation. We disagree.26

1.

Turner challenges the district court's finding that he
knew of several problems at GCI that contributed to the
constitutionally infirm conditions.2”7 He argues that

6 Turner has not challenged the district court's finding that
GCI failed to provide inmates with reasonable protection from
violence. We therefore assume that the plaintiffs satisfied the
Eighth Amendment's objective component as to each incident
for which money damages was sought.

*7 On appeal, Turner draws our attention to nine factors
identified by the district court as contributing to the unconstitu-
tional conditions at GCI: (1) a lack of weapons training, mar-
ginally indicating a more general failure by Turner to train his
staff, (2) the staff’s failure to report rapes, (3) the staff's failure
to report other illegal activity, (4) the staff’s failure regularly to
patrol dorms, (5) the staff’s failure to ensure maximum visibility
in the dormitories, (6) the lack of standard procedures for inves-
tigating rapes, (7) Turner’s failure to avail himself of outside

A 28

without this finding, the district court might not have
concluded that he knew of the infirm conditions and thus
that he had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’
safety.?8

Turner points to specific language in the district
court’s opinion indicating that the court applied a negli-
gence standard to determine his knowledge of the infirm
conditions and the problems that caused them. For
instance, in its discussion of Turner’s indifference to pris-
oner safety, the court stated that “[a] section 1983 plaintiff
must prove either that the official knew or should have
known that his action infringed a clearly established con-
stitutional right of the plaintiff, regardless of the officials’
subjective intent. . . . ” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 663
(emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted); see also id. at 658, 678-79 (relying on knowledge
“discernable to any prudent prison administrator”). In
light of Wilson, which has clarified that a subjective stan-
dard must be applied to Eighth Amendment claims, the
district court’s resort to such an objective standard was
erroneous.

The court also erred by inquiring as to Turner’s
knowledge during the “relevant time period of Plaintiffs’

agencies for investigating rapes and assaults, (8) Turner’s fail-
ure to establish inmate movement controls, and (9) Turner's
failure to transfer problem inmates.

28 This argument conflicts with Turner’s earlier contention
that he was not deliberately indifferent because he took affirma-
tive steps to improve prisoner safety. Yet, Turner could not
actively seek to remedy a situation of which he was unaware.
Turner’s earlier arguments thus indicate an awareness of the
infirm conditions.

A 29

damage claims,” instead of making a directed inquiry
into Turner’s knowledge at the time of each incident. See,
e.g., LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 708-09 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are
not isolated incidents. They stem from a far ranging and
serious failure of Defendant Turner to properly manage{]
GCI.”). The alleged assaults occurred over a three-year
period, and, as one would expect, Turner’s knowledge
ripened during this period. The district court failed to
determine properly whether Turner possessed the requi-
site knowledge at the time of each incident.

As we have already discussed, the evidence as a
whole, and, in particular Turner’s July 16, 1991 letter,
provide strong support for the court’s ultimate conclu-
sion that Turner knew of the pervasively and obviously
unsafe conditions at GCI. The district court, however, did
not rely solely on such evidence. We therefore cannot
conclude as a matter of law that Turner had a sufficient
awareness of the infirm conditions to satisfy Wilson's
subjective standard. Thus, while sufficient evidence exists
upon which to find knowledge of the conditions, see supra
part II.A, the court must reconsider its findings as to
whether Turner had knowledge of or recklessly disre-
garded the constitutionally infirm conditions at the time
of each incident.

,
&.

Turner also challenges the court's findings as to cau-
sation, i.e., whether his deliberate indifference caused the
alleged constitutionally infirm condition, and whether
the condition caused the assaults. The district court incor-
rectly stated that an official must “accomplish{] what

A 30

[can] be accomplished within the limits of his authority.”
LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 664 (citing Williams, 689 F.2d at
1388). As our discussion of Turner’s deliberate indif-
ference and causation indicates, see supra parts II.A.2 & 3,
merely showing that an official had the means to correct a
constitutional infirmity will not suffice. For the plaintiffs
to demonstrate the requisite causal nexus, Turner must
not only have had the means to correct the alleged consti-
tutional infirmities, but also must have at least recklessly
disregarded the inadequacy of the approach he took, the
availability of other approaches, and their capacity to
provide a cure. As we have already noted, it is, after all,
““obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in
good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause... .‘” Wilson
__ U.S. at ___, 11 S.Ct. at 2324 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S
at 319, 106 S.Ct. at 1084) (citations omitted; internal quo-
tations omitted; emphasis omitted); cf. Fernandez v. United
States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1494 (11th Cir.1991) (“To establish a
valid eighth amendment claim, ‘a prisoner must allege
acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [the]
deliberate indifference [of prison officials]. ...’” (quot-
ing Gamble, 429 U.S at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292)). This approach
ensures that we do not question the direction taken by
officials in performing the complex and arduous task of
running prisons. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492,
93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (“Since these
internal problems of state prisons involve issues so pecu-
liarly within state authority and expertise, the States have
an important interest in not being bypassed in the correc-

tion of those problems.”). Thus, we must revisit our anal-
ysis of Turner’s subjective intent to ensure that only

A 31

evidence probative of causation in the Eighth Amend-
ment context will be considered.

The district court did not identify the potential solu-
tions that Turner actually or recklessly disregarded.
Additionally, the court’s causation inquiry was not cir-
cumscribed by the knowledge Turner possessed at the
time of each alleged assault, a particularly important
consideration since the district court found that condi-
tions slowly, but continuously, improved during Turner’s
tenure as superintendent. Instead, the court assumed that
Turner actually knew, or should have known, of these
measures. Thus, even though the plaintiffs’ evidence sup-
ports a finding of causation, see supra part II.A.3, the
court's finding that the solutions available to Turner were
sufficient may have erroneously charged him with an
Eighth Amendment duty he did not have. The court
must, therefore, reconsider the issue of causation and
determine whether Turner knowingly or recklessly disre-
garded any corrective measures. If he did, the court must
then determine whether, taken as a whole, these mea-
sures would have eliminated the infirm conditions for
which he was responsible.

III.

We now shift our focus from the retrospective anal-
ysis of the plaintiffs’ damages claims against Turner to
the prospective relief sought by the class of present and
future inmates of GCI. Three challenges to the court’s
order granting injunctive relief merit discussion: (1) the
conditions at GCI had improved, and, therefore, injunc-
tive relief was no longer required, (2) Lambdin, GCI’s

A 32

current superintendent, had not been deliberately indif-
ferent to prisoner safety, and (3) the district court’s equi-
table grant unnecessarily intruded upon GCI’s
management.

A.

First, Lambdin argues that because GCI reasonably
protected inmates from violence at the time of trial, the
court erred in granting injunctive relief. We disagree.
Subsequent events, such as improvements in the
allegedly infirm conditions of confinement, while poten-
tially relevant, are not determinative. When a defendant
corrects the alleged infirmity after suit has been filed, a
court may nevertheless grant injunctive relief unless the
defendant shows that absent an injunction, the institution
would not return to its former, unconstitutionally defi-
cient state. Jones, 636 F.2d at 1375; Ciudadanos Unidos de
San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d
807, 822 (5th Cir.1980) (finding that “the defendant [must]
demonstrate that there is no reasonable expectation that
the wrong will be repeated” (internal quotations omit-
ted)), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964, 101 S.Ct. 1479, 67 L.Ed.2d
613 (1981). We have held that

[j)urisdiction may abate if there is no reasonable
expectation the alleged violations will recur and
if intervening events have completely and irre-
vocably eradicated the effects of the alleged vio-
lations. To defeat jurisdiction on this basis,
however, defendants must offer more than their
mere profession that the conduct has ceased and
will not be revived.

a

A 33

Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 656 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1981) (citations omitted). The burden is thus
“a heavy one.” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).

The district court, in the damages phase of the case,
found that GCI failed to provide inmates with reasonable
protection from violence. On appeal, Lambdin has not
challenged this determination, but has instead relied on
GCI's elimination of the infirm conditions to defeat the
court’s grant of injunctive relief.2? The district court,
however, concluded that Lambdin had not taken suffi-
cient steps to ensure that GCI’s past wrongs would not be
repeated. The record supports this finding. It was, there-
fore, appropriate for the court to consider granting the
plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.

B.

Second, relying on the court’s observation that
Lambdin “appears to be a dedicated public servant who
is trying very hard to make GCI an efficient and effective
correctional institution,” Lambdin argues that the court
erred in ordering injunctive relief. In essence, he asserts
that the court should have focused on his deliberate
indifference, instead of the institution’s historical indif-
ference. The Supreme Court in Kentucky v. Graham, 473

*” On remand, Turner may challenge the district court’s
findings as to the objective unreasonableness of conditions at
GCI at the time of the incidents underlying the original plain-
tiffs’ damages claims. We recognize that this does create a
potential for inconsistent findings in the damages and injunc-
tive phases of the case.

A 34

U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), explained
the significance of suits against state officials in their
official capacities:

Official-capacity suits .. . “generally represent
only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.” As
long as the government entity receives notice
and an opportunity to respond, an official-
capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,
to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is net
a suit against the official personally, for the real
party in interest is the entity.

Id. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 (citations omitted); see also
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109
S.Ct. 2304, 2311, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official's
office.” (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 US 464, 471, 105 S.Ct.
873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985))); Owens v. Fulton County,
877 F.2d 947, 951 n. 5 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, while changes
in circumstances may change the nature of, or necessity
for, injunctive relief, substitution of Lambdin as the
named official does not bar such relief. See Graham, 473
U.S. at 166 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 n. 11.

.
Third, Lambdin challenges the scope of the district
court’s order. We must therefore determine whether the
relief granted by the court squares with the alleged harm.

The court’s order dealt with three conditions of confine-
ment: (1) GCI’s protection of inmates, (2) conditions in

Pine eeieenaniniaitenininiens seers

A 35

protective confinement, and (3) counseling of rape vic-
tims. The later two conditions, although tangentially
related to prisoner safety, required a separate constitu-
tional foundation. We address each below.

l.

We have so far assumed, as the parties have, that at
the time of the second trial (on the claim for injunctive
relief), GCI provided inmates with reasonable, and con-
stitutionally adequate, protection from violence.
Although the district court did not reach this issue, we
are satisfied, after reviewing the record, that this assump-

tion is correct.

Absent an existing constitutional violation, the dis-
trict court’s power to grant equitable relief was limited to
ensuring that GCI continued to provide inmates with
adequate protection. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d
554 (1971) (“[T]he nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy.”) While district courts have broad
discretion to fashion equitable relief, such relief must
target the existing wrong. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
282, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2758, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (“[Flederal-
court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed
at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Con-
stitution or does not flow from such a violation. ... ”).
Here, the wrong was the risk that GCI would once again
disregard the safety of its inmates.

In Jones, we considered the appropriate form of relief
when, during the pendency of the court’s proceedings,

A 36

the defendants cured the constitutionally infirm condi-
tions alleged by inmate-plaintiffs. We stated that

Judges are neither correctional officers nor
penologists. Even if we had the expertise to
analyze the practical and theoretical implica-
tions of the conditions of incarceration, we
would have no warrant to impose our views, for
a legislature — state or federal — is not required
by the Constitution to operate penal institutions
in accordance with criminological doctrine or to
employ only experts in their management... .
Moreover, we are aware that we should not, “in
the name of the Constitution, become .

enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.”

636 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562,
99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)). In keeping
with the mandate of Bell v. Wolfish, we prescribed only
general constraints designed to ensure that the prison
would continue to operate in a constitutional manner.

In this case, the district court ordered Lambdin to
maintain policies requiring (1) that the dorms and con-
finement areas be regularly patrolled and that patrols
have clear views of the relevant areas, (2) the use and
maintenance of metal detectors, (3) regular shakedowns,
and (4) the disciplining of prisoners found in possession
of contraband. These aspects of the court’s order, while
not comprehensive, target GCI’s potential to slacken its
efforts to protect its inmates.

To effectuate its prescribed policies, however, the
court also ordered Lambdin to discipline his guards,
detailing the type of sanctions and the conditions under

A 37

which they should be employed. We find that this unnec-
essarily intrudes on GCI’s operations. See Bell, 441 U.S. at
547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351,
101 S.Ct. 2392, 2401, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The court
should have “accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of ruticies and practices that in
[the prison official’s] judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. It was
sufficient that the court enjoined Lambdin to ensure that
the specific policies were carried out. Going beyond this
to restrict the methods by which Lambdin effectuated
these policies was an inappropriate use of the court's
equity powers.

2.

The district court’s injunctive order also addressed
conditions in protective confinement. The court deter-
mined that during Turner’s tenure, conditions in protec-
tive confinement were punitive in nature. By the time of
the second trial, however, this was no longer the case.
The Court, therefore, should have limited its order to
ensuring that the conditions continued to conform with
the Eighth Amendment standards. Instead, the court fine-
tuned the existing conditions by (1) eliminating double-
bunking, (2) precluding stays in protective confinement
in excess of thirty days, (3) requiring the transfer of
inmates in protective confinement who could not be
returned to the general prison population, and (4) ensur-
ing that the lighting in protective confinement conforms

A 38

to American Correctional Association guidelines.*° The
conditions targeted here, whether taken singularly or
together, do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
and do not ensure that the prior infirm conditions will
US. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2327
(Separate failures of prison administration designed to

not recur. See Wilson, __
protect inmates “may establish an Eighth Amendment
violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so
alone, but only when they have mutually enforcing effect
that produces the deprivation of single, identifiable
human need... . ”). We, therefore, vacate the district
court’s injunction and remand the claim for injunctive
relief so that the court may determine whether an injunc-
tion is necessary to ensure the continuance of currently
constitutionally adequate conditions in protective con-
finement.

XJ

Finally, the district court ordered psychological coun-
seling of rape victims. The court found that GCI unneces-
sarily and wantonly inflicted pain upon prisoners by
failing to provide them with post-rape psychological or

30 The Supreme Court has rejected Eighth Amendment
challenges to double-bunking. See Bell, 441 U.S at 542, 99 S.Ct. at
1875 (rejecting any “sort of ‘one man, one cell’ principle”).
Similarly, the district court’s order precluding long-duration
stays in protective confinement, and requiring timely transfers
of inmates who cannot return to protective confinement, does
not address a constitutional violation. See Meriwether v. Faulkner,
821 F.2d 408, 415-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct.
311, 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987).

A 39

psychiatric counseling. This aspect of the court's injunc-
tion was based on independent findings of fact that
inmates are systematically denied access to such treat-
ment, cf. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505, and that such denials
constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, see Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291; Greason v.
Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir.1990). These findings are
well supported by the record. The court enjoined
Lambdin to (1) provide training to all prison guards in
the handling of rape complaints, (2) require special train-
ing for the staff psychiatrist and the staff psychologist,
and (3) “promulgate an official referral procedure for all
rape victims to the resident psychiatrist or psychologist
for evaluation.” We affirm these aspects of the injunction.

IV.
A.

Turner appeals the district court’s ruling that he
waived his Seventh Amendment right to jury trial as to
the new plaintiffs’ claims.*! See Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), (d).
The right to “trial by jury is a vital and cherished right,
integral in our judicial system,” City of Morgantown v.
Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 258, 69 S.Ct. 1067, 1069, 93
L.Ed. 1347 (1949), and a waiver of this right must be
meaningful, In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C.Cir.1977)
(Rule 38 was not “intended to diminish” the constitu-
tional right to a trial by jury in civil cases, “and should be

31 The Seventh Amendment preserves, “{i]n Suits at com-
mon law. ... the right of trial by jury. .. .” U.S. Const. amend.
VII.

A 40

interpreted, where possible, to avoid giving effect to
dubious waivers of rights.”). Moreover, “as the right of
jury trial is fundamental, [we must] indulge every reason-
able presumption against waiver.” Aetna Ins. Co. v. Ken-
nedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811-12, 81 L.Ed. 1177
(1937); Borgh v. Gentry, 953 F.2d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir.1992)
(“[A] court’s discretion [to deny a jury trial] is very
narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exer-
cised to preserve jury trial.” (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510, 79 S.Ct. 948, 956, 3 L.Ed.2d
988 (1959))). We therefore review the district court's
denial of a jury trial with “the most exacting scrutiny.”
City of Morgantown, 337 U.S. at 258, 69 S.Ct. at 1070.
Unless the error is harmless, we must reverse judgment
founded upon an unconstitutional denial of a jury trial.
Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 573 F.2d 255, 257 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895, 99 S.Ct. 255, 58 L.Ed.2d 241
(1978).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
“(t]he right to trial by jury as declared By the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution . . . shall be preserved to
the parties inviolate.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(a). A party may,
however, waive this right by failing to make a timely
demand upon the courts. Under Rule 38, as to “any issue
triable of right by a jury,” waiver occurs ten days after
“service of the last pleading directed to such issue.”

~. Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), (d); See Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748,
752-53 (Sth Cir.1978). Such waivers apply only to the
issues raised by the pleadings; subsequent amendments
to the pleadings can raise “new issues” for which the
right to a jury remains.

A 41

In this case, Turner did not demand a jury trial
within ten days of his answer to the first amended com-
plaint. He therefore waived his right to jury trial as to
issues raised in that complaint. He argues, however, that
he did not waive his right to jury trial as to the new
plaintiffs’ claims.

The district court, in rejecting Turner’s demand for a
jury trial, concentrated on Rule 38’s use of the term
“issue,” which the court noted refers to those issues
“raised in the original complaint.” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp.
at 652; Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82, 94 (2d Cir.1980) (“[T]he
term ‘issue’ means something more than the evidence
offered and the legal theories pursued. . . . [One must ask
whether] the ultimate issue for decision is different.”).
The court concluded that no new issues were raised by
the amended pleadings and struck Turner’s jury demand.

The district court’s approach illustrates the difference
between the jury’s role in resolving specific factual issues,
and the application of such determinations to legal theo-
ries. Guajardo, 580 F.2d at 753. New facts that “merely
clarif[y] ‘the same general issues’ raised in the original
complaint” do not create new issues of fact upon which
to assert a jury demand. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277, 1310 (2d Cir.1973) (en banc) (quoting Moore v.
United States, 196 F.2d 906, 908 (5th Cir.1952)); id. (The
“underlying facts and basic legal theory [must be]
changed by the amendments” in order to create new
issues.). Amendments to pleadings thus may contain new
facts which do not create new issues triable by a jury. Id.

These basic principles for identifying new issues
were developed in cases where all relevant parties were

a

A 42

before the trial court at the time of the initial waiver. In
such cases, a trial court applies these principles to deter-
mine the extent of a demanding party’s prior waiver. In
this case, however, the second amended complaint added
seven new plaintiffs permissively joined under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a).52 Each new plaintiff asserted an indi-
vidual claim for damages arising from a separate incident
at GCI. Moreover, the incidents alleged by three of the
new plaintiffs (Cobb, Durrance, and Aldred) had not
occurred at the time Turner waived jury trial as to the
issues raised by the first amended complaint. Turner
asserts that waivers under Rule 38 do not apply in such
circumstances. We agree.

The plaintiffs do not directly address whether the
district court’s approach of identifying new issues pro-
vides the proper analysis when newly joined parties raise
unique claims. Instead, they tenaciously argue (as they
successfully did below) that all issues raised in the sec-
ond and third amended complaints arose from the same
“general area” of dispute or involve the “same matrix of
facts” identified in the first amended complaint. See
Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1310. Thus, they contend that the sec-
ond and third amended complaints do not raise new
issues revitalizing Turner’s right to jury trial.

32 The original plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint states that the addition of the new plaintiffs
was consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Since the new plaintiffs’
claims raise independent causes of action, however, Fed.R.Civ.P.
20(a) controlled the insertion of these parties into the suit.

33 The plaintiffs point to, but do not discuss, three cases in
which new plaintiffs were added after waiver, but, nevertheless,
the right to a jury was not revived. See Commonwealth of Penn. v.

A 43

Underlying the plaintiffs’ resistance to Turner’s jury
demand is their mistaken belief that this case involved
only “one prison civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
This case involved eleven separate actions: ten indepen-
dent damages actions and one class action for injunctive
relief. Each of these actions raised distinct factual issues.
Turner was not “put on notice [as to these claims] by the
original round of pleadings in this case.” Cedars-Sinai
Medical Ctr. v. Revlon, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 24, 30 (D.Del.1986).
All he could have anticipated at the time of his waiver
was that evidence of the incidents underlying the new
plaintiffs’ claims might be presented at trial. Even under
its analysis, the district court erred by striking Turner’s
jury demand.

Turner raises an alternative approach to analyzing
his right to jury trial which determines which issues

Sincavage, 439 F.2d 1133 (3rd Cir.1971); Barr v. Arco Chem. Corp.,
529 F.Supp. 1275 (S.D.Tex. 1982); Ed Brawley, Inc. v. Gaffney, 399
F.Supp. 115 (N.D.Cal.1975). These cases did not involve a jury
demand by a defendant after the joinder of plaintiffs with dis-
tinct claims. Rather, each case involved a jury demand by an
intervening plaintiff. Sincavage, 439 F.2d at 1134 (requiring
plaintiff-intervenor to take case “in the status in which she
found it”); Barr, 529 F.Supp. at 1276 (“new plaintiff merely reas-
serted rights alleged in the original complaint,” and was joined
to correct prior pleadings); Ed Brawley, 399 F.Supp. at 118 (same
rights asserted by original and new plaintiffs). These cases sug-
gest no justification for precluding Turner’s jury demand.

4 The new issues included, at least, (1) whether each
assault actually occurred, (2) the damages stemming from such
assault, (3) the protection afforded to inmates at the time of each
assault, (4) Turner’s deliberate indifference to the unconstitu-
tional condition at the time of each assault, and (5) the causal
nexus between his indifference and the condition.

A 44

must, on remand, be tried before a jury. He observes that
if the new plaintiffs had brought separate suits, an effec-
tive waiver under Rule 38 in one suit would not extend to
the others. Under the district court’s approach, however,
permissive joinder provides a means to bypass a party’s
right to jury trial, thus making this fundamental right
contingent upon the procedural mechanism through
which a claim comes before a trial court. When such
processes are within the sole control of one side of a
dispute - here the plaintiffs - and subject only to the
discretion of the trial court, application of the Federal
Rules cannot extirpate a party’s constitutional right to
jury trial.

In this case, three and one-half years after LaMarca
filed his pro se complaint, and only two months before
trial, Turner demanded a jury trial as to all issues raised
in the new plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs stress these
dates as indicative of the frivolousness of Turner’s posi-
tion. Yet, the plaintiffs created this issue by seeking to
join the new plaintiffs in the heat of trial preparation, and
then insisting that Turner relinquish his right to present
his case to a jury. Turner objected to the joinder of the
new plaintiffs and stressed his intent to demand a jury
trial on all issues raised by the new claims. Nevertheless,
the court permitted joinder of the new claimants, and did
so without preserving Turner’s right to a jury trial.
Turner’s right to a jury trial thus fell victim to the trial
court’s discretionary decision to permit joinder of the
new claimants.*5 Notwithstanding any common thread

35 Richland v. Crandall, 259 F.Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.1966),
illustrates another procedural rule, consolidation, which, if

osc Tete Seals

ay liad. ee Sm

A 45

that may have existed between the original and amended
complaints, even if to a “sickening proportion,” LaMarca,
662 F.Supp. at 653, we cannot sanction such a result. We

improperly applied in the Rule 38 context, can be used by
bypass a party’s Seventh Amendment right. In Richland,
shareholders brought four suits derivatively, individually, and
as class actions, against 20 defendants (officers, directors, and
corporations) for violations of the Securities Exchange Act.
Before consolidation, at least one of the 20 defendants had
answered three of the four complaints. Id. at 281 & n. 9. The
plaintiffs filed a demand for a jury trial within 10 days of service
of the answers to the consolidated complaint by some of the
defendants. The defendants in Richland argued that by not
making a timely demand for a jury trial after the early answers
to the original complaints, the plaintiffs waived their right to a
jury as to the issues presented in each of the four original
complaints. The court, however, observed that the
“[djefendants ignore[d] the fact that the defendants who
answered some of the [original complaints . . . constitute[{d] only
3 out of the 20 parties named as defendants in one or more of the
underlying complaints and in the consolidated complaint, and
that the issue was not joined as to the other 17 defendants until
[the answers to the consolidated complaint had been filed].” Id.
at 28.

The distinction noted by the Richland court is critical. Even
though all claims involved the same transaction and there was
substantial similarity of issues, the plaintiffs’ Rule 38 jury
demand was timely as to the claims by the 17 defendants who
had not answered the original complaints.

We find the Richland court's analysis persuasive. The only
relevant distinction between Richland and this case is the
procedural mechanism through which the independent claims
were joined; in Richland separate suits were filed and then
consolidated; in the instant case, plaintiffs sought and obtained
leave to join new parties with independent claims.

A 46

hold, therefore, that Turner was entitled to a jury trial as
to the new plaintiffs’ claims.*

B.

Turner argues that his right to jury trial as to the new
plaintiffs’ claims trumps his waiver as to common issues
raised by the original plaintiffs’ claims,*” see In re Kaiser
Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380, 388 (10th Cir.1990) (holding, in
case with multiple parties, that waiver of common issue
does not occur until ten days following the last pleading
by any party), and therefore that he is entitled to a jury as
to all claims. Turner concedes, however, that he know-
ingly waived his right to a jury as to the original plain-
tiffs’ claims. Without a constitutional underpinning upon
which to rest, Turner must demonstrate that the district
court erred in its application of Rule 38 and that he was
harmed by this error. Cf. id., (holding amendments to
pleadings do not revive the right to jury trial as to issues
already framed). Because he has not done so, Turner’s
initial waiver as to the original plaintiffs’ claims remains
effective.

%¢ The plaintiffs’ assertion that the original class action suit
for injunctive relief incorporated the potential claims of the new
plaintiffs is patently meritless.

37 Consistent with his other arguments, Turner maintains
that the original and new plaintiffs’ claims have few, and per-
haps only one, common issue: “whether the prison conditions
during the time frame relevant to their claims were in violation
of the 8th and 14th Amendments.”

Se

- ———=—) . - i-

A 47

V.

Turner next appeals (1) the district court's refusal to
continue the December 2, 1985 trial; (2) the court’s refusal
following the trial to consider, as part of the trial record,
several depositions taken during and shortly after the
trial; and (3) the court’s refusal to reopen the record of
the trial to receive some additional evidence Turner
obtained while the first appeal (of the damages awards)
was pending in this court. We review these rulings for
abuse of discretion. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Breslin,
332 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir.1964).

As indicated earlier, after the plaintiffs filed their
second amended complaint (which added seven plaintiffs
to the case) on August 26, 1985, the defendants moved for
a continuance of the trial which had been set for Novem-
ber 4, 1985. The district court granted their motion on
November 10, continuing the trial until December 2. The
defendants wanted more time for discovery and to pre-
pare for trial; we cannot say, however, that the court
abused its discretion in giving them the extra time allot-
ted. See Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & Assocs., 785 F.2d
877, 881-82 (11th Cir.1986); Menendez v. Perishable Dis-
tribs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir.1985).38

38 We reach this result even though the record indicates that the
plaintiffs erroneously represented to the court that they were “ready
for trial.” In fact, their own expert witnesses were unprepared at the
time of the December 2, 1985 trial. Dr. Swanson, for instance, admit-
ted on cross-examination that he bypassed potentially relevant
sources of information because of severe time pressures. The district
court postponed consideration of the injunction claim because Dr.
Swanson was not fully prepared.

A 48

The defendants renewed their motion for a continu-
ance on November 13, stating that they would not be able
to complete their discovery by the scheduled trial date.
According to the defendants, they needed to depose sev-
eral witnesses who had been identified by the new plain-
tiffs when the defendants took their depositions.
Whatever may have been the defendants’ need for a
continuance at that time, the need increased when, as the
trial was about to begin, the district court gave the plain-
tiffs leave to file their third amended complaint adding
Billy Joe Harper’s damages claim.

Believing that Harper’s claim raised no new issues,
and thus created no need for additional discovery, the
district court refused to grant a continuance. The court's
belief was unfounded; Harper’s claim raised several new
issues requiring discovery. See supra note 34. After the
trial began, the magistrate judge apparently had second
thoughts about the defendants’ need for a continuance;
he permitted them to take discovery depositions both
during and after the trial with the understanding that

The plaintiffs’ counsel further skewed the court’s percep-
tion of the defendants’ discovery problems by representing to
the court that certain witnesses identified by the new plaintiffs
in their depositions were not “actual” witnesses whom Turner
might require time to contact. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that “I
[have] never seen a deposition taken, particularly prisoners, [in
an] inmate setting, where a deponent does not offer under
skilled examination, such as defendants’ counsel, a name of
somebody that was a potential witness to an incident, a name of
ani alleged perpetrator, a name of somebody in the next cell who
may have heard or seen [something].” (It seems apparent that
Turner’s counsel placed more stock in the credibility of the
prisoners’ stories than plaintiffs’ counsel did.)

J ee Oe

A 49

these depositions could be made a part of the trial record
at a later date. The defendants accepted this arrangement,
evidently believing that it would eliminate any prejudice
the denial of the continuance otherwise might have occa-
sioned. Given this acceptance by the defendants, we find
that the defendants effectively waived their objection to
the December 2 trial date.

The trial of the damages claims against Turner ended
on December 16, 1985. That day, the magistrate judge
instructed counsel to file their proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law by December 23, and scheduled
oral argument for December 27. Oral argument was held
that day, and the magistrate judge indicated in his report
to the district court that he would find for the plaintiffs.
On January 8, 1986, the plaintiffs moved the magistrate
judge to exclude from the record seven depositions that
defendants had taken with the permission of the plain-
tiffs and the court. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the
depositions should be excluded because the defendants
had denied counsel access to the deponents’ prison
records and thus a meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses. The magistrate judge granted the
motion, and the district court, after considering the mag-
istrate judge’s report and recommendation, affirmed.

In his brief to us, Turner does not explain how the
exclusion of the seven depositions from the record preju-
diced his case. Accordingly, Turner has shown no abuse
of discretion.

Finally, while the district court's disposition of the
plaintiffs’ damages claims was before us on appeal,

A 50

Turner’s counsel searched for evidence to rebut Dr. Swan-
son’s testimony as to the conditions prevailing at GCI
during Turner’s tenure.*?7They uncovered documentary
evidence, that Turner represents, undermines the court's
findings.*° After we dismissed the first appeal and
returned the case to the district court, Turner moved the
court to “reopen” the record of the damages trial and
consider the new evidence. The court, believing that it
lacked jurisdiction to do so, refused.*!

** The court’s extensive reliance on Dr. Swanson’s testi-
mony demonstrates the importance of this witness. Yet, Dr.
Swanson did not begin his investigation until after October 4,
1985, and did not complete his interviews with the plaintiffs
until December 1, 1985, the day before the damages trial began.

4° Turner described this evidence, in part, as more than 100
investigations were undertaken from 1980-84 . . . in respect to
sexual assaults, non-sexual assaults and batteries, possession of
weapons, possession of drugs or alcohol and introduction of
contraband; they reflect that, in virtually all instances, the Palm
Beach County Sheriff’s office was involved in the investiga-
tions; that prosecutions were undertaken; that, in respect to
alleged sexual assault, rape kit tests were administered when
appropriate; that there was an established procedure for investi-
gation and handling of such claims.

41 The court stated that

[i]f this Court’s order was incorrect earlier in that
respect in that we denied motions for continuance,
and I think there was perhaps more than one of these,
why, it seems to me .. . that I may not have jurisdic-
tion at this time since an appeal has been taken.
[Counsel for Turner] asserts that we still do, and per-
haps he is right, but it seems to me it is better to go
ahead and stick with that earlier ruling, and let the
appellate court review that point as well as this order
which I am now making denying the motion. . . .

> (ibe

A 51

The district court plainly had the authority to reopen
the record and to consider the new evidence. The court
had such authority at least until, on October 6, 1990,
when it entered the final judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 59;
S.D.Fla.Magis.R. 4(b) (A district court is free to “receive
further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter
to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.”); La Fever, Inc.
v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 571 F.2d 1367, 1368 (5th Cir.1978).
Prior to the entry of judgment (and the denial of the
defendants’ motion for a new trial), the court had the
power to revisit the entire case.

Since we remand the damages claims of the new
plaintiffs for trial before a jury, the district court’s action
in refusing to consider the new evidence only affects the
claims brought by LaMarca, Saunders, and Johnson.
Because the court might have considered Turner’s new
evidence, had it thought it had the power to do so, we
instruct the court to consider Turner’s proffer. We inti-
mate no view, however, as to whether the court should
accept it and reopen the proceedings as to these three
plaintiffs.

VI.

Turner retained the right to trial by jury as to the new
plaintiffs’ claims. We therefore vacate the money judg-
ments for Durrance, Cobb, Bronson, Aldred, and Harper,
and remand their claims for a new trial. We remand the
judgments favoring LaMarca, Johnson, and Saunders for
reconsideration in light of our discussions in parts II and
V. We remand the court’s grant of injunctive relief for

A 52

further preceedings consistent with part III of our opin-

ion. Finally, in light of these holdings, we must vacate the
court’s attorneys’ fees award.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

A 53

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
——_—_——— FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 90-F°09

District Court No. 82-8196-CIV

ANTHONY LaMARCA, MARTIN SAUNDERS and

EDWIN JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated, and DAVID ALDRED,

STEVE H. BRONSON, JR., EDDIE COBB, RON

DURRANCE, WAYNE EPPRECHT, MICHAEL “a
GORDON and BILLY JOE HARPER, individually,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

R. V. TURNER, individually in his former capacity
as Superintendent of Glades Correctional
Institution, CHESTER LAMBDIN, in his official
capacity as Superintendent of Glades Correctional
Institution,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit Judge,
and WILLIAMS*, Senior Circuit Judge.

* Honorable Jerre S. Williams, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

A 54

JUDGMENT
(Filed July 7, 1993)

This cause came to be heard on the transcript of the
record from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel;

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now
hereby ordered and adjudged by this Court that the

money judgments of the said District Court in this cause
be and the same are hereby VACATED and REMANDED

- to said District Court for a new trial as to plaintiffs

Durrance, Cobb, Bronson, Aldred and Harper; the judg-
ments favoring plaintiffs LaMarca, Johnson and Saunders
are hereby REMANDED for reconsideration in accor-
dance with part II and V of this Court’s opinion; the
District Court’s grant of injunctive relief as to defendant
Lambdin is hereby REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with Part III of this Court’s opinion; the award
of attorneys’ fees is hereby VACATED, in accordance
with the opinion of this Court.

Enterid: fuly 7, 1993
For the Cewr:: Miguel J. Cortez, Clerk

By: Karleen Illegible
Deputy Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE: NOV 10 1993

oe At

A 55

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CQ.!RT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLOXIDA

CASE NO. 82-8196-Civ-PAINE

ANTHONY LA MARCA,

et al., ORDER
V. (Filed

R. V. TURNER, et al. Nov. 25, 1985)

/

For reasons recited in open Court, it was ORDERED
as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to file a Third Amended Com-
plaint is GRANTED nunc pro tunc November 14, 1985.
The Court makes no present ruling, however, regarding
the recoverability of attorneys’ fees or the presence of the
State of Florida as a Defendant for that purpose.

2. Defendants’ Jury-Demand is DENIED. The
Motion for further Continuance of Trial is DENIED, with-
out prejudice. Upon their Motion to Strike, the Court
RESERVES. The parties are cautioned that the Court
expects that any expert witness will have been made
available for deposition before that expert’s testimony is
tendered to the Court. If there is any issue upon which
Defendants require a brief adjournment after the court
has begun the frial next week, their right to adjournment
can be further considered at that time.

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ORDERED in Miami, Florida, November 25, 1985.

/s/ Peter L. Nimkoff
PETER L. NIMKOFF
UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE

Copies:
Walter M. MegInnis, Esq.
David M. Lipman, Esq.
William M. Amlong, Esq.
Michael B. Davis, Esq.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 82-8196-CIV-PAINE

ANTHONY LAMARCA, MARTIN

SAUNDERS, and EDWIN

JOHNSON, individually and on ORDER
behalf of all others similarly

situated, and DAVID ALDRED,

STEVE H. BRONSON, JR., EDDIE

COBB, RON DURRANCE, WAYNE

EPPRECHT, MICHAEL GORDON,

and BILLY JOE HARPER,

Plaintiffs,
V.
R. V. TURNER, Individually, and
RANDALL MUSIC, as

Superintendent of Glades
Correctional Institution,

Defendants.

/

This cause is before the Court on the Appeal from
Magistrate’s Order and Petition For Emergency Hearing
filed by the Defendants R. V. TURNER, RANDALL
MUSIC and the State of Florida. The Court has also
received the Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Appeal
from Magistrate’s Order and Petition for Emergency
Hearing.

The Court has read and considered these submissions
of counsel with respect to the ruling made by Magistrate
Nimkoff on November 25, 1985. It appears that the ruling

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is not clearly erroneous. The Magistrate adequately con-
sidered the issues and his ruling is therefore AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Appeal from
Magistrate’s Order and Petition for Emergency Hearing is
DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of December,
1985, in Miami, Florida.

/s/ James C. Paine
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
JAMES C. PAINE

cc: All counsel of record

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Anthony LaMARCA, Martin Saunders, and
Edwin Johnson, individually and on behalf of
all others Similarly situated, and David
Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb, Ron
Durrance, Wayne Epprecht, Michael Gordon,
and Billy Joe Harper, individually, Plaintiffs,

V.

R. V. TURNER, individually in his former offi-

cial capacity as Superintendent of Glades Cor-

rectional Institution, Chester Lambdin, in his

official capacity as Superintendent of Glades

Correctional Institution, and the State of
Florida, Defendants.

No. 82-8196-Civ.
United States District Court,
S.D. Florida.

June 4, 1987.

David M. Lipman and Robert E. Weisberg, of Lipman
& Weisberg, Miami, Fla., and William Amlong of Hall &
Amlong, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Walter M. Meginniss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee,
Fla., and Michael B. Davis, of Davis, Critton, Hoy &
Diamond, West Palm Beach, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF MAGISTRATE

PAINE, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on the report and
recommendation of the Magistrate (DE 128), defendants’

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amended response and objections (DE 155), and plain-
tiffs’ reply (DE 170). The court has studied these submis-
sions and has reviewed the voluminous transcripts,
exhibits, and other materials in the case file as well as the
relevant authorities. Now being fully advised, the court
renders the following memorandum and order.

I.
BACKGROUND

This class action for damages and injunctive relief
was brought by inmates who claim that their federal
constitutional rights were violated when they were gang
raped or otherwise assaulted while incarcerated at the
Glades Correctional Institution (GCI), a state prison in
Belle Glade, Florida. The procedural history of the case is
set out at length by the Magistrate. Briefly, this litigation
was commenced on May 14, 1982 with the handwritten
pro se complaint of Anthony LaMarca, who alleged that
he was subjected to ongoing physical violence and
harassment by other GCI inmates because he refused to
participate in homosexual activity and that prison offi-
cials failed to act to alleviate the situation (DE 1). As the
lawsuit continued, counsel was obtained and the com-
plaint was amended several times (DE 23, 62, 93, 129,
131). On April 13, 1984, the undersigned district judge
ordered that for purposes of injunctive relief the case
proceed as a class action defined as those persons within
the Florida prison system who are or will be incarcerated
at GCI (DE 47).

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The third amended complaint contains claims for
damages by ten inmates. Named plaintiffs LaMarca, Sau-
nders and Johnson also seek equitable remedies on behalf
of the class. Defendant Turner is sued in his individual!
capacity as former superintendent of GCI. Defendant
Lambdin, the current superintendent, is sued solely in his
official capacity for purposes of injunctive and equitable
relief (DE 129). The State of Florida is a defendant for
purposes of attorneys’ fees and expenses.

The district court referred the case to United States
Magistrate Peter Nimkoff for a report and recommenda-
tion pursuant to Magistrate Rule 1(f) of the Local Rules of
the Southern District of Florida. The Magistrate con-
ducted two weeks of evidentiary hearings, reviewed
deposition testimony and numerous exhibits, and heard
oral argument. The Magistrate then filed a 135-page
report and recommendation containing findings of fact
and conclusions of law (DE 128) which found Turner
liable to the ten named plaintiffs in the aggregate amount
of $201,500 and recommended the creation of two com-

mittees to assist the court in formulating specific injunc-
tive relief.

Defendants filed extensive objections to the Magis-
trate’s report in accordance with Local Magistrate Rule
4(b) (DE 155). Defendants dispute the Magistrate’s failure
to grant a continuance, to grant a jury trial, and to recuse
himself from the proceedings, and also lodge numerous
objections to specific findings of fact and conclusions of

law. Plaintiffs submitted an equally extensive reply (DE
170).

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’s review of the Magistrate’s findings and
recommendations is governed by a de novo standard:

A District Judge shall make a de novo deter-
mination of those portions of the report or speci-
fied proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made and may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the Magistrate. The
District Judge, however, need conduct a new
hearing only in his discretion or where required
by law, and may consider the record developed
before the Magistrate, making his own deter-
mination of the basis of that record. The District
Judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, or recommit the matter to the Magis-
trate with instructions.

Magistrate Rule 4(b), Local Rules of the Southern District
of Florida; accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).

The Supreme Court has held that, in providing for a
de novo “determination” rather than a de novo hearing,
“Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district
judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose
to place on a Magistrate’s proposed findings and recom-
mendations.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676,
100 S.Ct. 2406, 2413, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The former
Fifth Circuit has held that, in situations involving the
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, a district
court should not enter an order inconsistent with the
Magistrate’s credibility determinations without person-
ally hearing the live testimony of the witnesses whose
testimony is determinative. Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d

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1105, 1109 (5th Cir.1980).1 Although the Louis court
expressly limited its holding to criminal cases, see id. n. 3,
the exercise of sound judicial discretion compels this
court to extend substantial deference to the Magistrate’s
credibility choices absent counterveiling considerations.
In a criminal case which preceded Louis, the Fifth Circuit
stated:

In our view it would be a rare case in which a
district judge could resolve credibility choices
contrary to the recommendations of the magis-
trate without himself having had an opportunity
to see and hear the witnesses testify. Certainly,
in such a rare case there should be found in the
transcript an articulable basis for rejecting the
magistrate’s original resolution of credibility
and that basis should be articulated by the dis-
trict judge.

United States v. Marshall, 609 F.2d 152, 155 (Sth Cir.1980).

Il.
FAILURE TO GRANT JURY TRIAL

Defendants first object to the Magistrate’s failure to
grant a jury trial. The Magistrate found that defendants
waived that right by failing to make a demand within ten
days of November 2, 1983, when they filed an answer to
the first amended complaint (DE 23, 41). Defendants first
demanded a jury trial on November 8, 1985, over two

' Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit filed prior to October
1, 1981 constitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en
banc).

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years later, in response to the second amended complaint
(DE 62, 69, 83). Following the Magistrate’s denial of a jury
trial (DE 105), defendants filed an emergency appeal with
the district court (DE 104), which the undersigned denied
(DE 112).

Defendants again argue that the second and third
amended complaints introduced new issues into the law-
suit which merited a jury trial and that therefore their
demand was timely. As the Magistrate correctly con-
cluded, the right to jury trial is waived by a failure to
make a demand within ten days of the “last pleading
directed to such issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b). If the original
pleadings effectively waive jury trial, the right cannot be
revived by amending the original pleadings. Walton v.
Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir.1977). A jury trial may
be demanded, however, for any “new issues” in the
amended pleadings. Amendments not introducing new
issues do not give rise to a demand for jury trial. Guajardo
v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir.1978).2

What constitutes a “new issue” is the bone of conten-
tion. The court’s review of the law on this subject has
yielded less than clear results. The former Fifth Circuit
has said that “[t]he term ‘new issues’ has been inter-
preted to mean new issues of fact and not new theories of
recovery.” Id. at 753. Notwithstanding, not every new fact
question has been held to give rise to a jury trial. For

2 Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b) permits a court in its discre-
tion to grant a jury trial after the period for a timely demand has
run, defendants insist that they were entitled to a jury trial as of
right and that therefore a Rule 39(b) analysis is inappropriate
(DE 155, at 5).

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example, in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F2d 1277 (2d
Cir.1973) (en banc), a securities case, the court held that a
claim for punitive damages and an allegation of willful-
ness were not new issues within the meaning of Rule 38:

The willfulness and falsity as of a particular
date merely clarified “the same general issues”
raised in the original complaint. Moore v. United
States, 196 F.2d 906, 908 (5th Cir.1952). Kircher
had been put on notice of the underlying facts and
basic legal theory — fraud — upon which plaintiffs
sought relief, and the character of the suit was in
no way changed by the amendments.

Id. at 1310 (emphasis added). One district court has artic-
ulated the following standard:

The test to be employed by a court in ruling ona
motion to strike a jury demand is whether the
“new issues” alleged in the amendments
“touch , . . the same general issues” raised by the
original pleadings, Roth v. Hyer, 142 F.2d 227,
228 (5th Cir.1944), or whether the issues con-
tained in the amended complaints “were in any
material way different from those presented by
the original [complaint].” Connecticut General
Life Insurance Co. v. Breslin, 332 F.2d 928, 931 (5th
Cir.1964).

Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources
Corp., 96 F.R.D. 564, 565 (S.D.Tex.1983) (emphasis added).

In this case, the second and third amended com-
plaints introduced claims for damages by seven new
plaintiffs. As defendants contend, each of these claims
requires proof as to whether the alleged incidents
occurred, whether the evidence establishes a causal con-
nection with defendants’ conduct, and whether damages

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have been sustained. All of these questions raise “new”
factual issues in the plainest sense of the word.

The peculiar circumstances of this case, however,
suggest a contrary result. First, the record of the evidenti-
ary hearings conducte« by the Magistrate provides the
court with 20/20 hindsigh? 5n the nature and materiality
of the new factual issues. Second, a class action posture
requires that the plaintiffs raise common questions of fact.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Of particular relevance is the testi-
mony of the named plaintiffs and of Dr. Richard M.
Swanson, plaintiffs’ expert witness in the field of correc-
tional psychology. Considered as a whole, this evidence
shows that plaintiffs’ claims possess a factual congruity
of sickening proportion. Their stories are strikingly simi-
lar, reflecting common experiences of harassment,
threats, attack, official indifference, and resulting dam-
age. The similarity of the factual questions is particularly
apparent in the court’s analysis of the causal connection
between Turner’s acts or omissions and plaintiffs’ claims.
See, infra at 681-682.

Thus, the issues raised by the seven new plaintiffs in
the second amended complaint “touch . . . the same
general issues” raised in the first amended complaint,
Roth v. Hyer, 142 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir.1944), and are not
materially different from the original issues, see Connecti-
cut General Life Insurance Co. v. Breslin, 332 F.2d 928, 931
(5th Cir.1964); see also Reading & Bates, 96 F.R.D. at 565.
The first amended complaint put defendants “on notice
of the underlying facts and basic legal theory . . . upon
which plaintiffs sought relief, and the character of the
suit was in no way changed by the amendments.” Lanza,
479 F.2d at 1310. Having failed timely to demand a jury

|

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trial in response to the first amended complaint, defen-
dants effectively waived their right to such a trial, and
their objection is overruled.

IV.
FAILURE TO GRANT CONTINUANCE

Defendants next object to the Magistrate’s failure to
grant a continuance of the evidentiary hearings. This
court has previously denied defendants’ emergency
appeal of the Magistrate’s ruling (DE 104, 112).

Orders concerning the conduct of a trial, such as
continuances, “are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of
the trial court” and “will not be disturbed except upon a
showing of abuse of discretion, and then only upon a
showing that such abuse of discretion resulted in sub-
stantial harm to the parties seeking relief.” Edward Leasing
Corp. v. Uhlig & Associates, Inc., 785 F.2d 877, 881-82 (11th
Cir.1986).

Defendants principally assert that they were not pre-
pared to defend against the damage claims because cir-
cumstances forced them to depose the seven new
plaintiffs as well as plaintiffs’ expert witnesses at the last
minute. Further, defendants contend that these deposi-
tions revealed the names of new witnesses with knowl-
edge of plaintiffs’ claims but defendants had no
opportunity to depose them.

The court is not persuaded that these circumstances
justify a continuance. Defendants had already been
granted one continuance from November 4, 1985 to a
special setting on December 2, 1985. In that order the

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Magistrate pointed out that defendants had had notice of
the claims of the seven new plaintiffs at least since Sep-
tember 1 (DE 80). While it is true that discovery contin-
ued after the evidentiary hearings had begun, such a
schedule does not appear to have dampened the energy
and enthusiasm of competent counsel for both sides.
Defendants were able to depose the seven new plaintiffs
on November 13-15. Defendants do not explain, however,
why this accelerated discovery schedule precluded them
from deposing the newly-revealed witnesses before or
after the commencement of trial on December 2, partic-
ularly considering that these new witnesses appear to be
prisoners in defendants’ custody. Defendants’ assertion
that they were unprepared to try this case, moreover, is
belied by their effective crossexamination of plaintiffs’
witnesses. Most important, defendants have demon-
strated no actual prejudice. Accordingly, defendants’
objection to the Magistrate’s failure to continue the trial is
overruled.

V.
FAILURE OF MAGISTRATE TO ENTER RECUSAL

During the testimony of Dr. Swanson, defendants
first became aware that the Magistrate had visited GCI in
the early stages of this litigation. Judge Nimkoff told
counsel that in 1982 he had conducted an informal hear-
ing of LaMarca’s claim, as was often his custom in pris-

oner cases. Also present at the unrecorded proceeding
were Joe Belitsky of the Attorney General’s Office, repre-
senting the State, and GCI Assistant Superintendent
Arline. LaMarca related to the court his concern for other

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inmates who had been abused. Belitsky and Arline
assured the Magistrate that a full investigation would
take place. No such inquiry ever occurred, and Turner
testified that he was unaware that these assurances were
made to the court (DE 128, at 30-31). At trial defendants
requested Judge Nimkoff to recuse himself, but the Mag-
istrate denied that he would become a witness in the suit
and accordingly refused the request.

Se eile! Deed

A judicial officer is required to disqualify himself in a
proceeding in which he has personal knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1)(a) and (d)(iv); 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1982). Defendants argue that the Magistrate
relied upon these events as evidence establishing either
Turner’s knowledge of alleged conditions at GCI or his
failure to act on those conditions after he he [sic] was put

on notice.

As defendants point out, the 1982 proceedings con-
ducted at GCI were nonrecord, and no witness testified
concerning the Magistrate’s recollection of the events.
Notwithstanding, knowledge acquired by a judge while
he performs judicial duties does not constitute grounds
for disqualification. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966).
Where it is alleged that a judge has personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning a proceeding
such that he should recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 455, the information or knowledge must stem from an
extrajudicial source to warrant disqualification. United
States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 916, 102 S.Ct. 1771, 72 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982). Judge
Nimkoff’s 1982 visit to GCI was undisputedly conducted

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as part of the instant proceeding and occurred in the
presence of counsel for the State. See United States v. State
of Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020, 1093-97 (W.D.Wash.1978),
aff'd, 645 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.1981). Defendants, moreover,
conceivably could have called Belitsky or Arline to testify
to their memory of the proceeding.

Defendants finally argue that the Magistrate was
inclined to rely on the 1982 hearing as evidence tending
to establish notice to Turner or Turner’s failure to act. The
transcripts disclose that the Magistrate asked questions of
several witnesses regarding that hearing. In his report
and recommendation, however, the Magistrate states that
those events serve “merely to underscore Plaintiffs’ posi-
tion that GCI, under the Turner administration, was an
institution not under the control of that Defendant” (DE
128, at 31). Thus, the Magistrate did not accord those
events with dispositive weight. Cf. State of Washington,
459 F.Supp. at 1095. In any event, disregarding the
account of the 1982 hearing, the record contains more
than enough evidence to support the Magistrate’s find-
ings and conclusions regarding Turner’s control of GCI.
The objection is overruled.

VI.
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT

The court next will address in turn each of defen-
dants’ objections to the Magistrate’s findings of fact and
will analyze their significance to the overall disposition
of the case. The numbers preceding each paragraph corre-
spond to the paragraph numbering in the report and
recommendation.

Raed ae ee retlri Fn Ske

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{1 31. As plaintiffs concede, defendants’ objection
should be sustained. Turner was superintendent of GCI
from mid-1976 to his retirement on July 31, 1984.

{ 32. The racial breakdown of the GCI inmate popu-
lation in 1985 is somewhat relevant to the issue of injunc-
tive relief. The Magistrate’s finding that approximately
sixty percent of the population was Black and the remain-
der White or Hispanic is generally supported by the
evidence which concededly was not the most competent
proof. Although the documentary evidence contains no
support for the conclusion that the figure for Whites
included Hispanics, there was testimony to that effect.
Objection overruled.

{ 33. Although defendants are correct that Music
estimated the Hispanic population at seven percent
(Music, DE 160, at 133), the evidence supports the infer-
ence that that percentage may have been higher at times.
Defendants also contest the definition of “close custody”
prisoners; however, the Magistrate did not define the
term. Objection sustained in part and overruled in part;
the Magistrate’s finding is modified accordingly.

1 36. Defendants protest the Magistrate’s overall
characterization of factors present at GCI such as “whole-
sale manufacture of prison wine,” “regular screenings of
sexually explicit videotapes,” and “maintenance of an ill-
assorted guard corps whose members the inmates per-
ceived as regularly trafficking-in contraband, extortion
and neglect.” Defendants admit that instances of these
factors appear in the record but far less frequently than
the Magistrate implied. The record supports findings that
prison wine was prevalent at GCI, that sexually-explicit

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films were shown, and that many of the guards were
perceived as corrupt or at least neglectful. Although the
Magistrate’s language is somewhat hyperbolic, the objec-
tion is overruled.

{ 38-39. Defendants argue that the Magistrate
implied that Turner was aware of all of the conditions at
GCI relating to plaintiffs’ claims and that two letters
Turner wrote to Louie L. Wainwright, secretary of the
Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), constitute
admissions of GCI’s unsafeness. It is apparent from the
letters in evidence, however, that Turner’s comments
must be viewed in the context of his reporting a staffing
shortage to his superior. Objection overruled.

Defendants make much of the relevance to this litiga-
tion of the accreditation of prisons and GCI in particular
by the American Correctional Association. The Magis-
trate found that the GCI accreditation had “virtually no
significance” to this lawsuit because accredited prisons
have been found unconstitutional by courts. Having con-
sidered the GCI accreditation along with the remainder of
the evidence, the undersigned district court finds it of
marginal relevance in this case. Objection overruled.

q 40. On January 30, 1980, the Palm Beach County
Grand Jury issued a presentment regarding conditions at
GCI (Pltf.ex. 4). Although the investigation was appar-
ently provoked by shortages in meat supply, other secu-
rity issues were addressed. Defendants’ objection to the
report’s admissibility in evidence on the ground of hear-
say is overruled pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C) and is
also overruled on the basis of relevance because the
report is germane at least to the question of notice to
Turner.

toe entateenitelagy

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Defendants again complain about the Magistrate’s
use of the phrase “a free flow of contraband.” The grand
jury heard testimony of lax security at GCI as well as
“many allegations and accusations of drugs, alcohol, and
other contraband, gambling, theft, confiscation, and pay-
offs among the inmates and personnel of GCI.” The
report stated that alcohol use and its manufacture was
apparently “prevalent.” Pltf.ex. 4, at 6. That such contra-
band was freely flowing at GCI is a reasonable construc-
tion of the grand jury’s findings, and the objection is
overruled.

142. On August 26-29, 1980, the DOC Office of the
Inspector General issued a report on its management
review of GCI (pltf.ex. 4). Among other things, the report
noted a serious lack of supervision on the compound due
to staffing shortages. The Magistrate simply cited this
portion of the report and did not seem to hold Turner
personally responsible for staff shortages. Accordingly,
the objection is overruled.

144. Defendants dispute the magistrate’s finding of
low morale among GCI staff. The district court believes
the record contains sufficient evidence to support this
finding. This evidence includes an employee question-
naire which reflected that staff members felt that on-job
training and the number of available staff were inade-
quate as well as the various witnesses’ perception of staff
apathy. Objection overruled.

1 45. The Office of the Inspection General issued a
second GCI management report approximately three
years later, on September 19-21, 1983 (pltf.ex. 6). The
management report supports the Magistrate’s finding of

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some laxity in security, which included improper control
and supervision of inmate movement from one location
to another and inadequate staffing of the perimeter posts
(id. at 8-9). Objection overruled.

Wi 46-50. The Magistrate found that the use of
excessive force by Lieutenant William Barrett when he
was acting chief correctional officer at GCI was relevant
to Turner’s management of GCI. In brief, Barrett was
summoned from a local festival in Belle Glade to the
prison after a fight broke out in a dormitory. Barrett was
accompanied by Sergeant Rickey Hayes and Lieutenant
L.A. Peters, GCI’s internal inspector. All three had been
drinking. Barrett and Hayes had their faces made up like
clowns. Although the incident had been largely quelled,
Barrett took a loaded shotgun into the compound and
used it to beat several inmates in the back of the head.

As plaintiffs emphasize, the Barrett incident is rele-
vant not as a showing of improper use of force but as an
illustration of Turner’s reaction to the situation. The inci-
dent report of the Office of the Inspector General states
that on the night of the incident Turner advised Barrett to
go home and rest and that Turner did not feel the situa-
tion warranted notification of a prison inspector (pltf.ex.
9, at 5). Defendants are correct to add that Turner eventu-
ally notified the inspector general, who sent a team to
GCI within three days of the incident (Swanson, DE 117,
at 213-14). Swanson criticized Turner for not immediately
suspending Barrett and taking away his gun and badge
rather than merely telling him to go home and rest.
Significantly, defendants do not object to the Magistrate’s

finding at J 49 that Barrett remained functioning as a

te OE alt all .

A 75

correctional officer for at least a full week after the inci-
dent. It is clear that the Magistrate did not attribute
undue weight to the Barrett incident. Objection over-
ruled.

The Magistrate also related Swanson’s testimony con-
cerning the transcript of Turner’s interview with one of
Barrett’s victims (pltf.ex. 9, subex. 13). The Magistrate
quoted Swanson’s testimony that the inmate’s reporting
of wine-drinking among the prisoners did not appear to
surprise Turner. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the
district court does not believe that the Magistrate found
that Turner “failed to register appropriate outrage” at this
revelation. The Magistrate simply quoted Swanson’s
opinion in a footnote and did not comment on it in any
way. Objection overruled.

W7 51-52. Defendants also challenge as irrelevant
the magistrate’s findings regarding the investigation? and
eventual dismissal and arrest of GCI correctional officer
Clarence Dixon. As defendants note, Turner did testify
that, although the investigation was hindered by several
obstacles, he ordered it to continue. Turner’s persistence,
however, does not negate the Magistrate’s finding that if
Dixon's employment application had been properly
screened he probably would not have been hired at al

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386002_1040%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
